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Taiwan Communiqué Published By: Formosan Association for Public Affairs 552 7Th St Taiwan Communiqué Published by: Formosan Association for Public Affairs 552 7th St. SE, Washington, D.C. 20003 Tel. (202) 547-3686 International edition, May / June 2011 Published 5 times a year 132 ISSN number: 1027-3999 Gearing up for presidential elections Tsai Ing-wen is the DPP nominee During the past few weeks, Taiwan has started to get into gear for the 2012 elections. On 19 April 2011 the Central Election Commission decided that the Legislative Yuan elections (originally slated for December 2011) and the Presidential elections (originally slated for March 2012) would be combined and held on Saturday 14 January 2012. A few days later, on 27 April 2011, the DPP announced that Tsai Ing-wen was the winner in its primary process, beating out former Prime Photo: Democratic Progressive Party Minister Su Tseng-chang. The nomination was formally confirmed by the DPP’s Central Stand- ing Committee on 4 May 2011. At the same time, the Kuomintang announced that incumbent President Ma Ying-jeou would be its candidate. Some analysis and commentary: Combining the presidential and legislative elections A heated debate erupted in Taiwan about the reasons for combining the elections. Many commentators indicate that this executive deci- sion was made because president Ma felt it was to his advantage to have the legislative and presidential elections coincide: his popularity is DPP Chair Tsai Ing-wen becomes relatively low (around 33% in most opinion presidential candidate Taiwan Communiqué -2- May / June 2011 polls) and by combining the elections he hopes to be able to ride the coattails of popular local candidates. However, in many districts, particularly in the South, the local candidates see Ma as a risk, and want to distance themselves from the president. Another effect of combining the elections is that it increases the turnout, and a higher turnout has traditionally been good for the ruling Kuomintang: people who would otherwise stay home and not vote for the president come out, vote for their local candidate, and then they might as well cast their vote for the president. A second issue in moving the presidential vote from March to January is that it significantly lengthens the transition period, since the inauguration date is consti- tutionally fixed on May 20th. Many observers are asking what will happen during this long transition period, particularly if the DPP wins. Will some right-wing elements in the old Kuomintang create unrest or organize demonstrations against the new government? And what will China do under those circumstances? Will it act rationally, or will it create unrest or tension? Will the elections be fair? A continuing issue is also the fairness of the elections. While the vote counting by the Central Election Commission is generally considered to be fair and non-partisan, a number of other factors do tilt the playing field in favor of the ruling Kuomintang party. One major factor is money. The Kuomintang is reportedly the richest political party in the world, reaping the benefits from many companies and enterprises it has owned since it came from China in 1945-49. Major amounts of funds are channeled to the local levels, where they are used by local KMT officials to influence the vote. A second factor are the Taishang, Taiwanese businessmen in China who have benefitted from the KMT’s China-leaning policies. They are induced to fly back to Taiwan and cast their vote for the ruling party. Some observers suggest that the new date of the combined elections, one week before Lunar New Year, was specifically chosen to facilitate the vote of the businessmen, who would be returning home for the New Year. A third factor is related to control of the press. While Taiwan’s media do show a reasonably wide spread across the political spectrum, the major publications such as the China Times and United Daily News are very much in the pocket of the ruling Kuomintang, while several other publications are increasingly under the control of money Taiwan Communiqué -3- May / June 2011 interests favorable to China. Only the Taipei Times, Liberty Times and Formosa TV are considered part of the Green Camp and can be expected to present more objective news. How will China influence the elections? Then there is the question how China will attempt to influence the elections. A first salvo across the bow was already fired in early May 2011, when Jia Qinglin, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), urged the people of Taiwan to “choose the right person” in order to maintain the stable development of the cross- strait relationship. Jia made his remarks when meeting Wu Poh-siung, the former chairman of Taiwan’s ruling Kuomintang (KMT) in Chengdu on 6 May 2011. Copyright: Taipei Times DPP Chairwoman and presi- dential candidate Tsai Ing- wen responded that China should realize that the Kuomintang will not be the ruling party in Taiwan for- ever and must therefore try to establish a “certain rela- tionship” with the DPP sooner or later. “It is the DPP’s policy to maintain an open-minded and prac- tical attitude toward the cross-strait relationship KMT legislators about combined elections: "It's no when we regain power in good. Master Ma is still scared of the tiger, even 2012,” Tsai said. “We will with all of us here to protect him." try to find a way to estab- lish a ‘mutual and long-term’ relationship with China. And we are also hoping that China is on the same track.” Observers in Taiwan also predict that in the run up to the elections, China will grant Ma and his government a number of symbolic favors in order to increase his chances of winning the elections. In the meantime, Ma himself is returning to the “I am for Taiwan” mode, which characterized his 2008 election campaign. This became evident with the choice of the campaign slogan for the elections: “Taiwan Cheers, Great!” Taiwan Communiqué -4- May / June 2011 Taiwan Communiqué comment: It is doubtful that the voting public will be convinced this time around. The experience of Ma pushing his “Taiwan” identity during the 2008 election campaign, and then turning 180 degrees around after his May 2008 inaugu- ration and going off on the “We are all Chinese” angle is not easily forgotten. People in Taiwan do want peaceful relations with China, but many feel that Ma has gone too far too fast in accommodating the PRC, and has insufficiently protected Taiwan’s interests, both in the economic area (ECFA), as well as in the areas of international space and safeguarding Taiwan’s sovereignty. Time and again he compromised Taiwan’s sovereignty and dignity in order to win favors from the PRC and make it appear that he was making headway in gaining international space. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * The World Health Organization and Taiwan Internal memo: Taiwan is “province of China” On 9 May 2011, DPP legislator Kuan Bi-ling announced in Taipei that she had received an internal World Health Organization memo instructing its agencies to refer to Taiwan as “province of China.” The memo, dated 14 September 2010, also stated that procedures used by the WHO to facilitate relations with Taiwan were subject to Chinese approval. The memo further stated that Taiwan “as a province of China, cannot be party to the International Health Regulations (IHR).” The information in the memo stands in stark contrast to the image presented by the Ma Ying-jeou administration, which announced the “breakthrough” in May 2009, and emphasized that Taiwan’s observership amounted to “substantive participa- tion” and had come about as a result of direct negotiations with the WHO, without Chinese involvement. The disclosure of the memo caused a firestorm in Taiwan, with the democratic opposition and overseas Taiwanese organizations accusing the Ma administration of misleading the public on the issue, and the Ma administration itself scrambling to do damage control by filing a protest with the WHO. However, the protest letter itself became a source of controversy when it was discovered that phrases concerning Taiwan’s sovereignty, which appeared in the Chinese-language Taiwan Communiqué -5- May / June 2011 version and which were clearly for domestic consumption, disappeared in the English text. Terms referring to “the nation” or “our country” in the Chinese text were mysteriously translated as “my”, “I” and “our”. Copyright: Taipei Times Taiwan Communiqué com- ment: The episode clearly shows that the approach taken by the Ma administra- tion in creating more inter- national space for Taiwan is leading nowhere. If any- thing, it has increased the PRC’s stranglehold on the issue: by insisting that Tai- wan be labeled a “province of China”, the PRC is trying to put Taiwan and the inter- national community before Ma administration: "That was my strongest protest a fait accompli. yet ... They can't possibly ignore it." The only way out of this quagmire is for Taiwan to present itself as a free and democratic nation under the name “Taiwan” and forget about any fuzzy designations such as “Chinese, Taipei.” For the international community it is essential to make a push to accept Taiwan in its midst, and resist Beijing’s bullying. History has shown that appeasement of authoritarian regimes has disastrous consequences. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * The Jasmine revolution No quiet Sunday stroll in China Another series of events with implication for relations between Taiwan and China were the Jasmine revolutions in North Africa, where street demonstrations toppled repressive regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, and where turmoil is still ongoing in Yemen, Syria and Libya. The whiff of jasmine drifted over into East Asia, prompting democracy activists in China to call for Sunday afternoon strolls and for people to smile at each other during these strolls.
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