The Art of Diplomacy: the Role of Exhibitions in the Development of Taiwan- China Relations

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McIntyre, Sophie (2015) The art of diplomacy: The role of exhibitions in the development of Taiwan- China relations. Journal of Curatorial Studies, 4(1), pp. 56-77.

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TITLE OF PAPER: The Art of Diplomacy: the role of art in the development of Taiwan- China relations

ABSTRACT: In 2009 and 2011, Taiwan’s premier public art museum, the Taipei Fine Arts Museum (TFAM) presented two major solo exhibitions by prominent Chinese artists Cai Guo- Qiang and Ai Weiwei. These exhibitions signified a critical juncture in museological practice in Taiwan and they were closely aligned with the Taiwan government’s mission to develop closer ties with China. This paper investigates the role of art in the development of cross-strait relations, including how it is being deployed by governments on both sides of the strait as a vehicle for soft power; and it examines some of the political agendas that influence and shape exhibitions of Chinese art in Taiwan. By exploring issues of representation and reception, this paper considers how Taiwan’s art community is responding to Taiwan’s rapprochement with China, and to the growing visibility of Chinese art in Taiwan’s museums.

KEY WORDS: Taiwan-China relations, museums, curatorial strategies, Chinese art, identity politics.

AUTHOR’S BIOGRAPHY: Dr Sophie McIntyre is a curator, lecturer and art writer. She is a Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University and is currently working on a book and exhibition. Her research explores the relationship between politics, identity and artistic agency in the production, selection, display, and reception of art, particularly in Taiwan and China. She has worked in art museums for more than 20 years, in Australia, New Zealand and Asia, and curated over 30 exhibitions, including several from Taiwan and China. Her texts have been published in periodicals, catalogues, books and other arts publications. [email protected]

It is already something of a platitude to describe the rise of China in the world as a defining moment in the twenty first century, increasingly referred to in the media as the ‘Chinese Century’. China’s burgeoning economy, its expanding consumer industries, and its flourishing art market have attracted significant global attention, but its impact on Taiwan, its nearest neighbour, has generally been overlooked or ignored by scholars, especially by those in the arts. What bearing does China’s global ascent have on Taiwan that strives to engage economically with China while seeking to safeguard its democratic freedoms? And how is the growing popularity and visibility of Chinese art in the world impacting on Taiwan’s artists who struggle to compete for international recognition? How can Taiwan’s art community capitalize on the rise of Chinese art without losing their sense of political and cultural distinctiveness and being absorbed into a Greater China paradigm which, for decades, many have endeavoured to resist?

This paper explores some of these questions in relation to Taiwan’s rapprochement with China, and its impact on Taiwan’s visual art field. It examines the ways in which art is being deployed by governments on both sides of the straits as a vehicle for soft power, used to forge economic, cultural, and some might argue political ties between these former arch rivals. This is exemplified in the museological representation of art, and by the growing number and size of cross-strait exhibition exchanges which emphasize Taiwan and China’s shared cultural heritage. It is also evident in the increasing number of Chinese art exhibitions presented in Taiwan’s art museums. In this paper I will examine two exhibitions presented by the Taipei Fine Arts Museum (TFAM) – of works by prominent Chinese artists, Cai Guo-Qiang (蔡国强) and Ai Weiwei (艾未未) that were shown in 2009 and 2011 respectively. As discussed, the opening up of cross-strait dialogue and exchange has sparked heated debate and been a source of significant tension within Taiwan’s art community, as artists and curators have become increasingly vocal and critical of the government’s political influence and involvement in Taiwan’s museums.

It is widely acknowledged that the public museum has for centuries played a critical ideological role in the nation-building process and in the fabrication and perpetuation of national community. Carol Duncan’s seminal essay on ‘Art Museums and the Ritual of Citizenship’ is particularly pertinent to this discussion as she draws our attention to the

‘political usefulness’ of art museums which she evocatively describes as ‘powerful identity-defining machines’ (Duncan 1991: 101). In Taiwan, the relationship between art and politics is closely intertwined and complex, especially when issues concerning Taiwan’s identity and its relations with China arise. To fully comprehend the meaning and significance of this recent shift in cultural policy and museological representation in Taiwan, a brief historical overview of the development of cross-strait relations is required. Since 1945, when the Chinese Nationalists (Kuomintang or KMT) retreated to Taiwan after the Civil War that brought the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to power, Taiwan-China relations have been conflict-ridden, and for decades cross-strait travel and communication were officially forbidden. Political issues concerning Taiwan’s legitimacy and sovereignty have been at the centre of this conflict and remain a sticking point. Although the KMT no longer claims to be the sole representative government of China,1 it nevertheless retains its status as the government of the Republic of China (ROC), and people in Taiwan insist on their democratic rights to remain a self-governed entity. However, the Chinese government in Beijing maintains that, under the ‘One China’ policy, Taiwan is a renegade province that must be reunified with the Mainland, by force if necessary.

During the years leading up to the lifting of martial law in 1987 and the rise of democratisation in Taiwan, there was a surge of political and cultural nationalism and anti-China sentiment. This nationalist fervour reached a feverish pitch during the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-1996 when the Chinese government launched a series of ballistic missiles across the Taiwan Strait which landed in close proximity to Taiwan’s main seaports. Although the Chinese government claimed they were merely undertaking military exercises, scholars concede that the timing and proximity of these missiles to Taiwan were intended to intimidate Taiwanese pro-independence supporters.2

In recent years, the geo-political gulf that separated Taiwan and the Mainland for nearly half a century has narrowed considerably. With a flagging domestic economy Taiwan has become increasingly economically reliant on China which is currently ranked as Taiwan’s foremost trading partner.3 Over the last two decades this deepening economic relationship has given rise to concerns within Taiwan that this small island is being

3 drawn into China’s powerful political orbit and that, as a consequence, Taiwan citizens will lose their hard-won political and cultural freedoms.

Under the leadership of Taiwan’s Hong Kong-born KMT leader, Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) who was elected President in 2008, a series of new economic and cultural reforms have been introduced that have unequivocally brought Taiwan and China closer together and facilitated increased cross-strait dialogue and exchange. These reforms include the introduction of direct flights between major cities in Taiwan and China which has contributed towards a significant increase in commerce, tourism, education, and cultural interaction. Given China’s burgeoning economy, a significant proportion of this traffic is unidirectional, with more Taiwan citizens regularly travelling to China.

Lured by China’s burgeoning economy, its global art market, and direct cross-strait linkages, China has become an attractive destination for many artists, gallerists and curators from Taiwan. For example, artists Michael Lin Ming-hong (林明弘) and Huang Chih-yang (黃致陽) have relocated to China which they view as an international arts hub that offers them significantly more opportunities than they would have in Taiwan to exhibit and sell their art works. Michael Lin, who is based in Shanghai but who regularly travels between Brussels and Taipei, candidly remarked that one cannot compare a city such as Taipei with a mere four million people, to China’s largest city, with a population exceeding 23 million (Lin 2011). Beijing-based, Huang Chih-yang, says that although he does not feel part of the close-knit local art community, there is nevertheless a constant flow of international collectors and curators visiting Beijing and from whose support he has benefitted (Huang 2013).

Undoubtedly, the emergence of China in the world has given rise to an increasingly pragmatic and cosmopolitan outlook amongst many Taiwanese, and particularly amongst the younger generations, who view China in a global rather than national context, and who seek to capitalize on these cross-strait connections and on China’s economic success. While older generations in Taiwan may continue to view China in nostalgic or oppositional terms - either as the sacred Motherland, or as an authoritarian and repressive force (depending on whether they conformed to KMT ideology or not), for Taiwan’s younger, mobile and cosmopolitan generation, China holds no particular

4 emotional or historical significance. China is no longer defined in dichotomous terms as ‘the Other’, but is viewed as an integral part of the world, with a burgeoning economy, markets and cultural opportunities, which some of Taiwan’s citizens are eager to explore.

However, in Taiwan, there has been growing criticism that the government is selling out to China, and between March and April 2014 students and civic groups staged a series of mass demonstrations in Taipei, which included occupying Taiwan’s parliament, opposing the government’s proposed trade pact with China.4 Citing Hong Kong as an example, many people fear that such cross-strait agreements will compromise Taiwan’s economic and political autonomy, and that they will have to relinquish their democratic freedoms and de facto independent status. Under Ma’s leadership, the KMT has officially implemented several new cultural initiatives designed to foster stronger cross-strait relations and promote mutual understanding. These include encouraging increased academic and cultural exchange, and introducing Chinese content in television, film and other media in Taiwan. For its part, the Chinese government strongly supports these moves for greater cultural integration, and proposed a ‘Cross-Strait Culture Cooperation Agreement’ with the aim of introducing ‘institutional mechanisms’ to promote greater mutual understanding (Ko 2010:1; Taiwan News 2010: 6).

In an editorial published in the Taipei Times in 2010 that was widely circulated within Taiwan’s visual art field, the editor expressed his concerns about China’s motives, claiming that these cross-strait cultural initiatives are being used as ‘a weapon’ by the Chinese government to ‘impose a Chinese cultural template on Taiwan’, which he feared ‘could succeed in eroding Taiwanese cultural identity’ (Cole 2010: 8). Specifically, the journalist was alluding to a remark made by a Chinese official who observed, ‘all this [cultural exchange has] greatly enhanced the acceptance of the Chinese nation and Chinese culture by our Taiwan compatriots.’ (Cole 2010: 8).

The extent of the Chinese government’s influence over cultural policy in Taiwan is difficult to gauge, but it is indisputable that culture is being deployed as a form of soft power to promote positive cross-strait relations. As one commentator acknowledges, ‘peaceful unification with Taiwan requires the Chinese government to develop and use

5 soft power to win over the hearts and minds of the people of Taiwan’ (Sun 2004 in Wang and Lu 2008: 435).5 In contrast to ‘hard power’, soft power is based on the principle of co-option rather than coercion, and it is widely recognised by governments internationally as an effective channel through which to achieve foreign policy objectives, enabling peaceful communication and negotiation between nation-states (Nye 2004).6 As Chinese scholars observe, the concept of soft power has been attracting increasing academic and political attention over the past decade in China and Taiwan, where it is viewed not only as a means to influence other countries, but also as a strategy to remain internationally competitive and maintain national stability (Wang and Lu 2008; Li 2008).7 Both governments across the strait have emphasized the importance of culture as a vehicle for soft power, and they actively promote their cultural achievements, language, and traditions through their institutions, as well as through international events, including exhibitions, festivals, and exchanges (Whyte 2009; Cosic 2011). In Taiwan, the government’s Minister for Cultural Affairs, Lung Ying- tai (龍應台) declared that, ‘a nation’s strength is determined by its “soft power”’, and as a diplomatically isolated nation-state Taiwan’s government relies significantly on culture to bolster its image overseas (Taipei Times 2012). China has also been investing heavily in its cultural infrastructure, evidenced by the vast number of large museums built in cities across China; and by the proliferation of Confucian Institutes that promote Chinese language and culture world-wide.

As state institutions, public museums are valuable mechanisms of soft power, and they play a critical role in nation-building and cultural diplomacy. In Taiwan, museums have been utilized by the Japanese colonial regime and by succeeding governments to endorse and disseminate political and cultural doctrine. During the first decades of KMT rule, the National Palace Museum (NPM) and the National Museum of History (NMH) which were established in 1965 and 1955 respectively, promoted the KMT’s vision of ‘cultural China’, a mythical concept based on China’s ‘sacred origins’ and its ‘continuous history’ (Chun 1994: 55; Tu 1991: 1-32). As an indication of their perceived importance, these were the only two museums on which the KMT bestowed national status during this period. According to the scholar Edward Vickers who has written widely on the ideological function of museums in Taiwan, ‘museums [in Taiwan] are never going to be depoliticised’ (Vickers 2010: 106). In his discussion on the impact of the rise to power of

6 the KMT to power on museums generally in Taiwan, Vickers acknowledges that while there is greater ‘scientific rigour’, professionalism and increased public scrutiny of museums, political intervention has not ceased; in fact, some museum staff contend it has increased rather than diminished under President Ma Ying-jeou’s rule.8 Similarly, a noted local authority in museum studies, Chen Kuo-ning (陳國寧), also acknowledges the ‘dominant’ and ‘crucial’ role the government has played in the development of museums in Taiwan, and in the ‘shaping and execution of cultural policies’ (Chen 2008: 123, 131).

Certainly, since 2008, there has been a significant increase in the volume of official communication and a rapid acceleration of government-sponsored exhibitions and exchanges between museums in Taiwan and China. Most remarkably, the National Palace Museum in Taipei, whose collection the KMT had for decades so closely guarded from the so-called ‘Communist Bandits’, is now collaborating with its Chinese counterpart, the National Palace Museum in Beijing. After 60 years of civil war and cross-strait rivalry, these two museums held their first joint exhibition in Taipei in 2009, an event that was extensively reported in the media (Gill 2011: Sui 2009; Jacobs 2011). Symbolically, a famous painting entitled Dwelling in the Fuchun Mountains (c. 1350) by the famous Chinese artist Huang Gongwang (黄公望), that was damaged and subsequently divided into two and previously held in museums on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, was ‘reunited’ and shown for the first time at the National Palace Museum in Taipei in June 2011.9 Of course, there are complex legal issues underpinning these bilateral exhibition exchanges, especially regarding ownership, and many of these issues remain unresolved.10

Taiwan’s premier municipal art museum, the Taipei Fine Arts Museum (TFAM), has also developed a partnership with its Beijing counter-part, the National Art Museum of China (NAMOC) and together they have organised several official bilateral exchange exhibitions. These include The Odyssey of Art in Taiwan 1950-2000 which opened in Beijing in 2006; and two months later NAMOC presented The Blossoming of Realism: The Oil Painting of Mainland China Since 1978. While these exhibition exchanges are often promoted as bilateral exchanges, according to artists such as Yao Jui-chung (姚瑞中), they are in fact ‘fake’ exchanges (Frazier 2007). Yao claims Mainland museums do not

7 reciprocate to the same extent, and Taiwanese artists are not treated with equal respect. With increased cross-strait cultural interaction, many artists and curators from Taiwan have had direct experience of China’s rule of law relating to censorship. This issue inevitably raises wider questions regarding Taiwan and China’s long-standing ideological differences, particularly in relation to freedom of expression.

As further evidence of the government’s political intervention into Taiwan’s museums, a quota system has also been implemented stipulating that a certain number of exhibitions by Mainland artists must be presented annually by Taiwan’s art museums. While this quota system has been widely reported in the media, its terms remain vague, and its existence has been refuted by some TFAM staff, and it certainly seems it is no longer being enforced on an annual basis (Chen 2010). However, in 2009, when TFAM presented two major exhibitions from China, the museum’s ‘new policy to explore contemporary art in China’ is discussed in its Annual Report (TFAM 2009: 155). The then Taipei City Deputy Mayor and Culture Affairs Department Commissioner Lee Yong- ping (李永萍) also publicly defended the government’s policy to promote cross-strait relations in art, explaining that this museological re-orientation towards China is integral to the KMT government’s new Mainland policy. She reportedly declared that, ‘…I feel that in the past we’ve had too little of an understanding of the Mainland. We’ve ignored [China] for too long….Now we need to face it.’ (Frazier 2007). In response to this quota system, members of Taiwan’s visual art community have accused the KMT government of using Taiwan’s museums as instruments for cross-strait diplomacy, and of privileging Chinese artists to the detriment of the development of local contemporary Taiwan art (Frazier 2007; Lin 2011). Acknowledging their concerns in relation to the two major Chinese art exhibitions the TFAM presented in 2009, the TFAM explains that, ‘The immense proportions of both [Chinese] exhibitions made the local art world wonder whether TFAM had invested too many resources in Chinese contemporary art’; and that some Taiwanese artists felt they were being ‘squeezed out’ or marginalized. They agreed to provide further details about their exhibition policies and marketing strategies so that the public would see the TFAM was ‘supporting all types of contemporary art’ (TFAM 2009: 156).

Under this quota system, the TFAM has organized exhibitions by prominent contemporary Chinese artists including, Fang Lijun (方力钧) (Apr. - July 2009) and Cai Guo-Qiang (Nov. 2009 - Feb. 2010), as well as Ai Weiwei (Oct. 2011 - Jan. 2012) and Xu Bing (徐冰) (Jan. - Apr. 2014). The choice of these Chinese artists was, I argue, strategic and closely aligned with the KMT’s political ideology and cultural policy objectives. These artists were all born on the Mainland but, importantly, they are internationally acclaimed and they have each spent significant periods of time in Western democratic countries (and particularly in the United States, Taiwan’s long-standing ally). Unequivocally, their Western credentials and politically liberal viewpoints enhance their appeal in Taiwan, and serve to reinforce the island’s international and democratic status. Within the scope of this paper it is impossible to examine each of these exhibitions in detail, so I will focus on Cai Guo-Qiang and Ai Weiwei’s exhibitions at the TFAM, which were markedly different in scale and scope, and generated significant political and cultural attention, and controversy.

Cai Guo-Qiang has been invited on a number of occasions to participate in exhibitions and produce gunpowder works in Taiwan which he affectionately describes as ‘my cultural homeland’ (Cai 2009: 21). The artist was born and grew up in Quanzhou in Fujian province in south-east China where many Taiwanese peoples’ ancestors originally came from before they migrated to Taiwan after the seventeenth century. The artist shares a similar cultural heritage and he speaks with a Minnan dialect (southern Fujianese) which many Taiwanese have also inherited. These attributes, coupled with the fact that Cai has lived in Japan and America, countries with which Taiwan has strong historical, political and cultural connections, undeniably grants Cai Guo-Qiang special status in Taiwan. The artist’s relationship to Taiwan, along with his international profile and commercial success are widely reported in the local media where he is referred to as the ‘Cai phenomenon’ (蔡國強現象) (Chang 2009).

Opening in November 2009, Cai’s solo exhibition was entitled Hanging Out in the Museum (泡美術館) and it was one of the largest and most costly exhibitions held to date at the TFAM. It was also one of the most conservative, compared to earlier works Cai had produced in Taiwan which, as I will discuss, were significantly more politically-

9 charged. The vast majority of works in this exhibition were sourced from the Guggenheim Museum’s exhibition, I Want to Believe that toured to Bilbao and Beijing. The Taipei iteration included several of Cai’s signature works, including his spectacular sequence of suspended exploding cars that lit up the TFAM’s cavernous grey foyer. Also on display was Reflection – a Gift from Iwakiri and several of his gun powder drawings and video projections; along with The Rent Collection Courtyard, a work in progress. Conspicuously, Borrowing your Enemy’s Arrows (1998) was not included in the TFAM’s exhibition. This installation, that comprises an excavated fishing boat pierced by 3000 arrows, is based on a Chinese military legend and Western critics have described it as one of Cai’s most nationalistic works, exemplified by the inclusion of the Chinese flag (Zaya 2002:26). Although the artist rejects this interpretation he concedes the work alludes to the emergence of China as a world leader and military power, a point many Taiwanese would not wish to be reminded of, especially since China has not renounced the use of military force against Taiwan.11 This, coupled with the fact the work includes the national flag of the People’s Republic of China, is likely to have contributed to the work being excluded from this exhibition.

Cai also created three new works for this exhibition that engaged visually with Taiwan’s landscape, and its culture and history. These included two gunpowder works, Taroko Gorge (2009) and Day and Night (2009), as well as a stone sculpture entitled Strait (2009) that was arguably the most politically-inspired work in this exhibition. This massive sculpture, weighing more than nine tonnes, renders in relief the body of water separating Taiwan from Mainland China. It maps the sweeping arc of Taiwan’s west coast on one side, and the jagged shoreline of Fujian province in southern China on the other. This strait, which is known as the Taiwan Strait (or previously the ‘black ditch’), has for centuries been an important trading route, and a passage many Chinese who migrated to Taiwan centuries earlier, also navigated. The strait has also been a site of military conflict, especially during the aforementioned Taiwan Strait Crisis when the United States sent its seventh fleet to defend Taiwan against Chinese military intervention in 1996.

It is relevant to note that the granite from which this work is made was sourced from a quarry in Quanzhou in southern China, where the work was sculpted and subsequently

10 shipped to Taiwan for the exhibition. Centuries earlier, this Quanzhou granite was used by the Chinese military, merchants and seafarers as ballast to stabilize their ships when they crossed this treacherous ‘black ditch’ to Taiwan to keep them on course; and it was also used to construct bridges, temples and pave roads in Taiwan. This work is rich in symbolism and it draws attention to the history of Taiwan-China relations. The fact the stone was sourced from Quanzhou, where Cai was born and from where many Taiwanese originally came, adds personal and cultural significance to this work. In the exhibition catalogue Cai states: Strait uses a rock that I had shipped from my hometown of Quanzhou. Being of Mainland Chinese descent, I am well aware of the weight of this theme. The work is infused with my deep affection for Taiwan. (Cai 2009: 21).

Predictably, government and museum officials in Taiwan praised this sculpture, claiming that it exemplifies Taiwan’s long-standing historical and cultural connections with China, and that it embodied the spirit of cross-strait exchange. At the press conference, the then TFAM Director, Hsieh Hsiao-yun (謝小韞) remarked upon the work’s ‘serious historical significance’, and in reference to the forthcoming anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall she asserted that the future of cross-strait relations will similarly ‘be written into history’ (Lin Chiao-yin 2009; Central Daily News 2009). Compared with Golden Missile, which Cai created in 1998 for the Taipei Biennial, Strait is a conservative and somewhat nationalistic work. Golden Missile was a politically- charged, explosion event in which the artist launched 200 model missiles outside the TFAM. This work directly responded to the aforementioned Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995- 1996) when the Chinese government launched a series of missiles into Taiwan’s sea- zone in an attempt to quash the Taiwanese pro-independence movement. While Cai is a politically-engaged artist, he is also a consummate diplomat, and in this instance he seemed eager to avoid, or was perhaps advised to avoid, sensitive political issues regarding Taiwan-China relations. As the title, Hanging out in the Museum suggests in this exhibition the artist was clearly focusing on engaging with local audiences on a cultural rather than on a political level.

Cai’s exhibition was widely publicised and well-attended, attracting over 220,000 people over a thirteen week period.12 However, the exhibition also sparked

11 considerable criticism within the local visual art community, not because of the choice of the artist per se, but because of the cost of exhibition (which was reportedly twice that allocated to the international Taipei Biennial),13 and the alleged political and commercial agendas driving this exhibition. A local arts reviewer writing in the Taipei Times identifies some of the key concerns expressed by the local arts community regarding this exhibition (Frazier 2007). First, a controversy developed around the alleged relationship between the artist and the incumbent KMT President, Ma Ying-jeou whose eldest daughter, Leslie Ma Wei-chung (馬唯中), was then working as Cai’s assistant.14 Secondly, there was purportedly a conflict of interest regarding the exhibition’s co-organiser and key sponsor, Eslite Corporation, a retail group, which owns a high profile commercial gallery in Taipei, which was concurrently presenting an exhibition of Cai Guo-Qiang’s work. These issues attracted significant attention in the visual art community and media, and local journalists probed the nature of the partnership between the Taipei Fine Arts Museum and Eslite Corporation. In response to the increasing number of blockbuster exhibitions the TFAM had presented, some also questioned the role, professionalism, and increasing commercialization of the Taipei Fine Arts Museum, with one writer suggesting the museum had become a ‘rental space’ (Lin Mei-xue 2009: Chang 2009)15 Viewed in a broader context, the criticisms were also a direct response to the quota system Ma’s government had implemented, and to the wider paradigm shift taking place in Taiwan’s public and commercial galleries, which have become increasingly China-focused.16

Under the same quota system, the TFAM presented a solo exhibition by Chinese artist Ai Weiwei that opened two years after Cai Guo-Qiang’s exhibition in October 2011. Entitled Ai Weiwei: Absent the exhibition comprised 21 works, the exhibition featured mixed media works, installations, photographs and videos which Ai created between 1983 and 2011. It was noticeably smaller in scale and scope than Cai’s retrospective, occupying only one floor in this vast museum, and in contrast to the comprehensive, full colour exhibition catalogue the TFAM published in conjunction with Hanging Out in the Museum, Ai’s exhibition was accompanied by a modest monochromatic brochure. Furthermore, Ai’s exhibition attracted fewer than half the number of visitors and, according to local media reports, the numerous government officials and celebrities

12 who attended Cai’s star-studded exhibition opening, were either not invited or chose not to attend the opening of Ai’s exhibition at the TFAM.17

Ai is renowned internationally as a social activist and he has gained international renown for his politically inspired work, and his widely publicised criticisms of the Chinese government’s stance on human rights and corruption. On 3 April, 2011 Ai was arrested at the Beijing International Airport when he was on his way to Taipei to work on the exhibition at the TFAM. He was held in detention for 81 days on alleged taxation evasion, and this exhibition opened at the TFAM only four months after he was released from detention in China. The fact Ai did not come to Taiwan during the exhibition gave its title, Ai Weiwei: Absent added poignancy.

In the museum’s large foyer was displayed Ai’s acclaimed installation, Circle of Animal/Zodiac Heads that comprises twelve over-sized bronze animal heads representing the Chinese zodiac. Although this work has been widely shown overseas, according to the museum this was the first time it had been shown in Asia. This exhibition also featured approximately 100 black and white photographs taken by Ai when he was living in New York (1983-1993) and also in Beijing’s East Village. While some of these images are politically-engaged, documenting local demonstrations, the majority focus on the artist’s day-to-day existence and include portraits of Chinese artist-friends who had also sought temporary exile in New York during the 1980s.

The highlight of this exhibition was the monumentally large installation entitled Forever Bicycles, which the artist created from approximately 1,200 bicycles which were perfectly stacked, aligned and suspended in space. At first glance members of the audience were confronted by a towering, labyrinthine-like structure which, when wandering through it and viewing it from different angles transformed in shape and size. Notably, on the cross-bars of each of these bicycles was the name Forever from which the title of this work is derived. Forever is one of China’s oldest and most popular brands of bicycle made in Shanghai, and until the rapid rise of urbanisation and the expansion of motorways, it was one of the most common forms of transport in China. In this exhibition, these bicycles were stripped of their functionality - they had no pedals, brakes or handlebars for steering – only the basic frame and wheels were retained.

Undoubtedly, this installation makes oblique references to socio-political issues in China and its official culture of conformity and authoritarianism. However, in this exhibition the political dimension was played down by the TFAM who described this particular work in more neutral and prosaic terms declaring that the work ‘symbolizes the state of constant change in China’s society and environment’ (TFAM 2011).

In the remainder of the exhibition there were few visual or textual references to controversial issues relating to Ai’s views of the Chinese government, and local and international audiences noted the lack of politically-engaged work. Audience members commented on the significant disparity between the artist’s role as a political activist, and the subdued and ‘de-politicised’ selection of works in this exhibition. One local journalist described the absence of Ai’s politically engaged work as ‘sinister’, suggesting the artist had been ‘muted’ by authorities; and another questioned if the curatorial selection was based on aesthetic or political criterion (Buchan 2011; Gong 2011). In the exhibition, Ai’s Surveillance Camera (2010), made from marble, clearly had a political subtext alluding to Ai’s detention, but this was not discussed in the catalogue or publicity the TFAM generated. It is important to emphasize that Ai’s exhibition was presented during a particularly politically sensitive period, when Taiwan-China relations were at the forefront of national debate with the lead up to the 2012 Presidential elections, and during the same year as the centenary of the Republic of China.

Clearly, in this exhibition the KMT government and museum staff were keen to avoid antagonising the Chinese government. However, their efforts to steer clear of controversy were quashed when Taiwan’s media and members of the local art community publicly accused the museum for not inviting the artist to attend the exhibition opening because it feared reprisals from the Chinese government. This controversy was fuelled by the artist himself who candidly stated during an interview on a local radio station in Taiwan that for political reasons the government and museum officials had made no attempt to invite him to the exhibition opening. He stated: … I can say very clearly that they didn’t try anything. They can go get close to China; China wants so badly for them to be close. But in that longing, what is it that they intentionally overlooked? The answer is, of course, the voices that

would make them unhappy. If the relationship between Taiwan and China is just doing business, I see no future in it…I heard there were barely any people [attending the exhibition]…I understand the political circles in Taipei are touch- and-go. A little island’s politics yielding entirely to a mighty power. Very interesting (Yang 2011).

According to TFAM staff, however, the artist was invited to attend the exhibition opening. Based on the conditions of his bail, the Chinese government allegedly did not allow the artist to travel to Taiwan, a point which Ai publicly acknowledged in an earlier media report (Lu, 2011). Unequivocally, Ai’s nonattendance gave the exhibition and its title greater political significance, and the controversy surrounding his absence was widely reported in the local and international media.

Seeking to defend the city government and museum, President Ma Ying-jeou declared that Ai Weiwei has been a leading advocate for human rights and would always be welcome in Taiwan which, he emphasized, actively supports democracy and freedom of speech. It could be argued that the fact the government allowed this exhibition to proceed during this politically sensitive period was strategic in terms of Taiwan’s international foreign policy objectives. As Wang and Lu point out in their discussion on soft power, Taiwan ‘has long been attentive to its international image’, and democracy and human rights are the main selling points for this nation-state which seeks to establish a distinctive national brand’ (Wang and Lu 2008: 437, 442-443, 445-446). During a carefully orchestrated visit when President Ma viewed Ai Weiwei’s exhibition at the TFAM, he declared to the media: The distance between Taiwan and the Mainland depends on the two sides’ views on the protection of human rights. The more similarities we share on the issues of human rights, the closer that distance will become (Mo 2011).

It is unlikely the TFAM’s exhibition of this political dissident’s work helped improve cross-strait relations. However, by presenting it in Taiwan’s most established state art museum, the government was clearly signalling to the world that Taiwan remains, as the former American President George Bush once described it, a ‘beacon of democracy’ in Asia. Ai Weiwei: Absent was promoted by the TFAM as the first large-scale solo

15 exhibition of this artist’s work that had been presented in the ‘ethnic Chinese world’ (TFAM in e-flux). For Ai Weiwei, it marked an important turning point in his career, remarking with a hint of irony: if Taiwan really is a part of China, which is what the Chinese government claims, this will be my first ever exhibition in China. So far, I have not been permitted to exhibit here [in China] (Oliver 2011).

While relations between Taiwan and China have improved markedly over the past five years, it is a fine balancing act for Taiwan that seeks to forge closer economic ties without surrendering its democratic freedoms. This paper has explored how culture, and art specifically, has been used as a vehicle of soft power by the Taiwan government to foster cross-strait dialogue and cooperation, and also to promote Taiwan’s image overseas. While Cai Guo-Qiang’s exhibition highlighted Taiwan and China’s shared historical and cultural connections, Absent: Ai Weiwei, on the other hand, underscored their ideological differences, and promoted Taiwan’s humanitarian and democratic values to the international community. Whether these exhibitions of Chinese art that have been discussed here have helped build mutual understanding and respect between Taiwan and China is debateable, but they have, without doubt, raised the level of cultural awareness between these former arch rivals.

How long Taiwan is able to maintain the status quo with China, or de facto independence, is the key question. How long will China tolerate Taiwan’s lack of compliance; to what extent can Taiwan resist being drawn into China’s powerful orbit; and what role might the United States play, if any, in Taiwan’s future? And how will this impact on Taiwan’s visual art field? While these questions remain unresolved, what is clear is that China will remain a focal point in Taiwan’s national and cultural imagination in the foreseeable future.

ENDNOTES

1 In October 1971, the Republic of China (Taiwan) was voted out of the United Nations and succeeded by the People’s Republic of China (China) which is now recognised by most countries as the sole, legitimate government of China. Taiwan has diplomatic relations with 22 sovereign states, none of which are major world powers.

2 The Taiwan Strait Crisis comprises three separate military incidents, occurring in 1954-1955 and 1958, and in 1995-1996 in which involved Mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States. For further details on see Dittmer 2005, pp.81-84; Copper 1997, pp. 199-227. 3 Cross-strait trade in 2011 totalled $US 127 billion, which is more than a quarter of Taiwan’s GDP according to Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council. 4 This student-led protest movement, which is popularly referred to as the Sunflower movement, opposed the government’s passing of the Cross-strait Service Trade Agreement. 5 Sun (2004) in Wang and Lu (2008: 435). 6 According to Joseph Nye, who is accredited with the invention of the term in the 1980s, soft power is one of the ‘primary currencies’ of international diplomacy today. 7 For a comparative analysis of the ways soft power is conceptualised and implemented in China and Taiwan see Wang Hongying and Lu Yeh-chung (2008); and for an analysis of debates about soft power in China see Li (2008). 8 For example, in 2011 during an interview with a key TFAM informant (who seeks to remain anonymous) said s/he hoped the DPP would be elected in 2012 Presidential elections because during DPP-rule there was not as much political intervention in the TFAM’s operation and management. 9 This painting was created in 1350 but in 1650 it was burned and divided into two. The smaller piece was held in the collection of the Zhejiang Museum in Hangzhou, China; and the larger piece is Taiwan’s National Palace Museum’s collection (Taipei Times 2011). 10 According to the Director of Taipei’s National Palace Museum (NPM), Chou Kung-shin, until the Chinese government signs an agreement that grants immunity for any piece of art borrowed from Taiwan’s museum it will not lend China’s museums works from the NPM’s collection. In regards to its partnership with Beijing’s National Palace Museum, Director Chou states that both museums have agreed to ‘engage in substance without bringing up titles or legal issues’ (Tan 2012). For more information see newspaper reports (Cai 2013; and Guo 2013). 11 In March 2005, the anti-secession law (反分裂國家法) was passed by the National People’s Congress in China which confirmed that the Chinese government would use force against Taiwan if it pursued independence. 12 According to the TFAM’s Annual Report in 2009 Hanging Out in the Museum attracted 220,710 visitors (TFAM 2009: 45). During this exhibition Cai was promoted by the TFAM to the public as a celebrity figure. Members of the audience were encouraged to compete for prizes, which included two return tickets to New York to visit Cai Guo-Qiang’s Studio, and also to have tea with the artist at the Empire State Building. 13 The exact amount spent on Cai’s exhibition has not been recorded in the TFAM’s Annual Report, but the budget was estimated at $NT80 million (approx $US 2,500,524) (Frazier 2007). 14 In 2013, Lesley Ma was appointed Curator of Ink Art at Hong Kong’s M+ Museum. In August 2013, it was reported that Cai Guo-Qiang was invited by President Ma Ying-jeou who was then visiting New York to a private dinner hosted that members of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association also attended (Peng and Chung 2013). 15 This reference to ‘blockbuster exhibitions’ was made in response to a succession of large and costly international exhibitions the TFAM hosted between 2009 and 2011 particularly. These included Arcadie —Dans les Collections du Centre Pompidou (Apr. – July 2009), Pixar: Twenty Years of Animation (Aug. – Nov. 2011), Monet’s Garden (Mar-June 2011), along with the exhibitions by Chinese artists Fang Lijun and Cai Guo-Qiang in 2009. 16 The local art community’s concerns were also noted in the Taipei Fine Art Museum’s 2009 Annual Report. Although it did not refer specifically to Cai’s exhibition it stated that during that year ‘contemporary art circles’ complained that the museum had become ‘too commercialized’ and that others had ‘called into question the scholastic integrity of the TFAM’s new policy to explore contemporary art in China’ (TFAM 2009: 155). 17 Ai Weiwei’s exhibition at TFAM attracted 96,540 visitors compared with Cai Guo-Qiang’s which attracted 220,701 visitors (TFAM 2009 and 2011: 133, 131). According to one media report, 2000 people attended Cai Guo-Qiang’s opening whereas only 200 people came to Ai Weiwei’s exhibition opening (Lin 2011).

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