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Xerox University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 74-20,882 CLARKE, Charles Amstard, 1941- ADMINISTRATIVE CENTRALIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON PLANNING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND SERVICE DELIVERY TO HINTERLAND AREAS IN LIBERIA. The American University, D.P.A., 1974 Political Science, public administration

Xerox University Microfilms,Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

© 1974

CHARLES AMSTARD CLARKE

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

ADMINISTRATIVE CENTRALIZATION AND ITS IMPACT

ON PLANNING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND

SERVICE DELIVERY TO HINTERLAND AREAS IN

LIBERIA

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for

the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy:

Public Administration

Charles A. Clarke

April 1974

Accepted:

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... iii

Chapter I. INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE SETTING UP MAJOR ARGUMENTS...... 1

II. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE SOCIO­ POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES ...... 35

Colonialism...... 36 Nationalism...... 43 African Socialism...... 46 Need for Political Stability ...... 55

III. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN HINTERLAND AREAS: 1944-1954...... 60

T a x a t i o n ...... 83 The Utilization of Traditional Political Institutions ...... 85 Representatives as Sources of Contacts . . . 87 Roads...... 100 H e a l t h ...... 105 Folk Medicine...... Ill Agriculture Development...... 114 C o n c l u s i o n ...... 121

IV. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND PLANNING 1955-1970...... 124

The Formation of the Opposition Party and the 1955 Elections ...... 126 The True Whig Party...... 135 The Internal Organization of the Party . . . 137 The National Convention...... 138 The Convention of Local Units...... 141 Two Groups Within the Party: Women and S t u d e n t s ...... 145 The Relationship Between the Party and the Bureaucracy^...... 148 Labor Unions ...... 154 Students ...... 156 The Legislative Branch ...... 158

i Political Expansion ...... 160 Rural Area Development an Experiment in Decentralization ...... 165 Rural Area Development and the Trial of 1968 ...... 169 National Planning ...... 172

V. SOME PUBLIC POLICIES: HEALTH, TRANSPORTATION, HEALTH AND AGRICULTURE...... 184

R o a d s ...... 184 Farm to Market Roads...... 188 Health...... 193 Physicians...... 194 Agriculture Services...... 205 Gbedin Rice Project ...... 207 The Agriculture Credit Corporation. . . . 220

VI. CONCLUSION...... 224

APPENDIX A ...... 235 B ...... 239 C ...... 245

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 249

ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To express adequately my appreciation to the many people and institutions that have assisted me in the preparation of this study is not possible within the limited space provided for this purpose here. Nevertheless,

I would like to extend special thanks to Dr. Coralie Bryant,

Dr. Richard Fehnel and Dr. Martin Meadows. As my advisors,

I received from them invaluable assistance from the beginning of the study to its completion. Their promptness in read­ ing the draft was equalled only by their patience. As chairman of my committee, Dr. Bryant was especially of invaluable assistance to me. She was very generous of her time and offered criticisms and comments which influenced greatly the quality of this study. I would like also to thank the many Liberian officials who shared freely with me the information available to them. I would like to thank my mother, stepfather, father and mother-in-law, sisters and brother, in-laws and relatives whose letters have been a constant source of inspiration to me.

Finally, I extend my sincere thanks to my wife, Amy and daughters Wanneh and Djuteh who have on the whole helped me most. Despite the hardships, their warmth and constant inspiration sustained me throughout. To them I dedicate this study.

iii CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to analyze as well

as to describe the centralization of governmental

administration and planning and their impact upon the

distribution of public policies in hinterland areas

in Liberia. The specific public policies which will

be examined are transportation, health and agriculture.

The major thrust of the argument will be that there

is a relationship between administrative centralization,

political participation and service delivery and that

these factors have played a major role in the develop­ ment of public policies in Liberia.

One cannot begin to discuss the many arguments

found within that complex set of issues surrounding

centralization and political participation without

recalling the literature to be found in this area.

And yet, the literature on administrative centraliza­ tion and political participation in Africa and other

less economically developed regions, reflects the general controversies that beset the fields of political science and public administration. Three of the major issues are to be found in the debates over balanced

1 vs. imbalanced development, the nature of participation and the extent to which these factors influence policy outputs.

One participant in the argument about participa­ tion and its effect on policy outputs, Alexander Groth, among others, argued, for example, that individuals extract benefits from the political system in proportion to their degree of organization and influence. The strength of their organization and influence will determine the extent to which they count.

Dr. Groth1s book Comparative Politics; A Distri­ butive Approach, the author explicitly stated that he is concerned with analyzing the outputs of political systems— the ways in which different political regimes tend to distribute social resources. Selected for correlation with different types of regimes are:

political participation,

group life, communication and organization,

taxation and budgeting,

aspects of economic policy,

education and culture

social welfare,

social change and mobility,

bureaucracy and public service,

justice and police power. 3

The author observed that in each of these areas there exists significant differences in comparative outputs among the different systems.

In analyzing the differences among various regimes,

Groth specifically examined democratic and autocratic political systems. In the case of democratic systems,

Groth limited his discussions to what he considered to be democratic countries— Australia, Canada, Great

Britain, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland,

United States, Uruguay. Autocratic regimes are dichotomized into: innovative-mobilization and traditional. The innovative-mobilization regimes are further subdivided into three categories: right, left and mixed. Included in the right are Fascist

Italy and Nazi Germany. On the left are Communist

Russia, Eastern Europe, Cuba and Peron's Argentina.1

Groth asserted that there are certain general characteristics which apply to all autocratic regimes and to all democratic regimes. Take, for example, the issue of political participation. Contrasting democratic and autocratic regimes, the author observed that well- established democratic regimes are characterized by

1Alexander J. Groth, Comparative Politics: A Distribute Approach (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1971) p. T 4 '. 4 more openness, freedom of expression, dialogue etc.

On the other hand, autocratic regimes are less tolerant of free and open exchange of ideas. Moreover, in the

area of group life, communication and organization, well-established democracies possess pluralistic, autonomous and diffuse decision-making structures.

The system is noted for a significant degree of bargain­

ing political participation by rank and file. In autocratic regimes, decision-making tends to be more centralized, less open to discussions by members of the rank and file. Within the area of taxation and budget, democratic regimes demonstrate a higher degree of relative equity. Among the well-established democ­ racies, the author found a high incidence of direct and essentially progressive taxation, relatively low tax evasion and also relatively high amounts (in proportion to GNP) of spending on the social, cultural and material needs of the population. Needless to say, Groth found that autocratic regimes reveal less of these characteristics.

Finally, in the chapter on bureaucracy and public service, the author asserted, in terms of the dichotomy between democracy and authoritarianism, the crucial distinctions relate not to efficiency or to technical competence but to accountability and control. Bureaucratic establishments in the democracies tend to be open to public 5 scrutiny and are subject to ultimate modification and change by organs closely linked to public opinion.2

The bureaucracy in autocratic systems is less free of public scrutiny, is not regarded as representative of the whole society. In brief, the degree of public service received by the population is directly related to the extent to which they "count" in the system— the extent to which they are allowed to participate.

Given the fact that in well established democracies, the citizens "count," it follows that on the whole the consumers in democratic systems receive better public services than autocratic regimes.

Groth also emphasized the following points:

1) Unlike democratic regimes, autocratic

systems are more likely to undergo sharp and

sudden fluctations of public policy. This is

due to the fact that, within autocratic regimes,

participation is limited to an identifiable

group which frequently changes policies at its

own discretion.

2) Democracies safeguard the right of

petition and association whereas authoritarian

regimes control, restrict and inhibit these

rights.

2lbid., p. 240. 6

3) Tax and budget policies of democracies

reflect the tendency to balance a wide variety

of interests with greater resultant equity for

the claims of constituents.

4) Economic policies and policy making organs

of democracies tend to be more responsive to

public opinion. Autocratic regimes tend to

limit group access in the formulation or

economic policy.

5) Autocratic regimes to the left of the

scale tend to expend a high proportion of their

income on the encouragement of mass public

education. Autocratic regimes to the right are

less interested and tend to fear and restrict

education. Traditional autocracies were usually

not interested in costly and politically explosive

expansion of education.

6) In terms of justice and police power,

democratic systems are less prone to intervention

from "above" and more open to demands from "below."

In case of autocratic regimes the situation is

reversed.

More recently, many writers have attempted cross­ national as well as intra-state comparisons in federal systems in order to determine the effects of systems characteristics on public policy outcomes. Thomas Dye has attempted, in Politics, Economics

and the Public; Policy Outcomes in the American States, 3

to examine the influence of political "systems charac­

teristics" on "policy outcomes." Unlike Groth however,

Dye concluded that the characteristics of the political

system have no significant effect on the outcome of public policies. Dye's comparative analysis based on

fifty American states, utilizing the political system characteristics of party control, inter-party competition, voter participation and mal-apportionment in state legislatures, the author attempted to determine the extent to which variation among states in any of these system characteristics affects local provision of: education, welfare, highway, taxation, revenues and regulation of public morality. Four economic or socio­ economic determinants were selected to reflect the level of interstate differences in economic development: percentage of population living in urban areas— level of urbanization; percentage of work force outside agriculture, fisheries and forestry— level of industri­ alization; median family income in dollars— income; median school year completed by population, age twenty- five and over— education.

3Thomas Dye, Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcome in the American States.(Chicago Illinois: Rand McUalley & Co., 1966) . In attempting to rationalize his decision for the use of the fifty states in his comparative analysis,

Dye asserted that, although the states share a common institutional framework and cultural milieu, they are nevertheless different in levels of economic development.

As a means of demonstrating his case, the author observed that in 1960, the median family income in

Connecticut was two and a half times higher than that of Mississippi. In South Dakota, over sixty-five percent of the residents lived in rural areas while

New Jersey had eighty-five percent of its residents living in urban areas. In contrast to Massachusetts which had one percent of its labor force engaged in agriculture,

South Dakota had thirty-three percent of its labor force engaged in similar activity. Correspondingly, the author went on to assert that despite their uniformity in con­ stitutional framework, the political systems of the fifty states of the United States also can be differentiated along the lines of: levels of intra-party competition, strength and functions of party organizations and so on.

Using correlation analysis, the author also con­ firmed the findings of several other scholars that intra-party competition in the fifty states is closely related to levels of economic development in the parti­ cular states. Moreover, voter participation rates in 9 the states were also seen to be related to levels of economic development. In other words, political parti­ cipation was found to be higher in states with a higher income and educational levels than with lower ones, of equal significance, Dye discovered that in the area of education, variations in educational policy outcomes among states are related closely to differences in their levels of economic development. The author further observed the existence of a wide gap between per pupil expenditures on education among the states. This range difference among states was seen to have been closely related to their differences in wealth. The economic development of the states was also cited for affecting the organization and financing of their school systems.

Incidence of centralization of educational administra­ tion was much higher among less developed states than developed ones.

Although noting that a significant portion of the literature in state politics implies that the level of intra-party competition, the level of voter partici­ pation and the degree of mal-apportionment independently influenced public policy, the results of the author's research led him to conclude that these systems characteristics have relatively little independent effect on policy outcomes in the states. Rather, the 10 author contended that the level of economic development of states will more accurately account for the nature of the public policies adopted. Quoting from Dye:

"Differences in the policy choices of states with different types of political systems turn out to be largely a product of differing socio-economic levels rather than a direct product of political variables. Levels of urbanization, industrialization, income and education appear to be more influential in shaping policy outcomes than political system characteristics."4

In essence, Dye was concluding that in terms of public policy outcomes it really does not matter much whether the State Government is controlled by the Republican or Democratic Party. Rather than party control, the level of economic development of the state will serve as a better determinant of its public policy outcomes.

Dye's argument was quite similar to that of the classical economists. Classical economists assume that development is the same as growth. The size of the GNP which is defined as all goods and services produced during a year, is used to determine the well­ being of a nation. This group further assumes that an increase in the size of the GNP will result in a simultaneous increase in the economic benefits which accrues to the people. Within this context, classical

4ibid. 11 economists have been criticized for placing undue emphasis on the size of the GNP. Critics argue that, rather than look at the size of the GNP as a basis for determining the well-being of a nation, one should be more concerned with looking at how the GNP is distributed. This latter point, they argue, serves to provide a more accurate indication of a nation's policy. According to this group, an increase in GNP would not necessarily be accompanied by an increased distribution of resources among the population. Rather, increased GNP could mean that government could use the added income to build prestige palaces or buy Mercedes

Benz for its officials. In this case, the growth of the economy serves to benefit only the elites. After all, they argue that third world countries provide us with unfortunate examples of growth without development.

In th@ book, Growth Without Development,5 Clowers et al. focused their analysis on the economic aspects of Americo-Liberian dominance. Analyzing the economic statistics for Liberia over the past decade, the authors observed that Liberia experienced a great deal of economic expansion during this period. This expansion, according to the authors, benefitted only a few Liberians.

5Robert W. Clower, Growth Without Development (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966) . 12

The analysis revealed that Liberians living in coastal areas received about four times the income of the hinterland population. The hinterland population who constituted the majority of the population received in

1960 only 4.8 percent of the gross domestic income.

Cognizant of the fact that Liberia's growth has been accompanied by substantial inflation, the authors observed that in real terms, the income of the hinter­ land population declined. Given these facts, they argued that the benefits from growth in GNP have been inequitably distributed as well as restricted to the population of coastal Liberians. In fact, the authors contended that in their desire to maintain control, the coastal-Liberian leadership has over the years developed a deliberate strategy for regulating the pace of economic development. Through this mechanism the coastal Liberian leadership has succeeded in managing the spread of development and ensuring that the expansion of modernization would not threaten coastal-Liberian control or in any way upset the existing power relationship.

Arguing along similar lines Liebenow in his book,

Liberia, The Evolution of Privilege,6 viewed the

®Gus J. Liebenow. Liberia, The Evolution of Privilege. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1969. ) 13 hegemony of coastal Liberian leadership as the major factor responsible for the inequitable distribution of public resources to the hinterland population. Liebenow saw the Liberian True Whig Party as performing the vital function of legitimizing coastal-Liberian dominance, but also conceptualized the party as being a vehicle for ensuring the perpetuation of this leadership. The party was used for restricting entry into the elite class to coastal-Liberian and a few "enlightened hinterland natives." The acquisition of positions in the public bureaucracy was based primarily on either family connec­ tions or loyalty to Tubman and the True Whig Party.

Outside of the academic community, Nkrumah would have been one of the most critical of Dye's low esti­ mation of the influence of political parties. For according to Nkrumah, "seek ye first the political kingdom and everything else shall be added." For

Nkrumah would argue that, colonial Africa provides good examples where increase in GNP have not been followed by increased benefits to the local population. Rather, most of the benefits from increased GNP within colonized areas have instead been channeled towards the develop­ ment of the imperial power. Therefore, Nkrumah would contend that the political party among African nations should first achieve political independence and then decide how resources are to be used. 14

Following, World War II, and more specifically immediately after independence (i.e. during the 1960's), there emerged a significant outflow of literature on political participation in African political systems:

David Apter 1955, Thomas Hodgkin 1961, Ruth Schachter

Morgenthau 1961, Emmanuel Wallerstein 1961, Coleman and Rosberg 1964, Aristide Zolberg 1966. Hodgkin and

Morgenthau in particular provided pioneering schema for classifying the form and degree of participation in various African political systems.

In his book, African Political Parties, Hodgkin drew a distinction between mass parties and elite parties. This distinction essentially was based upon the concept of participation. According to Hodgkin, mass parties seek to enroll the mass of the population as members. On the other hand, elite parties seek to mobilize a limited number of the population. Adherents to the party, base their support on their loyalty or ties to the chief, king or religious leader. Stating the contrast in its simplest form, Hodgkin asserts

"elites parties are content to reflect the structure as it is, or used to be; while mass parties attempt to impose their own new type of structure upon s o c i e t y . "7

7Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1961) p. 69. 15

Morgenthau basically reached the same conclusions in

her analysis on mass and patron parties. For

Morgenthau, mass parties attempt to enroll all members

of the population. They claim to represent all the

people, use organization as a weapon, integrate the

population into a nation and move towards democracy.

Patron parties are weakly organized, have little if

any direct membership participation and are not

democratic.

Interestingly enough, most of these writers viewed African nations as constituting highly centralized political systems with high levels of political participation. Many of the writers argued

that the trends toward centralization and mass politi­ cal participation provided African nations with the best opportunity for rapidly overcoming the socio­ economic barriers to nation-building. According to

Wallerstein,

"Most African nations came to independence by organizing a nationalist movement which laid effective claim to power. Almost everywhere the trend after independence has been in one of two directions; towards a one- party state (i.e. centralized) with subsequent stability or towards a breakdown of the party system with consequent instability and a tendency for the army to play a growing role. . . "®

^Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa; The Politics of Independence (New York; Vintage Books, 1961) pp. 55-96. 16

Increasingly in the middle 1960's, writers began

to modify some of the approaches used to characterize

African political systems. Rather than lump all

African countries into one category and apply general­

izations to this category, many began to articulate

the need for making distinctions within categories.

The book edited by Coleman and Roseberg is a pioneering

one in this content. In Political Parties and National

Integration in Tropical Africa,9 the authors were

concerned with analyzing the role of political parties and other groups in the functioning and development of the new African societies. To set the stage for their discussion, they observed that after Independence many of the African nations continued to maintain the "national" representative institutions inherited from the imperial powers. These institutions however, have tended to remain fragile and non-functional in the processes of government. Under conditions of institutional fragility and the absence of national cultural traditions, power within the new states has passed by default into the hands of organized groups— political parties.

The authors asserted that most uni-party dominant states can be divided into two prevailing forms:

1) the "pragmatic-pluralistic" pattern and 2) the

9James S. Coleman and Carl G. Roseberg. Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1964)'. 17

"revolutionary centralizing systems." The revolutionary centralizing systems are seen to be heavily pre-occupied with ideology. Their socio-economic programs are regarded as revolutionary and are intended to transform the entire society. The leadership is often anxious to replace traditional values which tend to inpede moderni­ zation. The parties encourage mass participation but maintain a monolithic and highly centralized organiza­ tion. In contrast, the pragmatic-pluralistic types are less ideologically oriented. The leadership of this group is less revolutionary in its proposed socio­ economic programs. Unlike the other group, they are inclined to allow traditional values within their political systems. The party restricts the level of political participation. As we will see in the case of the True Whig Party, a party which can be identified as a cadre party, the distribution of political patronage is used to limit effectively the level of political participation. In terms of its relationship to other groups, the "pragmatic-pluralistic" type is noted for tolerating a form of controlled pluralism, whereas, the "revolutionary-centralizing" pattern is noted for discouraging the growth of any organization which could rise to challenge its hegemony. Consequently, the

"revolutionary-centralizing party tends to curtail the 18

growth of parallel organizations by bringing them under

its folds.

Quite a number of writers have evaluated critically

many of the assumptions and findings on centralization

and political participation in African systems.

Notable among these critics is Aristide Zolberg.

Previous writers, commenting on African political

systems, referred to the one-party system as exercising

universal controls over the population, institutions

and all facets of the nation states. These writers

perceived the one-party system as attempting to

integrate disparate ethnic groups into the nation state

as well as performing a centralizing role in the nation-

building process. Zolberg along with others have

disputed such claims. He argued that it is wrong to

regard African systems as performing revolutionary or

centralizing roles. According to him, many of the

"revolutionary systems" fail to effectively manage

affairs at the local levels. Central organs do not get

the responses they want from regional and district party bodies. Moreover, there is a great deal of

deflection from central orders and plans. Commands made at the center are simply not implemented. Finally,

Zolberg stated that, although the leadership is

l^See f°r example the edited book by Coleman and Roseberg, op. cit. 19

authoritarian in its domain (i.e. cities?) that domain

is very limited and on the whole, national leaders

have little authority. That is, their activities do

not fill the entire political system in which they

operate.H

In the book, Political Order in Changing

Societies,12 Huntington observed that during the 1950's

and 1960's there was a high incidence of instability

among less developed nations. Throughout the world,

there was a decline in political order, an undermining

of the authority, effectiveness and legitimacy of

government. He asserted that this lack of political

stability can be attributed to rapid and inadequately

regulated modernization. According to Huntington,

the "development of a civic polity may have some relation to the stage of modernization and of political participation but it is not directly dependent upon

it."13 He then proceeds to develop a distinction between

"development" and "modernization." Utilizing the

indices of economists, Huntington viewed "development"

HAristide Zolberg. Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968) , pp. 131-132.

l^Samuel P. Huntington. Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1969).

l^ibid., p. 83. in terms of: per capita national income, percent of literate, percent of population engaged in non- agricultural employment, per capita GNP etc. On the other hand, "modernization" is viewed in terms of a nation's ability to develop highly adaptable, complex and autonomous organizations. As a means of demonstrating his point, the author presented the examples of Argentina as a case in which all of the criteria of economic develop­ ment were achieved by the middle of the twentieth century.

Nevertheless, Argentina suffered from a lack of equally strong institutions. This fact is evidenced in the number of coups and counter coups which have constantly plagued this nation. This type of instability has prevented

Argentina from becoming a "modern" nation state. Correspond ingly, the political institutions of India are seen to be highly "modern." In terms of economic development however, India is ranked within the "non-development category." Apparently, Huntington is convinced that for a nation to progress from a relative stage of "backwardness, it must possess the resources for fulfilling the require­ ments of both a "modern" and "developed" polity.

On another level, Huntington argued that in most developing nations, there exist low levels of political institutionalization. Huntington thus conceptualized political development as institutionalization. For him, 21

"institutionalization is the process by which organization and procedures acquire value and stability. The level of institutionalization of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy of its organizations and procedures. "14

The author then went on to examine various strategies which could be used to achieve the institutionalization of governmental structures as well as of participatory institutions. He discussed the limited potential

(i.e. in terms of socio-economic development) of traditional monarchies, the somewhat greater capability of military regimes and the much greater potential of party government. The development of effectively managed political parties is seen as providing a channel for regulating the political actions of the rural masses.

Essentially, Huntington viewed the institutionalization of political parties as providing the best opportunity for stability and socio-eocnomic development.

World War II and its aftermath, brought western public administrators into direct contact with a range of political systems that did not easily fit western conceptual and theoretical models. This awareness, coupled with the political independence of many new nations, impelled both scholars and policymakers alike to broaden the scope of their research so as to include

14Ibid. 22

political systems for which descriptive terms such as

"primitive" were clearly inadequate. The writings of

most of these individuals were heavily influenced by the

worlds of Max Weber and Talcott Parsons. Weber is of

general interest to both political scientists and

sociologists, primarily because of his ideal-typical

construction of authority systems associated with

societies that are essentially "traditional,"

"charismatic" or "legal rational." Moreover, his

identification of bureaucracy as the kind of system

typical of a legal rational authority system has had a

pervasive effect among scholars and practitioners within

the area of public administration. 15 on the other hand,

the influence of Parsons derives in part from his model of society, consisting of interrelated sectors having

to do with the functions of integration, adaptation, pattern maintenance and goal attainment. Parsons' most apparent impact within the area of bureaucracy and development relates to his concept of pattern variables.1®

Without going into further details at this point on Weber or Parsons, let us examine the writings of some individuals

l5Max Weber. Essays in Sociology, translated by H.H. Gerth and G. Wright Mills, New York: Oxford University Press, 1946. These essays contain the discussions on bureaucracy as well as on discipline power and authority.

15Lawrence C. Mayer. Comparative Political Inquiry (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey, 1972) p. 127. 23

they have influenced. Many of these writers have con­

structed typologies of administrative systems, specifically

dealing with developing areas. Riggs, Braibanti,

La Palombara, Esman, Eisenstadt and others are some

who have written extensively on the issue of administra­

tive centralization vis-a-vis decentralization in

developing nations.

In an article, "Bureaucrats and Political Develop­

ment: A Paradoxical ViewJ‘17 Riggs asserted that develop­

ing nations are characterized by an unbalanced {i.e.

centralized) growth of bureaucracy. Riggs attributed

centralization of bureaucracy to several factors:

1) The colonial legacy, which had as

its basic objectives, the policies of maintaining

law and order, collecting taxes etc. placed

heavy emphasis on the development of the adminis­

trative sector;

2) The policy or tendency of the western

"aid-giving" nations to stress administrative

development as the single most important "spark"

to development;

3) The relative ease with which administra­

tive systems adapt to technological change and

Joseph La Palombara, ed. Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) p. 120. 24

4) The tendency of developing nations to

carry on old policies or adopt new policies

adding to the unbalanced growth of the civil

bureaucracy. Conceptualizing development as

increasing differentiation (i.e. balanced or

decentralized) , Riggs emphasized the need for

the development or strengthening of other

institutions— local and national— which could

serve not only as viable countervailing power

centers to the civil bureaucracy, but also as

channels fon the distribution of resources to

all sectors of the population.

On another level, Riggs attempted in his book

Administration in Developing Nations: The Prismatic

Society,18 to identify or specify empirical examples

of Prismatic administrative conditions. In his book,

the author began by pointing out that traditionally public administration is viewed as the apparatus

(subject to a political organization) charged with the

task of implementing the laws. The bureaucarcy is

supposed to be politically neutral; it does not partici­ pate in policy determination; it has no specific interest of its own, etc. The main questions in public adminis­ tration arise under this set of assumptions. Riggs then made a distinction between "formal" and "substantive" administration. He argued that while the "formal"

l®Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries, The Theory Prismatic Society. (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964). 25 administrative machinery may be valuable for heuristic purposes and for developed countries, it is misleading

to assume its existence in less developed countries.

The author said that discussions of principles of administration are generally prescriptive (as opposed to descriptive), for they pre-suppose "efficiency" in policy implementation as a normative goal. He cited the so-called principles of public administration as examples of the normative character of the traditional approach; "authority should be commensurate with responsibility;" 'fetaff functions should be clearly separated from line functions," etc. Such maxims,

Riggs warned, while good for some countries may be harmful in others. The question of applicability of these maxims arises out of the gap between "formal" administration and "substantive" administration in developing nations because of their heterogeneity— traditional government involves a mixture between the traditional and the modern. The "formal" model assumes homogeneity. To the extent that heterogeneity prevails, a model which characterizes only one element in the mix, however important the element, cannot be regarded as an adequate image of the whole.19

l^ibid., pp. 80-84. Riggs believed that any attempt to understand public administration in heterogeneous social systems must be based on a study of the "overlapping" inter­ relationships as well as the internal mechanisms of administrative structures viewed as autonomous entities.

Convinced that "formalism" is not cognizant of reality in developing nations, being too legalistic,

Riggs suggested a new approach— a structural functional approach. This approach considers administration as a subsystem; as part of a larger social system. After criticizing the traditional study of government and policies for being concerned with structures, he then introduced his "prismatic (mixed) model". Drawing on simple optical theory, Riggs employed a conceptual model based on the "diffraction" of polychromatic light passing through a prism. At the source, the light is

"fused," while at the other end it is "diffracted" into a spectrum. Analogously, the traditional society is termed "fused" while the modern society is "diffracted.

The traditional structure is called "fused" because it performs a limited number of functions; it is

"functionally specific." The modern system is "diffracted because it performs a large number of functions; it is

"functionally diffuse." The prismatic society is comparable to the state of the light within the prism— 27 neither quite fused nor fully diffracted (neither modern nor traditional).

In the article, "Bureaucratic Politics in

&>■ Comparative Perspective,"20 Riggs presented a less abstract analysis in attempting to delineate some of the differences between so-called modern and non-modern administrative systems. According to Riggs, there is a reasonably stable balance of power relationship between the bureaucracy and the constitutive systems— executive, legislative, judiciary political party and so forth— within a modern polity. On the other hand, the non-modern polity is characterized by an imbalanced power relationship between the bureaucracy and the constitutive system. Riggs was convinced that a strategy of balanced development would enable developing nations to develop socio-economic policies which would accrue relatively equitable benefit to the entire population.

Like Riggs, Eisenstadt also believed that a developed political system is one in which power is shared between the bureaucracy and participating insti­ tutions. He viewed bureaucracy as the key institutional framework within which political elites create of fail

2^Fred Riggs, ed. Frontiers of Development Administration (Duke University Press, 1971) pp. 375-414. 28

to create capabilities related to the satisfaction of

demands. Nevertheless, Eisenstadt believed that in

order to function optimally over time, bureaucracy must

diffuse power and resources in order to maintain a

delicate balance with other groups or institutions

within society.

In contrast to the above writers, there is a

group of public administrators who view the uneven

development of the civilian administrative sector as

being a good or desirable strategy for development.

Advocates of this strategy fall into the "imbalanced"

(centralized) administrative development category.

Ralph Braibanti and Milton Esman are two of the major

proponents of this position.22

Braibanti argued that the process of institutional

development in developing nations will necessarily be

asymmetrical. The bureaucratic sector often would

wield unequal power, but uneven bureaucratic development

should not be discouraged. In fact, it should be

^l-Eisenstadt Nimrod Raphaeli edition— Readings in Comparative Public Administration (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1967) p. 220.

22The position of these two schools of thought— balance vs. imbalance— is discussed by Ilchman and Bhargava in an article entitled: "Balanced Thought and Economic Growth." Economic Development and Cultural Change XIV, 1966. pp. 385-399. 29

encouraged. Since political leadership in developing

nations is confronted with a high public demand for

social services, administrative capability in emerging

nations must be strengthened. Unlike Riggs and others,

Braibanti viewed administrative centralization as an

effective means for promoting the delivery of public

services in emerging nations. Therefore, he opposed

any attempt to deliberately curtail the growth of

administrative capability. He believed that reforms

designed to strengthen the bureaucracy must proceed

irrespective of the maturation of the political

system.23

Like Braibanti, Milton Esman is also committed to

the development of a strong bureaucracy. For Esman,

the development of a strong bureaucracy provides less developed nations with the best mechanism for effec­

tively dealing with their social and economic problems.

Commenting on Esman's belief in the need for a strong developmental bureaucracy, La Palombara wrote:

"Responding to those who might want to restitute before streamlining civilian administration and perhaps even to retard its growth as a machine of rationality and efficiency, Esman said: Debauching the bureaucracy by patronage appointments and even by the institutionalization of corrupt practices are condoned as devices for fostering non-bureaucratic activity and therefore political

23lbid., p. 354. 30

development. . .My hunch is that the remedy may be far more pernicious than the disease and that political development need not be at the cost of administrative development."24

To summarize, the writers discussed above favor

either the balanced or the imbalanced approach to

political development. For those within the balance

school, if either the party or the civil service

monopolizes power and performs the major role in the

thrust towards development, such imbalance is considered

dysfunctional to the overall growth process. The

simultaneous development of comparatively strong

institutions is conceived as constituting a more effec­

tive strategy for development. On the other hand,

advocates of the imbalance thesis tend to look favorably

on the development of a strong bureaucracy. It is not

only seen as good and hence a positive benefit, it is

also seen as providing emerging nations with the best

mechanism for dealing with the array of problems which

confront them.

In summary, this chapter has been concerned with

synthesizing and integrating three diverse bodies of

literature: that on African political parties, that on

political and administrative development and that on

policy outputs. Each of the three approaches related

24Milton Esman, Joseph La Palombara article, "Theory and Practice in Development Administration: Observations on the Role of the Civilian Bureaucracy" C.A.G. paper (January 1967) p. 24. 31

specifically to the topic of this study. The literature

on political and administrative development encompassed

the issue of balanced versus imbalanced development. In

the drive towards economic growth, each nation opts for

the adoption of a particular strategy which it believes will further the objectives it is attempting to achieve.

Nations do not always however, choose the most rational

strategy. Occasionally, some nations choose strategies which are incompatible with their stated objectives.

Liberia's policies are riddled with contradictions. On one hand, she espouses a formal policy which is based on the principle of insuring the equitable distribution of socio-economic and political resources to all Liberians.

On the other hand, she pursues in reality, policies which prevent her from achieving the formally stated objectives.

With this purpose in mind, an attempt will be made to bring into focus the major arguments of the three groups of literature as a means of demonstrating what adminis­ trative development strategy has been selected and the extent to which this strategy hinders or supports

Liberia's objective of achieving an equitable distribution of political participation and policy outputs among

Liberians.

The chapters which follow will develop these issues more fully. In particular, Chapter 2 provides a discussion and an analysis of four factors which have influenced public 32 administration in Africa in general and in Liberia in particular. The chapter shows that where Liberia was never colonized by an imperial power, she adopted many of the colonial administrative features. For example, one may pick the political ideology adopted by Liberia.

Liberia's political ideology was influenced directly by the colonial concept of indirect rule. The system of indirect rule was used in Liberia to integrate vertically disparate groups within the political system.

Chapter 3 demonstrates that during the first period of Liberia's administrative development, the system of administration was neither centralized nor decentralized. Lacking financial resources and the institutional capacity to pursue centralized development, the central government limited substantially the activities of the national government in hinterland areas to the collection of taxes and the maintenance of law and order. Using the philosophy of gradualism, hinterland participation was restricted to a few chiefs and "civilized countrymen." Meanwhile, power resided mainly in the hands of coastal elites. The majority of the hinterland population received little or no benefits from the national government. Drawing on Riggs and Edelman among others, the chapter shows that the government relied heavily on the use of formalism and 33

symbolism as a means of demonstrating to hinterland

groups its concern for their welfare.

Chapter 4 shows that with the introduction of

national planning and increasing financial resources,

the second period of Liberia's political development

was marked by increasing centralization of govenrment

programs and administration. During this period,

Tubman and the True Whig Party established firm

centralized control over major organizations within

the nation. Again, relying upon the ideology of

gradualism, formalism and symbolism, Tubman and the

coastal elites increased hinterland participation

only to the extent that it did not threaten the poli­

tical hegemony of coastal elites.

Chapter 5 discusses and evaluates public programs which were designed supposedly to benefit hinterland

groups. Lacking an effective voice in the development

and implementation of these programs, hinterland groups

received very little benefit from the programs' existence.

Instead, many of the program policies were shaped to

benefit the elites.

In conclusion, there is a vital need for under­

standing the relationship between administrative

centralization and its influence on political partici­ pation and the distribution of public resources to 34 hinterland areas. As we have seen from our survey of the literature, there is a general lack of consensus among political scientists and public administrators within this area, while some tend to view system characteristics as positively influencing the formation of public policies, others tend to dismiss their significance. For this latter group, the level of economic development accounts more for the variation of public policies among nations. A better under­ standing of this relationship not only would provide

Liberia with a more effective means of implementing public policies, it would also contribute towards the development of the discipline of political science and public administration. In the case of Liberia, there has never been a systematic attempt to:

a) examine the implications of the relationship

between administrative centralization,

political participation and service delivery

and

b) examine the extent to which this relationship

influenced the development of public policies

in Liberia. CHAPTER II

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIO­

POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

In attempting to foster development, elites in emerging nations consciously devise formulas which serve as an ideology for development within the parti­ cular political system. Ideologies are created to legitimize the political positions of leaders as well as to amalgamate citizens of disparate background.

In addition to this definition, Douglas Ashford in his book, provided a definition which will be used in this chapter. Ideology is defined as:

"a pattern of beliefs and concepts both factual and normative which purport to explain complex social phenomena with a view to directing and simplifying socio­ political choices facing individuals and groups."1

In the case of Africa, each African leader selects a form of ideology which is generally a reflection of the socio-political conditions of the nation. To deal with the specific problems of Liberia, Tubman devised a pragmatic and gradualistic form of ideology which he

Do u g l a s E. Ashford, Ideology and Participation (Beverly Hills: Sage Publication, 1972) p. 25.

35 36

characterized as Tubmanism. How, one may ask, has this

ideology affected public administration in Liberia?

In order to understand the relationship between

ideology and public administration in Liberia, one must

have an understanding of the historical origins of the

dominant ideologies in Africa generally and in Liberia

in particular. The historical origins of the socio­ political ideologies behind public administration in

Africa generally and in Liberia specifically are to be found in: a) colonialism, b) African socialism, g ) nationalism, and d) the need for political stability.

Colonialism

Colonialism is an emotionally charged word and often defies objective definition. The legacy of colonialism has been described so often and so completely, both by those who are inclined to magnify its achieve­ ments and by those who are inclined to belittle it, that there is little need for a comprehensive restate­ ment. It will suffice to review certain aspects of the British colonial inheritance which are relevant to this study: to ignore them would limit understanding of present phenomena.

Reduced to its barest form, colonialism is a foreign rule imposed upon a people. There are many economic and political implications of this rule. In 37

the Rostowian stages of economic growth, colonial policy helped these colonies move from traditional economies to the pre-take off stage. In seeking to stimulate the production of those products which the imperial economy could use, the colonial powers trans­ formed the traditional non-monetary economies. The impact of ideas from the colonial "invasions" shocked the traditional society and began or hastened its undoing, thereby shaping circumstances out of which a modern alternative to the traditional society was constructed out of the old culture. The idea spread that economic progress is a necessary condition for some other purpose. Judged to be good: be it national dignity, private profit, the general welfare or a better life for the children.^

In a political sense, British colonialism is said to have hastened the development of the latent abilities of the citizens in her colonies, whatever the nature of colonialism many writers, agree on one point-— colonialism is a bureaucratic system par excellence.

Administration in the British colonial system operated in a clearly defined area. The orientation and personnel of the civil service were directed towards the construction and prosecution of the imperial policies in Africa.

^W.W. Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth: A Non- Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). 38

According to Adu, the definition of the British

Civil Service embraced: all servants of the state, excluding the holders of political or judicial offices, who are employed in a civil capacity and receive monetary compensation form the government for the services performed. Included in this definition are all staff of departments or agencies and clerical workers,^ of course^ the definition does not include armed forces personnel, magistrates or judges. Liberia adopted this definition of the civil service. For the purposes of this study, this definition will be followed.

Under British colonialism, the main function of the service was to pacify the areas which by conquest or treaty had fallen into the British sphere of influence. The civil service in these African states was merely concerned with law and order and the collec­ tion of taxes. Each branch of the service was functionally related and the chain of command was clear and precise.

District commissioners or officers were responsible for the peace, welfare and order of the districts.

Furthermore, they were assigned the function of coordinating the activities of all local department officers. They maintained liaison with local traditional

O A.L. Adu, The Civil Service m New African States (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965) pT 25. 39 authorities where these existed and created chiefs where there were noneJ

The civil service played a very minimal role in the processes of industrialization. Such activities were primarily in the hands of private trading companies from overseas which were mainly interested in the sale of manufactured goods and the exploitation of mineral resources. Furthermore, the initiative for promoting agricultural development and other social services such as health and education came mainly from missionaries. For the most part, between 1900-1938, the civil service was not required or prepared to deal with the complexities of modern day socio-political and economic problems.

The above describes a situation which accorded with the general colonial experience of many African nations. Given her lack of such a colonial experience, can Liberia be fitted into the African administrative pattern? Unlike other African countries, Liberia was occupied by a group of Black American migrants— Americo-

Liberians. Leaving aside the lack of racial differences between Americo-Liberians and the indigenous groups

^Ibid., pp. 24-25. 40 however, the system of administration introduced by the

Americo-Liberian settlers was strikingly similar to that used by the British in her colonies.

During the early stages of Liberia's development, the civil service could involve itself only in the limited task of maintaining law and order. In the book Society and Polity of Tropical Africa, Kimble asserted that for the first eighty or more years of its existence, Liberia was unable to provide the minimum basic services to the majority of its population.

Consequently, most of the social services in hinterland areas were provided by missionary groups.5

During this period, the national government administrative activities were for the most part confined to Monrovia and the coastal counties. Although the constitution does not provide for a separate and distinct form of government for the hinterland areas, separate administrative practices for coastal and hinterland areas persisted for a long time in Liberia. (See Chapter 3.)

Hinterland administration in Liberia has been in a constant state of flux and can be broken down into four major stages:

^George H.T. Kimble, Society and Polity in Tropical Africa (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1960) pi 125. 41

1) 1847-1900. Administration of hinterland

areas was left entirely under the control of local

chiefs or kings.

2) 1900-1915. A period of close government

involvement in the selection of local chiefs.

During this period, each tribe was instructed

to submit for approval to the government, names

of paramount chiefs selected by the local

constituents. Following government approval,

the chiefs then were commissioned by the president

and thus became directly responsible to the

government.

3) 1915-1929. The hinterland was divided into

five districts under the control of district

commissioners appointed by the president. Under

the arrangement, the selection and distribution

of powers to local chiefs was contingent upon the

demonstration of their allegiance to government

policies.

4) 1930-1944. The five administrative

districts were further reduced to three provinces— western, central and eastern. In this case, each province was administered by a commissioner

selected by the president. Local chiefs were selected by the local constituents but their selection was subject to the veto of the president.®

This pattern of administration was quite similar to the system of colonial administration established by the British— a system of indirect rule. Under this system, district commissioners utilized to as great an extent as possible tribal political structures and traditional authorities as vehicles for central govern­ ment control. For the Liberian leadership, the insti­ tutionalization into the hinterland areas system of the administrative system adopted in the British colonies was considered appropriate for serving the limited objective of law and order and the collection of taxes.

According to Liebenow, the utilization of traditional authorities as instruments of the central government in the maintenance of law and order at the local level had many advantages for the Americo-Liberians. One major advantage is that,

"it perpetuated the social divisions of the hinterland into more than twenty tribal groups and capitalized upon the existing political fragmentation of these tribal groups into relatively autonomous chiefdoms."7

®Jerome Ernest Yancy, Historical Lights of Liberia Yesterday and Today (New Yorkl Jaffee, 1954) pT 152.

^J. Gus Liebenow, Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege (New York: Cornell University Press, 19 69) p. 57. 43

This condition prevented the possibility of a confronta­ tion between a unified tribal population and the dominant minority of Americo-Liberians.

The policies pursued during this period were to have important consequences for the future. As we will observe in chapter three, many of the policies of this period would be used by the Liberian leadership to mtaintain central government control.

Nationalism

The end of World War II was followed by an upsurge of African nationalism which culminated in the attain­ ment of independence by most African countries. But this development revealed some of the stark realities of freedom to African leaders who quickly realized that the political advantages of independence would be rendered meaningless without a corresponding advance in the standard of living of the population. The logic, or, one might say, the momentum of decolonization is that it should extend from the political to social and economic spheres.

The new African nations found themselves faced with an administrative machinery which was designed to meet the needs of the imperial countries. The adminis­ trative structure was comprised of a large number of 44

expatriate officers. It was therefore understandable

that one of the first goals of the new leaders was

Africanization of a substantial part of the civil

service. According to Adu:

"Africanization is defined as the process of transforming a colonial type service into a national on e . "8

But the replacement of expatriates by local personnel

is not the sole aim of Africanization. For many

leaders, the most important aspect of Africanization

is the creation of a national civil service whose

structure is designed to take up the burdens of nation

building. For example, one may transform a law and

order administration into an administrative system which is capable of participating in the development

and implementation of economic development programs.

As Panandiker asserted:

"The emphasis here (i.e. development adminis­ tration as opposed to colonial administration) is not on appropriational authority or on preventing disequilibrating forces, but on the attainment of goals and targets established in the planned programmes of the government which may in fact have built in forces disturbing social equilibrium."9

80p cit., p. 10.

9Panandiker in Nimrod Raphael!, Readings in Comparative Administration (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 19T7) pp. 205-203. 45

How, one might ask, did Liberia participate in

this wave of African nationalism, since, unlike other

African nations Liberia was never colonized by a

European power? Liberians did not experience the

traumatic events associated with organized nationalist movements. Nationalism in Liberia therefore must be

seen as a general awakening of the socio-economic consciousness of Liberians, marked by an attempt to develop a more cohesive political system and to introduce values and thoughts consistent with attaining the objec­ tives of the constitutional guarantees of equality, justice and freedom for all Liberians. That is, the development of policies designed to integrate the hinterland population into the political system.

The Americo-Liberian leadership as we have seen, adopted substantial portions of British colonial administrative features: territorial commissioners, district commissioners and elected chiefs. Moreover, taxes were collected without representation. In contrast to the coastal counties whose elected representative made up the legislature, none of the hinterland provinces had a representative voice in government.

The election of President William vs. Tubman in

1943 was singled out as the beginning of a series of planned and regulated changes within Liberia. Tubman 46 proceeded to develop a system of authority based upon the legitimacy of the regime. A System of national identity, either real or symbolic, should be one which all Liberians would view the central government as representative of their individual interest. Within this context, Tubman warned against the dangers of continuing dual forms of administration as well as policies which excluded hinterland areas from partici­ pating in the decisions of the central government.

Tubman argued that Liberia must not continue to exist as a nation divided between Americo-Liberians and indigenous or hinterland Liberians; rather it must function as a cohesive nation catering to the interests of all Liberians. This new concept of oneness exemplified in the speeches and public programs of Tubman can best be understood when viewed as the 'politics of form', in which symbolic actions were considered important to the government1 s decisionmaking process.

African Socialism

An important aspect for studying present day administration is African socialism— a generic term for vague and varied interpretations of socialism by African leaders and intellectuals. Ideologically, the African countries have chosen a middle road lying somewhere between what they regard as the extremes of capitalistic 47 organization exemplified by the United States, and of communistic organization chiefly exemplifed by the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The position is described by the Liberian Government as discretional non-alignment. The projection of a neutralist image is seen as an important means of enhancing the prestige of African leadership and of increasing the sense of national identify. Non-alignment is conceived as an expression of both the will and the ability to stand alone as a people and as a state. In any case, the concepts of African socialism range from the moderate

Senegalese and Tanzanian ones, which stress the attitudinal aspects of socialism viewed as growing naturally out of traditional communalism; to the extreme

Marxist-Leninist views of Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and

Sekou Toure of Guinea.

Of greater importance to this study are, the administrative implications of socialist attitudes.

It is the general belief of African socialists that socialism will emanate from the majority's conviction that this ideology answers the need for a moral and just society. In order to accomplish this objective, African socialists demand, equality of opportunity, social justice and the elimination of all class distinctions and privileges. For Marx, a socialist change was viewed 48 as rational. In the words of Leopold Senghor, President of Senegal:

"Socialism for us is nothing but the rational organization of human society considered in its totality, according to the most modern and efficient methods."10

Socialism then is regarded as essentially rational as opposed to arbitrary; for those who believe in it, it calls for some rational social action. Thus, Tubman warned against the continuation of dual forms of administrative machinery with all its privileges and class distinctions and pledged to develop an adminis­ trative system more in line with the goals of his administration.

Tubman and many African leaders dismissed the classic Marxist concept of the class struggle as having little relevance to Africa. Senghor sees the traditional

African society as being basically classless. Julius

Nyerere, although recognizing the existence of a stratified society, explained it in this way:

"In traditional African society, everybody was a worker. There was other ways of earning a living for the community. Even the elder who appeared to be enjoying himself without doing any work and for whom everyone else appeared to be working, had in fact worked all his younger days. The wealth he now appeared to possess was not his personally;

■^Leopold Sedar Senghor, African Socialism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger^ 1964) see Chapter on Senegalese Socialism. 49

it was only his as the elder of the group which had produced it. He was a guardian— wealth itself gave him neither power nor prestige. The respect paid to him by the young was his because he was older than they and had served in his community longer.

The ideology of African socialism as espoused by Nyerere is geared primarily towards achieving agriculture development and national unity. Accordingly, he attempts to create among the population the will to work, sacrifice and cooperate in programs of economic development. In an attempt to permeate the entire society with this philosophy Nyerere asserted:

"The true socialist may not exploit his fellows. So that if the members of any group within our society are going to argue that because they happen to be contributing more to the national income than some other groups, they must therefore take for themselves a greater share of the profits of their own industry than they actually need, and if they insist on this in spite of the fact that it would mean reducing their group1s contribution to the general income and thus slowing dcwn the rate at which the whole community can benefit, then that group is exploiting (or trying to exploit) its fellow human beings. There are bound to be certain groups which by virtue of the "market value of their particular industry will contri­ bute more to the nation's income than others. But the others may actually be producing goods and services which are of equal or greater intrinsic values although they do not happen to command such a high artificial value. For example, the food produced by the farmers is of more social value than the diamonds dug up by

Julius Nyerere, Ujama: Essays on Socialism (Dar-es- Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968) p . 57 50

the miners. Quite correctly the miners could assert that their labor was yielding greater financial profits to the community than the farmers. If, however, they went on to demand that they should therefore be given most of that extra profit themselves and that no share of it should be spent on helping the farmers they would be potential capitalists."12

For Nyerere, the blending of the traditional with the modern is considered an important element in nation building. Accordingly, he sees the institutionaliza­

tion of the egalitarian principles of traditional

African society as a positive step in this direction.

Liberia's attitude towards socialism is not as clearly defined as that of Tanzania or Guinea. The ruling True Whig Party has declared that it is the party's aim to work with "other socialist organizations" suggesting that the party is itself socialist. On the other hand, there is President Tubman's bold and revolutionary "unification policy" (described below) which contained phrases and words similar to those used by Nyerere or Toure.

Yet, while the public pronouncements of the Tubman administration may appear to contain all the trappings of moderate African socialism, Tubman can be more accurately described as a pragmatist, influenced by many of the ideas of African socialism. Domestically and internationally, the Tubman leadership assumed a more accurate

•*-2Ibid., p. 9. 51 posture than most new African nations. Tubman emphasized an approach which was flexible and pragmatic enough to meet fluid conditions and to avoid the stagnation of doctrinaire positions. In this sense, he spoke of the ideology of Tubmanism. This philosophy as explained by a hinterland chief, teaches that Liberia (and for all that matters the world)is one and all inhabitants are created equal. Therefore, both the literate and illiterate people of Liberia— "Civilized and uncivilized"— should

I O , learn to live together. In actual practice, the doctrine of Tubmanism was couched in a great deal of personalism, symbolism, formalism and gradualism. Tubman's pragmatic approach extended to his management of Liberian politics.

In speeches, he carefully avoided raising exaggerated expectations. Instead, he pursued policies which were noted more for their form and symbolism than for their tangible benefits.

Upon attaining office in 1944, the Tubman adminis­ tration immediatley launched as one of its first programs a national unification scheme. The objective of this scheme was to serve as a mechanism for integrating all

Liberians into a cohesive nation state. Coupled with this, the program provided for equal opportunity and protection under the law, as well as the equitable

l^Daily Listener, June 29, 1954. 52

distribution of public resources to all Liberians.

Addressing himself to the need for improving the social

and economic conditions of tribal groups, President

Tubman in his first legislative message on November 1,

1944 said:

"This plan (unification program) envisages new educational methods and improvements in economic conditions as the solution to the problem. A synopsis of which is: a) Introduction of a diversified educational system to give training in economics, scientific and vocational areas, b) Education of the masses in health and sanitation, c) Governments protection of the people's economic efforts, d) protection of labor and capital, e) Encouragement of local industries, f) A total road scheme for the Republic, g) Communications to link up the Republic by telephone and radio, h) Encourage all trans­ portation, i) Survey all lands to ascertain private and public domains, j) A geological and mineralogical survey of the country, k) Agricultural survey, 1) Encouragement of immigration.

The second plan will incude: a) Compulsory education, b) Improve the quality of our hinterland administration and district commissioners, c) Freedom of travel in the hinterland, d) Establish a native adminis­ tration school, e) Tribesmen of the provinces are to be represented as full-fledged members, f) Allocation of a portion of taxes for the improve­ ment of areas where they are collected, g) Better engineering in road construction, h) Establish an agricultural experiment station, i) Study of African institutions and assessing their values, j) Strict control of the frontier force soldiers in the hinterlands."14

l4"The First Annual Message of President Tubman to the Second Session of the 44th Legislature" (Nov. 1, 1944) Monrovia, Liberia. 53

Prior to the administration of Tubman, hinter­ land areas were subjected to widespread use of physical violence by individual district commissioners as well as by some soldiers of the Liberia Frontier Force.

This practice created a great deal of unrest and antagonisms within the hinterland areas. Cognizant of the potentially explosive nature of this problem,

Tubman in his first inaugural address on January 3, 1944 asserted:

"For it is to these fellow citizens, our inhabitants of the hinterland that we must look very largely for the future maintenance and perpetuity of the state. For we are aiming at developing a civilized state, the civilization of which will be as weak as its weakest pagan link, if due precaution be not taken. Due regard for the tribal authority shall be insisted upon and cases of malfeasance and misfeasance by officials charged with the administration of hinterland districts shall be dealt with rigidly and effectively. Penalities shall extend beyond removal from office. It would seem most important that the greatest possible care should be taken that the right kind of training which will develop the love of country should be provided, and that more direct participation by them in the hinterland and general administration of government should be extended by appropriate legislation. They shall receive in all matters fair and humane treatment, especially because of their unfortunate backwardness. In the meantime, firmness of judgment and prompt enforcement of law will be the attitude of this adminis­ tration. Rigid correctives will be adminis­ tered to willful recalcitrant characters in particular."15

15E . Reginald Townsend, President Tubman of Liberia Speaks (London: Allen and Unwin, 1959) p. 21. 54

An examination of some of the activities of the

Executive Council demonstrated in various ways the process through which the President dealt with the problem. Through the medium of executive conferences which were convened on a rotating basis in different parts of the nation, hinterland individuals were given the opportunity to articulate their grievances directly to the President— the symbol of the central goverr ent.

During these conferences charges were brought against district commissioners or other local officials.

Individual district commissioners or soldiers who were found guilty of subjecting the hinterland population to physical violence were summarily dismissed from their jobs by the President. As a result of Tubman's policy, there resulted a noticeable decline in physical violence inflicted upon chiefs and other individuals within hinterland areas.

Of significance here, is that executive council meetings allowed Tubman to emphasize the effectiveness of the state. These meetings not only provided the hinterland population with direct access to the President, but also enabled them to establish an identity with the nation. Although many of his plans and programs revealed several striking similarities to the goals and

■^Liebenow, op. cit., p. 75. 55

objectives of many African leaders within the moderate

socialist mold, Tubman made no attempt to ally his

policies with the ideology of African socialism.

Instead, he argued that such policies were necessary for

developing cohesiveness and thereby providing government

with the atmosphere for effectively spreading out the

socio-economic benefits to all sectors of the economy.

In Liberia, as in most developing nations, the latent

demands for social changes are so great that it would

be politically suicidal for any political leader to

ignore them. Cognizant of this fact, Tubman proceeded

to develop public programs based on an ideology which

incorporated many of the ideas of African socialism

but yet, remained flexible to deal with the special

problems of Liberia.

Need For Political Stability

Political stability is an important factor in the

administrative development of a nation. In Liberia and

other African countries, political stability is highly

desirable, but African leaders are aware that one of

the greatest sources of instability stems from the

problem of legitimacy. Government must be perceived

to exist not for pursuing the interests of a small minority; rather, it must lay claim to represent the

interests of its entire population. 56

Although the administering of social services

requires a degree of political stability, it can also

be said that the former can contribute towards the

achievement of the latter. By providing necessary social

services, a government not only can be seen to exist

but can do so in the interests of the people. This

type of administrative activity can and should be viewed

as a source of public consciousness. It should be

considered not only as an instrument of social action, but, also as an instrument to arouse enthusiasm in the populace.

In most developing nations, the bureaucracy occupies a key position in the process of political modernization.

But until the latter stages of the Tubman administration, the Liberian bureaucracy performed a minor role in the pursuit of the socio-economic objectives of the nation.

Programs for development were restricted principally to

Monrovia and the surrounding coastal areas. Upon assuming office, Tubman immediately realized the potential threat to stability posed by the continuation of public policies which benefitted a small minority of the population. Fully aware of this, Tubman placed a high degree of priority for achieving the twin goals of national unity and poli­ tical integration through a strategy of vertical integration.

This strategy (it should be added) was consistent with 57 his ideology of Tubmanism, maintaining stability and

change through policies of gradualism and formalism.

In recent years, social scientists have added a new dimension to the search for an adequate understanding of the processes of national development and integration.

Within this context, specific attention is given to the ties binding the rural sector to the urban centers.

In the case of Liberia, Tubman and the Liberian leader­ ship attempted to maintain stability through a process of vertical integration in which hinterland individuals viewed their relationship to the government as one running directly from the chief to the center. In essence, cross-cutting political ties were not formed and horizontal integration was ruled out. The strategy employed by Liberia has its origins in colonialism and is by no means unique. In a recent study of Sierra

Leone politics, Martin Kilson described the basic political framework of Sierra Leone— prior to coups of

1967— in terms of an alliance between the middle class elite and the traditional rural elite. According to

Kilson, this ruling alliance is held together by a mutual agreement to exchange local autonomy for votes:

"The central— Sierra Leone Peoples Party— elite depend upon the support of the chiefs, in return for which the latter are permitted a large influence in local politics through the archiac— native authority— system."17

l^Martin L. Kilson, Political Change in a West African State (Cambridge, Mass., 1967) p. 216. 58

Presenting a "reciprocity model of African politics,"

Kilson attempted to demonstrate the means through which

such alliances were formed, maintained and dissolved.

The model posits an exchange relationship between

leaders and followers. This relationship is one in which leaders are permitted to lead in return for something of value, frequently wealth. This relationship is similar to the familiar dyadic-patron-client. The study of dyadic relationship is also the subject of

Peter Blau's book, Exchange and Power in Social Life.

Among other things, Blau argued that a leader gains power over a follower as a result of an imbalance in exchange flows; the unilaterality of the interaction assures that one can demand obedience from the other. Authority emerges when norms exist which legitimize the demands made on subordinates and such norms are a collective expression of the willingness of the followers to follow.

That is, it is only when previously isolated subordinates

"get together," in some way and agree, at least implicitly, upon the intrinsic value of compliance that legitimizing norms appear. The values and perceptions of followers determine the legitimacy of power.

18Peter Blau, Excha:and Power in Social Life (New York, J. Wiley & Co., 19647“ 1964) p.p7 59

In the case of Liberia, Tubman relied on the influence of chiefs at the local level, to use Blau's phrase— "get the people together." Through this mechanism, compliance with the center's authority as well as stability has been achieved. Indeed, patronage has been one of the effective weapons used by the government to achieve stability as well as legitimacy.

As we will later observe, increase in government revenues have resulted in increased benefits to the coastal traditional hinterland elites. For example, in my discussions with Liberian officials, no one could recall an executive council meeting in which Tubman did not distribute gifts to the chiefs.

Finally in transitional societies like Liberia, where political integration and political stability are important ingredients necessary for achieving the goal of nation building, it is important that the poli­ tical leadership in each nation develop specific policies to minimize the threat of instability. Within the particular case of Liberia, the political ideology which emerged during the Tubman administration—

Tubmanism served to effectively contain this threat. CHAPTER III

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN HINTERLAND AREAS

1944-1954

Upon coming to power in 1944, Tubman became embroiled immediately in many of the post war socio­ economic developing nations. Specifically in Liberia's case, two major issues pre-occupied Tubman: economic development and embryonic nationalism.

In his inaugural address, Tubman underscored heavily the need for the development of health, agriculture, education and road services. The president further stressed that the lack of existing road facilities had resulted in the isolation of

Monrovia and the coastal counties from the hinterland of Liberia. Without roads, there was a general absence of adequate central government control outside Monrovia as well as a lack of mobility in the flow of goods from one part of the country to the other. For example, as a result of the lack of a system of road network which could facilitate the flow of goods from one area to another, there were often complaints about rice shortages in Monrovia and the coastal counties while at the same time in hinterland areas (less than three

60 61

hundred miles from Monrovia), rice was being produced

in excess of local needs.-*- This condition served as

one of the many factors accentuating the demand for

road development.

In corollary to the above objectives, Tubman

pledged further to dedicate himself not only to the

expansion of the hinterland policies of his predecessors

but also to make every effort to develop policies which

would unite all Liberians. Tubman emphasized the need

for building a cohesive nation, one in which an

individual does not conceive of himself as Kru, Vai,

Bassa or Americo-Liberian but rather as a Liberian.

Tubman noted in his inaugural address:

"We shall engage in and strive at the assimilation and unification of our various populations composing the body politic. . . Liberia must be a place for all Liberians to live in alike— all to stand equally, privileged, responsible and protected by like administration of law."2

Clearly Tubman's decision to re-evaluate the relation­

ship between the hinterland population and the Liberian

leadership was the result of both internal and external pressures. During the period following World War II, demands for Independence were heard by African nationalist groups in neighbouring countries. Demands

■''African Nationalist paper, March 24, 1944.

2Lawrence Marinelli, The New Liberia, A Historical and Political Survey, p. 36. 62

for political independence, i.e. on the basis of equality, were being echoed throughout the continents.

Liberia could not insulate her population from such doctrines. The extent however to which specific policies were developed to bring about Tubman's doctrine of "oneness" would to a large measure be determined by the actions of his administration. One indication of future actions as to the pace of progress anticipated by his administration in bringing about integration could be observed in his inaugural speech:

"In the administration of our population inhabiting the hinterland, our aim and purpose shall be to educate them into good and useful citizens, capable of knowing their dutyr status and rights as citizens and competent of exerting, enjoying and asserting them."3

Thus it appeared from this quote that while Tubman was in favor of assimilation, he was not prepared to achieve this objective through a rapid or radical transformation.

Rather for Tubman, assimilation would involve a slow and gradual process. Of course this strategy evoked unfavorable responses from individuals dissatisfied with the progress of his administration. Within this context, a major and acrimonious political skirmish would develop between Tubman as president and leader of the True Whig Party and Didwho Twe as opposition

^ibid., p. 36. 63

leader of the Reformation Party. The plan developed

by Tubman to deal successfully with this challenge

would serve as the beginning of a long series - of

presidential successes; resulting in a presidential

tenure free of interruptions for the next twenty-five

years. Finally, on the external level, in order to

obtain necessary financial support for the implementation

of his program Tubman would often respond to pressures

from the United States, a nation from whom he was anxious to get economic assistance.

President Tubman in his first inaugural message asserted that the United States Government regarded the drafting of a national plan as necessary for the protection of the income of the port of Monrovia.

Tubman proceeded to devise a plan consisting of: road construction, agriculture and health development, education and political participation— i.e. granting of suffrage. For practical purpose, this plan was nothing more than a set of topics representing the basic economic and political objectives of the Tubman

Administration; it was rather general and failed to develop specific criteria by which accomplishments could be measured. In any case, the plan was not accepted by the United States Government, a source from which the Liberian Government had anticipated 64

receiving most of the funds for financing the plan.

Instead, the United States Government suggested that

the Liberian Government in concert with the United

States Economic Mission stationed in Monrovia worked

together for the purpose of developing another and

more acceptable plan. This was done by a Joint

United States-Liberian Commission for Economic

Development.4

Through the combined efforts of the Liberian-

U.S. Commission for Economic Development, the new plan

was developed and accepted by both the Liberian and

United States Governments in December of 1950 to be

implemented within the span of five years. The five

years' plan of 1951-1955 proposed development along

five major lines at a total cost of $32,000,000.5

The lack of provision for the establishment of a formal

organization to coordinate the efforts of the Joint-

Economic Commission as well as other organizations engaged

in development was considered one of the major weaknesses

of the plan. Members of the board on the Liberian side

comprised principally of department heads who did not perceive of the plan as a mechanism designed to plan and

^See Appendix for Membership of Commission.

^See Appendix for breakdown of plan. 65

coordinate activities for the economy as a whole.

They were concerned essentially with the extent to which the plan benefitted their particular organiza­

tion. As a result, planning activities during this period were limited principally to the development of Monrovia and the coastal counties.

Liberia, from 1944-1954, was very much akin to the prismatic society envisioned by Riggs. According to Riggs, traditional societies are characteized by fused and undifferentiated structures. Conversely, modern societies defined as industrially developed and administratively effective are seen to possess diffracted or differentiated political systems. The prismatic society combines relatively fused traits with relatively diffracted ones. It presents an intermediate situation between the fused and diffracted ends of a continuum. This type of system is charac­ terized by institutions that do not resemble precisely the corresponding institutions in either modern or traditional societies.

Adopting the logic of Rigg's typology, it can be argued that if we recognize the existence of societies which developed structures intermediate between traditional and modern (e.g. western Europe between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries), so 66 too we should recognize the existence of administration systems historically intermediate between centralization and decentralization. Liberia after World War II was centralized structurally and became increasingly so given the growing power of Tubman's presidency. This picture was not unequivocal. However, for the Liberian

Government was so lacking in initiative as well as financial resources that decentralization was in existence de facto.® Lacking these resources, first line central government departments relied frequently on hinterland and county line administrators to utilize their own resources for the provision of services to their populations. The constitution of Liberia explicitly provides for a centralized form of government. Counties, provinces and other local branches of government are subordinate to the national government. They are created and assigned power according to the discretion of the central government. In formal terms, these local units possess no powers of their own. Within this context of local administration in Liberia, the county can be singled out as the largest and most important unit of government. County officers as well as other local government officials are appointed by the national government whose headquarter is in Monrovia.

®See Appendix for revenues of Liberia. 67

These officers or preferably local units of government are assigned specific functions by the national government. Some of these are:

1) Administering and maintaining the smooth

operation of the nation's laws.

2) Collecting taxes and maintaining law and

order.

3) Providing for the upkeep and maintenance of

all public roads, bridges and buildings.

4) Providing for the settlement of some legal

disputes within local courts of justice.

5) Recording transactions relating to the

purchasing of lands, deeds and surveys.

6) Conducting and supervising all local government

elections.

This form of administrative centralization places the responsibilities for economic, socio-political and administrative development of the local areas directly under the control of the national government. It gives the appearance of the national government tightly controlling the diffusion of economic, socio-political and administration resources to local areas. Of course as Riggs often warned us, when dealing with developing nations, it is necessary to look beyond the mere existence of formal structures which have been established to 68

perform certain functions. It may be necessary to

determine:

a) the extent to which the operation of these

structures differs from or accords with the

intended plan of operation or

b) the socio-economic constraints which prevent

the structures from operating in the manner

for which they were intended. The importance

of the latter will be evident throughout

this chapter.

From 1944-1954, the public management of local government activities in Liberia was based on a mixture of both centralization and decentralization. Administra­ tion in Liberia was divided along two principle lines: coastal and hinterland or native areas. The coastal strip extending forty (40) miles inland from the

Atlantic Ocean constituted five counties and four territories. Comprising the five counties were:

Montserrado, Cape Mount, Grand Bassa, Sinoe, and

Maryland. The territories consisted of Marshall River

Cess, Sasstown and Kru Coast. Each of these counties is directly controlled by the central government.

The president appointed a county superintendent. In addition, the present appointed all other county officials including the county collectors of internal 69

revenue. All county officials however worked under

the supervision of the county superintendents.

The interior was divided into three provinces,

western, central and eastern. Like the coastal areas,

administration in the hinterland provinces also was

controlled directly by the central government.

Administrative heads of each province were provincial

commissioners appointed by the president. Provincial

commissioners were responsible to the secretary of the

Interior who was a member of the president's cabinet.

Each province was divided into several districts. Each

of the subdivisions of the provinces was under the

supervision of a district commissioner who was appointed

by the president with formal approval from the Senate.

Each chiefdom was headed by a paramount chief. The

chiefdoms were in turn broken down into clans and

towns. Clans and towns were headed by clan or town

chiefs. The administration of tribal affairs in a

province was largely the responsibility of the paramount

chief who carried out his duties under the supervision of the provincial and district commissioners. Paramount chiefs were charged with the responsibility of imple­ menting statutory laws and administrative regulations passed by the central government.

This system of administration which was established during the administration of President Barclay (1930-1944) 70

served not only to strengthen the level of central

government control over hinterland areas but also

resulted in a special kind of relationship between the

True Whig Party and the men who were recruited to serve as chiefs. In Barclay's administration the old paramount chieftaincies based on ancient landowning lineages were reduced to the status of "clans" and were grouped into historically and geographically signi­ ficant sections under new paramount c h i e f s . ^ Therefore, paramount chiefs under the old system were relegated to clan chief status and new paramount chiefs were appointed. By the appointment of paramount over clan chiefs, the traditional political system was altered fundamentally. The new offices and jobs which were created by this major transformation of the hinterland political system culminated in intense competition among the popiilation for government favors. Through a system of reward and punishment, hinterland administra­ tive positions including that of paramount chiefs were offered to individuals who were loyal to the government and had fully or partially acculturated the values of

O the True Whig Party. According to d'Azevedo:

^Ernest Jerome Yancy. Historical Lights of Liberia's Yesterday & Today. New York, 1954. pp. 146-148.

^Liberian Studies Journal, Vol. II, No. 2, 1970, p. 103. 71

"Numerous chiefs and headmen were deposed by rivals who petitioned local commissioners or carried delegations to the president and had themselves appointed by decree tribal and informal government interior courts were over­ whelmed with charges and counter charges by which individuals and groups sought to prove their loyalty to government or to prove that others were disloyal."

Barclay was known to have encouraged the rivalry which this new arrangement generated. He awarded jobs and special favors to those who were considered loyal to government and ignored those whose support was ambiguous. Thus, positions in the hinterland adminis­ tration gradually became the avenue for social mobility into the governing class for individuals, characterized by d'Azevedo as "tribal" marginals.9 who were these

"tribal" marginals, one may ask. How did they acquire their positions in hinterland administration? "Tribal marginals were individuals who manipulated effectively their multilingual background and mixed cultural heritage.

This mixed background often allowed such individuals to represent either Gola, Kpelle, or other tribal groups as paramount, clan or town chief. The opening of Firestone concession coupled with the development of roads resulted in the pentration and settlement in the hinterland of a

9Ibid., pp. 110-115. 72

number of Americo-Liberians who had resided previously

in Monrovia and the coastal counties. They were

followed closely by Christian missionaries. Together

these two groups served as an effective mechanism for

the acculturation of large groups from the hinterland

who migrated to settle permanently in areas occupied

by Americo-Liberians and missionaries. It has been

noted that many of these individuals were refugees from

tribal wars who fled to the enclaves of Americo-

Liberian and missionary groups. The children of these

individuals constituted the majority of laborers and

house servants for Americo Liberians living in these

settlements. Their children also formed the majority of students entering missionary schools. Through these contacts, together with a network of intermarriage

(between hinterland groups as well as with Americo-

Liberians) , a close association was developed. This relationship often brought some members of hinterland groups into direct contacts with central government leaders in Monrovia. Their positions were enhanced through their familiarity with both tribal and non- tribal culture. Frequently, they legitimized their claims in the hinterland sector by marrying women from important lineages of local chiefdoms. Their link to tribal institutions was also strengthened by a method of permitting some of their children to be brought up in the 'hinterland way1 among the villages of their

wives. These men also assumed high ranking positions

within the poro or other tribal organizations. Equally

so, they married Americo-Liberian women living in the

enclave sector. Missionaries often hailed them as

"Christians and civilized chiefs."1° In fact, it was

not uncommon for such men to be known as an active

deacon of a Christian church. This method enabled

them to enjoy the best of both worlds— gaining easy

access to both the tribal community and the Americo-

Liberian group in Monrovia and the coastal counties.

Not trusted by either side, these men nevertheless

wielded enormous power and were respected and feared.

As "civilized countrymen," in favor of government

officialdom, they were often appointed to positions of

paramount chiefs or corresponding position of prominence

in hinterland administration. These men were, as they

are today, the sources through which the True Whig Party

recruited its members as well as maintained its support.

They often occupied top positions in the party at the

local level. Through their influence, wealthy Liberians

in Monrovia and coastal counties were able to purchase

tribal lands and converting them into private farms and plantations.I1 Finally, it should be noted that

11Ibid., pp. 110-115. 74 barring the personal benefits which accrued to these men

as a result of their participation in the central

government, the majority of the hinterland population had little or no voice in the administration of national government activities.

Throughout the early years of this period, the people of the hinterland could not vote. Although the

True Whig Party was formed in 1865, its membership was drawn largely from the elites in Monrovia and the coastal counties. Since 1870, Liberia has been ruled by the True Whig Party. The emergence of the True

Whig Party bore a strong resemblance to the development of parties in the western world. In the case of many

African countries, the party was formed for the purpose of freeing the country from foreign domination. In examining the genesis of the True Whig Party, one found that some of the main causes for its formation were related to the idea of challenging the discriminatory philosophy of the Republican Party. The color problem which had existed among Blacks in America reproduced itself in Liberia and thereby divided the Americo-

Liberian community into two competiting groups of

Mulattoes and Blacks. This division became institution­ alized socially into masonic clubs and politically into two parties. The old Whigs being that of the Blacks 75

and the True Liberian Party being that of the Mulattoes.

Between 1865 and 1867 both parties reorganized. The

True Liberian Party changed its name to the Republican

Party and the old Whig renamed itself to the True Whig

Party. Edward J. Roye's ascendency into the office of president marked the beginning of a long series of

True Whig domination in Liberian politics. Arising to 12 challenge the clanish philosophy of the Mulattoes,

it was generally assumed that the True Whig Party government would expand participation to all Liberians.

An analysis of the participative process would aid us in shedding light on the reality of this assumption.

The amendment of the constitution in 1944 which provided for the expansion of suffrage to the hinterland population as well as to women, ranked as one of the major achievements of the Tubman administration. Prior to 1944, there was a property qualification which restricted voting to only the owners of real estate property.I3 Leaving intact the requirement of property ownership, Tubman proceeded to broaden this qualification to include the owner of any hut upon which taxes had

■^The Republic Government was characterized by a system of limited participation which systematically discriminated against non-Mulattoes in the attainment of jobs, education and other social services within government.

13Liebenow, Liberia, the Evolution of Privilege. p. 73. been paid. Suffrage became an individual right in contrast to the past when a Chief acting in his corporate capacity as the holder of title to tribal land could register and vote the members of his community as a unit. Previously, the franchise also had been limited to electing representatives to sit in the house of representatives as delegates. This arrangement however, was contingent upon the payment of a fee of one hundred dollars ($100.00) by the hinterland population to the central government for each delegate represented in the lower house. As delegates, hinterland representatives participated and voted upon all matters relating to tribal affairs in the legislative agenda. This plan was abandoned in 1946. As a result, there emerged a change in the form of representation for the hinterland population. In 1948, the hinterland was allowed one of its first opportunities to elect representatives to the lower house. Even in 1948 however, their representation was limited severely. This year was marked by the election to the lower house of one representative each form the western, eastern and central provinces. Although there was no official census, it was estimated that these three provinces as compared to the coastal counties constituted the majority of population within Liberia.

Yet, three whole provinces with an estimated majority of 77

the population had only one representative each; while,

one county Moirtaerrado had seven representatives.

Individuals representing the three provinces were as

follows:

1. Eastern Province— Honorable D.P. Derricks

2. Central Province— Honorable Botoe Barclay

3. Western Province— Honorable Flomo Frumoyan

Two of the representatives from the provinces could neither speak nor write English. Even though all discussion sin the house of representatives were carried out in English. In some African countries where policy issues were discussed in English, paid interpreters were brought in as translators to serve as a communication link between speaking and non speaking representatives. Through this medium, policy issues were communicated in local dialects to the various representatives. The interpreter transmitted issues in simple and understandable language. The absence of this mechanism in Liberia limited the active participation of the hinterland representatives in the policy making process. A story often told by critics helped to crystalize this problem; it related to a non-

English speaking representative of the provinces.

During the proceedings of a particular day, several issues pertaining to both national and local policies 78

were brought up for discussions. Each representative

was called upon to articulate his views on the issues

being debated. The representative from one of the

provinces was called upon to state his position. His

reply uttered in pidgin English was as follows:

"If Richard Henries Gree I Gree." (Richard Henries is a

representative from Montserrado County and is presently

speaker of the house of representatives.) In addition,

to illustrating the language problems of hinterland representatives, this situation also symbolized one of the ways in which hinterland representatives could not or did not participate actively in decision making.

The lack of hinterland representation in the senate served as an additional example of the limited nature of hinterland participation within the political process.

During the entire span of this period, hinterland areas were not represented in the senate. The coastal counties however were each represented by two senators.

Lacking a voice in the senate, the hinterland population had little or no input in the selection of those who served in their areas. For example, District and

Provincial commissioners as well as a number of other administrators serving in hinterland areas were appointed by the president with approval from the senate. The absence of hinterland participation in the selection of 79

District offers may have accounted for the hostilities

which were often engendered between District officers

and the local population. Charges of brutality were

often levelled against many District officers by the

local population.Having examined specific cases

which pointed to the limited nature of hinterland

participation in decision making at the National

assembly levels, how then one may ask, was the influence

of the hinterland representatives felt in other areas

of government? To determine an answer to this question,

it appeared that Riggs' advice that when dealing with

developing nations one should learn to distinguish what

is supposed to happen from what is in fact happening would certainly serve as an appropriate guideline for undertaking this analysis. What then, could we ask did

in fact happen? Preliminary information presently

indicated that there existed an organized machinery of

informal participation between hinterland representatives and the central government. This relationship was in fact indispensible to the maintenance of central govern­ ment control over local areas. The relationship provided in an indirect way an opportunity for the hinterland population to participate in some of the major activities

l^Ibid., p. 75. 80 of the National Government. Specific areas of coopera­ tion were as follows:

a) The use of hinterland representatives as a

means of assisting the government in the

recruiting of laborers for Firestone.

b) Use of representatives as a means of assisting

government in collecting taxes.

c) Use of representatives as a means of legitimizing

National Government demands through traditional

political institutions such as the poro society.

d) The use of representatives by the hinterland

population as critical sources of contact in

the National Government. Each of these points

will be discussed in turn.

In 1926, the Liberian Government signed a long term agreement with Firestone, granting the company the right to produce rubber, Contrary to every day opinion however, many Liberians were openly critical of this agreement. For many of them including the then Secretary of State Edwin Barclay as well as other officials of government, believed that Liberia was being forced to sign an agreement whose terms were unacceptable. Indeed, it was only through heavy United States Government pressure that the agreement was finally s i g n e d .

!5The Canadian Journal of African Studies No. I, March 1967. Frank Chalk, The anatomy of an Investment: Firestones 1927 loan to Liberia, pp. 12-13. 81

The dual legacy of bitterness and dependence generated

by the 1927 loan concession had not been forgotten.

For in 1956, the government erected a statue of

President William U.S. Tubman to commemorate the

repayment of the debt to Firestone. A plaque on the

statue bore an inscription which reflected the legacy of

bitterness. It said:

"This monument erected by the people of Liberia is dedicated to the great relief brought to the country by the Tubman Administration in the retirement of the 1927 loan with its humiliating and strangulating effects on the economy of the nation. "^-6

Yet in spite of the acrimonious disagreements, once

the agreement was signed however, the Liberian Govern­

ment proceeded to enter into cooperative agreements with Firestone. One such agreement was the establish­ ment in 1926 (between Liberia and Firestone) of a

system of involuntary labor recruitment.-^ Through

the operation of this system, the Liberian Government provided workers to Firestone on a quota basis. As

a way of ensuring the success of the recruitment program, the government relied heavily on hinterland

representatives who often worked through local chiefs

i^Ibid.f pp. 12-32.

•^Johnetta Cole. Mobility and Wage Incentives, Northwestern University, Economic Survey, 1962. 82

in order to provide the government with the required

1 fi number of workers. ° Due to the fact that at one stage

of their careers the representatives had occupied

similar positions of chieftaincy. Their task was made

much easier, for as chiefs in their areas they had

performed previously corresponding task for the central

government. Botoe Barclay and Flomo Fromoyan were

considered two of the most prominent chiefs with a long

history of cooperating with the National Government.^

It was through their positions of chiefs that they

developed an alliance with the National Government.

For these men epitomized the image of the "civilized

tribesmen." It was not by mere coincidence that when

the hinterland areas were granted their first opportu­ nity to elect representatives to the lower house these men were elected to serve. In any case, through this network of recruitment, Firestone was able to fill the major portion of its labor force. For e.g. in 1954, 16,000 or 80% of Firestone work force was recruited through this method.20 Although the system of forced labor recruitment had been criticized,21 it should be noted however that the system did accrue some benefits to the

18Ibid.

l°Our Chiefs— State Department Report, Monrovia, Liberia, 1950.

20Johnetta Cole. Labor Mobility and Wage Incentives. Northwestern University Economy Survey, 1962. p. 50.

21Ibid., p. 50. 83

local population. This process enabled workers to be

brought directly into the money economy. Work at

Firestone provided the local population with the only

effective means for acquiring the necessary money to

pay taxes and buy consumer goods. Laborers while

away, often sent small amounts of money to their

relatives to assist in a number of activities. More­

over, upon returning home, workers who had accumulated

small amounts of money utilized it for the purpose of

shifting from subsistence to cash cropping. This

shift enabled many of them to participate actively in

all aspects of the national economy.

Taxation

Beginning from 1961, the Liberian Government

levied an annual hut tax on each hut within the hinterland provinces. This tax served as an important

link between the government and the local chiefs.

Each village chief obtained a commission from the central government as a form of compensation for his efforts in collecting the tax. Until the early forties, the hut tax served as an indispensible source of govern­ ment revenue. Cognizant of this fact, the government utilized the influence of the hinterland representatives in the staging of publicity campaigns designed to 84 appraise taxpayers of their obligations.22 By wielding their personal prestige and persuasion, the representa­ tives were often successful in getting the majority of hinterland residents to comply with the tax law.

Indeed, for many of the rural residents, payment of the hut tax exacted a heavy strain on their limited resources.

Without money to pay their taxes, many of the local residents resorted to the traditional system of pawning.

Pawning involved a process whereby an impoverished hinterland person indenture himself or a relative until a debt had been paid. A marked escalation in the practice was observed to have occurred immediately following the imposition of the hut t a x . 23 More significantly however, the imposition of the hut tax led to an expansion in the number of actors participating in the trading activity. This change was observed among the Manos by R i d d e l l . 24 According to Riddell, prior to the establishment of the hut tax, trade was primarily in the hands of "big men"— domi. The practice then was for men hired by the "big men" to peddle their goods to move these goods from one town to another, selling or bartering them in exchange for other

22Liberian Studies Journal. Vol. II, No. 2, 1970. p. 168.

^Ibid., pp. 168-169. 24ibid., pp. 168-169. 85

commodities. After 1916, however, with the machinery of

the national government power operating in this area,

the field of trading became less an activity for only

"big men." More common people began to participate in

this potentially lucrative field.

The Utilization of Traditional Political Institutions

The poro or poro oriented societies varying in

strength were found among most of the tribes within

Liberia. The society was known to have exercised one

of the most powerful roles within the community. It

was divided into two sections: the poro being exclusively

for men and the Sande for women. As an institution, its

rituals and sanctions had taken precedence over any

other institution within the community. Control over

the members within a community was exercised by either

invoking the threat of murder or the casting of a

spiritual curse. Operating as a decision making body,

it often acted upon important community matters brought before its council. On several occasions, the council

reversed policy decisions made by the chief or even deposed him in cases where his status in the society

25Liberian Studies Journal. Vol. II, No. 2, 1970. pp. 99-117. 86 was not high enough.2® Cognizant of its influence, the hinterland representatives as well as some chiefs often occupied high positions within the poro society.

Consequently, they often based their authority on either the high positions they held in the society or the extent to which they enjoyed the support of poro officials.

Through the use of hinterland representatives in Monrovia, the National Government was successful in channelling and hence legitimizing most of its demands through the society. By mobilizing community support, the poro society cooperated with the government in carrying out most of its hinterland road building program during this period. Until 1952, most of the government road building efforts in hinterland areas were performed by unpaid laborers. There were occasions however when frontier force soldiers were used to forcibly get villagers to participate. '

In addition to this fact, the poro also served as one of the most effective agencies of integration within hinterland areas. The society served as a common meeting ground for individuals of different tribes.

Its rituals which were commonly used among various tribes served as a cohesive force. As a result, Liebenow

26Ibid., pp. 99-102.

27The Canadian Journal of African Studies, VII, No. 2, 1973. pp. 217-236. 87

asserted that "even today the dey people await permission

of gola poro officials before opening up a new society."28

The poro, as later pages in this chapter will reveal,

performed even greater roles. They also provided most

of the agriculture and health services for the hinterland

areas during this period.

Representatives as Sources of Contacts

Together with the role which they performed for

the National Government, hinterland representatives

served as a convenience source of contact for hinterland residents migrating to Monrovia. Specifically, repre­ sentatives often tendered assistance in each of the

following areas:

a) Bringing in a substantial number of

hinterland youths to be reared in the

homes of Liberians.

b) Providing assistance to rural residents in

need of jobs.

Anxious for their children to acquire Western education, the parents of chiefs and some hinterland residents (through the assistance of their representa­ tives as well as other officials in their areas), brought into the homes of Americo-Liberians for adoption some

28Liebenow, op. cit., p. 48. 88

of their sons, daughters or relatives.2® In return for

the performance of specific household chores, hinterland

youths were provided with the opportunity of attending

school at the financial expense of their adopted parents.

While living in the homes, many of the youths proceeded

to pattern after their adopted families by accepting

their modes of dress, religion as well as some of their

mannerisms. Moreover, a substantial number of them

changed their surnames, preferring to adopt the western

surnames of their Americo-Liberian families. This fact has made it increasingly difficult to distinguish on the basis of surnames an Americo-Liberian from an indigenous

Liberian. Admittedly, however, a great deal of cultural assimilation occurred through this process. Having acquired some formal level of western education, most of the indi­ viduals upon leaving the homes of their adopted families aspired to prominent positions in the National Government or the hinterland provinces. Eventually, many of these men became faithful allies of the central government.

Of even greater significance however, their presence in government helped many rural residents to regard the

National Government as legitimate and to perceive the

Liberian state as "theirs."

^®Liberian Studies Journal. Vol. I, No. 2, 1970. p. 115. 89

Finally, for a hinterland resident entering the

city of Monrovia for the first time, seeking a job could often prove one of the most difficult task. Fully aware of this difficulty, a number of hinterland residents attempted to acquire jobs through the influence of their representatives.30 The representatives provided valuable assistance to some of these individuals by writing letters of recommendation or introduction to their future employees. Often, the letters enabled many of them to obtain their jobs more easily. Occasionally, representatives were contacted and informed of job opportu­ nities for manual workers. The representatives in turn channeled this information to their constituencies.

During the early part of this period, a substantial portion of labor flowing to the private sector was obtained through this medium. Through the influence of representatives, a number of hinterland residents were also employed as soldiers into the army as well as messengers and maintenance men in government agencies.

Riggs argued that parties and party participation can provide essential inputs into a political system.

This period in Liberia witnessed only the most unplanned

3®Our Chiefs— State Department Report, Monrovia, Liberia. 90

and formalistic forms of participation of hinterland

peoples in the political system. The period could

best be viewed as the "politics of form" in which

selective personalities from the hinterland areas were brought into the National Government to participate at a symbolic level. This strategy was central to the government decision making process. Again, Liberia confirmed Riggs' view that in many developing nations, policy statements often have more formalistic than substantive value. In this vein, it should be noted that statements on unification in the 1940's had more symbolic than substantive value. National identity took on a social rather than a positive political value, in that contacts and identification with the National Government brought prestige to selective families and villages in the hinterland. There was little concern however finding an effective role in the National Government for the participation of the majority of the hinterland people.

Changes such as the formal election of hinterland repre­ sentatives to lower house and the opening up of roads into the Interior may have been viewed by the hinterland population as evidence of the government's concern with their welfare. Clearly, the change was viewed in a different light by the coastal elites in Monrovia and the surrounding counties. For, as was demonstrated in the earlier pages of this chapter, the limited extension 91

of political representation to the hinterland areas

scarcely affected their influence in the Central Govern­

ment. Effective control of political and social affairs

at the national level continued to remain in the hands

of coastal elites. Hinterland groups participated only

the extent that they demonstrated their loyalty and

allegiance to the center. As was observed previously,

there were many organizations in the hinterland areas which might have been used by the National Government to serve as channels of participation. The use of these organizations however was limited by the National Govern­ ment only for the purpose of accomplishing specific objectives. There was however little or no inclination on the part of coastal elites to expand the level of participation.

Sensing the lack of inclination on the part of the

National Government, a number of individuals from the hinterland as well as the coastal areas began to express openly their criticisms of the Tubman Administration.

They demanded increase political participation as well as hospitals, schools and other social services for the hinterland population. Failing to receive what they considered as adequate response from the National Govern­ ment, these individuals led by Didwho Twe banded together to form the reformation party. This opposition constituted one of the most formidable Tubman faced during this period. 92

In 1947, the reformation party was formed. Didwho Twe,

a Liberian of the Kru tribe was one of the most prominent

members of this party.31 Twe was educated in the United

States at Rhode Island State University. While studying

in the United States, he cultivated a number of friendly

relationships with many Americans including the famous

Mark Twain, an individual whom he corresponded with

constantly.22 Prior to his membership in the reformation

party, Twe held a number of prominent positions within

the Government of Liberia. Unlike others however, Twe apparently was not content with "living well," while the majority of the people in the hinterland continued to suffer. Identifying his struggle with the plight of the hinterland population, Twe sought to build the bulk of his support within this group. A substantial number of

Americo-Liberians in coastal counties who also became dissatisfied with the politics of Tubman Administration, joined Twe as active participants of the reformation party. Utilizing the forum of the party, Twe began to escalate gradually his criticisms of the government for what he considered as its lack of concern for the economic

31 . The African Nationalist, Monrovia Liberia, September 1, 1947.

22Liberian Listener, April 25, 1951. 93

development of the hinterland areas. Writing in an

article Twe asserted:

"During the 100 years of its existence the education of the country has been left almost wholly in the hands of missionaries. But they have— missionaries— been handicapped on all sides in their efforts to reach the people because with the exception of the 40 miles of road recently built by Bonu Hills Company, there is only one motor road from Monrovia to the Interior. The rest of the country is inaccessible except on foot. And since most of the towns are far apart it is impossible for a large number of children to reach missionary schools in the Interior and on the coast. This brings us face-to-face with the fact that 1 1/2 million natives who pay taxes annually receive nothing in return— no schools, no roads, no water works, no health facilities or social s e r v i c e s . "33

Indeed Twe believed that by dramatizing the lack of development in hinterland areas, his party would gain popular support among this group.

In anticipation of testing the validity of this strategy, the reformation party in 1951 selected a slate of candidates to oppose the reelection of Tubman. At its

National Convention on April 10, 1951, the reformation party selected Didwho Twe as the party's presidential candidate and P.B.B. Morrias as Twe's vice presidential running mate.34 Twe who had recently returned to accept

33Didwho Twe, "Liberia: An American Responsibility." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, No. 282, July 1952.

34Liberian Listener, April 11, 1951. 94 the nomination from a sick bed in Georgetown Hospital in Washington, B.C., outlined in his acceptance speech the following points which he stood

1) the election of judges,

2) the retaining of revenues by each area in

which it is collected,

3) freedom of counties and hinterland areas

to elect their officers without dictation

from Monrovia,

4) protection of Liberian traders,

5) cessation of the policy in which civil servants1

salaries are contributed to the True Whig Party,

6) political freedom and availability of economic

opportunity for all.

Following the convention of the reformation party, the ruling True Whig Party wasted no time in beginning to attack the party and its candidates. Hurling accusa­ tions against Twe and his party, the official of the

True Whig Party accused Twe of being linked with the

Communist Party in Russia and attempting to incite and promote unrest among the hinterland population.^6

-^Listener, July 20, 1950.

•^Listener, April 17, 1951. 95

Paramount and clan chiefs in Sasstown (the area from which Twe originated and from where it was claimed he had substantial support) were pressured by the ruling

True Whig Party into denouncing him. Accordingly, in an open letter published in the Liberian Listener, the

Chiefs of Sasstown denounced Twe and his party, pledging unflinching support to Tubman and the True Whig Party.^7

This action on the part of the chiefs certainly registered a crippling blow to the canvassing drive of the reformation party. But even more disturbing to the party however, were reports emanating from party organizers in various parts of the country, complaining of physical violence being inflicted upon them. Political organizers of the reformation party were prevented from going into certain areas. Testimonial to this fact, a high ranking partisan of the True Whig Party was quoted in the Liberian Listener as saying:

"No one dare come into his area talking against the True Whig Party and its administration. In case any one did, the country devil will take care of him."3°

Most Liberians who were aware of the many gruesome stories associated with the actions of the "country devil," this statement was more than a veiled threat. For there were cases of unsolved murders in which the country devil had

37 . Listener. April 22, 1951. 38 Listener, April 24, 1951. 96

been proclaimed as the prime suspect. Faced with threats

and increasing violence against the members of his party,

Twe in a letter appealed to Tubman as the standard bearer

of the True Whig Party and most of all as President of

the nation to take all necessary measures in order to

curb the physical violence being inflicted upon the

organizers of his party.^9 In the letter Twe recounted

specific instances where according to him graved injustices had been committed against the officials of his party. Twe went on in the same letter to allude to a point which many believed would determine the fate of the reformation party in the May elections. According to Twe, he had been influenced through a reliable source that the presidential ballot for the May election was being printed with the omission of his name as a candidate for the reformation party. He warned Tubman and the True Whig Party that the exclusion of his name as well as that of the party from the ballot would result not only in irreparable harm to the democratic process but would also mar the inter­ national prestige of Liberia.

In the following day's issue, the Listener featured

Tubman's reply to Twe's letter.^® Without responding

•^Listener, April 15, 1951.

^Listener, April L6, 1951. 97

specifically to the contents of Twe's letter, Tubman's

reply which was laced with contempt, refused to acknowledge

the existence of the reformation party. According to him,

Twe had no party. He went on to accuse Twe of being an

inherent traitor, a liar as well as a bigot. In any case,

events of the following weeks proved the validity of Twe's

fears of being excluded from the ballot. For the election

commission, a body that had as one of its key functions,

the determination of whether a candidate or a party was

entitled to a place on the official ballot, declared in

April of 1951 that the name of the reformation party and

its candidate would not appear on the ballot.The principal reason given by the commission for excluding

the reformation party was the party's failure to comply with a provision in the election laws which stated that

the names of all candidates participating in an election

should be submitted to the commission 60 days prior to the date of election. The reformation party of course denied the commission's accusation of being guilty of

late registration. It accused the commission which according to law was non-partisan (in a more detailed discussion of the True Whig Party in Chapter 5, the "Non-

Partisan Role" of the commission will be discussed) of

4^Listener, p. 22, 1951. 98 being linked with the True Whig Party. The timing of the commissioner's decision moved the reformation party members to become even more cynical of the ruling.

Members of the reformation party argued that two days prior to the official ruling of the commission, in an article appearing in the newspapers, the national chair­ man and secretary of the True Whig Party proclaimed that the name of the reformation party would not appear on the b a l l o t . True to their pronouncements, the reformation party was excluded from the ballot.

Meanwhile, rumors pertaining to the arrest of Twe for possible charge of sedition began to circulate.

Convinced of the accuracy of these rumors, Twe fled the country one week before elections were held. Perhaps in hindsight, Twe might have applauded the wisdom of his decision, for in his final election speech, Tubman charged that Twe's hands "were stained with the blood of treason, rebellion and sedition. He has been unfaithful and recreant to his trust as a Liberian citizen."43

Finally, without opposition and victory assured, the elections were held as scheduled on May 1, 1951. When the returns of votes were finally tallied, Tubman with a total vote of 155,792 was formally declared the

^ Listener, May 20, 21, 1951.

^Listener, March 20, 1952. 99

unanimous winner. Having won the elections, Tubman with

support from key members of his party wasted no time

in weeding out once and for all individuals in government

positions who had given support to Twe and the reformation

party. One of the most prominent victims of this purge

was the Honorable W.B. Geeby, a member of the lower house.

In a letter sent to the lower house Tubman charged Geeby

with acting in concert with Twe to overthrow the Liberian

Government by force. Based on the charges sent by the

President, members of the lower house voted to elect a

special committee to investigate the matter. Following

the investigation, the committee found Geeby guilty of

acting in concert with Twe to subvert and overthrow the

Liberian Government. As penalty for his actions, the

committee recommended expulsion from the lower house.

In a full meeting of the lower house, the members voted

to expell Geeby from his seat. Having scored again a major victory, Tubman had subdued at least temporarily

all significant opposition to his administration.

Harold Laswell in Politics, Who Gets What, When and

How, brought attention to the distributional aspects of politics. Alexander Groth in his book, Comparative

Politics: A Distributive Approach, also attempted to analyze the ways in which different political regimes

tended to distribute social resources. According to 100 both of these authors, the issue of who gets what depended upon who was dealt with in the political game. We have already seen the limited fragile nature of the hinterland people's input; it came as no surprise then to see that they got very little of the outputs of the political system.

There were three policy outputs central to the welfare of hinterland inhabitants; it is to these three that we should now turn our focus of attention. The three policy outputs are: roads, health and agriculture.

Roads

The inadequate development in Liberia of a network of roads during this period not only was one of the principal obstacles to rapid economic development, it was also a major factor responsible for the failure to bring administrative practices in line with the theory of centralized control over field areas or services. In an article, "Transportation Expansion in Liberia,"44

William R. Stanley asserted that in 1944 the road systems in Liberia was a series of disconnections. Stanley went on to argue that in 1944 the system was characterized by intermittent stretches of road built by the indigenous labor force. Later on, these roads formed the outline of what became the principal highway from Monrovia to

Ganta (see map). In 1949, Liberia had 200 miles of road

^William R. Stanley, "Transportation Expansion in Liberia." The Journal of Developing Areas, 1971. 101

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mainly unsurfaced and generally in poor condition.

Within the entire country, there were fewer than 700

vehicles using this limited road mileage. During this

period, native trails constituted the primary means of

travelling within Liberia. This method was not only

time consuming but admittedly tedious. A few examples

will help demonstrate the nature of the problem. In

1949, a trip to the Northwestern area of Liberia around

VoinJama (a hinterland area), took several days. At

that time it would have been quicker to travel from

Monrovia to VoinJama by taking a ship to Freetown,

Sierra Leone or Abidjan, Ivory Coast and then journey

inland over the road systems in these countries. As

recently as 1950, a forty-eight mile trip from Monrovia to the airport at Robertsfield required three to four hours over mainly unsurfaced roads.

Stories linked to the travels of President Tubman into the hinterland areas also shed light on the problem of inadequate roads. The national unification program as mentioned earlier was considered one of the most important hallmarks of the Tubman administration. A significant facet of this program was regular planned visits by the president in most areas of the country.

During this period, most of the areas to which the president travelled were connected to Monrovia by foot 103 trails or, in some cases, air transportation. This fact resulted in heavy reliance on the use of hammocks as means of transportation. President Tubman often narrated stories about the degree of hardship suffered by individuals who shared the responsibility for carry­ ing him in hammocks on their shoulders. Occasionally, some were bitten by snakes or fainted from exhaustion.

For the president travelling into these areas was equally hazardous. In many cases, it required several days of travelling to reach the nearest road. This singular fact constituted a sufficient reason for detering most individuals from venturing into these areas. Barring periodical trips in the hinterland by the president and his staff, contact between central and local officials concerned with the development of services for day-to-day administration were either rare or infrequent. Similarly, there existed minimum inter-area contacts between citizens.

This problem permeated the administrative and political as well as economic spheres. The economic cost associated with the lack of adequate penetration lines into the interior is described by Kindleberger:

"Markets grow because of improvements in transport and communication. The market is originally local and small. Demand is restricted by the cost of getting goods out of the village and ignorance of whether they can be sold outside. Supplies are limited by the cost of getting goods into the village and ignorance of how much they can be brought outside. In these circumstances markets grow 104

through increases in transport and communica­ tion. The expansion becomes cumulative increased outlets for a commodity gives rise to increased real income which in turn raises the demand for other products. As new supplies of these come for the market, in turn, incomes grow further. The linkage of markets by an improvement in transportation or by the improvement in a product which makes it lighter and more readily transported become part of a developmental p r o c e s s . "^5

In the particular case of Liberia, the lack of developed

road systems in the eastern and western parts of the

hinterland areas compelled the citizens of these areas

to trade primarily with consumers outside the borders

of Liberia, i.e. Sierra Leone and Guinea. According to

one Liberian writer:

"We cannot over-estimate the importance of this development— roads— for our country. The isolation and lack of opportunity which so many of our people have experienced has, to a considerable extent arisen from the lack of adequate means of internal transport. One example will indicate what we have in mind. For several years now we have been importing rice. In 1954 we imported 12,000 tons while at the same time there were sections of Liberia with substantial rice surpluses. Farmers in the eastern and western provinces sell their rice for 3 cents per pound while it is selling for 8 cents in M o n r o v i a . "46

The development of other types of communication followed

a similar pattern, and in some cases, progress occurred

at a relatively slower pace. For example, travel by

45charles P. Kindleberger, Economic Development. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1958) pp~ 95-96.

46The United Christian Fellowship Conference of Liberia, "Changing Liberia: A Challenge to the Christians." Monrovia, Liberia, 1958. p. 39. 105

inland water ways was one of the slowest kinds of

communication to develop. Recurring rapids and heavy waterfalls along the rivers of Liberia obstructed the

free flow of trade and other forms of exchanges between

the hinterland and coastal areas. As for air travel,

since World War II, Liberia had had approximately twenty or more small airfields scattered throughout the country. Many of these were built as emergency fields for United States planes. The existence of these and other smaller airports built by the Government of Liberia served to alleviate the isolation of hinterland areas.

This line of transportation however had limited overall effects in increasing the amount of transportation available to the hinterland population for the transportation of their goods from farms to markets.

Health

The effects of the limitation of political parti­ cipation in hinterland areas was clearly revealed by the extent to which the population of these areas suffered from the lack of health services. The standard of health of a nation influences the attitudes and efforts of the people in their attempts to modernize.

Debilitating diseases such as malaria, yaws, sleeping sickness were known to seriously affect the level of productivity of those afflicted by them. Therefore, the 106 development of national health centers concerned with the dissemination of health information and improvement of the overall unsanitary health conditions and practices were viewed by African governments as necessary conditions for development.

The Bureau of Public Health and Sanitation was created by an act of legislature effective January 1,

1930. The bureau was assigned the following functions:

To control the spread of communicable diseases from one county, district, municipality or part of the Republic, to other districts, municipalities or part of the Republic. The prevention of the introduction of diseases from other countries and the prevention of certain communicable diseases when prevented in the Republic to the parts of other nations. A provision also was included for a director of public health and sanitation who should be appointed by the president and responsible for directly reporting to the president. The act also authorized the director to appoint health officials for each county or district.47

A section in the act provided some insight into what the legislature expected to achieve in practical operations.

Extracting from section 20 of the act which created the

Bureau of Public Health and Sanitation:

"The Public Health and Sanitation Service shall commence in Monrovia and control shall be extended from time to time to other parts of the republic when imperative or when funds are available."

Until the late forties, operation of the Public Health

Service was limited to Monrovia. A former director of

^Liberian Acts, Chapter III, Section 18, Department of State, Monrovia, Liberia. 1930-31. 107

the National Service justifies this limited coverage

by emphasizing: "there were no doctors nor sufficiently

trained persons to send out to the various counties,

provinces, and districts of Liberia."4^ It appeared

from this statement that like Dye, the former director was saying that the bigger the pie the more people will have. That is, an increase in the number of doctors would lead to increased distribution. While it is

important to take into consideration the issue pertaining to the availability of doctors, it is even more important perhaps to determine the extent to which the available doctors were distributed. The development of an effective distributive system enabled any government especially a poor one to utilize fully the very little it has. There is a popular saying which states, "it is not how much a man has that counts rather, it is how well a man uses what he has." This statement is as applicable to men as it is to governments. Admittedly, Liberia had very few doctors during this period. Yet it seemed that with the development of an effective distribution system the government could have ensured broader participation.

As the following events indicated this step was not taken.

Reports emanating from the United States Health

Mission in Liberia helped illuminate some of the health

4^Ibid., Chapter IV, Section 18, 1930-31. 108 problems. It should be pointed out that the United

States Health Mission was sent to Liberia in 1944 principally to protect United States military personnel assigned to the country.^ Dr. John B. West, major in the Army Medical Corps was one of the medical officers chosen to serve at Robertsfield. In his annual report,

Dr. West who was responsible for supervising the malaria control operation at Robertsfield, estimated that the infant mortality rate in hinterland areas was about 50% while the incidence of malaria was about equal to the same percentage. The author concluded by estimating that at least 25% of the native population was affected with tropical u l c e r s . 50 West also observed that government financed health facilities outside Monrovia and the coastal counties were either non-existent or available on a limited basis. This situation could be easily demonstrated in the case of the malaria program.

Malaria has long constituted one of the chief hazards to health and life in Liberia. The government with the assistance of the United States Public Health

Mission, initiated its first malaria program in 1945.

During the first phase of the program, efforts of the

4^During World War II, through a Joint Liberian- U.S. Agreement, Robertsfield Harkel was used as an air base. As a result of this agreement, Liberia declared war on Germany.

50Annual Report, U.S. Health Mission in Liberia. June 30, 1945. 109

Joint Liberian United States Health Mission were limited to a relatively small area in Monrovia. An area about twelve miles long and not over three m i l e s . 51 By 1948, the program expanded to include other areas within

Monrovia and the coastal counties. In 1953, the pervasive­ ness of the mosquito problems in developing nations moved a WHO-UNICEF team to begin studying the possibility of employing large scale spraying of insecticides to control malaria. In Liberia, they set up their headquarters at

Kpain, a hinterland area and selected target areas for carrying out their experiments. This program marked the first time a malaria controlled program had been introduced in hinterland areas. Following experiments in selected villages, it was discovered that dieldrin and benzine hexachloride were ineffective as a mosquito spray killing device. Later on, the chemical DDT was introduced and proved successful. Since the harmful side effects of this chemical was still unknown, one could only speculate as to the possible damage inflicted on the population by the use of the chemical. In any case, with the exception of small experimental foreign projects scattered through selected hinterland areas, the bulk of central government malaria controlled program during this period was con­ centrated in Monrovia and the coastal counties. By 1955,

51Ibid. 110

Monrovia along with the coastal counties had experienced

an appreciable decline in its mosquito population. The

extent to which hinterland areas were disadvantaged

by a lack of a national government malaria control

program was revealed by a report. Attempting to demonstrate

the difference between sprayed areas (i.e. Monrovia and

the coastal counties) and unsprayed areas (hinterland

districts), a Joint U.S. Commission for Public Health

examined the incidence of malaria among infants 0-11 months in sprayed and unsprayed a r e a s . 52 The following

results were obtained:

Incidence of Malaria Unsprayed Areas ______0-11 Months_____

Gbarnga 100%

Tchien 80%

Sprayed Areas Incidence of Malaria 0-11 Months_____

Bushrod Island 17%

Paynesville 12%

The example of the malaria control program should not be viewed as an isolated case in which the national government contributed little to the hinterland population.

Rather, it should be seen as a reflection of an overall process in which limited hinterland participation in the

52Malaria Control Terminal Report— Kohler, National Public Health Service, 1957. Ill

political process restricted the extent to which they

could exert pressure on the national government to obtain

the necessary social services. Lacking sufficient organized pressure at the national level, hinterland areas were forced to rely on their own traditional social and political institutions. These institutions were relied on by the majority of the hinterland population during this period to obtain needed health care.

Folk Medicine

Folk medicine constituted the whole complex of beliefs, attitudes and practices associated with health curing activities, as well as the prevention of diseases.

Almost all tribes in Liberia were equipped with a philosophy which explained the cause and cure of disease and the prevention of illness. Folk medical practitioners most commonly were called Zos— combined the functions of priesthood, midwifery, medicine and divinity or philosophy. Zos could be either male or female, usually these men and women occupied their positions after long periods of formal or informal training. Formal training was acquired through traditional school manned and operated by the poro society. Informal skills were acquired by serving as apprentices or assistants to older practitioners.

The pervasiveness of folk medicine represented a good example of the state of development of modern medicine 112 in hinterland Liberia. It flourished not only because it constituted a functional part of the peoples' way of life, in many cases it was the only available alternative.

Quoting from Morrow:

"As of 1945 these tribespeoples— Gios, Kpelle and so forth— were totally dependent on native doctors with only peripheral assistance from one or two missionaries. The native tribal practitioners were serving or striving to serve their people as general practitioners, obstetrician, pharmacists, epidemiologists and bone setters."^3

Quite frequently, hinterland practitioners cured sickness and alleviated suffering. They also proved very knowledgeable in their selection of indigenous herbs for curing purposes.

Dr. George W. Harley, the career medical doctor at Ganta mission in Liberia wrote:

"At Ganta— a Bassa boy was thrown by a Kisi wrestler, landing on one foot and suffering a potts fracture. The white doctor applied a plaster of paris splint in the approved fashion. The reputation of the mano specialist in fracture was greater than that of the white doctor. The boy had the plaster removed. The native specialist applied a light co-adaptation splint made of split maffia midrib. He removed the latter daily and massaged the foot with a stringent paste which dried on like a coat of stiff glue. The splints were reapplied each day. After a week the patient was urged to use the foot lightly. The aim was for a useful member rather than a perfect alignment. The final result was as good as could be expected. There was no deformity.Ihe boy walked without limping."54

S^Black Africa in Micro cosm— Charles Morrow, 1971. p. 160.

^Native African Medicine— Harley. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1944. p. 120. 113

Native or folk medicine was also bound up with rituals which were often interrelated with an assortment of prayers. Medicine entered into certain phases of the ritualistic schools of the poro society for men and sande society for women. In these schools, the youths were instructed in elementary first aid practices as well as indigenous pharmacology. As a result of their training, in these institutions, hinterland medical practitioners obtained an impressive array of success.

In certain areas, especially clinical psychology they proved particularly adept in their techniques. In many other cases however, folk medicine proved limited in providing cures for individuals affected by some of the most common diseases. In pointing out some of the limitations of tribal medicine, Morrow alluded to the activities of a Norweigian born American Nurse who worked as a missionary to the Lutheran Mission in Liberia:

"The beloved Portia learned at first hand of the limitations and lapses of tribal medicine alone with its many practical advantages. In line of self assumed duties she recognized its severely limited facilities for combatting such pathogenic enemies as veneral disease, pneumonias, malarias and many affliction of both superficial and internal parasites. Tribal medicine cannot fend itself against the ravages of leprosy, the filariases, sleeping sickness, the snail fluke disease, yaws and a great many m o r e . "55

55Morrow, op cit., p. 161. 114

Indeed in many cases, folk medicine could not provide adequate cure for common diseases which could have been cured easily by modern professional doctors. Yet, as we have seen, such doctors were not easily accessible to the hinterland population. Expecting little or no resources from the national government for the development of health care facilities, hinterland residents were forced to rely on the useful but underdeveloped folk medicine provided by the poro society and other traditional institutions.

Agricultural Development

The expansion of food production and increased productivity in agriculture is widely recognized as important aspects of the process of economic growth.

Liberia, like most developing nations is predominantly an agricultural economy. About eighty percent (80%) of the population was directly employed in agriculture.

Agriculture resources produced for domestic consumption such crops as rice, cassava, yams, eddoes, vegetables and fruits. Principal agriculture exports were: rubber, palm oil, palm kernels, cacao and so forth. Agriculture development as with health development suffered during this period from a general pattern of neglect. Until

1948, agriculture was serviced by a bureau attached to the Department of Public Works. During the entire span of this period there was little or no attention given to 115 the development of an effective agriculture program. This situation changed slightly, however, when in 1948 the

Department of Agriculture and Commerce was established.

The establishment of this department nevertheless did little to improve the conditions of agriculture develop­ ment among hinterland groups. As later discussed would reveal, for the majority of people living in hinterland areas, subsistence agriculture operated as the prevailing system of agriculture during this period. Wharton defined subsistence production as "a situation where the fruits of an individual or group productive efforts are directed more toward meeting immediate consumption needs out of production without any or few intermediaries or exchange— barter or money."56 At the same time there existed in

Liberia a growing modern agriculture sector operated mainly by foreigners. The existence of these two agriculture sectors operating side-by-side led many economists to characterize Liberia as a dual economy. This approach— dual economy— was used by economists attempting to understand the relationship (or lack of relationship) between a lagging traditional sector and a growing modern sector within non-western societies. It was also viewed

^Clifton Wharton. Subsistence Agriculture and Economic Development. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969) p. 15. 116

as a spectacle of a high productivity sector producing

for export; coexisting with a low productivity sector

producing for local consumption. Higgins traced the

origin of dualism to differences in technology between

the modern and subsistence sectors. In his view, the modern sector concentrated heavily on the production of primary commodities in mining and on plantations.

Expansion of the modern sector was seen as being primarily

in response to demand in foreign markets with growth having relatively little impact on the local economy within the context of the duality argument. Large foreign and

Liberian owned plantations could be viewed as the modern industrial enterprises, while subsistence farming practiced by the majority of the hinterland population could be seen as the traditional or non-industrial sector.

Beginning from the early 50's, Liberia experienced a substantial increase in its farm income. The table on the following page indicated that during the latter half of this period, agriculture commodities comprised between

70-80% of all exports by value. The great bulk of the agriculture exports however came from the industrial sector which was owned and operated by foreigners and a few Liberians living in the coastal areas. As a result, the bulk of this farm income accrued to these two groups.

Yet, this rise in farm income resulted in a new kind of VALUE AND QUANTITY OF LIBERIAN EXPORTS BY COMMODITY cr> IT) CT> LO ro LO t ­ -to 5 ^ 4 c io c O -> O' •r* D» r— •p O' > •r* O' O' •r- r_— -o +-> o •r" 4 4 4-> +-> +-> 4 4 4_) > CO 3 ro c >) to 3 Q) 3 3 <0 rO C >5 3 cu 3 o> o E E o s•r— >s -> -> -> ^ CTY LO ro r— O LO r— o> LO LO cr> CM CM r-* C r-s. OCM CO CT> ro CO ro CO CO 00 ro o o “O -J s co 30 o o (/) 3 rt rt •••••• • • • • • • • « v a r* CO Mh* CO h-* 00 CM CM r— r— o cx> p* r^ 00 o 00 JD CO CO r-. 00 CO o CO ro o CM o 00 to D£ JD X) S- 3 cu n rt rt n rt • • • • • • * • • • • • •••••• • • • • • • • • p— r^. CO 00 00 LO r** 00 CM r— cr» CO r— O CM CM O * CM ro LO CM 1 CO ro CTY CM *— LO CM CM CM LO r— LO CO CM LO JD J_ —J — _J _J +J ^. 3 ro CD X «t rt ft A " ft 117 > o p- o> < CM i— LO r^. r— « r— CM 00 O CM CO LO ^ O o CO LO 00 cr> LO LO CO o co co 00 — r*o LO o> r>* r— CM CM 00 r- CO o_ o D JD JD 3 - r S-

z: o +-> (/> E E *o 3 0

cm 00 cr> o 00 1 co •«- co 1 — — 3 03 r» “ • ^ o r^. CO CM CM •p CM p* cr> LO LO o. JD CM LO LO LO CO or CO 00 O i — J — o rt trt rt rt • • • • 00 LO r— r— p CO P“ OCO LO LO CM LO p- a> P- CD a> O O O ro rt • CM 1 LO CM LO <4- JD cn 00 CM LO r— CM CO LO r— O o O CO 1 — 000 00 ^. O CU CD • C£ JDO JD l S- UJ rOQ- CO o 3 cu P ^ o o 4 4 — . < rO < H p- p-L c t t c p X •p S-. P» 4 o> o S- CD. O s- cu 3 3 > +■> -> L/> O ^ ro ^ <4- LU 0 O r-“ CO r-. oo co r— LO 4 -> • CO o

In their partnership with the foreign concessionaries, many political leaders employed their official positions to obtain personal gain. Some accepted gifts from the enterprises, others enriched themselves at the public trough. This period witnessed a remarkable increase in the construction of new residential houses. It was no mere coincidence that most of these homes were owned by some of the top officials of government. In addition, a number of officials occupying top positions in the Liberian legislature, True

Whig Party, and other centers of government accepted positions in some of the enterprises as legal counselors, advisors and so forth. By entering contractual agreements with the enterprises, a number of officials also provided trucking services. There were still other officials who profitted from this relationship by establishing private rubber farms. In this context, they sold their rubber directly to the enterprises as well as obtained some free services such as the borrowing of equipments, free advice on the care and management of rubber trees and so forth.

S ^ C l o w e r , Dalton, Horwitz and Walters. Growth Without Development. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966. p. 238. 119

Meanwhile, the majority of the population living

in hinterland areas continued to remain wedded to a form

of subsistence agriculture. Subsistence activities as

defined previously yield no cash income. Under this

system, although the land devoted to farming was owned by

the tribe, each farm was operated on an individual basis.

The system was dominated by a form of communal ethos characterized by a great deal of sharing. This fact was evidenced by the large number of work societies operating during this period. Blanchard observed the operation of cooperatives among the Mano tribe.^8 According to the author, most of the heavy work performed in Mano towns was done by cooperatives which were commonly known as

Gbua. All mature adults within the community were expected to become members of cooperatives which often ranged in size from 5-70 members. There were both male and female cooperatives. The job functions of these two groups were separated on the basis of the division of labor principle. Operating on this basis, men cooperatives slashed and burned the area needed for farming and also prepared the storage facilities for each year's harvest. Women cooperatives were in turn responsible for the planting and weeding of the rice farms. On the basis of relation, the cooperative workers contributed a full day's labor on the farm of each member. Fines were imposed on members who defaulted. Although the scale of agriculture was relatively

^Liberian Studies Journal, No. I, 1967. 120 small, the pervasiveness of the communal ethos prevented any one from starving or being without food. Some of the most important foods produced on subsistence farms were: rice, cassava, yams and bananas. To earn money, farmers often sold surpluses in order to meet what economists call target demands. That is, farmers identified a specific need such as radio and proceeded to plant surplus crop large enough to defray the cost of its purchase.

Additionally, subsistence agriculture was heavily influenced by the poro society. In areas where markets existed, the poro society exercised a great deal of control.

Through the teaching of marketing skills, they determined not only what would be produced but also where markets would be held. Under the general guidance of the poro society, hinterland areas in which markets existed developed their own forms of currency. Specifically, within the

Voinjama area, iron bars made by local blacksmiths were used as a legitimate medium of exchange. It should be noted however, that this medium of exchange was accepted only within hinterland areas. Also in many areas, the hunting of wild deers, cows, monkeys and so forth provided hinterland population with most of their protein diet. Again/ hunting was perceived as a specialized craft whose skills were sacredly guarded by the poro society. Training in this area 121 was administered selectively to only a few individuals.

Participating in almost all aspects of hinterland life, the poro society constituted one of the most effective organizations of this period.

Finally, during this period the fate of Liberia's agriculture development was cast in the modern export oriented sector with this extensive reliance on the modern sector. The government failed to utilize the special skills of cooperatives and other organizations in hinterland communities. By developing policies which would have utilized the skills of hinterland groups, the government would have then established the basis for a gradual takeover of functions performed by foreigners in the modern agriculture sector. In the absence of specific national government policies or support for agriculture organizations in hinterland areas, this period was marked by a situation in which the major portion of the economic benefits generated by the modern agriculture sector accrued to foreigners and Liberians living in coastal counties.

Conclusion

In summary, pressures of the post war period moved the national government to reevaluate its policies towards the hinterland population. In response to these pressures, the government adopted a strategy based on the politics 122 of form. In this light, the government attempted to develop a political system which would appear to legitimize the claims of all Liberians. A system in which all Liberians would view the central government as truly representative of their specific interests. Within this context, the unification policy was developed. In form, the unification policy was designed to signify to the hinterland population an end to past policies which excluded them from partici­ pation in the affairs of the national government. As we have seen in practice however, the policy did little to increase the level of hinterland participation. Hinterland participation was allowed only to the extent that it ensured the continued control of the coastal counties. The symbolic representation of hinterland groups how ver, strengthened the legitimacy of the national government. Although the unification policy effected few substantive changes, it nevertheless served as an effective instrument in managing the problem of national identify. This fact could be seen clearly in President Tubman's executive council meetings— an important aspect of his unification program. During these meetings, the President heard direct charges brought against his district commissioners and other officials found guilty of committing wrong acts,were scolded or suspended in the case of more serious offenses. Through this medium, the president was seen as the producer of 123 justice. While the root of an important problem might not have been dealt with, the form of the actions taken by the President was often of sufficient symbolic content to alleviate tensions.

By utilizing the policies of formalism, Tubman succeeded in firmly anchoring his political power. Having overcome successfully opposition from Twe and other political adversaries, Tubman and the True Whig Party were freed of all major opposition until 1956. It was as if Tubman had already assimilated the arguments of Huntington.

By managing the pace of modernization, Tubman proceeded to expand hinterland participation on the basis of a step- by-step approach. CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND

PLANNING 1955-1970

The period 1955-1970 was marked by a remarkable upsurge in the revenues of Liberia, a direct result of

Tubman's "open door" policy. This policy, it may be recalled, encouraged the investment of foreign private capital in Liberia's natural resources. As a means of attracting foreign investment, the government granted generous long-term agreements, duty free privileges, as well as unrestricted reparations of funds, with increased revenues, the government embarked upon the development of primary roads which served as a means of accelerating the pace of centralization and thereby strengthening national government control.

Cognizant of this new prosperity, hinterland groups demanded participation in the socio-economic benefits.

This demand created a great deal of apprehension among the coastal elites. This latter group was particularly interested in determining from Tubman his proposals for protecting the small number of coastal elites against the large hinterland population who are being attracted in large numbers to the cities. Thus, Tubman once again mollified the fears of coastal elites by utilizing his strategy of guided and controlled change. This was

124 125

strategy which again allowed Tubman to take credit for the

benefits attributed to change and at the same time enabled

him to take the necessary precaution to ensure that the

possible danger— to the coastal elites' authority— inherent

in such change is minimized.

During this period, Tubman and the True Whig Party

faced a major battle from the Dependent True Whig Party

which was led by the former president of Liberia, Tubman's

predecessor Edwin Barclay. As a means of overcoming this

challenge, Tubman and the True Whig Party not only relied

heavily on their alliance with notables in hinterland areas

to mobilize support of the hingerland population but also

resorted to some of the same tactics which proved so

successful during Twe's challenge. The failure of this

latter challenge to unseat Tubman and the True Whig Party resulted in a new kind of assertiveness for both Tubman and the party. Having successfully overcome the challenge

from Barclay and the Independent True Whig Party, Tubman and his party used this victory as a means of expanding and tightening their control over most of the major activities within the nation.

Finally, this period witnessed a growing United States influence reflected by an upward surge in U.S. aid expendi­ tures to Liberia. Occasionally, this influence was used to pressure Liberia into adopting reform measures. An example of one of these reform measures is the Rural Area Development Plan (R.A.D.). This plan which called

for decentralization came into direct conflict with Tubman's plan for centralizing control. Although not committed to

the principles of R.A.D., Tubman nevertheless adopted this plan as a means of ensuring the continuation of U.S. aid.

In the implementation of the plan however, Tubman did little to contribute towards its success. National planning, a concept whose adoption in Liberia was influ­ enced by the U.S., also played a symbolic role during this period. With the increase in revenue, planning was perceived as a tool which would be utilized to bring about an equitable distribution of wealth as well as greater rationality in the use of public funds. One may wonder to what extent did planning contribute toward the equitable distribution of funds. Did planning serve as a mere symbol appearing as though it was doing something for the population

Was Dye incorrect when he asserted that an increase in revenue will result in a corresponding increase in the distribution of wealth? Throughout this Chapter, an attempt will be made to answer these and other questions.

The Formation of the Opposition Party and the 1955 Elections

In October 1954, the Independent True Whig Party was formed to contest the elections of May 1, 1955. The selection of the party leadership constituted one of the 127

first functions of the new party.-*- Following the election

of offices, Nete Sie Brownell an individual who would be

elected to serve as the Vice Presidential candidate of

the party made the following remarks:

"If you fear death, you must surely die, our opponents are fully prepared to destroy anybody that is on our side of the fence. They have collected certain weapons which they are aiming at crushing us. . . . We shall be vituperated, we will be intimidated, they will seek to destroy and assasinate our character and finally they will try to eliminate u s . "2

From this statement, it appeared that Brownell was dis­

trustful of the True Whig's party motives as well as its

ability to allow an opposition to use the democratic

channel of free elections as a means of challenging the

hegemony of the ruling party. In this respect, Brownell

appeared to confirm Dye's point that the lack of trust

was an essential ingredient of the political mix within

developing nations. Within these nations, insecurity

-*-The Independent at 16, issue 1954, reports the elected leaders as follows: S. David Coleman, National Chairman; Willie Forbe, Vice National Chairman (Kakata); S.B. Dunbar, National General Secretary; B.T. Bracewell, Assistant National Treasurer; Henry Dennis, Montserrado County Chairman; J.W. Duncan, Assistant Montserrado County Chairman; Mrs. Dinah Coleman Cooper, Secretary; Mrs. Georgia Scott, Administrative Secretary; Samuel N. Smith, Assistant Administrator; Thomas Johnson, Director and Business Manager; Othello Coleman, Director of Budget.

^The Independent Daily, October 16, 1954. 128 or distrust of the motives of others served as an essential barrier to enter political b a r g a i n s . 3 How correct was

Brownell when he predicted that Tubman and the True Whig

Party did everything to eliminate them. Riggs argued that within the prismatic society, the failure of the ruling party to allow legal participation in the political system by the opposition often led the opposition to become combative and attempted to overthrow the ruling party.

How legitimate were the fears one might ask? Did Brownell and the opposition have basis for distrusting the motives of Tubman and the Whig Party? Would the Whig Party seek to stifle the activities of the opposition? What was the response of the opposition to True Whig Party attempts to restrict legitimate participation within the political process? A detailed analysis of the political activities of the opposition party should provide some answers to these questions.

On the 8th of January 1955, the Independent True Whig

Party held its convention and elected former President

Edwin Barclay as its Presidential candidate and Nete Sie

Brownell as its Vice Presidential candidate. In their acceptance speeches, both of the candidates pledged to dedicate their efforts towards achieving victory for the

^Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture. (Boston, 1965) especially pp. 361-362. 129 party in the forthcoming elections. Specifically, Barclay charged the Tubman administration with corruption and

indulging in wasteful spending of government financial resources. As an example of such waste, he mentioned the buying of a three million presidential yacht by the govern­ ment. If elected, he pledged to end corruption as well as grant full rights and privileges to the hinterland population, a group which he accused the Tubman adminis­ tration of denying full participation within the political process.’

Following the Independent Party's convention, there developed a noticeable escalation in the battle of innuendoes between the two political parties. The national media became riddled with charge and counter charges of sabotage, assassination attempts and so forth. Within a short time span, however, the debate transformed into physical violence. From various sections of the country, opposition members reported incidence of physical violence being directed against them by government frontier force soldiers. In many of these areas, violence against the opposition was being organized by the local government officials many of whom were members of the True Whig

^The Independent Daily, January 12, 1955. 130

Party.^ Opposition members travelling in trucks to participate in party demonstrations in Monrovia were often stoned and shot at. This pattern of violence against the opposition seemed to have confirmed Brownell’s earlier prediction.

Pye, along with a number of political scientists and public administrators who recently have rediscovered trust as an essential ingredient in the political mix argued that trust served as an essential catalyst in the formula for an expandable politics. In the absence of trust, both the ruling party and the opposition harbored intense suspicion for the other. The game of politics was trans­ formed into a battleground where the opposition was perceived as an enemy deserving only total destruction.

Indeed, in Liberia's case, the major political battle was yet to come. Signs of a major True Whig Party attack against the opposition began to emerge when an alleged plot by the opposition to assasinate Tubman was revealed.^

In an immediate reacton to this alleged plot, the legisla­ ture granted Tubman emergency powers in order to cope with what they characterized as "this national complications."

^In the January 22, 1955 issue of the Independent, the paper reported mass arrests of Independent Party members in Kakata and Klay. The paper charged the district commissioners of these areas with carrying out these arrests.

6See Daily Listener, January 13, 1955. 131

The emergency power granted by the legislature

empowered the president to suspend the Writ of habeas corpus. Under this act, individuals suspected of committing a criminal act could be jailed for a period of ninety days without being brought to trial or convicted of charges made against them. Protesting against the legislature for granting emergency powers to Tubman, a delegation from the opposition attempted to meet with members of the legislature. In a remarkable display of contempt for the opposition, the legislature voted against granting them a hearing. This latest act by the legislature was so pleasing to the True Whig Party that they organized a massive demonstration to the members of the legislature congratulating them for their "patriotic actions." In a show of strength, Tubman, acting under the emergency powers granted him, proceeded to arrest the journalist of the Independent True Whig Party publication, charging him with publishing malacious and seditious• articles. • 7

In spite of the additional arrests which followed this incident, the opposition party continued to demonstrate an impressive level of resilience. Even with their show of strength, however, the future survival of the party appeared threatened. Cognizant of their uncertain future together, with their precarious state of existence, they

^The arrest of Journalist S. Tuan Wreh is reported in the February 19, 1955 issue of the Independent. 132

again appealed to the legislature as well as the executive

branch of government for help in conducting the elections

in an environment of what they characterized as "fair play." They argued that the entire election process was being conducted in a way which gave unfair advantage to the True Whig Party. Again, the legislature refused to investigate or even consider the nature of the opposition complaints. Instead, in a move which spelled the final doom for the opposition, the legislature voted and banned by statute the Independent True Whig Party. The legisla­ ture premised its actions on what it claimed to be "the unpatriotic, unconstitutional, illegal and conscienceless acts of the opposition."8 Once again, the re-election of

Tubman had been assured, the opponent was defeated even before the balloting occurred. Even though it was clear that victory had been achieved, yet, for Tubman and the party, it was essential that the form of a democratic content be maintained. Therefore, with pomp and ceremony and the brandishing of all the symbols used in democratic elections, the election took place as scheduled on May 1,

1955. When the official returns from voting were announced,

Tubman and the True Whig Party had garnered 99% of the

8Liebenow, gp. cit., p. 114. 133

votes cast.^ Despite Tubman's victory, the most eventual

moments of this election year had yet to come.

For according to Riggs, the denial of legitimate

participation to the opposition often led the opposition

to seek a violent overthrow of the political system. In

confirmation of Riggs' point, on June 22, 1955, the day

in which the legislature (keeping within the constitu­

tional provision) was officially to inform Tubman of his

re-election, the opposition attempted to assassinate him.

Three unsuccessful shots were fired at Tubman who along with many of the True Whig Party members had gathered in

the Executive Pavilion to celebrate this occasion. The gunman who was later subdued by Tubman's body-guards revealed that he was hired by leading members of the

Independent True Whig Party.^ Acting on the confessions of the attempted assassin, the government proceeded to round up all top officials of the opposition party. Warrants of arrests were issued for the National Chairman, the Vice-

Presidential candidate, legal advisor and a number of key members totalling 40 or more persons. With the exception of the national chairman and his son, all of the men were arrested and brought to trial. While most of these men

8The Listener, May 12, 1955 issue, reports the results of the election as follows: True Whig Party— 317,357, Independent True Whig Party— 1,482.

-*-8P. & The Plot that Failed, the story of the attempted assassination of President Tubman, published by The Liberian Information Service, Monrovia, Liberia, 1959. 134 were found guilty, seven of them including the Vice-

Presidential candidate and the legal advisor were sentenced to death. ^ Meanwhile, the national chairman and his son who apparently resisted arrest were on

July 27, 1955 shot to death while hiding in a sugar cane farm. Thus, once again, Tubman and the True Whig Party had scored a major victory.

With no major opposition in sight, Tubman and the

True Whig Party proceeded to use the incident surrounding the assassination attempt as a ploy to bring under their control all major groups and organizations within the nation. Tubman and the party allowed no other group or organization to maintain an autonomous existence or to threaten the party's monopoly of power. Rival organizations or groups were either absorbed into the party structure or eliminated. This pattern was by no means unique to Liberia however, for Coleman and Rosberg observed the occurrence of a similar event among one party regime in West A f r i c a . -*-2

What was unique however was the extent to which this method was used by Tubman and the True Whig Party to regulate

H a s a result of a Presidential pardon none of these men were killed. Instead they were later released. See p. 57. Plot that Failed.

-*-2coleman and Rosberg. Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964) . pp. (T65-666. 135

hinterland participation. To understand how Tubman and

the party regulated hinterland participation as well as

attempted to contain new groups, it is important first of

all to undertake a more detailed analysis of the True

Whig Party. Following this analysis, we will discuss

the relationship of the party to the bureaucracy, labor

unions, students and legislature alluding to specific

examples which point to the pattern of regulation of

political participation in hinterland areas.

The True Whig Party

The True Whig Party of Liberia could be classified

as assimilationist in ideology and exclusivistic in

membership recruitment.13 The party's strategy which was

exemplified by Tubman was designed to incorporate individuals

into the political system through the manipulation of such

symbols as "equality," "justice," "citizenship," "freedom,"

"universal suffrage," and "equal opportunity." As a result

of its membership, the party could be identified as an

elite party to use Hodgkins' classification. It had

successfully brought together a group of coastal elites,

hinterland chiefs and "civilized countrymen" in an alliance

for the purpose of conducting campaigns and the preparation

of elections. Until now however, the party had yet to publish

13see article by Lester G. Seligman, "Elite Recruit­ ment and Political Development," Journal of Politics, August 26, 1964. 136

the names of its members, even though the general rules

and regulations of the party had been published.^

Apparently, the party had deliberately allowed the issue

of membership to remain vague preferring not to define the

criteria for membership. While the absence of a formal

membership list might appear confusing to the outsider,

members of the True Whig Party were from all indications

quite satisifed with this arrangement. For the party

served as a viable political machinery of elite rule, it

was the avenue through which political ambitions were

processed. Tubman, like other members of the party

attempted to draw no distinction between the party and

state. They seemed to consider the party and the state

as one and the same, preferring to believe that whatever was good for the True Whig Party was good for Liberia.

Tubman, for the first time, formally acknowledged this

point when he spoke at a reception held in his honour by

the True Whig Party.

"We as True Whigs can proudly proclaim tonight that the stability of our government of which every Liberian can boast and because of which we have gained international confidence is attributable mainly to the preponderance of the centrifugal political force possessed by our grand old True Whig Party. It has sustained because we believe in the maxim that he serves his party best who serves his country best. "li>

l^True Whig Party of Liberia: General Rules and Regulations, published February 7, 1963. Monrovia, Liberia. 15 Daily Listener, February 19, 1955. 137

From this statement it appeared as though Tubman was determined to permit his role as the President to remain inseparable from his role as the standard bearer of the

True Whig Party. Tubman, was in essence saying that, even though an expansion and consolidation of his Presidential powers might benefit him personally it would also benefit the party. In other words, by serving his party best he would also serve his country best. It is important that this point be kept in focus for it provided us with a good basis for attempting to understand the relationship between the True Whig Party and the State.

The Internal Organization of the Party

Unlike many African nations who have constitutionally banned the operation of any political party except the ruling party, the Liberian constitution provided for the operation of a competitive party system. Despite this format pronouncement, it had been probably observed that in reality, the ruling True Whig Party did everything to emasculate the opposition. This fact had contributed to the continued domination of the True Whig Party. Equally important to the party's domination was that since 1869, the True Whig Party had been the only political organization in Liberia to function on a continuing basis. Opposition parties that had emerged to challenge the True Whig often registered for participation in specific election only to 138 disband at the end of that election. One principal reason for the disintegration of opposition parties was that in most cases the foundation of the party was rooted in the personality of a single individual. As a result, the death or absence of the individual from the political scene, brought about a decline in the organization.

The True Whig Party was divided into two major branches: the county or local Whig branch and the national

Whig branch. The county or Whig branch met at least every two years in a convention to nominate candidates for the

National legislature. On the other hand, the national

Whig branch met every four or eight years depending on whether the president was being elected for the first time or was succeeding himself. It should be noted however, that although the national Whig branch did not meet as frequently as the local branch, the national branch never­ theless exercised a great deal of control over the activities of the local unit. In discussing the local branch, an attempt was made to introduce specific examples of national Whig control or restrictions over the local unit.

The National Convention

The national convention assembles every four or eight years contingent upon whether the president is in his first eight years or a succeeding term. Generally, the meeting is held in Monrovia during the first month of 139 the New Year. This pattern changed slightly however in

1955 when the True Whig Party held its convention in

September. The early holding of the convention might have been due to the force of the opposition which Tubman faced.

The former President of Liberia had hand-picked Tubman to succeed him. The early holding of the convention provided

Tubman with an opportunity to fully mobilize his support.

The primary agenda of the convention was to nominate either a President, Vice-President or both. For all practical purposes however, the candidates had already been chosen.

This fact was confirmed in 1943 when a leading official of the National Whig branch was quoted as saying that "the big boys" of the party had already met and decided upon the candidates. ^ During the convention, all of the rhetoric of a national campaign was employed. The celebration of virtues like honesty and loyalty, the promises to reform the campaign buttons as well as the literature in which the leaders were portrayed in flattering language by their supporters. The opposition was cursed, derided and branded as unpatriotic.

According to Liebenow, that party had devised no specific formula for the allocation of seats to local units of the party. At least in one particular year, 1955, the large size of delegates from local units was designed to

l^See African Nationalist, January 22, 1943. 140 demonstrate a show of strength. In a move clearly geared

towards countering the influence of Barclay, Tubman and

the Whig Party brought in truck loads of delegates from each of the various local units. ^ Coupled with the nomination of Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates, the convention also performed other functions. It approved the party platform as well as elected a slate of candidates to assist the president to carry out the day to day activities of the party between conventions. The executive committee— the elected administrative arm of the party was comprised of the president as the de facto head of the party as well as leading members of the legislature and cabinet.Most of the Party's important decisions were made within the national committee. Yet, no hinterland individual had been elected to this committee. Rather, positions within the Committee had remained limited to individuals from the coastal areas. The National Chairman, one of the most powerful men of this committee, was charged with the responsibility of managing the Presidential

Campaign, appointing registrars, and some election officials.

One indication of the relative strength of the position was that Deshield, the present national chairman who

l^Liebenow, p. 126. The author gathered this informa- from the Daily Listener, February 27, 1959.

-*-®In 1955 the Party elected Senator Morgan as National Chairman; Wilken Tyler as Vice-National Chairman; member of the Cabinet, McKinley Deshield as General Secretary; Cabinet Minister William Dennis as Secretary of Treasury. See Listener, September 25, 1955. 141 replaced Morgan after his death was the only cabinet official to hold onto his position throughout Tubman's

tenure.^ Much of the Chairman's strength layed within his knowledge of such important information as the distribution of patronage funds as well as his partici­ pation in crucial party decisions. For example, the

Chairman was known to have dissuaded the president on several occasions from dismissing certain individuals or taking a particular course of action.

The Convention of Local Units

The convention of local branches is held every four years to elect candidates for the legislature. The degree of national influence over the activities of the local branches is clearly visible during this stage. During the convention, a single slate of county or province wide candidates is elected to represent the party during the elections. This fact is due to the operation in Liberia of the single member district system. Under this system, the electoral method does not result in strict proportional representation. As a result of this fact, the opposition party has been highly critical of this arrangement. They

•^In spite of the change in administration Deshield continues to hold his cabinet position— Post Master General. 142 correctly argue that the system serves to aid the True

Whig Party. Fully aware of the benefits this system offers to the party in power, the True Whig Party has demonstrated little inclination to change the system. The operation of this system as it was observed later also served to regulate hinterland participation. In any case, it is important to examine specific cases of control exercised by the national Whig unit over the convention decision of the local branches. According to Liebenow, in 1959, at the Sinoe pre-convention caucus, representative William

Witherspoon by a vote of 223-84 successfully defeated his challenger H.C. Williamson. As a result of Witherspoon's victory, his name should have been the only one appearing before the convention. Through a rather skillful maneuver, however, Williamson's name was brought before the convention and elected in place of Witherspoon. Interestingly enough, this writer is quite familiar with the history of this particular incident. In fact the writer originates from the area which was represented by Witherspoon. Witherspoon as most informed Liberians know, was one of the most independent minded individuals of the legislature. As a member of the legislature, he frequently criticized some of Tubman's actions. Of more importance however, he was married to Coleman's daughter, the National Chairman of the opposition party whom it may be added, was the brother 143

of Tubman's executive secretary. Liebenow mentioned also

the case of Grand Bassa where the unanimous decision of

the convention was reversed. In this case, a second con­

vention was held to nominate a candidate who was more

acceptable to Tubman and the national party.2® In hinter­

land areas, the pattern of national Whig control over the

local branch was even less disguised. In many cases, the

convention in these areas was opened by the National

Chairman of the Whig Party. His participation in the

convention acted as a deterrent to the selection of

candidates not acceptable to the national Whig leadership.2

During the convention, the local units like their national

counter-part elected a group of individuals who were charged with the responsibility of administering the affairs of

the Party between conventions. Within the coastal counties,

the local Chairman was one of the few powerful individuals

of the local executive committee. In most cases, the

position of Chairman was also held by the most senior member of the Senate. Acting in a dual capacity, the

Chairman often participated in important decisions pertaining

to his county. These men were often consulted when appoint­ ments of superintendents and other local officials of the

county were being considered. In many cases, appointment

2®Liebenow, op. cit., p. 127. Reference from Liberian Age, February 27, 1959.

2^See Listener, February 26, 1954. Reports the visit of National Chairman Senator Edwin Morgan to Provincial Conventions. 144

to these positions were based upon the recommendation of the chairman. Moreover, the balancing of representation of individuals from all counties within the President's

Cabinet constituted one of the most informal rules of the

Whig leadership. Most Presidents including Tubman had rigidly adhered to this rule. Therefore, in the selection of his Cabinet members, the Presidnet relied heavily on the county Chairman to recommend names of individuals from his country. The provincial chairman, unlike the county chairman, participated less actively in the selection of administrative officials in his area. The provincial chairman's most important function was related to organizing support for the party in his area. The chairman who was also in some cases the paramount Chief was often called 22 upon to mobilize hxs people for demonstrations m Monrovia.

In 1955, provincial chairmen were frequently called upon to participate in demonstrations in Monrovia. The influence of these men were by no means limited to this single activity.

It was through these men that the national party channeled patronage funds for the area. As later sections of the chapter will reveal, these men had become a part of the elite. They often exercised their influence to get local and foreign scholarships for their sons, daughters or relatives. As Tubman began to call upon them to counter­ balance the challenge from factions within the coastal elite,

22At the provincial convention in 1954 Paramount Chief Teah was elected Chairman of the Eastern Province True Whig branch, see Listener, February 26, 1954. 145

these men began to assume increasingly important

roles.

Two Groups Within the Party: Women and Students

The women's political and social movement was formed

in 1946 following the granting of the franchise to women.

From its inception, this group has been primarily con­ cerned with demanding greater representation for women in government. The founder of this movement was Sarah Simpson

George, the sister of Tubman's first Vice-President

Clarence S i m p s o n . 23 & s an organization, the women's political movement played an active role within the True

Whig Party. Their early demonstrations in support of measures being contemplated by Tubman and the party served as a means of testing public reaction. For example, in

1948, when the issue of a constitutional amendment was being discussed, this group was the first organization to demonstrate in favor of amending the constitution, to allow presidents unlimited years of succession. Prior to Tubman,

Presidential tenure was limited to two years. This pattern was changed in 1948 however when the constitution was amended to allow presidents to remain in office an unlimited number

23puring the True Whig convention of 1943 Simpson vied with Tubman for the Presidential nomination. He however, failed in his bid to capture the nomination. As a result a compromise was reached at the convention and Tubman was forced to accept Simpson as his Vice-Presidential running mate. In 1952, Tubman dumped Simpson for William R. Tolbert a less threatening individual to Tubman's political ambition. 146

of years— as long as they could win re-election. . . .

As the organization expanded its ranks to include women

organizations from other areas of the country, it has

increased its status. It appeared that this pattern would

continue, for many of the prominent members of this organi­

zation were also wives of prominent men in the True Whig

Party. Presently Mrs. Doris Banks Henries, the wife of

the Speaker of the House of Representatives and Chairman

of the powerful Montserrado County Whig branch is head

of the women's political and social movement.

The young peoples' association— a branch of the True

Whig Party was formed in 1958 in Maryland County and has

spread to other areas within Liberia. Unlike political youth organizations in a number of African countries that perform field services in rural areas, the activities of

the young peoples' movement were confined to cultivating political awareness among the youths of Liberia. Partici­ pation in the activities of the organization accrued personal benefits to some individuals' operation through

the president of the organization who was also the personal

secretary to Tubman. Also, a number of youths acquired government scholarships to study a b r o a d . 24 Fully in charge of the political machinery of the party, Tubman and the

Whig leadership proceeded to direct their attention to other organizations within the nation.

^1. Max Smith was the first president of the associa­ tion until he was killed in an auto accident in 1962, he worked as the personalsecretary to Tubman. 147

Public administrators and political scientists have

been increasingly directing their attention to the issue

of political and administrative balance within the political

system. Riggs argued that in systems where political power was concentrated, the political party would become a vehicle

for domination over the government. The bureaucracy, like other organizations in the society, played a subservient role to the party. In this case, the party used the bureau­ cracy not only as a means of implementing public policies but also as an essential vehicle for recruiting individuals 2 5 into the elite class. Primarily concerned with balance development, Riggs viewed the monopoly of power by the political party as dysfunctional to the development process.

Like Riggs, Eisenstadt warned against the consequences of uneven growth of the political party. He argued that the optimal contribution of the political party to crisis management required that a balance be achieved between the party and bureaucracy. This section will attempt to examine three groups which are considered important to the modernization of developing nations with a view of deter­ mining the role of patronage and cooptation in the party's

2 5 Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964) pp. 133-135. 2 6 S.N. Eisentadt, The Political System of Empires (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963) p. 154. 148 strategy of gaining control. Utilizing the threat of deprivation of the ’social sweets,1 the party attempted to co-opt opposition or groups by explaining to them that there was really no place outside of the political party for the individual or group to turn. Throughout our discussions, it will be necessary to determine the extent to which the party has manipulated the distribution of resources— patronage— combined with the politics of form and symbolism to gain control over these groups.

The Relationship Between the Party and Bureaucracy

The Liberian Civil Service was formally established on November 26, 1934. Although this bureau was established to increase the efficiency of government administration, the head of this agency has never been able to exert control over personnel recruitment, promotions or the allocation of financial rewards. Appointive power into the bureau­ cracy was widely exercised by the president and the party leadership. Using patronage as a weapon, the party dispensed jobs, favours and honours to those who supported it. As later discussions revealed however, the civil service laws specifically restricted civil servants from indulging in partisan politics.

In regards to partisanship, Rule I of the Liberian civil service law specifically states that a superior 149

officer is prohibited from requiring the performance of

political service from subordinates working in the

classified service. The law goes on to emphasize:

"No employee in the classified service is under any obligation because of his appoint­ ment to perform any political service or to contribute to party funds. He is expected however to exercise his right to franchise in supporting principles and candidates of his choice without openly seeking to coerce or influence others in their decision on these issues. This rule is not to be so construed as to relieve employees of financial obligations voluntarily incurred by them or on their account prior to entry into the classified service, nor to prejudice their serving the government in the several non-partisan positions required to be filled in connection with e l e c t i o n . "27

Positions in the civil service of Liberia are divided along two lines: classified and unclassified. Entry into the classified positions can be attained through competitive examinations. In the case of a competitive examination, an individual entrance into the service is based on the achievement of 70% on each course required by the commission. 28

On the contrary, entry into the unclassified level of the service is based upon the discretion of the head of each department or bureau. In most cases, individuals occupying these positions are restricted from performing duties performed by the classified employees. Individuals in the

27Rules and Regulations Governing the Classified Civil Service, Republic of Liberia, Monrovia, Oct. 1, 1936.

28Ibid., p. 3. 150

unclassified level of the service have less on the job

security or tenure than those who are classified. For,

according to the civil service law, an employee in the

classified service can be removed only within the rules O Q established by section 15 and 2 6 of the Civil Service Act. J

Unlike the unclassified service, all positions in the

O A classified service are divided into four classes. u The

law specifically stipulates that entry into any one of

these classes must be based solely on the results obtained

on a competitive examination. Yet, as we have observed

consistently in Liberia, political form differs from actual practice. Within this context, the civil service law is noted more for its political form and symbolic content than for its practice. For example, during the 1955 elections, the opposition party constantly criticized

Tubman for what they considered as his use of the force of government to dismiss civil servants in the classified service who supported the opposition party. The opposition proceeded to provide names of individuals who were dismissed from their jobs because of their connections with the opposition party.A more subtle criticism came from the commissioners of the civil service. On several occasions,

Civil Service Commissioners had testified in their annual

28Ibid., p. 10. 28Ibid., p. 12.

•^Independent Daily, January 22, 1955. 151 reports that the heads of departments had consistently neglected to apply civil service standards for the employment, selection for promotion or dismissal of individuals. They complained of large numbers of indivi­ duals being hired on the basis of ascriptive criteria.

This fact was also confirmed by a special commission of government operations. In 1964, the commission reported that most government departments were overstaffed, and that civil servants' jobs and salaries depended more on an ascriptive rather than universalistic criteria. The heavy cost of the patronage system was reflected in the fact that the personnel section of the budget consumed about seventy-five percent of public funds. Almost all Liberians who possessed administrative and technical skills were employed by the government. Positions in the bureaucracy were desired not necessarily because of the salaries,for they were often quite low. What attracted many Liberians to the service however, was the increased prerequisite that went with employment in the bureaucracy. For many individuals, employment in the bureaucracy offered the opportunity for acquiring rent-free house, car and gasoline, conferences abroad and so forth. The government's policy of providing rent-free government leased houses to a number of individuals in the service resulted in a residential construction boom.

In anticipation of leasing to government, many individuals 152 were induced to enter into the business of constructing

residential homes. The public housing market became a

supplier's market where the landlord set his own price.

Buildings were rented first to those who were considered

"party faithfuls." Government rental payments were set at a very high level. With the policy-maker and the

landlords one and the same, how could it be different one might ask? On the other hand, occupancy of a govern­ ment leased house was based less on individual needs and more on the issue of having the right connections. In this state of affairs, many individuals got paid by govern­ ment for living in their own homes. The policy of providing government vehicles to civil servants constituted another form of benefit. In this case, a number of government bureaucrats acquired government owned vehicles for their personal use. With free gasoline available and little restrictions on the use of these vehicles, most individuals used their vehicles day and night for personal use.

Representation at conferences abroad served as another form of benefit enjoyed by individuals employed in the public sector. The attendance of government conferences abroad served as a means whereby heads of

Departments or their assistants got short vacation at government's expense. Even more significant, in travelling abroad, conference representatives were frequently given more money than the required cost of the conference. As 153

a result, the attending of conferences abroad became a

lucrative source for acquiring additional income whereby

individuals subordinated the government's interest in

the subject matter of the conference to their personal

desire to accumulate wealth. With few exceptions, many

returned home with nothing to show, not even summary reports

highlighting the essential points of the conference.

Like the old Tammany boss, the government in the

name of the party provided financial help to certain indivi­

duals through a public relations scheme. Public relations'

officers were employed in the public bureaucracy in every

county of Liberia. Liebenow asserted that according to

the Liberian code, "the duty of these officers is to provide

for the prevention of subversive activity and dissemination

of dangerous propaganda."22 Fearing that the bartender or waiter was a paid public relations officer, many Liberians were prevented from talking freely in bars, hotels or

other public places. As a result of the actions of these

officers, nobody, not even a foreigner was immune from

arbitrary incarceration.

Anxious to continue to enjoy the benefits of public

employment and without the hopes of achieving an alternative

source of income, a sizeable number of Liberians hesitated

32The Independent, October 2, 1954. 154

to express manifest opposition to government. Instead, most members of the civil service participated openly in political rallies. It became immediately apparent to

them that attendance at political rallies and public displays of loyalty to the president and the party was often a good way for maintaining a job with the government.

Coupled with this, the involuntary contribution of a month's salary to the True Whig Party also aided the individual in maintaining his job.

The above analysis was not intended to demonstrate that the bureaucracy had no technical function. Certainly, there were a number of departments where a sizeable core of highly educated civil servants were engaged in managing the affairs of the nation. For example, at the office of national planning where job functions required some level of technical competence, most individuals were selected on the basis of merit. It is important to note however, that regardless of how these individuals entered the bureaucracy, they continued to remain personally responsible to the president and the Whig leadership. Consequently, the bureaucracy was left without any autonomous political power.

Labor Unions

Labor unions have existed in Liberia since 1949, but until now they have made little or no attempt to challenge the power of the True Whig Party. Rather, the party has 155

gained effective control over the activities of unions.

The Labor Congress of Liberia (L.C.L.) and the Congress

of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.) are two of the major

industrial unions in Liberia. The party exercised

control over these members by controlling their leader­

ship. Most of the officers of these two unions have been

employed as government officials. T. Dupigny-Leigh a member

of the House of Representatives until his death and former

social secretary to Tubman was the head of the Labor

Congress of Liberia. Leigh, according to Liebenow stated

a few years ago that he did not favor strikes.^3 in 1962,

Shad Tubman, son of President Tubman was President of the

Congress of Industrial Organizations. These two organiza­

tions received direct financial support and advice from

the government. The activities of unions were also con­

trolled by government regulations. Under the provision of the Liberian Labor Code, a Labor Practices Review Board was established. According to the law, no strike can be

called without the approval of the board. With the salaries of board members being paid by government, most of the decisions of the board tended to reflect the "no strikes" philosophy of the administration.34 Also, in seeking to

33 . Liebenow, p. 116. 34 Although strikes were never approved by the Board, Lowenkopf observed that beginning from the early sixties a number of strikes occurred. Political modernization and integration in Liberia. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of London, 1969, Chapter 7. 156

regulate the activities of the unions, the government has

not hesitated to arrest and detain illegal strikers--

strikes not approved by the board. In its continuing

efforts to maintain control over a potentially powerful

interest group, the government created a cabinet-level

labor Department to administer workers1 grievances, compensa­

tion and un-employment schemes and so forth. As a result

of the formal establishment of these organizations, the

government apparently convinced the rank and file union members that they also were interested in their welfare.

That these organizations exist in form and attend to some

grievances, this argument appeared to have been sufficient

for the workers.

Students

Liberia, like other African nations considers invest­ ments in education as one of the principle means for

achieving economic development. Cognizant of this fact,

Tubman launched Liberia's first educational scheme in 1945.

Under this program, a large number of schools were built

throughout Liberia. By 1970, Liberia had about 1,117

secondary and primary schools with 135,739 students,

4,265 teachers, and an educational budget of 7.9 million.^

O C In 1944 Liberia had only 251 primary and secondary schools, 500 teachers and an education budget of $50,000. See Liberian Star, July, 1967. 157

Despite the increase in the number of modern educated

Liberians, Tubman and the party have been able to effec­

tively channel this group within the accepted limits of the

political party. For example, beginning from 1948, the

government began to provide both local and foreign scholar­

ships to a number of Liberians under this program, a sizeable number of Liberians received government financed scholar­

ships for the purpose of achieving a college degree either

at home or abroad. In order to obtain a scholarship,

individuals were required by law to pass a written examination administered by the Department of Education. In practice however, most scholarships were awarded less on the basis of the individual's aptitude and more on the strength of his political or family ties. Moreover, many who received

full scholarships or grants-in-aid did not need them.

Scholarships to study abroad were awarded to sons, daughters and relatives of chiefs as well as prominent members of the coastal elites. As a result of this lack of a rigid selection process, many of the areas in which scholarships were granted were not related to the needs of the country.

Of equal importance however, upon their return home, many of these individuals were employed by the government.

Fully enjoying all of the bureaucratic amenities of govern­ ment employment, they have remained content to demand for little or no change. In this process, they have proceeded to develop a strong sense of identification with the govern­ ment and party at the center. 158

The Legislature Branch

In Liberia as we have observed, political form differs

radically from actual practice. Liberia as we observed

earlier, has a constitution and government which are in

form modeled after the United States. In practice however,

each of the three branches of government— legislative,

executive and judicial— differs in operation from those of the United States.

As an institution, the legislature is considered a virtual rubber stamp of the president. All seats in both the senate and the house are held by members of the True

Whig Party. Drawing little distinction between the party and state, members of the legislature work in close cooperation with the President for the mutual benefit of the party. Liebenow could discover no significant issue where the legislature had failed to act favorably on a presidential recommendation or where legislation had been passed which was opposed by the President. Even in rare events where legislative opposition developed, individuals often couched their argument in terms of principles previously articulated by the President. In expanding further on the subordinate role of the legislature, Liebenow observed that throughout Tubman's administration, no major laws had

3 6 See Econ. Survey of Liberia, pp. 112-119. 159

been passed which were initiated solely by the legislature.

With additional emphasis on this point, Liebenow alluded

to a conversation he held with the former Vice President

and now President of Liberia William A. Tolbert.

"Mr. Tolbert stated that the House and the Senate could not consider any measure during the first month inasmuch as the President was still in Europe and we don't know what his thoughts are."37

Despite the fact that the legislature did not initiate

legislation or posed no serious opposition to the President, this body was composed of individuals who were highly prominent in their counties. As was noted, legislators, especially Senators wielded power in their areas in a manner similar to an executive. Through the influence of representatives, local citizens often gained access to some of the social services offered by government. Their letters of recommendation frequently provided a number of individuals with the opportunity of being accepted into schools, hospitals or securing a job. The legislature also performed an educa­ tional function. Their debates helped to educate the public as well as the leadership as to the nature and importance of the issues being considered. Additionally, membership in the legislature offered direct benefits to individual members. For example, a number of individuals in the

37Liebenow, op. cit., pp. 158-161. 160

legislature owned private law firms. Acting in this

capacity, they earned salaries as attorneys for representing

foreign concessions.

Political Expansion

Having gained full control over all major organiza­

tions and with no opposition in sight, Tubman proceeded

to expand political participation to hinterland areas.

Here again, from this act, it appeared that Tubman had

fully digested Huntington's major arguments and followed

step-by-step his strategy for regulated development.

In 1964, the Liberian political system expanded to

bring within its ranks a number of new participants. The

process for this expansion began in 1961, when President

Tubman dispatched a special message to the national legis­

lature requesting them to review his plan geared towards

the objective of abolishing old political sub-divisions

of the country. In responding favorably to the president's

request, the legislature authorized the President to set

up a special commission to study and review the issue of

political subdivisions. The President established a commission of 12 members who proceeded immediately to conduct meetings and extensive interviews with citizens and leaders from both national and local governments. At the completion of the study, the Commission recommended the establishment of four new counties out of the three provinces of the hinterland. 161

Accepting the recommendation of the commission, the President

submitted the report to the legislature for enactment into

law. On April 25, 1963, a bill creating four new counties

was enacted into law by both houses of the legislature. The

act creating the four new counties reads as follows:

"That from and immediately after the passage of this act, any and all portions of the act of the legislature approved on October 13, 1914, which provided for regulations governing the Interior Department and dividing the Republic into county and hinterland jurisdictions and which was declared unconstitutional by the supreme court of Liberia by its decision of 1919 and all other acts or regulations which heretofore divided the Republic into county and hinterland jurisdictions be and the same are hereby repealed. In addition to the existing counties of Montserrado, Grand Bassa, Sinoe, Maryland and Grand Cape Mount, there are hereby created within the Republic of Liberia four new counties: Grand Gedeh, Nimba, Bong, Lofa to replace the three hinterland provinces heretofore existing."38

With the bill having been enacted into law, the

President issued an executive decree which called for the convening of special elections throughout the new counties on the first Tuesday of May, 1964. On this day, citizens of the newly created counties went to the polls to exercise for the first time the right to elect two senators each to represent them in the upper House of Representatives. In addition, each of the new counties elected six representatives to the lower house.

^®Ibid., p. 160. 162

Although this new arrangement expanded the scope of

national politics to the local level, it failed to alter

significantly the existing political imbalance between

the former hinterland and coastal areas. The center of

political power continued to remain in the hands of the

coastal counties. The constitution explicitly states that

there should be one representative for each 10,000. This

rule however, was not followed in the case of the hinterland

population who constituted 70% of the population. With a

total of 18 senators, the four hinterland counties had eight.

In the case of the lower house, the four hinterland

counties had 24 representatives out of a total of 64.^9

In addition to this factor, many of the elites of coastal

areas possessed large holdings of farmland in hinterland

counties. As a result, they continued to wield substantial

influence in these areas.

Under the present land system, the national government

is responsible for the sale of all public lands. Included

in the definition, public lands are all lands occupied by government establishments, concessionaries tribes, as well as forest reserves, unearmarked, unimproved, unleased, undeeded, and all unoccupied lands.Prior to the establish­ ment of national government control over land distribution,

39 A breakdown of the number and names of senators represented in each county is listed in the appendix. 40 "Act of Legislature," Government Printing Office, April 25, 1963. 163 all tribal land was under the control of local Chiefs.

Land was not bought and sold on the open market. Instead, individuals acquired the right to use as much land as was necessary to farm. Although the land remained the property of the community, the individual maintained his rights to the use of the land as long as he continued to develop it.

Under the existing system of national government control however, land is bought and sold on the open market. The ownership of land is contingent upon the individual's ability to pay. Taking advantage of this change, a large number of coastal elites bought large acres of farm land in hinterland counties. In some cases, more prominent coastal elites obtained their land free of charge. One example of this case is provided below:

"Of the estimate 5,346 acres of farm land surveyed in 1963, about 2,500 are located along the RAD Ybarnga-Kikoya road, completed that year. Two thousand of these acres were presented as a gift to an influential coastal politician; the remaining 500 acres of land belong to a wealthy native."41

The extent of coastal elites' influence in hinterland counties was revealed by the fact that in many cases, workers in hinterland counties, although receiving no salaries for their labor insisted on remaining on the farms of coastal elites was not only considered honorable in the

41 . . Dominic N. Tarpeh and J.V. Mueller, A Study of Liberia's Traditional and National Land Tenure Systems, p. 11, Cuttington College, Gbarnga, Liberia. 164 eyes of their colleagues, it also protected them against . . 42 constant harassment from local officials.

The lack of political power in new counties was often the source of complaints by superintendents admin­ istering these areas. In complaining of being left out of decisions affecting their areas, superintendents alluded to cases where the national government entered into contracts with concessions operating within their areas.

They were often not invited to the ceremonies pertaining to the signing of these agreements nor were they provided with copies of these agreements. Therefore, superinten­ dents were often unaware of the exact nature of th;. amount of financial assistance concessions were required to give to the areas in which they operated. Citing additional examples, they pointed to cases where representatives of agencies from the national government working in their counties operated independent of the superintendent.

Representatives of agencies from the national government were controlled directly from Monrovia. As a result, they frequently ignored directives from the superinten- 43 dent. With little or no political power or control and without an independent source of finance to carry out local development, superintendents have continued their

42 Ibid., p . 23.

43Ibid., p. 25. 165 heavy reliance on the national government. In attempting to change or limit the extent of this reliance, a decen­ tralization plan was developed.

Rural Area Development (RAD), an Experiment in Decentralization

Decentralization for the purpose of involving effective participation of the people in government programs at the local level is now generally accepted as yielding substantial benefits to many governments.

In order to ensure that all individuals benefit from the fruits of development, government programs must be designed to reach and benefit the majority of people who contribute to national unity and development. Cognizant of the fact that the form and degree of decentralization must be adopted to the ecological requirements of a particular system, most nations have adopted either one of the following four patterns: a) Comprehensive local government system--this approach allows for the local government to perform some functions on behalf of the central government. Some of the services performed by local authorities are: agricultural, educational, health, and welfare; b) Partnership system— the division of function between central and local governments; c) Dual system— central government directly administers technical services, some autonomy given to local areas to plan and develop program which will contribute towards national 166

development. The technical services, however, are per­

formed by the central government; d) Integrated adminis­

trative system— all technical services are administered

directly by the central government. Field coordination

is performed by either central government area coordina­

tors or district administrators responsible for field

coordination. Local authorities have little if any

control over personnel of the central government working 44 in their areas.

In 19 57, in the Gbarnga district of Bong County,

Liberia began its first attempt toward decentralization.

Designated as the Rural Area Development Project (RAD),

the project began as an AID pilot project within the health department. AID successfully persuaded the

Liberian government to adopt this plan. As later discussions revealed, the plan came into direct conflict with Tubman's strategy for planned and regulated develop­ ment. Cognizant of this fact, Tubman adopted the plan merely as a means of ensuring the financial support of

AID. Showing little enthusiasm for the concept, Tubman knew that the plan had little chance of succeeding. The plan was intended to demonstrate some of the achievements or improvements in administration which could be obtained

44Local Administration and Rural Development, paper delivered by the Superintendent of Lofa County. E. Sumo Jones, at the President's Executive Conference on Public Administration 15-16, Nov. 1973. Monrovia, Liberia. See especially pp. 4-6. 167

from decentralization of certain services. Adopting a

plan similar to the comprehensive approach to decentrali­

zation, the RAD project was composed of field representa­

tives from each of the following departments: Health,

Agriculture, Education, Public Works, Public Information,

and Treasury. The committee was given control over its

budget as well as the responsibility to manage all

financial matters pertaining to its operation. One of

the principle objectives of the committee was to plan,

direct and guide the socio-economic development of the

district. In the performance of its plan, the committee

selected a number of villages for demonstration projects and proceeded to concentrate their resources toward the development of these villages. Upon determining that the selected communities had been developed fully, and that they were capable of sustaining the momentum already generated, the committee moved on to other villages to begin the same process. By rotating the development process, the committee succeeded in building delivery huts, pit latrines, wash houses as well as a number of water facilities in an assorted number of villages.

In 196 3, Liberia's experiment in decentralization came to an end. The experiment remained in Gbarnga

District, failing to expand to other districts within the country. Given the apparent need for this program, why one might ask, did the program end so early? What prevented 168 the program from being institutionalized? In seeking answers to these questions, this writer discussed the subject with a number of prominent Liberians. Signifi­ cantly, the lack of political support was cited more frequently as the crucial reason for RAD failure. In discussing the issue of RAD with this writer, the present minister of Treasury and brother of the President, Stephen

Tolbert, emphasized that in his opinion, the lack of political support constituted one of the principal 45 reasons for RAD failure. According to this view, decentralization was viewed by a highly centralized government as a threat to its own power. The plan was noted more for its symbolic content. Tolbert believed that decentralization was seen by the Tubman leadership as providing ambitious local leaders with the base to develop political support and clout. The argument continued to assert that, by providing local areas with the resources which would enable them to become rela­ tively self-sufficient, the environment would have been created for the development of a number of powerful, autonomous local leaders capable of aspiring to national 46 leadership. It is important that this point be noted.

45 . . . During the period of RAD's implementation, Mr. Tolbert was Assistant Secretary of the Agriculture Department. My interview with Tolbert took place on August 22, 1973 in Washington, D.C. 46 Tarpeh & Mueller, p. 22. 169

The concept of RAD came during a time when Tubman was in the process of consolidating his power. The unification program, an important symbol of this administration, had yet to take roots. Tubman was fully committed toward the objective of establishing a sense of national con­ sciousness among the population. He was apparently convinced that this plan could best be achieved through a gradual scheme of administrative centralization. Until this had been accomplished, Tubman could not support a decentralization plan which appeared to run counter to his strategy of gradualism. Within this context, the case of Fahnbulleh provided us with important clues to some of the factors which led to Tubman's latent opposi­ tion to decentralization. In a sense, this case must be seen as the culmination of the opposition to RAD.

Rural Area Development and the Trial of 1968

On March 7, 1968, the Grand Jury of Montserrado

County indicted the Ambassador to Kenya, Tanzania, and

Uganda, Henry Fahnbulleh, of treason. Among the other charges, Fahnbulleh was accused of being the leader and promoter of an underground movement to overthrow the

Liberian government. In a secret memorandum, Fahnbulleh was alleged to have outlined a plan to organize an underground movement for educating the "sons of the soil" for the exploitation being practiced against them by 170

Tubman and the Americo-Liberians. The accused was also

charged with being the author of a book critical of

Liberia, Liberia Within Independent Africa and the author

of a poem— Awake Captain intended to arouse the hostili­

ties of the hinterland population against the coastal

elites. Included in the group Fahnbulleh was accused of

organizing were two superintendents from the hinterland

counties and a number of prominent individuals from

hinterland areas.^ ^

On March 12, members of the legislature visited

Tubman to assure him of their continued unflinching

support. They condemned as diabolicle and subversive the

acts Fahnbulleh was alleged to have committed. Demon­

strations against Fahnbulleh continued on April 30, when

a large group of True Whig party members paraded the

streets of Monrovia. While affirming their complete

faith and confidence in Tubman's unification and integra­

tion policy, the citizens condemned any movement intended

to subvert and overthrow the government. In a symbolic

display of unification, Tubman, who was also present at

the demonstration, was fully attired in a Bassa King

leopard skin gown. Addressing the crowd, Tubman again

stressed how important the unification plan was to him.

He emphasized to the crowd that an underground movement was in existence and was supported by a group anxious to

47 Liberian Star, March 12, 1968. 171

destroy the unification policy which had brought the people

together to build a nation. Tubman stressed that it

was not for himself personally that he sought support

but for Tubmanism. No doubt, Tubman was claiming that

the policies of formalism, symbolism, and gradualism,

which had characterized his management of Liberian

politics had indeed contributed towards the nation's

stability.

In view of these demonstrations, Fahnbulleh expressed

doubts as to whether any court in Liberia could render him justice. He observed that the legislature had already

condemned him. On June 10, the trial of Fahnbulleh was

formally opened. At the trial, Fahnbulleh objected to the entire jury panel. He charged that all of the mem­ bers of the panel belonged to the True Whig Party and were either pensioners or employees of the government.

The accused also noted that many of the jurymen had taken part in a nationwide demonstration against him.

Irrespective of these objections, the judge overruled the defendant and the case continued. Following four months of imprisonment and three weeks of trial, the case of Fahnbulleh came to an end. On July 3, 1968, the jury took about thirty minutes to find Fahnbulleh guilty of treason. The court immediately sentenced Fahnbulleh to the maximum penalty permitted under the law— twenty years at hard labor and confiscation of all real personal 172 48 and mixed property. Of equal importance, the superin­

tendents of two hinterland counties— Lofa and Nimba— were

later dismissed from their positions for their alleged

involvement in Fahnbulleh's plan to overthrow the

government and exterminate the ruling coastal elites.

This case may have served to vindicate Tubman's fears and

subsequent opposition to RAD. For Tubman could point

to this case as proof that Liberia was not yet unified

until the population could begin to perceive themselves

as Liberians rather than indigenous or Americo Liberians;

therefore, it was necessary to continue the plan of

administrative centralization. Along with RAD, the

establishment of the National Planning Agency was seen as another mechanism for increasing hinterland participation.

As was noted earlier, the agency for International development was instrumental in the development of this agency.

National Planning

Like the national flag, the establishment of planning institutions as well as economic plans is con­ sidered an important symbol of political independence by

African nations. Nearly every African country has a planning institution in which national plans are drawn.

Although there are differences in the scope of these plans, in most cases, the development plans are really

^ I b i d . , May 2, 1968. 173

aggregations of individual projects being undertaken or

to be undertaken by individuals into estimated require­

ments of capital equipment, raw materials, imported

skilled labor, unskilled labor depreciation and so forth.

Economic planning in the sense of coordinated

government decision making is relatively new in Liberia.

The legislative act of 1959 which provided for the

establishment of the Bureau of Economic Research is

considered the first step toward systematic development

planning. By the legislative act of May 8, 1962, the national planning agency was created. Prior to the establishment of this agency, there was a general lack of coordination between the agencies of government. The departments of government often entered into commitments without effec­

tive control on foreign projects, contractor credit arrangements, concession awards and so forth. This lack of control resulted in the public debt crisis of 1963.

According to Berg, "Government did not know the extent of its commitments and was faced with debt repayments which would have absorbed almost its entire recurrent budget."49 This state of affairs led Liberia to develop its first national plan. A planned economy allows government to allocate resources in the most efficient manner and to attack the bottlenecks of economic develop­ ment. How can we relate political and economic

^ Listener, July 6, 1968. 174

development in Liberia? Can we make the connection

between economic development and the True Whig Party?

In order to make this connection, it is important to

determine how the True Whig Party interacted with its

economic environment to bring about change or regulate

change within the economy. As a means of determining

how the True Whig Party interacted with the economy, it

is important to examine the environment in which the

party lived and then the formulation and implementation

of the four year plan.

It is generally agreed that from 1955, Liberia

experienced substantial rate of economic growth. The

noticeable rise in government revenues during this period served as one indication of this impressive rate of growth.

(See chart in appendix.) With this increase in revenues,

the government directed its public investment toward providing basic infrastructure as roads, public build­

ings, communication, urban services and so forth. This

increase in growth rate not only enriched and strengthened the coastal elites, it also attracted a large number of

Liberia's subsistence agriculture population to the cities. With the bulk of government expenditures being concentrated in the coastal sector as salaries for government employees, and the construction of elaborate public facilities, Liberia's economic growth had not greatly affected the mass of the hinterland population. 175

For example, in 1960, three quarters of the population that made up the hinterland sector received only 4.8% of the gross domestic income.^® Dalton observed that in

1960 Liberia spent almost as much on diplomacy as on 51 education. While there has been a shift from a sub­ sistence to a monetary economy since the 1950's, agricul­ ture continued to remain dominant. About 65 percent of the Liberian work force were engaged in subsistence agriculture. On the other hand about 30 percent were employed as unskilled wage workers on rubber farms.

Irrespective of Liberia's large agricultural population, there has been a relative decline in the gross domestic production of subsistence agriculture from 1950 to 1960— from 22.2 to 18.1 million— (see table in appendix). It was within this environment that Liberia developed her first national plan, a plan which emphasized the diffu­ sion of economic benefits as one of its principle objec­ tives. Again one might ask, to what extent did the national plan serve merely as a symbol, intended to silence potential critics, to give the impression that government was doing something about the economic imbalance? How did economic planning fit into Tubman's

50 Elliot J. Berg, "Defining a Strategy for Planning: The Liberian Experience," Economic Development Report No. 40, presented at the DAS Conference Bellagio, Italy, June, 1966. 51 George Dalton, "History, Politics and Economic Development in Liberia." Journal of Economic History Vol. XXV, 1965. No. 4, p. 569. 176

strategy of regulated development? To answer these and

other questions it is important to turn our attention to

the formulation of the plan. For the strategy adopted

for the plan, formulation as well as implementation

provided us with a good cue as to the government's serious­

ness in bringing about balance development.

The planning process can be divided into two main

parts, namely the formulation of the plan and its

implementation. Of prime importance in the formulation

of plans is the institutional framework within which the plan is carried out. The degree to which the fruits of development is spread— an intended objective of the

Liberian plan as well as the overall success of the plan depends upon the strategy developed within particular institutions. Generally, the planning strategy adopted by a particular country is limited to one of two basic approaches: the program approach and project approach.

The programming approach assumes that policy makers know best and therefore would find it advisable to first of all, determine the administrative feasibility of the plan and then sell its objective to the people. Basic researches and surveys are conducted as a means of determining the amount and quality of available resources and the rate at which they may be mobilized for develop­ ment. The project approach which is more democratic in its operation, assumes that government derives its authority from the consent of the governed and admits 177

that a development plan can be implemented only through 52 the will of the people. As later discussions revealed,

the institutional framework for planning in Liberia

provided for a situation in which the executing agencies

in Monrovia determined what and how development was to

be carried out in local areas. This process which was

also described as "top-down" or programming planning,

forecloses any measurement of involvement in the identi­

fication, preparation, and implementation of projects by

the hinterland population. All development projects were planned as well implemented by representatives of

executing agencies in Monrovia.

The 1967-70 development plan— aimed at accomplishing

the following objectives: a) a steadily increasing per

capita income through increased production; b) a distri­ bution of income conducive to long run political stability

and social justice; c) a fuller participation by

Liberians in positions of skill and responsibility in

all areas of the economy; d) a more widespread distribu­

tion of the benefits of economic development, to bring better and longer lives to Liberians of all regions and

social groups; and, e) a more broadly based economic and

industrial development through realization of the

economics of scale and the increasing returns resulting

from active participation in joint economic projects

~^Ibid. , p . 578 . 178 53 involving other nations of the West African subregion.

The 1967-70 plan contained planned government expenditure totaling $98 million. Transportation received the largest allocation of the total expenditure, followed by public utilities, agriculture, education and health.

Summary of the 1967-70 Plan

Recipient Budget Other External Appropriation Domestic Assistance $000 Sources

Agriculture $5,556 $1,522 $3,215 10,293 10.5

Transport 7,063 4,359 25,051 36,473 37.1

Communica­ 1,011 110 1,431 1.5310 tions

Public 1,790 3,257 18,880 927 24.3 Utilities

Natural 2,546 4,968 7,514 7.7 Resources

Education 5,950 3,157 9,107 9.3

Public 4,531 4,427 8,958 9.2 Health

Other 290 100 390 0.4 Services

Total 28,737 9,248 60,108 98,093 100.0 Program

53 Albert Waterson, pp. 61-67. 179

The four year plan relied heavily on foreign

financing. About 60% of the plan was financed through

foreign assistance. The reliance on foreign financing

seemed even more pronounced when we considered that

private investment was made in large part by non-

Liberians. If we considered the private sector as a

foreign source, then most of the plan's financing was

from external sources. Of course, this heavy dependence

on foreign financing limited the flexibility of planners.

The four year plan was largely concerned with out­

lining projects rather than analyzing the economy and providing for structural changes. In his attempt to convince the coastal elites that the introduction of planning would not bring about a radical change in the political balance, Tubman in the foreword of the 1967-70 plan asserted:

"It should be emphasized that in formulating the plan we have not abandoned or modified the principles of government and economic policy that have guided the nation in the past and which have proven their worth in the remarkable progress we have made within their framework. . . ."54

Again, Tubman appeared to be assuring members of the coastal elites that he was not abandoning his strategy of regulated development. The plan was primarily limited to planning within the public sector. It did not

54 Four Year Plan for Economic and Social Develop­ ment, 1967-70, Monrovia, Liberia, 1967, p. 18. 180

stipulate any rate of growth higher than that which had

occurred in the past— about six percent. There were

several phases in the formulation of the four year plan,

all of which involved Tubman and the True Whig Party.

The formulation of the plan was dominated by the national

government with little or no input from the local areas.

At the Center, the National Planning Council (NPC)

provided general guidance in the formulation of the four

year plan. The council was created as an autonomous

agency in the executive branch of government. NPC was

composed of the President of Liberia as Chairman and

eight cabinet ministers who were appointed to the council

by the President. The council served as the ultimate

decision-making body in all matters pertaining to

development planning and policies. The NPC was also

responsible for reviewing for approval or disapproval all

recommendations made by the Secretary of Planning and

Economic Affairs. It also approved all economic develop­ ment priorities (see appendix for additional functions).

With the exception of the Secretaries of Planning, Treasury and State, most of the cabinet members of NPC were in their early fifties. These men were not only staunch members of the party, the majority of them also occupied top positions within the party. Equally important, a substantial number of the cabinet members, (to name a few) Post Office and Telegraph, Information, Interior, 181

Defense, acquired their positions by working within the

Party (Old Guards). As could be expected, they tended

to be more conservative in their approach to planning,

often reflecting the philosophy of gradualism. With

power being fully concentrated in the Council, Tubman and

the Old Guard made every effort to ensure the maintenance

of the status quo. Working along with the NPC, was the

Office of National Planning. Again this office operated

at the Center with little feed-back from local areas.

The Office of the National Planning operated under

the NPC and acted as the technical secretariat to the

council. Among other functions, the Office of National

Planning was required to undertake economic studies

required for planning and policy purposes, prepare,

evaluate and coordinate the annual development budget, and

analyze the inter-relationship and internal consistency of various proposed programs and projects. (See appendix

for additional functions.) In the 1967-70 development plan, the Office of National Planning asked each Department 55 head to submit a development plan. The Office of

National Planning not only served as the coordinator of

the sectoral plans, it also gave guidance to the sectoral departments in order to develop a plan consistent with

the intra-sectoral development programs. Following the

integration of sectoral plans, the Secretary of Planning

55 Ibid, p . 182 submitted a draft program to the NPC for their approval or disapproval. Upon the approval of NPC, the program was referred to the President for his approval. Here again, it should be noted however, that throughout the development of sectoral plans, no attempts were made by the executing agencies in Monrovia to initiate dialogue with the local population. The hinterland or local areas were completely removed from the formulation of the plan. This strategy limited the extent to which indivi­ duals could participate effectively within the political system. It was generally conceded that in the implemen­ tation of the plan, the government needed financial as well as human resources. To be successful, a plan must require the total involvement of government and people at every level. A development plan could be used to arouse enthusiasm among the population. The plan served as a demonstrable intention that government was doing something about poverty. Through a development plan, government could be seen to exist in the interest of the people. By involving the people in the planning process, the local population could believe that their taxes paid to the central government were being expended on projects which accrued benefits to them. In the case of Liberia, the plan was noted more for its symbolic action than for its attempt to commit government to a fullscale onslaught against poverty. The plan did not call for structural 183 changes in the economy. It did not attempt to encourage the formation of cooperatives as a means of increasing hinterland participation in agriculture production. With little hinterland participation in the planning process, the planning policies reflected the interest of a few— those who count. Groth argued this point further by maintaining that the degree of public service received by the population is directly related to the extent to which they "count" in the system. That is, the extent to which they are allowed to participate. So far, we have seen that the True Whig Party and Tubman have been successful in their attempts to regulate hinterland participation. Cognizant of this fact, it should come as no surprise if they accrued little benefits from the policy outputs. In order to determine this fact, it is important to begin an examination of three policy outputs which are of prime importance to the hinterland popula­ tion: roads, health, agriculture. CHAPTER V

SOME PUBLIC POLICIES:

TRANSPORTATION, HEALTH AND AGRICULTURE

In a system where the channels of participation are

monopolized by the elites, public policies are developed

and reflect the interest of this group. Groth as we have

observed argued that the extent to which individuals participate in the system will determine the extent to which they count and hence, the benefits which accrue to

them. Three public services which are important to the hinterland population are: roads, agriculture and

health. Here again, we will observe that as a result of

the limited nature of hinterland participation, they were

not affected greatly by economic development in these

three areas.

Roads

Beginning from the 1950's, there has been a steady

increase in the growth of the public road system. The

rapid expansion of the road system can be viewed from the

following table:

184 185

Public, Primary and Secondary Roads

Year Miles'*-

1949 220

1954 300

1961 900

1967 2,200

By the end of 197 0, the public road system consisted of

about 2,900 miles of roads. This figure, of course, excluded roads constructed by various private conces­

sions. The rapid upsurge in motor vehicles constituted a second factor which pointed to the growth of the road system. For the period 1966-70, the number of motor vehicles were as follows:

Year Total Private Taxi Buses Trucks Cars Cabs

19 66 11,732 5,762 1,728 1,447 2,795

1967 15,036 7,268 2,299 1,986 3,489

1968 19,681 8,963 3,434 2,785 4,543

1969 21,136 9,880 3,353 2,995 4,908

1970 23,210 7,134 2,969 1,962 4,436

Joint publication, Departments of Public Works and National Planning. Road development in Liberia, Monrovia, Liberia, 1968. 2 Economic survey of Liberia 1971 Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, p. 87. 186 Liberian roads are classified into three main

types: primary paved, primary laterite and secondary 3 laterite. The primary system consists of all weather

roads and is designed for speed limits of 45 m.p.h. Like

the primary paved roads, the primary laterites are also

designed for speed limits of 45 m.p.h. Speed limits on

secondary roads however, range from 30-40 m.p.h. Roads

which fall into the secondary classification are basi­

cally farm to market roads. These roads have little or

no modern engineering design standards. They are generally

below 10 miles long and are usually limited in use for

six month periods, i.e. during the dry and mid-dry sea­

sons .

In most developing areas, there is a general debate over the issue of whether to allocate scarce public

funds to the building of primary roads as opposed to

secondary; or the building of roads in one sector as compared to the other. The selection of a particular

strategy often provides us with a cue for assessing the relative influence of groups within the system. In

the case of Liberia, we find that the road building pro­ gram is based on a strategy designed to achieve adminis­ trative centralization and attract foreign investment.

3 Primary paved roads are comprised of bituminous pavement while the primary laterite and secondary laterite roads consist of laterite surface. 187

This strategy, it should be added, served to benefit those who count. The "open door policy" is primarily concerned with attracting foreign investment. As a means of attracting foreign investments, the government directed its efforts toward the building of roads. Under the road building program, priority was assigned to two areas: a) to the construction of roads which facilitated the easy flow of goods and services to and from con­ cession areas; b) to the construction of roads linking

Monrovia with the Coastal counties. As a result of this strategy, the Department of Public Works, which is responsible for all road building activities, proceeded to construct primary roads at the expense of farm to market roads.

The construction of primary roads into hinterland areas provided the central government with an effective means of collecting taxes. Additionally, the construc­ tion of these roads resulted in an influx of coastal

Liberians into hinterland areas in search of farm lands and other economic opportunities. While the construction of these roads increased the effectiveness of central government control and enhanced the economic opportunities for coastal elites, it provided little benefits to the hinterland population. For the hinterland population, the construction of farm to market roads provided the best opportunity for increased economic benefits. Yet, 188

there was a general lack of emphasis on the development

of these roads.

Farm to Market Roads

Irrespective of the impressive increase in road

mileage over the years, the strategy of centralization

pursued by the government resulted in the continued

isolation of a large number of hinterland areas. It is

argued by many individuals, that there is a close rela­

tionship between volumes of transport and levels of

economic activity. This argument is due in part to the

fact that most economic activities are possible only if

transport is available to make them so. If, for example,

produce from farm to consuming center takes an excessive

length of time, considerable loss will be sustained and manufacture and production of cash crops will be cur­

tailed. The lack of roads or transport facilities has

the added effect of forcing communities to rely primarily

on human poterage as a means of moving goods to and from

the market.

In the case of Bong County, an area whose road

facilities are relatively more developed (see road map on following page) this problem is typified. Rice produced on village farms usually was carried to market on the heads of the farmer or his wives. A 1967 survey in this county revealed that, of those farmers who sold some of their rice, seventy five percent (75%) transported 189

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0 MltQ 190 it by walking. Of those selling their rice, seventy two per cent (72%) indicated that they made sales only 4 occasionally. The lack of transport facilities, coupled with the nonexistence of storage areas, resulted in the rot of substantial portions of agricultural goods. The combination of these two factors served to create a lack of incentive among local farmers. Often many of them walked considerable distances to sell their rice; they were therefore, unlikely to carry it home if the price was not satisfactory. Awareness of this fact provided the farmer with little incentive for surplus production.

The problems created by the lack of roads in hinterland areas were again illuminated in a recent article on the Guma-Mendi Chiefdom. Located in Lofa

County, this chiefdom was situated near the Sierra Leone border. The article pointed out that there were no roads connecting the chiefdom either with the county in which it is located or to the rest of Liberia. As a consequence, most of the trade of this community was conducted with

Sierra Leone. This fact was manifested in the use of

Sierra Leone currency as the principle medium of exchange.

Lacking hospital facilities as well, the members of this community often travelled to Sierra Leone for

4 Reported in conference paper presented at the University of Liberia, "The Effects of Transportation on Subsistence Farming in Liberia," D. Clay, p. 11. 191 5 medical treatment. The map revealed that the case of

this chiefdom did not constitute an isolated example.

In fact, there existed a noticeable lack of adequate

road networks— especially farm to market— in the whole

southeastern section of Liberia. Without farm to market

roads, this section of Liberia had experienced a steady

decline in agricultural products as well as a substantial

migration of its population to the cities and concession

areas. Even when farm to market roads existed, they were either poorly constructed or inadequately maintained.

Consequently, many of these roads were usually washed

away and were impassable during the rainy seasons. We will observe in our discussions on health services that

this situation created serious difficulties for the delivery of supplies to hinterland areas.

In cases where the hinterland population was provided with the economic resources and the opportunity to participate, they have demonstrated an impressive ability to develop as well as implement successful road building programs. This fact was observed in the case of local

self-help programs. These cases provided us with examples of some of the possible benefits which could be obtained from decentralization.

Recently, a document as well as a map were published by the ministry of local government which showed local

5 Liberian Star, December 20, 1972. 192

self-help road projects completed during the period

1968-1972. It should be interesting to note that barring

a number of scattered projects in Grand Bassa, Grand

Gedeh, Montserrado and Cape Mount Counties, the bulk of

self-help farm to market road projects is centered in g Lofa and Nimba Counties. Within the two counties are

located the bulk of Liberia's iron ore concessions. These companies contributed funds to the local areas for the purpose of building self-help road projects. With avail­ able funds, chiefs and other local officials have been able to marshall the support of the community and have succeeded in building a number of self-help projects.

In most cases, the decision as to where a particular road project was built emanated from the community. It is important to note that in most cases, the decision often reflected the general interest of the community.

Roads were built where they were needed most. The roads provided the local community with outlets to markets as well as access to clinics which were once inaccessible to them.

Finally, this section has attempted to show that from the early 1950's to 1970, there has been a remarkable increase in roads. This expansion, however, has not altered noticeably the isolated conditions of many

g See appendix for list of self-help road projects. 193 hinterland communities. This fact is due primarily to the government's strategy, which emphasized the construc­ tion of primary roads at the expense of secondary or farm to market roads. This strategy in fact has been geared toward the objective of attracting foreign invest­ ment as well as linking the coastal counties together. Of equal importance, the government's strategy tended to benefit the coastal elites who as a result of new roads penetrated hinterland areas and utilized their influence to purchase farmland near primary roads.

As with roads, there was a general increase in health facilities during this period. But as we have so often seen in the case of Liberia, an increase in a particular activity has not resulted in an equitable distribution of benefits among the population. Rather, an increase in a particular activity has more often resulted in increased rewards for those who count. Turn­ ing our attention to health, it is important to determine the extent to which this pattern continued.

Health

It is generally now accepted, that the economic development process must be concerned with the twin goals of increasing the production of goods and services as well as monitoring the equitable distribution of these goods and services. Within this context, the allocation or distribution of existing health facilities has 194 important implications for balanced or sustained economic performance. What was the nature of the health distri­ bution system, one might ask? To what extent has the existing health distribution system facilitated or hindered the equitable diffusion of health facilities?

In order to answer these questions, it is now necessary to begin an examination of the health distribution system in Liberia. An appropriate point for beginning our analysis is to determine the dispersion of western-trained doctors among the population.

Physicians

The extent to which doctors as well as other health facilities were distributed among the population again provided us with a good indication of those who count.

For a greater distribution of doctors and other health 7 facilities often entailed greater life span. Publica­ tion of Liberia's first census in 1962 provided us with the first completed statistical data on the distribution of doctors. Listed below is the relationship between the distribution of doctors and population among the counties.

7 This fact can be clearly seen m the case of developed and developing nations where, because of more health facilities, individuals in developed nations tend to have a greater life span. 195

Population and Doctor/Population Ratio by Counties

Name of County Population Number of Doctor/Population Doctors Ratio

Grand Basser 131,840 5 1:26,368

Cape Mount 32,190 1 1:32,190

Maryland 62,786 5 1:12,557

Montserrado 258,821 61 1:4,243

Sinoe 56,095 2 1:28,047

Nimba 160,743 6 1:26,790

Grand Gedeh 59,275 - -

Bong 131,528 4 1:32,882

Lofa 123,165 6 1:20,527

Total 1,016,443 90 1:11,2948

Although there has yet to be developed an absolute criteria for specifying the ratio of health doctors to population, the United Nations has established a minimum criteria which serves as an objective for most nations to 9 aim for. In terms of medical doctors, the statistics revealed that there existed an enormous disparity between the ratio of doctors to population in the coastal counties of Montserrado and Maryland as compared to the hinterland counties of Nimba and Bong. An even more glaring example

g Ten year National Health Plan, 1967-76, p. 51 9 . Decentralization for national and local development. U.N. publication, 1962, New York, p. 121. 196 was the case of the hinterland county of Grand Gedeh which at the time of the census was without a major hospital or a university trained medical doctor.

The degree of inequality in medical facilities was also reflected in the varying capacity of hospitals and hospital beds between the coastal and hinterland counties.

Population and Beds/Population Ratio by Counties Census 1962

Name of Gov't . Ratio of Beds County Population Hospitals Beds to 1,000 Pop.

Grand Basser 131,840 1 38 1:3,469

Cape Mount 32,190 1 41 1: 785

Maryland 62,786 1 86 1: 730

Montserrado 258,821 7 565 1: 493

Sinoe 56,095 1 40 1:1,402

Nimba 160,743 1 28 1:5,540

Grand Gedeh 59,275 - - -

Bong 131,528 1 26 1:5,058

Lofa 123,165 1 52 1:2,368

Total 1,016,443 15 886 1:1,14710

The wide variation in hospital beds between coastal and hinterland counties can be seen clearly in the examples of Nimba and Maryland Counties. In this case, the more

"^Ten Year National Health Plan, p. 43. 197

densely populated hinterland county of Nimba had less

hospital beds than the less sparsely populated coastal

county of Maryland. Here again, the example seemed to

confirm Groth's point. The distribution of benefits

correlates highly with participation, i.e. those who count.

Maryland's representation at the pyramid of the policy­ making process clearly served as one reflection as to the

extent to which she counts. Originating from Maryland,

President Tubman succeeded in using the influence of his

office to channel a substantial level of public services

to the citizens of this county. This fact provided us with one explanation for the existing disparity of hos­ pital beds between Maryland and Nimba. Faced with a

limited supply of health facilities, the hinterland popula­

tion has experienced a relatively short life span, a fact reflected in the high infant mortality and crude death rate in these areas.

The hinterland population in many instances was either left without modern medical care or serviced by

small clinics. Health clinics in these areas constituted

the only government facility to which the majority of the population could turn in the first instance for medical care. Yet, clinics in hinterland areas were poorly

staffed. A few clinics were staffed by a nurse, medical assistant or dresser. In most clinics, however, the only medical staff of significance was either a midwife or an 198

Estimates of Crude Birth Rate, Death Rate, Infant Mortality Rate and Life Expectancy Rate at Birth and Median Age at Death, 1970

Index Liberia Rural Urban^ Areas Areas

Crude Live Birth 51 50 53 Rate - 1

Crude death 16 18 12 Rate - 2

Infant Mortality 137 158 82 Rate - 3

Life Expectancy 54 51 54 at Birth - 4

Median age at 30 2.0 4.7 Death - 5 1 = number of live births per 1,000 population.

2 = children under age 5 years per 1,000, women ages 15-44.

3 = number of deaths during year divided by mid-year population and multiplied by 1,000.

4 = life expectancy of both sexes •

5 = age which represents half the distribution of death. auxiliary midwife. Even with the limited services avail- able in the clinics , the lack of transportation facilities in hinterland areas prevented many individuals from participating in the few benefits offered.

Presented on the following page is a map of Lofa

County portraying the health facilities and their proximity

■^Economic Survey of Liberia, Monrovia, Liberia. National planning, p. 122, 1971. LoFft C ounty H£ m >h Fa c i l i t i e s .

Q - U l H E h ForU^g: S k r r a L e o *je

Foyo- ka-f^Lro-V \ , . \ ^

Kua.ttt.hc "■+ B o u u ^ \ voVwj a m A^pxsr.

y ^ O cx.Zq.cnDO- C\ KoLAHUN ^XSTRlGl

f-V^Won J%©r\U>-

DXSTPXCT MbcNL o m

ffcpc^a

✓ vZflLo UC •»5»>^Je.t,-Su°- I BOPOLI/

key: K_ij.il.lt- Cjtovt', Hos?>t fosfc G k Orotv C U n . c

~ - - - O 6-c o a cl cx/c R. O o- cl-s . Htt U3tiCtVhe.r l^o

It is divided into Ll districts: Kolahun Dist.-51,000 Zorzor Dist. -33,000. Voinjama Dist.-26,000. Bopolu Dist. -26,000.

199 200 to roads. The map shows that in many cases, clinics were located in areas which were without roads. Although the map is intended to portray the problem as it existed in

Lofa, it is by no means unique. Rather, the example should be viewed as representing a typical case of the problem as it existed in other hinterland counties. From the map, it can be observed that within the Bopolu District of Lofa County, there were no roads linking the population of the area to existing clinics. Consequently, residents of the area must travel by foot in order to get to clinics.

The dysfunctional effects of little or no partici­ pation in the planning and policy-making process can be seen in no clearer examples than these. Clinics in many hinterland counties were accessible only on foot, requiring as much as a day's walk from a motor road. An even more serious problem for hinterland groups was that in many areas, some clinics were functional only during the dry or mid-dry season. In an interview with the super­ intendent of Bong County, the superintendent informed me of some of the problems which this situation posed for him. He emphasized that during the rainy seasons, many of the clinics in his county were often without supplies for extended periods of time. This condition he asserted, stemmed from the fact that, in his county, most secondary roads were often poorly constructed. As a result, during the rainy seasons, a substantial number of roads become 201 impassable; they were either flooded or washed away.

The superintendent then revealed that he was in the process of devising a scheme whereby during periods when roads were inoperative, the national government would provide the county with a small plane to fly in medical 12 supplies to clinics in affected areas.

Although the problem of supplies for clinics was especially intense during periods of the rainy season, the problem of supply delivery existed even during dry seasons. Requisitioning their drugs directly from

Monrovia, many clinics in hinterland areas experienced excessive delays in their orders. This writer observed during a visit to Lofa County, that it was not an uncommon practice for clinic personnel to travel to Monrovia— closing down the clinics— in pursuit of their unfilled 13 drug order. In some cases, this problem also affected large hospitals outside Monrovia. A recent report mentioned instances where the food supply of a hospital was completely exhausted, resulting in the hospital purchasing food on a daily basis.

Without roads or sufficient medical supplies, hinterland areas have not been able to attract the

12 Interview with Superintendent Harry Greaves of Bong County, Gharnga, September 9-10, 1973. 13 This observation was made during my visit to Lofa County, September 12-14, 1973 202 necessary para-medical staff which was so essential for the effective operation of their clinics. The majority of para-medics often resided in Monrovia or the coastal counties taking advantage of the greater socio-economic opportunities available in these areas. Listed below is a table which shows that with the singular exception of health assistants, the Monrovia metropolitan area alone claimed more than one-half of the para-medical staff whose whereabouts could be determined in each of the health occupations.

Liberian Para-Medical Manpower Survey: Location of Para-Medical Personnel in Liberia

Professional Monrovia Other Areas Whereabout Total Metropolitan of Unknown Area____ Liberia

Nurses 170 84 176 430

Practical 14 13 35 62 Nurses

Nurse Anaesthetists

Midwives 71 43 62 176

Lab Tech. 38 21 21 80

X-ray Tech. 14 6 4 24

Dieticians 9 4 5 18

Pharmacists 8 3 0 11

Health 0 25 0 25 Assistants

Health 47 41 24 112 Inspectors 203 14 Professional Monrovia Other Areas Whereabout Total Metropolitan of Unknown Area Liberia

Health 6 41 24 112 Educators

Hospital 3 0 1 4 Administrators

Dental 5 0 0 5 Technician

Therapists 4 1 2 7

Traditionally, there has existed a parallel

development between the development of roads and the

growth of other social services. The development of

roads often served as a catalyst for attracting other

social programs. Lacking roads and with limited social

opportunities, hinterland communities have not been able

to recruit the necessary para-medical staff. This writer

has gathered from conversations with nurses and a number

of individuals associated with health care in Liberia,

some of the factors which accounted for the inequitable

distribution of nurses and other para-medical personnel.

Most of the reasons as could be expected related directly

to the relative imbalance in socio-economic opportunities between hinterland communities and coastal counties. As a result of this imbalance, many nurses have been attracted

14 Report to the government of Liberia on total involvement: A Strategy for Development: International Labour Office, 1972, p. 73. 204

to Monrovia and other coastal cities. Some of the

specific benefits enjoyed by nurses in Monrovia and some

coastal cities are enumerated below.

There is a discrepancy in salaries. In Liberia,

there was a lack of uniformity in wages paid to indivi­

duals performing similar functions. Generally, indivi­

duals in Monrovia and some coastal counties received higher

salaries than their counterparts in hinterland areas.

During my conversation with a number of nurses, they

alluded to the fact that nurses' salaries in Monrovia doubled that of their hinterland counterparts. The nurses further emphasized that salaries paid to nurses were generally meager. As a result, many of them supplemented their salaries by holding a second job.

Unlike hinterland areas, these jobs could more easily be obtained in Monrovia. There were cases however, where nurses accepted jobs in hinterland areas even in spite of these problems. In most cases, many of these indivi­ duals were often faced with the additional problem of not getting paid on time. Owing to the lag in development of roads as well as other forms of transportation facili­ ties, it was not unusual for salaries to be delayed for periods up to two months or more.

Coupled with the above problems, the lack of medical equipment in hinterland clinics was listed as one of the major sources of complaints. A number of nurses 205

emphasized that clinics in Monrovia and other coastal

cities were provided with most of the equipment necessary

to operate their programs. On the contrary, hinterland 15 clinics were frequently without equipment. These fac­

tors combined have tended to have an influence on limiting

the flow of nurses and other para-medics to hinterland communities.

As in health development, Tubman and a number of

Liberian officials issued formal statements emphasizing

the importance of agricultural development. Development of agricultural areas was seen by these leaders as providing hinterland communities with the opportunity to participate in the economic benefits of the nation. But, as we so often have seen in the case of Liberia, formal statements were often not translated into reality. If the government were interested in developing agricultural areas, it must develop specific policies to raise the level of technology of this sector, as well as to encourage the utilization and expansion of traditional forms of agricultural organizations which have proven their effectiveness to the hinterland population. Two agricul­ tural projects which have been developed to increase hinterland participation in the economic benefits of the

15 Interview with nurses in the presence of Chief, Nursing Division. Ministry of Health, September 17, 1973. 206 nation were: a) the Gbedin Rice Scheme; and? b) the

Agriculture Credit Corporation. An examination of these two projects will serve to provide us with some indica­ tion as to the seriousness of the government's commitment toward the objective of increasing hinterland participa­ tion in agricultural production.

Performing the role of the catalyst for agricultural development was the Department of Agriculture. The goals of this Department were listed as follows:

1) Diversify Liberia's agricultural economy.

2) Increase the participation of Liberia's

citizens in modern agricultural production.

3) Increase farmers' income; create purchasing

power and develop a market for consumer goods.

4) Maximize the national income of Liberia through

agriculture and forestry pursuits.

5) Provide rural and urban consumers with more

nutritive diets at lower cost.

Of the many agricultural commodities produced in Liberia, rice was considered to be one of the most important. Its importance to the Liberian diet is analogous to wheat and potatoes to the diet of Americans. Until 1948, Liberia was reported to have been self-sufficient in the production of rice. Since 1948, however, there has been a steady decrease in the domestic production of rice, followed by a gradual increase in the amount of imported rice.'*'6 In

1 See table in appendix. 207

response to this steady increase in rice import, coupled

with the desired goal of attaining self-sufficiency in

the production of rice as well as increasing hinterland

participation, the Department of Agriculture launched the

Gbedin Rice Project.

Gbedin Rice Project

The Gbedin Rice Project was started in 1954. The

then Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, Stephen Tolbert,

explained the aim of the project as follows:

"It was decided to set up a swamp rice project in the Gbedin Swamp to be financed by the Liberian Government. . . . This project was to be conducted as a demonstration to show the natives and the public the best way of producing rice in a swamp."I7

It was then anticipated that the techniques acquired from these demonstration projects were to be transferred later to local villages— resulting in the establishment of swamp rice farms throughout Liberia.

Swamp rice production was seen to have several advan­ tages over upland rice production: 1) Once a block of land was cleared, it could be kept in production for a substantial number of years and thereby eliminate the need for clearing new land every year; 2) The destruction of timber estimated at a yearly average of 50,000 and the erosion of land which resulted from upland rice

17 Gabriel Meaux, Liberian Swam^> Rice Production: A Success, Washington, D.C. U.S Foreign Administration, 1955, p. 12. 208

production would be stopped; and, 3) Per acre yield

potentials in swamp production was reported to be much

greater than for upland rice.

Responding to a request from the Liberian Govern­

ment, the United States Government dispatched a rice

specialist to Liberia to assist in the growing of swamp

rice. To understand some of the effects of administrative

centralization (a strategy which limited hinterland

participation), it is important to examine some of the

policy decisions leading to the setting up of this

project. In the book Liberian Swamp Rice Production: A

Success, Gabriel Meaux provided us with an insight into

discussions relating to the establishment of the project.

According to Meaux, on February 8, 1954, Stephen Tolbert

held a conference which was attended by Frank Pinder, the

Agricultural Adviser Point IV, A. B. Sidigi, a Liberian

rice specialist, and Meaux, the United States rice

representative specialist. At the conference, Tolbert,

the government representative, proceeded to brief the group on decisions which had already been reached in

Monrovia. Briefly, they were as follows. The Liberian government had decided to set up demonstration swamp projects in four hinterland districts of the central province, now Bong County: Saniquelle, Gbarnga, Tappita and Salala. District commissioners would be instructed to request chiefs in the four districts to provide labor 209 or preferably trainees for the project.

Following the conference, Meaux, along with mem­ bers of his team, travelled to the Central Province to confer with district commissioner Allen Williams. Meaux informed the commissioner of the project and then dis­ cussed with him the possibility of providing laborers— trainees— to work on the project. The commissioner assured Meaux and his team that by the start of the pro­ ject, they would have the required quantity of men. True to his word, on the scheduled opening day of the program, the commissioner had gathered workers representing various clans of the districts who reported to the Gbedin 18 site. It is interesting, however, to observe the procedure through which these men were recruited. The commissioner dispatched a letter to the paramount chief instructing him to send a number of men to work on a government project. Without participation in the deci­ sion leading to the establishment of the project and hence, not fully aware of the potential benefits being offered by the project, most chiefs supported the program with little or no enthusiasm. For example, while responding to the government's request, chiefs dispatched workers to Gbedin who had demonstrated little or no signs of leadership or the ability to work within the community.

18 See appendix for names of clans represented. 210

Instead, these men were noted more for causing trouble.

The best workers, those who had consistently exemplified

their leadership and effectiveness over the years, were reserved for the community. Of equal importance, most of the workers that were sent to Gbedin did not under­ stand the nature of the program nor the reasons for being there. As we observed earlier, most labour recruitment programs have been geared toward either getting workers for the construction of roads or for working on the farms of coastal elites and concessions. The nature of their employment was temporary. They worked for a few weeks, collected their money and returned to their villages.

In the absence of an effective method for communicating the concept of the project, many of the workers perceived

Gbedin as a project owned by a government official in

Monrovia. They viewed their association with the pro­ ject essentially on the basis of an employer-employee relationship. As such, they were principally concerned with working for a number of weeks, collecting their money and returning to their villages. All along, how- 19 ever, the main objective of Gbedin eluded them. It should be remembered that these men did not participate in the decision which resulted in the formation of this project. For no one had made it sufficiently clear to

19 For a good discussion relating to some of the problems entailed in the transfer of technology, see Communication of Innovations: A Cross Cultural Approach, E. M. Rogers and F. Shoemaker, 2nd Ed., New York, Free Press, 1971. 211

them that they were at Gbedin to be taught the skills of

transplanting swamp rice from nursery plots. Having acquired

the skills, they would then return home to establish

demonstration or extension programs in their own areas,

thereby serving as transmitters of the concept of swamp

production. Failing to grasp the total concept of the

program, the majority of workers left Gbedin and returned

to their villages only to continue their involvement in

upland rice cultivation, the exact system of rice

production the government had been attempting to

discourage. There were a few cases, however, where rice

specialists in cooperation with the chiefs of some clans,

succeeded in establishing demonstration or extension

swamp rice projects in areas other than Gbedin. Even

in these cases, farmers in the areas were said to have reacted negatively to the concept of swamp rice produc­

tion. Six years following the establishment of Gbedin,

the government could find no perceptible shift among

farmers toward swamp rice production. In fact, the

government discovered that it had made little progress

toward its goal of attaining self-sufficiency in rice production. This fact can be observed in the steady

increase in the import of rice during this period. Fail­

ing to achieve any significant results whatsoever, the

government in 1960 abandoned the Gbedin Rice Project.

Two years following Gbedin's failure, Tubman again expressed the desire for Liberia to become self-sufficient 212 in rice production. In order to accomplish this goal, the government again set out to develop a second Gbedin

Project. To assist in carrying out the President's objective, the Liberian Government requested the assist­ ance of rice experts from China (Taiwan) to replace the

American specialists. Arriving in the latter half of

1962, the Chinese specialists began what is commonly called in Liberia, "the era of the second Gbedin fiasco."

Interestingly enough, the strategy employed in the second

Gbedin Project was strikingly similar to the first.

Again, there was no attempt to gear the program through traditional agricultural groups as a means of increasing hinterland acceptance and participation. As a result, the second Gbedin Project which it should be noted continues to exist, again failed to move beyond the demonstration stage. After more than ten years of existence, the program failed to develop a successful method for communicating the technique of swamp rice production to local farmers. The majority of local farmers con­ tinued to pursue their traditional practice of upland rice cultivation. Meanwhile, Liberia continued to steadily import rice and as yet showed no sign of either devising ways of increasing hinterland participa­ tion in agriculture production nor achieving the level of self-sufficiency often predicted. 213

In spite of formal governmental pronouncements in support of hinterland participation, how does one account for Gbedin's failure to mobilize the resources of this group? The answer lies largely in the utilization of the politics of form and symbolism. Thus, by establishing projects like Gbedin, the government would appear to be encouraging or spearheading the drive toward rapid social change and increased participation among hinterland groups. In actual practice, however, the strategy which the government utilized precluded the operation of any form of change which would threaten the stability of the nation or disrupt the pattern of control established by the elites. Any change was perceived as coming incre­ mentally within the limits set by the elites.

The case of the Gbedin Rice Project provided us with another example of the operation of this strategy.

Bong County, the county in which the Gbedin experiment was conducted, is an area in which the Kpelle Tribe constituted the majority of the population. As we observed earlier, this tribe has developed successfully a highly organized form of agricultural cooperative known as the

Kuu. As a cooperative labor group, the majority of small farmers were members of Kuus. It seemed logical, then, that any program which was designed to increase rice production among hinterland groups would at least channel some aspects of the program through traditional cooperatives 214 which were already in existence. For these cooperatives could, with a little initiative as well as imagination, be transformed into modern cooperatives which could greatly increase rice production. Having retained and modernized the Kuu, the government could also use this organization as a means of strengthening the appeal of swamp rice production among hinterland population. But, as we have seen, the government failed to develop any links of communication with the Kuu. Why, one might ask, did the government fail to utilize traditional agricultural coopera­ tives in the establishment as well as operation of

Gbedin? One indication of the elites' position on this issue can be seen in Tubman's statement. When faced with this question, Tubman replied that Liberia was not 20 yet ready for cooperatives. It should come as no surprise, however, that Tubman and the Liberian elites were opposed to the development of modern cooperatives.

For, after all, Liberian officials were quite familiar with events in neighboring African countries. In coun­ tries such as Kenya, Ghana and Tanzania, where modern cooperatives have been allowed to operate, these groups have proven successful in their attempts to secure political power as well as to extract economic benefits from the system. Fully aware of the potential power

20 ... Liebenow, Liberia the Evolution of Priviledge, p. 87. 215 which a modern cooperative in Liberia could wield, the government proceeded to develop Gbedin without attempting to seek any involvement from the Kuu.

Meanwhile, the government relied on a strategy of centralized top-to-bottom planning, in which blueprints for Gbedin were conceived and developed in Monrovia by the central government. Little or no efforts were made to explain fully the concepts and objectives of the program.

The beneficiaries of the project never understood or appreciated fully the need of this project. Additionally, no attempts were made to discover techniques that would motivate farmers or to develop modern production tech­ niques which could be adapted to the prevailing ecologi­ cal conditions of hinterland farmers. Most rural development experts observed that many farmers correctly argued that a particular fertilizer dose that proved profitable with one crop in one locality may prove a loss with the same crop in a different locality. For most farmers, the test of relevance was whether a particular practice proved superior on his farm or his neighbor's and not on the experiment station farms. In other words, the success of any particular innovation must be demon­ strated in the farmer's environment. In emphasizing the importance of this point, Campbell, Byrnes and Byrnes asserted: 216

"Many extension programs have been based on the assumption that farmers use inductive thought process almost exclusively. Demonstra­ tion plots and experiment farms have been used to provide factual information about produc­ tion practices. If the conditions prevailing on a specific farm are similar to those existing on the experimental farm, the operator of that farm might appropriately apply the practice demonstrated on his own farm. The weaknesses of this approach stem from the fact that no two farms have identical, physical, economical and managerial resources and on no privately owned farm can conditions on the experimental farm be duplicated."21

The relevance of these findings to the Liberian

case was demonstrated by recent studies in Liberia which

reached the conclusion that the acceptance of new practices by farmers would depend upon the extent to which they believed this practice would contribute

toward increased yields within their environment. In a

survey of Liberian hinterland farmers by W. D. McCourtie,

82% of 220 farmers interviewed stated that they were afraid of growing new crops with which they have had no experience. Even more important, the report also revealed that most farmers were apparently convinced that swamp rice production was definitely less profitable than dry 22 land rice production. In a remarkably candid interview

21 Roanan Weitz, Rural Development m a Changing World, Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press, p. 64. 22 W. D. McCourtie, Traditional Farming in Liberia: A Preliminary Inquiry, Research Bulletin, No. 16. College of Agriculture and Forestry, Monrovia, Liberia, Univer­ sity of Liberia, September 1968, p. 69. 217 23 with farmers by a Liberian writer, an attempt was made

to determine some of the factors which led to the far­

mers' refusal to adopt the technique of swamp rice

production.

In order to determine some of the reasons which

led to the farmers' rejection of the concept of swamp rice production, more than one hundred persons in

several villages were interviewed. Although many ques­ tions were asked, we will focus our attention on only two interrelated questions. They are: a) Why do you like to grow upland rice? or turning the question around, b) Why do Kpelle people in general in the past and now like to grow upland rice more than swamp rice? In response to these questions, the following answers were provided: 1) Many of the farmers emphasized that in upland rice cultivation, a system known as intercropping was practiced. This system allowed farmers to plant supplementary crops together with rice such as yams, eddoes, cassova, bitter ball and so forth. Farmers realized, however, that these supplementary crops could not be grown in swamps. This fact entailed that they would have to rely solely on rice production as the only source for generating income to pay their taxes as well

2 “3 Interview conducted by John Kellemu, Article reported in Liberia Research Association Journal, p. 1-18, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1969, University of Liberia, Monrovia, Liberia. 218

as feed themselves. They believed that this could not be

done with swamp rice cultivation. In order to adopt the

technique of swamp rice, farmers argued that a solution

to the problem of intercropping must be evolved.

Secondly, in earlier years, a substantial number of

farmers were affected with yaws. This disease was espe­

cially prevalent among individuals who tended to stand

in swamp water over prolonged periods. With the intro­

duction of pencillin and other forms of modern medicine,

however, this disease has been almost completely eradica­

ted. Even with this fact, a large number of farmers continued to associate swamps with the spreading of yaws. Thirdly, as we have already noted, the majority of Kpelle farmers worked in the Kuu. In performing their assigned functions, members of the Kuu tended to mix work with enjoyment. As the members of the Kuu worked, they sang, danced, rolled over, and so forth. Recent studies in public administration alluded to the fact that in a situation of monotonous work activity, workers will develop a system of interaction which is intended to minimize boredom of the job.2^ This observation is certainly applicable to the Kuu. For their form of inter­ action was not only intended to develop esprit de corps among workers, but more importantly, to minimize the

24 Organizational behavior and the practice of management. Revised Edition, Hampton, Summer & Webber, Scott, Foresman & Co., Glenview, 111, p. 229. 219 loneliness and boredom of the job. Farmers pointed out that important ritual could not be performed in swamps.

As yet, no suitable technique has been developed to transfer this important ritual to swamps. Fourthly, many of the interviewees expressed little or no knowledge of Gbedin or the concept of swamp rice production.

The interviewer discovered that a large number of farmers had never been contacted. How one might ask, was infor­ mation transmitted to the farmers ?

The agricultural extension service was developed in 1960, the era of the second Gbedin project, for the purpose of transmitting information to farmers, encouraging increased farm production and promoting the objective of efficient farm management. As later discussions revealed however, this service benefited mainly those who count.

In a report conducted for the Liberian government by ILO, it was revealed that the activities of extension workers were limited to 60 or 70 large farmers located within coastal counties. The report emphasized that the majority of traditional farmers received no help from the extension program. Even prior to this time, in a 1960 statistical report, the number of farm households in rural areas was listed to 250,000, Yet, there were only 100 agricultural extension workers assigned to the rural areas. The report noted that, within this group, a good number of workers were not trained or equipped to deal with the 220 problems at hand. On the other hand, most extension workers in coastal counties had acquired a bachelor's degree in agriculture as well as some training abroad.

Unlike their hinterland counterparts, who often travelled by bicycle or on foot to reach the farmer, extension workers in coastal counties had access to a motor vehicle-- 25 a pick-up. The extent of the xmbalance can be seen further in a table included in the appendix. These factors combined have prevented hinterland farmers from receiving little, if any, benefits from Gbedin and the extension service. In addition to Gbedin, the Agriculture

Credit Corporation was developed to provide loans to farmers and thereby increase participation among this group.

The Agriculture Credit Corporation

The Agriculture Credit Corporation was established in 1961 as an instrument of government to provide credit to growers of agricultural products. Under the terms of its charter, however, the Corporation was restricted from awarding loans to farmers who could not present acceptable collateral. Acceptable collateral, as defined by the

Corporation's charter, was rarely available in sufficient quantity to poor or small farmers. As a consequence, most loans have been awarded to rubber growers or large farmers residing in coastal counties and were members of

^ I L O Report, p. 70. 221

the Rubber Planter's Association— the association which

acted as the technical agent for the appraisal of all

loan applications.

When asked to estimate the number of loans which

went to hinterland farmers during his two year tenure,

the director could only think of four or five cases.

Even in these cases, the loans were awarded to chiefs or

prominent members of the hinterland class. The small or

poor farmers who constituted the majority of the farm

population, however, have received little benefits

from the Corporation. Consequently, in order to obtain

a loan, most small farmers relied on three sources:

a) chiefs; b) Lebanese traders; and, c) savings coopera­

tives. By far the most popular type of arrangement was the savings cooperative, generally known among the hinterland population as SUSU. In this arrangement, individuals were organized into groups. Each member contributed small amounts to a pool, the total of which was then given to one member at a time. This practice was characterized by economists as a form of compulsory savings.

While noting that the Agriculture Credit Corporation was contributing little to the development of small farmers, the minister of planning referred to the organization as a mere symbol which was in need of corrective 222 2 6 surgery. Corrective surgery was not apparently admin­

istered on time, for by 1964, the Corporation was

saddled with a number of bad debts which resulted in the

close of its operation. When asked by this writer to

list some of the factors which contributed to the

Corporation's failure, the Director stated that the

problem could be summarized in one word— Politics.

According to him, the operations of the Corporation were

highly politicized. As a result, most loans were awarded

not on the basis of the economic effectiveness of a

client's proposal, but rather on the basis of his

political contacts. This fact resulted in the lack of

control over the entire lending process. For example,

even though the corporation loans were restricted to

individuals who were supposedly owners and operators of farms, the director listed a number of instances where loans were awarded to non-farmers, many of whom used 27 their loans to build private homes. Significantly, a large number of individuals defaulted in their payments.

Given the political strength of these individuals, however, the Corporation refrained from seeking court action against them.

2 6 Papers of Conference on Development Objectives and Strategy, Document No. 9, Monrovia, Liberia, Department of Planning, 1969, p. 15. 27 Interview with the former Director of Agriculture Credit Corporation, September 20, 1973. 223

The case of the Corporation's failure was by no means unique. This section has revealed a consistent pattern of the failure of public programs which have been designed to increase hinterland participation. The failure can be principally attributed to a centralized strategy which rewarded those who count and served to limit the extent to which those who did not count participated within the political system. In the pres­ ence of limited participation among hinterland groups, a group which counted very little, programs have been developed which were often not in congruence with the ecological conditions of the community. To the extent that these programs existed, they served to mollify criticisms of the government, appearing as though all efforts were being made to increase economic benefits to hinterland groups. CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This study has in essence described and analyzed the political and administrative development of Liberia during two periods of Tubman's administration. For analytical reasons, the two periods chosen were 1944-

1954, and 1955-1970.

The first period, which encompassed the years

1944-1954, is characterized, to use Rigg's term, as an administrative mix period. This was a period in which the administrative system of Liberia was neither cen­ tralized nor decentralized. Participation in the econo­ mic and political activities of the central government was limited to Monrovia and the Coastal Counties. There existed, however, a loose form of administrative control over hinterland areas which was maintained through a system of indirect rule. Led by Twe and the Reformation

Party, at least one major attempt was made to unseat

Tubman and the ruling True Whig Party. Twe was forced to flee the country when the machinery of the national government was used to apply political and economic pressures against opposition members, and the attempt was thus overwhelmed.

Although the channels of participation were monopo­ lized by the coastal elites, there remained, however, a

224 225 few hinterland individuals who penetrated the ranks of the elites through a system of intermarriage and adop­ tion. Through the process of adoption, a number of hinterland children, many of whom were sons of chiefs, were brought into the homes of coastal elites. By being attached to a man of rank and influence, these indivi­ duals were thus offered the opportunity to enter the elite network. While proceeding to adopt the attitudes and mannerisms of the coastal elites, these individuals served as critical links between the central government and hinterland areas. The relationship which emerged from the specific functions performed by these men is analogous to the arrangement of the patron-client relationship, a relationship used effectively in Liberia to facilitate the forging of links between the center and the periphery. By relying on the personal influence of chiefs and other notables, the central government succeeded in maintaining stability in hinterland areas.

Meanwhile, public policies were shaped to benefit mainly those peoples whose influence and participation the political system encouraged.

The majority of the hinterland population received little or no political or economic benefits from the central government. Until the latter stages of this period, the hinterland population could not vote nor did they have a representative voice in government. As we 226 have seen, Groth argued that within political systems, benefits accrue to individuals according to the degree of their influence. Counting very little, hinterland groups received in turn few benefits. The three major public resources— health, transportation and agriculture— which are of importance to hinterland groups were pro­ vided, in the early period, by traditional hinterland organizations. Yet, through the effective use of for­ malism and symbolism, the government provided an image of "doing something" for the hinterland people. When penetrating behind the form of government programs

"intended for hinterland areas," one finds that for hinterland groups, these programs had more symbolic than substantive value.

The national unification program which was initiated during this period did little to change the conditions of the majority of hinterland groups. Changes such as the extension of representation to hinterland areas were interpreted by the hinterland population as evidence of the government's concern for their well-being. Yet, such formal change as the extension of representation to hinterland areas did not result in the shifting of power to hinterland groups. Instead, political and economic power continued to remain in the hands of coastal elites.

While the "Open Door Policy," which attracted a large amount of foreign investment into Liberia^ opened up 227

hinterland areas, some coastal elites perceived the

penetration of hinterland areas by foreign investors as a potential threat to their control. Yet, most of the monetary benefits which flowed from these investments

accrued to coastal elites and served to strengthen their overall control over the political and economic activi­

ties of the national government.

From 1955-1970, the second period of Liberia's development, the administrative system became more centralized. As a result of increased revenues during this period, there emerged a demand for more developed and modern institutions as well as the need for a rela­ tively strong central government. Unlike the first period where the demand for a strong central government was not especially great, this condition changed during the second period.

The political strategy which emerged during the second period was not significantly different from the first. Faced with growing demands for participation in the socio-economic benefits of the nation, Tubman again relied on the politics of formalism and symbolism, proceeding to manage and regulate the pace of moderniza­ tion.

Tubman and the True Whig Party faced a second major challenge to their rule when Edwin Barclay, a former

President of Liberia, attempted to unseat him and the 228 ruling party. Again, in attempting to overcome this challenge, Tubman and the True Whig Party resorted to the same tactics which proved so successful during their encounter with Twe and the Reformation Party. Having successfully turned back the challenge from Barclay and the Reformation Party, Tubman and the True Whig Party proceeded to bring under their fold all groups which posed as potential threats to their rule. Accordingly, such groups as wage laborers, youths, the civil service, emerging hinterland elites, were brought into the party and were made to feel incorporated into the decision­ making process. In full control over the machinery of the national government, Tubman and the True Whig Party increased hinterland participation in 1964. During this year, the system of indirect rule administered through provincial and district commissioners was replaced by county governments— a system of administration similar to that in coastal counties. This change ended a long period of almost separate rule for hinterland areas and thus ushered in a new period of an integrated administra­ tive system with the central government in control.

Without the existence of independent sources of power, the party served as the conduit through which individuals or groups could rise to positions of political and economic prominence. With increased revenues and expanding economic opportunities, the political party 229

possessed the resources to reward its supporters. Thus,

those who expressed their support for Tubman and the

party were rewarded with economic benefits. Similarly,

individuals opposed to the Whig leadership were in turn

excluded from participation in the economic rewards. The patronage power wielded by Tubman and the party was of

such magnitude that it succeeded in winning over poten­

tial opposition groups.

While continuing to maintain control, the rank of the elites was opened up to new entrants of hinterland background. A number of these individuals such as Togba,

Massaquoi, Boyou, Caine, traditional hinterland names, were appointed to cabinet and sub-cabinet positions in the Tubman administration. In order to maintain their positions, however, these individuals had to operate within the rules of the game. And the rules were in many cases shaped to ensure the continued control of coastal elites.

Utilizing the strategy of formalism and regulated development, public programs and policies were developed which often contradicted the objectives the government attempted to achieve. In contrast to formal pronounce­ ments of developmental objectives, developmental policies in the process of implementation had different impacts from stated objectives. Public policies were often shaped to benefit a relatively small elite, mainly those 230 who count. Meanwhile, the majority of the population accrued few benefits from developmental activities.

Confronted with political pressures from home and especially abroad, Tubman was forced to adopt the Rural

Area Development Plan. This plan was intended to diffuse economic benefits. In actual practice, however, the plan lacked political support from Tubman and the Liberian leadership. Penetrating behind the formalism of the plan, one finds that it was intended more to mollify criti­ cisms. As a result for the hinterland peoples, the plan had more symbolic than substantive value.

Additionally, lacking the political and economic clout, hinterland areas were excluded from participation in the planning of agriculture programs which served to benefit the majority of the masses. Traditional cooperative organizations, long noted for their success in agriculture development programs among the hinterland population, were often by-passed by central government officials attempting to introduce agriculture development programs in these areas. The continued use of this stra­ tegy resulted in the failure of a number of government programs. For example, the Gbedin Rice Project. This program, as we have seen, was designed and developed by the central government with little or no participation from the local population. Without being afforded the opportunity to meet and discuss properly the merits of 231

particular programs and therefore lacking an effective

voice, the local population accepted Gbedin with little

enthusiasm. Many of the local residents failed to

perceive of Gbedin as a program which was truly theirs.

As a result, the program failed to take roots within

hinterland communities. In discussing Gbedin's failure

with the Director of Agriculture Extension Service in

Monrovia, the Director singled out the lack of meaningful

local participation as one of the principal reasons for

the program's failure. He went on to assert that membership participation occurs when local programs are based on the expressed decisions of the villagers. This strategy gives villagers the feeling of being consulted as well as a feeling that someone respects their intel­

ligence .

Without adequate public services in their areas, many hinterland residents have migrated to the cities to take advantage of better hospital facilities, schools, water supplies and other facilities unavailable in the rural areas. This fact has resulted in an increase in the level of unemployment as well as overcrowded conditions in Monrovia and other coastal cities.

Finally, Huntington asserts that, by generating inequalities, expectations and new demands, the process of modernization can become politically destabilizing.'*'

■*■8. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 41. 232

But as we have seen in the case of Liberia, political development can itself be managed. While adapting to changing conditions, Liberia's political development has proceeded at a conservative and gradual pace. This strategy which has been characterized by Lowenkopf as the "salami approach" to political development has been sufficient to maintain the political stability of the 2 nation. Even though the utilization of this strategy in Liberia has contained successfully military coups, a phenomenon common to a number of African countries, it has not succeeded in distributing evenly the political and economic benefits of development. Instead, economic growth has tended to make the rich richer.

Prior to the death of Tubman, foreigners and

Liberians alike often asked the now familiar question, can the political system survive without Tubman? Dire predictions of violent revolution were often echoed.

These predictions, however, have yet to materialize.

For, in July 1971, President Tubman died following sur­ gery. As provided by the constitution, his Vice President

William R. Tolbert succeeded him to the presidency.

The transition was smooth and orderly. Thus, Liberia demonstrated that its political system could sirvive without Tubman.

2 . Martin Lowenkopf, Political Modernization m Liberia: A Conservative Model, Western Political Quarterly, 1970, p. 96. 233

Even though Liberia has until now managed success­

fully the process of modernization, there is still a

general awareness among the elites that a consistent pattern of differential access to the rewards of develop­ ment would eventually create tensions among the popula- 3 tion. In recognition of this fact, the Tolbert adminis­

tration has embarked upon a program which is intended to bring about a more balanced and equitable distribution of resources among the population. Within this context,

Tolbert has enunciated a strategy of development which calls for the diffusion of economic benefits through

"total involvement." The thrust of this plan is geared toward achieving the objective of rural development. In order to achieve this objective, the government is attempting to develop a decentralization plan in Panta

Chiefdom of Bong County. It is rather too early, however, to determine whether this plan will develop eventually to a point where it will serve as a model for decentraliza­ tion in Liberia or remain a mere symbol. The concern for the future will be in determining whether Tolbert will continue to use formalism, symbolism, and gradualism as substantive policies of the national government.

According to Young, an imbalanced relationship in the distribution of public resources to the local popu­ lation accounted for one of the major reasons for tribal conflicts in the congo. See Crawford Young, Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence, Princeton, New Jersey, 1965. 234

Indeed, whether the use of these policies will be sufficient to ensure the continued stability of the

Liberian government remains to be seen. APPENDIX A

Members of the commission were as follows:

Liberian Members

Secretary of the Treasury - Chairman

The Financial and Economic Advisor to the President

Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce

Secretary of Public Works and Utilities

Director of National Public Health Service

Secretary of Public Instruction

Attorney General

President of Liberian Ex-Officio member

United States Members

Country Director

Program Director

Agricultural Advisor

Public Health Advisor

Education Adviser

U.S. Ambassador Ex-Officio member

The functions assigned to the joint commission were as

follows:

1. Allocate funds and technical personnel to the

various agencies to carry out assigned projects.

235 236

2. Draft specifications and construction or

operational contracts and provide contractors.

3. Make progress inspections of contruction work

on other operations carried out with develop­

ment program funds.

4. Determine the timing and completion date of

each project.

5. Prepare loan application for submission to the

Liberian government where loans are deemed

necessary to finance particular projects.

6. Give special considerations to the interests of

private investors in order to encourage their

participation in the national development plan.

1951-1955 Plan

Government Administration 1,193,000

Agriculture 4,226,430

Engineering 11,267,260

Public Health 8,773,000

Education 7,120,040

Total 32,579,730

Principal projects in the Liberian Five Years' Economic

Development Plan of 1951

I. Government Administration

GA-1 - Modernization and Extension of government

services. 237

II. Agriculture

A-l - Establishment of an agriculture credit

corporation

A-2 - Agriculture research and demonstration

A-3 - Extension education in agriculture and home

economics

A-4 - Forest conservation

III. Engineering

E-l - Engineering service organization

E-2 - Engineering administrative organization

E-3 - Engineering library and experience file

E-4 -- Map of Liberia

E-5 - Compilation and recording of engineering

statistics

E-6 - Project planning designing and supervision

E-7 - Airfields runways and facilities

E-8 - Maintenance of existing highways

E-9 - Highway bridge replacement

E-10- Highway surfacing

E-ll- New Highway construction

E-12- Monrovia electric power plant

E-13- Monrovia water works

E-14- Paving of municipal streets

E-15- River and harbor improvement

E-16- Monrovia sewage system 238

IV. Public Health

PH-1 - Prevention and control of malaria intestinal

parasites and diarrhea

PH-2 - Health education

PH-3 - Hospitals and clinics

V. Education

ED-1 - Rural elementary schools

ED-2 - Monrovia elementary demonstration schools

ED-3 - Booker Washington Institute and other

vocational schools

ED-4 - College of West Africa in Monrovia

ED-5 - Liberia college

ED-6 - Scholarships abroad

TABLE 1 REVENUES OF GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA

1944-1954

(Figures in million US $)

Year Revenue

1944 1,598 1945 1,934 1946 2,337 1947 3,212 1948 3,430 1949 3,816 1950 3,872 1951 12,831 1952 8,852 1953 11,199 1954 11,924

Source: Revenues of Government of Liberia, 1944-1954, p. 18. APPENDIX B

Revenues of Government of Liberia 1955-1970

(Figures in million U.S. $)

Year Revenue

1955 15,297.8 1956 17,923,4 1957 20,131.2 1958 18,107.4 1959 24,552.4 1960 31,700.0 1961 31.700.0 1962 35,567.0 1963 38,500.0 1964 40,100.0 1965 42,400.0 1966 45,200.0 1967 48,100.0 1968 51,800.0 1969 61,800.0 1970 66,500.0

Source: Bureau of Revenues, Republic of Liberia.

Members of the House of Representatives:

The Legislature

A. The Liberian Senate

Montserrado County

Honorable Frank E. Tolbert

Honorable D.W.B. Morris

Grand Bassa County

Honorable Joshua L. Harmon

Honorable Levi H. Martin-*-

^Deceased.

239 240

Sinoe County

Honorable Lawrence Mitchell

Honorable Harrison W. Grigsby

Maryland County

Honorable William V.S. Tubman, Jr.

Honorable David Hne

Grand Cape Mount County

Honorable Urias B. Freeman

Honorable Isaac A. David

Bong County

Honorable Botoe Barclay

Honorable Elizabeth K. Collins

Nimba County

Honorable Johnny Voker

Honorable Catherine Cummings

Lofa County

Honorable Willie Belleh

Honorable Ernest Liberty

Grand Gedeh County

Honorable David Niabo Towah

Honorable Harry Karngbe

Total Number of Senators = 18 241

B. The House of Representatives

Montserrado County

Honorable J.C.N. Howard

Honorable Robert I.E. Bright

Honorable Anthony Roberts

Honorable Samuel B. Cole, Sr.

Honorable Alfred J. Raynes

Honorable Gbaflen Davies

Honorable Ethel Dunbar

Honorable A.B. Cassell

Honorable Johnny G. Holder

Honorable James W. Brown

Honorable Charles H. Simpson

Total = 11

Grand Bassa County

Honorable H.L. Brumskine

Honorable Clifford Reeves

Honorable Jacob H. Willis

Honorable Edward J. Harris

Honorable Milton P. Artis

Honorable Kpua-Whea Sarkum

Total = 6

Sinoe County

Honorable J. Dominic Bing

Honorable Henry C. Williamson 242

Honorable William G. Boyanneh

Honorable T. Edwin Swen

Honorable Delsena Draper

Honorable Joseph Slewro

Total = 6

Maryland County

Honorable E.J. Hitchins

Honorable Panella Pearson

Honorable A.T. Thompson

Honorable J. Hiliary Brewer

Honorable Sally Howe

Honorable Wudi Wah Bedell

Total = 6

Grand Cape Mount County

Honorable John Gray

Honorable Fran Gailor

Honorable Edwin 0. Fahnbulleh

Honorable Edward D. E. Hoff

Honorable M. Fahnbulleh Jones

Honorable Daniel Cooke

Total = 6

Lofa County

Honorable Jusu Donor

Honorable Bomah K. Morris

Honorable James B. Telleweyan 243

Honorable Mama Dukuly

Honorable Henry H. Saoh one vacant seat

Total = 6

Bong County

Honorable Quelleh Gwee

Honorable Gbarsee Kpangbai

Honorable Melville F. Harris, Sr.

Honorable Momo Kaine

Honorable Joseph N. Cooper

Honorable Wesseh Gardea

Total = 6

Nimba County

Honorable J.C.N. Constance

Honorable Gblozoe Toweh

Honorable Peter Dorliae

Honorable Soko Sackor, Jr.

Honorable Benjamin Tuazama

Honorable Jimmy Gborplay

Total = 6

Grand Gedeh County

Honorable S.T. Doboyue

Honorable Silas P. Rue

Honorable Thomas T. Toomey

Honorable Edmund Gibson 244

Honorable Moses P. Harris

Honorable Saydee Toloye

Total = 6

Territories

Marshall Territory

Honorable Emma Campbell

Rivercess Territory

Honorable J. W. M. Bowier

Sasstown Territory

Honorable F. F. Doe

Kru Coast Territory

Honorable Jacob S . Nma

Bomi Territory

Honorable Charles C. Dennis, Sr.

Total = 5

Total Number of Representatives = 64 APPENDIX C

COMPLETED SELF-HELP ROAD PROJECTS (1968-1972)

Name Miles County

Sorlumba-Kambalahun 17 Lofa-Kolahun District

Kolahun-Hanga 26

Kolahun-Nyademeilahun 7

Kpembu-Foya Tengia 10

Kamatahun-Yaswa 4

Popalahun-Ka i1ahun 15

Kamtahun Dodo 6

Masum/Bolahun-Mombo 9

Bolahun-Yengamalahun 2

Sodu 5

Kpand 5

Vezala-Loboba 3 Lofa-Voinjama District

Voinjama-Lawalazu 7

Voinj ama-Mavigendue 12

Barkiemai 7

Lazelimai-Zinalormai 13

Kugkama 4

245 COMPLETED SELF-HELP ROAD PROJECTS (1968-1972)

Name Miles County

Konia-Boi 4 Lofa-Zorzor District

Konia-Zigida 7

Fisebu-Bekeza 4

Salayea-Zelewe 6

Zorzor-Kileiw 8

Lepula-Kealey 4 Nimba

Karnplay-Lorgatro 12

Gbanquoi-Guawin 7

Guawin-Menlah 12

Kwedin-Tappita 10

Kwedin-Zahnzeyee 10

Kpetuo-Kargieie 23

Karyee-Voipa 6

Voipa-Zikiepa 3

Duo-Blowee 4

Blowee-Gbowin 12

Blowee-Menlah 14

Menlah-Gamwee 7

Garplay-Teahplay 10

Bahn-Gbieah 5

Boogede Grand Bassa

Buah-Sasstown 30-miles Grand Gedeh completed

246 COMPLETED SELF-HELP ROAD PROJECTS (1968-1972)

Name Miles County

Jomacai 5 Montserrado

Bongomi 6 Grd. Cape Mount

Mussakpa 4 " " "

TABLE III

Imports of Milled Rice, Liberia 1948-68

Calendar Calendar Year Imports Year Imports 1,000 M.T. 1,000 M.T.

1948 1. 991 1958 12.499 1949 1. 216 1959 17.794 1950 1.499 1960 27.812 1951 3.001 1961 22.780 1952 5.305 1962 30.007 1953 2.046 1963 40.007 1954 11.784 1964 1955 8.888 1965 32.509 1956 6.043 1966 46.311 1957 13.252 1967 35.865

247 Representing various clans from the districts, by March 1, the total work population of the project read as follows:

Yarmein Clan - 30

Gbehlay Clan - 30

Gbehyi Clan - 28

Gbae Clan - 30

Zoe Clan - 30

Lissihen Clan - 31

Garr Clan - 29

Sollay Clan - 30

Permanent Clan - 21

Total 259

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Senghor, Leopold Sedar. African Socialism. New York: Frederick A. Praeger^ 1964.

Shils, Edward. Political Development in New States. Mouton: S'Gravenhage Holland, 19'62.

Sigmund, Paul E. The Ideologies of the Developing Nations. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. 255

Smith, Robert A. The Emancipation of the Hinterland. Monrovia, Liberia: The Star Magazine and Advertising Service, 1964.

Smith, Robert A. Unification Reconsidered. Monrovia, Liberia: Providence Publications.

Solomon, M. D. A General Bibliography of the Republic of LiberiaT Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1962.

Swerdlow, Irving. Development Administration Concept and Problems. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1963.

Townsend, E. Reginald. President Tubman of Liberia Speaks. London: Allen and Unwin, 1959.

United Christian Fellowship Conference of Liberia. Changing Liberia: A Challenge to the Christians. Monrovia, Liberia: The United Christian Fellowship Conference of Liberia.

U.S. Area Handbook for Liberia. Washington, D.C., July, 1964.

Vente, Rolf E. Planning Processes: The East African Case. GMBH, Munchen: Weltforum-Verlag, 1970.

Von der Mehden, Fred R. Politics of the Developing Nations. Eaglewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1963.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. Africa: The Politics of Inde­ pendence. New Yorkl Vintage Books, 1961.

Warner, Esther Dendel. The Crossing Fee: A Story of Life in Liberia. London: Gollantz Company, 1968.

______. Seven Days into Lomaland. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1954.

Weiner, Myron and Lapalalombara, Joseph. Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Weitz, Roan ed. Rural Development in a Changing World. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1971.

Wilson, Charles Morrow. Liberia: Black Africa in Microcosm. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. 256

Wraith, Ronald. Corruption in Developing Countries. London: Allen and Unwin, 1^6>3.

Yancy, Ernest Jerome. Historical Lights of Liberia: Yesterday and Today. New York: H. Jaffe Company, 1954.

Young, Crawford. Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence. Princeton, New Jersey, 1965.

Zolberg, Aristide. Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966. ARTICLES

Holsoe, Svend E.A. "Bibliography of Liberian Government Documents." African Studies Bulletin, April, 1968.

McCourtie, W. D. "Traditional Farming in Liberia: A Preliminary Inquiry." Research Bulletin No. 16, College of Agriculture and Forestry, Monrovia, Liberia: University of Liberia, September, 1968.

"Decentralization for National and Local Development." New York: United Nations Publications, 1962.

"Administration for Development." Public Administration Section, Economic Commission for Africa, United Nations, 1971.

257 OFFICIAL publications , p a m p h l e t s a n d j o u r n a l s o n

LIBERIAN GOVERNMENT

"Act of the Legislature." (April 25, 1963) Monrovia, Liberia: Government Printing Office.

Africa Report.

American Political Science Quarterly.

Annual Reports of "The Civil Service Commission," "The Department of Education," "The Department of Planning and Economic Affairs," "The Department of the Interior."

"Annual Report." Monrovia, Liberia: Department of the Interior.

"Annual Reports." Monrovia, Liberia: National Public Health Services.

Barclay, Richard M. Public Sector Accounts of Liberia. Monrovia, Liberia: Office of National Planning.

Canadian Journal of African Studies.

"1962 Census of Population." Monrovia, Liberia: National Planning Office.

Cole, H. B. The Liberian Year Book. London: Diplomatic Press and Publishing Company.

Economic Development and Cultural Change.

"Economic Survey of Liberia, 1970-71." Monrovia,Liberia: Department of Planning and Economic Affairs.

"Executive Branch Organization and Operations: A Survey Report." Monrovia, Liberia: Special Commission on Government Operations, 1964.

"Facts About Liberia." Monrovia, Liberia: Department of Information and Cultural Affairs, 1971.

258 259

"The First Annual Message of President Tubman to the Second Session of the 44th Legislature." (November 1, 1944) Monrovia, Liberia: Government Printing Office.

The Geographical Review.

Journal of Commerce and Industry.

Journal of Comparative Politics.

Journal of Development Studies.

Journal of Modern African Studies.

Journal of Politics.

"Liberian Agriculture and Commerce." Monrovia, Liberia: Department of Agriculture and Commerce.

"The Liberia Annual Review." Monrovia, Liberia: Providence Publications.

"Liberian Law Report." Legislature of Liberia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955-62.

"Liberia Today." Monrovia, Liberia: State Department, 1951-61.

"Liberia Trade, Industry and Travel." London: Consolidated Publications, 1958.

Liberian Studies Journal.

"The National Unification Program in Liberia." Monrovia, Liberia: Department of State, 1954.

"Papers of the Conference on Development Objectives and Strategy.” Document No. 9, 1969. Monrovia, Liberia: Department of Planning and Economic Affairs.

Public Administration Review.

"Quarterly Statistical Bulletin of Liberia." Monrovia, Liberia: Department of Planning and Economic Affairs.

Quarterly Statistical Report. 260

"Report to the Government of Liberia on Total Involvement: A Strategy for Development." Geneva: International Labour Office, 1972.

"Republic of Liberia, Liberia Code of Laws." Legislature of Liberia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956.

"Rules and Regulations Governing the Classified Civils Service of the Republic of Liberia: Monrovia, Liberia." Government Printing Office, Department of State, (October, 1936).

"Ten Year National Health Plan, 1967-1976." Monrovia, Liberia: National Public Health Services, 1967.

Townsend, E. Reginald, Ed. The Official Papers of W.V.S. Tubman, 1960-67. Monrovia, Liberia: Department of Information and Cultural Affairs, 1968.

West Africa.

Western Political Science Journal. NEWSPAPERS

"The Daily Listener," 1946.

"The Liberian Age," Semi-Weekly since 1946.

"The Liberian Historical Review," Publication started in 1966.

"The Liberian Law Journal," Publication started in 1968, (Greencastle, Indiana: Depauw University.)

"The Star," Daily Publication since 1965.

261