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Air Force Studies Board

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YEARS OF SERVICE 1962-1987

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AIR FORCE STUDIES BOARD

SYMPOSIUM ON AIR FORCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

16 November 1987

PROPERTY OP NRC LIBRARY

DEC 1 4 1988 V-t-oml Ttthflfcil !;.f. ,:ni:;on Service

National Research Council Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems Washington, D.C. 1988 NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance. This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors according to procedures approved by a Report Review Committee consisting of members of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Frank Press is president of the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Robert M. White is president of the National Academy of Engineering. The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Samuel O. Thier is president of the Institute of Medicine. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Frank Press and Dr. Robert M. White are chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council. These proceedings represent work under Contract No. F49620-87-C-0122 between the United States Air Force and the National Academy of Sciences. Copies are available from: Air Force Studies Board National Research Council 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20418 Without vision, the people perish.

- Proverbs 29:18

General Bernard P. Randolph Preface

These are the proceedings of a symposium held in com memoration of the 25th anniversary of the Air Force Studies Board. The presentations are the opinions of the participants and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the National Research Council or the Air Force Studies Board. The contents of this document have been edited only for clarity or brevity. CONTENTS

Executive Summary ■ 1

Welcome ■ 8 Frank Press, President, National Academy of Sciences

Opening Remarks ■ 9 John L. McLucas, Chairman

Reflections of the Original Chairman ■ 10 Brian O'Brien

Air Force Systems Command, A Historical Perspective ■ 13 Bernard A. Schriever, General, USAF (Retired)

Discussion ■ 20

The Ones That Didn't Fly ■ 24 Alexander Flax, Home Secretary, National Academy of Engineering

Discussion ■ 31

The Winners and Why ■ 34 Robert T. Marsh, General, USAF (Retired)

Discussion ■ 38

Project Forecast I and // ■ 45 Lawrence A. Skantze, General, USAF (Retired)

Discussion ■ S3

The Future of Air Force R&D ■ 59 Panel of Three

The Future R&D Environment ■ 60 Daniel J. Fink

Capability and Bureaucracy ■ 64 Samuel C. Phillips, General USAF (Retired) Technology and the Future of Air Force R&D ■ 68 Gerald P. Dinneen

Discussion ■ 72

Meeting the Challenge ■ 87 Bernard P. Randolph, General, USAF, Commander, AFSC

Discussion ■ 93

Dinner ■ 103

Presentation of Medals ■ 103

Dinner Address ■ 104 John J. Welch, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisitions

Closing Remarks ■ 109 John McLucas

Symposium Agenda ■ 111

Board and Committee Members, 1962-1987 ■ 113

Reports by the Air Force Studies Board, 1961-1987 ■ 141

Biographies of the Symposium Speakers ■ 148 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Air Force Studies Board celebrated 25 consecutive years of service to the National Research Council and the United States Air Force on November 16, 1987, with a symposium reviewing the last 25 years of Air Force research and develop ment, and projecting lessons learned into the future. The AFSB was formed in 1962 at the request of General Bernard Schriever, then Commander, Air Force Systems Command. The AFSC had been recently created as the focal point for Air Force research and development. General Schriever wanted an impartial study board that could evaluate critical science and technology issues, and help guide the Air Force in making reasoned judgments about management organization and weapons systems development. During the intervening 25 years the AFSB has maintained a close relationship with successive AFSC commanders and has pub lished 86 studies on such diverse topics as jet and rocket pro pulsion, optics, satellite time transfer, battle management, and avionics troubleshooting. Approximately 150 dignitaries associated with the Air Force attended the symposium, including former secretaries and'assist- ant secretaries, generals, chief scientists, senior program man agers, and the past and present members of the Board and its committees. Frank Press opened the meeting with a review of the AFSB's history and accomplishments. He gave special recognition to key participants who helped form the Board and to those who have been instrumental in leading its many activities. Most notable among these are the current chairman, John L. McLucas and the three past chairmen, Brian O'Brien, Brockway McMillan, and Julian Davidson. A highlight of the symposium was an address by the Board's original chairman, Brian O'Brien, who reflected on the origin and development of the AFSB. Dr. O'Brien helped organize the Board and served as its leader for 12 years. General Schriever set the stage for a substantive review of the past 25 years of Air Force research and development by giv ing a historical perspective of the Systems Command, its origins and its role in the Air Force. He began with an assessment of 2 the primitive state of the Army Air Corps after World War I. He noted that it generally takes a crisis to change things and the Air Corps' attempt to handle commercial air mail was an early crisis that got the nation to commit to R&D in aviation. This effort helped prepare us for World War II. During WWII, the scientific community accepted the chal lenge and developed many technical breakthroughs. However, after the war they returned to their civilian jobs. Through General Hap Arnold's foresight the postwar Air Force established close ties to the scientific community that continues to this day. In 1960 the crisis of space was still in the forefront. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatrick offered to assign the responsibility of military space to the Air Force if it could develop a management scheme that would resolve the conflict between systems development and logistics. Thus the Air Force Systems Command and the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) were created with General Schriever in command of AFSC and General McK.ee commanding AFLC. To enable him to have a direct relationship with the scientific community, General Schriever asked the National Research Council to create the Air Force Studies Board. General Schriever concluded that in recent years the Air Force's relationship with the scientific community and industry has been detrimentally affected by too much micromanagement by Congress and the OSD staff. As a result, the Air Force is unable to use its resources and people efficiently. In discussion with the symposium participants, General Schriever offered these further observations: • Working closely with the scientific community gives the Air Force leverage it would not have if it relied solely on internal decision making. • The military is the one agency that should be taking some risk to introduce new technology, however, the present system is not conducive to risk taking. Alexander Flax, Home Secretary of the National Academy of Engineering, and General Robert T. Marsh, former AFSC Com mander, presented specific lessons learned . Dr. Flax agreed with General Schriever that the 1950s were the Golden Age of Air Force R&D. After World War II, we initiated missile programs at the "drop of a hat." We were learning by experimentation, by 3 doing. We can no longer function in this mode, it is too expensive. But we also suffer from excessive oversight. Dr. Flax reminded us that great civilizations fall because their administra tive bureaucracies grow too large and cumbersome to efficiently manage their domestic affairs and international obligations and interests. He reviewed approximately 20 programs that were initiated but never became operational. He stated that programs fail because: • requirements change, • policy changes, • strategy changes, • the programs are too technically difficult, schedules are too long, they are too costly, and patience runs out, • the program does not have support of the operators. John McLucas added in discussion that many programs fail simply because they have low priority and because the DoD budget is limited. Dr. Flax did mention the positive contributions of some of these programs and that they may be revived later. He pointed out that in R&D, if nothing fails, one has taken no risks. But, he said, the Air Force should never try to rush into an oper ational mode until it is sure the thing works. This is a current potential pitfall. Air Force procurement practices tend to commit industry to design and build systems before the R&D has been done, before the problems have been identified. In a juxtaposition, General Marsh reviewed successful pro grams. He looked at the acquisition and beyond into the oper ations and support phases to develop three criteria for selecting the winners: • Acquisition must be efficient and expeditious, consistent with need, technical risk, and magnitude of the understanding. • The system must make a quantum and enduring contribution to our warfighting capability. • It must be affordable. General Marsh spoke about first generation and second generation weapons systems. The first generation systems were acquired from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. The second generation were those systems acquired after 1970 but do not include the most recent ones, such as the Bl-B, the Peacekeeper missile, 4

GPS, AMRAAM, and the DSCS III. His conclusions: • Our concept of decentralized execution of systems acquisition is sound. • The winning programs adhered to the following principles: •• good front-end definition, •• well balanced concurrency among development, test, and production, •• program stability, •• tight cost control, •• program managers were delegated the authority required to get the job done, •• high quality program managers, •• good support within the Air Force, DoD, and Congress. General Marsh added the following thoughts: • To the extent practical, we should attempt to build in growth potential to meet the changing threats. • We have swung too far in the direction of competition for competition's sake, and should use competition only when it makes sense. • If prototyping is to succeed, it must be funded with money earmarked for DARPA or OSD that is over and above the services' TOA. • VSTOL aircraft will not be acceptable to the Air Force until they can be designed with much better payload-range capabil ity. General Larry Skantze provided a nexus between the past and future with a discussion of Forecast I and II. The original Forecast, which was conducted by General LeMay and Secretary Zuckert, identified and promoted technologies that made several of our current operational systems possible. Having worked on Forecast I, General Skantze was convinced that such a technol ogy push should be done every 20 years. When he became com mander of Systems Command, he proposed Forecast II, which was completed in February 1986. General Skantze discussed the organization and methodol ogy of Forecast II. Of the 2,000 ideas considered, 70 were finally selected to be pursued. The technologies that turned out to enable many systems and the systems that turned out to enable many capabilities tended to be the ones that filtered through as the most valuable in the screening process. The ideas s could be classified into categories: revolutionary, pervasive, older ideas enabled by new technology, and synergistic combin ations of ideas. General Skantze provided an overview of some of these ideas. He stated that AFSC did not stop with this study. They have actively pursued a program of briefing indus try, have committed 10 percent of the S&T budget to Forecast II projects, have asked for a two percent increase in TOA to sup port these projects, and have convinced the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to treat S&T as a single program element. The result is positive support of the Forecast II initiatives. General Skantze concluded with the recommendation that a Forecast be done every 20 years. In follow-on discussion, General Skantze noted that he is disappointed with the way the government has responded to the Packard Commission report, and would in particular like to see the recommendations implemented regarding the qualifications for Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition. A look into the future was provided by a panel consisting of Daniel Fink, Samuel Phillips, and Gerald Dinneen. Mr. Fink discussed the future environment for R&D in the U.S. He voiced concerns that we tend to wait for a crisis before we make progress and that we are not supplying enough qualified scientists and engineers to provide for our future R&D needs. He stated that the Air Force and other institutions should actively motivate students to pursue science and engineering. Mr. Fink concluded that in the future other nations will lead in certain technologies which will present problems of reverse technology transfer. The United States will have to pursue more meaningful cooperative R&D programs with our allies. Also, more DoD programs will be joint efforts and will have development times that will take decades. Special manage ment skills must be developed to deal with the problems pre sented by these conditions. We must return to rational decision making that precludes the need to second guess OSD or Congress and provide contractual procedures that do not erode the profit ability of industry. Finally, in the future, the DoD and Air Force must take the initiative in developing many technologies. They can no longer depend on the civilian economy to do the work. 6

General Phillips addressed two issues that will have a bearing on the effectiveness of Systems Command: capability and bureaucracy. People and facilities, he said, are the fundamental capability of Systems Command. The Air Force must have a high level of technical and managerial competence in its blue-suit and civil service personnel within the Systems Command, the Air Staff, and in the joint staffs that make the decisions and plan the programs. To provide this competence, the management of talent both in uniform and in the civil service sectors of the Systems Command is absolutely vital. This includes the tenure of key people and attention to developing a career path for prom ising technological and program managers. The astute management of both government laboratories and FFRDCs will be critical if we are to continue to provide the necessary in-depth technical and scientific support. We must also be concerned with Air Force relations with other agencies, NASA in particular. A cooperative environment is essential and such a relationship must be cultivated at all levels. General Phillips concluded by saying that at times institu tions reach a point where bureaucracy becomes so cumbersome that the only way to really make progress is to throw out the old and start over again. We are getting close to that point in systems development and acquisition. We must improve the process and a good way to start is to move in a direction that is consistent with the Packard Commission report. Gerald P. Dinneen completed the projection into the future by discussing some of the technologies that he believes will be important to the Air Force in the coming years, and what we need to do to ensure that they are available. He began with a retrospective of his career and concluded that the biggest prob lem we face in R&D is converting technology into products, which for the Air Force means weapons systems. He covered several technologies and concluded that two technologies that will have greatest impact in the next 10-15 years will be Al/expert systems and semiconductors. The confluence of those two give us tremendous opportunities. In the discussions, Thomas Cooper, former Assistant Sec retary of Air Force for Acquisition, offered a perspective for the future political environment. He stated that we are facing a political environment that is probably as tough as the technical environment. We must find a way to work in it. He believes 7 the solution is: good people, good management systems, good organization, and a very clever use of our resources. Dr. Cooper said that the key congressional staffers that work on the com mittees are probably the best friends the military have and he urged the younger participants to get to know them. After the panel discussion, General Bernard P. Randolph, current commander of AFSC, responded with his thoughts on how the Systems Command will meet the challenges of the future. He began by addressing some current concerns; these include: a 42% retention rate for officers with engineering skills, the decreasing defense budget, problems with software and electronic warfare, micromanagement by Congress, a growing threat, technology that is being transferred to the Soviet Union, and the "not invented here" syndrome that inhibits the use of available technology. To respond to these concerns and to meet the challenges of the future, General Randolph has set three goals for AFSC: • Recognize that AFSC exists for the using commands. • Stress the need for acquisition excellence. • Place an increased emphasis on technology development. He is pursuing these goals by promoting a better communication among the operating commands and AFSC personnel, making man agement training more readily available, combining Development Plans and Science & Technology into one deputate, and treating technology funding as a corporate interest. The climax of this event was a dinner address by the Honorable John J. Welch, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. He discussed the reorganization of the manage ment of science and technology in the Air Force. He believes that the reorganization will give more attention to S&T and provide an opportunity to have one community working to support S&T and acquisition. His concerns about acquisition management include: • The need for career management and continued training of acquisition personnel. • Recognition of the need for excellence in acquisition. • Designing new systems for long life and growth potential. • Congressional micromanagement. • Taking advantage of the opportunity to use automation to aid in systems management from design to maintenance. • The challenge of joint, including international, programs. 8

Proceedings of the Air Force Studies Board 25th Anniversary Symposium on Air Force Research & Development November 16, 1987

Welcome

[John L. McLucas, Chairman of the Air Force Studies Board, introduced Dr. Frank Press, president of the National Academy of Sciences.]

Dr. Press: Thanks, John. I'd like to welcome the participants to this symposium, organized on the occasion of the 25th anniver sary of the Air Force Studies Board. It is entirely appropriate to look back at what was achieved, and to look ahead to the next 25 years, which I am sure will be an exciting period. The Air Force Studies Board was formed in 1962 at the request of General Schriever, commander of the Air Force Systems Command. The AFSB has had the good fortune of being chaired by a succession of outstanding leaders. The first chairman was Dr. Brian O'Brien. Subsequent chairmen were Brockway McMillan, Julian Davidson, and currently John McLucas. John Coleman, a former executive director of the National Research Council, helped to originate the Board. Ken McAlpine became the executive director shortly after the Board's inception and very ably guided and supported the Board for some 23 years. During its 25 years of service, the AFSB produced some 86 reports. [See Appendix D for list of AFSB reports] As with all NRC boards, the membership of the board rotates. We try to find the most qualified and experienced people to serve on our boards, and the Air Force Studies Board is one of our best. If you look at the current list of members, I think you will agree that it is a very distinguished group. 9

It is the height of public service to participate on a board like this because the members serve without stipend. They are all busy. Those who are retired are engaged in many activities and those who are employed have responsible positions. To take a significant amount of time and render public service without compensation, I think, requires a strong public commitment.

The Board maintains a close working relationship with the Air Force and meets at least twice a year with the commander of the Air Force Systems Command, currently General Bernard Randolph. As a proactive board, topics of our studies are suggested in many ways. The Board members, having participated in the Board activities, and bringing in diverse backgrounds, are a very good source of advice about topics for analysis and study. The network of scientists and engineers, literally thousands of them across the country, are also important sources of advice about important topics that might be considered. And our sponsor, Air Force Systems Command, will suggest topics for the board to undertake. These diverse sources of input are what make our boards function well, particularly this Board. I would like to congratulate all of the past and present participants of the Air Force Studies Board, and commend our chairman, John McLucas, for taking on these important duties.

Opening Remarks

Dr. John L. McLucas, Chairman, AFSB

Dr. McLucas: Thank you, Dr. Press. Many things started back 25 years ago and we think the Air Force Studies Board is one of the good ones. When I called General Schriever and said "we're thinking of having a 25th anniversary of the Air Force Studies Board and you started it," he said "I never started anything called the Air Force Studies Board." Well it turned out the name had been changed, and sure enough he did start it, but it was called something else. Maybe he'll explain that to us. Today we want to go over what has happened in that 25 years and project 10 ahead and see what lessons we've learned, if any. I hope we've learned some, and that we will determine how we can use what we've learned to help us in the future. Right now the AFSB is doing three major studies for the Systems Command: optical data collection for missile tests, advanced robotics for Air Force operations, and hypersonic technology for military applications. We will be considering new studies at our next meeting and we will start three or four depending on General Randolph's needs.

Reflections of the Original Chairman

Dr. Brian O'Brien

[Note: Dr. O'Brien was the founder of the Air Force Studies Board and its chairman for 12 years. He is now 90 and prefers not to travel. To enable him to participate in this commemora tive occasion, we patched his phone into the public address system of the NAS auditorium. This segment of the program is presented in its unedited, informal format.]

McLucas: I think it's time to call on our eldest chairman emeritus, Brian O'Brien, and so I'd like to find whether Dr. O'Brien is tuned in and if he's ready to speak with us. Dr. O'Brien, are you available?

Dr. Brian O'Brien: Yes, here I am.

McLucas: Great.

O'Brien: Is this John McLucas?

McLucas: This is John McLucas. Hi.

O'Brien: Hi. Don't be too formal. The name is Brian you know.

McLucas: Well, we start out with Dr. O'Brien. 11

O'Brien: Okay. "Doctor" is fine, but don't forget we're old friends.

McLucas: Well, I remember running into you at MITRE about 20 years ago.

O'Brien: Oh yeah, we've been around. So have you. I'm very glad you've taken the chairmanship.

McLucas: Well, thank you. I understand you have, what shall I call it, a prepared statement you want to make?

O'Brien: Yes, to give a little background.

McLucas: Okay.

O'Brien: I think a brief mention of some factors leading to the formation of this Board and its early operation may be of interest. In 1957 and 1958 two rather ambitious summer studies for the Air Force were conducted by the National Academy of Sciences. The chairman was Theodore von Karman, assisted by Vice Chairman, William Sears, with the many details of operation managed by John Coleman. These studies were very successful, due to good management and the high quality of the people who took part, and led to an increasing interest in Air Force-National Academy collaboration. Somewhat later, General Bernard Schriever, commander of the Air Force Systems Command, discussed with the Academy the need for a committee to report directly to his Command. There were a number of details to work out, causing some delay. These were taken care of, largely by John Coleman, and in 1962 I was asked to head the committee. I had the good fortune to secure Kenneth McAlpine as Executive Secretary, and in November he and I went to see Schriever. Schriever knew what he wanted, primarily the study and solution of specific problems, and we went to work with a very good group with the title of Advisory Committee to the Air Force Systems Command. 12

The general was fun to work with and almost at once we became good friends. One of our early activities was to assist in securing consultants for Project Forecast, which is now called Forecast I. Our practice was to meet at different Air Force bases to learn of problems which did or might involve the Systems Command. This arrangement continued generally throughout my service. Following Schriever, we served with Generals Ferguson, Brown, Phillips, and Evans. All were fine to work with. I missed the opportunity to serve with General Lew Allen when he was Systems commander. However, I had the pleasure of working with him some years earlier on a very interesting special assignment. In 1974, after 12 years as chairman, I felt a change was desirable. With Sam Phillips' approval, I persuaded Brockway McMillan to accept the post. Needless to say, he did a good job. At this time it was apparent that our problems were related much more to engineering than to pure science. I discussed this with Brockway McMillan, Sam Phillips, and the presidents of the two Academies, Phil Handler and Bob Seamans. All were in agree ment, so before handing over the reins to Brockway McMillan, we changed the committee name to the more appropriate Air Force Studies Board and arranged to have it assigned to Engineering. Ken McAlpine was with me throughout my service, and his work was invaluable on every count. John Coleman was not directly connected with the Board, but as Executive Officer of the NAS and the NRC, both with President Frederick Seitz and Philip Handler, he gave us a great deal of help on many occasions. I think the Board's subsequent performance has been excellent and I am very proud to be associated with it.

[After these remarks, Dr. O'Brien exchanged greetings with sev eral participants, including General Schriever, General Phillips, and Dr. Dinneen. An abbreviated summary of their comments to Dr. O'Brien follows.]

Schriever: Even at this late date I want to thank you for everything you did for me, and for establishing this activity which has grown to become such an important part in the Air Force's dealings with the scientific community. 13

Phillips: Hearing your message helped to make this meeting a pleasure for me and I'm sure for most of us. So I'm joining Ben Schriever in saying thanks to you for the contribution that you've made in helping the Air Force make such magnificent progress in carrying out its mission.

Dinneen: I did want to say that I enjoyed working with you and with the Air Force. I remember how you always brought me up short by suggesting new areas where technology could serve, and I wanted to thank you for that.

Air Force Systems Command, A Historical Perspective

General Bernard A. Schriever, USAF Retired

McLucas: Thank you, Brian. It's time now to introduce General Bernard Schriever, one of our true heroes in the Air Force. He's certainly one of mine and he's a good friend, whom I've enjoyed working with over the years. It's a great pleasure to introduce him.

General Schriever: Thank you, John. You know, this is quite a task that I've agreed to undertake: to put in perspective the Air Force Systems Command. To do that I'm going to broaden the subject and talk about R&D in the Air Force. Let me begin by saying that I'm very pleased to see that what was the Advisory Committee to the Air Force Systems Command, now the Air Force Studies Board, is so active. I don't think Brian or I visualized it as an ongoing operation that would continue to grow and expand, although I'd hoped that it would. As he indicated, it did take a little doing to get the National Academy of Sciences to go along with tying it in directly with a command, such as Systems Command, but I'm glad we hear that the other services are benefiting as well as the Air Force. I'd like to trace the R&D activities in the Air Force as I saw them during my career, and not just from an AFSC perspec tive. First of all, I'd like to go back to the post-World War I 14 period because that's when I entered the Air Corps as a cadet, at the flying school at Randolph Field in 1932. We hadn't pro gressed very far in technology up to 1932 since the end of World War I. I can remember being at Camp Stanley near San Antonio, Texas, in my summer camp days at Texas A&M. They had some airplanes at that time. The Army was thinking about airplanes primarily for artillery spotting, and maybe some reconnaissance, and that's about where the Air Corps stood in the eyes of the Army in those days. I have found by my experience that it takes a crisis to change things. We didn't think there was any danger of war after World War I. We had made the world safe for democracy. But in 1934 Roosevelt cancelled commercial air mail, and the Air Corps was called upon to fly it. I know most of you have read the history of the Air Mail debacle in early winter of 1934. I happened to be flying between Salt Lake City and Cheyenne, Wyoming, a nice little route to fly in open cockpit airplanes right in the middle of February and March of one of the coldest winters we'd ever had. One day I lost two of my classmates in separate accidents, both having taken off from Salt Lake City. A board was set up by the President to investigate. Their recom mendations were: "Let's modernize the Air Corps. Let's get more people in it." As a result, by the time I had arrived at Wright Field, in Dayton, Ohio, in 1939 as a test pilot, all the aircraft, that we flew during World War II (pursuit aircraft, as we called them, and bombers), with the exception of the B-29, were under test there. So I guess it was quite fortunate that we had a crisis. Without it I doubt very seriously that we would have been ready to fight in the air in World War II. The air mail crisis created a very, very strong impetus to the research and development activ ity. We had the people at Wright Field and we had the procure ment practices, and I think the Air Force did a tremendous job. All it needed was the necessary policy and direction to allow us to go ahead. During the war in 1941-45, the Air Force's job was one of massive production and model improvement to existing aircraft. I think we went from B-17A to the B-17H; it was about that many different models. And the same thing applied to practically all of our aircraft in World War II. 15

The scientific community really entered into defense activities during World War II, and provided all the technical breakthroughs. It ushered in the nuclear age. Radar was simply the tip of the iceberg, chronicling the advent of the electronic age. Many laboratories were created. Von Karman was at the Jet Propulsion Lab. We started first with jet propulsion for assisted take-off and of course the Germans had broken through with rocketry with their V2s. It was that period of technological breakthrough that we inherited at the end of World War II. After the war, scientists went back to their civilian jobs, exodusing from the laboratories that had been set up by the government. They were going back to universities, to private laboratories, industry, and so forth. Hap Arnold came back from the war. He was chief of the Army Air Forces at that time and was a very visionary man. He said the next war will not be fought like the last one, that to win we must maintain our lead in science and technology. He stated in very clear terms that we needed to establish a long-term close working relationship with the scientific community, and we went about creating certain institutions to bring that about: the Scientific Advisory Board under Von Karman and the Rand Corporation. The first job he gave the Rand Corporation was to determine the feasibility of a reconnaissance satellite. He also created the Office of Scientific Liaison, and appointed me its head after I returned from the Southwest Pacific in December of 1945. He said, "Bennie, I want you to work on establishing the closest possible relationship with the scientific community. We need them, we need them badly, and we need to work together." And that's how I became closely associated with many of the scientific community. Many of you sitting here I've known from those early days. From 1945-50 we created the flight test center at Edwards, the missile test range which was Banana River (now Patrick AFB), and Cape Canaveral. We centralized electronics activities in Rome and in the Boston area at Hanscom. The Arnold Engi neering Development Center was the dream of Von Karman, and legislation was passed in 1950 creating that organization. So things were moving and moving quite rapidly. However, from an organizational standpoint, there was still one major "hangover" from World War II. The procurement people at the Air Materiel Command still had the power of the 16 purse. They had all the procurement dollars which were the major dollars that were being funneled in the acquisition process to industry. Air Research and Development Command also had been created in 1950. They had the technical responsibility, they made the most of that, but the procurement problem still divided the authority for the systems acquisition process. At the Air Staff level the technology was overshadowed by the operational requirements. Operational Requirements probably was the strongest office in the Air Staff during the period following the war until at least into the early 1950s, when a number of committees were set up. I think many of you will remember the Doolittle Committee, the Ridenour Committee, and key players in the scientific community: Von Karman, Ridenour, Doolittle, Getting, Compton, Merv Kelly, Milliken, Perkins, Stever; Al Flax came in about that time as well. I didn't name all of the people that were on the Scientific Advisory Board, but we had a very outstanding group. Now, many top military leaders were involved in studying the rearrangement, and giving technology a greater voice in decision-making for future weapons systems. Hap Arnold laid the groundwork, established the foundation. He was followed by Tooey Spaata in Vandenberg. Bill Craigie was in the Pentagon at that time. He and Don Putt were the prime movers at the deputy level at the Air Staff. And then we had some young turks: Walkowitz, Dempsey, Shank, Vince Ford, Nunziatto, and I put myself in that category. After the war I spent nine years in Washington, four years as scientific liaison chief and then another four years in the development planning office, with a year at the National War College in between. But the institutionalization of research and development of technology came about in that period. By the 1950s technology had been positioned so that it would have a great influence on the decision making process. We had established close working relationships with the scientific community. The Air Force definitely took the lead in this. Air Research and Development Command had already been established. The Deputy Chief of Staff for R&D had already been established. Operational requirements came under that office. And development planning had been created in 1950. Ivan Getting was the first Assistant for Evaluation. He was there for 17 a year. When I left the War College in 1950 I became his deputy. And when he left to go back into academia, I was given the job and we changed the name to Assistant for Development Planning. So new technology did have a voice in the decision making process and new technology in the period from 1950 to 1960 did flow to the operational inventory of the Air Force in great profusion and in a high quality. We introduced supersonic flight. The electronic revolution really took off. Ballistic missiles came into being. Not only in the Air Force but in the Navy. We talked about space. I made a speech in San Diego in February 1957, where I said the ICBM platform provided the foundation for us to move into space. The next day I received a wire not to use the word space in any of my speeches in the future. Then Sputnik came along in October, 1957, and from that time on we were always being asked, "why can't you move faster in getting into space?" So things change in a hurry in this country, but here again we had another crisis. It was the crisis of space. In 1950-60, scientists continued to play a very important role in major Air Force decisions. For example, the Von Neumann committees. The first Von Neumann committee was set up under the SAB to determine the feasibility of a dry thermonuclear weapon. They confirmed what both Teller and Von Neumann had said at an SAB meeting at Patrick AFB in the Spring of 1953, that we could have a small size, dry thermonuclear weapon, weighing 1500 lb. that would give us a yield of one megaton. That changed the whole picture with respect to the feasibility of a long range ballistic missile. Von Neumann was then appointed through Secretary Wilson along with Trev Gardner to head up a committee to review all long range strategic missiles. That committee made its report, called Teapot, in February 1954, and said that an ICBM was feasible, that we could have it operational by 1960 /'/ we created a special management arrangement that could bypass the normal bureaucracy. The SAB continued to play a very important role during that period. Industry was embracing long range develop ment planning. The 1950s were the golden years of the influence of new technology in making decisions on major systems acquisi tions. 18

President Eisenhower, when he came back from World War II, and was chief of staff of the army, wrote several memos and made several speeches pointing out the tremendous importance of teamwork among the military, science, and industry. So he understood during his presidency the relationship of industry, science, and the military. And he established priorities, and he was able because of his background to delegate authority as well as responsibility, which I think today is done very poorly. Responsibility is not delegated, it is given, but the authority to go along with it often isn't there. In the 1950s, we accomplished a lot. And I can say again what was done in creating the institutions which allowed science and the Air Force to work closely together really paid off in spades. As we moved into the 1960s that hangover of divided authority between ARDC and Air Material Command (AMC) remained. AMC still held the procurement dollars and we had joint SPOs and so forth, and joint anything is not very good. In 1961, when President Kennedy came in, Roz Gilpatrick called in Tommy White, Air Force chief of staff, and told Tommy, "Look, we'll assign the responsibility of military space to the Air Force if you'll straighten out that mess between AMC and ARDC." Well, it was straightened out post haste. And out of that came the Air Force Systems Command, and the Air Force Logistics Command, with the AFSC having total responsibility and the funds to do the acquisition job. In 1961, when LeMay took over as chief of staff, I went over to see him. I told him "McKee is the commander of the Logistics Command and I am commander of the Systems Command. We're going to resolve all of our problems between the two of us. We're not going to submit one letter to Air Force head quarters of a disagreement and let some of your majors make the decisions for us." And we established a system where we met every month. We put all the major problems between the two commands right on the table. It wasn't long before the staffs of Systems Command and Log Command understood that we meant business. We didn't want them to come and see that we couldn't agree. We never once sent a disagreement to the Air Staff for resolution. When McKee came in to be vice chief of staff, and Bradley took over, then Hobson, I had the same relationship with Gen. Bradley and Hobson. We never once sent a disagreement 19 forward. I think that tradition continues, but I'm not 100 per cent sure. I know it held for a good while. Let me say a few words about how this Board got started. The first task I gave Brian O'Brien was the study of laser technology, to determine whether or not it could be weaponized, either for defense or offensive purposes. The findings of that study group established the foundation for our laser work that's been going on for these many 20 odd years. Brian mentioned working in Project Forecast, and they did. The Advisory Committee to the Systems Command was very active in Project Forecast. During the early days of the Systems Command, I had a disagreement with General Bim Wilson, who at that time was deputy chief of staff for R&D, concerning the relationship of the Systems Command to the SAB. I knew that the SAB was a group responsive to the chief of staff of the Air Force, but, after all, Systems Command was the major arm of the Air Force for carrying out research, development, and systems acquisition and we needed to have a direct working relationship with the Scientific Advisory Board. Well, what finally evolved out of that was the creation of the Division Advisory Groups (DAGs), which still exist today. They were extremely helpful to me during my tour as commander of the Systems Command and I know they're extremely helpful to the division commanders within the Systems Command. Hap Arnold and Eisenhower had the vision to recognize the need for the military to work very closely with the scientific community after World War II. They would be very happy with what has been accomplished. I'm sorry to say that some of the relationships with industry have certainly broken down. We have too much micromanagement from the top, both from the Congress and from the OSD staff, which has grown and grown and grown. And everything in between has to grow some too, so that by the time you get down to the working level, you have many levels above that have a lot of authority to say no but no authority to say yes. We have an adversarial relationship between the defense department and industry which I think is sad. We have regula tions, inspectors, legal eagles, contracting officers, and I'm afraid that the influence of technology that came about during the 1950s, and remained for a while, has been eroded to some degree, maybe quite a lot. 20

With the help of Sam Phillips and a number of other pro gram directors during the period that I was on the west coast and also in ARDC and AFSC, we prepared a report that we sent to the Packard Commission and, as a matter of fact, Sam's document is attached to the report in full. That was sent to him last year. I have a copy of that report here and if you all want to make copies, John, you might just distribute it to people.1 But it gives in more detail some of the concerns that we see based on our past experience related to some of the problems today. As far as people are concerned, I've maintained close contact with the blue suiters and the scientific people. We have the resources and people, the know-how, probably to a much higher degree than we had at the time that I was on active duty because we have a tremendous educational program in the Air Force and we do have qualified people. We just hog tie them with bureaucracy. The fact that we had to have a Packard Commission indicates that there are some problems today, but there are certainly no problems as far as I can see in the relationship of the Air Force and the scientific community, and I am very happy that I was able to play a small part in achieving that. Thank you.

Discussion

McLucas: I thank you, Bennie, for that retrospective. We have some time to ask General Schriever a few questions. I'd like to start out with a question myself. Although you referred to this item I'm not sure I completely understood your comment. And this is my first session as chairman of the AFSB, therefore I can put myself in the position of a pupil and ask the teacher a question. Since the SAB had already existed, why did we need to create the Air Force Studies Board? Schriever: I was having so much difficulty with the air staff in creating the right kind of relationship that I thought was

Copies of the report are available from the AFSB office. 21 necessary between the SAB and the Systems Command that I said, "Well, to hell with it - I'll get the National Academy of Sciences to give me a hand." And that's how that really started, at least from my point of view.

McLucas: You made the comment about the Air Force forming a relationship with the technical community and in fact being in the lead. There was a Navy anniversary here recently where they said that the Navy was the leader in that. Is that true?

Schriever: Well, you know, if you'd asked me that question before I went to the National War College and got broadened, I would have said, "Hell no, it's not true," but having been broadened by the National War College, I'll have to say maybe.

McLucas: Okay. I went to a Navy program about five years ago. John Lehmann was still secretary and he gave a speech on Navy space. He talked all evening and never mentioned the Air Force. And I thought, you know, there's something wrong here....

Schriever: Let me comment on that, John. Red Rayburn is always bragging about the Navy's Polaris program and the solid propellant, and all of us in the Air Force know how the solid propellant program got underway in terms of the long range ballistic missile. We initiated a feasibility program recommended by the Von Karman study group which we set up in 1955 on the west coast. We carried out that feasibility program, and from it decided to proceed on the Minuteman. Dan Kimball called me one day and invited me to lunch, and he asked, "Will you make available the technology that came out of your solid propellant feasibility program to the Navy." I said, "Yes, it's not just for the Air Force. The Navy can have any of it and all of it." I had previously discussed this subject with Savvy Sides, when he came out to visit with me early on the ICBM program. The Navy was talking about having an intermediate range ballistic missile, and they were going to have a shipborne cryogenic missile. I said, "Savvy, that doesn't make sense. You ought to wait until you can get one that has the solid propellant." But they went ahead with it anyway and that's how the Jupiter program got started. The Navy doesn't often give the Air Force much credit. 22

I'll be very happy to give the Navy credit where it's due, but when it's not due, I'll speak up.

Dr. Grant L. Hansen: What are the considerations that go into determining whether a particular subject should be addressed internally by the Air Force Systems Command or by an outside advisory group, and has your perspective of that changed over the 25-year period since the Studies Board started?

Schriever: Well, I think number one, we generally are always - talking about new technologies, not necessarily basic research, but exploratory technology that has a high potential. We would like to get the benefit of the expertise and the scientific minds and an objective view on the feasibility of such technology before we move forward into hardware. Internally, we have very good people, but there is always this matter of their own axe to grind. So to have this outside view of the very top people in the scientific community is very very valuable in the decision making process. I've always looked at it from that point of view, and, after all, it isn't just making studies but it's also the contributions that the scientific community makes to the Air Force, new ideas that are generated. Too often we have our nose a little bit too close to the grindstone. The operational requirements office is more inclined to move forward through some modification process, to improve to a small degree the performance of a particular system rather than saying, "okay, our technology now has the opportunity to leapfrog that and provide a much superior capability, even changing certain matters of operational tactics and philosophy or even doctrine." Working closely with the scientific community gives us the leverage that I don't think we'd ever have just by trying to make those decisions internally. You remember that the scientific community has great credibility, and particularly on specific studies that are important to the future capabilities of the military. They give credibility to move forward on something that has a degree of risk involved. In my opinion the military is the one agency that should be taking some risk with respect to introducing new technology. I mean if we don't we're crazy. We send people out to be shot at and killed in wartime, so we should give them the very best 23 equipment. If we can't take some risks during peacetime to introduce new technology to give everybody a better break, then we'd better change our thinking. And our system right now is not very conducive to taking risk. The contractual procedures, the fixed price contracts on programs that nobody has ever done before - it's asinine.

General Robert C. Mathls: General Schriever, you've mentioned several times the problem that we have with the acquisition process and the adversarial relationship between industry and the department of defense. There's an adversarial relationship that I've seen which has really deteriorated between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services and it's a constant problem. I'd like to ask what people like us can do to improve that, because I've seen it just go downhill over the last 20 years. It looks like it's at rock bottom, in spite of the Packard Commission or Goldwater-Nunn, or whoever.

Schriever: Bob, I agree with you. I'm frustrated. I'm really frustrated because if you make even simple recommendations, they get lost in the shuffle. I've heard Nunn say, "Well, why don't we take a few of the most important programs out of the system and do a streamlined management?" We've done it before. The precedents exist for that. The ballistic missile program isn't the only one. There have been a number of other programs that have been handled outside the normal system. You can't do that to everything but you can do it to a few programs that are of extreme importance to the nation. And I think you could demonstrate that you could complete the programs more quickly. Time is money. You'd save money. And yet you can't get any action taken on that whatsoever. Sam Phillips knows how programs are run when they're taken out of the system. He's probably had more experience running major programs outside the bureaucracy than anybody in the country. So I think you have to demonstrate with a few important programs that you can do better than you're doing today. And yet we haven't had any response to that. Until we do prove that we can do it and demonstrate it, I think we're going to be in the same morass. We seem to be going further and further downhill despite the Packard Commission report. 24

Dr. John J. Martin: General Schriever, what areas of technology or science do you see exploitable in the next ten years or so?

Schriever: We do have some very important programs underway today. I'm encouraged about that. Stealth, hypersonic flight, the national aerospace plane. I think we become too optimistic about what can be done over the short haul. One of the committees of the Air Force Studies Board is studying hypersonic flight. I was a huckster for hypersonic flight even before I retired. And now it finally is coming back again. That has to be an extremely important program. Development of the com posites has been slow but I think their role in future generations of aircraft is assured. I haven't studied Forecast II in detail, but I have looked at some of the technologies identified therein and many look quite promising; they should be supported. We are on the threshold of another period where technology has much to offer to national security, and to the civilian aviation community.

The Ones That Didn't Fly Dr. Alexander Flax, Home Secretary, NAE

McLucas: Thank you, Bennie. Al Flax is here today because we felt it would be worthwhile under the heading of Lessons Learned to talk about things that worked and things that didn't work.

Dr. Alexander Flax: Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to be here and the first thing I'd like to say is that I completely agree with everything that General Schriever said. The 1950s were indeed the golden age for Air Force R&D. The big question is why did the golden age end? I don't profess to be able to give a complete answer to that. Maybe there's some subtle message here in the fact that in choosing somebody to talk about the failures they chose somebody who had served in the Head quarters, not in AFSC. But, I'll assume that's not the case. You will have to draw your own conclusions. 25

Now, also I hope that people didn't come here just to have lunch, because if you go away after my talk you're going to get the impression that the Air Force didn't succeed in anything except Minuteman. That's really the only thing that we've really covered, and you should hear Tom Marsh tell you proudly about all the successes. When I talk about what did not fly, I'm not going to be very strict. I'm going to talk about things that flew but didn't fly very well, very far, or very long because they're equally important in understanding what happened. / would like to remind every one of what the great historian Toynbee said about why great civilizations fall. It's not from external attack primarily, it's because they have gotten so wound up in the complexities of managing their domestic and international affairs that they fall of the weight of their own bureaucracies. And as General Schriever already suggested, we're moving in that direction, though I'd be far from being able to make a projection as to when things will get so bad that they fall apart. But things that don't fly are an important part of any robust R&D program. If nothing fails, if everything works exactly as you planned it, it's almost certain that you are taking no risks and not really pushing very hard. On the other hand, you don't want too many things to fail. Furthermore, if they do fall short of expectations, you'd like to detect that fairly early in the program so that you don't spend a lot of money on things that don't work. In other words, exploration is a good and essential feature of every R&D program, and the people can differ as to whether exploration in any given case can be completely and exhaustively done on paper, in the laboratory, with a prototype, or an experimental vehicle. That we still argue today. Programs that fail for one reason or another (I use this broad definition of fail: they don't achieve their expected potential) usually don't fail for technical reasons. There are very few things that were just technically infeasible. They failed because requirements changed, the international situation changed, the domestic policy changed, strategy changed, or they turned out to be much more difficult than anticipated, therefore had a longer schedule, and growing costs, and patience ran out. So timing the start of a program to have a finite length, one that strains the span of attention of decision makers not too 26 much is very important and I think you will see that in some of the examples. The period we're talking about over the life of the Air Force Studies Board was preceded by a great educational program in the United States. I called it the "57 varieties of missiles" program. Right after the war we initiated missile programs at the drop of a hat. It was understood that they would not all reach operational status. We were learning by doing and encountering all the pitfalls. Many people were trained: Air Force people, industry people, and academic people. And so we came into the sixties out of that period. It couldn't continue. The Air Force alone had 26 programs in 1947. One of them was Atlas, or what preceded Atlas, MX 774, and that was cancelled in 1947, not to be fully restarted again until the mid-1950s. But we were hedging all the bets. It was a time of change. We had not only manned aircraft - manned strategic air craft - but also intercontinental missiles, and some of them were airbreathers like Snark and Navajo. Snark actually reached operational status briefly but ballistic missiles were too much of a success story and they drove all these things out. We also had other aspirations. We had all kinds of space programs that were started or thought about or studied. They were talked about in the mid to late '50s and then went under all kinds of classification so it's hard to keep track of them. Another thing that had happened at that time and it's a theme that comes back again and again. The nuclear age had come upon us in the war and somehow there was the innate feeling that we had to have nuclear power in Air Force systems, and that was tried in numerous ways. The nuclear bomber aircraft, the nuclear cruise missile - so-called SLAM - nuclear rockets, and then we had studies of how to use nuclear weapons directly, the Orion or "Putt-Putt" program to launch heavy payloads into space. So there were no inhibitions about studying these programs and pushing them as far as anybody thought they could go, and in the nuclear era we pushed them pretty far before it became apparent that all of them were not leading to viable operational systems. There were not only operational problems, there were technological problems, there were environmental problems, and of course competing systems, notably the ICBMs were far too 27 well established and on any grounds of cost effectiveness which came into vogue at that time, all of these systems fell apart. Similarly we had one launch of a reactor into space, SNAP 10, and it was a dead end. Solar power was fulfilling all the requirements admirably well at that stage of things, so that died too. It's being revived. All of these things are never completely dead and buried. The nuclear airplane keeps cropping up periodically. People will propose that we embark on some new approach, new angle, new technology making possible what was previously not possible. But they really have not gone very far. There were also all kinds of advanced schemes for gas core reactors, glow plugs, things of that nature, to try to push up the specific impulse of launch vehicles and otherwise apply nuclear power. Again, these things did not turn out to look very practical in light of the competition. Now, there is another class of vehicles that were embarked on; these were the supersonic cruise vehicles, as exemplified first by the B-58 bomber, which was a limited success, but did serve an operational role. The B-70, which was to have been a successor, and the F-108 interceptor; these were victims of many things: changes in the threat, changes in technology, changes in requirements, the de-emphasis on continental air defense. While the F-108 was cancelled, out of the black side of the house came the YF-12. Its more capable successor, the F-12, was proposed. In 1963, although it was never stated explicitly, we started a phase-down of continental air defense because the missile threat was so overwhelming that aircraft didn't loom very large in the picture. While you can debate that philosophy, that actually was what happened. So we never deployed any supersonic cruise interceptors, in spite of magnificent studies by General Glen Kent, showing how effective they would be if we wanted to mount a sufficient level of defense. Skybolt was also a victim of a decision to check the growth and proliferation of new varieties of strategic weapons. Again the Polaris, the Minuteman, and their improvements and follow-ons looked so good that such things not only as Skybolt but the train-mobile Minuteman, which you may remember, were all cancelled in the early sixties. All these things crop up again. We now talk about a proposal for a train-mobile MX. 28

We had several space programs. One of the most visible that was cancelled was the X-20, or Dina-soar, and there the Air Force was the victim of a big con game. They were first told by the powers that be in the administration that this was not to be an operational system, but a research vehicle like the X-15. That sounded reasonable, so the program proceeded on that basis. Then in early 1963, NASA voiced concern that the program would be a diversion from their own manned program and withdrew sup port of the notion that this was a useful research vehicle. OSD came back and said, "Now you must prove the operational utility of this system." That went down the drain very quickly, al though I remember editing a very long and impassioned statement by the Air Force about why this program should be continued. In the early 1960s there were research programs like Asset and Prime, unmanned programs, which provided technology that can be used to support such things as the aerospace plane. These programs ended and, until NASP, no other research was done in that flight envelope. As a consolation prize, the Secretary of Defense gave us the manned orbiting laboratory. It was a military manned orbiting laboratory doomed to failure in part because the mission was so classified that it was impossible to give a justification to the newspapers or in open hearings. It was also a very narrow concept without much likelihood of success and couldn't justify the costs. There were broader applications which could have been pursued. I note, however, that the Soviets seem to have taken the white program descrip tions to heart: if you look at the volume and external features, Salyut-Soyuz is not very far from what the MOL was described to be. Recently, I was on an OSD committee to review the current aerospace plane program and at the first meeting I announced that I had already written the report, dated 1961, and the elements of that program were very much like the elements of the program described today. The difficult thing was that there were some technologies which were not far enough along in development and I noticed that some of the early studies of the AFSB had to do with supersonic combustion ramjets. Well, we just discontinued most of that work over the intervening time, so technologically we are about back where we were. Although there were a few small cells, monasteries, so to speak, where the 29 technology was preserved by two or three people, here and there, no major programs were mounted in support of that technology. Coming out of Forecast I, we had a boundary layer control experimental airplane, the X-21, which was a modified B-66, and it was very intriguing. It showed we didn't understand enough about how to be consistent in maintaining laminar boundary layers, but we were making some progress. There were some good flights. There were issues of insects collecting on the leading edge, and dust and dirt, and things of that nature. But that was not pursued much further. To some extent that was a victim of our growing involvement in Vietnam and the need to turn R&D resources to some of those problems. Then we have the search for the will-o-the-wisp, which we and many other organizations, both the other services here and abroad have been working on for a long long time, and that's vertical and short take-off. During the 1960s we had two pro grams that really were stimulated by the army but which were converted by OSD into tri-service type programs. The XV-4 was based on jet ejector thrust augmentation. It didn't work. The full scale didn't behave like the laboratory. The XV-5 was the GE fan in the wing and it sort of worked on the margin. And the only thing that came out of that that did work was the XV- 6. The XV-6 was then successor of the Hawker P-1127, then called the Kestrel, and now known as the Harrier. That is the only one of those programs that came out with a result that entered the operational inventory in the United Kingdom. Also our forward looking marines in this country saw it as a means of satisfying some of their own peculiar mission requirements. Over considerable opposition from many quarters, they pushed it through. So that's the only operational vertical and short take off airplane in the U.S. The only other one operational in the free world is its counterpart in the UK, and of course on the Soviet side, we have the Yak 36. We also had the McNamara-Von Hassell agreement, the U.S.-Federal Republic of Germany vertical and short take-off fighter. This was never for real. It was a purely political maneuver. We went through the motions of setting up the program, but it wouldn't survive the first budget cycle. It had little support from the operators and no program goes very far if you call it a fighter and you don't have operators behind it. It 30 also wasn't very well thought out. It was a compromise between U.S. and German views of what it ought to be. We did have limited success with an experimental prototype of a transport, the XC-142. That actually flew. It was not the ideal flying machine. Its handling qualities over the speed range left much to be desired but it did fly and it could have formed the basis for an operational aircraft of limited capability but nevertheless having this unique feature of vertical take-off as a possibility, or at least vertical landing. We also had the X-19, which was a tilt propeller, not a tilt wing, but we were buying that on the cheap. There was only one experimental aircraft. It crashed for reasons having nothing to do with its basic characteristics, so that ended the program. We had many many stops and starts in the area of unmanned aircraft. We operated drones rather successfully over North Vietnam, during that conflict; the system died as soon as the war was over. There were many studies, but only in recent years have we come back to considering drones, RPVs, and unmanned aircraft, for various missions. There is a big gap of about 10 to 15 years in our progress in that area. One of my favorite systems, a C3I system, which never went anywhere, is the precision emitter location and strike system, PELS. It's been around since the Vietnam days, has had its vicissitudes, difficulties, delays, mostly long, stretch outs in funding, but I think primarily it failed because either the R&D concept was wrong or it has had too little operational support. During my days in the Pentagon the largest percentage overrun I ever encountered was the Mark II avionics on the F- 111. Nobody really wanted it, but a combination of political and other forces bulled it through, leaving the Air Force with 96 F- 11 1Ds, which never were satisfactory. I understand they are now in the process of stripping out the avionics, which was too ambitious, aimed ahead of its time, and unreliable and marginal in performance, and that's another message: don't rush into the operational mode with things you're not really sure can be done. I think the Air Force has done much better in its later avionics suites. Sometimes they're a little bit behind the latest and best but they've gone a long way in the packages to be found in F- 15s and 16s. They can always be modernized, half-way through 31 the life cycle at some cost, but not near the costs involved in the F-111D program. So we have a mixed bag. I would say that the programs that were conducted in the main contributed to the learning process but that education in some cases cost too much. We should really look at the learning process as something to be managed economically. The world, unfortunately, has changed and it is no longer so easy to start these programs, to proceed in a provisional manner. We're too busy checking and balancing from every level. The congressional staff, including OTA, now numbers over 10,000 people. And studies of weapon systems are being made in very unlikely places: in the Congressional Budget Office, the Con gressional Research Service. Anybody at the drop of a hat can enter the fray. We're busy trying to prevent all future catas trophes, and that process itself may be the greatest catastrophe. We had said as a result of the C-5 procurement action, which was called total package procurement, that this was a terrible thing, that it was counter-productive and that we were never going to do it again. So we eliminated the name "total package procurement," but if you look at what's actually being done in some of the recent procurements, it amounts to a return to total package procurement. We're attempting to commit the contrac tor, before the R&D is done, to long production runs at fixed cost of something he hasn't built yet. And that is a very very chancy procedure. We did learn some lessons and hopefully wiser heads than ours will glean greater benefits than we have from these lessons. Thank you.

Discussion

McLucas: We'll take a few questions. Bennie said that our problem is we don't take enough risks, and Al said that the Mark II avionics demonstrates that we reach too far, so that implies there's a happy middle ground, if you're lucky enough to figure out where it is. You talked about the MOL briefly; I remember when that was cancelled because Bob Seamans insisted on a hearing with 32

President Nixon, and he went over and he spent over an hour with him. But I guess everyone in the room except Bob knew that it was already hopeless. I think a lot of systems that didn't make it really had nothing wrong with them. It was just a ques tion of timing or perhaps they just fell off the bottom of the Air Force priority list. It doesn't mean they weren't worthy. I think of things like the AMST which I don't think anybody found anything wrong with, but we just couldn't keep the funding in there year after year. If, for example, the C-17 program goes down then I think it will not be because of technical mismanage ment but rather the inability to keep it on the priority list.

Dr. William L. Lehmann: You've talked about the operators- some systems failing because the operators didn't want them. You've talked about systems that were based on technology we wanted to push forward and because you could build them. Have the operators ever come to the technology people and said: "Hey, we need this!" Does that process for the operators- knowing what they need, having some ideas, and advocating it to the technology - does that work at all? Or is that a weak link or Achilles Heel?

Flax: No. For the systems that succeed that process of reaching mutual understandings between developers and operators works quite well. You know you can always point to some flaw in the system, but by and large it works quite well. Sometimes there's a gap in understanding or communication, and a most notable one I remember was the laser-guided bomb. When that thing breezed through development with great speed, nobody in the Seventh Air Force wanted it. Harold Brown, who was then the Secretary, went out and said, "You know, we can increase production right now to 600 a month or whatever you want," and they said "We don't know what we'd do with it." It wasn't until General Jack Lavelle, who had been working that kind of problem here and was more conversant with the capabilities and potentials went to the Seventh Air Force that they suddenly created an overnight shortage of laser- guided bombs. Now I don't fault the operators too much. It's as much the fault of the R&D community; they probably should have been inviting the operators down if they could get them away from 33 what they were doing, serious business in Vietnam. They should have been inviting them down to participate in the early dem onstrations in some way, shape, or form and kind of building up acceptance, and that wasn't being done. It was such an expe dited program that nobody even thought of that.

Hansen: I recall a program called Bambi, which I believe got killed by a treaty which said not to put those kinds of things up there. Also, I was an engineer at Douglas Aircraft at the time Skybolt was cancelled, and we were told that the program was cancelled because it was failing in its flight tests and was not a good program technically. After that the remaining missiles on the program were flown out quite successfully, but the feeling was that success came too late to affect a decision on a program that had been decided to be a poor program because it wasn't working. Do you have any recollections that match with that or is that just what we were told?

Flax: No. I was the chairman of the ASD advisory group that reviewed Skybolt and we found that the igniter on the second stage was not playing its flames onto the propellant grain properly and once that was fixed it worked. The underlying reason for its cancellation was a desire to cut back on the proliferation of strategic weapons. Also, Minuteman was so successful that competing systems had a real rough time.

McLucas: There's a program that Al appropriately did not talk about, but that would have been on my list for about 15 years and that was something which eventually became AWACS. Now maybe Tom Marsh will talk about it this afternoon, but I remember as I said that for the first 15 years of its development, I kept saying, "Why do we keep putting money in this? It's not going anywhere." It seemed to take forever, then finally, some body made a breakthrough, and we got a very successful program. But there are a lot of things you struggle with for years before you achieve any relative degree of success. 34

The Winners and Why

General Robert T. Marsh, USAF retired

McLucas: General Robert T. Marsh, otherwise known as Tom, is a graduate of the Military Academy and a graduate of Michigan, and he's done great things in the Air Force. He was commis sioned in 1949. He's been a space systems project officer, director of reconnaissance in electronic warfare, had various jobs in R&D in the Pentagon, and was the commander of the Systems Command for four years. Al Flax told us about the ones that got away. Now Tom will tell about the other side, the ones that did good things.

General Robert T. Marsh: Thank you, John. And good after noon, ladies and gentlemen. I congratulate and commend you for your valuable support to the Command and to the Air Force over these many years. You've tackled some tough issues and helped all the AFSC commanders steer a course through this technologi cal thicket. In thinking through the selection of the top winners, I found it difficult to set aside the "inside the beltway" views and influences and really settle on an objective set of criteria with which you could judge programs. The politicians and pundits are quick to judge our acquisitions as losers as soon as they en counter their first test difficulty, any kind of management irregularity no matter how small, or take any kind of an excursion off their planned acquisition cost and schedule. The B- 1 and the Peacekeeper come immediately to mind. But on the other hand, it doesn't necessarily follow that programs meeting their acquisition costs, schedule, and perfor mance plan are all top winners; as one might first think. For example, the A- 10 was acquired generally to plan, but it is facing an unusually early phase out due to its lack of growth potential to stay abreast of the threat. Now I would not classify it as a top winner. And I'm sure you can think of other examples. Therefore, I thought that I should look at both the acquisition phase and beyond into the operations and support phases to develop criteria for selecting winners. 35

After some thought I settled on three criteria for judging top winners. First, acquisition must be efficient and expeditious, consistent with the need, the technical risk, and the magnitude of the undertaking. Second, the new system must make a quan tum and enduring contribution to our war fighting capability, and implicit in that statement is sufficient growth potential to maintain effectiveness in the face of a reasonably expected changing threat. And finally, it must be affordable in terms of the eventual numbers and skills of personnel and other resources that are required to operate and maintain it. Now if you accept these as reasonable criteria for selecting the winners, then you must judge only those systems that are far enough along in their life cycle so that their mature war fighting readiness and capability, their adaptability to the changing threat, and their actual operating and support costs can be observed. It's too early to judge our third generation systems, the B1B, the Peacekeeper, the GPS, the A AMR AM, and the DSCS III. On the other hand, our successors - this room 25 years from now - may judge some of these current systems as top winners, and in fact I'm confident they will. As I looked back over the many systems fielded by AFSC over the years, I divided them into first and second generation systems, the first generation being those acquired in the late '50s, '60s, and into the early '70s, the second generation being those from the early '70s to date. I wanted to see if the major reforms that were instituted by David Packard from 1969-73 affected my perception of winners, either in numbers or quality. The Packard reforms were intended to address the problems encountered with the acquisition of some of the later first generation systems under Robert McNamara's highly centralized management of the requirements and system acquisition processes. The C-5A and the F-111A are the most notable examples of systems acquired under that centralized concept. I'm not sure I could see much difference in the quality and number of winners before Mr. McNamara's centralization and after Mr. Packard's reforms. As for the period in between, that is, from about the late '60s to the early '70s, I looked hard at both the C-5A and the F- 111, and they're both fine systems today. But they do not satisfy my criterion for efficient and expeditious acquisition. Incidentally, I've been on the fence on 36 the C-5 as to whether it's a winner or not. We had terrible trouble giving birth to it, but it's a fine weapons system today, except that it's Operations and Support costs are high, and that was my swinger. There are clearly a number of real top winners in both the first and second generations in Air Force Systems. As for first generation winners I like the B-52 bomber, the Minuteman missile, the F-4 fighter, the C-141 cargo airplane, and the AIM 7 Sparrow air-to-air missile. Among the second generation systems, I selected the F-15, the F-16, the airborne warning and control system (AWACS), the defense support program (DSP), the defense communication satellite system (DSCS II), the Maverick antitank missile, and the laser-guided bomb. I believe these systems meet all three of my criteria. I think probably more test missiles were lost in the Minuteman test program than in the Peacekeeper test program to date, and more F-4 test aircraft were lost than in both the F-15 and F-16 test programs together to date. The AWACS and the DSP had sched ule delays, and some cost overruns. The Maverick as refined still does not solve all the Air Force's all-weather tank-killing needs. And DSCS does not have all of the communications capability that we desire. However, each of these systems represented a quantum increase in war fighting capability and all have lent themselves to cost-effective upgrading over many years to cope with the increasing threat. Incidentally, I had not thought much about the growth potential of systems. I was always acquisition-oriented. But I really have begun to think that one can't ignore how well a system can adapt to the changing threat over time. That's a judgment that can only be made retrospectively, but I think it's a very important judgment as to whether or not a system really was a top winner. AFSC has proved its ability to acquire superior weapons systems. Our concept for decentralized execution of systems acquisition - that is, assigning the total responsibility to the program manager and his program office and providing him with commensurate authority and support - is sound. There's a need to continually refine and improve management tools and tech niques and to improve the process wherever possible. Cost estimating capabilities are being constantly improved and are

37 helping to reduce the frequency and severity of cost overruns. Baselining techniques are forcing more thorough definition of the systems requirements and their associated costs earlier in the acquisition process, thereby introducing more stability into the programs, but I see no need for reform of this process or the institution, as some are advocating. As I look over the winners, I note that all have been managed in accordance with the principles which we today advocate for all programs: • All had undergone good front-end definition, either by way of extensive requirements and preliminary design studies as in the case of the F-15, the Minuteman, and DSCS, or they were preceded by prototyping or breadboarding efforts, as in the case of DSP, the F-16, and AWACS. • All were structured with well-balanced concurrence between development, test, and production. Risk was identified at the outset and it was managed well, specifically managed. • All were stable programs, by that I mean there was good funding support from the front-end through production. Didn't get the rates we always wanted in production, but we had continuity of funding. • All of the program managers emphasized tight cost control and the program managers were delegated all the authority required to get the job done. • In every case, these program managers were of high quality. They were leaders and well-experienced in the acquisition business before taking on these assignments. • In nearly every instance, there was good support for the program within the Air Force, the DoD, and the Congress. And in the cases where support was lacking, a concerted effort was made to garner such support. AWACS didn't have the congressional support that we wanted it to have in the early days, but we made it a fun damental objective of the Air Force to get that support and we finally got it. Maverick didn't have all the support that it needed throughout its lifetime. You couldn't get the B-l resurrected today, as I think everybody in this room would agree. Any program that lacks support either within the service, within OSD, or on the Hill is doomed to failure. On the other hand, 38 where such support is unanimous the probability of success is very high. Some believe that the black acquisition process produces more winners than the conventional process. And I must say that in this era of grandiose micromanagement, the black process does serve to insulate the program manager from much of this outside scrutiny and it tends to cut the naysayers out of the pattern. More winners should result. However, in the cases that I've selected, the Air Force fixed the responsibility clearly on the program manager and provided him sufficient authority to ward off such outside meddling, and I think we can still do that. The streamlining recommended by the Packard commission was aimed at just such unconstructive meddling. Now, while I didn't agree with the commission's particular fix, it's far preferable, I think, to institute such a system than it is to color too many programs black for managerial rather than security reasons. I really want to thank Vern Miles for posing the question. He made me take a different look at the results of our acquisi tion efforts over the years. The results serve to reaffirm my confidence in our Air Force acquisition processes and system, and in the Air Force Systems Command, which provides the institu tional framework within which this highly difficult, complex, and extremely important systems management can be carried out so effectively. We know how to acquire quality systems. The challenge is to create the congressional and administration environment to allow the system to fulfill its purpose. Thank you.

Discussion

McLucas: Thank you, Tom. I don't remember your using the term "configuration control." Did you use that term?

Marsh: I did not.

McLucas: You want to say a word about it? Do you believe in it? 39

Marsh: I think change management is fundamental to the process of keeping a program on track, and stability of the program is exceedingly important. Change management begets stability. I think a much better job of definition at the outset by way of baselining tends to flush out many second order configuration questions early on. Get those settled early on and then only make modifications that threat changes dictate.

McLucas: Maybe you can clarify what you said. It sounded to me like you were saying "We didn't get smarter because we didn't have any more winners after than before, but we did get smarter because now we know how to do it." What did you say?

Marsh: We learned at the outset, as we formed the Command under Bennie's vision, how to acquire systems. We began immediately to develop the expertise of systems management, and I think that the challenges of the earlier times didn't demand as much as they do today. The task of keeping the public and the congressional support for the program is more difficult today.

Dr. Gerald P. Dinneen: One of the characteristics of the winners is that they all had a fairly long lifetime. Many of them are still very important. That means that either by design or by good fortune we were able to go through many upgrades and were able to evolve those systems. Is that implied in what you said in the three characteristics or is that something that you think we should be doing more of?

Marsh: It is certainly implied in my lesson learned for the future that I think that we do need to pay specific attention to growth potential. We need to postulate the threat impact on weapons systems as the threat evolves and, to the extent that it is practical and possible, we ought to attempt to build in that kind of growth potential. I guess, to be honest, I believe it's more happenstance than planned, in the cases I cited.

Unidentified Speaker: Could you comment on the changes in the contracting laws over the years, whether you think that con 40 tinued growth of competition is going to change our ability to keep programs growing and maintaining momentum.

Marsh: I think that we have swung too far in the direction of competition for competition's sake. We must return to using competition as a good business practice when it makes good business sense. If we don't make such a return, I think it will inhibit moving forward in both the fundamental acquisition business and in the modification of systems to keep them current and abreast of the threat.

Dr. Martin: General Marsh, Al Flax mentioned that Congress had added something like 10,000 people to its staff during the last 20 or 25 years. And you seem to be saying that it doesn't make any difference what's going on in Congress if we can still have winners as frequently as we did before. Does Congress make a difference? Does that oversight have some relevance or is it just that we work harder and are just as successful? Marsh: We have the capability and the know-how to acquire the systems today as well as we ever did, but unless we find a way to keep the meddling out of the process, then the process will fail. Within the Air Force we have, as a result of the recent Packard recommendations, instituted ways to keep meddling under control and allow the acquisition process to proceed efficiently. I don't have any solution to the problem of the increasing congressional meddling. If we don't turn it around, its going to constipate the system, and we won't get any acquisition job done. Congress must reform its practices. All we've done so far is reform the practices within the Department of Defense, while Congress has taken no steps toward reform - and they must or we will not improve the overall process.

Dr. Lehmann: Tom, there's a piece of the system that neither you nor Al Flax, nor Bernie Schriever, nor anybody in this room has mentioned. Over the past 40 years the airbase has been almost totally ignored. Hap Arnold said that air power is airmen, aircraft, and airbases. We've worked the aircraft problems and Al Flax would probably say you've got about a 1.2 orders of magnitude improvement as you went from the P-47 and the C-47 up to the F-15 and the C-141s, and they are superb in the air. 41

When you come down to the base, people just assume that the base will be there in wartime. In World War II, when you had those P-47s and the C-47s, they'd take off on 2000 or 3000 ft. strips, which would be gravel. The Air Corps engineers were putting in one base every 33 hours from the time we had Normandy on through the time that Germany collapsed. Today the basing of our systems has simply gone down. We now need aircraft that require 8-10 thousand feet of smooth concrete runway, and if you disrupt that you're in as much trouble as if you drop a few bombs on some of the bridges in Washington or on the beltway, you tie the whole thing up. The Air Force ran a test called Salty Demo. They had the best in the Air Force, fully equipped, fully manned, fully sup plied, ready to go. They knew it was coming on a Monday in May 1985, and that's all they knew. It was a disaster. There's no other way to describe it. The Soviets would have had time to get back and hit us three or four more times before we could' ve gotten the first airplane off of that airbase. The Air Force doesn't accept that and says it wasn't a realistic threat. What is a realistic threat? You know the experiences in Bien Hoa, Vietnam. The Systems Command is responsible for all three parts of the system. It has solved the airman problem with training and with human resources and human systems. The aircraft has done a superb job. But the airbase has received moderate support at best, no leadership at worst. One could make a very credible case that they [the Soviets] could put our air power out of action on the first day. It can't be defined away and it can't be wished away. There are things we can do, but they haven't been done in the last 40 years, and its a challenge to the Studies Board and Systems Command. You were a commander at Systems Command. You must have thought about it. I'd be interested to know how you looked at that problem, if you considered it, and if you did, what was your bottom line?

Marsh: Bill, your implied criticism is correct. I think we have not done enough in this area, although I've noticed in the last six or seven years a lot more attention has been given to the problem than earlier. An airbase survivability program office was 42 formed at Eglin, and a lot of projects were undertaken there, including the clearing of bomblets from airfields, alarms of various kinds for chemical attack, and others. Civil engineers have examined the runway repair problem carefully, and I believe you'll find that runway repair kits stockage throughout the world has been stepped up considerably. I think you'll see a lot more effort put to defensive counter air to protect our airbases with our air assets, which is fundamental to keeping the enemy from our airbases. I think you'll also see a lot more emphasis on STOL. The F-15E has a take-off and landing distance of 2000 ft., loaded. I'm not positive of those numbers so don't hold me to them. I think a lot has been done, a lot more needs to be done. Every senior leader is aware that this is a very important area and more work must be done. In the past 10 or 20 years it did not receive the priority it deserved, but I think it's starting to get that priority.

Dr. Lawrence M. Weeks: I'd like to ask General Marsh, why you didn't include in the launch vehicle world some things that a young Colonel Schriever started at Ballistic Missile Division (BMD) almost three decades ago. The Titan was a fairly good, flexible changing device. They did Titan 2, and then the Gemini launch vehicle, and then General Bleymaier did a pretty good job on Titan 3, and now Titan 4 has sort of come back. Even old Atlas, of which 600 or so were built, is still in use as a Centaur Atlas. Couldn't you find one of those to meet your criteria, sir?

Marsh: I didn't want to pander to the Ballistic Missile crowd. I gave Minuteman. I think you're absolutely right. They are winners and very good capabilities. A little earlier than the time frame I used. I started in the early '60s really for my systems, and those were born in the late '50s, although I did make an exception in the case of the B-52.

Hansen: Dave Packard, in 1969-72, talked about competitive prototyping from a point of view of wanting to do some proto typing on a lot of different things, not necessarily just compet ition for the same program, but for competing programs. This would be done so that decisions could be based on hardware and test results instead of on just piles of paper. I can't remember

Atlas Centaur

43 what his public declarations were. His private feelings were that the competitive prototyping thrust that he tried to inject in the system was frustrated or defeated by the fact that the advocates of the losing prototypes, the ones that were not judged to be the very best, weren't willing to give up. The combined forces of the military and the Congress and the industrial people, once something was started, would never believe that it could possibly be destined to not continue into production. They would force it into production. I believe that Dave's concepts on competitive prototyping were good and there are some examples where it has worked well. As you think about the successes of the past and look to the future, do you think that there's more of a role for competi tive prototyping of competitive systems? I'm not talking about the same airplane being built by two firms, I'm talking about a manned aircraft versus a drone, for example. Do you think there's more of a future for competitive prototypes than has been realized so far, or do you think that's a concept that just didn't work because of the forces of our system?

Marsh: We tried after Mr. Packard left to include funding in our program for prototypes, competitive prototyping as well, but that funding was the first to go. If you had an important need, or if you could perceive an important need out there for a job to be done, you put a program together to go after that job. After the budget crunch, prototyping funds disappeared. On the other hand, DARPA was successful in spending on the order of $300- 400 million a year in prototyping efforts, but many of those were inhibited by the bureaucratic problem of DARPA not being able to persuade the services to follow through on those prototype efforts. DARPA didn't work hard enough in my judgment to get a military input to their prototype selection. An argument has been made that if one is to set aside $300-400 million a year (or perhaps today a half a billion dollars) for prototyping, then one might compete it out in the services. It must be over and above their TOA. I don't like to see a lot of little rabbit ears formed, but prototyping may be so important that there ought to be a sum of money set aside to do competi tive prototyping. Now I think it does have all the pluses going for it that you suggest, but it will not survive in the current 44 way we do our budgeting. So I believe a way to do it might be to earmark a sum of money for DARPA or OSD, and have them run a prototype competition among the services to compete for those dollars over and above their TOA. That's the only way I can see getting it done.

McLucas: Tom, when I went into the Pentagon in '69, the Air Force had colonels in charge of some of the major programs, and those that got in trouble soon had two-star generals in charge. Do you think that putting those generals in charge improved the chance of success? Did it improve their chance of getting funded? What was the result of upgrading the rank of those people?

Marsh: We deliberately elevate program manager rank based on the importance of the program. We've come to accept that. I don't think there's a good sound rationale for it.

Unidentified Speaker: I'd like to follow on Bill Lehmann's long speech with a short question, General Marsh, at least I hope it's short. Given that the airbase is not a sanctuary anymore and is more vulnerable than it used to be, why hasn't the Air Force ever really embraced the VSTOL program and come up with a VSTOL aircraft?

Marsh: I'm not well informed in that subject to answer that question. I would guess that based on the VSTOL designs that I've looked at, they just didn't have the payload-range capability. The technology is probably around the corner or about to make a good payload range capability possible with VSTOL, but until it does, the Air Force will not invest in something that will carry 500 pounds 500 miles. That's not our job and we will not put resources into that kind of a capability. As those numbers grow dramatically, and they've got to grow a lot from what I last saw, then I think they'll become competitive. 45

Forecast I and II General Lawrence A. Skantze, USAF Retired

McLucas: In 1962 I went to the Pentagon. I was on the third floor and we had people on the fourth floor that were very excited about something called Forecast. It was conventional wisdom on the third floor to scoff at what was coming out of this particular study and I guess I was naive because I thought there was some good work going on there. And I still think so. Here to talk about this is General Larry Skantze. Larry is a Naval Academy graduate and also an AFIT graduate. He served in the Navy for a number of years. He's a bomber pilot, had a lot of engineering assignments, and during those engineering assignments he had programs to manage like SRAM, and AWACS. He gradually progressed through the system until he's just now finished a tour as commander of Air Force Systems Command.

Forecast I

General Skantze: I am pleased to have the opportunity to talk about Forecast, the original one and the one we recently completed, Forecast II. The first Forecast was sponsored by Secretary Zuckert and General LeMay. We were looking for ten- year technology pushes. It involved not only the government but industry people who worked on it full time. The environment to involve industry people was a lot different back then than it is today. And I think through that process they built a fairly good consensus. Products that came out were things like composite mater ials, and high-bypass turbofan engines, which in turn produced the large cargo transport, the C-5. We looked at enhanced radiation weapons because we had a weapons panel strongly represented by what was known then (and probably still is today) as the "nuclear mafia." The advanced manned strategic airplane (AMSA), successor to the B-70, was the forerunner of the B-l. The reusable space launch vehicle gave birth to the shuttle, and was the early genesis of the national aerospace plane. 46

When I became commander of Systems Command, I decided that we should do a Forecast every 20 years, so I proposed it to the Chief of Staff and to the Secretary. They wrote me a charter, and that was our kickoff for Forecast II.

Forecast II

Not having the largesse of Schriever's budgets, I decided we'd do Forecast II in Washington, but we still needed to create an environment where the technologists and system thinkers could be detached from their day-to-day jobs and work together in a synergistic environment. We did this by taking some space from ANSER in Crystal City. We were going to look ahead more than 10 years. We wanted to push the state of the art and have a spectrum of things we could do, some that might be achievable in the near term and some so far out that they obviously would have to wait until the next century, but would still have sufficient potential to warrant our attention. Because of the environment, I decided we couldn't directly involve industry, so we instead created a series of seminars. We brought in those industries that were function ally oriented to certain aspects of technology, had a day-long seminar, and exchanged views from our point of view (the Air Force) as both users and technologists and their point of view from the industry. In retrospect, I think that worked out pretty well. After the study was over, we went out of our way to debrief industry, tell them all the things we had done because we wanted to build a consensus within the industry. This was the organization chart [see Table 1]. The original Forecast had a much more elaborate structure. There were a number of mission panels dedicated to individual opera tional areas. Jerry Paige, who some of you remember was sort of the chief bright planner for the Air Force, had a panel on what wars would look like five and ten years ahead, and we had a number of review groups who were there full time and who in many respects served as filters. And, in some cases bright ideas, in my opinion, didn't surface because they didn't pass the filter test. In a few cases it was a "not invented here" problem of a

H DEPUTY DIRECTOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR AF/XO-LG HUGHES AF/RD--LG RANDOLPH ASSISTANT FOR PROGRAMMING ASSISTANT FOR SUPPORT GM MA IS J BAINBRIOGE GLASGOW LT COL WILLIAMS t- ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT TECHNICAL SUPPORT c DEPUTY PROGRAM MANAGERS GM- 15 GOLOSTAYNAT COL NEIREITER

TECHNOLOGY PANELS MISSION PANELS ANALYSIS PANELS CHAIRMAN BG STEB8INS CHAIRMAN MG DURKIN CHAIRMAN-COL FRIEL DEPUTY DR. KULP OEPUTY COLMcOANIEL DEPUTY COL WALTON PROPULSION ft POWER STRATEGIC OFFENSE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS- MATERIALS & PRODUCIBILITY STRATEGIC DEFENSE SYSTEMS COSTING VEHICLES ft STRUCTURES THEATER WARFARE THREAT/RED TEAM ELECTRONICS t SENSORS LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT INFORMATION PROCESSING BATTLE I ARMAMENTS ft WEAPONS COMMUNICATIONS LIFE SCIENCES ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES 'ft MAINTAINABILITY

Table 1 Project Forecast II Organization

47 bright idea that didn't conform with what somebody on the high level review panel wanted to look at. We put this organization together for Forecast II and the people who did all the day-to-day work were the program managers. Eric Nelson, who was the planner at Systems Com mand at that point, is now the Vice Commander of ESD; and Charlie Stebbins, who ran science and technology, ran the full time day-to-day work. Charlie focused on the technology panels. Bob Durkin, who was director of requirements in the Air Staff, came over and was the mission panel chairman. We used Colonel Friel from the Space Technology Center to do the actual analytical work to make sure that we understood enough about feasibility, that we understood a fair amount about the costing so it could be credible in terms of looking at it as a keeper. We solicited quite a few people and quite a few resources. I signed a number of letters that addressed these issues to these people and asked for their views. Either they could come in and talk to the people in Crystal City in the panels or they could write in their views. This they did to some degree and it was a good input to the final product. We ran the study from June 1985 to February 1986. We had 175 participants. When we went through the divergent phase, we wound up with 2,000 ideas from all sources including industry and in-house people. In the convergent process we had a methodology to look at these ideas and to select the very best, whether they were in a proposed systems concept or pure technology. These became the 70 projects split almost equally between technology and systems, which we call the keepers. We did have both a senior review group of outside experts in the research technology and development area and a military advisory group. We scheduled two meetings. We scheduled one review when we had gone through the preliminary process and felt like we had made the first cut at the best things we were doing. Then we brought them back about a month before we concluded the project to get a final check. The purpose of this group in my parlance was to provide "sanity checks." We wanted to be sure that we didn't have a system proposal or technology proposal that really didn't make sense. The military advisory group was made up largely of the vice commanders of the operational organizations in the Air 48

Force. We also had a hidden agenda in that we were going to need broad-based Air Force support to make any advocacy arguments that we needed for an increase in the budget share. Again, we brought them back twice and they provided the sanity checks we needed. When we screened the ideas we looked at the technologies on their own merits, built a matrix to compare those against systems, and identified the systems as they compared to capabil ities. Smart built-in test is a pervasive technology in that it plays into many of the systems concepts. The hypervelocity vehicle, in turn, provides a capability that is pervasive in covering a wide variety of capabilities that may be desired by the user. So the technologies that turned out to enable many systems and the systems that turned out to enable many capabil ities tended to be the ones that filtered through as the most valuable in the screening process. We could classify the ideas that we came up with into several categories. Revolutionary ideas include the pursuit of anti-matter. Pervasive ideas include artificial intelligence, which fits across a broad spectrum of things one would like to do. Older ideas enabled by new technology is characteristic of the National Aerospace Plane program. That is not a new idea, but we've determined that the technologies available or anticipated to be available allowed us to look more strongly at the achievability of that objective. We also looked at synergistic combinations of ideas on things like a very smart cockpit. Here you're using the better symbology presentations that you can give to a man flying a fighter combined with the artificial intelligence and expertness you can put in a processor, to give him what we would call a smart cockpit. I'm going to run through a quick menu of several of the technologies we selected before I come to a conclusion to kind of give you a flavor for what we did. For each one of these we determined the descriptor, the enabling technologies, the funding profile (which was not unrealistic, but consistent with what we were trying to sell), and the milestones. As a result of this, and recognizing where DARPA was in the Copper Canyon program, I proposed to Secretary Aldrich that we form a National Aerospace Plane program office and put the program office at Wright- Patterson to report directly to me. That way we had the 49 initiative to include not only DARPA, but the Navy and NASA in this program. We formulated it, got Secretary Weinberger's approval, then got the President's endorsement. It still enjoys congressional support. One point I would make in this context was to propose an X-type of vehicle, and somewhere in the bowels of the Pentagon where they do those dastardly things, there emerged an X-30. An X-30 conjures up a sort of definitive configuration; it implies that there's something more definitive to that vehicle than there really is at this time. The date 1990 is what I call a moveable feast: if the technology shows you that you're not quite there, you move the date. You then pursue the other part of technology that you need to do. I think that the X-30 got the connotation that the date was absolutely fixed and we knew exactly what it was we wanted. Nevertheless, I think the program, while fragile in some respects, appears to be enjoying the support from the Hill and the administration and it appears to be appropriately funded in 1988. Sparse Arrays in Space. We came up with the idea that perhaps as we looked ahead to things like the space -based radar it might make some sense to explore the idea of building a large number of sparse arrays, each of which would be about 40 inches square. The idea was that we might be able to deploy them in quantity, have the flexibility to distribute them in space in such a way that you could use them coherently to focus in on what you needed to detect or communicate with, and at the same time by virtue of numbers, would have a survivability associated with that. So that was a keeper. It is funded. We have the milestones and we are moving ahead with people in Lincoln Lab and ESD and other elements of Systems Command exploring the feasibility of proceeding. High Altitude Reconnaissance Aircraft. We also recom mended a very high altitude (90,000 ft.+) unmanned reconnais sance aircraft that could stay up for about two weeks on station. It would have smart skin and photonics. I think we're doing a little work on the design tradeoffs, and there are some other candidates in the mill that are being looked at but basically it was to see the feasibility of fulfilling that capability as a desired systems concept enabled by some of the technologies that came out of Forecast. so

Autonomous Weapons. There's a considerable amount of work going on in this field in the Air Force and Navy labs and in industry. We're interested in using dual sensors for en-route and terminal guidance sensors, and in the ability to launch a vehicle and let it recognize and strike a target of value. Some of these characteristics have been demonstrated in conceptual flight tests at Eglin, and a considerable amount of effort is going into this area as a near term achievement. We're working on very smart seekers on small weapons and on the captive flight test plan for the cruise missile advanced guidance. Smart Cockpit. The cockpit development at the Avionics Laboratory at Wright-Patterson is part of the effort to get pilot- assist capabilities. A lot of this work on an evolutionary break out basis is intended for use in the Advanced Technology Fighter and would be equally applicable to the Navy's Advanced Technol ogy Attack aircraft. There's considerable effort going on in this area not only in the Avionics Lab, but in the Human Resources Lab, and the Armstrong Lab out at Wright-Patterson. It is probably as heavily funded and motivated an activity as we have going on today. High Performance Engines. One of the things that came out of the original Forecast was higher temperature turbine engine materials. One thing we didn't do as well as we could have in the original Forecast was to build a consensus. We did some, but it was an assumption that a lot of these projects would have a life of their own. While that was true for some of the more visible items like AMSA and the C-5A, it was not equally true of materials work. So the amounts that were recommended to go after higher temperature materials never got fully funded. One of the things we tried to do in coming out of Forecast II was to build that constituency. Charlie Stebbins and Eric Nelson spent one year on the road, literally, and we went everywhere to brief everybody on everything on Project Forecast II. We did this so that we would have that constituency, so that we could build it and so that it would be self-sustaining. Certainly we saw the high-performance turbine engine as a very distinct reality achievable by the end of the next decade if we pushed on the critical technologies, which are high temperature materials and advanced aerodynamics within the core structure itself. As Tom Marsh pointed out, if we could get this technology to

Sparse Arrays in Space

51 provide a 20 to 1 thrust-to-weight ratio, the Air Force would get very interested in VSTOL because it would preserve the kind of payload/range mix that they would want, and he's absolutely right. That was simply the thing that prevented the Air Force from looking at something like the AV8A or AV8B. But this was something that we thought was clearly achievable, and so there is a major effort to develop that componentry in the engine 6.2 and 6.3 program area. Smart Battle Management. The leverage provided by smart battle management is really a very important element of what we're trying to do with expert systems, powerful algorithms that help us to fuse, sort, and filter data and present the battle manager with only the kind of critical information he needs. Beyond year 2000 the battle manager may operate in a simulated environment holographically projected around him, in effect putting him in the middle of the battlefield. The Rome Air Development Center (RADC) Battle Management Laboratory is spearheading that work. Electronic Systems Division (ESD) has the SDI battle management program office for the Colorado Springs test bed. Most of our laboratories involved in human interaction, such as the Human Resources Lab, are working on the perceptive systems and the smart algorithms to facilitate this particular area of the technology. Photonics. We became interested in the possibility of creating integrated photonic systems from optical sensing to processing to display, taking advantage of the inherent powerful characteristics of photonics. People in industry are developing optical arithmetic units and its seems to us we have a very exciting area here. RADC is the photonics center of excellence. They're working on photonic elements to forge the way to the future where we can replace electrons, avoid the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) arena totally, and raise the processing speed. Robotic Telepresence. We see an opportunity to use a dumb robot with a cathode ray tube (CRT) for a head, and tactile sensors with mechanical advantage so someone on the ground could use his fingers and dexterity and translate those movements to a robot in a hostile environment, be it in space or in a chemical or nuclear environment. And we're proceeding on this. Much of the work is being done at Armstrong Lab and at the Human Resources Lab. 52

High Powered Microwaves. If we could generate gigahertz of microwave power from a 2,000-lb. class bomb, we could prob ably wipe out all electronics at an airfield, and create havoc. A lot of basic work is underway to try to determine if we can realize the powers and densities required within a predictable timeframe. Smart Skins. Harry Davis always complained that we designed airframes and then "oh, by the way" stuck avionics in them. He said, "Why don't you design an avionic airframe and then go fly that?" Smart skins is a way to get Harry Davis' airplane. If you look at the work being done on conformal arrays, in using active elements so that you bunch up a number of elements on a wing root or on the side of a fuselage, that begins to approach smart skins concepts. If you look at some of the antenna work that's being done to create multiple frequency- use antenna, then that begins to conjure up that not only could you use it for detection, you might also use it for communication. We think this is a very exciting area with a great future. It certainly gives you the 360 degree coverage, so maybe we could eliminate the surprises of the 6 o'clock position. And it cer tainly enhances the low radar observability because you're not stuck with bubbles and parts and radomes. We spent a good bit of time thinking about how we'd go out and sell the program. In one of the first big meetings we pulled industry into Kirtland and briefed them on the results in some depth to encourage them to look at things that we thought were important and to include them in their IR&D programs. We also scheduled them to come back 6-9 months later to tell us what they were doing in IR&D. That had the healthy effect of focusing them, and they came back and we reviewed what they had done. I think we were very pleased to the extent that industry came on board. Another thing I did was to establish a principle: We can't go to the Air Staffs and the Chiefs and the Secretaries and ask for additional TOA unless we demonstrate some faith in what we've done. So we took 10 percent of our budget in the S&T base and replowed those dollars into Forecast II initiatives. Then when I went to the Air Staff and asked for some real TOA increase, and 2 percent is a goal (2 percent of TOA); we got a pretty good hearing. Furthermore, I was able to convince the

S3

Chief that he ought to treat the tech base as a program element and not to have people in his panels over there mucking around picking out one 62 project versus another. He agreed to that and he formalized it in a document that said the S&T base will be considered a program element. So we did get a lot of healthy support, and, in fact, I think that the S&T base is still in a plus up in the 1988 budget at this time. I think that's been very gratifying because nominally S&T is the last to be fed and the first to be starved. So there's some reason to feel very positive about the fact that we have been able to make that case and that we have been able to engender that support. I think we have generated the right kinds of programs. We didn't limit the scope. I told Edward Teller that we believe we ought to do something on anti-matter. And he said, "What year?" And I said, "Maybe about 2025." And he said, "2075." At any rate, we built the consensus. I think we balanced evolu tionary and revolutionary. The Army is about to start its own Forecast and CNO invited me over last week to talk to the Navy long range planners at dinner and in essence asked me to tell them how to do this. So I think it's been a great effort on the part of people in the Air Force both in Systems Command and others and ought to be done every 20 years. Whoever is going to be around in 2006, remind people we've got to do another one. Thank you.

Discussion

McLucas: Thank you, Larry. I wanted to ask you, Larry, whether the Air Force will ever get serious about RPVs (remotely piloted vehicles).

Skantze: I think they are, John. I think there's enough going on (not necessarily visible), but there's enough money going in that some of those things are going to come to pass. I was gratified that Seek Spinner got a new life. I think that was very inappropriately terminated a couple of years ago and it has come back on its own and I would hope that comes to pass. If you'll indulge me, the thing I always liked about Seek Spinner was if you could build it for about $20-25,000 as a 54 terminal device against radiating emitters - if you launched a thousand and only 50 of them hit something I believe you shut down the whole system. And that was the whole idea. It was a harassment drone and not a .9 PK device.

Unidentified Speaker: Larry, what's your assessment of the track record of Forecast I in picking the major technology payoffs of the past 20 years, and how many things that you did pick in Forecast I turned out to be duds?

Skantze: I think the purpose of a forecast is to give you a set of goals as you best perceive them. To say that in the follow-on process you won't come up with more new ideas you didn't think of is kind of foolish because innovation hopefully will do that. For example, the Air Force never had a requirement for low observables, never wrote one. That came to pass because some bright guys were looking at something. So I wouldn't fault a forecast for what it didn't discover necessarily held over a period of 20 years. Maybe if you said in the next 10, but you know some things come to pass and we get more bright new ideas, so I think what they did produce was good. They established a mechanism for doing something which fortunately someone could come back to later and do again and, hopefully, someone will do in another 20 years.

Dr. Robert H. Korkegi: Back in the '50s we closed down all our best transonic wind tunnels because we thought we knew it all. And after 10 years or so we decided we ought to revive some. We did the same thing with hypersonics. I once ran the Hyper sonic Research Laboratory at the Aeronautical Research Lab and under some pressure for a couple of years I finally changed the name. Now we're reviving hypersonic, getting all kinds of things out of mothballs and out of closets. Do you see any safeguards in the future against making such mistakes?

Skantze: Well, I think you know you've got to develop the advocacy if you think the technology's important to pursue even though people don't perceive the payoff. You're absolutely right; in the mid to late '70s, in particular, and into the first couple of years of the '80s we could not get tech base programs in 55 hypersonics to survive. We tried. We would advocate them from Systems Command and say this is good technology, we ought to be doing it. But it never survived. For one reason or another it was not perceived as being "relevant," in some cases on the third floor, in some cases in Congress. It wasn't that we didn't perceive that as a gap. In fact I was running Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) when Tom was my boss, and we used to talk about the fact that we ought to be doing something, but we couldn't seem to get it sponsored.

Dr. George H. Miley: General Skantze, I understand the rationale for the 20-year time period for a new project, Forecast III, I guess. What worries me is that technology is advancing so rapidly it seems that that's a very long time period in that scale. I wonder if there's any provision for periodic updates so that this doesn't become obsolescent.

Skantze: One of the things that I didn't perceive when I said we were going to put 10 percent of the tech base into Forecast II projects was that that funding became the real motivational drive within the labs. All of a sudden the labs grabbed those projects and started to work them. When Charlie and I went out to review what they were doing, it suddenly dawned on me that the labs had developed their own momentum in these areas. That's why the efforts are surviving and ongoing and very productive. I think within the context of all those tech program initiatives, which in the technology arena is something on the order of 38 or 39, that they will tend to sweep in further advances in technology if something fundamentally new is discovered. But I think that there's a synergism that now goes with what the labs are doing internally in-house, and, I think you know, anything that would occur within the pushing of that technology will tend to surface.

McLucas: I had a question on robotics. You mentioned taking the abilities of the fingers, the dexterity, and converting it into mechanical form. I've heard criticisms to the effect that we try to build to low-grade people instead of building intelligent machines. Are we making a mistake if we try to duplicate human performance versus starting out with what a machine is good at? 56

Skantze: I think it's a case where if you can develop the tactile device you can easily use the man to be able to do some main tenance, mechanical efforts in a hostile environment without trying to develop a very sophisticated robot who is adaptable to a whole series of situations. If you had to fix three or four different satellites and you had to do different things to fix it, certainly that device would allow the man to adapt very readily because he sees what needs to be done, whereas the robot would literally have to be programmed for a wide variety of things.

Dr. Delbert Tesar: During the 1960s we had an unusually high growth of robotics technology in the military. A lot of very interesting contracts were being pursued during that time. We had growth during the 1970s in industrial robotics, for example. The $6 million effort by Cincinnati Milicron to develop an industrial robot; the NASA people produced a $100 million effort to produce their RMS machine, which is now flying. They're now pursuing a $200 million effort for a flying telerobotic servicer. Unfortunately, since the 1970s the major corporations have gotten out of robotics, so less technology is coming onto the shelf. I have to raise the question of magnitude for our funding of the present initiative. It just doesn't seem to be in propor tion to the magnitude of the technology that we need to bring forward. Do we have any chance to put more funding into it?

Skantze: I think you're right. Industry rushed forward and found there were many things they could do which, from the point of view of return on investment, didn't make sense. My perception was that part of the problem was that they couldn't get the accuracy in placement in robots that they needed for some very sophisticated manufacturing processes. I think we've tended to try and look into the smart applications like the one I described which requires development of new technology but that we're not putting money into industrial robots because what's out there now doing things in the Air Force interests are very suitable to the job they're doing. Other than fine tuning the placement, using optical sensors to allow you more flexibility, and get you out of the registration function, I don't know that we 57 have any great thrusts in any other direction. George Moore is sitting back there not too far behind you. You may ask him the same question afterwards.

Dr. Carroll O. Alley, Jr.: I'd like to comment that in your Forecast II, I didn't see much mention of very accurate sensing of space and time or very high resolution capabilities which another aspect of lasers and atomic clocks now give us, where one can measure distances with laser radar in the millimeter range. We have done this to the moon with 7.5 mm recently. One can measure time down in the tens of picoseconds region now with existing atomic clocks. So it would seem to me that some modest investment in what one might call space-time geodesy, where this kind of precision requires a full knowledge and understanding of general relativistic effects in space and in the tracking of very high speed vehicles, might be a prudent thing for the Air Force to follow in future years.

Skantze: I might point out that we kept all 2,000 ideas reviewed. We just focused the funding on the others. Charlie, do you have any recollection of whether we had a project in that domain?

BrigGen. Charles E. Stebbins: Sir, we do not. We do have ongoing efforts on precise clocks at Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and at RADC, Hanscom. But nothing came out of Forecast II in that regard. I'd be happy to talk to you after the meeting.

Skantze: I want to comment on something. I spent a lot of time with Dave Packard and Bill Perry and company, putting together some ideas, actually some language, for the Packard Commission report. My view was that it was an attempt to create a single focal point, a knowledgeable focal point for DoD acquisition. When Dave Packard was Deputy Secretary of Defense he used to chair the DSARC, and so by virtue of chairing the DSARC he had the biggest vote. You can have split decisions in the DSARC, and if Dave Packard said we're going to do this, we did it. I reminded him that he made a decision on the short range attack missile, SRAM, for five years' worth of procurement for 1,500 missiles, and the vote was 3 for and 2 against. Then he, the chairman, voted for it and we went ahead. I was the 58 program manager. When Dave left, Bill Clements refused to chair the DSARC and it's been a meeting of equals since. The decision making process is least common denominator. That was one of the reasons that the thrust was put in there - to create a single focal point. The other thing that was very key was that Packard's report recommended that it be put in statute that the Under secretary of Defense for Acquisition be someone who has in- depth experience in the defense industry. That didn't happen and that was one part of the problem. The other part of the prob lem is that the turf battle never got settled. There was simply no way that an individual, be it Dodman or somebody else, was going to be able to do his role without having primacy in the acquisition area. It has been very very sad to see that happen in terms of that very important commission report. I think, frankly, that everybody's going to wait for the next administra tion.

McLucas: Well, we have to support what you said, but I would like to think that the Packard panel, since it did so much work, would achieve something. It's not only a good idea to have a fine report with lots of good recommendations, you've got to execute it. As I think about the Packard era, it seems to me that it was sort of unique. I happen to be a fan of his. He had the rank, the brains, and the experience. If you don't have all three of those, you can't hack it. I would like to ask you if you were a strong user of the Defense Systems Management College, and if so, if the people you got that have been there do a better job.

Skantze: Well, the Air Force always has been the strongest proponent of that. You know, it's now mandatory. We always have tried to put everybody we could through there. In fact, we filled quotas when the other two services have missed them. Because I think that absent the numbers of good technically qualified or management degree people that we get, we can take our bright people and send them through there and get a lot of practicality to rub off on them. I think we've been a fan of that place and we've used it to the maximum. 59

The Future of Air Force R&D - Panel of Three

McLucas: Where do we go next in Air Force R&D? We have a distinguished panel of three speakers, each of whom will address this subject for approximately 15 minutes. Then we will take questions as a panel. The first speaker is Dan Fink. Dan is an MIT product. He did four years in the Pentagon in DDR&E, when that still existed. He operated in the Space Division of GE, and I typically associate him with space programs and also visiting him at Valley Forge. Dan has been a consultant and adviser to NASA and DoD for many many years, and we're glad to have him on the panel. The second speaker will be General Sam Phillips. I remember when General Phillips left the Air Force Systems Command and we talked about whether an upstanding Air Force general could work for TRW without a conflict. He found a way to do it and he did it very well. He's a Wyoming graduate, and also Michigan, and one of his early claims to fame was managing the Minuteman program. After the Minuteman program, Sam achieved still greater fame on the Apollo program and did a lot, I think, to make that a success. I won't mention his tour at NSA, because it's probably unmentionable. Anyway, Sam was one of the distinguished leaders of the Systems Command. Our last speaker will be Dr. Gerald Dinneen. A math ematics graduate, of all things, at Queens College, and then Wisconsin. Vice President at Honeywell. I knew him as head of Lincoln Laboratory for a long time. He ran the Air Force SAB for many years and was active on the Defense Intelligence Agency Advisory Committee and the DSB. In the Pentagon he brought a high degree of sophistication to many of the problems in the area of C3I. And anyone who can deal with all of that and not be completely beat down in that process has my admi ration. So let's go back to the first of these three gentlemen, Dan Fink. 60

The Future R&D Environment Dr. Daniel J. Fink

Thanks, John. It's a pleasure to be here, although this is one of those rare meetings when sometimes its more fun to look back than it is to look forward. Vern said, "Why don't you talk about the environment for R&D for the next 10 to 25 years," so I agreed to do that. And the more I thought about it the more depressed I got. Finally, I saw Si Ramo at a meeting and went through this song and dance with him and he said, "Oh you shouldn't worry, don't forget: we make progress in this country when there's crisis." When enough people and enough institutions realize that something must be changed, they change it. So I guess the bad news is that things are going to hell in a handbasket, and the good news is that we're about to turn it around. In talking about the future environment, I think one of the first things we have to talk about is the supply of R&D people, and talent, and the science education in this country. The data, I think you all know, are not good. I have the 1985 issue of "Science Indicators," put out by the National Science Board. • Science achievement scores from the students aged 9-13 were lower in 1982 than in 1970. • Tenth grade is the last time that most U.S. high school students are exposed to any science. • American high school students get about 1/2 to 1/3 the course work as their counterparts do in Japan, Germany, or the Soviet Union. It's little wonder that the SAT scores have declined during the same period for students that are expected to enter science and engineering. • In 1982 the United States graduated 64,000 engineering bachelors. Japan, with about half our population, had 74,000, and the Soviet Union 330,000. Now it's easy to poo-poo the Soviet educational system and point out that many of these engineers are underemployed - and that may be true - but with all that effort going in, something has to come out. 61

• The Soviets have the largest R&D program either in absolute terms or relative to GNP. Roughly, 10 of every 1,000 Soviet scientists and engineers are in R&D compared to seven in the United States. • In 1982 over 53% of engineering doctorates in this country went to foreign students, and while it's true that over 40% of those people stayed here, can we continue to expect that trend to last, particularly as foreign R&D investments increase? • Between 1969 and 1982 the number of patent applications applied by U.S. citizens abroad fell 50% while Japanese external applications grew by a little bit more than that amount.

Well, what do we do about it? In the short term, probably nothing. In the long term I think the Air Force and every institution that's interested in increasing the numbers and the quality of scientists and engineers have to work on that pre- college problem to motivate young people to pursue science. But I think this will have certain effects on Air Force management in the decade or so to come. For one thing, I think we will need to look overseas more often for certain tech nologies. We will be less self-sufficient. Many industrial partnerships are underway between U.S. companies and overseas counterparts, and I think we will have to pursue more meaningful cooperative R&D programs with our allies. The accent is on meaningful. They're much more difficult to manage, as anyone who has been involved in a joint overseas program knows. But that can't be a deterrent. We'll have to worry about strange new things, such as reverse technology transfer. We've had a hard line now for several years, and I worry that it will come back to haunt us. As a matter of fact, I happened to read the other day where the Japanese, if you can believe this, are refusing to license, I think it was McDonnell Douglas, some of the Japanese rocket engine technologies. Can you imagine that? Future R&D managers in the Air Force, and in DoD gen erally, will have to manage more joint programs. Bennie Schriever said that joint anything is no good. I'm afraid that's going to be a way of life, not just in world commerce and 62 military alliances, but joint service and joint agency work, and we must learn how to do that. If you don't like the joint pro grams you'd better learn how to take a leadership position so that you can at least lead those programs. SDI is a joint program, in a way. As an example, we can't go along with the kind of prob lems we have in this nation developing a heavy lift launch vehicle. The battles and the squabbles between the Air Force and NASA are generally unproductive and that is not the way to make progress in an important program like that. There could even be joint programs with industry, where both the industrial partner and the DoD or the Air Force will be interested in the result, and I don't mean just cost sharing, I mean a really joint program. That's one trend I would see. Another trend that's going to complicate management is the length of projects. We're going to see more projects whose development time is measured in decades. We have not learned to manage such programs because they are usually cancelled on the way or they're distorted in some way. MOL was mentioned this morning. It may have died in part because of its development length and the amount of money that had to go in for a long time before anything came out. We fielded our first ICBM and IRBM in about 5 years from inception to IOC. I wonder how long they'd take in today's environment. And would we have persevered? SDI, as originally proposed, was an R&D program that started with the president's speech in 1983. It was supposed to give a future president in the early 1990s the data on which to make a full scale engineering development decision, after which there would be another ten years until operational capability. Over 20 years. And already you see that falling apart. The danger is that we start giving them some kind of a special focused mission, as we did with MOL, for example, and then we pull the props out from under them. What about NASP? That program will extend over a period of decades. We have to develop the management skills, and those skills must include management of the political process to successfully run those long term programs. We must do it because our adver saries do it. The Soviet Union seems to have less trouble. We're already hearing the tortoise-hare analogue between the 63

U.S. and the Soviet space programs. I've studied their program. They do have a very well planned out space program, both in lift and in their military and civilian goals. We need a more rational world. We have to get back to rational R&D decision making. We just can't continue to go along trying to read the tea leaves of OSD, as if OSD thinks about it at all, or what some congressional staffer might think. The successful programs that we refer to in the past, were conceived and run by people who knew what they wanted, there was an institution behind them who developed the data to help sell the program. They stuck to it and were successful. Contrast that with the debacle that we've had for the last 15-20 years in a follow-on to Minuteman, the whole land-based missile force. Any good ideas were distorted or were, let's say "downgraded" just to get something that would sell rather than get what was really appropriate at the time. What's the future of government-industry relationships? I doubt they can get much worse. Perhaps we'll see that one turn around. / think there's a danger that if we continue down the road we're going, companies that can do something else with their talent other than apply it to defense matters will do so. They simply will not stand much further harassment or profit erosion without diverting that talent. We've recently begun to rely on civilian technology prog ress for defense matters. And this has been quite right. Par ticularly in electronics, the pull of electronics fueled primarily by consumer demand, has made progress probably faster than the DoD could have alone. I have some concern that we expect that will be the wave of the future. In general, I think there's a caution to be made here. It could happen in some degree but I'm not sure there are that many analogues or the insatiable demands of consumer electronics in other areas, so I think the Department of Defense, and the Air Force in particular, are going to have to lead in many technologies and not depend upon civilian economies to do the work. So the environment, as I see it, is tough. But I think we can handle it if we can get the talent. All the organizational things we talk about, the current one in OSD, they will work or not work depending upon the kind of talent that we pull into our system. And that to me is probably the biggest challenge we all 64 have. If we can increase our talent base, both uniformed and civilian, then I have a lot of confidence that we'll handle these environmental problems.

Capability and Bureaucracy

General Samuel C. Phillips

It really is a pleasure for me to be able to participate with all of you in celebrating the 25th anniversary of the Air Force Studies Board. You know, the Systems Command, is a mag nificent acquisition organization with a tremendous capability. It's probably the best in the world. It didn't get that way easily, and those of you here who will determine its destiny have a lot of work to do to keep it that way. I want to talk about two things that will have a con siderable effect on the effectiveness of the Systems Command in future years. One is capability and the other is bureaucracy. The capability that is today's Systems Command took a lot of careful thinking, work, and political savvy, starting back in the 1940s, to create. The fundamental capability of the Systems Command is people and facilities. The development of people for the future is a considerable challenge. After World War II the Air Force launched an innovative program of large scale educa tion of military officers, enlisted men, and civilians. Programs were begun in the 1940s at the University of Michigan to estab lish a guided missile course, and then the instrumentation course. At other universities there were other kinds of courses. At MIT support developed for what became the Draper Laboratory. And over the years the Air Force, again going back to the 1940s, has sent people to universities for focused education, graduate education, in relevant subjects. That the ballistic missile program was able to take off when it did in the middle 1950s was a function of many things, one of which was that quite a number of officers had been put through an education program. The program of educating people in technologies and sciences relevant to the military need has gone up and down over 65

the years. For a while in the 1970s, for reasons of budget pressures and other things, the program was severely curtailed. When it was my privilege to take command of the Systems Command in 1973, I found that the education program through AFIT and civilian universities and the program of sending officers to the Draper Lab for education and training had fallen to a very low level. The Air Force must have a high level of technical and managerial competence in its blue-suit and civil service people within the Systems Command, the Air Staff, and in the joint staffs that makes the decisions and plan the programs. They ultimately frame the efforts that guide what's done. Four or five years ago, in one of my advisory activities with the Air Force Space Division in California, I observed that the officers available to manage the efforts of that very impor tant organization had a very large number of very young recent graduates, tremendous people, very bright, but with very little experience. They still had a few of the older heads in the colonel rank with lots of good experience and know how and there was a big bathtub of people in the middle, the program manager level of majors, lieutenant colonels. The effects of that situation were being felt. I don't know just where that stands today but my message is that the management of the develop ment, the continuous development of talent both in uniform and in the civil service sectors of the Systems Command is absolutely vital. A few years from now a measure of the effectiveness of the Systems Command as a premier acquisition organization will correlate very closely with attention to the continued manage ment of the development of people. Over the years since World War II the Systems Command has done a good job of developing organizations for engineering, science, and technology support. It's played a role in developing, supporting, and creating the need for the FFRDCs such as Aerospace Corporation, MITRE, and government-owned, contrac tor-operated facilities such as AEDC. Now that sort of thing is a highly political subject and requires astute management to continue the future maintenance, and the expansion in certain cases, and the evolution of this very necessary in-depth, tech nical, scientific supporting structure. The role of Air Force laboratories has varied over the years. They have played a tremendous role in the advancement 66 of technology and in the support of systems development. Here again, there's a political challenge to manage the continued development of the in-house laboratories. It's partly political. But here too the development of technology to support the needs of the Systems Command will depend very much on how well that process is managed. There's an interservice relationship and there's very clearly an interNASA relationship in research and development. Over the last year and a half now, I've spent a lot of time trying to support Dr. Jim Fletcher, the current administrator of NASA, in making some improvements in how NASA manages its business. I'm very disturbed at the bad state of relations between NASA and the Department of Defense in general, and the Air Force in particular. It's a bad situation and if you compare it with how it was 15 or 20 years ago, when I knew it more directly, I think it's just unacceptable. As an example, there was a question this morning about the biomedical area. This is one field where I think that the future of the country's efforts in developing meaningful and relevant systems in space is going to be very dependent on an intelligent development of knowledge of the human being and how the man, the human, can operate effec tively in the environments that he'll be subjected to in future years. It's really deplorable that there's not a better working relationship in order to advance biomedicine or robotics or rocket propulsion or aircraft propulsion. The relationships between the Air Force and NASA need to be worked on at all levels. I've been trying to cause some things to happen at the top of those organizations and I think some of you here could be instrumental in the near term, to say nothing of the longer term, to positively influence that relationship. The day's going to come when the role of human beings in space for military purposes will have to be clarified. There have been efforts over the past 25 or 30 years to define that role, but the only way the Air Force will get meaningful manned flight experience in the next few years is to work closely with NASA in flying the space shuttle. So I urge for many reasons that the bridges and the cooperation between NASA and the Air Force be improved. This is a tough problem and it's going to require good efforts in a management sense to get good people. The competi 67 tion for people whether it's civil service or in uniform for program managers or work in the technology areas is a tough one to manage and I don't know the solution, but it's a challenge that really needs attention. I want to stress some of the principles that the Systems Command has developed over the years that are important to managing programs and will be important in the future. I've seen a couple of very dramatic instances where practices, procedures, and disciplines that were well developed and known to work somehow fell into disuse and organizations got in trouble. I saw that in industry and I put some time into trying to correct some of those problems from the standpoint of one company. I've now seen some of that in measurable ways in the work that I've been doing with NASA for the last year and a half. It requires constant management attention to know what the right processes are, the right disciplines, the right practices, and then building on those because they do require adaptation to changing conditions. If you become complacent and inattentive, they'll fall into disuse and there'll be troubles. They have to do with such things as we've all learned: • The need for tenure of key people in managing programs in particular, but many other things; in other words being with the program long enough to see it through. • Attention to developing a career path for promising people in the areas of technology and program management (and that's going to get tougher now as laws are now in effect that require a person to have filled a joint duty kind of "square" before he can get a star). I assert from a Systems Command standpoint that that is among the subjects that will require real management attention. I disagree with Tom Marsh about why generals are put in charge of programs. In some of the big programs that level of exper ience and ability to interrelate with the outside world is really important. A few words about bureaucracy. Somehow every 25 to 40 years our society reaches a point where the bureaucracy becomes so cumbersome that the only way to really make progress is to throw out the old and start over again. (That's fundamentally what was done in 1954 when General Schriever was chartered to form what was then called the Western Development Division.) I 68 have felt over the last few years that perhaps we're getting close to that point again. Jobs we once did well in 4-6 years take at least twice that long now, and probably cost more for that reason. I hope that the current and upcoming generation can be instrumental in trying to turn around the problems that the bureaucracy has created for us in the R&D and the system acquisition business. There's always the danger of over-institu tionalizing a good process, and that to some extent has happened. Many practices developed in the ballistic missile program got written into regulations and got overdone and it was part of a process that went too far and created problems. We have to be careful about that. It is important for the Air Force to move in a direction that is consistent with the intent of the Packard Commission and to make things work.

Technology and the Future of Air Force R&D

Dr. Gerald P. Dinneen

John, congratulations to you and the members of the Air Force Studies Board on their 25th anniversary. Ladies and gentlemen, it's a pleasure for me to be a part of this celebration. I want to touch on a few technologies that I think will be important to the Air Force R&D and in meeting the Air Force mission requirements over the next several years. But before I do that I want to give you some idea of how I chose those technologies. I'll have to tell you something about my back ground and my experience. Let me begin by just asking the same question with respect to the three careers I've had, and that question is: What one objective, if it had been achieved, would have made the biggest contribution to the R&D enterprise that you were part of at any particular time? (and you ought first to ask that of Lincoln Laboratory, where I spent 25 years) And the answer to that question would be: More effective transfer of technology to industry. More effective because we are effective at Lincoln and we've been effective in the government and 69 industry but I'm asking: what would have made the biggest difference? I'll give you one example of where that transfer could have been more effective. Lincoln Laboratory had a satellite com munications program in the late 1950s and early 1960s. If they could have been more effectively transferred to industry we'd have reduced the time till we got to DSCS II or Fleet Sat Com or any of the other effective programs that we had. If I were to ask that same question about my time in the Pentagon, I would say that we would have been better off if we'd been more effective in moving products from the govern ment laboratories or from industry out into the field. One of my frustrations was to know how much technology there was in the laboratory and in industry that we didn't have in the field. Obviously there are many successes and many of them have been mentioned, but I would agree with Al Flax and say PELS was a frustration. One of my biggest frustrations was something called JTIDS, Joint Tactical Information Data System. The technology was there. We didn't get it into the field. I can tell you horror stories about high frequency systems in Europe that still used vacuum tubes when transistors were common elsewhere in industry. If asked that same question now with respect to my seven years of experience in industry, the answer would be that we must find a more effective way to convert technology into products, not just products that will sell initially, but those that will continue to be competitive in the worldwide market. We've had successes but I think you can point to situations where we've had unnecessary delays in taking that technology (whether it's semiconductor technology or sensor technology or whatever) into products that are competitive not just in the United States, but worldwide. The Japanese certainly have shown us how to take technology wherever it's developed and turn it into competitive products. When I was at Lincoln and when I was in government, we always looked to the Soviet Union. We pointed out what they were doing. Since I've been in industry, I've spent much more time looking at what the Japanese are doing, visiting Japan and seeing what they do and how effective they've been in turning technology into products. 70

With that background, you probably see that there's a certain similarity in the answers that I gave: this business of taking technology and turning it into a weapons system or a product. But technology itself has not been the problem. The problem has been something else. I have to hasten right away to say that if we didn't have the technology, the technology would be the problem. Obviously we need more technology. But we've got to do a better job of converting it into weapons systems and into products. There is now an unacceptable gap between the technology that is now available and its use in our systems and products. Now let me discuss a technology that I think can make a very important difference in the Air Force during the next 10 to 15 years. We've heard about the information age. I think there's a tremendous amount of hype and I'm sometimes as upset as you are by all the discussion of that. But if you take away the hype and reduce the rhetoric maybe by half or even by a tenth, you've still got a very important trend. The Air Force has been dependent since World War II on the collection, processing, storage, and dissemination of informa tion. My first big system was the Sage system. If I describe that as a concept it would look like one of the modern CSI systems of the day. Unfortunately, our concept was a little bit ahead of its time. Technology has now caught up, so a lot of those things we achieved, such as digital transmission, real time displays, real time control, and so on, can now be done much more efficiently. Let me highlight what technologies can do in each of those functions. I'll begin with collection. There's been much talk so far about platforms, so I will not talk about platforms, be they spaceborne or airborne. But if you look at the sensors that we're going to need for better collection, those technologies are here now and are beginning to be used and will be used: very large arrays of sensors, mosaics, new sensors, new IR sensors; the promise of uncooled infrared sensors, and fiber optic sensors, in addition to ring laser gyros and all the others that now exist. After collection we have the problem of processing and here's where the revolution has been fantastic. The develop ments in semiconductors are explosive. However, there has developed over the last several years the ability to design very 71 complicated integrated circuits, the ability to work with com pilers, and with standard cells. Soon we'll be able to build semicustom parts with 200,000 gates. I remember Whirlwind One where a gate was the old flip-flop. Now we're putting 200,000 of those on something the size of my fingernail. Compiler-based standard cells probably can contain 450,000 gates, and for full custom, 500,000 gates. Other things which will make a difference in the future include diamond films and wafer scale integration. Architectures are now available (the 32-bit microprocessors) to do data processing, distributed data processing, and parallel data processing, which give even more leverage to the semiconductor circuits. On storage, the one megabit dynamic RAM is here today, from Fujitsu and Hitachi, but also from Motorola and TI in the U.S., and from Siemans in Europe. Dan Fink said that we're going to have to work technology around the world. The four megabit is not too far behind. I've visited the NTT Laboratory in Atsugi earlier this year where they've already demonstrated in the laboratory a 16- megabit RAM. Optical storage, which we've talked about for years and years, is probably almost here. We'll probably be using compact discs for systems as well. When it comes to dissemination, we focus a great deal on satellite communications and on fiber optic links, but local and wide area networks, which allow people to have access from their PC or their workstation to many other machines, are going to make the biggest difference to industry and to the Air Force. Coupled with that is the importance of working with standards and protocols and open systems so that one can easily access large data bases. I've already mentioned the architectures that allow parallel data processing distribution. The Air Force, if we do this kind of thing, must also worry about security; and with these integrated circuits we can certainly do end-to-end encryp tion to handle that. The security in the computers, which Al Flax mentioned earlier, is now possible from several manufac turers. I will summarize by saying that the two most important technologies that will have an impact are artificial intelligence /- expert systems and semiconductors. Artificial intelligence is a word that goes back a long way and it gives us lots of problems. But I'm really talking about expert systems, and the way they 72 can have an impact on the development of software, and how they can make a significant difference in how we maintain our aircraft and weapons systems. Many expert systems are in use today in industry for maintenance, for helping the repair people ... to teach them. Those systems can clearly have a wide appli cation. We can now develop and use them on small PCs. And the second of those technologies of course is the explosive work in semiconductors. These two go together. There's no way that we could exploit the processing capability in semiconductors if we didn't have expert systems to do the computer-aided design of those circuits, and there's no way we can do the expert systems without the integrated circuits. But the confluence of those two things gives us tremendous oppor tunity. Dan mentioned that we are depending a good deal on technologies being developed in the civilian world. And that's fine. At some point we will have to worry as we did with VHSIC about developing our own. But if we can move to the PCs, LANs, and open systems then we'll be able to upgrade our defense systems. We won't have the situation we had with Sage, or with some of the L-systems, which were unique and for which new technology was very difficult to introduce. I see great opportunity for improving the collection, processing, storage, and dissemination of information, which are going to be a central part of our Air Force systems.

Discussion

McLucas: I can't resist making a dig at Dan Fink, and he'll say "I didn't say it and I didn't mean it." I'm reminded of a line from a Tennessee Williams' play, which said, "My family's been having trouble with foreigners ever since we came to this country." He was talking about the large fraction of our grad uate students that are foreigners and I want to know whether he thinks it's bad that Einstein, Teller, Von Karman, just to mention three, chose to come to the United States and gave us the ben efit of some of their talents. The first thought that occurs to me that they must be attracted to something that is very mag netic here. Dan, you didn't say that was bad, did you? 73

Fink: No, that's very good. The point I was making was expressing a concern that the future Einsteins and the Tellers won't stay here because the other environments will be better. They used to have to come here to earn a living and to get the challenges. They may be able to get that back home.

Korkegi: General Phillips, you were decrying the deteriorated state of cooperation between NASA and the Air Force in R&D and in order to really have effective cooperation it must be encouraged at the highest level. I presume this means the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board, but in fact it happens at the working level. Is the breakdown at the high management level, at the working level, or both?

Phillips: Both. There was a time probably four or five years ago when there was a considered decision made on the NASA side to abandon participation in the AACB structures. The current administration has been trying to get that reestablished. There was a period when the upper level coordinating structure just wasn't working; they weren't meeting. So there is an effort to get that reestablished. I think that's part of what's needed. I've spent time at all the NASA centers over the recent months and I find it very difficult to find what I consider to be an effective working relationship in most any technical area between the NASA technologists and the Air Force. Things are probably going on that I haven't been able to discover, but there was mentioned today a lack of coupling in this biomed area, and that has a history of its own, but that's just one of several. I was talking with one of the individuals who is here today from God- dard who works on robotics and he wasn't aware of interchanges that I think could be effective to both NASA and the Air Force.

Unidentified Speaker: I was wondering whether at the working level we're getting to a point where a lot of the talent that came into Wright-Patterson AFB in the 1950s is retiring. Is new talent feeding in that can provide the elements for cooperation with NASA? 74

Phillips: I would hope so. There is new blood in both organiza tions. I think with the leadership from the top that could again be rebuilt. I'm going to continue to help make that happen.

Mathis: General Phillips, I got heavily involved with NASA on the shuttle. We built a small facility (Vandenberg AFB) on the west coast that we really wanted to build and it cost us about $3 billion. It seems to me that something should be done to enhance NASA-Air Force cooperation if we're going to use that facility.

Phillips: I think a major national strategic error was made when it was decided that the only way anything in this country could get into space was aboard the shuttle. That decision was made ultimately in the White House and I don't recall exactly when. What's going on now bears this conclusion out. The problems that arose from that decision have played a part in the last couple of years right up to now in making a very difficult environment between the two organizations. Some of the dif ficulty had its roots back in that decision period and the fact that the Air Force was placed at a considerable disadvantage. With some strong leadership from Secretary Aldrich the Air Force was able to start buying some expendable launch vehicles again, that was well before the Challenger accident. This move started to correct some of the problems that the shuttle commitment had started. Hopefully, there's enough at stake now in terms of broader national interests that ways may be found for more truly cooperative and mutually supporting efforts.

McLucas: I second what you said about Pete Aldrich. I think that he's probably made as many mistakes as the rest of us secretaries. But on that one I say every night, thank God for Pete Aldrich. Dan?

Fink: A lot of people besides ourselves are concerned about this. I chair the NASA advisory council and just got an agreement with the administrator that I would try to put together a joint panel with the Defense Science Board to address what we can do in the future to improve that situation. 75

Dr. Art Guenther: Jerry, you addressed the comments about the sophistication and miniaturization of semiconductors and the lead being in the industrial commercial sector. In the military, we have to worry about these materials in adverse environments, particularly space-qualified electronics that have to stay in orbit for long durations. Do you see industry playing in that lead? As we go to smaller devices that require smaller signal amplitudes we make ourselves even more vulnerable to new threats such as microwaves.

Dinneen: This business of whether the major contributions are made by the Defense Department or by the commercial world has varied over the years. The first contributions to semiconductors were made by the military and they go back to the Minuteman program. I talk to people in the Defense Department, particu larly in the Air Force, about what they need. They clearly need circuits that can work in that kind of environment - radiation- hardened circuits, and there's work going on as you know in various of the government laboratories, Sandia, in particular, and there's also work going on in many industries, including my own, for circuits which are radiation- hardened. There are many of those ... bipolar ... that can do that. I think the role for industry is to support the Defense Department. The primary objective of the VHSIC program was not radiation-hardening, but was to move the semiconductor field toward satisfying the mil itary requirements; this has had a very positive impact on the field. So there are specific needs in radiation-hardened memories and microprocessors for space and there's a lot of technology now available but that is more costly and will be driven more by defense needs than commercial needs.

Don Thompson: We at Iowa State University are doing a consid erable amount of research for the Air Force in nondestructive evaluation, the development of new techniques to assure struc tural integrity and quality structural materials and components. We've also started a Center for NDE under the auspices of the NSF, the university, and a number of sponsors, largely from the Air Force and the aerospace industry. I had a background with Rockwell before coming to the university, so presumably I know the problems of the industry better. Though we have several 76 sponsors from aerospace who are very perceptive of the overall goals that we've talked about here, which include industrially relevant research related to Air Force needs, the development of new people to take a hold on some of these things, and the transfer of technology to the user, we still find a problem: Industry in this country still has remnants of the "what did you do for me today" attitude which is not consistent with the development of new people. At the same time, we see Japanese and some West German industries waiting in the wings, asking to join the Center to take part in it. We're in a dilemma: we need this kind of support to proceed with our work; on the other hand we do not want to involve ourselves with foreign industry.

Fink: I think that the industries that I deal with are acutely aware of the need to support organizations such as yours. On the other hand, they are pressed by "many worthy causes." I recall from my experience at GE where we had MITs microelec tronics effort, and RPI's effort, etc. At the same time, the profits (and now we talk about the defense industry) are being squeezed very badly, so there are two very antagonistic forces at work here. One is the desire to correct the problems you're talking about. The other is to husband one's resources. I have no solution other than what has to really work, to keep working on industry to make sure they don't lose that long-term sight.

Johnson: I think that's a very key problem because we do have the need to keep operating. How do you keep foreign industry out of the business until this long term concern comes back?

Fink: I'm not sure you can keep the foreign industries out. I'm not even sure you should in some cases.

Lehmann: How ready are the services and how much should the services pick up good technology coming in from industry? Flight simulator got nowhere in the Air Force until the airlines showed what they were doing with flight simulators, then the Air Force picked up on that. Personal computers got nowhere in the Air Force until they came in from industry. There are many other examples in the civil engineering field. What is your assessment of what's to be gained by the Air Force and the 77 other services exploiting existing capabilities of industry in the commercial sector?

Dinneen: Well, I think that's changing. When I was in the Pentagon, there were many times when people came and said "instead of developing your own switches for communications, why not buy one from this or that contractor." And when we reviewed it at that time, the concern always was on the main tenance, availability, continued availability, supply of spare parts, and so forth. As these industries become better established so that there is a solid source and one is not dependent on one manufacturer, then I think we're going to see more use of that. That trend has changed and we are seeing military services taking more advantage of commercially available equipment, particularly in communications.

Phillips: I'd give the Air Force better marks than you have. It's true a lot of people didn't want simulators. Simulators took away from flight hours and the commercial airlines were using them routinely, at least for certain kinds of training. The Air Force did invest in R&D and improvements in simulation, particularly in computer-generated imagery resolution to the point where they're responsible for a great deal of progress in that field, which is now fed back to the commercial airline simulators and into the Air Force. Regarding PCs, until recently large companies really weren't making such great use of them as a huge tool so I'm not sure the Air Force was behind even in that area.

McLucas: Dan may be saying that in large companies bureaucra cies are just as well entrenched as they are in the military.

Unidentified Speaker: How about universities, too?

Unidentified Speaker: General Phillips, in the relations between NASA and the Air Force has any thought been given to the Air Force taking a more active role in launching scientific satellites? NASA has a tremendous backlog of things that have been prom ised and never gone. For many years, the Air Force has had the 78 space test program, which has launched many interesting scien tific satellites, but this bears on training younger people in the technologies of space. There's a real reluctance for young grad uate students and young faculty members to get into these long programs because they'd never get launched. Could you comment on that please?

Phillips: I agree with your last statement that there is a growing reluctance, or at least it's a problem that some of these flight experiments take so long to reach a stage where they fly that there is a problem attracting people to work on them. You mentioned the Air Force's own technology program in which the space test project has over a number of years conducted their own technology program, and it used to be, and I hope it still is well coordinated with NASA. I'm not currently in a position of knowledge to comment on what could be done, if anything, for scientific experiments that have been developed under NASA to get flights on Air Force boosters.

McLucas: Tom Marsh, is Systems Command still bringing in good people to replace those who are leaving? I remember the 1950s not as a time of a superfluity of talent, but looking hard to find anyone with a college degree. Now the typical officer in this business has a Master's degree and I just wonder to what extent the Air Force has difficulty bringing in talent.

Marsh: // is a problem for the Air Force to retain good scien tific and technical talent. It has been a severe problem for about the last 15 years. Perhaps it's improved and I hope it has, but I think the answer is probably not. At various Air Force Systems Command facilities where there are great numbers of bright young lieutenants, there's a big void in the middle grades and a few of the older people. That tells you the inflow is reasonably good, but the retention is not. I think that because of the demographics of the future there is going to be a continuing challenge to be able to hold on to good science and technology youngsters. It is also difficult to challenge many of these bright young people who enjoy hands-on work and have come to expect that when they get in the Systems Command they're going to be 79

involved in a lot of hands-on engineering. But we need them in engineering management positions, and sometimes that's a frustration to the top quality young S&Ts.

Dean Hanink: I have a statement to make regarding NASA and Air Force cooperation. They have been cooperating. After the Titan and shuttle disasters I think you've found great coopera tion. Second, on technology transfer, perhaps the problem is recognizing when it's time to transfer.

Hansen: When I was quite a bit younger there was a philosophy that says, if you want something done in the best way that it can be done, you go find the very best people to do it and you give them the job. It seems to me that other priorities are overtaking that. We're worried about spreading the wealth, contracting in versus contracting out, etc. Are you concerned that some of the evolving national priorities might be prejudicial to the excellence with which we can do research and technology work in the future?

Phillips: It's hurting us right now. I think it has been for some few years. You know there are a number of legislative actions that have a good intent, but the way they get enacted and implemented creates problems. Take competition in contracting. It's hard to argue against competition. Competition is good and, if done in the right way and for the right things, can produce some very good results. But the way legislation has been imposed and implemented is stretching out the contracting process, in many cases almost interminably. My answer is that it's more difficult to do the right things and to attract good people who want to work in some parts of this environment because of these complications. It is hurting us. It's a challenge for all concerned to try to help figure out what can be done to try to turn some of that around.

Fink: I think, Sam, one of the things you talked about was the educational system, the Air Force sponsoring various educational programs. I think there's an area we might look at. We're not going to change the legislation but if we can get more very good people articulating what has to be done and the rational way it 80 should be done, we'd be a lot better off. Perhaps the Air Force should start a program similar to that used to train doctors, whereby people going to medical school are then obligated to stay in service for some number of years. What about a program where you'd have a combined PhD in some science and engineer ing coupled with management or political science? Have those people around to start working the problems and who can make the case in the kind of adversarial situation that they're often placed in.

Unidentified Speaker: Mr. Fink, if you look at the distribution in the Science Indicators that you've mentioned, among PhDs in different fields scientists are averaging about 20 percent, materials science about 18 percent. You go down to the middle level, you find chemical engineering at 6 percent and aerospace at 4.4 percent. Electrical engineering 2.7 percent. Mechanical engineering, which is what I represent, 1.5 percent. We have about a 13 to 1 ratio from one end of that spectrum to the other and I'm suggesting that there's an availability problem, an advocacy problem for a distributed technology base. Universities are not being driven to respond to the manufacturing issue sufficiently to produce the mechanical engineers to deal with that question. Logistics has the same class problem. We have too few mechanical engineers in the universities dealing with that class problem. Can we get this advocacy problem to self-correct that dilemma?

Fink: There's always a lag, but I had the impression that the recognition of the manufacturer and the lack of manufacturing engineering already have been recognized and that several schools have really accented that. And despite the ratios of specialties you quote, my experience is that people are a lot more flexible than their specialties would show. Look at the space program, for example. Nobody was trained in space, yet mechanical engineers, mathematicians, and physicists, all made the transition. If the funds can be provided, the specialties will take care of themselves.

Dinneen: John, could I just add to that? Those of us in R&D in industry now are spending a lot more time worrying about the 81 total R&D picture, not just for new products, but for the whole lifetime of the products, for the manufacturability of the prod ucts. We haven't got the right word. Manufacturing is almost too narrow a term, because you're really looking at the whole life cycle from the design through the engineering development through the manufacturing through the marketing through in- field service. Most of the universities now are beginning programs as Dan mentioned. MIT, Purdue, and Stanford each have one. They and many others are combining engineering with business so that the people coming into industry can have both those backgrounds. So I think it's happening, and I suppose you have to have a crisis to stir people to act. The crisis in our competition with Japan has forced us all to look at that.

Unidentified Speaker: I want to get back to this subject of tech transfer. Jerry, you pointed out that one of the things you wish you'd done better at Lincoln Lab is transfer the technology out of there. That was something that wasn't addressed when you got to your present industrial job. What do you see that needs to be done to make the technology in the federal laboratories more acceptable to industry to make us more competitive when we have these issues of exclusivity and licensing and what not?

Dinneen: You're really raising two questions. The easier one to deal with is the Lincoln Laboratory or the government labora tories into the military environment because that's what the technology is for. And I raise this only because this is some thing that would have made us more effective. Obviously, we transferred a lot of technology. We need closer ties between industry and either the government laboratories or places like Lincoln. What happens otherwise is you finish the job, construct the prototype, demonstrate that the technology works, and then industry comes in and they start all over again because they don't have all the drawings and specifications. The other question you raised, which is the transfer of technology from the laboratories to industry, generally is a much more difficult one because the laboratories are working on technology such as the one you mentioned earlier on radiation hardened circuits and other kinds of things which are designed for military applications. They aren't always well-suited to 82

commercial applications. But there's a lot more that can be done. The "not invented here" syndrome is pervasive in this country throughout industries, universities and in the government. It's a very serious problem and many of us have worked hard to overcome it. But there is something about doing it yourself. People are more motivated by doing their own technology. They don't get rewarded from going outside and finding a technology. We're all searching for ways to motivate engineers and provide some kind of incentive for them to go and find the technology and apply it in their particular case. But it is a very difficult thing to overcome.

Flax: I think we're dancing around the problem a little bit by assuming that there's complete transferability from civilian to military technology. The reason there is not is the very point that Jerry Dinneen just made. Technology in itself is worthless. It's the translation of that technology into a product that counts. There's nothing the military could have done that would have saved the automobile industry from its problems with the Japa nese. The auto industry itself had to do that. So a crisis that is real may have zero impact on military technology. The same thing's true in consumer electronics. It has a very large impact. Nevertheless, if you think about what is involved, there's no military counterpart. In the total product realization sense, to transfer technology you must make a product in the same quantities at the same rates in the same total numbers or you have the embedded technology in a piece of hardware but an entirely different process technology which is needed to make it. So I would ask whether it is not true that military technology will have to ride on its own process base, admittedly with some input from the civilian sector, but it's not going to be trans ferable one way or another a hundred percent. The transfer may be of only limited efficiency, 50 percent, 20 percent; it depends on the technology. I don't think you're going to manufacture a thousand radar sets, which is a big number, the same way we produce a million VCRs.

McLucas: Jerry, I believe that you brushed too lightly over the security issue. It's my impression that there are not very many large-scale LANs in the country, where people of different 83 classifications can have access to the same system, talk to people at their own clearance level, and not get into some sort of a problem. Am I wrong?

Dinneen: No, you're right. I brushed over it too lightly. The only point I was making was that it is conceivable now with the ability to build custom circuits to go to end-to-end encryption. Some systems have that capability, but very large-scale systems do not. And it's a very serious problem.

McLucas: Well, maybe this is an example of what Al was saying, that technology alone is not the answer.

Dinneen: I will point out though, John, that this is a problem that many of us have worked on for a long time and we find it hard to understand why people in the commercial world, whether it be banks or insurance companies or hospitals, aren't more concerned about that same problem. At some point they're going to have to be and at that point we may see the volume of research that will help the problem.

Unidentified Speaker: I don't think this is the question to end on, but both Mr. Fink and Dr. Dinneen brought up the reality that we no longer have a monopoly on cutting edge technology and so now the question is how do we reconcile our desire to cooperate, take advantage of high tech elsewhere, low cost elsewhere with the need to support U.S. industry, for example, in critical areas? You want to comment on that?

Dinneen: Well, that's the critical question. It will be impossible to do that for a very broad area of U.S. industry. You simply cannot close the barriers. I mean technology's going to be developed in other places, we're going to have to have a free flow. If you select a few very critical technologies, then perhaps we can support them. "Industrial policy" is anathema to the United States. We simply don't do it. Japan doesn't do it as much as people believe. But we must recognize that technology is developed throughout the world and we must take advantage of it. For those few critical technologies, particularly for national security, then we can support U.S. industry. We must look more 84 carefully at those technologies in other countries. I set up some of my own people in Japan in the research labs so that I can have access to some of that technology so that the flow can be not just one way as it has been in the past.

Unidentified Speaker: Right now we're in an era where industry thinks that invention is the mother of necessity. We invented it, so by God you need it. But if the Air Force has a mission in mind and it's not applicable to the mission, they tend to forget about it. In a few years we're going into enter an era where the rate of change of what's hanging from the threat tree is going to be so rapid that neither approach is going to be very useful. My question is: Have we already come into an era where the threat tree is changing so fast that it'll affect how you plan to do R&D, or if we get into that era are there plans to handle something where every few months we might be faced with coming up with a new system?

Fink: I think industry is much more sophisticated than you state. And I don't think the threat is changing so rapidly. It's getting much more complex and I think we also in some respects have lagged taking the initiative. If we only react to the threat without looking for our individual opportunities, we are not going to get anywhere. This past summer I participated in a Defense Science Board summer study on non-nuclear strategic applications. Initiatives in the smart weapons business could drive our com petitive posture quite dramatically. So there are a lot of initiatives that could be pushed by technology, perhaps more than driven by the thrust.

McLucas: Before we close this segment, I'd like to ask Tom Cooper to speak.

Tom Cooper: I don't have any prepared remarks. John caught me at the break and said the congressional staffer didn't show up and since I held a position like that a few years ago, would I care to make any remarks. The answer to that is no, I don't have any lengthy remarks but I do have one comment that I'd like to make and that's on the political environment. 85

I think the political environment we're facing is probably as tough as the technical environment. In fact in many ways it's probably tougher. But I don't think it's going to do us much good to complain about it among ourselves. It's not going to change any that I can see. In fact, if anything it's going to get more complex. I think we just have to find a way to work in it. The budgets are going down. There's still an awful lot of money in the budget. In fact, more money than there's ever been if you plot it in real terms. The Air Force budget is about $92 billion. Not too many years ago it was half that amount. We've got more programs in the budget than we can support. I don't think technology has been impacted that much by the political process. It's our own internal doings and where we put our priorities. Over the last five or six years we've been putting our emphasis on big systems. If that's where we want to put our priorities, so be it. On the other hand, if we really are con cerned about technology I think it's an internal matter for us to reprioritize and start putting more emphasis on the technology base. From the last year and a half, to support Forecast II, it's been difficult to get the Air Force budget pumped up in the technology base, not because of Congress or because of the political environment, but because we've got such things as the B-l, and the ATB, the ATF, the AAMRAM, the small ICBM. We can complain about it, but I really don't think it's the political environment that's hitting us there. The solution is - and I think all the speakers have touched on it - good people, a good management system, good organization, and a very clever use of our resources. There's an awful lot of money still in the DoD budget, though not as much as we planned for. The watershed year for Defense was 1985. We requested something like $310 billion and got $295 billion. As I recall in '86 we got $289 and in '87 we got $291, this year it's going to be $292. Congress is telling us something. We probably will not get $300 billion. That's like $1.98. We probably won't break that threshold. So we need to be clever internally. It may involve some restruc turing, drawing the programs down. But I'd like to think we can still build an enormously effective Air Force if we're clever about how we use our resources. 86

Over the last five or six years, there've been some enormous success stories in the Air Force: F-15s, F-16s, and notwithstanding the criticism we've got, B-ls and C-17s coming on line; a magnificent MX missile, if we can get the guidance system to work. The list of success stories over the last decade has been as long as the list in previous decades. I think there's a very bright future ahead. The political process is tough, no doubt about it. You wanted me to comment on congressional staffers, John. There is a lot of criticism about congressional staffers, but the key staffers that work on the committees are probably the best friends the military have. I would urge you, particularly the young guys in the room that are working the Hill, to get to know those people. Try to take this very complex story that we have to tell, simplify it so they can take it to the members, and make the arguments for the systems we want. I can think of very few Air Force systems that we've lost over the last half a dozen years. In fact the one that comes to mind is the T-46, and we killed that one, not the Hill Don't give up. It's much more complex than it was in the past. Some of these things with time will take care of themselves. In some of the legislation the Congress has overreacted, and most of the time when you do get legislation it is overreaction. Give it a few years; perhaps we can roll some of it back. But I think there's a bright future ahead. I'm not pessimistic at all.

McLucas: Thank you, Tom. I don't know if this is an appro priate remark, but you remind me of the salesman trying to sell a farming encyclopedia to a farmer. The farmer says, "I already ain't farming as well as I know how now." I'd like to thank our panel, and I think they've done a great job for us. 87

Meeting the Challenge

General Bernard P. Randolph, Commander, AFSC

McLucas: I don't envy General Randolph his position on the program after a long day. Randy, I mentioned a couple of times things that happened to me in my brief career with the military. One of the first things I was called on to do in 1962, when I came to Washington, was to go over and meet with the President's Science Advisory Committee. The first question I got was, "Sir, do you know when the transistor was invented?" And I said, "Yes, back in the late '40s." They said, "Well, do you know what year this is?" And I said, "Yes, it's 1962." "Well," they asked, " when are you going to start using transistors on airplanes like the TFX?" They thought 14 years was long enough. On the other side, I remember a conversation with Mel Laird in 1969. At that time I was undersecretary and Bob Seamans was out of town, so he got the first guy he could reach and he said, "John, I want you to give me the name of any program you can think of that the Air Force is doing a good job on." Well, we have here the man who is now in charge of these programs. And so we ought to find out from him. General Randolph has been Commander of Systems Command ever since August 1, so by now he must be on top of things. He started out at Xavier University. He got one BS there. He joined the Air Force and then he got another BS and a Masters from the University of North Dakota. He did a couple of tours in the Space Division. He did a Vietnam tour. He's been working his way up through the Systems Command. He was sort of the logical next head of the Systems Command, and lo and behold, he is. So I'd like to introduce him. General Randolph.

General Bernard P. Randolph: Thank you very much. This is kind of an unusual position to be in, right at the tail end and everybody's wondering what's going to happen next. But none theless, I'm going to talk a little bit about the things that concern me. 88

First of all, I'm going to answer a couple of questions because I was very anxious to talk a little bit about those issues that were discussed. As far as retention is concerned, right now we have a 42% retention rate for our engineers and that's not good. We should have at least 60 percent in order to keep our heads above water and the situation, General Marsh, is getting worse, not better. It's been getting worse for the past several years. After we stopped the bonuses, it's been on a downturn. And of course, the Air Force is in a considerable area of concern with pilots, and the pilot retention rate is about 51 percent. So it's much better than engineers. We do have a very serious problem and we're trying to determine what we should do about that. Sam Phillips mentioned competition. I think the Competi tion in Contracting Act is very good. It's one area on which we've worked hard to implement properly. One of the things that we've done is to mandate 120-day source selection cycle. And, by the way, that's working. It's the sort of thing that allows us to get through the competition period rapidly. We have restricted the number of pages that the contractors can give us in response to an RFP, and that does allow us to get through the process a bit more rapidly. Now, the area where we're hurting in that process is the one that we've been talking about this afternoon and that is in the small S&T projects. That is a down side to the Competition in Contracting Act. We've been trying to do exactly what Tom said: to make that fact known to the folks on the Hill and see if we can get some flexibility in the Competition in Contracting Act to make it work better for us. But on balance it has been probably one of the more positive pieces of legislation enacted over the past few years. You've left it up to me to talk about the AFSC challenges of the future. Sometime ago, Abraham Lincoln said we live in the midst of alarms. Anxiety beclouds the future, we expect some new disaster with each newspaper we read. And that's the way it is right now. In fact, one of the things I'll have to say, Tom, that the only thing that's falling faster than the Defense budget is the stock market and the Supreme Court nominees. The Defense budget has gone down about 4 percent and we're going to be hit pretty hard in 1988. We expect $92 billion and that's only if the negotiators reach an agreement this week. If 89

Gramm-Rudman comes in, then we're really going to be in deep trouble. Unfortunately, it's going to affect everybody and I think the negotiators recognize that. Let's talk a little bit about some challenges. We still have some huge problems in the software business. It continues to haunt me on every system that we've got. And I think the nation has just got to come to grips with that. I know we've tried everything, and part of it by the way is bureaucratic. It's the way we do our business. But I'm convinced that we're simply going to have to address software in a business sense, in a manner that's different from the way we do the normal kinds of hardware activities. A more specific challenge is the business of electronic warfare. There was a question about the changing threat. The fact of the matter is that in electronic warfare the threat is indeed changing, is more complex, and that's what the Soviets are doing. They're making the challenges a lot more complex on a regular basis and we just simply cannot keep up. We are con stantly two yards behind all of the action. The real challenge that we face is congressional micro- management. Do you realize that we have not had an appropria tions bill passed on time since 1977? That's 10 years. In the bill that passed in 1985 1,800 separate line items were changed, and the Congress asked for four hundred different studies. Now if that's not micromanagement I don't know what is; and some of those studies were real barnburners, things like lamb products in the commissaries, raising retirement benefits for Philippine scouts, and things like that, which is a gigantic waste of time. But the fact of the matter is, I think micromanagement by Congress is indeed a serious problem. We are going to have to work with the Congress, it is not going to go away, but I just believe that together - we, the Congress and the Defense Depart ment - have got to come to grips with that. Take a look at the Packard commission. We've imple mented many of Packard's recommendations, not all by a long shot. But the things that the Packard commission said about the Congress - zero implementation. Absolutely nothing. I think that's something we've got to work on. Of course the problems that we have right now are not new. As Tom mentioned, they're not going to go away. Legis 90 lative micromanagement seems to increase as the news coverage of the problems increases. Clearly there is a causal effect there. The only problem that I'm not sure of is what's the cause and what's the effect. I think it's a classic example of the second law of thermodynamics - constantly increasing entropy. By the way, Tom, we do not have a problem with the guidance system on the Peacekeeper. The problem is not with the guidance sys tem, the problem is with the production capacity and the ability to produce on schedule. The guidance system works extremely well. On the business of the threat, I believe the threat is getting worse all the time; it is changing rapidly. Right now, just to stay even, NATO must have a three to one advantage in the exchange ratio with our fighters. That's just to stay even. The Soviet tactical air forces over the past decade have grown about 10 percent. Based on projections, by the time we get the ATF fielded, we're going to need a ten to one advantage just to stay even in working against the air threat. On the ground it's just as bad if not worse. If every NATO antitank weapon worked perfectly and every NATO tank got a Warsaw Pact or Soviet tank there'd still be 5,000 Soviet tanks left, so you're talking about some massive numbers. Only in surface combatants are we anywhere close, and of course, John Leyman pushed that very hard. And we outbuild them by about six or seven ships. Of course, these numbers are hard to keep track of. They remind me of the story Lincoln used to tell: somebody asked him how many Confederate soldiers there were and he said there are 12 hundred thousand. And the guy was incredulous. He said 12 hundred thousand? That's amazing! How can that be? Lincoln says, well we have 400 thousand on our side, and every time one of our generals gets beaten, he says the reason he was beaten is because the Confederates had a three to one advantage, so I multiplied three times four and I got twelve. Sometimes I wonder whether our intelligence is any more accurate than that. But the numbers are staggering and I don't believe that we've really come to grips with them. We don't really appreciate their significance. We've forgotten that Lenin always said that quantity has a quality all its own. After a while when you take a look at those numbers, because they're so unbelievable and so far-fetched, we just sink into shock. We 91 disregard the numbers and just hope that we're capable of overcoming whatever they can throw at us. The technology has indeed been eroding and I gather from the discussions that we've had this afternoon you've been talking about that today. There have been some 5,000 (according to our count) Soviet R&D programs that have benefited from the tech nology transfer that we talked about: our technology transferred to them. So they're not too proud to use our technology. They use it all the time and Toshiba just happens to be one of the most infamous incidents. It is in fact a rather widespread prac tice. And I don't think it's ever going to stop. That's the nature of our society and we're not interested in paying the price to stop the technology transfer. So I do think, Jerry, that the right answer is to use the technology that's available. I am concerned about the NIH (not invented here) syn drome. We've got to make good use of whatever technology is available. We have the problem internal to the Air Force as well as within the industry. There's a tendency for one lab not to want to use the inventions of the other one. Now, what are we doing at Systems Command to face those challenges? First of all, / set three goals when I started, and these goals are very simple, but the idea behind the goals was to try to emphasize where the Command should go. There's nothing revolutionary about them, not something that we haven't done in the past. When I said I'm doing these things, it is not meant to be critical of anybody in the past, it's simply saying that we ought to focus our attention on these things. The first one was to recognize that we exist for the using commands. We're there to support them. The using commands know that, we know that, everybody knows that, but every once in a while we've got to say it. We've got to say it over and over again. I want to say that often because in recent years I have noticed that the using commands are developing an attitude that Systems Command is not supportive enough. I happen to believe that's not true, nonetheless, those attitudes appear to be developing. So to stave that off and make sure that everybody understands that we know we're there to support those using commands, we have emphasized that and emphasized it very strongly. I want those program directors to be in frequent, 92 direct, close contact with their user organizations; I insist on it. When the program directors come to brief I ask them: Have you been talking to the using commands and have you worked those problems directly with the using commands? The second thing is acquisition excellence. We are pushing training and education. Right now 70 percent of the young majors just up for promotion have Masters degrees, but inade quate training and education in the area of acquisition. So I doubled the acquisition staff at the systems acquisition school at Brooks AFB and emphasized more training. I've asked the staff folks to go out to the various product divisions and do some of the training out there, not just wait for the students to come to Brooks. The result is that last year we had some 1,700 people complete the short courses. This year we will more than double the number who will go through those short courses, which are in the process of developing and improving the acquisition expertise that our people have. I believe this is important not simply to make sure that our people are well trained, but to make sure they develop the necessary understanding of the problem and the interest levels that I believe helps improve our retention rates. Third: emphasis on technology. It is very difficult to set the Air Force to increase technology funding. Nobody is against technology, but when it comes to putting money where the mouth is, it is tough. Very recently we've been able to get the Air Force to accept the fact that technology should be a corporate investment and should be managed as such. Our goal is to get the S&T budget (6.1, 6.2, and 6.3) up to about 2 percent of the Air Force budget. We are at 1.5 percent now, but we're contin uing to push that. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force has accepted that and that is now part of the Air Force's policy. As the budgets begin to tighten, our salvation is going to be in maintaining that strong S&T base. That's absolutely essential. It's the cornerstone of our defense posture and we simply cannot deviate from it. A discussion I had with one of the junior officers in the headquarters illustrates part of our problem. She told me she was worried about a proposed international cooperative develop ment effort. She was worried not that we might eventually give the technology to the Soviets, but that our Allies might produce 93 the same technology better and more cost effectively than we could. That's a worrisome thing when some of our people begin to think like that, because, as Chekhov said, man is what he believes. I was very disturbed to find out that she was thinking that way. And she's not alone. But as Vince Lombardi said, football is blocking and tackling, and everything else is bunk. At Systems Command the basics that we're concerned with are the user followed by the user followed by the user and that's exactly what we're going to continue to emphasize. It is in the user's interest and to his direct benefit to worry about S&T. We have a one star as the program executive officer for the Systems Command S&T area. There are 13 technical areas and 44 S&T program elements. We've institutionalized Project Forecast. Today about 10 percent of our S&T budget is in the technologies of Project Forecast II and by 1992 that number could increase to as much as 5O percent and we're going to continue to push that. We believe we've created some foun dations in the Command; we hope we are following properly in the footsteps of Generals Schriever, Phillips, Marsh and Skantze in trying to keep Systems Command an active and viable com mand, one that is very much interested in the S&T business. I think we've got a very strong program and I agree with Tom Cooper, the future is bright. It's not going to be easy, but if it were easy, then why would they need us? Thank you very much.

Discussion

Hansen: Randy, I really applaud your emphasis on improving the link between R&D and the users. Is anyone responsible to coor dinate participation in operational exercises by the R&D people, joint activities in the test beds, and assignment of user people to the laboratories?

Randolph: To strengthen that tie we have combined future plans and the technology organization under one deputate, headed by a general officer. We did that to strengthen that link between what the user thinks he needs for the future and what he's 94 asking for. That's really what our planners work on, and the technology that's available to solve those problems. Your second point: how can we get our users more conversant with what we're doing and vice versa. To make that happen we have two programs to send our young people out to the user organizations. First, we send a limited number for a three- year tour with the using organization so that they can get some operational experience. Second, we send them on a short visit, for a week or so, to an operational organization (not a headquarters, I mean a place where people are getting their hands dirty and spend some time with the operational organiza tion). In addition to that, we have the operators come and join our program offices, not as liaison officers but as people who roll up their sleeves and work. We have several fighter pilots in the ATF SPO who are part of the work force, not a liaison force, and we're trying to increase this movement back and forth. Getting people into the operational commands for a three year tour and then back to Systems Command is difficult to implement because of the clamp down on PCS funds, nonetheless we're continuing that. Although today the numbers are small we're going to continue to press that program because I think that has great benefits to both the user and to us in Systems Command.

Fink: Randy, you talked positively about competition. I don't want to speak against competition but I do think the costs are horrendous and getting worse. B&P (Bid and Proposal) is squeezing out IR&D, it's taking a lot of the best talent, it's almost an industry unto itself. You mentioned that you're cutting the time down to 120 days. Are there some other things in process which could help that situation of competitive costs?

Randolph: Well, the point you made about B&P is indeed valid, but that's a bureaucratic thing that I have constantly talked about to the people on the Hill. Tying down the B&P and IR&D levels so tightly contributes to that problem and that's totally unnecessary. Congress should not get all wrapped up in it and should not try to control it. On the other hand, I've seen some positive aspects. For example, we were talking about the man 95 ufacturing business. There is lots of innovation that may allow us to better control costs. That's a big plus. You're right, it's not all plus as I had said, but I think on balance it's a plus. I agree with you that we've got to do something about the B&P. We've got to make sure that we don't overspecify. We are in fact moving more toward functional RFPs as opposed to these detailed specs. That's a culture all unto itself and it's not easy to change that, as you know firsthand.

Korkegi: About the retention rate among engineering people in the Air Force: I think Tom Marsh touched on the gap between the young people coming in and the old timers. What does it take to retain people? Clearly it takes a certain environment. The Air Force clearly needs program managers. It's difficult to convince a young PhD in aeronautics to go into program manage ment and to stay there. Could a program be formed whereby the people coming in spend time as program managers then spend some time at the bench, some kind of a rotation? Or are there other solutions that are likely to entice the right kind of person to come in because that person is truly important to the Air Force? These are the people who assess systems that the Air Force buys. Of course I applaud your desire to double the S&T activity. I think that this is all part of it.

Randolph: The point you're making is very good. And we've been trying to find things that will help us retain the engineers. The engineers that we've talked with tell me they get out for several reasons, and money is not one of them. Clearly money is a player, but it's not up there at the top. They want respon sibility. They want to make sure that there is a future in the business. They want to make sure that they are recognized as doing things that are meaningful. So you're correct. The environment is the key. Some people will always get out because they can make more money outside, but on balance that's not the overriding issue. To cope with that we have been working on creating a more attractive environment. We have a gate system that's very similar to the pilot gate system. It's called the acquisition managers list and the senior acquisition managers list. We have 96 identified things that the officers should do in a professional development. This is how one develops as a professional in this business. And we would hope that engineers and scientists can go to the laboratory, get their hands dirty working on things, get out and use that experience in the acquisition management. When you add all those years together, it turns out that you can reach the point where you're ready to run a program at about the 15-year point (which is not bad) if you're not a flyer. If you're a test pilot it takes you 21 years to do that. If you happen to be a fighter pilot who goes through all the schools that the fighter pilots go through and you go through the rating gates and the acquisition gates, it takes 24 years to reach the point where you can run a program. That's a serious problem. Ours is a flying Air Force and we need some rated people in this business. Right now the rated work force at Systems Command is down to 6 percent of the acquisition work force. That's too small. We need to increase the numbers above that, and we're trying to work that problem with the Air Force per sonnel right now. In addition, we have taken steps to enhance the stature of our program directors to the point that they can recognize that they can get promoted to more senior ranks while they are program directors. For example, they do not have to relinquish the job of program director to become commander of the 4950th in order to get promoted. We hope you'll see the results of that shortly. Program directors can get promoted right where they are because that's the bread and butter of this organization. That not only enhances the environment, but attracts the best people because they obviously are interested in advancing for the future, and I believe this type of environment enhancement will improve our retention. However, having said all that I'm looking for any good ideas I can get. If you have any good ideas, let me know.

Weeks: General Randolph, the Soviets have flown Energia. It's quite a capable machine apparently. The morning paper says that Secretary Weinberger says they now have four million pounds per year capability. Would you mind telling us what you believe is the proper counter to the Soviet Energia? 97

Randolph: I'm not sure "counter" is the right term, but the booster that we're working on is the advanced launch system (ALS), and hopefully we can get our good colleagues from NASA to work that with us. Clearly I believe that's the right way to go, for two reasons: first, the primary objective of the ALS is to routinize launch, to make launch more a checklist item, and make sure we can do it in a less costly way. The goal is to reduce the cost per pound to orbit by an order of magnitude. I'm not so sure we'll reach that but I don't think that's the overriding objective. The objective should be to launch quickly and reliably, because reliable launch is the key to the future, and in fact it's absolutely essential to SDI. If we fail to have that reliable launch capability SDI will never succeed, so we must have that. But it's not only for SDI, it's the sort of thing that I think we need for the space program in general.

Lehmann: You put a lot of emphasis on the user. Sometimes the users are dumb or blind or short-sighted. This morning we were talking about laser guided bombs, which is one of the big success stories among our weapons systems. How do you as Commander of Systems Command advocate to the user things they ought to advocate to the Air Force?

Randolph: I would never call the user dumb or short-sighted. I would say that the user needs education and it's our job to provide that education. I tell our people, "make sure the user really understands what he's asking for and what opportunities are available." And if you're working with the user, it's amazing how he'll listen to you. But if you're working against him, it gets to be a manhood issue. Nobody will listen and then you begin to just argue with each other. Having said that, I recog nize that's not easy, nonetheless that's the objective that we've set for ourselves.

Dinneen: Randy, could you say something about your thoughts on joint development programs with the other services or with NATO allies?

Randolph: Joint development programs have the strength of get ting different views and different ideas into the system. They 98 have the weakness of the bureaucracies that come with any joint program. We're in the midst right now of the Modular standoff weapon and you just cannot believe the level of mail that I'm getting on the source selection authority. Not because anyone is against it - everybody's in favor of it - but because each bureaucracy must be properly satisfied. I believe that it's the way we must continue to do things in the future. We're going to have to simply come to grips with those bureaucracies and recog nize that they exist and that we're going to have to work within them. We have had some good success in working joint programs with the Army. The Navy has a different set of rules and that makes cooperation a bit more difficult. We're trying to work JTIDS right now with the Navy and hopefully, we're going to succeed. But I think joint programs are here to stay.

John E. Short: General Randolph, I'm a retired PO 313 out of Wright- Pat. For many years I made program management my profession. Hearing Al Flax talk about the ones that were good and the further conversations on some that were bad, I had a fair sample of both. At the time of my retirement I was the Senior Program Manager at ASD. As I've listened to the dis cussions today about the impact of efficient, effective profes sional program management on the final successful execution of a program, it occurred to me that perhaps we can help relieve, not solve the situation, but relieve it on selected programs to allow the SES (Senior Executive Service) group of civilians to assume program management responsibilities. Would you comment on that for me, please?

Randolph: I agree with you. I put Bart Barthelmy in charge of the National Aerospace Plane for that very reason, and those of you who know Bart know that he's an SESer and I intend to do that with a couple of other programs. The SES resource is valu able. The civilian population is half of Systems Command, obviously a critical part of the Command, and should be treated accordingly. I intend to make better use of the civil service resources in running the programs, and Bart is the first of several that I intend to appoint.

99

Mathis: Randy, you were just talking about the civil service. Jack Short mentioned having civil service program managers, SES and so forth, and I was wondering whether you had any problems obtaining civil service program managers, drawing them. We talk about the fact that you're retaining 40 percent of the young officer engineers and that money isn't a big factor there. But the Washington Post pointed out here in the last week that the military had very high pay compared to the civil service. I guess I was just curious to hear your thoughts on the subject of the pay differential between the two and how you're doing with the civilians in attracting the right ones.

Randolph: Evidently the GAO did that study, and I looked at the numbers and I find them very difficult to believe. I've asked my people to analyze those numbers and give me some better appre ciation, but I don't think that they're correct. Having said that, we have a mixed bag on retention of civil servants. At Wright- Patterson, for example, our retention rates are excellent, and we get top notch people. In the Boston area, it's darn near impos sible to keep people on board. At Space Division it is impossible. We just can't keep them, not so much because they're not inter ested in working for the government, but because the cost of living is so high that they can't afford it. So in those places money does make a difference. In fact, in Long Island, we have to use military people to stabilize the work force. The civil service folks just will not stay. It's an impossible situation for them. So I do recognize that is part of the problem. To answer the question, we are working the issue of education and training and retention for civil service people just as much as we are for the military side of the house.

Craigie: Randy, 40 years ago, when I had the engineering div ision, which was the forerunner of ASD, I had a real problem dealing with the user in that the user gets two different pictures of the state of the art, one from the contractor who is hungry for a contract, and another from the scientific community. It was a real problem then and you must have some aspect of that problem today, do you not? 100

Randolph: Yes, in fact, it's a very difficult problem. There are those folks who always say that we can do it instantly and it doesn't cost anything and it's going to work perfectly the first time. This kind of propaganda does indeed confuse the user and when we say no you can't get it instantly, and it isn't going to work perfectly all the time, and it's going to cost you some money, then they get a little angry at us because we're talking reality. However, I believe that those people who are responsible in the industry and who recognize that indeed they have to answer for those things in the future are the folks that we should and do work with and we try to explain to our users that there is no magic in this business. It's tough and it's going to continue to be tough. But it's a continuing problem and it's one that we've got to deal with.

Craigie: Right. Now, I don't go back quite as far as Brian O'Brien does because I'm only approaching my 86th birthday in January. But as I listened to a lot of the things that have been said today, I couldn't help but think back to how different they were forty or fifty years ago. For example, on this business of whether a program manager should be a colonel or a general: as a captain at Wright field in 1935 I was the SPO not only for a transport and a trainer, I was the SPO for all trainers and transports. Things were a lot different in those days, of course. The dollars were far fewer and industry was as small as we were. As late as 1937, the aircraft industry had about 3,000 employees, about half of whom worked for Douglas. Industry grew up as we did in the Army Air Corps, and it really wasn't too strange that as a captain I would be the point of contact with industry on all matters dealing with transports and trainers. On the business of prototype competition, again things were much much simpler back in the '30s. We put out a circular proposal with the desired specifications and a method of evalua tion which indicated the relative value we put on various per formance points, and in about a year the bids would be opened. In the meantime, the contractor had to build an airplane. He provided what was known as the physical article, along with his bid. In the late 1930s airplanes began to get too expensive so that was changed; but things were a little different then, a little simpler. We had the competition and we awarded a contract to 101 the winner. Then the competitive prototype system developed. When General Brown was Commander of AFSC, I called on him one day (he'd been there about a year then) and the subject came up. He said that he'd had a small group study all of the contracts that had been let over the last two or three years. Every single one of them was let for a price lower than the Systems Command's "should cost" estimate, and I think there's something wrong with that. The industry isn't going broke, but I've never felt happy about that feature of the competitive prototype system where the government, trying to get more for the taxpayer's dollar, pits one contractor against the other in what is sometimes a very unethical manner. The government forces a concession from a contractor, and the contractor knows it can't possibly comply. Well, they try to do it, because their competitor has already agreed to.

Cooper: I just wanted to make a comment on Bob Mathis' ques tion. I think Bob asked a very profound question about the civilians and, Randy, I think you gave a good answer as far as the Command is concerned. The Packard commission report would place civilians more in the day-to-day management role of DoD acquisitions. With pay caps where they are and the legis lation that we have making government service a disincentive, we're not going to get the middle management talent that we need to carry this off as Packard intended. I am not talking about the assistant secretaries or the Secretary of the Air Force. We can get people like that to come in. But we can't get the people below that level who are supposed to replace the generals and colonels now on the Air Staff and who occupy those day-to day management positions in the Pentagon. There is also the legal specter hanging over people's heads that if they come in and work in the government for a year, in fact for a day, they might not be able to go back to the industry from which they came. Ladies and gentlemen, that is a real problem, and not withstanding what I said earlier about having to work our way through this complex maze, we must do something about it. Whether you like Packard or not, it's not an issue of whether it's right or wrong, it is. And I don't see the Hill changing that legislation. I can tell you we completely changed deck chairs on the ship over the last six or eight months. It was painful to me. 102

It was painful to General Randolph. It was painful to General Skantze. But it's there and if we're going to make it work, not only do we have to get the qualified military, but we must attract qualified civilians. I think Randy, you and the others, in the blue suit have done a magnificent job, and I don't say that lightly, in managing the military work force and in fact the civilian work force in the field. But I think it's bordering on a crisis where we are right now. To get that 35-40 year-old middle manager out of industry that's had a train wreck or two and can recognize a train wreck when he sees it coming, to come into the Pentagon and help us manage this business that we have is tough. We need that talent and I don't think we're able to get the talent in the numbers we need today. That is something we really have to work if we're going to maintain this mag nificent Air Force.

McLucas: Thank you. Well as we're coming to the end of this day I'm impressed with the amount of talent we have in terms of experience in Air Force R&D and I'm reminded of a comment that was made when Isaac Newton was asked, "How could you accomplish so much in one lifetime?" He said, "I stood on the shoulders of giants." I think we're in this position right now. We have a good man in charge of the Systems Command and he's going to be able to stand on the shoulders of those here today. I estimate there's about 3,000 man-years of talent right here in this room, and I know he's got a lot of other talent that he can draw on. As head of the Studies Board, I'm looking forward to General Randolph's tour at the Systems Command. And I hope that we can be useful to him as he carries this off. 103

Dinner

Presentation of Medals

To General Bernard A. Schriever:

McLucas: Ladies and Gentlemen, since Bennie has already received every possible medal from the military side, we thought it would be appropriate to give him the seal of the National Academy of Sciences, properly inscribed. So that's what I have here. On the back it says: "Presented to Bernard A. Schriever for Extraordinary Leadership in the Advancement of Science for National Defense, 1962-1987." Congratulations, Bennie.

Schriever: I accept this with humility. And I have only one thing to say. I'm very happy that this thing that we started very small has grown and has become the important element in maintaining the kind of scientific and military relationships that General Hap Arnold and General Eisenhower envisioned after World War II. I think we have carried on the tradition of main taining that close relationship with the scientific community which started in World War II. Thank you very much.

To Dr. Brian O'Brien, Sr.:

McLucas: Now if Brian O'Brien, Jr. would come forward. Since Brian, Sr. isn't with us, his son will accept on his behalf. This medal is inscribed as follows: "Presented to Brian O'Brien, founder and leader, Air Force Studies Board, 1962-1987."

Brian O'Brien, Jr.: On behalf of my father I wish to thank you very much. I know he will be surprised and greatly pleased by this. I also know that he will wish to share the honor with all of you who have worked so hard to make this important enter prise the success that it has been. Thank you again. 104

Dinner Address

Dr. John J. Welch, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisitions

McLucas: To celebrate the founding of the Air Force Studies Board, I think we have a very appropriate speaker. We've had a full day of appropriate speakers, and so tonight we would like to present something unique, namely the first speech that this man has given since he took office. Jack Welch is the new Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisitions. It used to be called R&D and things like that, but presumably acquisitions includes all that in the new formulation. He started his duties here just last month. In addition to being the Assistant Secretary for Acquis itions, he's chairman of the F-16 Multinational Fighter Program steering committee, and senior delegate to the NATO Advisory Group for Aerospace R&D. Jack has had a long and successful career. He started at MIT. I won't say how long ago because he looks much younger. He joined Chance Vought in Dallas and he was on various air craft and missile programs. He worked in flight tests, missile operations, ASW, and development. In 1965 he became an LTV vice president, in charge of all space defense programs. So, in 1969 he came for a tour as Air Force chief scientist. After that tour he went back to LTV and continued to do well in that organization. He served on the Defense Science Board, the Army Science Board, the Naval Studies Board, the SAB, and the DAGs. So we have here one more guy who's very well-qualified to serve the Air Force in his new capacity, and I'm very happy and pleased and proud to introduce Jack Welch.

The Honorable John J. Welch: It really is a pleasure to be here tonight. This is a good opportunity to congratulate the people who have been involved over the 25 years that this organization has made a significant contribution. It's appropriate to talk about some of the changes that we see happening, about some of the challenges that appear from a couple of weeks' perspective on this job, and also to sincerely ask the people who have par ticipated so meaningfully, and in a rather dedicated fashion, in 105 the Air Force Studies Board over the years, for your ideas as we head into the future. Many of you are as close to the changes as we who are trying to look at it on a full-time basis. I would encourage the people here to share some of their experience. People say that what goes around comes around. Thus, I can't imagine we're going to invent something that hasn't been tried before, but hopefully we'll approach it a bit more positively. That's a sincere request, and I would appreciate very much hearing how we might provide some of the focus, because we're going to see a period of decreasing budgets. That's not new, and we've faced up to that in the past. However, times have changed. We can talk a little bit about the merits of legislation and regulation. We can also talk about the ability to try to make a contribution in government and then try to go out and make an honest living. But this opportunity is no longer open to many people, and this policy makes it very difficult to attract competent people. These things come at a time of great change in attitudes toward defense, great change in the technical community and in the academic community. All the people that I have seen during the short time that I have been in the Pentagon have impressed me by what they value. The relationship of science and technol ogy to the present and future of the Air Force is alive and well. It's been husbanded over the last 40 years of the Air Force. The foundations are there and they need to be not only protected, but emphasized more strongly. Hopefully, as we put some of the organizational changes in place we want to recognize science and technology as an equal participant with the mission, to give it the attention that it deserves. General Randolph, in one of his first announcements after taking over Systems Command, emphasized that the future of the Air Force lies in science and technology. One could spend a long time debating whether we needed legislation or not, but we have it. And it has changed many things not only operationally, but culturally. Where almost everybody in this room knew a DCS R&D, there is no more DCS R&D; but there is an opportunity to have one community working together to support the kinds of things that one needs to prepare for and to actually perform in the acquisition area. And perhaps that's a plus. We can get everybody in one place working together to one focus. 106

The Air Force recognized early that acquisition is a career field, both military and civilian, and that those folks need to be recognized. We must preserve that acquisition career field and its ability to carry on into the future, and to provide the career path right to the very top of the Air Force. Perhaps that is what sets it aside from the other two military services - the recognition of excellence in acquisition and all the things that used to be research, development, and logistics. It's terribly important to preserve, and we're trying to be very careful not just to preserve that but to encourage it. As younger people come into the system, there is a middle man agement gap. That gap is not much different in industry. In some instances, there have been few opportunities for younger people to train and to get some of the experiences that others had before. That must now be augmented and I think the value of formal acquisition training is becoming recognized. But we do have a challenge! Is the management of science and technology meant to be centralized? Can it even be central ized in order to bring the right kind of activity, the right kind of product, the right kind of support systems into place? You know, I really don't think so. I don't think people meant it to be that way. We see emphasis on the word management rather than oversight and support and participation. Here's another opportunity for a challenge. The programs that have been put in place since the 1960s have created prod ucts with very long lives. It's easier to talk about the airplanes, but it's applicable to some other things too: long life airframes, that are going to be around for a while; the opportunity to grow engines; the opportunity to substitute systems. We must find better ways to insert those kinds of technologies and those kinds of performances into the newer systems. We are finding the front-end process is not only expensive but time consuming. We must assure that opportunity is there. In a conversation at the dinner table tonight, the word micromanage came up. Perhaps one shouldn't use that word. It suggests some kind of management, and it really isn't. Defense appropriations legislation is becoming a growth industry with probably more potential impact, both short and long term, by short words and phrases that are inserted in terms that become direction. This is not to suggest that the contribution by many 107 of the study groups isn't a positive one, but it seems very strange to see Congress sit there and decide which group ought to do a study. Should the Defense Science Board do a study, should the SAB do a study? You know, pretty soon we can look forward to line items for each of those groups. I don't think that's wise. I think it is dangerous because it takes away some of the resources that have been so significant, such as this group - the ability to ask some people to share their experiences as plans are put together and to contribute to plans and put them into place. We must husband those resources because the past tells us that they're terribly valuable. The connection in the academic community has grown since even before the Air Force in name today was born, and it served everybody well. With the new legislation, General Monahan and I are now roommates, so to speak, and I think there's a very great plus there. If we tap civilians and officers responsible for Air Force R&D, we can communicate better, and use all the various resources that were somewhat separate. Then I think we can take from the major commanders their inputs in the form of their needs, and convert them much more specifically into characteristics and tasks to be done. Those tasks can in turn be examined by the Systems Command for the development and application of technologies to potential operational capabilities. The coming of some of the more automated systems, such as CAD/CAM, provides a data base that can carry through from day one of design, out into the logistics community. This is a very great challenge, the results of which we'll see in the early part of the 1990s in an automated logistics system. The logistics management system is very real, very necessary, and is being well supported. It closes that loop between putting out a prod uct and supporting it. Automated training approaches, some of the technology items that came out of the Forecast studies, are real and are being considered. There is another arena of challenges and that is with our emphasis on the word joint. Anybody in this room who's partici pated in a joint program recognizes that it provides a few addi tional challenges and opportunities. In today's environment, the international coupling is very real, not that it was absent in the past. If you look at the policy statements and some of the implementations of the policy statements, it's almost like a 108 preflight checklist. You've got to dutifully check off each of these things, and it's putting a heavy load on the front end of the process. In the past year the ability to couple the acquisition community with the PPBS process and the Defense Resources Board has been sorted out some, but again, the acquisition community is feeling its way at that process. You can't have two boards of directors. This government doesn't have a shadow cabinet ability and doesn't need it. I think that how well we solve those things as they come to bear will be a measure of how we have taken advantage of the pluses that have been given to us. You know, to come back to the Pentagon after having been out for quite some period of time, it's rather exciting to see what people have taken a hold of and how they have applied them. Whether you're talking about the basic phenomenology where there's much more attention or whether it be applied in the lethality or the survivability area, the foundations in the laboratories that have served people well over the years are picking up their focus and continuing that kind of activity. Some of the things that didn't quite make it over the hurdles are still waiting. But again, people can focus. For example, a lot of people in this room have talked about a desire to have an oppor tunity to start R&D in hypervelocity technology. I can't believe you all went through the day without talking about NASP at some point. It's a program to be supported. It's important and it does in fact offer a potential leap ahead. It also offers a very big gathering point for recognizing that if you don't pay atten tion pretty soon you're behind in facilities, you're behind in tech base, and you're behind in all the methodologies where you want to apply these talents; and it's very expensive to catch up. But catch up the plan is to be and it will be supported assuming again that we can sort out all these activities. That's a rather rambling kind of description of the situ ation, but I thought it was perhaps a better closing to point out all of the things that are left to be done. I think sometimes in these meetings people have a tendency to feature (and rightly so) the good things that have been done, particularly by a group like the Air Force Studies Board here. But as you go around to the universities and talk to the graduate students, they always have 109 this fear that everything's been invented, everything's been applied, that the materials guys are all dried up, there's no more room for the chemists, and all that. I'd like to assure people that there is more than sufficient room for those folks to get in and stay in an active program. We would look forward sincerely to hearing about those things that might have failed in the past. But again we wish to look more to those things that in fact worked for each of you here when you served in the government. The likelihood is that we can put those in place very quickly and understand them. It's not necessarily that we want to do some thing different, but rather just to make it right. We'd like to see if we can continue to save those things that were important and work with the new things that give us an opportunity. Again, congratulations on your day here and your 25 years of great service. Thank you.

Closing Remarks

McLucas: Thank you Jack, we hope you have another good tour with the Air Force. I said earlier today that many of us were fortunate to be able to stand on the shoulders of giants. Certainly your predecessors in that job are men who have achieved a high degree of respect because of their talent and accomplishments, so you are following in a good tradition. The Air Force is 40 years old. We're a young service, but during that time we have accumulated many proud traditions. I'd like to see this symposium every 25 years as another tradition. Well, we've had many good presentations and a good audience. I think we've had a good celebration. I'd like to close with this thought. One of my favorite Bible passages is: Without vision the people perish. Many of you remember a young boy growing up in Massachusetts. He climbed the cherry tree in his back yard and the other kids in the neighborhood climbed up their trees, but all they saw was a cherry tree and a small distance out from their homes. Robert Goddard climbed that tree and he said, "you know 110 if I could just get off up into space, what a wonderful view of the world I would get." There was a man with vision, and he converted that vision into a new method of locomotion. And we went into space because of his vision. That's what we need and we're counting on the people in this room to help us achieve that kind of vision. Our day is over. Thank you all for coming. 1ll

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMISSION ON ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SYSTEMS

Air Force Studies Board Symposium on Air Force Research & Development 16 November 1987

Agenda

1000 Welcome Dr. Frank Press President, NAS

1005 Opening Remarks Dr. John McLucas Chairman, AFSB

1020 Reflections of the Dr. Brian O'Brien Original Chairman

1030 AFSC, A Historical General Schriever, Perspective USAF Ret.

1100 Discussion Chairman McLucas, Moderator

1115 Break

1130 The Ones That Didn't Fly Dr. Al Flax, Home Secretary, NAE

1200 Discussion Chairman McLucas

1215 Break

1230 Lunch

1330 The Winners and Why General Marsh, USAF Retired 112

1400 Discussion Chairman McLucas

1415 Forecast I & II General Skantze

1500 Discussion Chairman McLucas

1515 Break

1530 The Future of Air Force R&D Panel of Three:

General Phillips, USAF Retired, Former AFSC Commander

Dr. Gerald P. Dinneen, VP Science and Technology, Honeywell

Mr. Daniel J. Fink President, D. J. Fink Associates

1700 Meeting the Challenge General Randolph, Commander, AFSC

1730 Discussion/Closing Remarks Chairman McLucas

1800 Social Period

1900 Dinner

1945 Dinner Address Hon. John J. Welch, Jr. Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisitions) 113

Board and Committee Members/Liaisons 1962-1987

Major General Jesse M. Allen (USAF Retired) JMA Associates, 11826 Blue Spruce Drive, Reston, VA 22091 Committee on Tactical Battle Management

Dr. John L. Allen President, John L. Allen Associates, 1901 N. Fort Myer Drive, Suite 1120, Arlington, VA 22209 Board Member; Committee on Aircraft and Engine Development Testing

Dr. Carroll Alley University of Maryland, Physics Department, Room 2121, College Park, MD 20742 Optical Masers Panel

Dr. Sigmund J. Amster AT&T Bell Laboratories, Crawfords Corner Road, Room 2 K 502, Holmdel, NJ 07733 Panel on Fuel Control Systems

Mr. John Atwood Perkin Elmer Corporation, 761 Main Avenue, Norwalk, CT 06859-0072 Subpanel on Optics

Dr. Peter L. Auer Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, 224 Upson Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853 Plasma Physics Panel

Mr. David K. Barton 180 Prospect Hill Road, Harvard, MA 01451 Panel on Electromagnetic Propagation 114

Mr. Gordon Bate Optimization Technology, Inc., 175 East Magnolia Avenue, Auburn, AL 36830 Committee on Fault Isolation

Dr. Richard H. Battin Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Mail Stop 4A, 555 Technology Square, Cambridge, MA 02139 Board Member

Dr. Everet H. Beckner Sandia National Laboratories, Division 5000, P. O. Box 5800, Albuquerque, NM 87185 Board Member

Dr. George A. Bekey Professor and Chairman, Computer Science Department, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0782 Committee on Advanced Robotics

Dr. Arden L. Bement, Jr. Vice President of Technical Resources, TRW, Inc., 1900 Richmond Road, 4-W, Cleveland, OH 44124 Committee on Net Shape Technology

Mr. John Berbert Code 634, NASA - Goddard, Greenbelt, MD 20771 Panel on Electromagnetic Propagation

Dr. Herbert L. Berk Institute of Fusion, The University of Texas at Austin, Robert Lee Moore Hall, Austin, TX 78712-1081 Committee on Advanced Fusion Power

Dr. Charles A. Berry 10777 Westheimer Road, Suite 935, Houston, TX 77042 Board Member 115

Dr. Robert F. Bestgen Director, Aerospace Technology, Battelle Columbus Laboratory, 505 King Avenue, Columbus, OH 43201-2693 Committee on Hypersonic Technology

Mr. Richard A. Billings SC/CNSI, Los Angeles Air Force Station, P. O. Box 92960, Los Angeles, CA 90009 Committee on Optical Data Collection

Dr. David Bixler Department of Energy, Office of Fusion Energy, DP-231, C-407, GTN, Washington, DC 20545 Committee on Advanced Fusion Power

Mr. Barry W. Boehm TRW, R2, Room 2086, One Space Park, Redondo Beach, CA 90275 Committee on Methods for Improving Software Quality

Mr. Seymour M. Bogdonoff Professor, Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineer ing, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540 Committee on Hypersonic Technology

Mr. David A. Bonyun Manager, Research and Development, I. P. Sharp Associates, Limited, 265 Carling Avenue, Suite 600, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1S2E1 Committee on Multilevel Data Management Security

Professor Henry G. Booker Department of Applied Physics and Information Science, C-104, University of California - San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093 Engineering Panel on the PAVE PAWS Radar System

Mr. Francis Boulger 1816 Harwitch Road, Columbus, OH 43221 Committee on Net Shape Technology 116

Professor H. Kent Bo wen Ford Professor of Engineering, Building 12-011, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 Committee on Net Shape Technology

Mr. Martin Burg Composite Market Reports, Inc., 7670 Opportunity Road, Suite 250, San Diego, CA 92111-2222 Panel on Future Composite Manufacturing Technology

Dr. Ronald D. Butler AFWAL/POSH, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433 Committee on Fault Isolation

Mr. John Buzawa Trapel Incorporated, 60 O'Connor Avenue, Fairport, NY 14450 Subpanel on Optics

Mr. Dan L. Cain Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 301-360, 4800 Oak Grove, Pasadena, CA 91109 Panel on Tracking Data Analysis

Dr. Ali B. Cambel CMEE Department, 801 22nd Street, N. W., Suite T-703, Washington, DC 20052 Panel on Magnetohydrodynamics

Mr. Norman Caplan National Science Foundation, 1800 G Street, NW, Room 1238-A, Washington, DC 20550 Committee on Advanced Robotics

Dr. David C. Cartwright E-527, Los Alamos National Laboratory, P. O. Box 1663, Los Alamos, NM 87545 Committee on Advanced Fusion Power 117

Mr. Richard P. Case IBM Research Center, 500 Columbus Avenue - 2B35, Thornwood, NY 10594 Committee on Operational Software Management and Develop ment

Dr. Dean R. Chapman Professor, Departments of Aeronautics/ Astronautics, and Mechanical Engineering, Durand Building, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 Committee on Hypersonic Technology

Dr. Randall A. Chapman Department of Nuclear Engineering, University of Illinois, 214 Nuclear Engineering Laboratory, 103 South Goodwin Avenue, Urbana, IL 61801-2984 Committee on Advanced Fusion Power

Captain Brian E. Chappel BMO/MYEP, Norton AFB, CA 92409-6468 Committee on Optical Data Collection

Dr. Robert F. Christy Professor of Physics, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125 Committee on Advanced Fusion Power

Dr. Marvin S. Cohen Decision Science Consortium, 7700 Leesburg Pike, Suite 421, Falls Church, VA 22043 Committee on Tactical Battle Management

Mr. John Coleman 3010 N. Florida Street, Arlington, VA 22205 Co-Founder

Mr. John Cornell WSMC/ENI, Vandenberg AFB, CA 93437-6021 Committee on Optical Data Collection 118

Dr. James Cornie Department of Metallurgy, Room 8-401, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 Panel on Future Composite Manufacturing Technology

Mr. Eugene G. Crossland Manager, Plans & Modernization, Materials & Manufacturing Technology, Boeing Advanced Systems Company, Mail Stop 3305, P. O. Box 3707, Seattle, WA 98124-2207 Panel on Future Composite Manufacturing Technology

Dr. Frank Crossman Manager, Materials Engineering, Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Palo Alto Research Labs, Dept. 930-30, Bldg. 204, 3251 Hanover Street, Palo Alto, CA 94304 Panel on Future Composite Manufacturing Technology

Professor C. C. Cutler Stanford University, Ginzton Laboratory, Stanford, CA 94305 Engineering Panel on the PAVE PAWS Radar System

Mr. Gary J. Dau 3412 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94304 Panel on Nondestructive Inspection

Mr. Julian Davidson Vice President, Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Inc., 4330 East-West Highway, Bethesda, MD 20814 Chairman Emeritus

Dr. Donald E. Davis 350 Siesta Avenue, Thousand Oaks, CA 11360 Committee on Advanced Robotics

Dr. John W. Davis Vice President and General Manager AEDC Division, Calspan, Arnold Air Force Base, Tullahoma, TN 37388 Committee on Aircraft and Engine Development Testing 119

Dr. Josephine D. Davis Dean, Graduate School, Albany State College, P. O. Box 3, Albany, GA 31705 Board Member; Committee on Tactical Battle Management

Dr. Stephen Dean Fusion Power Associates, 2 Professional Drive, Suite 249, Gaithersburg, MD 20879 Committee on Advanced Fusion Power

Mr. William P. Delaney MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Room A 175, P. O. Box 73, Lexington, MA 02173-0073 Board Member

Professor Dorothy C. Denning Computer Science Laboratory, SRI International, 333 Ravens- wood Avenue, Menlo Park, CA 94025 Committee on Multilevel Data Management Security

Mr. Dennis D. Doe Vice President, Software Products Transfer, 1880 Campus Commons Drive, Reston, VA 22091 Board Member

Mr. Paul R. Drouilhet Assistant Director, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, P. O. Box 73, Lexington, MA 02173 Board Member; Committee on Tactical Battle Management

Dr. Lee C. Eagleton 445 Crickewood Drive, State College, PA 16801 Board Member

Dr. Margaret A. Eastwood Vice President and General Manager, Cimcorp Inc., 615 N. Enterprise Street, Aurora, IL 60507-2032 Committee on Advanced Robotics 120

Dr. Seymour Edelberg MIT Lincoln Laboratory - KB 200, P. O. Box 73, Lexington, MA 02173-0073 Committee on Optical Data Collection

Professor Ward D. Edwards Social Sciences Research Institute, University of Southern California, University Park, Los Angeles, CA 90089-1111 Committee on Tactical Battle Management

Mr. Joseph F. Engelberger Chairman, Transitions Research Corporation, 15 Durant Avenue, Bethel, CT 06801 Committee on Advanced Robotics Mr. Gordon R. England VP Research & Engineering, Mail Zone 424-01-07, General Dynamics Corporation, Land Systems Division, P. O. Box 1901, Warren, MI 48090 Committee on Fault Isolation

Dr. John M. Evans President, Transitions Research Corporation, 15 Durant Avenue, Bethel CT 06801 Committee on Advanced Robotics

General William J. Evans (USAF Retired) Vice President, United Technologies Corporation, United Technologies Building, Hartford, CT 06101 Committee on Tactical Battle Management

Mr. Robert R. Everett President, The MITRE Corporation, Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 CETS Liaison

Dr. Charles F. Fanning 197 Park Avenue, Bridge water, MA 02324 Committee on Fault Isolation 121

Craig L. Fischer, M.D. 47-001 Monroe Street, Suite 104, Indio, CA 92201 Board Member

Dr. Richard G. Folsom 585 Oakville Crossroad, Napa, CA 94558 Board Member; Panel on Laser Mirror Reliability

Mr. T. K. Fowler Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, L-640, P. O. Box 808, Liver- more, CA 94550 Plasma Physics Panel

Mr. Robert P. Frankenthal AT&T Bell Laboratories, Room 1D352, 600 Mountain Avenue, Murray Hill, NJ 07974 Panel on Laser Mirror Reliability

Dr. Donald C. Fraser Vice President, Technical Operations, Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, MS 02, 555 Technology Square, Cambridge, MA 02139 Committee on Hypersonic Technology

Dr. William Frederick OSD/SDIO/SN, Assistant Director, Sensor Technology, The Pentagon, Room 1E 168, Washington, DC 20301-7100 Committee on Optical Data Collection

Dr. Allen Fuhs 25932 Carmel Knolls Drive, Carmel, CA 93921 Propulsion Panel

Dr. John K. Gait Bell Telephone Laboratories, Mountain Avenue, Murray Hill, NJ 07974 Plume Emissions Panel 122

Dr. Om P. Gandhi Department of Electrical and Bioengineering, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 Engineering Panel on the PAVE PAWS Radar System

Dr. Lester A. Gerhardt Chairman, Electrical, Computer, and Systems Engineering Department, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY 12180 Committee on Advanced Robotics

Dr. M. Gottlieb 14 Mershon Drive, Princeton, NJ 08540 Plasma Physics Panel

Dr. R. Earl Good Director, Optical Physics Division, AFGL/OP, Hanscom AFB, MA 01731 Committee on Optical Data Collection Dr. Roy Gould Department of Engineering 128-95, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125 Plasma Physics Panel

Mr. Gary M. Grann Technical Director, ESD/XR, Hanscom Air Force Base, MA 01731 Committee on Tactical Battle Management

Dr. Nicholas J. Grant Professor, Department of Materials Science and Engineering, Room 8-407, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 Committee on Hypersonic Technology

Dr. C. Cordell Green Director, Kestrel Institute, 1801 Page Mill Road, Palo Alto, CA 94304 Board Member 123

Captain Kirk E. Hackett AFWL/AWPP, Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-6008 Committee on Advanced Fusion Power

Mr. Richard Hadcock Director of Advanced Development, Grumman Aerospace Corporation, Mail Stop B 28/25, Bethpage, NY 11714 Panel on Future Composite Manufacturing Technology

Mr. Ronald D. Haggarty Chief Engineer, MITRE Corporation, Mail Stop A 235, Burling ton Road, Bedford, MA 01730 Committee on Fault Isolation

Dr. John C. Hancock Executive Vice President, Corporation of Development and Technology, United Telecommunications Inc., Box 11315, Kansas City, MO 64112 Committee on Multilevel Data Management Security

Mr. Dean K. Hanink 145 Maple Crest Drive, Carmel, IN 46032 Committee on Net Shape Technology

Dr. Grant L. Hansen 10737 Fuerte Drive, La Mesa, CA 92041 Board Member; Committee on Tactical Battle Management; Panel on Strategic Mobile Target Detection

Dr. Donald W. Hanson RADC/OCSP, Griff iss AFB, NY 13441-5700 Committee on Optical Data Collection

Dr. William J. Harris, Jr. Department of Civil Engineering, Texas A & M University, 517 D, Blocker Building, College Station, TX 77843 Panel on Nondestructive Inspection 124

Dr. Fred Hawthorne Department of Chemistry, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90024 Plume Emissions Panel

LtGen Richard C. Henry (USAF Retired) 81 Angelo Walk, Long Beach, CA 90803 Committee on Hypersonic Technology

Dr. Philip D. Henshaw Division Manager, Sensor Technology Division, SPARTA, Inc., 21 Worthen Road, Lexington, MA 02173 Committee on Optical Data Collection

Mr. William C. Hittinger 149 Bellevue Avenue, Summit, NJ 07901 Board Member

Dr. Nathan J. Hoffman Rockwell International, ETEC, P. O. Box 1449, Canoga Park, CA 91304 Committee on Advanced Fusion Power

Dr. Robert E. Hopkins 49 Reservoir Avenue, Rochester, NY 14620 Panel on Cloudcroft Surveillance Site and Optical Science Laboratory

Mr. Richard E. Horner 1581 Via Entrada Del Lago, Lake San Marcos, CA 92069-5262 Board Member

Mr. Dean Howard Code 5330, Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC 20375 Panel on Electromagnetic Propagation

Mr. Benjamin Huberman Vice President, The Consultants International Group, 1616 H Street, N. W., Suite 400, Washington, D. C. 20006 Board Member; Committee on Optical Data Collection; Commit tee on Technology Assessment 125

Dr. Erich P. Ippen Professor of Electrical Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 Board Member, Committee on Optical Data Collection

Dr. Ira David Jacobson Director, Center for Computer Aided Engineering, Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22901 Committee on Advanced Robotics

Dr. Robert I. Jaffee Electric Power Research Institute, 3412 Nillview Avenue, P. O. Box 10412, Palo Alto, CA 94304 Panel on Magnetohydrodynamics

Mr. Robert L. Johnson 5304 West 62d Street, Edina, MN 55436 Panel on Fuel Control Systems

Dr. William Johnson Search Technology, Inc., 5550A Peachtree Parkway, Suite 500, Technology Park/Summit, Norcross, GA 30092 Committee on Fault Isolation

Mr. Joseph Kaplan Physics Department, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90032 Committee on Atmospheric Sciences Mr. Richard W. Karman RADC/OCSP, Griff iss AFB, NY 13441 Committee on Optical Data Collection

Ms. Iris M. Kameny The Rand Corporation, 1700 Main Street, P. O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90406-2138 Committees on Tactical Battle Management, Technology Assessment 126

Dr. Jack L. Kerrebrock Associate Dean of Engineering, Room 1-206, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 Committees on Hypersonic Technology, Aircraft and Engine Development Testing

Mr. Frank Stevens Kirkham Mail Stop 411, NASA/Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23665 Committee on Aircraft and Engine Development Testing

Dr. Kenneth E. Kissell Physical and Astronomy Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 Committee on Optical Data Collection

Dr. Robert H. Korkegi Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, National Research Council, 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20418 Committee on Hypersonic Technology

Dr. Lorenz A. Kull Chief Operating Officer, Executive Vice President, Science Applications International Corporation, 10260 Campus Point Drive, San Diego, CA 92121 Board Member; Committee on Advanced Fusion Power

Dr. Russell M. Kulsrud Princeton University, Plasma Physics Laboratory, P. O. Box 451, Princeton, NJ 08544 Committee on Advanced Fusion Power

Mr. Edward L. Lafferty Technical Director, MITRE Corporation, Burlington Road, Mail Stop A-350, Bedford, MA 01730 Committee on Methods for Improving Software Quality 127

Mr. Keith Lampson Chief Metallurgist, Marquardt Company, 16555 Saticoy Street, P.O. Box 9104, Van Ni y*, CA 91409-9104 Committee on Net Shape Technology

Dr. John K. Lauber National Transportation Safety Board, 800 Independence Avenue, S. W., Washington, D C. 20594 Board Member

LtGen Howard W. Leaf (USAF Retired) The BDM Corporation, 7915 Jones Branch Drive, McLean, VA 22102 Committees on Advanced Robotics, Tactical Battle Management

Mr. Sylvester Lee AFWAL/MLTM, Wright Patterson AFB, OH 45433 Committee on Advanced Robotics

Dr. Jurn-Sun Leung General Research Corporation, 240 N. Nash Street, El Segundo, CA 90245 Committee on Accuracy of Time Transfer in Satellite Systems

Mr. George J. Levenbach 229 Union Avenue, New Providence, NJ 07974 Committee on Mechanical Reliability

Mr. Courtland S. Lewis 485 1-B South 28th Street, Arlington, VA 22206 Committee on Tactical Battle Management

Dr. Frederick F. Ling William Howard Hart Professor and Chairman, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Aeronautical Engineering and Mechan ics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY 12181 Panel on Fuel Control Systems 128

Captain Mary E. Livingston HQ, AFSC/DLXP, Andrews Air Force Base, MD 20334-5000 Committee on Tactical Battle Management

Mr. Hylan B. Lyon North Texas Commission, P.O. Box 610246, Dallas-Ft. Worth Airport, Texas 75261 Committee on Fault Isolation

Dr. Artur Mager 1353 Woodruff Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024 Committee on Hypersonic Technology

Captain Bettina Males HQ, TAC USAF, JSG/XP, Langley Air Force Base, VA 23665 Committee on Tactical Battle Management

Mr. Thomas Malone Travelers Insurance Company Annuity Services - 5 NB, Tower Square, Hartford, CT 06183 Committee on Atmospheric Sciences

Dr. James W. Mar Hunsaker Professor of Aerospace Education, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 Board Member; Committee on Hypersonic Technology

Dr. Frank E. Marble Richard L. Hayman and Dorothy M. Hayman Professor of Mechanical Engineering and Professor of Jet Propulsion, MS 205-45, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125 Committee on Hypersonic Technology

Dr. William Markowitz 2800 East Sun Rise, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33304 Panel on Basic Measurements 129

Dr. John J. Martin 7818 Fulbright Court, Bethesda, MD 20817 Board Member; Committees on Fault Isolation, Tactical Battle Management, Optical Data Collection; Panel on Electronic Warfare

Dr. Gary D. Mather President, Applied Sciences Center, Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 4330 East- West Highway, Suite 800, Bethesda, MD 20814 Board Member

General Robert C. Mathis (USAF Retired) 515 Shaw Road, Sterling, VA 22170-9402 Board Member; Committee on Fault Isolation; Panels on Strategic Mobile Targets, Electronic Warfare

Mr. Kenneth S. McAlpine 5115 Fifteenth Street, N, Arlington, VA 22205 Director Emeritus

Mr. Richard D. McLain Section Chief, Small Engine Controls, Allison Gas Turbine, P.O. Box 420, Speed Code T-12, Indianapolis, IN 46206-0420 Panel on Fuel Control Systems

Dr. John L. McLucas Chairman, QuesTech Incorporated, 6858 Old Dominion Drive, McLean, V A 22101 Chairman

Dr. Brockway McMillan P.O. Box 27, Sedgwick, ME 04676 Chairman Emeritus; Committee on Accuracy of Time Transfer in Satellite Systems; Engineering Panel on PAVE PAWS Radar System

Mr. Duane T. McRuer President, Systems Technologies, Inc., 13766 S. Hawthorne Blvd., Hawthorne, CA 90250 Committee on Hypersonic Technology 130

Mr. Franklin B. Mead, Jr. AFAL/LKC, Edwards AFB, CA 93523-5000 Committee on Advanced Fusion Power

Dr. Robert Mehrabian Dean College of Engineering, Engineering One Building, Room 1016, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 Committee on Net Shape Technology

Dr. A. B. Meinel Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 4800 Oak Grove Drive, 186-134, Pasadena, CA 91109 Subpanel on Optics

Dr. George H. Miley University of Illinois, 103 South Goodwin Street, Mail Stop 214, Urbana, IL 61801 Committee on Advanced Fusion Power

Mr. Chester W. Miller 11215 Caravel Circle, SW, Ft. Myers, FL 33908 Committee on Aircraft and Engine Development Testing

Mr. Edward F. Miller, Jr. Software Research, Incorporated, 625 3rd Street, San Francisco, CA 94107 Committee on Methods for Improving Software Quality

Mr. Hugh Miller 4109 Great Oak Road, Rockville, MD 20853 Board Member

Mr. Elmer Mitchell U. S. Army Strategic Defense Command, DASD-H-YD, P. O. Box 1500, Huntsville, AL 35801-3801 Committee on Optical Data Collection 131

Mr. John H. Monahan Vice President for Operations, The MITRE Corporation, Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 Committee on Tactical Battle Management

Dr. Melvin D. Montemerlo NASA Headquarters, Code RC, Washington, DC 20546 Committee on Advanced Robotics

Dr. Donald W. Moon Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, P. O. Box 5508, Mail Stop L-482, University of California, Livermore, CA 94550 Panel on Laser Mirror Reliability

Mr. Robert Morris EMSP Control and Diagnostic Software Group, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., 1 Whippany Road, Whipany, NJ 07981 Committee on Multilevel Data Management Security

Dr. Walter E. Morrow, Jr. MIT Lincoln Laboratory, 244 Wood Street, Lexington, MA 02173 Board Member; Committee on Technology Assessment

Dr. George E. Mueller President and CEO, George E. Mueller Corporation, P. O. Box 5856, Santa Barbara, CA 93108 Board Member

Mr. John B. Munson UNISYS, 600 Gemini, Huston, TX 77058-2777 Committee on Operational Software Management and Develop ment

Dr. Roger N. Nagel Lehigh University, Harold S. Mohler Laboratory #200, Beth lehem, PA 18015 Committee on Advanced Robotics 132

Dr. F. Robert Naka Vice President, Engineering & Planning, GTE Government Systems Corporation, 100 First Avenue, Waltham, MA 02254 Board Member

Mr. Robert G. Naum Applied Resources, Incorporated, P. O. Box 241, Pittsford, NY 14534 Panel on Laser Mirror Reliability

Mrs. Hyla S. Napadensky Napadensky Engineers, Inc., 650 Judson Avenue, Evanston, IL 60202-2551 Board Member; CETS Liaison

Mr. George W. Neumann Vice President, Giordano Associates, Inc., Suite 1419, 2301 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, VA 22202 Committee on Fault Isolation

Dr. Peter G. Neumann Assistant Director, Computer Science Laboratory, SRI Inter national - BN 168, 333 Ravenswood Avenue, Menlo Park, CA 94025 Committee on Multilevel Data Management Security

Mr. David Norris Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 4800 Oak Grove Drive, MS 264-654, Pasadena, CA 91109 Committee on Optical Data Collection

Dr. Brian O'Brien P.O. Box 166, Woodstock, CT 06281 Founder; Chairman Emeritus; Optical Maser Panel

Mr. Brian O'Brien, Jr. P. O. Box 12, Fabyan, CT 06245 Committee on Optical Data Collection 133

Dr. Frederic C. E. Oder 400 San Domingo Way, Los Altos, CA 94022 Board Member

Mr. Abe Offner Perkin Elmer Corporation, 761 Main Avenue, Norwalk, CT 06859-0229 Subpanel on Optics

Mr. Richard P. Parten Lockheed Engineering and Management Company, A-22, 2400 NASA Road -1, Huston, TX 77058 Committee on Operational Software Management and Develop ment

Dr. Jennie R. Patrick Rohm and Haas Company, Bristol Research Laboratories, P.O. Box 219, Bristol, PA 19007 Board Member

Dr. Stuart L. Petrie Sverdrup Technologies, 16530 Commerce Court, P. O. Box 30650 Midpark Branch, Middleburg Heights, OH 44130 Committee on Aircraft and Engine Development Testing

Dr. Henry Plotkin Code 700, Assistant Director, Development Projects in Engi neering Directorate, NASA/GSE, Greenbelt, MD 20771 Panel on Electromagnetic Propagation

Dr. Richard F. Post University of California, L-644, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, P. O. Box 808, Livermore, CA 94551 Plasma Physics Panel

Mr. H. Postma Oak Ridge National Laboratory, P. O. Box X, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6255 Plasma Physics Panel 134

Dr. James R. Powell, Jr. T-318, Department of Nuclear Energy, Bldg 701, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, NY 11973 Committee on Advanced Fusion Power

Mr. C. V. Ramamorrthy 1117 Sierra Vist Way, Lafayette, CA 94549 Committee on Methods for Improving Software Quality

Dr. W. Duncan Rannie 205-45, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125 Propulsion Panel

LtCol Vincent L. Rausch AFSC/NAI, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-6503 Committee on Hypersonic Technology

Dr. Robert Rosenfeld DARPA, 1400 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, VA 22209-2308 Committee on Advanced Robotics

Dr. J. Reece Roth Department of Electrical Engineering, Ferris Hall, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996-2100 Committee on Advanced Fusion Power

Dr. Albert C. Saxman Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 Panel on Laser Mirror Reliability

Mr. Marvin Schaefer DOD Computer Security Center, 9800 Savage Road, Fort Meade, MD 20755 Committee on Multilevel Data Management Security

Dr. A. Richard Seebass Dean, College of Engineering and Applied Science, Campus Box 422, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309 Board Member 135

Dr. Frederick Seitz Rockefeller University, 1230 York Avenue, New York, NY 10021 Board Member

Dr. George K. Serovy Department of Mechanical Engineering, Iowa State University, Room 3038, Ames, IA 5001 1 Propulsion Panel

Professor Aly Shabaik 6531 Boelter Hall, School of Engineering, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90024 Committee on Net Shape Technology

Dr. Charles V. Shank AT&T Bell Laboratories, Room 4E-436, Crawfords Corner Road, Holmdel, NJ 07733 Board Member; Committees on Tactical Battle Management, Aircraft and Engine Development Testing

Professor Robert R. Shannon Optical Science Center, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 Panel on Laser Mirror Reliability

Mr. John E. Short 221 Stanford Place, Springfield, OH 45503 Committee on Mechanical Reliability

Dr. Frederick Simmons The Aerospace Corporation, P. O. Box 92957, MI- 126, Los Angeles, CA 90009 Plume Emissions Panel

Dr. Ronald Smelt P. O. Box AG, Watsonville, CA 95077 Committee on Hypersonic Technology 136

Mr. Yale Smith RADC/COAD, Griff iss Air Force Base, NY 13441-5700 Committee on Tactical Battle Management

Dr. L. D. Smoot Clyde Building, Department of Chemical Engineering Science, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602 Plume Emissions Panel

Mr. Richard D. Somers Senior Research Engineer, Automation and Data Systems, Division 05, Southwest Research Institute, P. O. Drawer 28510, 6220 Culebra Road, San Antonio, TX 78284 Committee on Fault Isolation

Mr. Patrick Squires National Center for Atmospheric Research, P. O. Box 3000, Boulder, CO 80307 Committee on Atmospheric Sciences

Mr. William E. Stanton Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, MS 06, 555 Technology Square, Cambridge, MA 02139 Committee on Fault Isolation

Dr. Morris A. Steinberg 348 Homewood Road, Los Angeles, CA 90049 Committees on Hypersonic Technology, Net Shape Technology, and Laser Mirror Reliability

Mr. Robertson Stevens Section Chief, Communications Elements Research, 4800 Oak Grove Drive, Mail Stop - 264/800, Pasadena, CA 91109 Panel on Electromagnetic Propagation

Dr. Philip M. Stone Department of Energy, Office of Fusion Energy, ER-532, Washington, DC 20545 Committee on Advanced Fusion Power 137

Mr. Greg Stottlemeyer SDIO/S/ES, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7100 Committee on Net Shape Technology

Dr. A. W. Straiton 4212 Far West Boulevard, Austin, TX 78731 Panel on Electromagnetic Propagation

Dr. Allen R. Stubberud Director, Division of Electrical, Communications & Systems, National Science Foundation, 1800 G Street, NW, Room 1151, Washington, D. C. 20550 Committee on Advanced Robotics

Dr. P. A. Sturrock Astrophysics, ERL Building Room 306, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 Plasma Physics Panel

Dr. Paul A. Temple Naval Weapons Center, Code 38104, China Lake, CA 93555 Committee on Optical Data Collection

Dr. Delbert Tesar Department of Mechanical Engineering, ETCH 5.160, University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712-1063 Committee on Advanced Robotics

Dr. Donald O. Thompson Iowa State University, Ames Laboratory 231 Sedding, Ames, IA 50011 Panel on Nondestructive Inspection

Mr. Phillip Thompson National Center for Atmospheric Research, P. O. Box 3000, Boulder, CO 80307 Committee on Atmospheric Sciences 138

Dr. Joseph E. Urban Chairman, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Miami, P. O. Box 248294, Coral Gables, FL 33124 Board Member; Committee on Advanced Robotics

Dr. Charles R. Vick P. O. Box 949, Auburn, AL 36831 Board Member

Dr. Oswald G. Villard, Jr. Professor, Electrical Engineering Department, Stanford Univer sity, and Senior Scientific Advisor, SRI International, 333 Ravenswood Avenue, Menlo Park, CA 94025 Board Member

Dr. Starnes Walker Phillips Petroleum Company, 116 AL, Phillips Research Center, Bartlesville, OK 74004 Committee on Advanced Fusion Power

Major General Brien D. Ward (USAF Retired) Boeing Airplane Company, P. O. Box 3707, MS 4R-36, Seattle, WA 98124 Committee on Optical Data Collection

Dr. Willis Ware The Rand Corporation, 1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, CA 90406 Board Member

Mr. Lawrence M. Weeks NASA Headquarters, 600 Independence Ave., SW, Washington, DC 20546 Committee on Hypersonic Technology

Mr. Clark Weissman Deputy Division Manager and Chief Technologist, Research and Development Division, System Development Corporation, 2400 Colorado Avenue, Santa Monica, CA 90406 Committee on Multilevel Data Management Security 139

Dr. Robert A. White College of Engineeering, Department of Mech. and Industrial Engineering, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 144 Mechanical Engineering Bldg., 1206 West Green Street, Urbana, IL 61801 Board Member; Committees on Aircraft and Engine Development Testing, Hypersonic Technology

Dr. Eugene Wigner Physics Department, Princeton University, P. O. Box 708, Princeton, NJ 08544 Advisory Committee to the AFSC

Dr. Ben L. Williams AFALC/ER, Building 15, Room 133, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433 Committee on Advanced Robotics

Dr. Gemot M. R. Winkler Director, Time Service Department, U. S. Naval Observatory, 34th and Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20392-5100 Committee on Accuracy of Time Transfer in Satellite Systems

Dr. Jack K. Wolf Professor, Center for Magnetic Recording Research, University of California at San Diego, Mail Stop R-001, La Jolla, CA 92093 Committee on Tactical Battle Management

Dr. Raymond T. Yeh ISSI, 9420 Research Blvd., Suite 200, Austin, TX 78759-6539 Committee on Methods for Improving Software Quality

Dr. Laurence R. Young Starlab, Durand Building, Room 202, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 Board Member 140

Mr. Thomas M. Zakrzewski Vice President, Nichols Research Corporation, 8618 Westwood Center Drive, Suite 200, Vienna, VA 22180-2222 Committee on Optical Data Collection

Air Force Studies Board Staff

Vernon H. Miles, Sr., Director Donald L. Whittaker, Assistant to the Director/Editor Katherine H. Atkins, Secretary 141

Reports by the Air Force Studies Board 1961-1987

1987 Advanced Fusion Power, October (U)

1986 Isolation of Faults in Air Force Weapons and Support Systems, Vol. /, (U) April

Isolation of Faults in Air Force Weapons and Support Systems, Vol. //, (U) July

Aircraft and Engine Development Testing, (U) September

Accuracy of Time Transfer in Satellite Systems, (U) September

Net Shape Technology in Aerospace Structures, 4 vols, (U) Nov-Dec.

1985 Methods for Improving Software Quality and Life Cycle Cost, (U) January

Report of the Panel on Laser Mirror Reliability, (NFD) August

1984 Advanced Airborne Surveillance Radar Report, (S) July

1983 Final Report on the Fuel Control System of the F100 Engine, (U) April

Multilevel Data Management Security, (U) 1982 Woods Hole Summer Study, June

Final Report on the Effectiveness of the AF Nondestructive Inspection Program, (U) October 142

1982 The Effectiveness of the Air Force Nondestructive Inspec tion Management, (U) March Automation in Combat Aircraft, (NFD) March

1981 Survivable Tactical and Strategic C3I Systems, (S) Woods Hole 1979 Summer Study, March

Fuel Control System of the F100 Engine, Panel on Fuel Control Systems, (U) July

1980 Detection and Tracking of Cruise Missiles, (S) Woods Hole 1978 Summer Study, April

Final Report of the Committee on E-3A Radar, (SNF) March

1979 Radiation Intensity of the PAVE PAWS Radar System, (U) April

Toward an Effective and Reliable ch System for the USAF, (S) June

Pulsed Power Sources, (S) Summer Study, November

1978 Air Force Technological Tradeoffs Panel Report, Follow-up to Reliability in Aeronautical Avionics Equipment (1975), (U) October

1977 Operational Software Management and Development of USAF Computer Systems, (U) Woods Hole Summer Study 1976, August

Data Link Technology Panel Report, Letter Report, (C) December

1975 Reliability in Aeronautical Avionics Equipment, (U) Air Force Technological Tradeoffs Panel, July 143

Transonic Axial-Flow Compressor Configurations for Air craft Propulsion Systems, (C/NFD) Propulsion Panel, September

1974 Report of the Propulsion Panel, (U) August

1973 Have Flood, Propulsion Panel, (C) March

Progress Report on the Range Measurements Laboratory, (U) April

Final Report of the Systran Panel, (U) April

Report of the Plume Emissions Panel, (U) June

Report of the Propulsion Panel, (U) August

1972 Air Force Office of Scientific Research Workshop on Environmental Quality Research, Letter Report, (U) September

1971 Report of the Propulsion Panel on the Compressor Research Facility, (U) February

Preliminary Report of the Systran Panel, (U) July

Final Report of the Recognition Panel, (S) November

Final Report of the Magnetic Materials Panel, (U) Decem ber

1970 Report of the Academic Community Relationships Panel, (U) January

Report of the Optical Maser Panel, (U) February

Final Report of the Magnetohydrodynamic Panel, (U) September 144

Report of the Propulsion Panel on Jet Engines, (U) November

1969 Reconnaissance in Limited War, (S) Limited War Panel, March

Investigation of the Prediction Accuracy of Low Altitude Passive Satellite Orbits by the Air Force Eastern Test Range, (S) Final Report of the Satellite Tracking Accuracy Panel, June

1968 Final Report Aspects of ABRES and NIKE-X Flight Test Programs, (S) Re-Entry Physics Panel, January

Progress Report of the Satellite Tracking Accuracy Panel, (U) February

Report on Programs at Aerojet-General, San Ramon Research Operation, (U) Plasma Physics Panel, February

Limited War Operations, (S) Limited War Panel, March

Weapons Delivery, (S) Limited War Panel, June

Report on Beacons, (S) Limited War Panel, July

Comments on Plan for Mobilization of Drafted Scientists and Engineers in AFSC, (U) July

Synthetic Aperture Optics, Vol. 1-2, (U) Woods Hole Summer Study, August

Synthetic Aperture Optics, Supp. to Vol. 2, (S) October

1967 Review of Radar Discrimination and its Implications on Minuteman III Penetration Concept, (S-RD) Re-Entry Physics Panel, January

Avalanche Photodiodes as Optical Detectors, (U) June 145

Optical Instrumentation Panel Report, (U) June

Relations with the Scientific Community, (U) Academic Community Relations Panel, June

Re-Entry Physics Panel Report, (S) July

Memo Report Concerning the Possibility of USAF Exploi tation of the Automation Art, (U) July

Report by the Ad Hoc Panel Review on the Cloudcroft Facility, (U) Ad Hoc Panel on Cloudcroft, October

Report of the Re-Entry Physics Panel, (S) November

Report by the Reconnaissance Panel, (S) November

1966 Recommendations Relative to Electro-Optical Surveillance Research Facility at Cloudcroft, N.M., (U) Optical Maser Panel, February

Summary Report, (S) Special Ad Hoc Panel, February

Incremental Flight Test Program Review, (U) Scramjet Panel, March

Report to HELP Task Force, (U) Optical Maser Panel, March

Special Memorandum Report, (U) Reconnaissance Panel, June

Restoration of Atmospherically Degraded Images, Vol. 1-4, (U) Woods Hole Summer Study, July

Partial Highlights: Re-Entry Physics Panel Report of Summer Study Working Group, (S-RD) August

Special Memorandum Report, (S) Reconnaissance Panel, August 146

Summary Report on Scramjet Panel Meeting of September 1966 (U)

Review of the AGN High Temperature Plasma Research Pro gram, (U) Plasma Physics Panel, December

1965 An Evaluation of the TJ60 Program of the Wright Aero nautical Division, (C) June

ABRES Developments to 25 June 1965, (S) Re-Entry Physics Panel, July

Report of the Panel on Optical Instrumentation, (U) August

Report of the Optical Maser Panel, (U) August

Systems Analyses Associated with ABRES, (S-RD) Re-Entry Physics Panel, September

Report of the Optical Maser Panel, (U) December

Progress Report of the Scramjet Panel, (U) December

1964 Final Report of the Panel on Tracking Data Analysis, (U) June

Report of the Panel on Optical Instrumentation, (U) June

Report on Atmospheric Sciences for the AFSC, (U) Woods Hole Summer Study, August

Pro ject Sand Dollar (S)

1963 Report of the Panel on Optical Instrumentation, (U) Octo ber

Some Initial Reactions to Projects PRESS and LORV in the Light of REX-1 and REX-2, Re-Entry Physics Panel, (S-RD) October) 147

1962 Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Electromagnetic Propa gation (U)

1961 Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Basic Measurements, (U) December 148

Biographies of the Speakers

Dr. Gerald P. Dinneen Vice President, Science and Technology, Honeywell, Inc.

Born Elmhurst, New York, October 23, 1924; B.S., Queens College, 1947; M.S., University of Wisconsin, 1948; PhD, math ematics, 1952; teaching assistant, mathematics, University of Wisconsin 1947-51; senior developing engineer, Goodyear Aircraft Corporation, Ohio 1951-53; staff member, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, 1953-58, section leader data processing group, 1958, from assistant leader to leader, 1958-60, associate head information processing division 1960-63 and communications division, 1963-64, head 1964-66, from assistant director to associate director, 1966- 70; professor of electrical engineering, MIT, 1971-77; assistant secretary of defense for cV Department of Defense, 1977-81; Corporate Vice President Science and Technology, Honeywell, Inc., 1981- . Consultant, Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 1959-60, member electronics panel, 1960-65 and chairman information processing panel, 1963-65; member, Defense Intelligence Agency Scientific Advisory Committee, 1965-66; vice chairman, 1966-73; member Defense Scientific Board panels, 1966-67; chairman, Air Force Scientific Advisory Board 1975-77. Member, board of directors, Votan & Sci Mus Minn, Microelectronics & Computer Technology Corporation, Honeywell Foundation. Honors and Awards: Decoration Exceptional Civilian Service, Air Force, 1966 and 1977. Member: National Academy of Engineering; American Mathematics Society. 149

Daniel J. Fink Daniel J. Fink Associates

Born Jersey City, New Jersey, December 13, 1926; ,B.S., aeronautical engineering, MIT, 1948, M.S., 1949; aeromechanics engineer, Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Buffalo, New York, 1948; group leader, aircraft dynamics, Bell Aircraft Corporation, 1949-52; various positions to vice president, Allied Research Associates, Inc., 1952-63; assistant director for defensive systems, deputy director of defense research and engineering for strategic and space systems, 1963-67; research and development, Space Systems, Valley Forge Space Center, General Electric; general manager, Space Systems Organization, GE, 1967-69; vice president and general manager, Space Division, GE, 1969-77; vice president and group executive, Aerospace Group, GE, 1977-79; senior vice president, corporate planning and development, GE, 1979-82; president, D. J. Fink Associates, Inc., 1982- . Honors: Collier Trophy, 1974, Distinguished Public Service Medal; Honorary Fellow, AIAA; Fellow, AAAS; MIT Aeronautics Department Honors Group; Recipient of Goodyear Fellowship; Tau Beta Pi, and Sigma Xi. Member, National Academy of Engineer ing, president, AIAA; Defense Science Board, Army Scientific Advisory Board. Corresponding member of the International Academy of Astronautics of the International Astronautical Federation, and chairman of the AIAA Committee on International Cooperation in Space. Board of Governors of the National Space Club. Member emeritus, AIAA Board of Directors. 150

Alexander H. Flax Home Secretary, National Academy of Engineering

Born Brooklyn, January 18, 1921; B.S, aeronautical engin eering, New York University, 1940; Ph.D., physics, University of Buffalo, 1958; structure and vibration engineering, airplane division, Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 1940-44; chief, aerodynamics and structures, Piasecki Helicopter Corporation, 1944-46; assistant head aeromechanics department Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, 1946-49, head aerodynamics department, 1949-55, assistant director, 1955-56, vice president, technical director, 1956-59, 61- 63; chief scientist, Air Force, 1959-61; assistant secretary Air Force for R&D, 1963-69; vice presideent for research, Institute for Defense Analyses, Arlington, Virginia, 1969, President, 1969- ; Honors: Recipient Air Force Exceptional Civilian Service awards, 1961, 1969; NASA Distinguished Service medal, 1968; Civilian Service medal, Defense Intelligence Agency, 1974; Von Karman medal NATO Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development, 1978; Medal for Distinguished Public Service Department of Defense, 1983. Member, committee aerodynamics NACA, 1952-54, subcommittee highspeed aerodynamics, 1954-58; advisory committee aircraft aerodynamics NASA, 1958-62; rep resentative, SHAPE Tech. Center, The Hague, Netherlands, 1963- 69, Chairman 1965-67; U.S. delegate to advisory committee aeronautical research and development, NATO, 1969- ; Board of Directors, Von Karman Institute, Brussels, 1969- ; advisory council, Stanford University School of Engineering, 1981- . Hon. fellow AIAA (Lawrence Sperry award 1949, Wright Bros, lectr. 1959); fellow Royal Aeronautical Society (Wright Brothers Memorial Lecturer, 1974); member National Academy of Engineer ing. 151

Robert T. Marsh Former Commander, Air Force Systems Command

Born Logansport, Indiana, January 3, 1925; student, Wabash College, 1943; U.S. Army, 1943-45; B.S., U.S. Military Academy 1949; M.S. engineering, University of Michigan, 1956; postgrad uate, Air Command and Staff College 1960, Air War College, 1965; commissioned 2d liutenant, USAF, 1949, promoted to general, 1970; space systems project officer, HQ, Space Systems division, Los Angeles Air Force Station, 1960-64; staff officer, Directorate of Reconnaissance & Electronic Warfare, USAF; chief, Projects Division, Directorate of Space, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Research & Development, HQ USAF, Washington 1965-67; executive officer staff, development plans, HQ, AFSC, Andrews AFB, Maryland, 1973, deputy chief of staff, Systems 1973-75, vice commander, 1975-77; commander, Electronic Systems Division, Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts, 1977-81, Air Force Systems Command, 1977-81. Honors: Legion of Merit, Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster. 152

Dr. Brian O'Brien Founder and Former Chairman Air Force Studies Board

Born, January 2, 1898; Ph.D., electrical engineering, Yale, 1918; Ph.D. Yale, Physics, 1922; Research Engineer, Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, 1922-23; Research Physicist, Buffalo Tuberculosis Association, 1923-27; Physicist and Director Medical Research, J. N. Adam Memorial, 1927-30; Professor, Physiological Optics, University of Rochester, 1930-46; Director, Institute of Optics, 1938-53, Research Professor, Physics and Optics, 1946-53; Vice President, Trustee and Director, Ameerican Optical Company, 1953-58; Consulting Physicist, 1958- . Honors and Awards: Emeritus Member, Air Force Scientific Advisory Board; Chairman, Space Program Advisory Council, NASA: Presidential Medal for Merit, 1948; Fellow A A AS; American Physical Society; Optical Society of America; American Geo physical Union; Society of Motion Picture and TV Engineers; American Academy of Arts and Sciences; Member, American Philosophical Society; National Academy of Sciences; National Academy of Engineering.

General Samuel C. Phillips Former Commander, Air Force Systems Command

Born 1921; B.S. electrical engineering, University of Wyoming, 1942; M.S. electrical engineering, University of Michi gan, 1950; director of operations, 1st A ACS Wing, Langley AFB, Virginia, 1947-48; director of operations, Armament Lab, B-52 project officer, director of guided missile projects, Wright- Patterson AFB, Ohio, 1950-56; chief of logistics and director of material, 7th Air Division, SAC, England, 1956-59; director Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Program, 1959-63; vice commander, Ballistic Systems Division, Norton AFB, California; 1963-64; deputy program director, Apollo Program, NASA, 1964; director, Apollo Manned Lunar Landing Program, NASA, 1964-69; commander, Space and Missile Organization (SAMSO), AFSC, Los Angeles, California, 1969-72; director, 153

National Security Agency, Chief Central Security Service, Fort Meade, 1972-73; commander, AFSC, Andrews AFB, Maryland, 1973-75; vice president and general manager, Energy Systems Management Division, TRW Systems and Energy, 1975-76; vice president and general manager, TRW Energy Products Group, 1976-83; vice president, TRW Defense Systems Group, 1984-86; consultant, 1986-present. Honors and Awards: Honorary Doctor of Laws Degree, U. of Wyoming; Distinguished Service Medal, NASA (twice); Distinguished Service Medal, USAF, 1 Oak Leaf Cluster; Legion of Merit; Distinguished Flying Cross, 1 Oak Leaf Cluster; Air Medal, U.S. Air Force, 7 Oak Leaf Clusters; Army Commendation Medal; World War II Victory Medal; IEEE Fellow; AIAA Fellow; Member, National Academy of Engineering. 154

Dr. Frank Press President, National Academy of Sciences

Born in Brooklyn, New York in 1924. B.S. physics, City College of New York, 1946; geophysics, Columbia University, 1949; associate professor of geophysics and oceanography, Columbia faculty, 1952; professor of geophysics, California Institute of Technology, 1955; director of CIT Seismological Laboratory, 1957; department head, Geology and Geophysics at MIT, 1965 (renamed the Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences); presidential science adviser and director of Office of Science and Technology Policy, 1977; Institute Professor, MIT, 1981; President, National Academy of Sciences, July 1981; re-elected in 1987. Member: Seismological Society of America, American Geophysical Union; NAS; AAAS; American Philosophical Society; foreign member of the French Academy of Sciences; Board of Trustees of Sloan Foundation and Rockefeller University; Corpor ation of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; foreign member of the Royal Society; National Academy of Public Administration. Honors: Gold Medal of the Royal Astronomical Society; Arthur L. Day Medal of the Geophysical Union; Maurice Ewing Medal of the Society of Exploratory Geophysicists; Department of the Interior's Public Service Award; Distinguished Public Service Medal (NASA). 155

General Bernard P. Randolph Commander, Air Force Systems Command

Born July 10, 1933, New Orleans; B.S. Chemistry, Xavier University, 1954; instructor and member of select crew on KC-97 and B-47s, Strategic Air Command, 1956-62; Squadron Officer School, 1959; chief, on-orbit operations, Space Systems Division, 1965; B.S. (magna cum laude), 1964, M.S., E.E., University of North Dakota, 1965; distinguished graduate, Air Command and Staff College, 1969; MBA, Auburn University, 1969, distinguished graduate, Air War College, 1974; awarded commission and wings through the Aviation Cadet Program; airlift operations officer, Chu Lai, Vietnam; 1970; chief of command plans in test evalua tion, executive officer to deputy chief of staff for operations, 1970-1793; Air War College, 1973-74; director, space systems planning, Space and Missile Systems Organization, Los Angeles AFS, 1974-75; deputy program director, program director, Air Force Satellite Communications System, 1975-78; vice commander, Warner Robins ALC, Robins AFB, Georgia, 1980-81; director of space systems and C^, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, RD&A, HQ USAF, Washington, D.C., 1981-83; vice commander and deputy commander for space systems acquisition for Space Division, 1983-84; vice commander, AFSC, 1984-85; deputy chief of staff for RD&A, 1985-87; commander, AFSC, August 1987- . Awards: Distinguished Service Medal; Legion of Merit with one oak leaf cluster; Bronze Star Medal; Meritorious Service Medal; Air Force Commendation Medal; Presidential Unit Citation. 156

Bernard A. Schriever

Born Bremen, Germany, September 14, 1910; came to U.S., 1917, naturalized, 1923; B.S., Texas A&M University, 1931; M.S., mechanical engineering, Stanford University, 1942; D.Sc. (honors), Creighton University, 1958; Rider College, 1958; Adelphia College 1959; Rollins College, 1959; D. Aeronautical Science, University of Michigan, 1961; D. English, Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute, 1961; LL.D., Loyola University, Los Angeles, 1960; commissioned 2d lieutenant U.S. Army Air Force, 1938; advanced through grades to General U.S. Air Force, 1961; commander, ICBM program, 1954-59, 1959-66, retired, 1966; Chairman Board Schriever & McKee, Washington, 1971- . Director: American Med. International, Control Data Corporation, Eastern Air Lines, Emerson Electric Company. Wackenhut Corporation. Honors: Distinguished Service Medal; Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster; Legion of Merit; Air Medal; Purple Heart; Fellow AIAA. Member, National Academy of Engineering; American Astronomical Society; Air Force Association. 157

Lawrence A. Skantze Former Commander, Air Force Systems Command

Born Bronx, New York, June 24, 1928; B.S., U.S. Naval Academy, 1952; M.S., Air Force Institute of Technology, 1959; U.S. Navy, 1946-52; commissioned 2d lieutenant, USAF, 1952; advanced through grades to General 1983; bomber pilot, Korea, 1954; various assignments in engineering, 1955-69; director of personnel, Air Force Systems Command, 1969-71; program manager Short Range Attack Missile, 1971-73, program manager, Airborne Warning and Control System, 1973-77; deputy chief of staff for Systems Development HQ, AFSC, Andrews AFB, Maryland, 1977- 79; commander, Aeronautical Systems Division, AFSC, Wright- Patterson AFB, Ohio, 1979-82; deputy chief of staff for Research, Development and Acquisitions, HQ USAF, Washington, D.C., 1982- 83; vice chief of staff, 1983-85; commander, AFSC, 1985-86. Author and lecturer, Air Force Management Techniques. Honors: Distinguished Service Medal; Legion of Merit; Merit orious Service Medal; Commendation Medal. Member, Air Force Association (Outstanding Program Manager award 1973, Theodore Von Karman award 1975), American Nuclear Society. 158

John J. Welch, Jr. Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisitions

Born, Cambridge, Massachusetts, August 23, 1930; B.S., engineering, MIT, 1951; junior engineer, aircraft and missile systems, Chance Vought Corporation; variety of engineering and program management positions in flight test, missile operations, anti-submarine warfare, advanced programs, and aircraft and missile product development; vice president, space defense systems, Ling-Temco- Vought, 1965; vice president and manager, Missiles and Space Division; chief scientist, Air Force, 1969; vice president, programs, LTV Aerospace; corporation vice president, LTV, 1974; senior vice president, LTV, 1975; assistant secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Washington, D.C., 1987 Honors: Exceptional Civilian Service Award for his work as Chief Scientist. Member (emeritus), Defense Science Board, Army Science Board, NAS Naval Studies Board, AF SAB, and AFSC Division Advisory Groups; chairman of the F-16 Multinational Fighter Program Steering Committee and senior U.S. delegate to NATO Advisory Group for Aerospace R&D.