ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR IN THE
AIR MATERIEL COMMAND
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University
By
JOHN LEWIS HESS, B. A., M. A
******
The Ohio State University 1959
Approved by
Aaviser Department W Political Science ACKNOWLSDtmNT
In the development of the study which resulted in this dissertation, valuable guidance and assistance were provided by
Professor Harvey C. Mansfield and Professor Harvey Walker of the
Department of Political Science, and Professor Carroll L. Shartle of the Department of Psychology and the Personnel Research board, the Ohio State University.
Appreciation is also expressed to the officials of the Air
Materiel Command, United States Air Force, for making available certain basic historical records and for permitting access to sources of information upon which this paper is based. The writer is espe cially grateful to Colonel John De Vos and Mr. John £. Taylor of the
Personnel Directorate, Headquarters, Air Materiel Command, for the assistance and encouragement provided in connection with this under taking.
ii TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... ii
LIST OF TABLES...... iv
Chapter I. INTRODUCTION...... 1
II. THE ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT...... 23
III. HYPOTHESIS AND l-ETHODOLOGY OF THE ST U D Y ...... 50
IV. FINDINGS A HD INTERPRETATIONS...... 62
V. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, DEMOCRACY, AND THE "MILITARY MIND" ...... 98
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 112
ill LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Scored Questions on the Leader Behavior Description Questionnaire according to the Dimensions, Con sideration and Initiating Structure...... 9
2. Democratic and Authoritarian Leadership Situations in an Experimental Setting at the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station...... 13
3. Means and Standard Deviations of LBDQ Responses Describing the Ideal AMC Military Officer Adminis trator, the Successful, and the Less than Successful AMC Civilian Administrator...... 63
4. Mean Scores of 30 LBDQ Items Describing the Ideal AMC Military Officer Administrator in Descending Order of Mean Scores...... 67
5. LBDQ Items on Which Largest Mean Differences Occurred in Comparing Descriptions of Successful and Less than Successful Civilian Administrators...... 71
6. Comparison of 153 Successful and 112 Less than Successful AMC Civilian Administrators in Terms of Means, Standard Deviations, and t-Ratios of Mean Differences of Selected Biographical Factors .... 73
7. Intercorrelations (Pearsonian r) among the Dimensions of Consideration and Initiating Structure, together with Selected Biographical Factors, for 153 Successful and 112 Less than Successful Civilian Administrators...... 74
S. Mean Scores on Consideration and Initiating Structure for Real and Ideal AMC Civilian Administrators, Dividing Successful from Less than Successful, and Comparing Scores according to Civilian and Military Describers...... 76
iv LIST OF TABLES-Continued
Table Page
9. Coefficients of Correlation (Pearsonian r) between Real and Ideal AMC Civilian Administrators on the Dimensions of Consideration and Initiating Structure, according to Successful and Less than Successful Civilian Administrators, and Military and Civilian Describers...... 78
10. Comparison of Mean Scores of Responses to ’'Most Authori tarian" and "Most Democratic" LBDQ Items Describing the Ideal AMC Military Officer Administrator, the Successful AMC Civilian Administrator, and the Successful Non-AMC Civilian Administrator ...... 81
11. Correlation Coefficients Expressing the Relationship between Dimension Scores and Selected Biographical Data for Successful and Less than Successful AMC Civilian Administrators ...... 84
12. Correlation Coefficients Expressing the Relationship between Dimension Scores of Ideal AMC Military Officer Administrators and Selected Biographical Data on Military Describers of Ideal...... 85
13. Correlation Coefficients Expressing the Relationship between Dimension Scores on Ideal AMC Civilian Administrators and Selected Biographical Data on Military Describers Who Supervise Successful and Less than Successful Civilian Administrators...... 86
14. Correlation Coefficients Expressing the Relationship between Dimension Scores on Ideal AMC Civilian Administrators and Selected Biographical Data on Civilian Describers Who Supervise Successful and Less than Successful Civilian Administrators...... 87
15. Correlation Coefficients Expressing the Relationship between Dimension Scores and Selected Biographical Data on Military Supervisors Describing Successful and Less than Successful AMC Civilian Administrators. 88
16. Correlation Coefficients Expressing the Relationship between Dimension Scores and Selected Biographical Data on Civilian Supervisors Describing Successful and Less than Successful AMC Civilian Administrators. 89
v LIST OF TABLES-Continued
Table Page
17. Means, Standard Deviations, and t-Ratios of Mean Differences in Ideal Leader Behavior of 132 Aircraft Commanders and 119 AMC Military Officer Administrators...... 99
18. Means, Standard Deviations, and t-katios of Mean Differences in Ideal Leader Behavior of 64 Educational Administrators and 119 AMC Military Officer Administrators...... 100
vi CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The basic objectives of this study Have been to determine the extent to which selected civilian administrators within a military logistics organization (the Air Materiel Command of the United States
Air Force) tend to conform to patterns of behavior valued by their military peers and superiors; and to ascertain whether such behavior reflects values tending to be democratic and permissive, or authori tarian, or a combination of both, or neither.
Essentially, this has involved an analysis of described behavior within a specific public administrative environment, and nas followed generally a research approach and a set of techniques developed by the staff members of the Ohio State University Personnel Research
Board. One of the major objectives of the leadership studies con ducted by the Board had been to test hypotheses concerning the situa tional determination of leader behavior, as contrasted with previous endeavors to explain the phenomenon of leadership from the personality traits of the leader. According to Carroll I. Shartle, Chairman of the Personnel Research Board, "the trait approach reached an impasse before the beginning of World War II."1
Carroll L. Shartle, "Introduction," Leader Behavior: Its Description and Measurement, ed, Ralph M. Stogdill and Alvin E. Coons (Columbus: The Ohio State University Bureau of Business Research, 1957), p. 1. 1 It was also considered that the ability to describe leader behavior objectively was central to the study of leadership. Conse quently, leader behavior description became a focal point of concern for the staff of the Personnel Research Board. The end product of their efforts in this connection was the Leader Behavior Description questionnaire, the specific instrument utilized in the study reported hereinafter.
The research done preliminary to the development of the Leader
Behavior Description questionnaire (hereafter referred to as the LBDQ) has been reported by Hemphill and Coons. As they have stated it,
their report is concerned with
an attempt to develop an objective method of describing "how" a leader carries out his activities. For example, a leader in his coordinating or supervisory activity, nay engage in a considerable amount of dominating behavior; or, he may accomplish these tasks without displaying dominating behavior at all.-*-
Based on extended discussions by the staff members of the Per
sonnel Research Board, the initial classification of the dimensions or
the "hows'1 of leader behavior was accomplished. These were as follows:
1. Integration — acts which tend to increase cooperation among members or decrease competition among them
2. Communication - act3 which increase the understanding of and knowledge about what is going on in the group
3. Production emphasis - acts which are oriented toward volume of work accomplished
^-John K. Hemphill and Alvin E. Coons, "Development of the Leader Behavior Description Questionnaire," Leader Behavior: Its Description and Measurement, ed. Ralph M« Stogdill and Alvin E. Coons (Columbus: The Ohio State University Bureau of Business Research, 1957), P. 6. 3
4. Representation - act3 which 3peak for the group in interaction with outside agencies
5. Fraternization - acts which tend to make the leader a part of the group
6. Organization - acts which lead to differentiation of duties and which prescribe ways of doing things
7. Evaluation - acts which have to do with distribution of rewards (or punishment)
8. Initiation - acts which lead to change in group activities
9. Domination - act3 which disregard the ideas or person of members of the group
The foregoing nine areas provided a framework for specific items of leader behavior which were subsequently developed and evalu ated. Based on previous field studies and on personal contacts with private industries and public organizations, each staff member of the
Personnel Research Board wrote items of behavior which seemed to fit into the nine a priori areas or dimensions of behavior. Items were also written by members of advanced university classes as an exercise in item construction. All items were then considered for overlap of content, relative freedom from overlap with items in other of the nine areas, range of content, general evaluation tone, etc. In this process, all but 150 items were screened out, and these were arranged in a preliminary questionnaire. In addition, the nine areas were re defined to correspond more closely with the actual content of the items in each such area. On the questionnaire proper, the 150 items were randomized, with no reference made to the nine categories or areas of behavior.
One of the major problems encountered in the development of the LBDQ related to value tone associated with the items. The question was: "Row could connotations and inferences as to quality of leadership be excluded from the questionnaire items, which were intended only to describe behavior?" One possible solution was to use the "forced choice" format, whereby two items having similar
evaluation tone are paired so as to force the respondent to choose
between them. By the use of this method the response probably would be based on considerations other than the evaluation tone of the item.
However, a number of difficulties would have been involved in the use of "forced choice"; furthermore, it was desired to obtain responses
quantitatively comparable in terns of frequency with which a leader
engages in an item of behavior. It was not possible to use "forced
choice" and, at the same time, measure frequency of behavioral engage ment. The decision was made to use a multiple choice format, provid
ing for five frequency choices in connection with each questionnaire
item, e.g.,
He schedules the work to be done. A. Always B. Often C. Occasionally D. Seldom E. Never
After completion of the questionnaire format, it was adminis
tered in a test situation to determine reliability of scores, the
extent of overlap between the areas of classification, and the rela
tionship between questionnaire responses and the overall evaluation
of a leader. The questionnaire was administered to 357 individuals,
205 of whom were asked to describe a leader within a group in which
they had membership, and 152 of whom were asked to describe themselves
as leaders. In addition to completing a questionnaire, each respondent was asked to make an evaluation of the leader described.
Based on consideration of the occupations, age range, and other biographical information, it was concluded that the sample obtained was a fairly catholic one.
The internal-consistency iten-analysis procedure was employed, whereby each item within an area was correlated with the total score of such area. As it turned out, approximately half of the items were more highly correlated with one or more other dimensions than with their own dimension. The hypothesized independence of the dimensions was thus disproved. Other significant results of the analysis of the questionnaire responses in this initial test situation were:
1. Intercorrelations between dimension scores appeared to reinforce the conclusion that the leader description dimensions were not independent, with most dimensions showing substantial overlap with one another.
2. In examining the relationships between dimension scores and the overall evaluation of the leader1s leadership quality, substan tial lack of independence was observed. However, some of the individual questionnaire items had little or no correlation with the overall evaluation ratings. Furthermore, correlations between dimen sion scores and evaluation ratings were not sufficiently high to explain the relatively high reliabilities of the dimension scores.
In other words, there appeared to be some room for unique variance associated with each dimension.
3. A factor analysis of the intercorrelation of dimension scores identified three general factors: general social agreeableness; a drive for objective or goal attainment; and a stressing of the main tenance of effective interaction of group members.
Another major step in the development of leader behavior descriptions under the Ohio State Leadership Studies was represented by a factorial study of leader behavior descriptions reported by
Halpin and Winer.^ In this study a modified LBDQ of 130 items was administered to 52 air crews flying B-50 bombers. The leader behavior of the 52 air crew commanders was described by 300 crew members. The factor analysis of the intercorrelations among eight hypothesized dimensions of leader behavior resulted in the emergence of four factors. Two of these factors, designated Consideration and Initi ating Structure, accounted for 83 per cent of the total factor variance. A short scale was then developed, utilizing 40 items, 15
i* items for measuring Consideration, 15 items for measuring Initiating
Structure, and 10 buffer items to maintain the "tone” of the questionnaire provided by the items in the two factors of the original four that were discarded. The reliability of the short keys was found to be sufficiently high for practical use. Although the two factor scales of Consideration and Initiating Structure correlated to a moderate degree, they were sufficiently independent to be con sidered as measures of different kinds of behavior.
^Andrew W. Halpin and B. James Winer, "A Factorial Study of the Leader Behavior Descriptions," Leader Behavior: Its Description and Measurement, ed. Ralph M. Stogdill and Alvin £. Coons (Columbus: The Ohio State University Bureau of Business Research, 1957)* pp. 39-51* Fleishman has reported the development and application of a
Leader Behavior Description for use in industry.1 Like the previous
Air Force air crew version, the final industrial form evolved with measures of Consideration and Initiating structure. The scales were found to be independent and reliable. Reliability was assessed in terms of internal consistency, inter-rater agreement, and stability of repeated measurements over time. Validity was assessed through correlations with independent measures, e.g., absenteeism and turn over data, productivity ratings, peer ratings, and leaderless group situation tests. The two scales were found to be differentially predictive of a number of these criteria.
Finally, in a factorial study of very short scales by
Stogdill, Scott, and Jaynes,^ descriptions of leader behavior resulted in the identification of three factors: Administrative Control,
Effective Interpersonal Relations, and Public Relations or Represen tation. The fact that these three factors appeared in two different
samples appeared to lend credence to the results. It was also obvious that the two dimensions of Administrative Control and
Effective Interpersonal Relations bore a high degree of similarity
to the two dimensions of Initiating Structure and Consideration.
^Edwin A. Fleishman, "A Leader Behavior Description for Industry," Leader Behavior: Its Description and Measurement, ed. Ralph K. Stogdill and Alvin E. Coons (Columbus: The Ohio State University Bureau of Business Research, 1957)* PP* 103-119.
2Ralph M. Stogdill, Ellis L. Scott, and William E. Jaynes, "A Factorial Study of Very Short Scales," Leader Behavior: Its Description and Measurement, ed. Ralph M. Stogdill and Alvin E. Coons (Columbus: The Ohio State University Bureau of Business Research, 1957), pp. 140-49. In addition to the foregoing, Leader Behavior Descriptions have been used in a variety of situations. The following studies are representative:
1. Leader behavior and the effectiveness of aircraft commanders, a study sponsored jointly by the Human Resources Research Laboratories, Department of the Air Force, and the Ohio State University Research Foundation
2. The observed leader behaviors and ideal leader behaviors of aircraft commanders and school superintendents, re ported by Andrew A. Halpin
3. Relationships between leader behavior and group charac teristics within air crews, reported by Carl H. Kush, Jr.
4. Leader behavior associated with the administrative repu tations of college departments, reported by John K. Hemphill
5. A comparison of general and specific leader behavior descriptions by Kelvin Seeman
It is somewhat apparent from the foregoing outline pertaining to the description and use of the LBDQ, that this is a relatively well tested instrument. Although some reservations may be expressed with regard to it, e.g., in connection with the probable evaluation tone or evaluation halo produced by the instrument, and although those who have developed and used the LBDQ would be the first to agree that it does not supply the final answers in the matter of describing leader behavior, it does appear, as Shartle has stated, that "the descriptive dimensions represent useful concepts thet are pertinent to research and to the utilization of research results."^-
^-Carroll L. Shartle, loc. cit., p. 4* 9
In the study reported here, actual descriptions of behavior, involving both real leaders and ideal leaders, were obtained by use
of the final, short form LBDQ. A3 indicated in the foregoing refer
ence to the report by Halpin and Winder, the questionnaire consists of
40 questions, only thirty of which are scored. Table 1 categorizes
the individual scored questions, according to the basic dimensions.
t a b l e 1
SCORED QUESTIONS ON THE LEADER BEHAVIOR DESCRIPTION QUESTIONNAIRE ACCORDING TO THE DIMENSIONS, CONSIDERATION AND INITIATING- STRUCTURE
Consideration
Item No. Item
1. He does personal favors for group members.
3. He does little things to make it pleasant to be a member of the group.
6. He is easy to understand.
8. He finds time to listen to group members.
12. He keeps to himself (scored negatively).
13. He looks out for the personal welfare of individual group members.
18. He refuses to explain his actions (scored negatively).
20. He acts without consulting the group (scored negatively).
21. He backs up the members in their actions.
23. He treats all group members as his equals.
26. He is willing to make changes.
26. He is friendly and approachable.
31. He makes group members feel at ease when talking with him 10
TABLci 1 - Continued
Consideration
Item No* Item
34. He puts suggestions made by the group into operation.
38. He gets group approval on important matters before going ahead.
Initiating Structure
Item No. Item
2. He makes his attitudes clear to the group.
4. He tries out his new ideas with the group.
9. He criticizes poor work.
10. He speaks in a manner not to be questioned.
14. He assigns group members to particular tasks.
15. He schedules the work to be done.
17. He maintains definite standards of performance.
22. He emphasizes the meeting of deadlines.
24. He encourages the use of uniform procedures.
27. He makes sure that his part in the organization is under stood by all group members.
29. He asks that group members follow standard rules and regulations.
32. He lets group members know what is expected of them.
35. He sees to it that group members are working up to capacity.
3 6 . He sees to it that the work of group members is coordi nated.
As a matter of definition, Consideration refers to behavior indicative of friendship, mutual trust, respect and warmth in the 11 relationship between the leader and the members of the group. It is roughly equivalent to permissive, human relations-oriented, and demo cratic supervision. Initiating Structure, on the other hand, refers to the leader's behavior in delineating the relationship between himself and the members of his group, and in endeavoring to establish well-defined patterns of organization, channels of communication, and ways of getting the job done. It is equated, generally, to status,
rank, line-of-command-oriented, authoritarian supervision. Although
they constitute relatively discrete dimensions of behavior, Considera
tion and Initiating Structure are not incompatible, nor should they be
considered to represent opposite extremes of a behavioral continuum.
As this and other studies utilizing the Leader Behavior Description
technique have demonstrated, the described behaviors of many individ
uals reflect both dimensions to a marked degree.
The definitions of "democratic" and "authoritarian" behaviors,
for the purpose of this study, are based on the traditional constructs
of political theory. Thus, democratic values, regardless of the en
vironment in which they find expression, stress the individual and his
ability and entitlement to determine what is good for him. On this
account, also, democracy strongly infers egalitarianism. Furthermore,
since the ultimate democratic value is the individual and his rights,
dignity and welfare, social or organizational goals tend to be sub
ordinated to the means by which these goals are achieved. The various
forms of authoritarianism, on the other hand, while perhaps officially
oriented to the goals of individuals or the majority of individuals,
relegate to a leader or to an elite group the authority and responsi
bility for determining what is good for individuals. In the political 12 sense, those who are ruled are not equal to the rulers. The "rights" of individuals are dependent to a greater extent on attitudes and decisions of the ruler or the ruling class; and finally, the indi vidual and his aspirations, in an authoritarian environment, are subordinated to the overall goals of the unit of which the individual is only a part.
Within this frame of reference, then, the following kinds of behavior on the part of a supervisor or administrator in relationship to other group members are considered to be "democratic":
1. displaying egalitarian tendencies in inter-personal relationships
2. evincing attitudes of respect for individual aspirations, personality and welfare
3. seeking or promoting participation of organizational members in the decision making process
Conversely, examples of "authoritarian" behavior within an organization would include
1. administering the organization and making decisions with minimum reference to group members
2. emphasizing personal status differentiations in terms of formal organization
3. accepting too narrow a view of the goals of the organiza tion as simply production and delivery, without adequate consideration for personal welfare and the goals of indi vidual group members
An example of the dichotomization of leadership situations into "democratic" and "authoritarian" for empirical purposes is provided by an experiment conducted by E. Lippitt and R. K. White 13 at the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station. Croup leader activities were differentiated as shown in Table 2.^
TABLE 2
DEMOCRATIC AND AUTHORITARIAN LEADERSHIP SITUATIONS IN AN EXPERIMENTAL SETTING AT THE IOWA CHILD WELFARE RESEARCH STATION
Democratic Authoritarian
1. All policies a matter of 1. All determination of policy group determination, en by the strongest person couraged and drawn out by (leader). the leader,
2. Activity perspective given 2. Techniques and steps of at by an explanation of the taining the goal dictated by general steps of the process the authority, one at a time, during discussion at first so that future direction was meeting. Where technical always uncertain to a large advice was needed, the degree. leader tried to point out two or three alternative procedures from which choice could be made.
3. The members were free to 3* The authority usually deter work with whomever they mined autocratically what chose and the division of each member should do and with tasks was left up to the whom he should work. group.
A. The leader attempted to be 4* The dominator criticized and a group member in spirit praised individual1 s activities and in discussion but not without giving objective rea to perform much of the sons, and remained aloof from actual work. He gave ob active group participation. He jective praise and criti was always impersonal rather cism. than outwardly hostile or friendly (a necessary con cession in method).
■4turt Lewin, “The Consequences of An Authoritarian and Democratic Leadership," Studies in Leadership, ed. Alvin W. Gouldner (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 411-14* 14
During the process of designing this study, the question was considered as to whether the LBDQ could be relied upon to distinguish between "democratic11 and "authoritarian" behaviors. It appeared that a number of the LBDQ items do have a manifest "authoritarian" or
"democratic" content, e.g.,
Autho ritarian
Item No. 7 - He rules with an iron hand. Item No. 11 - He speaks in a manner not to be questioned.
Democratic
Item No. 23 - He treats all group members as his equals. Item No. 38 - He gets group approval on important matters before going ahead.
Thus, if a supervisor is described as ruling with an iron hand always or often, it appeared relatively safe to assume that he was inclined to "authoritarian" behavior. On the other hand, if he always or often treated all group members as his equals, it appeared reason able to assume that he had "democratic" proclivities, ouch a distinc tion would be invalid, of course, if the respondent stated that a
supervisor both ruled with an iron hand and treated all group members as his equals. With regard to the other LBDQ items, it is not so manifestly clear that they belong either in an "authoritarian" or a
"democratic" category. Item No. 17, "He maintains definite standards of performance," is a case at point. On the surface, this would appear to be an "authoritarian" item, but it could just as readily be argued that the establishment of standards of performance within an organiza tion represents a basically fair and equal application of rules necessary to organized effort and, in this sense, is in full accord 15 with democratic procedure.
Perhaps of greater significance in discriminating between
"democratic11 and "authoritarian" behavior are the dimensions of
Consideration and Initiating structure. In a study of B-29 and B-50 air crews and their aircraft commanders, intercorrelations between
Hemphill1s group dimensions and the LBD^ dimensions showed relatively high negative correlations between Stratification (a group dimension) and Consideration. This was interpreted to mean that if a crew member perceives wide status differences between the crew and the aircraft commander, he is not likely to construe the aircraft commander1s behavior as considerate. In this sense, the dimension of Considera tion does appear to bear a negative relationship to "non-democratic"
behavior and, by inference, a positive relationship to "democratic" behavior,^- Furthermore, in two Navy samples, a low, but significantly
positive, correlation was obtained between Initiating structure and
the scores on- the F scale, a measure of authoritarianism.
In view of the foregoing, it was considered that some gener
alization might be made with regard to "democratic" vs. "authoritarian"
behavior among administrators within the environment of this study,
based on an analysis of item and dimension scores of the LBDQ, Thus,
^Carl A. Rush, Jr., "Leader Behavior and Group Character istics," Leader Behavior; Its Description and Measurement, ed. Ralph K , stogdjTl and Alvin E. Coons (Columbus; The Ohio State University Bureau of Business Research, 1957)» pp. 69-73,
^Edwin A. Fleishman, "The Leadership Opinion Questionnaire," Leader Behavior; Its Description and Measurement. ed, Ralph to. Stogdill and Alvin E. Coons (Columbus: The Ohio State University Bureau of Business Research, 1957)* pp. 120-33. 16 assuming that leader behavior can actually be described with a degree of reliability through the use of the LBDQ, and, further, that responses can be dichotomized into "democratic" and "authoritarian" categories, what when could be the implications of a study such as this?
In the first place, it i3 thought that the focus of attention might be directed advantageously to the matter of democratic and author!'arian tendencies, values and behaviors as they may be mani fested by administrators and other supervisors within public organiza tions. The subject of democracy in administration has been dealt with extensively from the points of view of representation and interpreta tion of the "public interest", and the responsibility and accountabil ity of the administrator.
However, relatively little empirical inquiry has been made of the extent to which shared values and ideals of democracy are observed in the actual work processes of the administrative structure, itself.
It is suggested here that 3uch an inquiry may be in order, particularly since democracy, inherently, places high value on means (presumably- including means and ways of inter-personal behavior) as contrasted with ends.
Secondly, it might be assumed reasonably that organizations with which individuals are affiliated formally, such as public agencies, mis»ht well project their internally accepted and practiced values and hence influence significantly individuals or groups outside
such organizations. In very large public agencies, such as the
Department of Defense, this might be particularly true because of the size of the "publics" involved and affected. This kind of influence, however, is stated only as a possibil ity, in view of a general lack of data from which generalizations can be made. It can probably be safely assumed that individuals affili ated with formal organizations do, indeed, by their behaviors, influence and affect those outside the organizations with whom they
come into contact, whether or not behaviors internal to an organiza tion are carried to the outside in anything resembling pure form is
another question. As a matter of fact, there is a growing body of
evidence indicating that individuals assume or take varying roles,
depending on the particular environment or situation encountered or
experienced. Thus, it would appear to be within the realm of possi
bility for an individual to assume an authoritarian role in one situa
tion and a democratic one in another.
As a final point, the extent to which organizational leader
ship tends to be "democratic" or "authoritarian", or any combination
thereof, may have a relationship to factors tiaving a more direct
bearing on the organ!zational goals. Efficiency and productivity are
the factors most often cited in thi3 connection. In a relatively
authoritarian environment, efficiency and productivity can be impaired
a 3 a result of status barriers to communications. Thus, Stouffer and
associates in studies within the Army found that officers were often
inadequately aware of what enlisted men were thinking due to barriers
to communication imposed by power and status differences, strengthened
by the psychological stresses of officer training, and enforced by physical as well as social separation in a non-democratic environ ment .
In a study at the Prudential Insurance Company conducted by the Institute of Social Research, University of Michigan, it was
found that first-line supervisors in high production work groups
differ from those in low production groups in that they are under
less close supervision from their own supervisors, place less emphasis on production as a goal, encourage employee participation in decision making, are employee centered, spend more time in supervision and less
In straight production work, and have a greater feeling of confidence
in their supervisory r o l e s . ^ in a railroad study by the Institute of
Social Research, the rank and file employees of the high production
sections saw their foremen as more interested in the mens' off-the-job problems, more helpful in training them for better jobs, and construc
tive rather than punitive in attitudes toward their mens' mistakes*^
Field experiments at the Harwood Kanufacturing Corporation in
Marion, Virginia, reported by French, were designed to discover
whether democratic techniques would be effective in increasing pro
ductivity in an industrial setting.^4- A comparison was made between
^Samuel A. Stouffer et al.. The American Soldier. Vol. I: Adjustment During Army Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), p p . 391-401.
^Survey Research Center, Productivity. Supervision, and Employee Morale, Report 1 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1948).
^Survey Research Center, Productivity. Supervision, and Morale among Railroad Workers, Monograph Series Number 5 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1951).
R. P. French, Jr., "Field Experiments: Changing Group Productivity," Experiments in Social Progress. ed. J. Miller (New York McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950). 19 groups of women sewing machine operators. In the experimental group, the leader left all decisions up to the group, namely whether they wanted to set a production goal, and if so, at what level and at what time. The results showed an increase of 185& in production without any changes in the job methods or other physical conditions of work.
The change was attributed to leadership and the social factors in volved in group decisions. In a later experiment a different aspect of democratic procedure was investigated, Each worker was allowed
to plan to work slowly each day at certain hours, and at other hours
to work more rapidly. Even though no decisions were iaade to increase
production, the results showed a similar rise in production over the
usual situation where supervisors were continually urging the operators to sew as fast as possible at all times. French concluded from the
series of experiments that democratic leadership can result in marked
increases in production in the industrial setting, and that the style
of leadership is the most important variable and differs markedly from
one leader to another.
In contradistinction to those studies which have indicated a
positive correlation between democratic leadership and group pro
ductivity, a five year project in social perception and group effec
tiveness at the University of Illinois indicated that a certain
amount of psychological distance between the leader and his men,
especially his key subordinates, is an essential attribute of a
productive situation. According to Fiedler,
this requires a reinterpretation of the social barriers which by custom and tradition separate officers from enlisted men in the armed services, and executives from other employees in business and industry. These barriers cannot be adequately 20
explained in terms of the "familiarlty-breeds-contempt" notion that one must prevent subordinates from becoming too familiar with their leader# Rather, the main function of these barriers seems to consist of preventing the leader from becoming too familiar with his men. In the presence of such social barriers, the leader is less likely to form deep emotional attachments or close friendships with subordinates, which could lead to favoritism toward some and poor discipline among all the men in his unit."^
In summary, a number of carefully controlled studies have demonstrated that leadership behavior does represent a significant factor in group productivity, although precisely how and why tnis comes about still remains somewhat obscure. Nonetheless, the description and analysis of leadership behavior in public agencies, as well as in private organizations, does appear to represent a valid and necessary area for study and research, insofar as such behavior affects efficiency, productivity and related aspects pertaining to the fulfillment of organizational goals.
As indicated at the outset of this chapter, the primary objec tives of this study were to determine the extent to which successful civilian administrators within a specific public organization adhered to a pattern of behavior or ideal stereotype postulated by their military peers and superiors; and secondly, to the extent possible, to determine whether tuch behavior tended to be democratic or authoritarian.
Only the first stated objective involves the postulating and testing of an hypothesis, as will be shown later in this paper.
^Fred E. Fiedler, Leader Attitudes and Group Effectiveness (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958), p. J+4. Fiedler1 s investigations pointed up two major leadership attributes necessary to prediction of group productivity, which must exist concurrently. One, as indicated, is a certain amount of social distance, and the other, which might be construed as 11 demo era tic,11 is acceptability of the leader to the followers. 21 Because of the considerable amount, and nature of, the data collected for testing the hypothesis, it was anticipated that other useful information or deductions might be developed and determined.
These data and deductions constitute the secondary objectives of the study and can be expressed in terms of providing some insight with respect to the following questions: 1. To what extent are the values of superiors reflected in their performance evaluations of subordinates in a military-civilian public administrative environ ment? 2. In this environment, how do successful civilian adminis trators behave as compared with less than successful adminlstrators?
3 * What Impact do such variables as military experience, education, age, and intelligence have on administrative behavior? These questions will be dealt with in detail in the succeed
ing chapters of this paper. At this point, however, suffice it to say that these questions and their possible answers represent problems of
continuing concern to administrators and personnel directors at
probably all levels of government. The performance or efficiency rating is a case in point. It has been used variously as a key ele ment in determining retention preference in the Civil Service, and in
determining eligibility for promotion, demotion, re-assignment, re moval, and recognition awards. Except in the relatively few instances
where ratings can be based on quantitative production records or per
formance records, they must be based on subjective considerations and the value judgments of individual supervisors as to what represents 22 inadequate, adequate or more than adequate performance. Thus, it was thought that thie study might have some very limited utility in shedding light on the extent of variance between individual super* viaory standards or frames of reference for assigning employee per* formance evaluations. CHAPTER II
THE ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
It is axiomatic that the behavior of individuals is condi tioned to some extent by the organizational or institutional environ ments in which they work. For this reason the environment in which this study of administrative behavior was conducted is described here with in some of its more pertinent aspects.
The logistics arm of the United States Air Force, the Air
Materiel Command, is composed of a network of 6k air bases and other installations in the continental United States and overseas. Over
190,000 people, including Air Force military, United States citizen civilian, and foreign nationals, are assigned to, or employed by, the
Air Materiel Command. The ratio of military to civilian is approxi mately 1: 7. The number of people employed at any one Air Materiel
Command base ranges from a few hundred at the smallest stations to over 20,000 at the gigantic Kelly Air Force Base at San Antonio,
Texas, and the Tinker Air Force Base at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
From the standpoint of numbers employed, the Air Materiel
Command is larger than all but the largest of American industries.
Although equated in organizational terms to a federal government bureau, it employs far more people than most departments of government.
For example, its total employed population is twenty times that of the
23 24
Department of labor and is exceeded in numbers employed only by the individual departments of the Armed Services, the Post Office Depart ment, and the Veterans Administration.
During 1954 the magnitude and scope of Air Materiel Command operations were reported as follows in the magazine, Aviation Week:
...AMC operated the largest business in the country within a framework of legislative and regulatory restrictions that would doom any civilian management to frustration and bankruptcy. AMC has total assets of $30 billion - $6 billion more than the combined total of the two largest private corporations in the country, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and the Bell Telephone System.
Here is some of the business AMC did during fiscal 1954: Spent til.4 billion, of which more than $8 billion bought weapons systems and hardware required by USAF. Since the outbreak of the Korean war in mid-1950, AMC has spent $25 billion to put muscle on the under-nourished skeleton of USAF combat wings. Carries contracts currently on its books with hundreds of American firms for future delivery of $17 billion worth of USAF equipment. Overhauled 27,500 aircraft engines and reconditioned 4»512 aircraft. Shipped 4^ million tons of supplies to 300 USAF bases and 1,800 other military installations around the world. Stocked over 800,000 types of items in depots containing 50 million square feet of storage space. Processed 39 million supply items through its domestic and foreign depots.1
As described in Air Force regulations, the mission of the Air Materiel
Command is as follows:
... to provide materiel support for all Air Force activities, and for other agencies to the extent directed by the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. Included in this support are the developing, establishing,operating and controlling systems governing procurement, production, quality control, identifica tion, maintenance, modification, inventory, distribution, traffic management, supply and disposal of all materiel in, or programmed for, the Air Force inventory.2
Robert Hotz, ’’AMC Streamlines Management Pattern," Aviation Week. August 15, 1954, pp. 4-5.
2Air Force Regulation No. 23-2, Organization-Field, Air Mater iel Command, Department of the Air Force, Washington, November 21, 1956, p. 1. 25
Of a total of sixty specific functions designated as the responsibility of the Air Materiel Command, the following are repre sentative:
(1) Act as the over-all central aquisition, procurement, and contracting agency for all materiel required by the Air Force.
(4) Implement approved production programs, including produc tion scheduling, allocation of production facilities, produc tion control, quality oontrol during manufacture of materiel, inspection and acceptance, and the initial custody and control of all materiel Air Force-procured for which the Department of the Air Force has the assigned procurement responsibility....
(8) Conduct or supervise factory acceptance testing and depot modification center testing....
(11) Schedule reparable assets into depot and commercial facilities for repair and return to the Air Force materiel system when necessary to meet programmed requirements....
(14) Compute requirements for all materiel required by the Air Force, based on program data provided or directed by the Chief of Staff, U3AF....
(24) Manage and implement modification of Air Force equipment in keeping with the policies and procedures set forth in appropriate Air Force regulations.
(31) Direct and perform the depot-level operational supply functions related to receipting, distributing, storing, issu ing and controlling Air Force materiel. This includes Army, Navy, or other Federal agency-procured materiel for which the Air Force has storage and issue responsibility. Also provide technical direction and assistance on supply matters as required.
(40) Provide depot-level maintenance for Air Force materiel and for materiel procured by other departments for the Air Force, or by the Air Force for other departments according to inter-departmental agreements.
(43) Prescribe maintenance-engineering technical systems, methods, and procedures to be applied at organization, field, and depot levels.
(47) Coordinate with Air Research and Development Command and industry on design specifications to insure that design of new 26
equipment provides for maintainability....
(48) Accomplish maintenance requirements which exceed the technical capability of using organizations.1
As might be expected in an organization with such breadth of
scope and diversity of function and responsibility, there exists within the Air Materiel Command a wide variety of occupations, both
civilian and military. More or less self-explanatory, random examples
of occupational areas (primarily civilian) are as follows:
electronic equipment repairer buyer price analyst maintenance scheduler property and supply clerk logistician industrial engineer janitor purchasing clerk management analyst aircraft hydraulic mechanic programmer placement and employee industrial specialist relations officer contract specialist jet engine mechanic clerk typist cataloger storekeeper accountant budget officer carpenter supply requirements officer architect armament mechanic patrolman transportation officer organization and methods production specialist examiner general supply officer tabulating equipment operator psychologist carburetor repairer attorney medical officer truck driver patent adviser firefighter
Among the civilians with the Air Materiel Command, represent
ing the great preponderance of personnel, occupations are divided
between the "Classification Act" and "Wage Board" categories. Com
prising approximately 40 per cent of the total, the former are prima
rily administrative, fiscal, sub-professional, professional and cleri
cal positions, such as accountant, psychologist, transportation officer
^Ibid., pp. 2-7. 27 and clerk typist. The incumbents of these positions are paid accord ing to classification grades established by the Classification Act of
1949. .j'age Board employees comprise about 60 per cent of the total civilian complement. They occupy such mechanical trades positions as
Jet engine mechanic and electronic equipment repairer. The hage
Board positions are excluded from the provisions of the Classification
Act, and their pay rates are established in accordance with prevailing locality, industrial ana commercial wage rates.
Although the range of salaries and wages within the Command is not as great as one that might be found within a major industry, for example, there is a significant spread between the lowest and highest paid occupations. The lowest wage, the first step of ’age
Board Grade 1 at >obins Air Force Base, Georgia, is ,»2,579 per annum; and the highest salary, the top step of General .Schedule Grade 17 at
Headquarters, Air Materiel Command, Tright-Fatterson Air Force Base,
Ohio, is $16,335 per annum.
Assigned primarily to executive, administrative and professional
positions, the military officers in the Air Materiel Command, totaling
4,900, range in rank from second lieutenant to the Commander, Air
Materiel Command, a four-star general officer. The enlisted personnel
of the Command, numbering slightly in excess of 18,000, is assigned
to relatively routine, but strictly military, duties, such as to
clerical posts in intelligence or coding operations, flight operations,
and in a fairly wide variety of logistics operations overseas.
The magnitude, dispersion and complexity of operations have
probably had a singular effect on attitudes and behaviors of 28 administrators within the Air materiel Command, civilian and military alike. Of ecsual or possibly greater impact in this connection has been the dynamic and transitional nature of the mission and organiza
tion.
Although possibly an over-simplification, the major task of
the Air Materiel Command, basically, is to ensure that the weaponry
of the Air Force is in the hands of the users, i.e., the combat air
commands, such as the otrategic Air Command, at the right time, at the
right place, in the right amount, and in optimum condition, Major
political and technological developments in the decade since 1950
have changed radically the character and posture of the Air Force.
These developments have necessarily been paralleled by changes in the
organization, physical structure, and the management system of the
logistics component, the Air Materiel Command. In a comparatively
short span of ten years, the Command has undergone a transition in
posture which may be described according to the following general
sequence:
1. Logistical support of large fleets of limited range air craft from a United States industrial base and from huge stockpiles of materiel and a large reservoir of technical, logistical skills in depots and other installations both in the continental United States and overseas
2. Logistical support of a radically different inter-conti nental striking force based in the continental United States, with maintenance workloads increasingly being contracted to private industry
3. Progressive change in support of residual tactical forces overseas, involving a cut—back in logistical materiel and personnel overseas in favor of direct support from the zone of interior
4. A transition from support of conventional, manned airplanes 29
to support of manned and unmanned guided missiles, ballistic missiles and space vehicles? and a concurrent withdrawal of maintenance workloads from private industrial to Air Material Command, "in-house" facilities
The dynamic, emergent nature of the logistics mission was expressed as follows by General R. W. Rawlings, in a pre-retirement message on February 27, 1959:
The mission of logistics— the effective support of military operations— is an unchanging one. However, the way in which this mission must be performed changes constantly as weapons and concepts of warfare change, and as the tools available to the logistician change. The logistics system must always be capable of rendering effective support to the current force in-being. Yet it also must be flexible and dynamic— always preparing itself for the new and different forces to come. The constant challenge facing the logistician is continuous change.
Weapons development trends are far enough along to enable relatively accurate estimates to be made of the nature of the force to be supported through most of the decade of the I9601s. It will be a mixed force, made up of manned aircraft and missiles, with space vehicles becoming increasingly more important. It will be tailored to a variety of missions, and will include both a general and a limited war capability. It will be a smaller force, containing sufficient numbers to accomplish its missions, but being shaped more by the constant development of new weapon systems than by the mass production of already proven ones. The trend to complexity, both in air vehicle and ground environment, will continue, accentuating the requirement for increasingly sophisticated logistics support•
The concept of deterrence will remain all important; without effective deterrence, there can be nothing else. How ever, under the shield of deterrence, continuous challenges to our technological supremacy can be expected. They must be met in kind. Gpace will continue to be a twofold battle field with both military supremacy and national prestige at stake. The increasingly complex logistics mission must embrace a new dimension— space.
One thing will not and should not change— resource limitations. The logisticians integrity impels him to seek sufficient resources to assure effective support. It also 30
requires that he continually find ways to economize— without compromising this support. He must be continually striving to improve the state of the logistic art.^
The conception of rapid, continuous, and sometimes erratic change and development to keep the logistics system abreast of an almost exploding weapons technology and force posture is also reflected in the official history of the Air Materiel Command;
During V'orld War II and in the years immediately follow ing, there were growing indications that the Air Force logistics system was going to need a major overhaul. In the first place, the complexity of modern air weapons was increas ing at a startling rate. Sporadic outcries against "gadgetry" in the Air Force did little to change the inevitable results of American inventiveness and concern for the welfare and safety of crews. And in the early "AO's" the stark realities of war spurred the drive for stepped-up operational capa bility, Great advances in instrumentation, new and compli cated fire control systems, increased defensive and offensive armament and complex equipments for shackling and discharging larger bombs were only a few obvious illustrations of the trend* The whole matter was highlighted during Congressional hearings in 1950 when one Congressman somewhat plaintively remarked that "there are so many hundreds of thousands of parts in an airplane that I am just hoping that you have found the answer to (requirements computation)."
This complexity, in turn, forced a spectacular jump in costs over and above that generated by a spiraling economy. This fact, too, was dramatically illustrated by an AMC general officer who told a Congressional committee that a Norden bombsight used in World War II "cost about 42,500 and fit into a little black suitcase," while the bombing equipment in a B-47 "would fill one end of this room and runs about $250,000 a set." Figures like that helped to explain the disparity between the *600,000 unit flyaway cost of a B-29 and the 42,000,000 the Air Force laid on the line to get a B-A7 jet bomber six years later.
Logistics problems were further compounded by the fact that a substantial number of air vehicles had to be ready to fight anywhere on earth. V'orld War II had confirmed what
^Quoted from a published letter from General K. W. Rawlings, Commander, Air Materiel Command, dated February 27, 1959* to the Chief of Staff, Headquarters, United States Air Force, on the subject of the "Future Development of the Air Materiel Command." 31
World War I had presaged. That was the fact tr.at if two major powers came to blows, the opposing forces would be killing each other all over the globe to prove who was right. And when it became apparent that both sicies would be able to do the job with high speed jet aircraft carrying atomic weapons, the Air Force had to be fully capable of instant, massive retaliation in case someone else pulled the trigger first. All of this might be a nightmarish reflection on man's stupidity, but that didn't alter the hard facts of life for the logistics people who had to gear their operations to the revolutionary demands of modern hot and cold wars.
To meet those demands, the AMC began to develop a good many new policies and techniques during the years immediately following World War II. New means of statistical analysis, mechanized stock control, punch card accounting methods in requirements computations, and a streamlined buyers' system were a few examples of the effort. But the Korean War made it painfully evident that not enough had been done. Logistics operations were too slow, they did not respond quickly enough to combat methods and objectives, and they cost too much. Thus it was that "speed," "flexibility," and "economy" became bywords in logistics jargon. To make them realities as well as bywords, and to solve the problems created by the enormous size of the logistics job, the AMC had to develop new systems of control...... 1
Within the broader framework of policical and technological developments, and the concomitant changes in logistic concepts and posture, numerous organizational and functional changes have taken place within the Air Materiel Command. Designed to streamline and expedite logistic support, these changes, by virtue of their direct impact on individuals within organizations, have probably affected administrative behavior to a marked degree. Some of these "internal" changes are described briefly in the following paragraphs as a
History of the Air Materiel Command, 1 January - 30 June 1957* Volume II, prepared by the Historical Division, Office of Information Services, Air Materiel Command, Wright - Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, January, 1958. 32 means of illustrating more specifically the dynamics implicit in the
Air Kateriel Command operations.^
Large scale decentralization of Air Materiel Command logistics operations began in 1952, because AMC's job had become so large and complex that it could not longer be operated as theretofore by a central organization. This decentralization had its parallel, and possibly its prototype, in the previous decentralizations effected within industrial structures, such as the Ceneral Kotors Corporation and the Ceneral ilectric Corporation.
During the first phase of decentralization, all headquarters,
AMC supply, maintenance, ana administrative support operations not essential to management by central policy control were delegated to subordinate commanders in the Air Materiel Areas and Depots. This was followed by a delegation of contract administration to the Air
Materiel Area commanders who had also been given jurisdiction, pre viously held centrally in AKC headquarters, over a redesigned Air
Procurement District complex.
Somewhat later, the Air Materiel Forces attached to the theatre commanders in Surope and in the Pacific areas were reorganized and transferred to the Air Materiel Command. Concurrently, a large scale effort was inaugurated to convert many of the technical and administrative positions in these Forces from military to civilian.
This decision was based on an increasingly critical need for highly
^■All of the information pertaining to internal organization of the Air Materiel Command, the evidence of logistic responsiveness, and the descriptions of management controls and evolving physical resources provided hereinafter are from official documents of the Air Materiel Command made available to the writer. 33 developed logistics skills overseas which were not readily available within the military personnel complement. Consequently, there was developed an elaborate system of rotation of civilian technicians on a two year cycle to overseas posts and then in reverse to the zone of interior. Almost simultaneously, however, it became technically feasible to decrease substantially AMC's overseas operations and to furnish support, at least with regard to "firstline” air weapons, directly from Air Materiel Areas within the continental United States,
Therefore, cut-backs in civilian manning, so recently augmented over seas, began an organizational trend in yet another direction.
In accordance with the overall objective of a rapid logistic response capability, there was developed and placed in operation a
Logistic Support Manager concept, whereby the "customer” (the commander of an air combat organization or unit) would have only one point of contact for coordinating his multifarious logistic needs, e.g., buying, supply, maintenance, and transportation. This move was, in a sense, a centralization and pin-pointing of responsibility for each major weapon system. At the same time, major world-wide management responsibilities were taken away by the Logistic Support Manager from other old line organizational entities, such as Maintenance Engineer ing and Supply.
Central procurement of Department of Defense directed weapons and support systems was the objective of yet another major reorganiza tion in 1958, viz., the establishment of the AMC Ballistic Missile
Center and the AMC Aeronautical Systems Center. Into these organiza tions was localized and centralized the executive management of 34 weapons systems as they move from the developmental stage under the
Air Research and Development Command to the logistics pipe line of the Air Materiel Command*
As a further means of increasing and improving logistics responsiveness* steps were taken to overhaul records systems, to improve communications, to place logistical data processing on a high speed basis, and to expedite actual materiel movements*
A world-wide electrical accounting machine, punch-card transceiver network was installed and used for transmitting supply requisitions from the "customer's" bases to depots and among depots.
The net was progressively extended until it served most major Air
Force bases. With this operating net established, plans were made to move toward a single materiel communication system, which would incorporate high speed automatic switching and routing, and provide direct machine-language tie-in with all computer (data processing) centers.
Most important to logistics management was the modernization of the materiel data system through the use of electronic data processing. Although much remains to be done in this area of endeavor, electronic data processing has become an integral and vital element in the materiel support process, with large scale computers in place at most major Air Materiel Command installations.
Beginning with a relatively small but unique system of UBe of
contracted commercial air carriers for movement of aircraft spare parts from the continental United States to the Korean theatre, a high speed capability was developed for movement of materiel utilizing 35 all forms of military and civilian transportation. In-transit times for critically needed materiel within the continental United States were pegged at a maximum of four days. Regular deliveries of such items to overseas combat forces were expedited so that they could be effected within ten days. This compared with pre-1951 times of thirty and ninety days respectively. At the same time, the investment in stockpiled materiel decreased accordingly, and warehouse requirements were drastically reduced.
Increasingly, depot—level emergency maintenance support of the
"customer's" air weapons, e.g., complete overhaul or replacement of a major component such as an aircraft engine, was provided through mobile maintenance teams. The first such teams were established for
D-day support of Strategic Air Command war-committed aircraft. In time, the program was increased to the place where it encompassed 52 separate teams with a total personnel complement in excess of 2700.
Other teams were established for normal area support within the zone of interior and overseas; twenty-four hour, seven days a week mainte nance and supply support to combat aircraft landing at AMC bases; and
support for reclamation and salvage of mission aircraft crashed at non-
AMC bases. The members of the mobile maintenance teams are on team duty for a relatively small part of their total work time, normally
for "dry-runs" or for actual emergency situations, and the remainder of their time is spent on jobs in the fixed depot installations.
Related to many of the organizational and functional changes
that were effected as a means of rendering the AMC logistic system more responsive to the needs of the combat commands have been the 36 adoption and utilization of certain "business" techniques designed to
improve management controls, and operations in general. Certain of
these have already been indicated, such as the decentralization
program, the introduction of coordinating managers, e.g. the Logistic
Support Manager, and the utilization of electronic data processing
methods for materiel control. Although the fact has resulted in cer
tain apparent contradictions of purpose and ambivalent attitudes on
the part of AMC's top management, the resemblance of the Air Materiel
Command to a large business-industrial-comraercial organization is
inescapable. The huge overhaul facilities of the AMC depots in many
respects are closely similar to large industrial establishments, such
as the aircraft and automobile manufacturers. As a matter of fact,
the assembly line production techniques of the automobile makers have
long been in effect at the major AMC engine and airframe overhaul
centers. The supply, warehousing and transportation operations also
have their counterparts in big business. The processes and problems
involved in stock record keeping, warehouse management, inventory
control, and transportation pipelines from supply source to customer
are common both to the Air Materiel Command and a number of large
commercial concerns, such as Sears, Roebuck and Company. The large
scale buying and inspection of Air Force materiel by AMC also is
closely allied to counterpart functions in business and industry.
Some of the major business techniques installed by the Air
Materiel Command in the past few years include the following:
1. A management evaluation system involving a graphic, periodic
presentation of major Command problems, usually in quantitative terms, 37 and comparing actual performance with a schedule, standard or goal.
Only problems are presented, thus providing a basis for management by exception*
2. A depot plant manager ent system, enabling . u vi C managers to define their requirements for men and materiel with reasonable accuracy, to measure their performance in getting the job done, and to provide means of relating the work to be done to the cost of doing
it. Among other things, this has involved the establishment of a
system of controls based upon the standard hour - standard cost con
cepts which have proven effective in private industry.
3. The selective management of "Hi-Valu" materiel, based on the
fact that the overwhelming portion of Air Force dollars is spent for
a limited number of high cost items. Thu3, in the management of
"Hi-Valu" items, the objective has been to select a range of more
expensive "spares" for detailed, especially accurate and austere management *
4. Refining financial management by physically locating the
accounting, disbursing and reporting function pertaining to vendors'
contracts in the vicinity of, or in the plant of, the contractor.
The provision of accurate and prompt data regarding due-in assets,
in-transit inventories, and accrued expenditures has been an integral
part of this project.
5. Management of common use materiol and services, i.e., common
to Air Force installations and also to the Army and Navy, by means of
a revolving fund (stock and industrial funding).
6. The adoption of a quality control procedure as a basis for 38 inspecting the industrial production of Air Force materiel. This involved the application of a system of "multi-level continuous sampling plans by attributes" developed by the Stanford University in conjunction with the Air Materiel Command. This plan automatically provided for the adjustment of inspection rates to the level of quality found to exist during the inspection process.
The various systems, programs and techniques described above have pointed up the increasing need for more effective managetiient skills within the Air Materiel Command. "Management capability,"
General Rawlings has 3aid, "is at once our most essential and scarcest commodity." A former Director of Personnel of the Commend, Major
General Paul 1. Ruestow, has made essentially the same point as follows:
One of the most urgently felt needs of Government, a/, is the case with private Industry, is the need for highly competent top managers. Outstanding managerial talents are a must in an organization of the size and complexity of the Air Kateriel Command. For this reason we have, for several years past, given careful attention to the development of executive talents.
In somewhat the same vein, Major General Thetus C. Odom, former
Commander of the Can Antonio Air Kateriel Area, Kelly Air Force Base,
Texas, has emphasized that:
...On the one hand there is a public demand for more and stronger air power. On the other hand there is public demand for lower taxes. Putting these demands together, we find that we are expected to produce more airpower for fewer dollars. Government's answer, like industry's, can only be better management.
^lajor General Paul E. Ruestow, "Use of Manpower Resources in the Air Materiel Command," Armed Forces Management. Vol. 2, Number 12 (September, 1956), 47# 39
In the Air Force, more than in most industry, there is always a need for people to fill management positions. In addition to a normal need for replacements, defense indus tries like Kelly have a recurring emergency need, When an international crisis-like the Berlin Airlift-arises, Kelly expands very rapidly. When the crisis is over, Kelly's strength is cut. Such recurring situations make great demands on the organization and especially on its management.
The combination of normal and recurring emergency needs makes it necessary to have a pool of executive talent avail able to meet all eventualities. Each man in this pool must be developed to near the top of his capacity.
Another indication of the emphasis given the development of effective management skills has been the institutional training and education underwritten by the Air Materiel Command for its personnel at executive and administrative levels. In September, 1958, the AMC
Logistics Education Center was established at Aright-Patterson Air
Force Base. Operated under the joint auspices of the Ohio State
University and the Air Force Institute of Technology (a subsidiary of the Air University), the Center during its first year of operation enrolled over 1200 students for a total of 108,000 student hours of instruction. Courses of the curriculum include the following 2 subjects:
Logistics Fhilosophy and Doctrine Logic and Creative Thinking Logistics Planning and Programming Management and Financial Management Logistics Operations Research Techniques and Methodologies Air Materiel Management Seminar
^Major General Thetus C. Odom, "Management Development at Kelly Air Force Base," Public Administration Review. XVI (Winter, 1956), 33-34.
^From the published catalogue, School of Logistics, 1959-1960, The Logistics Education Center Courses: AMC, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. 40
Materials and Manufacturing Processes Production Analysis Production Management Seminar Supervisory Maintenance Maintenance Operations Industrial Property Administration Advanced Buying Principles of Buying Base Procurement Management Principles of Contract Administration Principles of Pricing Advanced Materiel Requirements Determination Logistics Systems Engineering Statistical quality Control Advanced Quality Analysis
In addition to the executive and management level training given at the Logistics Education Center, a total of twenty-eignt man- years of management training was given AMC management personnel, primarily in short, specialized courses of two or three weeks duration,
on the campuses of American colleges and universities. Moreover,
extensive, formal management training is given on the Job to super
visors and managers below the higher management levels.
The major characteristics of the organizational environment,
discussed thus far, that might be said to affect administrative behavior materially, have included the magnitude and scope of the Air
Materiel Command and its operations; its dynamic and fluid aspects;
and its emphasis on business management. There now remains to be
discussed another facet of the environment, that is of especial perti nence to this stucty-. This refers to the tensions and differences
arising from problems relating to military and civilian authorities,
responsibilities, and assignments.
Although matters pertaining to emulation and imitation, as
between the civilian and military administrative groups, will be 41 dealt with hereinafter in connection with the major hypothesis, it is appropriate at this point to discuss two developments, originating for the most part outside the Air Materiel Command, which probably served to stress considerably the separateness of the two groups.
The first development has to do with the recommendations of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern ment, in 1955, pertaining to "civilianization" of support activities within the Department of Defense, The most pertinent of these were as follows:
Recommendation Number 8 Congress should enact legislation establishing a separate civilian-managed agency, reporting to the Secretary of Defense, to administer common supply and service activities.
Recommendation Number 10 The separate agency should be named the "Defense Supply and Service Administration," and its Administrator should be a presidential appointee. Initially, the agency should manage selected items of common supply, and operate general and specialized hospitals.
Recommendation Number 13 Congress should enact a Title V to the Rational Security Act to provide the legislative basis for specializing manage ment and technical personnel in the support activities. This legislation should establish these basic principles: a. Military personnel will be limited primarily to posts in tactical organizations, and civilian personnel will be utilized increasingly in management and technical positions in support activities. b. Criteria will be established for use in determin ing those management and technical positions in support organizations which will be filled by civilian personnel and those which will be filled by military officers. c. Legal and administrative obstacles which prevent the most productive utilization of both civilian and military personnel in support activities must be promptly removed.
Recommendation Number 14 Congress should incorporate criteria in Title V to the National Security Act which will clearly distinguish the 42
proper roles for civilian and military support managers and technical personnel and should direct immediate application of these criteria by the secretary of Defense.^
The Commission's recommendations posed a real problem and threat to the top military officers of the Air Force and the Air
Materiel Command, who traditionally had regarded support activities, such as those dealt with in the Commission's recommendations, as integral to, and inseparable from, military management and operations.
Although the stated purpose of the proposed Defense Supply and Service
Administration was to administer supply and services common to the
Armed Forces, this was probably construed as an undesirable precedent upon which later incursions into the logistics and support functions could be based. Possibly equally unpalatable, and unreasonable, in the eyes of military personnel, was the Commission's premise that many military officers had been and were occupying positions that properly should be civilian. To ensure that civilians would replace military in the appropriate areas, the Commission had recommended
A report to Congress each year, for 5 years, on the number of positions formerly held by military officers which had been opened to civilians, and the number of such positions which had been filled by civilian managers and technicians.
As could be expected, reaction to the Commission's recommenda tions within the Air Force and Air Kateriel Command hierarchies was rather positive, in spite of certain random indications of support
^Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Business Organization of the Department of Defense*- A report to the Congress, June, 1955, PP. 45-63*
2Ibid., pp. 63-65. 43 from some military quarters. The Air Force elements, including the
Air Materiel Command, 11 non-concurred." Although somewhat eclectic in nature, the reasons given for non-concurrence were based on a serious and sincere appraisal of consequences by key personnel. These reasons, in summary, were:
1. Logistics management should not be removed from the line of the Air Force command, since the logistics system is a vital and inseparable part of the total Air Force combat organization; and the
Chief of Staff cannot perform his mission effectively without control over all the resources which are vital to and inherent in the ac complishment of that mission.
2. A separate logistics agency introduces centralization to an extreme and would result in the creation of cumbersome administrative processes and procedures and a general unresponsiveness in an area of supply important to the needs of the military departments,
3. The arbitrary division of military and civilian groups, based on assignment of military personnel to tactical organizations, and
civilian personnel to management and technical positions would not be practicable.
4. The Air Force had already taken 3teps in the direction of civilian!zation wherever possible. For example, the supply function of AMC within the United States was staffed by about 40,000 civilians and slightly over 200 military officers.
5. A limiting factor to further civilian!zation was the unavail ability in the civilian system of personnel of persons with the requisite high-level, management-logistics capabilities. 44
A second, but related, development that served to underline the dichotomization of "civilian” and "military" was a rapidly evolving feeling that the assimilation of the Air Materiel Command to big business had gone too far, and that "businesslike" management in logistics was creating a disruptive centrifugal force that was inimical to military control. Top management in AMC was becoming increasingly concerned with three developments in particular:
1. Increasing use in logistics of single managers and working capital funds of the stock and industrial types
2. Overbalance in the proportion of logistics support, e.g., maintenance of air weapons, by private contractors
3. Increasingly centralized budgetary and fund control
With each of these developments, control by the military line was somewhat diminished. Under the system of single management of items and services common to the Armed Forces, Air Force commanders were dependent on organizations outside the Air Force jurisdiction, e.g., in connection with clothing and textile supply which was managed by the Army Quartermaster, Perhaps more serious in terms of military line control was the growth of depot-level contractual maintenance
from less than 10 per cent of the total AMC maintenance workload in
1950 to approximately 55 per cent in early 1959* Here, actual control of work was outside the Command’s jurisdiction entirely, thus exposing military logistics to such uncontrollable exigencies as work stoppages and strikes. Budgetary and fund control, representing, in a sense, the life blood of the military organization, had been gravitating to
financial management centers and civilian control at the levels of the 45
Secretaries of the Air Force and the Department of Defense.
The apprehension that business techniques, which for years had been endorsed and encouraged, were tending to overshadow and jeopardize effective support of military operations was expressed by General i£.
W. Rawlings in an address on January 5, 1959, to students of the AMC
Logistics Education Center, as follows:
Briefly, I believe that a genuine hazard to the future of effective air logistic support is emerging today from too close an identification in some areas between business and military logistics principles of management. Cumulative pressure for "businesslike" management in logistics is creat ing a disruptive centrifugal force. This tends to divert segments of the total, integrated logistics mission and thus compromise its primary objective— effective support of military operations.
The trend toward business standards and methods in logistical management is not new. In most of its aspects it has proved a highly desirable stimulus to management improvement. In the Air Materiel Command we have for years borrowed, begged and bought all the business "know-how" that could be profitably applied to our operations and organization structure....
These have all helped to streamline and strengthen our logistic operations. Their favorable results have led us to take the business analogy for granted— perhaps too much so. In the flux of many and rapid developments within our evolving system, certain piecemeal "business" trends have now begun to consolidate into major management concepts which are potential obstacles to effective accomplishment of our mission.
This and other polemics against the "disintegrative" tendencies resulting from over-emphasis on "business-like" techniques are based primarily on the assumption that unity of command and direct line control over major resources are essential to effective support of the combat organizations. Nonetheless, military vis-a-vis civilian con trol is also inherent in the arguments, and a definite demarcation between what should be considered military as opposed to non-military 46
(hence civilian) is 3trongly inferred.
In the internal administration of the Air Materiel Command, the line of demarcation between what is considered appropriate for
military operation and what is appropriate for civilian operation also
has been rather carefully drawn. The staffing policies and criteria
for determining whether management positions in AMC should be desig
nated as military or civilian are based generally on guidelines laid
down by the Department of Defense and issued pursuant to recommenda
tions made by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government. Included in the guidelines were the provisions
that:
1. Military personnel will normally be assigned to manage ment positions when required by law, when the position requires skills and knowledges acquired primarily through military training and experience, and when experience in the position is essential to enable the officer personnel to assume responsibilities necessary to maintain combat- related support and proper career development.
2. Civilian personnel will normally be assigned to manage ment positions where the specialist skills required are usually found in the civilian economy and continuity of management and experience is essential and can be better provided by civilians. Proper civilian career develop ment will be essential in these determinations.
3. The line of authority and supervision in support-type activities need not be military. Any level of super visory authority may be exercised in support-type activities by either civilian or military personnel.
Admittedly, the foregoing guidelines are open to varying
interpretations, and possibly this needs to be the case in view of the
necessity for application under highly diverse circumstances. Suffice
^From Attachment 1 to a Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, dated April 5» 1956. kl it to say at this point that the guidelines have been interpreted within the Air Materiel Command to accord to military officers the top level administrative and executive positions. Thus, in Head quarters, AriC, the Commander, tne Vice Commander, their immediate official family, the immediately subordinate directors, and most division chiefs below the directors are military. Some directors have civilian assistants, and rnosu division chiefs have civilian deputies.
In the various AKC installations below Headquarters, a KC, there is a somewhat greater degree of ci-' ilianization, although the pattern is fairly consistent. Thus, within the major Air Materiel Areas, the commanding officers and their subordinate directors are military, while most organizations below the directorate level are headed by civilians.
It 3hould not be inferred from the foregoing descriptions that antagonisms or rivalries exist between military and civilian staffs in
AMC. Such an inference is not warranted. As a matter of fact, at the management level there is abundant evidence of harmonious and coopera tive working relationships and mutual respect between individuals in the two separate categories. The organizational goals are understood and supported by both civilian and military employees, and much sincere, official emphasis has been placed on the desirability of the two groups working as a team. Indeed, benefits accruing from member ship in the organization, or disadvantages arising therefrom, are
common to a large extent to military and civilian alike. Both have a career stake in the continuance of the organization at an effective level of operation; and the psychological rewards attached to public 48
service in the promotion of national defense accrue equally to both.
On the other hand, it is entirely reasonable that the circunt-
stances described above, aiming at reduction and restriction of the
share of the military in the logistic function, have brought to the military management group an acute awareness of the need to defend the
concept of military control against the idea that logistical functions
should be performed primarily by civilian groups and individuals. The
civilians within the Command, also, are not unaware of the fact that, regardless of their individual capabilities and potentialities, the top management positions in the organizations in which they are employed are beyond their reach. These conditions nave, indeed,
created a certain amount of inter-group tension.
Summarizing this chapter, it is suggested that certain,
specific characteristics of the Air Materiel Command organizational
environment may be expected to influence the administrative behavior of civilian executives and administrators working within that environ ment. Chief among these environmental characteristics are the large
size of the organization; the wide scope and impact of its operations;
the dynamic and fluid quality of the process of mission fulfillment;
the assimilation to big business practices; and the dual-status
system at the management levels. Precisely how administrative behaviors are affected within this context could be the subject of
considerable speculation. At the minimum, however, one could expect
civilian administrators, at least the successful ones, to exhibit
adaptive and flexible attributes to a fairly high degree. Furthermore, 49 in view of the military-business management aspects of the environment, a significant amount of structuring behavior should be in evidence.
Finally, in view of the side-by-side existence of two separate career groups, competitive, emulative, and perhaps imitative behaviors should be observable. CHAPTER III
HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
The major hypothesis tested in this study is stated as follows:
Successful civilian administrators within a military logis tics environment (the Air Materiel Command of the United States Air Force) exhibit behaviors tending to correspond to a behavioral pattern associated with successful military officers or with a military officer stereotype within the same environment.
As a matter of definition, for purposes of this study a
"civilian administrator" refers to a civilian (Civil Service) employee of grade GS-12 ($8,500 approximate annual salary) or above, who super vises an organization. The word, "successful," within the context of the term, "successful civilian administrator," is equated generally to organizational success as evidenced by receipt of rewards or other recognition for having contributed effectively to the goals of the particular organization. More concretely, the successful civilian administrator is considered to be one whose present administrative performance, in the eyes of his superiors and peers, is very good or
superior, and whose potential for future development and advancement is not questioned. Where an important deficiency in performance is indicated, or there is evidence of need for development in, or cor rection of, important aspects of administrative performance, such performance is considered "less than successful." By way of example, 51 a "leas than successful" civilian administrator would be one who fails to meet or barely meets the goals or objectives of his organization; needs definite development of his management or technical skill; does not coordinate his activities with superiors on important matters; cannot be depended upon to act without frequent follow-up; or lacks the imagination necessary to plan for future program needs (as shown by employee appraisal records).
As indicated in Chapter I, the instrument selected for the measurement of behavior was the Leader Behavior Description Question naire (LBDQ), developed in conjunction with the Ohio State Leadership
Studies. Among other reasons for selecting this particular instrument was the fact that the questions seemed to lead to responses indicative of "democratic" and "authoritarian" supervisory practices. Although it was recognized that an instrument designed to measure leader behavior does not necessarily measure the most important aspects of total behavior, it was considered that sufficient aspects of total behavior would be indicated to enable a pattern to be discerned, if, indeed, any pattern could be formulated at all.
It had been observed by the writer— and generally corroborated by a number of his associates within the headquarters, Air Material
Command— that those civilian administrators who advanced most rapidly within the organizational ranks seemed to behave in ways indicative of an ideal military behavioral stereotype, i.e., exhibiting behavior valued by successful and potentially successful military officers.
For example, such civilians were orderly and neat in dress and appear ance ; deported themselves in an alert manner; appeared to be 52 especially decisive in official dealings and transactions; gave evi dence of strong convictions and self-confidence; generally eschewed deliverative and equivocating behavior; appeared to be highly moti vated; delegated authority and, at the same time, held subordinates strictly accountable; demonstrated loyalty toward both superiors and subordinates; and were generally consistent and predictable in terms of their administrative behaviors. Essentially these same character istics were also observed in successful military officers and were thought to reflect a sort of military stereotype*
There i3 considerable theoretical backing and some empirical evidence to support the above hypothesis* The history of psychology is replete with various theories pertaining to imitation, identifica tion, and role models* In reviewing the history of imitation, Killer and Dollard classified the various theories into (1) those which stressed imitative tendencies as being innate; (2) those which sug gested a specific neurological mechanism for a primary sort of imita tion; (3) those which postulated that imitative behavior is learned; and (4) a final, somewhat ill-defined group which presented a variety of points of view, including those that took no position on the genesis of imitative behavior but simply assumed it to exi3t at some given point along the life continuum, and others that emphasized sociological variables at the expense of the psychological.^" Names such as Gabriel
Tarde, E. A. Ross, E. B. Holt, F. H, Allport, J. B. Watson, L. T.
Hobhouse, John Dewey, Aristotle, C. H. Cooley, and Charles Darwin
% e a l E. Miller and John Dollard, General Learning and Imi tation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941)/ Appendix 2, pp. 289-326. 53 figure prominently in theories of imitation.
Imitation, or learning to decide between alternatives of role incumbency, according to Talcott Parsons, is a part of a general process of social learning. He has asserted, further, that "imita tion presumably must prove rewarding in some sense if the act to be learned is to be reinforced.1'^ Thus, it appears that a reward- punishment mechanism or process may operate to orient the imitator's behavior, to motivate him to conformity, and dissuade him from devia tion from the expectations of the individual or individuals being imitated. This process results, according to Parsons, in internaliz ing the values of the model (the person being imitated). Specifically, he ha3 said:
The socializing effect will be conceived as the integration of ego into a role complementary to that of alter(s) in such a way that the common values are internalized into ego's personality, and their respective behaviors come to constitute a complementary role-expectation-sanction system.... alter... has certain control of the situation in which ego acts, so that he may influence the consequences of ego's actions. Put in learning terms, he may use these to reinforce the tendencies of ego* s behavior which fit his own expectations of how ego should behave and operate to extinguish those which are deviant.2
Imitation, identification, and role taking may all be con
sidered as aspects or functions of conformance. Conformance, accord
ing to La Pierre, is brought about through social control. It is the
individual's regard for social status that makes him susceptible to
social control and channels his behavior into a "status-group role,"
^Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), p. 211.
^Ibid., pp. 2 1 1 - 1 2 . 54 a form of Identification or imitation* Statue groups, such as work groups, have their laws and norma which are usually bound up with tradition and frequently are not explicit. La Pierre asserts that
...the norms of a status group provide a multi-dimensional scale against which the members measure the actual perform^ ance of each individual. That scale is, in a sense, a com posite ideal of how the perfect member of the group would behave. If all the members conformed to this ideal, the relations of the group would, by assumption, be completely harmonious and each member would secure the maximum possible gratification from participation in the group.1 The individual, according to La Pierre* s approach, is more or less effectively held to the obligations imposed by the status-group norms and laws by the fact that his rights can be overtly and covertly contracted if his performance deviates. Thus, La Pierre postulates, as did Parsons, a reward-punishment socializing or social control mechanism. The techniques of social control for La Pierre include physical, economic, and psychological sanctions and rewards. Perti nent to the hypothesis of this study is La Pierre's observation that, Perhaps the most significant way in which many groups can economically reward the individual for exceptional conduct is through speeding his promotion up the occupational ranks.... This aspect of group control is one of the reasons why occupationally ambitious individuals are es pecially vulnerable to social controls. Also of pertinence to this particular stmdy are the observa tions made by Hiller and Dollard regarding inter-class imitation, which indicate that **imitation in a class hierarchy takes place between juxtaposed classes rather than between those that are socially
^Ri chard T. La Pierre, A Theory of Social Control (New York: McQraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954)* p. 121.
2Ibid.. p. 237 55 distant from one another,"1 Apparently, according to this thesis, members of sub-groups in a society learn that they are subordinated in the privilege hierarchy, and there is an inevitable tendency for the members of the subordinate group to strive for the symbols and other emoluments of superior status. It is interesting to note in this connection, however, that although superordinate groups tend to establish patterns of approved behavior for subordinate groups, the superordinated in a class structure do not necessarily welcome the cheapening of their valued symbols of status by sharing them too widely. Thus, the more widely these symbols are shared, the less the return to each possessor thereof. To use a somewhat facetious example in the environment of this study, top military officers of the Air
Materiel Cosmand might well sanction some simulated military behavioral patterns for subordinate civilian employees but would likely be emphatic In opposing any civilian employee wearing military medals or
Insignia of rank on his civilian clothing. As a matter of fact, simulated military ranks are sometimes used for civilians, such as in connection with determining precedence for seats in airplanes, seating at conference tables, and for other types of accomodations. Thus, a civilian employee of grade GS-14 or GS-15 might be equated in rank to a full colonel in the military service. To the knowledge of the writer, however, such simulated ranks are not specified in official
Air Force or Air Materiel Command regulation or other publications, presumably because of the invidious aspects of such a comparison and a possible aversion on the part of the military to the enforced
^Miller and Dollard, op. clt., p. 189* 56 sharing of this particular symbol of status with non-military personnel. At ths experimental level, there have been numerous studies which have tested hypotheses relating to identification and imitation. Two recent controlled experiments within Industrial and bureaucratic universes are cited as cases at point. In a study of "Leadership
Climate and Supervisory Behavior," Fleishman found that attitudes and behavior of foremen were controlled more by the "leadership climate" under which the foremen worked than by what they had learned in a leadership training course. The fact that changes in attitudes of foremen were registered immediately after training but that no kind of permanent changes were produced has definite implications with regard to the compelling nature of imitation and social control.
Fleishman conjectured that if the foreman could return to an environ ment "where ths boss behaved in a way consistent with what the foreman was taught in the training course, where the new modes of behavior were now the shortest path to approval, we might expect a more perma nent effect of the course."* In a somewhat different but allied vein in a study of varia tions in role-playing patterns among bureaucratic leaders, Hetsler determined that leaders of greater advancement potential tended to emulate both peers and superiors for both status gratification and
^Edwin A. Fleishman, "Leadership Climate" and Supervisory Behavior (Columbus: Personnel Research Board, The Ohio State University, 1951)» pp. 157-56. 57 other rewardo, while, conversely, leaders of lower advancement poten tial tended to elect their subordinates as the primary frame of reference for status enhancement.^
An important factor bearing on the hypothesis of this study is the dual status system that obtains in the Air Materiel Command,
Although, as has been indicated in Chapter II, there are a number of relatively high-level civilian (Civil Service) employees occupying positions of responsibility in the Conaand, there are relatively well-
delined upper limits for the civilian, and the real responsibility and ultimate authority belong to the military. It has thus been hypothe
sised, within the theoretical frame of reference adumbrated above, that members of the status group without the real power (the civilians)
tend to imitate, conform to the values and ideal behavioral patterns
of, and perhaps even emulate the status group with the power (the top military officers) in the hope that their (the civilians') status and
power will be enhanced. As a first step in the study, it was necessary to determine
whether a "behavioral pattern associated with the successful military
officer" actually existed as a picture in the minds of the top
military group of the Air Materiel Command. The Leader Behavior
Description Questionnaire (LBDQ) was used for this purpose and,
accordingly, was administered to a random sampling of 19 general
officers and 100 full colonels within the Command. The leader
described was the "ideal AMC military officer administrator."
^Stanley A. Hetsler, "Variations in Role-Playing Patterns among Different Echelons of Bureaucratic Leaders," American Sociolo gical Review. Vol 20, No. 6 (December, 1953)> p* 705* 58 Secondly, a review was made of approximately 1000 executive development appraisals for civilian administrators at Wright-Pat terson
Air Force Base, Ohio; Kelly Air Force Base, Texas; Robins Air Force
Base, Georgia; and Hill Air Force Base, Utah, These appraisals were designed primarily to serve as a basis for further professional, administrative, or executive development, but were used in connection with this study as the criteria of "successful" or "less than success ful" administrative performance. The validity of these appraisals rests primarily on the fact that each appraisal represents a consensus of three appraisers: the employee’s immediate superior; the next higher supervisor in the supervisory chain; and a peer of the employee in another department. During the appraisal process, each of the three appraisers was counseled by a representative of the personnel department in order to insure careful and objective consideration of each person being appraised and to obviate or control bias to the
extent possible.
From the appraisals reviewed, the following samples (totaling
265 cases) were obtained, based on the foregoing definitions of
"successful" and "less than successful" civilian administrators:
1. 84 successful civilian administrators whose immediate supervisors were military officers
2. 69 successful civilian administrators whose immediate supervisors were civilians
3. 29 less than successful civilian administrators whose immediate supervisors were military officers
4. 83 less than successful civilian administrators whose immediate supervisors were civilians
The immediate supervisors of the persons comprising the 59 foregoing four groups were asked to fill out Leader Behavior Descrip tion Questionnaires (LBDQ's) describing 1. the leader behavior of the administrator supervised 2. the leader behavior of an ideal person occupying the same position as that occupied by the actual adminis trator previously described The following biographical data were collected for all the civilians involved, both those whose behavior was described and those who described behavior: 1. 2. education (total years) 3. college degrees 4. military service (total years) 5. highest rank attained in military service 6. Federal Civil Service (total years) 7. intelligence test scores (Air Force Learning Ability Test) 8. scores on Air Force Civilian Supervisory Selection Battery of tests. 9. scores on Air Force Administrative Judgment Test (Wright- Patterson AFB civilian personnel only) The following biographical data were collected for all military officers who described behavior of subordinates, as well as the 119 general officers and full colonels who described the "ideal AMC mili tary officer administrator":
1. age 2. education (total years) 3. college degrees 4. military service (total years) 60 5. military rank (e.g., major, captain) 6. status in service (regular or reserve) 7. number of promotions in rank during past ten years Data obtained from the Leader Behavior Description Question naires (LBDQ's) and the biographical data were processed as follows: 1. All LBDQ's were scored and the scores combined into the dimensions, Consideration and Initiating Structure. 2. Means and standard deviations were computed for Considera tion and Initiating Structure in each of the following nine (9) questionnaire groups: a. military supervisors* descriptions of 84 successful subordinate civilian administrator s b. the same military supervisors' descriptions of ideal subordinate civilian administrators c. civilian supervisors' descriptions of 69 successful subordinate civilian administrators d. the same civilian supervisors' descriptions of ideal subordinate civilian administrators e. military supervisors' descriptions of 29 less than successful subordinate civilian administrators f. the same military supervisors' descriptions of ideal subordinate civilian administrators g. civilian supervisors' descriptions of 83 less than successful subordinate civilian administrators h. the same civilian supervisors' descriptions of ideal subordinate civilian adainistrators i. the 119 successful military officers' descriptions of the "ideal AMC military officer administrator" (i.e., the descriptions by the 19 general officers and the 100 full colonels) 3. Means and standard deviations were computed for each of the 30 questionnaire items of the LBDQ by each of the foregoing nine (9) questionnaire groups. 4. Within each of the nine (9) questionnaire groups, a matrix of correlation coefficients (Peareonian r) was computed 61
between scores on each of the two dimensions of Considera tion and Initiating Structure and the categories of biographical data specified above. By way of example, for each of the nine (9) questionnaire groups, correla tions were run between the dimension of Initiating Structure and education; Initiating Structure and military rank; between Consideration and intelligence scores; and between Consideration and age. Separate sets of correla tions were computed using the biographical data on those whose behavior was described and those who described behavior. 5. Within each of the nine (9) questionnaire groups, correla tions were computed between each of the thirty (30) items of the LBDQ and each of the biographical variables. 6. Critical ratios (t-ratios) were computed in order to deter mine the statistical significance of differences between various means. All of the significant statistical data are presented and inter preted in the following chapters. CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS
As a rssult of the scoring and analysis of the LBDQ responses of the 119 general officers and colonels, describing the "ideal AMC military officer administrator," a "behavioral pattern associated with the successful military officer administrator" was discerned. The relatively smaller standard deviations from the mean scores in the sample, as compared with other sample groups (illustrated in Table 3)> are interpreted as being indicative of the existence of a military stereotype in the minds of the military describers. Based on the mean scores of the various LBDQ items, the "ideal AMC military officer administrator" may be described in narrative terms as one who perceives his relationship with his group members as one of friendship, mutual trust, respect, and loyalty. He always backs up members in their actions. To a very high degree, he is approachable and endeavors to make group members feel at ease during conversation. He is easy to understand and finds time to listen to group members. He has a genuine concern for their personal welfare. To a somewhat lesser degree, he gets group approval on Important matters before going ahead, puts suggestions made by the group into operation, and treats group members as his equals.
62 63
TABLE 3 MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF LBDQ RESPONSES DESCRIBING THE IDEAL AMC MILITARY OFFICER ADMINISTRATOR, THE SUCCESSFUL, AND THE LESS THAN SUCCESSFUL AMC CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATOR
Ideal Military Successful Less Than Officer Civilian Successful LBDQ Items Civilian
M cr M cr M cr
1. He does personal favors for group members. 1.8 .9 2.2 .9 2.2 .8 2. He makes his attitudes clear to the group. 3.7 .5 3.4 .7 3.0 .9 3. He does little things to make It pleasant to be a member of the group. 3.1 .6 2.7 .7 2.5 .9 4. He tries out his new Ideas with the group. 3.0 .7 2.8 .8 2.5 .9 6. He is easy to understand 3.8 •4 3.4 .8 2.8 .9 7. He rules with an Iron hand. 1.5 .9 1.8 1.0 1.3 1.1 6 . He finds time to listen to group members. 3.5 .6 3.4 .7 3.1 .6 9. He criticises poor work. 3.0 .9 2.8 1.0 2.5 .9 11. He speaks In a manner not to be questioned. 2.1 1.0 2.6 1.1 2.3 1.1
12. He keeps to himself. 2.5 .9 2.8 .9 2.6 .9 13. He looks out for the personal welfare of indi vldual group members. 3.5 .7 3.1 .8 2.8 .9 14. He assigns group members to particular tasks* 3.2 •8 3.2 .8 3.0 .9 64
TABLE 3 - Continued
Ideal Military Successful Less Than LBDQ Items Officer Civilian Successful Civilian M cr MM c r
16. He schedules the work to be done. 3.0 .9 3.2 .8 2.9 1.1
17. He maintains definite standards of performance, 3.8 .4 3.2 .8 2,6 1.0
Id. He refuses to explain his actions (neg.). 3.3 .7 3.5 .7 3.4 .8 o CM
• He acts without consult ing the group (neg.). 2.5 .8 2.3 .9 2.3 .8
21. He backs up members in their actions. 4.0 .5 3.4 .6 3.1 .9 22. He emphasises the meeting of deadlines. 3.9 • 5 3.5 .7 3.0 1.0
23. He treats all group meebe rs as his equals. 2.7 1.3 2.9 1.1 2.9 1.1 • He encourages the use of uniform procedures. 3.3 .8 3.4 .7 3.1 .9 26. He is willing to make changes. 3.3 .7 3.2 .8 2.8 .9 27. He makes sure that his part in the organisation is understood by all group members. 3.8 .5 3.5 .7 3.0 .9 28. He is friendly and approachable. 3.8 •4 3.6 .6 3.4 .7 29. He asks that group members follow standard rules and regulations. 3.3 .9 3.2 .8 3.2 .8 31. He makes group members feel at ease when talk ing with him. 3.8 .4 3.5 .7 3.2 .8 65 TABLE 3 - Continued Ideal Military Successful Less Than Officer Civilian Successful LBDQ Items Civilian M Cf M cr M ef 32. He lets group members know what is expected of them. 3.8 .5 2.3 .9 3.0 .9 34* He puts suggestions made by the group into opera tion. 2.9 .4 3.4 .6 2.6 .6 35. He sees to it that group members are working up to capacity. 3.3 .7 3.5 .7 2.6 1.0 36. He gets group approval on important matters before going ahead. 2.9 .8 2.9 1.1 2.5 .8 39. He sees to it that the work of group members is coordinated. 3.7 .5 3.4 .7 2.9 .8 Consideration 47.2 4.7 45.6* 6.7 42.0* 7.9 Initiating Structure 48.1 4.8 47.0* 7.3 41.0* 9.8 "Differences between mean dimension scores of successful civilian and less than successful civilian significant to better than the .01 level of confidence (t-ratios of 4*01 on Consideration and 5.73 on Initiating Structure, with 263 degrees of freedom). 66 Although definitely human relations oriented, he also per* ceives his relationship with group members as one that is rather highly structured. Thus, to a very high degree, he makes sure that group members understand his (the administrator's) position in the organisation. He stresses both production and organization, as evidenced by his maintenance of definite standards of work per formance, seeing that group members are working up to capacity, emphasizing the meeting of deadlines, seeing to it that the work of group members is coordinated, and encouraging the use of uniform procedures and standard rules and regulations. Although almost always he lets group members know what is expected of them, only occasionally does he speak in a manner not to be questioned. Normally, he eschews ruling with an iron hand but on occasion finds this to be necessary and appropriate. Table U presents the mean scores of the individual question naire responses from the LBDQ's describing the "ideal AMC military officer administrator." The questionnaire items listed in the table are in descending order of mean scores. An arbitrary division into approximate thirds has been made of the items so ranked. It is possibly significant that the Consideration items in the top-ranked third (rank numbers 1, U, 5, and 3) are items indi cating loyalty and friendliness, traits traditionally associated with organisational esprit de corps, but not necessarily indicating "democratic" attitudes with regard to subordinates (i.e., "democratic" in terms of obtaining the consent or participation of subordinates in 67 TABLE 4 MEAN SCORES OF 30 LBDQ ITEMS DESCRIBING THE IDEAL AMC MILITARY OFFICER ADMINISTRATOR IN DESCENDING CRDER OF MEAN SCORES Rank Ord«r LBDQ Item M 1. He backs up member0 In their actions. 4.0 2. He emphasises the meeting of deadlines. 3-9 3. He lets group members know what is expected of them. 3.8 4. He makes group members feel at ease when talking with him. 3.8 5. He is friendly and approachable. 3.8 6. He makes sure his part in the organisation is understood by group members. 3.8 7. He maintains definite standards of per formance. 3.8 8. He is easy to understand. 3.8 9. He makes his attitudes clear to the group. 3.7 10. He sees to it that the work of group members is coordinated. 3.7 11. He looks out for the personal welfare for individual group members. 3.5 12. He finds time to listen to group members. 3.5 13. He sees to it that group members are working up to capacity. 3.3 14. He is willing to make changes. 3.3 15. He asks that group members follow standard rules and regulations. 3.3 16. He encourages the use of uniform procedures. 3.3 68 TABLE 4 - Continued Rank Order LBDQ Itens M 17. He refuses to explain his actions (neg.). 3.3 18. He assigns group members to particular tasks. 3.2 19. He does little things to make it pleasant to be a member of the group. 3.1 20. He schedules the work to be done. 3.0 21. He criticises poor work. 3.0 22. He tries out his new ideas with the group. 3.0 23. He puts suggestions made by the group into operation. 2.9 24. He gets group approval on important matters before going ahead. 2.9 25. He treats all group members as his equals. 2.7 26. He keeps to himself (neg). 2.5 27. He acts without consulting the group (neg.). 2.5 28. He speaks in a manner not to be questioned. 2.1 29. He does personal favors for group members. 1.8 30. He rules with an iron hand. 1.5 69 the process of adadniatarlng the organization or achieving the organizational goals). On the other hand, the Initiating Structure items in the top- ranked third of the item listing include those items that appear, per se, to be more authoritarian and structured than other items appearing lover on the list. Items ranked 3, 6, and 9 are cases at point. The notable exceptions are the lowest and the third from the lowest ranked of all of the items, viz., "He rules with an iron hand" and "He speaks in a manner not to be questioned." Nonetheless, these items are so patently "authoritarian" in their content, that it may be considered surprising that mean scores as high as 1.5 end 2.1 (the former being half way between "occasionally" and "seldom," and the latter being slightly more than "occasionally") were produced. Perhaps more significant is the fact that those items which have the greatest "democratic" content of all items (rank numbers 2 3 , 24, 25, and 27) all fall in the lowest third of the ranked items. Thus, although the "ideal AMC military officer administrator" descriptions produced relatively high mean scores on both of the dimensions of Consideration and Initiating Structure, it appears that greater Importance relatively was attached by the describers to the "authority" items vis \ vis the "democratic." In spite of this, however, the fact remains that even the lowest ranked "democratic" items produced mean scores well above the median of the score range. Table 3 indicates, in terms of the basic dimensions of Consideration and Initiating Structure, as well as the individual questionnaire items, that the behavior of the successful AMC civilian 70 admini strator approximates closely the pattern of the ideal AMC military officer administrator* On the other hand, the differences between the mean scores of the successful civilians and the less than successful civilians, on the same two dimensions, are statistically significant to a high level of confidence. Stated simply, the successful civilian administrator conforms closely to the pattern of the ideal AMC military group, while the less than successful civilian administrator deviates considerably from this pattern. Thus, the hypothesis of this study is proved, so far as it can be assuming the validity of the instruments used. Comparing successful and less than successful AMC civilian administrators, it is to be noted that the greatest differences between mean questionnaire scores occur in those items shown in Table 5. These items, therefore, appear to be the most discriminat ing in terms of the differences between successful and less than successful civilian administrators, as perceived by their superiors. Of the nine items listed on the table, all but two (items 6 and 34) are Initiating Structure items. On one of these (item 32), however, the mean score of the less than successful is higher than that of the successful civilian. On the others, the successful civilian has the higher item score, as might be expected. Item 7, perhaps the most "authoritarian" of all the items, produced a higher mean score for the successful civilian than for either the less than successful civilian or the ideal AMC military officer administrator (means of 1.8, 1.3* and 1.3 respectively). In addition to the dimensions of Consideration and Initiating 71 TABLE 5 LBDQ ITEMS ON WHICH LARGEST MEAN DIFFERENCES OCCURRED IN COMPARING DESCRIPTIONS OF SUCCESSFUL AND LESS THAN SUCCESSFUL CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATORS Mean Scores Item No. LBDQ Items Successful Less Than Successful 6. He Is easy to understand. 3.4 2.8 7. He rules with an iron hand. 1.8 1.3 17. He maintains definite standards of performance. 3.2 2.6 22. He emphasises the meeting of deadlines. 3.5 3.0 27. He makes sure his part in the organisation is understood by group members. 3.5 3.0 32. He lets group members know what is expected of them. 2.3 3.0 34. He puts suggestions made by the group into operation. 3.4 2.6 35. He sees to it that group members are working up to capacity. 3.5 2.6 39. He sees to it that the work of group members is coordinated. 3.4 2.9 72 Structure and the various individual questionnaire items, five other factors from the data collected appear to discriminate significantly between the successful and less than successful civilian administra tors. These are age, Learning Ability (intelligence), test scores on the Air Force Civilian Supervisor Selection Battery, test scores on the Air Force Administrative Judgment test, and military service.^ Table 6 compares the successful and less than successful group in terms of the mean scores on these five factors, the standard devi ations and the t-ratios of the differences between the various means. Table 7 shows the intercorrelations (Pearsonian r) between the five factors. Taken independently, the relationship of the biographical variables to successful or less than successful performance is obvi ously open to considerable question. For example, although the factor of age appears to discriminate significantly between successful and less than successful, it may well be only an expression of another variable or vice versa. Thus, significant negative correlations are found to exist between age and intelligence, as measured by the Learning Ability test. It is possible that intelligence (learning ^The Learning Ability (LA) test is similar to intelligence tests common in schools and industry. The Civilian Supervisory Selection Battery (CSSB) is a battery of tests designed to measure a number of factors predictive of success in supervisory positions, including judgment, interest, and aptitude. The Administrative Judgment test, as the name indicates, measures judgment in administra tive matters. Validation studies on all of the tests have shown them to have statistical validity with relationship to various criterion ratings. 73 TABLE 6 COMPARISON OF 153 SUCCESSFUL AND 112 LESS THAN SUCCESSFUL AMC CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATORS IN TERMS OF MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND t-RATIOS OF MEAN DIFFERENCES OF SELECTED BIOGRAPHICAL FACTORS Mean Scores t-Ratio Factors O' Successful Less Than Successful Less Than Successful Successful Ag« a . 9 47.2 6.2 7.9 6.12* Tears Military Service 2.4 1.9 2.7 2.5 1.54** Learning Abillt y Test 65.3 61.8 9.0 9.7 3.03* CSSB Test, Part A 38.9 35.5 4.7 6.5 4.94* Administrative judgment Test 38.0 33.7 8.0 7.6 10.52* *t’s significant beyond the .01 level of confidence. **f. significant to slightly less than the .10 level of confidence. 74 TABLE 7 INTERCORRELATIONS (PEARSONIAN r) AMONG THE DIMENSIONS OF CON SIDERATION AND INITIATING STRUCTURE, TOGETHER WITH SELECTED BIOGRAPHICAL FACTORS, FOR 153 SUCCESSFUL AND 112 LESS THAN SUCCESSFUL CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATORS Factors Factors Age Trs. Mil. L.A. CSSB AJ Con I.S. Service Test Pt.A Test sid. Successful 1 10 Age X .05 -.23** • -.13 .00 .00 Yrs. Mil. Service X .14 .17** .32** -.01 .02 L.A. Test X .64* .57* .03 .03 CSSB Teat Part A X .61* .03 .03 * AJ Test X .05 -.25 Consid. X .56* I.S. X Less than Successful . . . . ** L.A. Test X .62* .3«* .09 .10 CSSB Test Part A X .53* .17 .13 AJ Test X .00 .11 Consid. X .65* I.S. X *Significant to the .01 level of confidence. ^Significant to the .05 level of confidence. 75 ability) is more the causal factor in accounting for success, while age merely stands in a somewhat negative relationship to intelligence as measured by the instrument used. As another example, while years of military service appear to discriminate between successful and less than successful, this too might well be a reflection of administrative judgment (since positive correlations of some significance exist between years of military service and scores on the Air Force Administrative Judgment Test), or administrative judgment as measured by the instrument used might well be a concomitant of years of mili tary service. Table 6 depicts the mean scores on Consideration and Initi ating Structure for real and ideal civilian administrators, dividing successful from less than successful and comparing scores according to civilian and military describers. From this table it is to be noted that the descriptions by military superiors result in slightly, but uniformly higher mean scores on the two basic dimensions, for both successful and less than successful civilian adsdnistrators, than do the descriptions by civilian superiors. Conversely, in describing ideal civilian administrators, the civilian describers postulate higher mean scores on both dimensions than do the military describers. The differences are indicated by the t-ratios, only two of which are especially significant, vis. military describers perceive their successful civilian subordinate administrators as being higher on Initiating Structure than do civilian describers of successful subordinates; and civilian describers of ideal subordinate adminis trators postulate higher scores on the Consideration dimension than 76 TABLE 8 MEAN SCORES ON CONSIDERATION AND INITIATING STRUCTURE FOR REAL AND IDEAL AMC CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATORS, DIVIDING SUCCESSFUL FROM LESS THAN SUCCESSFUL, AND COMPARING SCORES ACCORDING TO CIVILIAN AND MILITARY DESCRIBERS Con sideration Initiating Structure N M Successful - Real Civilian 69 45.16 5*63 69 46.22 6.80 Military 84 46.30 6.70 84 * * 4 8 . 0 ? 6.90 Less than Successful - Real Civilian 83 41.43 8.25 83 40.76 9.49 Military 29 43.67 6.63 29 a . 29 10.58 Successful - Ideal Civilian 69 50.29 3.46 69 52.20 4.12 Military 84 48.99 5.80 84 51.82 6.60 Less than Successful - Ideal Civilian 83 50.08 3.74 83 52.37 3.46 Military 29 * 47.81 5.66 29 52.26 4.69 t-ratios of the difference between means of civilian and military describers: *Signifleant to the .02 level of confidence. ^Significant to the .10 level of confidence. 77 do military describers. This could indicate, however, a somewhat greater tendency toward structuring behavior by the military describers than by the civilian. Table 8 also indicates a closer relationship between real and ideal descriptions by the military describers than by the civilian describers* This relationship is even more clearly depicted by Table 9 which shows coefficients of correlation between real and ideal descriptions in terms of the dimensions of Consideration and Initi ating Structure, according to civilian and military describers. It appears from the higher correlations involving the military describers, vis a vis the civilian describers of successful civilian administra tors, that the military, in describing ideal civilian administrators, might be more directly influenced by their descriptions of their successful civilian subordinates than are the civilian describers. The converse, of course, is also a possibility, i.e., the military describers in describing their successful (real) civilian subordinate administrators are more directly influenced by their ideal pattern of the successful administrator than are the civilian describers. None theless, a question could be posed as to whether civilian supervisors might be more discriminating in their perceptions of the performance of their civilian subordinates than are military supervisors, due to their (the civilians1) more extensive experience (because of their relative ienunity from rotational assignments) with civilian subordi nates in occupations specific to the environment. Although there are significant, positive correlations between descriptions of successful (real) civilian administrators and 78 TABLE 9 COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION (FEARSONIAN r) BETWEEN REAL AND IDEAL AMC CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATORS ON THE DIMENSIONS OF CONSIDERATION AND INITIATING STRUCTURE, ACCORDING TO SUCCESSFUL AND LESS THAN SUCCESSFUL CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATORS, AND MILITARY AND CIVILIAN DESCRIBERS r Consideration Initiating N Structure Successful Civilian Administrators Described by Military Superiors .59* .69* 84 Successful Civilian Administrators Described by Civilian Superiors .30** .29** 69 Less Than Successful Civilian Administrators Described by Military Superiors -.24 .18 29 Less Than Successful Civilian Administrators Described by Civilian Superiors .29* .09 83 *Significant to the .01 level of confidence. ^Significant to the .05 level of confidence. 79 descriptions of ideal civilian administrators on both the dimensions of Consideration and Initiating Structure, whether or not the describers are civilian or military, this is not the case with respect to correlations involving less than successful civilian administrators. In the latter category, there is a negative correla tion (not statistically significant) between descriptions of less than successful civilian administrators (real) and ideal civilian administrators by military describers, on the dimension of Considera tion, and a significant positive correlation between descriptions of the same real and ideal categories by civilian describers. Moreover, there is a higher positive correlation between descriptions of less than successful (real) civilian administrators and ideal civilian administrators by military describers on the dimension of Initiating Structure than by civilian describers on the same dimension, although neither correlation is statistically significant. Nonetheless, it appears that the military superiors tend to discriminate between less than successful and ideal civilian subordinate administrators more on the Consideration dimension, while civilian superiors tend to dis criminate more on the basis of the Initiating Structure dimension. The discussion in this chapter has Indicated the existence of a military behavioral stereotype for AMC military administrators and has shown (Table U) that relatively greater value is assigned within \ this stereotype to Initiating Structure vis a vis the Consideration items. Also it has been shown (Table 3) that successful civilian administrators in the Air Materiel Command conform more to the stereotype than do less than successful civilian administrators. 80 Table 5 shows that those items which discriminate most between successful and less than successful administrators are the Initiating Structure items. Table 8 furnishes evidence that military superiors perceive their successful civilian subordinate administrators as being significantly higher on Initiating Structure than do civilian superiors. And, similarly, Table 9 indicates that the military superiors tend to account for most of the variance between successful and ideal civilian administrators in terms of Initiating Structure. In spite of high parallel scores on the Consideration dimension, it could be construed from the foregoing that the military influence in the Air Materiel Command is more conducive to structuring behavior among the administrative group than to considerate behavior, and this, by definition, might be equated to a slight "authoritarian," "nan- democratic" tendency. In order to examine these points, arrangements were made to have the LBDQ administered to a small sample (N-18) of successful administrators in two non-military Federal organisations, utilising the same criteria of success as were utilised within the AMC complex. Ten of the questionnaires were completed by employees of the Internal Revenue Service of the Treasury Department and eight by employees assigned to the Sixth Civil Service Region Headquarters, Cincinnati, Ohio. Comparisons are made in Table 10 between ideal military officer behavioral patterns, the described behavior of the successful AMC civilian administrators, and the described behavior of the successful non-AMC administrators, in terms of the dimensions of Consideration 81 TABUS 10 COMPARISON OF MEAN SCORES OF RESPONSES TO "MOST AUTHORITARIAN" AND "MOST DEMOCRATIC" LBDQ ITEMS DESCRIBING THE IDEAL AMC MILITARY OFFICER ADMINISTRATOR, THE SUCCESSFUL AMC CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATOR, AND THE SUCCESSFUL NQN-AMC CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATOR Successful Successful LBDQ Items Ideal Officer AMC non-AMC Civilian Civilian M(l) 20. He acts without consult m ing the group (neg). 2.5 .8 2.3 .9 2.3 .7 23* He treats all group members as his equals. 2.7 1.3 2.9 1.1 2.4 1.3 34. He puts suggestions made by the group into operation. 2.9 .5 3.4 .6 2.8 .5 38. He gets group approval on important natters before going ahead. 2.9 .8 2.9 1.1 2.3 .9 Initiating Structure 48.1 *•7 47.0* 7.3 46.7* 5.2 Consideration 47.2 4.8 | 45.** 6.7 44.5* 8.6 *Differences between M a n dimension scores of successful AMC civilian and successful non-AMC civilian not significant. 82 and Initiating Structure, plua the "moat democratic" and the "most authoritarian" of the LBDQ items. These comparisons indicate a close correspondence between dimension scores of the successful AMC civilian administrator and the successful non-AMC administrator. The slight difference between means is not significant. On the individual "most authoritarian" items, the successful non-AMC administrators were scored lower on two, equal on one, and higher on one, when compared with the successful AMC civilian administrators. On the "most democratic" items, the successful non- AMC administrator was scored equal on one and lower on three. In effect, the two groups were approximately equal on their scores on the "most authoritarian" items, while the non-AMC administrators were scored lower than the successful AMC civilian administrators on the "most democratic" items. Because of the relatively small differences between successful AMC and non-AMC civilian administrators in terms of the basic di mensions of Consideration and Initiating Structure, it is ooncluded that the AMC environment does not necessarily produce unique behavioral patterns when compared with another public organisation. Moreover, in view of the lower scores for the non-AMC group on the "most democratic" items, as well as on the dimension of Consideration, it cannot be ooncluded on the basis of the evidence that the AMC administrative environment is any less "democratic" than other non military, bureaucratic environments, insofar as the instrument used can be said to measure this factor. 83 Tables 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 present matrices of correla tion coefficients which indicate, in certain cases, that the variance in dimension scores (Consideration and Initiating Structure) can be accounted for to some extent by selected biographical variables. The dimension scores from descriptions of real administrators appear to be related to certain biographical variables pertaining both to the described and the describers; and the dimension scores from de scriptions of ideal administrators appear to be related to certain biographical variables pertaining to the describers of the ideal. Thus, Table 11 shows significant negative correlations between both the Consideration and Initiating Structure scores of less than successful civilian administrators and their years of education. Table 14 shows a significant positive correlation between the Con sideration scores of ideal civilian administrators and the ages of civilian describers of ideal; a significant positive correlation between Consideration scores of ideal and years of Civil Service of civilian describers of ideal; significant negative correlations between both dimension scores (Initiating Structure and Consideration) of ideal and years of education of civilian describers of ideal; a significant negative correlation between Initiating Structure scores of ideal civilian administrators and college degrees of civilian describers of the ideal; and a significant negative correlation between Consideration scores of the ideal and the years of military service of civilian describers of the ideal. Table 15 shows a sig nificant negative correlation between Initiating Structure scores of successful civilian administrators (real) and the number of promotions TABLE 11 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS EXPRESSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIMENSION SCORES AND SELECTED BIOGRAPHICAL DATA FOR SUCCESSFUL AND LESS THAN SUCCESSFUL AMC CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATORS Biographical Data on Civilians Described Dimensions A J CSSB CSSB L A Years Highest Years College Years Age Test Pts. Pt. A Test Civil Military Military Degrees Educa B & C Service Rank Service tion Successful Initiating 1 O Structure -*25 -.15 .03 .03 -.09 -.10 .02 -.08 . .02 M C O . i o e Consideration .05 -.05 .03 .03 -.06 .01 -.01 v n -.02 Lass than Successful Initiating Structure .11 .06 .13 .10 -.07 .04 .17 -.22 -.22** -.15 Consideration .00 .09 .17 .09 -.01 -.03 .17 -.11 -.24** -.17 ^Significant to the .05 level of confidence. TABLE 12 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS EXPRESSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIMENSION SCORES OF IDEAL AMC MILITARY OFFICER ADMINISTRATORS AND SELECTED BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON MILITARY DESCRIBERS OF IDEAL1 Biographical Data on Military Describers Diaensions No. Promotions Military Status Military Tears of College Tears of Age in Rank in (Regular or Rank Military Degrees Education Past 10 Tears Reserve) Service Initiating VN 0 1 • b Structure .00 .00 -.03 -.OS .10 co V* Consideration -.02 .04 .07 .09 -.11 -.13 .14 significant correlations. TABLE 13 ELATION COEFFICIENTS EXPRESSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIMENSION SCORES ON IDEAL AMC CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATORS AND SEIECTED BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON MILITARY DESCRIBERS WHO SUPERVISE SUCCESSFUL AND LESS THAN SUCCESSFUL AMC CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATORS1 Biographical Data on Military Describers Dimensions No. Promotions Military Status Military Years of College Years of Age in Rank in (Regular or Rank Military Degrees Education Past 10 Years Reserve) Service Successful Initiating Structure -.06 -.05 -.11 .14 -.10 -.01 .04 Consideration -.04 -.05 -.13 .05 .00 -.01 -.02 Less than Successful Initiating Structure -.04 -.03 -.02 .06 -.09 .00 .07 3 1 Consideration -.27 .05 .10 .id -.03 * .31 Total Initiating 0 i/\ 1 . i o H Structure -.06 -.09 .12 -.09 • .05 Consideration -.09 -.02 -.07 .08 -.01 -.02 .03 1No significant correlations. TABLE 14 RELATION COEFFICIENTS EXPRESSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIMENSION SCORES ON IDEAL AMC CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATORS AND SELECTED BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON CIVILIAN DESCRIBERS WHO SUPERVISE SUCCESSFUL AND LESS THAN SUCCESSFUL AMC CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATORS Biographical Data on Civilian Describers Dimensions A J CSSB CSSB L A Years Highest Years College Years Age Test Ets* Pt. A Test Civil Military Military Degrees Educa B A C Service Rank Service tion Successful Initiating Structure -.28 .00 .07 .11 .14 -.15 -.19 — .04 -.18 -.19 Consideration -.21 .10 -.14 -.07 .10 .23 -.21 -.06 -.16 .20 Less than Successful Initiating Structure -.15 — .03 -.10 -.14 .19 -.25 -.12 -.26** -.17 -.04 Consideration -.07 .20 -.12 -.11 .35** -.08 -.12 -.14 -.20 .35< Total Initiating i Structure -.20 -.01 -.03 a .05 -.20 -.15 -.17** -.17** -.11 i Consideration h .15 -.13 -.09 .25* .06 -.16** -.11 -.18** .29* ^Significant to the *01 level* **Significant to the .05 level. TABLE 15 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS EXPRESSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIMENSION SCORES AND SELECTED BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON MILITARY SUPERVISORS DESCRIBING SUCCESSFUL AND LESS THAN SUCCESSFUL AMC CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATORS Biographical Data on Military Describere Dimensions No. Promotions Military Statue Military Years of College Years of Age in Rank in (Regular or Rank Military Degrees Education Past 10 Years Reserve) Service Successful Initiating Structure -.24** -.07 -.12 .17 -.13 -.09 .05 Consideration -.14 .07 .01 .15 -.01 -.05 -.06 Loss than Successful Initiating i Structure -.06 .05 -.17 .07 -.15 s -.10 Consideration .10 .42** .02 .20 -.08 -.03 -.06 ^Significant to the .05 level of confidence. TABLE 16 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS EXPRESSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIMENSION SCORES AND SELECTED BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON CIVILIAN SUPERVISORS DESCRIBING SUCCESSFUL AND LESS THAN SUCCESSFUL AMC CIVILIAN ABtlNISTRATORS Biographical Data on Civilian Describers Dimensions A J CSSB CSSB L A Tears Highest Years College Years Age Teat Pts. Pt. A Teat Civil Military Military Degreea Educa B & C Service Rank Service tion Successful Initiating Structure .17 -.17 .01 .06 .00 -.12 .07 -.09 -.21 .07 Consideration .19 .05 -.12 .01 .2 6 ** ,ou .14 .10 -.09 .21 Leas than Successful Initiating t Structure .38 -.08 -.22** -.12 .29* -.27 -.06 b -.26** .15 $ 1 i • o . Consideration .25 -.17 -.16 .31* -.18 .11 -.08 S3 .31* ^Significant to the .01 level of confidence. ^Significant to the .05 level of confidence. 90 in rank received in the past ten years by their military describers; and a significant positive correlation between Consideration scores of less than successful civilian administrators and the military status (regular or reserve status) of their military describers (i.e., the more permanent the status of the military supervisor, the more he perceives his less than successful subordinate civilian administrators as rating high on the Consideration dimension). Finally, Table 16 shows a significant positive correlation between the Consideration scores of less than successful civilian administrators and the ages of their civilian describers; significant negative correlations between the scores on both dimensions of less than successful civilian administrators and the years of education of their civilian describers; a significant positive correlation between the Consideration scores of the successful civilian administrators and the years of Civil Service of their civilian describers; significant positive correlations between both dimension scores of the less than successful civilian administrators and the years of Civil Service of their civilian describers; and a negative correlation between the scores on Initiating Structure of the less than successful civilian administrators and the scores achieved on Part A of the Air Force Civilian Supervisory Selection Battery by their civilian describers. In addition to the foregoing, other relationships are indi cated by the tables, although these are not statistically significant. For example, in the case of military describers of ideal civilian actainistrators (Table 13), there appears to be a somewhat positive relationship between both of the described dimensions and the years of 91 military service of the describers; and a somewhat negative relation ship between both of the described dimensions and the military rank of the describers. Thus, it appears that the more years of military service, the more the military supervisor perceives the ideal civilian administrator sb rating high on both Initiating Structure and Consideration; and, if the military supervisor is supervising a successful civilian administrator, the more military service by the military supervisor, the more he is likely to perceive the ideal as being higher on Initiating Structure and lower on Consideration; while, if he is supervising a less than successful civilian adminis trator, the more military service he has had, the more he is likely to perceive the ideal as being higher on Consideration and lower on Initiating Structure. However, it appears that the more the military supervisor is advanced in rank, the lower he perceives the ideal civilian administrator in terms of Initiating Structure and Considera tion. Another example of this type of relationship is found in Table 15, where it is indicated that the more years of military service a military supervisor has had, the higher he perceives his subordinate civilian administrators in terms of Initiating Structure and Consideration; but he perceives successful subordinates as being higher on Initiating Structure and lower on Consideration, and less than successful civilian subordinates as being lower on Initiating Structure and higher on Consideration. Finally, there appears to be a generally positive relationship between the ages of civilian describer-supervisors of successful and 92 less than successful subordinates and the scores ascribed to such subordinates on Initiating Structure and Consideration (higher on Consideration and lower on Initiating Structure); while there is a generally negative relationship between the extent of education of both civilian and military descrlber-supervisors and their percep tions of their subordinates on both Consideration and Initiating Structure* Although the foregoing descriptive material indicates certain relationships, many of which are statistically significant, between LBDQ dimension scores and certain biographical variables, the meaning of these relationships can only be hypothesized or conjectured in view of the limited scope of this study and the large number of variables involved* Some interpretations are presented herewith strictly for heuristic purposes* Thus, it would appear that the positive correlations between the ages of civilian describers and the Consideration scores ascribed by them to both real and ideal subordinates (Tables 14 and 16) might be explained partly by a tendency of older persons to withdraw from aggressive behaviors (due possibly to the limited nature of their future career opportunities) and partly by a possibly closer affinity for widely shared ethical values related to Consideration. The absence of significant correlations in this area with respect to military describers (Tables 13 and 1$) could possibly be attributed to countervailing factors inherent in the military system, such as the concept of military discipline* 93 Positive correlations between Consideration scores and years of Civil Service of civilian describers (Tables 14 and 16) are probably due to substantially the same factors that produced significant correlations between Consideration and age. In two of the sample groups analysed in connection with this study, significant correla tions of ,53 and .39* respectively, were found to exist between age and years of Civil Service. As has been indicated, Tables 11 through 16 show consistent negative correlations between dimension scores and the "education" variables (years of education and college degrees). Thus, there is a significant negative relationship between both dimension scores of the less than successful civilian administrators and their years of educa tion (Table 11). In addition, there are significant negative correla tions between both dimension scores for both real and ideal civilian administrators and the years of education of their civilian describers (Tables 14 and 16). From the negative correlations with Initiating Structure, it might be supposed that the more formal education a civilian supervisor has had, the greater has been his exposure to more sophisticated concepts of supervision, and the more likely he is to play down structuring behavior in the leadership role. Somewhat conversely, however, the negative correlations with the Consideration dimension could possibly be explained in terms of the status aspects of higher education and a consequent development of feelings of social distance in connection with the supervisory-employee relationship. Thus, the concurrent operation of these influences could, conceivably, 94 result in lower values and the perception of lower values with respect to both Initiating Structure and Consideration. Table 11 shows significant negative correlations between both dimension scores for less than successful civilian administrators and their years of education. Although negative correlations exist also between the dimension scores of the successful civilian administrators and their years of education, these are very low and not statistically significant. It could be interpreted from this that in the Air Materiel Command environment the level of education of civilian administrators tends to be associated negatively with successful administrative performance. This would appear to be a possibility even though the mean scores on years of education do not generally discriminate between successful and less than successful civilian administrators, as do other biographical factors indicated in Table 6. Although there are negative correlations between years of education of civilian describers and the described dimensions for both real and ideal civilian subordinates (Tables 14 end 16), there are very low negative correlations (not significant) between years of education of military describers and the described dimensions (Tables 13 and 13). It would seem that those factors contributing to a nega tive relationship in the case of civilian describers (e.g., the possible effects of education as a symbol of status in the supervisory- employee relationship) might be neutralised to some extent by opposing factors in the military career environment (e.g., emphasis on esprit de corps). 95 The low but consistent positive correlations between Consider ation scores for real and ideal civilian administrators and the years of military service of their military describers (Tables 13 and 15) might be explained on essentially the same basis as was the above described relationship between Consideration scores and age. Signifi cant positive correlations were obtained between age and years of military service in three sample groups within this study, viz., .55t .49, and .46. The low but consistent positive correlations between Initiating Structure scores for real and ideal civilian administrators and the years of military service of their military describers (Tables 13 and 15) could possibly be explained, as indicated previously, by the process of indoctrination in structuring and disciplinary values and behaviors over the course of a military career. Two other significant correlations between dimension scores and variables pertaining to military tenure remain to be discussed, viz., the significant negative correlations between Initiating Structure scores ascribed to successful (real) civilian administrators and the number of promotions in military rank in the past 10 years of military describers (Table 15); end a significant positive correlation between Consideration scores ascribed to less than successful civilian administrators and the military status (regular or reserve) of the military describers (Table 15)> With regard to the former, it may be that the military officer who has been rewarded by promotions rela tively frequently either tends to play down structuring behavior in order to reinforce his acquired status, or feels, based on personal 96 experience, that structuring behavior actually diminishes the probability of promotion* Then, perhaps these attitudes or values are reflected in the military officer1s perceptions of his successful civilian subordinates* With regard to the latter case (i.e., the positive correlations between Consideration scores of less than successful civilian adninistrators and the military status of their military describers), the relationship might be attributed to those same factors suggested above as contributing to the positive rela tionship between Consideration scores and years of military service, inasmuch as significant positive correlations obtain between military status and years of military service (correlation coefficients of .23, */f2, and .36 were obtained in three sample groups). It should be emphasized, again, that the above explanations of relationships between LBDQ dimensions and certain biographical variables are merely suggested as possibilities, and for each expla nation suggested there could readily be several other equally or more plausible ones. The problem is complicated by the inter-relationship of variables and multivariability. The point to be made is merely that the data and the correlations adduced do indicate the existence of relationships between selected biographical variables (pertaining both to describers and those described) and perceptions or evaluations of administrative behavior. However, it can be inferred from such relationships that employee evaluations, to some extent at least, may be based on con siderations other than an unbiased assessment of production or organizational goal fulfillment. In view of this possibility, it 97 would appear that the use of employee evaluations normally ought to be restricted to the objective of improving employee job performance rather than for comparing the relative worth of employees for such career-determining purposes as promotion. Although a number of significant statistical relationships were found to exist between individual LBDQ item scores and the various biographical variables, the analysis of the correlations did not produce a basis for additional, pertinent generalisations. decent commentaries in this connection on the inadequacies of employee appraisals and performance ratings can be found in Douglas McGregor, "An Uneasy Look at Performance Appraisal,n Harvard Business Review. May-June, 1957; end Philip R. Kelly, "Reappraisal of Appraisals," Harvard Business Review. May-June, 1958* CHAPTER V PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, DEMOCRACY, AND THE "MILITARY MIND" At has been seen in the preceding chapter, successful civilian administrators within the Air Materiel Command tend to conform to an ideal pattern of behavior adumbrated by the top military group to a significantly greater extent than the less than successful civilian administrators. It appears, therefore, that one measure of success of civilian adainistrators in the Air Materiel Command is behavioral con formance, or the appearance of oonformance, to the ideals and values of the dominant military group. The facts produced in this study thus tend to reinforce the various theoretical generalisations extant on the subjects of imitation, identification, and social control (such as those by Parsons, La Pierre, and others, described in Chapter III). However, the behavioral patterns perceived in the successful AMC civilian administrators are not necessarily exclusive to the Air Materiel Command environment. This has been demonstrated as the re sult of the administration of the LBDQ to a small sampling of suc cessful administrators in two non-military Federal agencies (see Chapter IV, preceding). On the other hand, neither can it be said that the administrative behavioral values and ideals existing in the Air Materiel Command are essentially the same as those of most other organisations. A study by Halpin, comparing the mean scores on the 98 99 LBDQ-ideal of 132 aircraft commanders of B—29 and B—50 crews and a group of 64 educational administrators, provides some basis for as sessing the uniqueness of the AMC military officer ideal. ^ Tables 17 and 18 compare the aircraft commanders and the educational adminis trator 8 with the AMC military-executive group on mean scores for Consideration-ideal and Initiating Structure ideal. TABLE 17 MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND t-RATIOS OF MEAN DIFFERENCES IN IDEAL LEADER BEHAVIOR OF 132 AIRCRAFT COMMANDERS AND 119 AMC MILITARY OFFICER ADMINISTRATORS Ideal Aircraft AMC Military t-Ratio Behavior Commanders Admini strator s M cr M cr Consideration 48.7 5.3 47.2 4.7 2.362** Initiating Structure 51.0 4* 6 43.1 4.3 4.886* Significant to the .01 level of confidence. ^Significant to the .02 level of confidence. Thus, differences between means of the AMC military ideal, as compared with the aircraft commander and the educational administrator ideals, on both Consideration and Initiating Structure, are statisti cally significant to a substantial level of confidence, and appear to reinforce the thesis that the AMC environment does have some impact ^Andrew W. Halpin, "The Leader Behavior and Leadership Ideology of Educational Administrators and Aircraft Commanders," Harvard Educational Review. Vol. XXV (1955)* PP* 18-32. 100 TABLE 18 MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND t-RATIOS OF MEAN DIFFERENCES IN IDEAL LEADER BEHAVIOR OF 64 EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATORS AND 119 AMC MILITARY OFFICER ADMINISTRATORS Ideal Educational AMC Military t-Ratio Behavior Administrator s Admini strators M cr M O' Consideration 52.4 3.9 47.2 4.7 7.559* Initiating Structure 43.8 6.4 48.1 4.8 5.127* *Significant to the .01 level of confidence. on the administrative behavioral values possessed by the top level personnel in the military hierarchy. It could well be that the values of military personnel coming into the AMC environment are affected and modified somewhat by that environment, as suggested in Chapter 11,^ As has been indicated, one of the express purposes of this study has been to determine, to the extent possible, whether the influence of the military on administrative behavior in the Air Materiel Command tended to be "democratic," or "authoritarian," or both, or neither. This appeared to be a desirable undertaking in view of the two considerations stated in Chapter I: (1) relatively little lit is interesting to note that there is a close correspond ence between LBDQ dimension scores of the ideal aircraft commanders and the ideal AMC civilian administrator as described by his military superiors. There is a mean score of 48.7 on Consideration for both groups, and on Initiating Structure, 51*0 for the commanders, and 51.9 for the AMC civilian administrators. 101 inquiry has bean made of the extent to which shared values and ideals of democracy are observed in the actual processes of the Federal government administrative structure, itself; and (2) it was thought reasonable to assume that organizations with which individuals are affiliated formally, such as public agencies, might project their internally accepted and practiced values and hence influence signifi cantly individuals or groups (publics) outside such organizations. Moreover, concern has been expressed in some quarters about the possible adverse Influence of the military on the democratic- liberal way of life, in view of the extensive growth of the military establishment in the United States in the past two decades. The fears expressed have not been so much because of the thought that the military might take over the reins of government, but more because of the possible, long-range psychological effects on the democratic- liberal public values that might be produced through perpetuating and expanding military institutions* Thus, it has been alleged that the ways of the military are antithetical to individual freedom of thought and expression, and other traditional democratic values. One of the chief contemporary exponents of this point of view, C. Wright Mills describes the military life as follows: They (military personnel) are inside an apparatus of preroga tive and graded privilege in which they have been economically secure and unworrled. Although not usually rich, they have never faced the perils of earning a living in the same way that the lower and middle-class persons have. The orderly ranks of their chain of command.. .are carried over into their social life: such striving for status as they have known has been within an unambiguous and well organized hierarchy of status, in which each knows his place and remains within it. In this military world, debate is no more at a premium than persuasion: one obeys and one commands, and matters, 102 even unimportant matters, are not to be decided by voting. Life in the military world accordingly influences the mili tary mind's outlook on other institutions as well as on its own. The warlord often sees economic institutions as means for military production and the huge corporation as a sort of ill-run military establishment. In his world, wages are fixed, unions impossible to conceive. He sees political institutions as often corrupt and usually inefficient obsta cles, full of undisciplined and cantankerous civilians. And is he happy to hear of civilians and politicians making fools of themselves? It is men with minds and outlooks formed by such condi tions who in postwar America have oome to occupy positions of great decision.^ In a similar vein, John P. Marquand has alleged that "all professional soldiers have similar attitudes and reactions, because they have the military mind." He has described the "military mind" and the environment which produces it as follows: Their profession (the military's) has placed them in their own social order, a strictly monastic sort of order governed by definite regulations seldom wholly comprehensible to a civilian.... This order is what a general, broadly speaking, would call the Chain of Command, which gives everyone in the service sphere a definite relationship to everyone else above and below him; setting everyone exactly in his place. It is a world in which everyone has both to command and obey, promptly and without the friction of debate.... He thinks of any human organisation as a team and usually speaks of it as such, preferably a loyal football team with a good back- field, a brainy quarterback to call the signals, and a strong obedient line.,.. Debate, when protracted, makes him impatient, and the niceties and the delays of the law make him impatient too when he compares them with the simpler military justice.^ Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford Univer sity Press, 1956),pp. 195-4. %ohn P. Marquand, "Inquiry into the Military Mind," N. Y. Times Magaslnet March 30, 1952, p. 53* 103 Although Mills, Marquand, and others have echoed apprehensions and attitudes about military influence and control that have been traditional in the Anglo-American culture, the seriousness of the military influence (in terms of the possible adverse effects of the "military mind1' on democratic-liberal values) is open to considerable question in view of present-day realities. For example, there is, and has been, abundant evidence, at the level of national security policy formulation at least, that whatever isolation of military officers from "civilian" affairs and attitudes has existed in the past is now becoming a thing of the past. Professor Stein has illustrated the point as follows: There has been a great enhancement in the number and im portance of the problems that cannot be decided in isolation, that must be dealt with jointly by men whose habits of work, whose traditional orders of priority, are quite different. To seat around a conference table a group, for example, that includes officers of the three services, of the Foreign Service, a scientist or two, a budget specialist, two or three assistant secretaries whose careers have been shaped in the world of big business, and maybe a congressman and senator as well, is no great oddity today: between the wars it was so rare as to be almost unthinkable .3* In fact, rather than the "military mind" unduly influencing the "civilian" objectives of government, under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower there has been an increasing "politicisation” of the top military, i.e., the Joint Chiefs. It has become impossible, or impracticable at least, to draw a line between civilian and military affairs in view of the military implications of political decision and Walter Mi Hi a, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Harold Stein, Arms and the State (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958) * pp. 6-7. 104 the political implications of the military responsibility. Further more, as the bases for military policy become more complex and more dependent on non-military types of professionalism, it is becoming increasingly difficult to justify the military officer's claim for professional autonomy. The expertise of the military staff officer in many cases has become indistinguishable from the expertise required of managers and technicians in both governmental and industrial bureaucra cies. It is especially difficult to identify the peculiar requirements of military knowledge, when the problems on which many senior officers work are more complicated and abstruse than any that they have en countered in their previous professional careers. In this interdisci plinary milieu, such alleged military attributes as inflexibility of thought, reliance on the authority of rank, and unwillingness to debate and compromise, obviously, would be hard put to survive. Military officers, generally, are acquiring a wider variety of experience in the process of developing their careers. For example, in a poll taken of a recent graduating class at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, whose students are selected from the Army* s senior officer group, it was shown that the professional military careers of these officers (averaging about 13 years of service) was divisible into approximate thirds with regard to type of experience: one-third, command; one-third, staff and adminis tration; and one-third, schools and teaching. It might thus be concluded that the modern professional military man has tended to 105 becob* & commander-manager and a planner-teacher.^ Moreover, with th* Increasing military involvement in national policy and administration, resolute steps have been taken by the three services and th* Depart ment of Defense to broaden the base of education for military officers, thereby mitigating any tendency toward parochialism of thought. Within a matter of a very few years it is quite possible that military officers, by and large, will have significantly more formal educa- tional preparation than comparable civilian officials. Somewhat the same kind of intermeshing of civilian and mili tary affairs, functions, and values that has taken place elsewhere in the government and the military service has occurred also within the Air Materiel Command. As has been seen in the description in Chapter II, many aspects of the Air Materiel Command environment appear to be more civilian than military, e.g., the commercial-industrial nature of the Command functions and the numerical preponderance of civilian personnel in the Command. These environmental factors, as has been suggested, could be expected to affect the attitudes and behaviors of the military officers assigned to the Command. Some specific evidence in support of this thesis is presented hereinafter. Suffice it to say at this point that a military officer possessing the stereotyped ^Colonel G. A. Lincoln and Lt. Colonel A. A. Jordan, Jr., "Leadership to Provide for the Common Defense," Public Administration Review. Vol. XVII, Number 4 (Autumn, 1957), P. 263. 2A detailed and highly competent description of present-day military education in the United States is contained in the book by John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholar* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). 106 attributes of the so-called "military mind" would be ill-adapted to the dynamic environment of the Air Materiel Command. With regard to the specific data produced by this study in relationship to the question of the effect of the attitudes and values of the top Air Materiel Command military officers on administrative behavior in the Coaeand, the following can be said in summary: There is some evidence of bias toward structuring behavior on the part of the Air Materiel Command military personnel. From the priority list ing of items in Table 2*, for example, it has been seen that relatively greater weight is assigned by the top level military officers in the Command to such structuring behaviors as letting group members know what is expected of them, making sure that the supervisor's part in the organisation is understood by all group members, making attitudes clear to the group, emphasizing the meeting of deadlines, and main taining definite standards of performance, as opposed to such demo cratic behaviors as trying out new ideas with the group, putting suggestions made by the group into operation, acting only after con sulting the group, and the supervisor treating his group members as his equals rather than his inferiors. In addition, the majority of individual LBDQ items which discriminated most between successful and less than successful civilian administrators were Initiating Structure items (Table 5)* Furthermore, the mean scores of the successful civilian administrators were slightly higher on Initiating Structure than on Consideration; while the scores of the less than successful civilian administrators were lower on Initiating Structure and higher on Consideration (Table 8). In all cases, the scores of "ideal" 107 civilian administrators (both civilian and military) ware higher on Initiating Structure than on Consideration (Tables 3 end 8). Finally, military supervisors tended to account for most of the variance between successful and ideal civilian administrators in terms of Initiating Structure (Table 9). However, in addition to the observations indicating a bias toward structuring behavior and behavioral values, it must also be borne in mind that the descriptions of successful (real) and "ideal" civilian administrators within the Air Materiel Command resulted in only slightly, although uniformly, lower scores for Consideration than for Initiating Structure. Of perhaps special pertinence to this aspect of the inquiry is the matter of the close similarity between the described behaviors of the successful Air Materiel Command civilian administrators and the successful civilian administrators in two Federal, non-military organ izations (Table 10 indicates no significant differences between the mean scores of the two groups on the dimensions of Consideration and Initiating Structure). From this it appears that the dominant factors in controlling administrative behavior in the Air Materiel Command might well be other than the militai*y aspects of the Command1 s leader ship and environment. Indeed, it might be hypothesized that the bureaucratic structure, itself, is the more basic factor in terms of effect on administrative behavior, rather than the military influence. As a matter of fact, many of the characteristics traditionally associated with military organisations (sometimes negatively from the standpoint of liberal-democratic values) are also said to apply to 108 most other typea of bureaucratic organisations* Thus, personnel in such organizations are situated in a clearly defined hierarchy of office; the salary scale is established according to the rank in the hierarchy; a career system is normally Involved; promotion is accord ing to seniority or achievement; and the entire staff operates under a system of authority involving systematic discipline and control in the conduct of office* Most theories of organization and management, moreover, have emphasized traditionally such military-sounding principles as "unity of command" and "span of control." Max Weber, who is generally regarded as the founder of the organized study of bureaucracy, has indicated that personnel in all true bureaucratic organizations function according to essentially the same kinds of criteria. Many large organizations, as he perceived them, operated in close approximation to an "ideal type.” Thus, he has said, This type of organization is in principle applicable with equal facility to a wide variety of different fields. It may be applied in profit-making business or in charitable organizations, or in any number of other types of private enterprises serving ideal or material ends. It is equally applicable to political and to religious organizations. With varying degrees of approximation to a pure type, its historical existence can be demonstrated in all these fields. For exasple, this type of bureaucracy is found in private clinics, as well as in endowed hospitals or the hospitals maintained by religious orders. Bureaucratic organization has played a major role in the Catholic Church. It is well illustrated by the administrative role of the priesthood in the modern church.... The same phenomena are found in the large-scale capitalistic enterprise; and the larger it is, thm greater their role. And this is not less true of political parties.... Finally, the modern army is essentially 109 a bureaucratic organization administered by that peculiar type of military functionary, the "officer.111 Granting the influence of the military officers on civilian administrative behavior in the Air Materiel Command, it would appear to be unrealistic to assume that the civilians do not influence, in turn, the attitudes and behaviors of the military officers. Such a civilian influence would appear to be most reasonable in view of two facts previously discussed, viz., the numerical preponderance of the civilian group, and the relatively greater permanence of their tenure within the Command by virtue of the military officer* s susceptibility to periodic rotational assignments.^ The fact that the dimension scores of the Air Materiel Command military officer "ideal" differ significantly from those in the "ideal" in Helpin's study of Air Force combat commanders (Table 17) also suggests that the Air Materiel Command "civilian" organizational environment has a differential effect on the behavioral values of the Command's military officers. Finally, the high correlations between the dimension scores of the successful civilian administrators and the "ideal" civilian adminis trators, as described by the Air Materiel Command military officers (Table 9) suggests the possibility of more than an incidental influ ence by the successful civilian group on the military officer ^Max Weber, "The Essentials of Bureaucratic Organization: An Ideal Type Construction," Reader in Bureaucracy, Robert K. Merton et al. (ed.), (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952), p. 22. %4ilitary officers newly assigned to the Air Materiel Command are in many instances "apprenticed," in effect, to a civilian "expert," at least for the initial orientation to the work to be done. At this point, the civilian influence on the military officer can be consider able, and even enduring. 110 perceptions relating to successful civilian performance. It Is concluded, based on the foregoing observations, that administrative behavior in the Air Materiel Command tends to be both "democratic1* and "authoritarian" within the definitions of organiza tional behavior used in this study (assuming a rough equivalence between Consideration and "democratic," and between Initiating Structure and "authoritarian"); but that there is no basis for assuming that administrative behavior in the Air Materiel Command is either more or less "democratic" or more or less "authoritarian" than administrative behavior in other non-military, Federal organizations. Although the Air Materiel Command environment has produced certain tensions between the civilian and the military administrative groups (due to such factors, described in Chapter II, as the seaming "civilian" incursions on the controls exercised by the military as the result of recommendations of the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, and the reserving of the top administrative and executive positions for the senior military offi cers), it does not follow that the military officers in the Command are "anti-civilian" in the sense that they are opposed to civilian controls through democratic processes in government. Such tensions as these are probably inherent in most dual or scalar status systems where one group is subordinated (or superordinated) to another, e.g., lay v. ecelesiastical officials in religious organizations; "manage ment" v. "labor" in industry; professional nurses v. practical nurses in a hospital; and political appointees v. appointed civil servants in government. Ill In summary, then, while this study has shown that those who want to get ahead in the Air Materiel Command must conform generally to a behavioral stereotype valued by the dominant military group, and that this stereotype reflects a combination of "democratic11 and "authoritarian" supervisory attitudes, no evidence was adduced which would indicate, one way or the other, that the behavioral patterns valued and imitated are antithetical to liberal-democratic precepts or objectives. In fact, as suggested heretofore, the possibility must be recognised that those qualities of mind that nourish liberal democracy, such as devotion to liberty, belief in freedom of thought and expression, a genuine toleration of ideas, and a strong adherence to the concepts of the dignity and equality of men, may not be readily manifest in the overt behaviors of men working within bureaucratic, hierarchical organisations. BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Adorno, T. VI., et al. The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950. Appelby, Paul H. Morality and Administration. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952. Bernstein, Marvin H. The Job of the Federal Executive. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1958. Drucker, Peter F. The Practice of Management. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954. Ekirch, Arthur A., Jr. The Civilian and the Military. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. Fiedler, Fred E. Leader Attitudes and Group Effectiveness. 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"Additional Observations on the Social Perception of Authoritarians and Nonauthoritarians," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. Vol. 52 (1956), pp. 92-95. Seeman, Melvin. "Role Conflict and Ambivalence in Leadership," American Sociological Review. Vol. XVIII, No. 4 (August, 1953)* pp. 373-80. Shartle, Carroll L. "Leadership Aspects of Administrative Behavior," Advanced Management. Vol. XV, No. 11 (1950), pp. 12-15. Stouffer, Samuel A. "An Analysis of Conflicting Social Norms," American Sociological Review. Vol. XIV (1949), pp. 707-17- Wynne, John M. "Military-Civilian Teamwork," Public Administration Review. Vol. XVII, No. 3 (Summer, 1957), pp. 170-72. Public Documents Air Materiel Command. History of the Air Materiel Command. Vol. II, January 1 - June 30, 1957. Prepared by the Historical Division, Office of Information Services, Headquarters, Air Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, January, 1958. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. Business Organization of the Department of Defense - A Report to the Congress. June, 1955. Rawlings, E. W. "Future Development of the Air Materiel Command." Published letter to the Chief of Staff, Headquarters, United States Air Force, February 27, 1959. U. S. Department of the Air Force. Air Force Regulation No. 23-2. Organization - Field. Air Materiel Command. November 21, 1956. 117 Other Sources Rawlings, E. W. "Business Management and the Air Logistics Mission." Speech to students of the School of Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, January 5» 1959. AUTOBIOGRAPHY I, John Lewis Hess, was born in Newark, Ohio, January 2, 1914. I received my secondary education in the Newark, Ohio, public schools, and my undergraduate training at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, and at the Ohio State University. I received the Bachelor of Arts degree from the Ohio State University in 1936 and the Master of Arts degree in 1938. From 1941 until the present date (1959) I have been employed with the United States Air Force. This experience has been primarily in the field of public personnel administration. In 1953 I took a leave of absence to fulfill residence and academic requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Since 1955, I have been engaged in the study upon which my dissertation is based. 118