The Future of the Naval Service Reserve

Introduction

The Naval Service Reserve (NSR) is in decline and needs to be reviewed urgently. It is falling foul of many of the issues experienced within the Naval Service (NS). Recruitment and retention problems exists and are extenuated by the effect of a lack of Permanent

Defence Force (PDF) personnel to facilitate additional training, administration and logistical support as needed. The Commission has a unique opportunity to review the standing of the

Naval Service Reserve and make recommendations accordingly.

This submission while limited in length will seek to address some of the key challenges posed in creating an integrated, functional, professional and effective Reserve. This paper will be broken down into three key headings these are, Capability, Structure and Staffing.

This paper will move on to briefly look at international practices surrounding Naval Reserves before offering a conclusion of where improvements and advances can be made.

The White Paper on Defence has called for an increase of 100 personnel to the Naval Service

Reserve. The Naval Service Reserve is presently organized into five separate units, one each in Cork, Dublin, Limerick, Waterford and a Technical Support Unit (TSU). The role of NSR is “to augment PDF Seagoing strength through provision of trained personnel and at unit level to provide for the capability of armed Naval Element afloat with local shore support and expert local maritime knowledge and intelligence in support of PDF Operations at and from the sea in the main trading ports. In support of the mission to maintain Sea Lines of

Communication (SLOC) for this island Nation”. This is accomplished through standalone operations in their home parts and through time spent on board Naval Service RHIBS and

Motor Launches. During the Covid-19 pandemic the NSR was used extensively in the initial response. They assisted on Ships in Dublin, Galway and Cork. They were also able to carry out other key operational tasks. Such tasks included but are not limited to: I. Liaison Officer Roles

II. Driving Duties

III. PPE Stowage and Distribution

IV. Assistance to the Civil Authority

The current establishment is forty nine personnel in each of the Cork, Limerick, Waterford and Dublin units. The strength of the Technical Support Group is four. This allows for two

Naval Watch-keepers and Two General Practitioners.

The current allocation of personnel to the NSR is 200. This figure currently includes four vacancies within a Technical Support Unit.

The actual number of personnel attested is between one hundred and one hundred and thirty.

The operational strength of the Naval Service Reserve is hovering between 55% and 65%.

While this sounds positive one must take stock that there are less than one hundred and thirty

Naval Reservists for the entire population. It must also be noted that the Naval Service

Reserve have not been in regular training since March 2020 and numbers may suffer due to inactivity. Currently the NSR fall under the remit of Officer Commanding Shore Operations.

They have a dedicated Cadre staff of eight personnel. The Cadre Staff are responsible for training, logistical and administration support to the NSR.

Structure

In the Naval Service there are four key branches namely, Seaman’s, Communications,

Logistics and Mechnicans. Currently the Naval Service Reserve is structured that all personnel are inducted into the Seaman’s Branch. This branch is one of the most critical to the Naval Service. A Seaman is involved in all deck evolutions. They are the individuals who drive RHIBs, handle mooring lines, fire weapons, conduct watches, they are involved in every facet of shipborne life. In this regard it makes sense that each member of the Naval Service Reserve is inducted into this branch. It would not be prudent or feasible to begin

dividing up the reserve into the various branches as there is not enough personnel. However

Reservists should be allowed conduct additional branch training in other areas. Currently a

reservists undergoes no initial specialized training outside of their recruit training. This is

unacceptable as they are not treated the same as the Permanent colleagues. They should

conduct branch specific training and as they progress they should be allowed to conduct

additional branch training in Communications, Logistics or Mechnicians. This both increases

their knowledge but also the units capabilities. It in essence means a Reservists would be a

Seaman first and foremost but can get an additional qualification to enable them act as a

communications operative. The representative Association for the Reserve Forces (RDFRA)

have made their submission to this commission public and seek to establish a reinforcement

reserve. A divide between general reservists and technical reservists is necessary. However in

order for a general or reinforcement reserve to function correctly appropriate facilities are

needed.

Currently there is no reserve presence on the West coast or in the Northern region of the

country. New units should be establish at a minimum in Galway and Donegal. In both these

counties there are vast connections to the maritime sphere. There are third level institutions

providing degrees in specific marine areas and also they are relatively densely populated. In

these two counties military installations are present and can be used for the naval reserve if

designated. An additional unit in Dublin must also be analysed. As the most densely

populated area in the country it has the ability to have a larger group involved than other area.

Expansion brings two key benefits.

1. A greater pool of reservists enabling further capabilities.

2. Creating and improving the national footprint of the Naval Service. The above points must be seen as critical. An increase in reserve establishment would

increase capability, diversity and knowledge. The National footprint of the Naval Service is

in one sense non-existent. The Naval Service does much of its work over the Horizon and

away from media attention. The service is struggling now in a recruitment crisis that will not

be solved for a number of years. The establishment of new reserve units or bigger units in

more densely populated areas offer a unique opportunity to generate an interest in the Naval

Service in new locations, it brings the navy to the forefront of peoples mind. In a time where

information is key, people would have access to that information through their local reserve

office. A national footprint is key to bringing the entire defences forces forward and

improving them as we move towards the future.

Capability

The NSR is located in four key maritime ports namely, Cork, Waterford, Limerick and

Dublin. There capability is hindered due to a lack of modularized training and a limited

number of PDF staff available. The capability of each unit remains further limited due to the low amount of reserves and their limited experience in an operational environment. When needed however the NSR have shown themselves to be professional, keen and innovative.

This is evidenced from the major flooding incident in 2016. Here the Limerick unit of the

NSR were tasked with moving personnel from flooded areas. Their support was in addition to

the Permanent Defence Forces but they were held in very high regard after the incident. Last

year and undoubtedly more importantly the Reserve were involved in key areas during the

beginning of the response to Covid-19.

The primary tasking of the NSR was assisting in Operation fortitude. In total over 1300 days

were given to the response by Naval reservists. There were personnel embarked on board L.E Eithne for the move between the Naval basin

and Horgan’s Quay. This was a critical juncture as the Defence Forces stepped up the initial

response to the ongoing external situation. The ship move represented L.E Eithne being taken

off Operational Reserve. The fact that Naval reservists responded so quickly with availability is a testament to the passion and desire they have.

NSR Personnel were involved with a variety of units throughout Operation Fortitude. These units were based in Galway, Dublin and Cork and were primarily used as testing centres as

the Nation ramped up its capacity.

Reservists completed a variety of task while embarked on units. They also assisted units

ashore when and where required. Some of tasks completed included:

i. Driving Duties

ii. Liaison Officer Role

iii. PPE stowage and Distribution

iv. Duties on board

v. Assisting the Civil authority.

vi. Sanitization of necessary spaces.

vii. General Ships Husbandry.

A Point of Contact was appointed from each NSR unit. This enabled a clear line of

communication between units and Naval Service Reserve Headquarters. Furthermore it

allowed for stringent monitoring of where personnel where and what they were involved in.

This is key as Irelands legislation for protecting Military reserves is weak, personnel’s safety

and protection is paramount oversight is a necessity.

At the height of Operation Fortitude up to thirty five (35) personnel were being deployed on a daily basis. This represented 38% of the entire effective strength of the NSR. They showed effectiveness and professionalism throughout the year. This is true of all aspects of their role. It also demonstrates the inter-operability between the NS and the NSR.

The involvement of the NSR in Operation Fortitude demonstrates what is possible when reservists are integrated. However it should not take a crisis situation for such involvement.

Capabilities need to be expanded for non-crisis times. Reservists should be more involved with ceremonial, Training events, recruitment events. Integration is key to expanding and creating a reserve which will augment the PDF Strength.

One area in need of key strengthening is the technical support unit. This unit needs to be reorganised and modernised dramatically.

The expansion of the TSU is an imperative. As technology becomes increasingly critical in the functioning of the Naval Service, there will be a requirement for further Technical

Expertise. By seeking out those with suitable qualifications, the NSR could increase support the NS through an expansion of knowledge within the reserve. Additional Medical and

Dental officer Roles increase NS capability, with the potential to further enhance wider DF capabilities. CIS roles would enable those with qualifications in IT and other communication systems apply. Engine Room Artificers are highly sought after in the NS and the private

Sector. Creating these appointments would enable civilians to have an opportunity to experience the Naval Service. PO SBAs could be expanded to include both medical and dental nurses, paramedics and others who may have a relevant and desirable skill. Similarly

Hull Artificer appointments in the TSU would allow those who have qualifications in marine surveying and Naval Architecture an opportunity to utilise their highly technical and relevant skills to the significant benefit of the NS. The proposed additions to the TSU have the potential to greatly expand the knowledge and experience available to the NS. The expansion of the TSU naturally increases capability and knowledge of the Naval Service and the

Reserve and wider DF by seeking out highly qualified civilian personnel.

Staffing

The NSR is currently under the command of Shore Operations. This makes sense as this position represents the Head of Branch for the seaman’s division. This office deals regularly with tasking’s for ceremonial, Base duties and many other key units on the Naval Base.

However under the single force concept it is the Naval College who is responsible for training. This creates issues in the administering and provision of courses for the NSR to increase their capability. The NSR can no longer come under the command of either of these areas. If we only follow the White Paper 2019 analysis and increase establishment by 100 personnel. The Reserve would have a standing of 300 personnel total. One of the above mentioned areas be it the Naval College or Shore Operations deal with a variety of other units and other personnel. In order to get a better integrated and function reserve proportional and appropriate numbers of PDF subject matter experts are necessary, In this regard a clear, separate and dedicated command structure is necessary. This would represent a dramatic increase in PDF personnel associated with the reserve. This new structure should follow the same as any other unit with a commander, a second in command a minimum of 5 lieutenants.

The creation of such a command brings with it clarity in terms of training, communication and capability. With such an increase in establishment. The Cadre Staff now would have the ability to conduct additional courses. They have access to instructors and are not reliant on the Naval College.

Permanent Defence Force involvement is crucial to a creating a successful reserve. The nature of the Naval service or any military organisation is to engaged with a level of risk. This is particularly true however of the Naval Service. Any involvement with the sea can be dangerous only by proper training and ensure standards are maintained can accidents be avoided. There have been many tragedies when working in or near the sea. One that remains to the forefront of my mind occurred in 2016. Here an Irish Coast Guard Volunteer tragically died. The subsequent report by the Marine Casualty Investigation Board was extremely critical of the management system in place. It was also critical of the training received by the personnel and also the statutory requirements for its vessels. This tragedy was avoidable. The

NSR are a volunteer force. They engage regularly in training activities however an individual’s ability to engage is limited by personal circumstance. They are limited by their career, there family and other key aspects of their life, they volunteer their time. The

Defence Force is uniquely position to mitigate risk through the provision of subject matter experts. They deal with the sea on a daily basis as well as all a host of other evolutions and training activities. An appropriate staff designated to the NSR ensure consistent standards and more importantly the safety of all personnel.

International Context

Finding an appropriate method of reviewing Irelands Reserves in an international setting is difficult. In similar countries such as Finland there are massive number of reservists that are needed due to the country’s defence strategy and land borders. In New Zealand their most recent white paper on defence 2019 calls for further integration. Here reservists are larger in number but carry out similar roles. In 2020 they assisted in preparing hospitals for the first wave of Covid-19 patients. Reservists in New Zealand have better access to training and are more integrated to the Navy.

In the United States they pushed for reserve integration from 2003. This was under the “Total

Navy Force” concept. They see reservist as valued partners and have them performing clearly defined roles. These are varied but included desk roles in positions where their civilian qualifications apply but also ceremonial and training roles. Again they have a clear training process where each new reservist undergoes the same training as their full time counterparts just over a longer period.

In 2011 the United Kingdom published the “Independent Commission on the Reserve

Defence Forces”. This paper is detailed and summarizes the issues succinctly. While the

United Kingdom has a far larger armed force and is not neutral, the issues faced by its reserves are similar to what we in Ireland face today.

Its key findings were that by attaining a better balance between the permeant armed force and the reserve it would be in the interest of all parties. It increases national security, resilience and utility of the armed forces. The Commission went on to call for better stabilisation and equipment as only by resource a reserve can you arrest the decline. It sought to establish a revised role and also enable the reserve through national legislation. This would protect personnel who are called to serve from losing their civilian career. All these issues are present within the Reserve Defence Forces of Ireland. The key difference in the United

Kingdom model is their reserves a governed by a full time Commodore.

It is apparent from “Independent Commission on the Reserve Defence Forces” the s they’re are higher levels of collective training. These are both in volume of courses conduct but also number of available courses. They have a larger Reserve structure and fulfil a wider and more varied role. However each of these nations have faced the same issue in terms of reserves at one time or another. The United States acted in 2003 and the united kingdom in 2011. Our

Reserve are not on the same scale in size but the same issues are faced.

Conclusion

This submission has sought to address some of the key challenges posed in creating an integrated, functional, professional and effective Naval Reserve We are at a cross roads where the decision will ultimately shape the Naval Reserve for the future. The reserve are a key element in Irelands Defence Strategy. They offer a surge capacity as shown through

Operation Fortitude. The Naval Reserves failings currently are inexperience and low numbers. This is evident from the daily involvement in Operation Fortitude. A high number is considered less than forty personnel. If more were needed they were not there. What is amazing is that despite many of the issues facing the organisation they have always been involved in some capacity. Most notably last year during a Crisis situation. There is an opportunity to lay a foundation whereby the Reserve can now become better trained, better staffed and better equipped so that should another crisis situation occur they are better prepared. The purpose of the reserve to provide local shore support and expert local maritime knowledge is not being met. Nor can it be a purpose when they are present in only four counties. A functioning Reserve also improves recruitment due to an increased national footprint.

The priorities moving forward should be as follows.

The creation of a new unit in Galway at a minimum. Proposed establishment is below and conforms to other units. The commission should also investigate the establishment of reservists in other key counties and additional personnel in densely populated regions. The immediate benefits are the increase of the national Naval Footprint which will bring with it improved recruitment for the Naval Service. Below is the current unit establishment in Cork,

Limerick, Dublin and Waterford.

Lt Cdr Lt S/Lt Ens SCPO CPO PO LS AB REC Total

1 4 0 0 1 2 4 8 29 0 49

In addition the Commission should also look at an expansion of the TSU. A technical reserve

is imperative. In order to maximise personnel I have attached a table below with proposed

numbers and vacancies.

Cdr Lt Cdr Lt Cdr Lt Lt Lt Lt (GP Lt (Dentist) WO CPO PO PO PO PO Total

(NWC) (NWC) (MEO) (NWC) (MEO) (CIS) ERA ERA HA SBA EA

1 5 5 12 12 7 7 7 1 12 12 6 12 6 100

This acknowledges all key areas of the Naval Service. It gives scope for Merchant Mariners,

Communication Experts, Doctors, Dentists, Nurses, Paramedics, Fitters, carpenters and

electricians, Naval Architects, and Engineers. The additional Commanders appointment gives

a path of career Progression for reservists as does the implementation of a Warrant Officer.

This unit could benefit the NS massively if introduced. It represents a unique opportunity to

bring a variety of subject matter experts into particular operations.

However any expansion should be in line with an expansion of the PDF staff. Key to

efficiency and professionalism is access to appropriate instructors and subject matter experts.

Once this achieved integration into an operational environment is possible. It must also be

noted that will Reservists have a vast array of military experience they are still volunteers Appropriate staffing will facilitate a Naval Service Reserve that are functional and adaptable.

A clear Chain of command is imperative to this. Failure to implement one without the other will ultimately leave the Naval Reserve in limbo.

Bibliography Bury, P and Catigani, S., 2019. Future Reserves 2020, the British Army and the politics of military innovation during the Cameron era, International Affairs 95(3) pp.608-701 Future Reserves 2020, 2011, The independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces