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ANNEX I Public ICC-02/05-01/09-251-AnxI 23-10-2015 1/12 EC PT ANNEX I Public ICC-02/05-01/09-251-AnxI 23-10-2015 2/12 EC PT Sudan Tribune Bashir arrives in Mauritania for regional summit1 July 26, 2015 (KHARTOUM) – Sudan’s president Omer Hassan al-Bashir has travelled to Mauritania on Sunday to participate in the 4th summit of the Great Green Wall for the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative (GGWSSI), state media reported. Sudanese president Omer Hassan al-Bashir as they pose for photographers ahead of the African Union summit in Johannesburg June 14, 2015 (REUTERS/Siphiwe Sibeko) This is Bashir’s second visit to Mauritania since the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for him in 2009 and 2010, charging him with genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity related to alleged atrocities carried out by the military and government-backed militias in the conflict in Darfur. Mauritania is not a state party to the Rome Statute of the ICC, and therefore has no obligations under the statute. However, the ICC chief prosecutor, Fatu Bensouda, had in the past asked Saudi Arabia and Egypt who are also non signatories to the statute to arrest Bashir. Also, the ICC had previously asked Qatar, Congo, Kenya, and Ethiopia to arrest the Sudanese president who continued to travel to several African capitals despite the arrest warrants. Since the issuance of the two arrest warrants, Bashir limited his trips abroad to ICC non- party states but he also traveled to five signatory states including the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Malawi, Djibouti and South Africa. 1 http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article55832, last accessed 14 October 2015. ICC-02/05-01/09-251-AnxI 23-10-2015 3/12 EC PT His recent trip to South Africa drew international attention after he flew out of the country defying a High court order which order the government to ban his departure until an application calling for his arrest had been heard. GGWSSI SUMMIT Several ministers and experts from GGWSSI member states on Thursday have started their regular meetings in the Mauritanian capital, Nouakchott in preparation for the presidential summit which would convene on Monday. The GGWSSI is a pan-African programme launched in 2007 by the African Union (AU). Its goal is to address land degradation and desertification in the Sahel and Sahara, boost food security, and support communities to adapt to climate change. The initiative brings together more than 20 countries from the Sahel-Saharan region including Algeria, Burkina Faso, Benin, Chad, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, the Gambia and Tunisia. NDTV Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir in Mauritania Despite International Criminal Court Arrest Warrant2 2 http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/sudans-president-omar-al-bashir-in-mauritania-despite-international- criminal-court-arrest-warrant-1200843 , on Irish Sun, last accessed 14 October 2015. ICC-02/05-01/09-251-AnxI 23-10-2015 4/12 EC PT Nouakchott: Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir arrived in Mauritania on Sunday to attend a summit, despite an international arrest warrant issued against him in 2009 over charges of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The visit came weeks after South Africa refused to arrest Bashir during an African Union summit, and even threatened it may withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC) after an outcry. In Mauritania, which has not signed the Rome Statute of the ICC, Bashir will on Monday attend a meeting of Great Green Wall initiative, which aims to plant a wall of trees in Africa to stop the desert from spreading, Mauritania's state news agency said. Leaders from Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mali, Chad and Mauritania are expected to attend the one-day summit. Bashir has ruled Sudan since 1989 and was indicted for genocide against the civilian population in the western region of Darfur during the conflict that erupted in 2003. The conflict began in 2003 when black insurgents rose up against his Arab-dominated government, protesting they were marginalised. Khartoum unleashed a bloody counter-insurgency, using the armed forces and allied militia. The United Nations says 300,000 people were killed in the conflict and another 2.5 million forced to flee their homes. Sudan Vision Al Bashir to Head to China to Review Strategic Projects3 Khartoum: President of the Republic Field Marshal Omer Al Bashir is expected to pay an official visit to China during the coming few weeks. Al Bashir was acquainted with the volume of cooperation economic projects between Sudan and China. Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, Badr Al Din Mahmoud said following the President meeting with the with The Ministers of Economic Sector yesterday said the meeting has reviewed the measures taken on the projects that will be discussed with the Chinese side during the prospected visit of the President to China as China is a strategic partner of Sudan. Badr Al Din outlined that the meeting has reviewed the economic projects in Sudan financed by China as well as Chinese investment in Sudan. 3 http://news.sudanvisiondaily.com/details.html?rsnpid=253892 , last accessed 14 October 2015. ICC-02/05-01/09-251-AnxI 23-10-2015 5/12 EC PT He said during the meeting the loans offered by China to Sudan have been reviewed for constructing the projects of infrastructures particularly in the sphere of development, roads, electricity, airports and railway lines. The Minister disclosed the preferential loans offered by China to Sudan noting that the meeting affirmed the importance of prioritizing these loans as well as setting new priorities for these loans towards establishing new projects to boost exports from the one hand and increase the country’s revenues from foreign currencies from the other. He further said the meeting has underscored developing the sector of petroleum and increasing its production via entering in new fields as well as entering the field of gas during the coming period in addition to cooperation in the fields of agriculture, industry and the other investment spheres via the free zones and the economic zones. The Minister of Finance went on to affirm that all the discussed issues in this meeting will be presented during the meetings with the Chinese officials in the said prospected visit. He further disclosed that the agreements concluded towards increasing the Chinese investments in the agricultural field particularly with regards to producing cash crops in which Sudan is endowed with a comparative advantage like oilseeds, cotton as well as the projects of animal resources through establishing slaughterhouses and meat factories as well as giving due attention to introducing the Chinese technology in the fields of agriculture towards realizing good productivity in the future. The Minister pledged to enter in big projects agreements with the Chinese side in the field of irrigation like Kenana Canal Setit and Merowe dams for funding them and starting partnership in them. Regarding agreements between the two countries the Minister disclosed a totality of agreements previously concluded between the two countries top of which is the agreement of rescheduling of debts noting that China has shown big flexibility in this regards to assist Sudan overcome the post-secession phase and the loss of petroleum resources. He noted that China has entered into vital spheres for compensating Sudan top of which interring the field of mining outlining that big number of Chinese companies have started producing gold and other minerals. By Zuleikha Abdul Raziq, 24/08/2015 Kyodo News 30 foreign leaders to attend China's Sept. WWII events4 About 30 foreign leaders will take part in events early next month in Beijing to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, a senior Chinese diplomat said Tuesday. 4 http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2015/08/370847.html, last accessed 14 October 2015. ICC-02/05-01/09-251-AnxI 23-10-2015 6/12 EC PT But as widely expected, top leaders from world powers, excluding Russian President Vladimir Putin, will not be attending the Sept. 3 commemorations, which include a huge military parade in the heart of the capital. Other countries that have decided to send their heads of state, presidents or top leaders to the commemorations include Cambodia, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, South Africa, South Korea, Sudan, Tajikistan, Venezuela and Vietnam, Chinese deputy foreign minister Zhang Ming told a press conference. Quartz Africa China welcomes an accused war criminal to a parade lambasting Japanese war crimes during WWII5 Sudanese president Omar Hassan al-Bashir, an accused war criminal, has arrived in Beijing to attend a military parade celebrating the defeat of Japan—a country that China still accuses of not fully owning up to its own war crimes. The International Criminal Court has accused Bashir of orchestrating violent campaigns in Darfur that left up to 400,000 people dead and over 2.5 million displaced. But because China is not a signatory to the treaty that established the organization, it is not obligated to act on ICC arrest warrants. Since the warrants were issued in 2009 and 2010, China has been the only country outside of Africa and the Middle East that Bashir has been able to travel to. In China, Bashir was personally welcomed by president Xi Jinping. “China and Sudan are like two brothers that are also good friends and partners,” Xi said, telling Bashir, “You are an old friend of the Chinese people.” No Western countries are sending their head of state to the event officially known as “Commemoration of 70th Anniversary of Victory of Chinese People’s Resistance against Japanese Aggression and World Anti-Fascist War.” The visit is fast becoming a point of diplomatic tension.
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