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Interna Tional Edition Number 2 2014 ISSN 2196-3940 INTERNATIONAL South Sudan’s Newest War: When Two Old Men Divide a Nation Carlo Koos and Thea Gutschke A political power struggle between South Sudanese president Salva Kiir and former vice president Riek Machar resulted in violent clashes between ethnic army factions in December 2013. Since then fighting has spread across South Sudan and claimed the lives of around 10,000 people. Analysis South Sudan has experienced several insurgencies since gaining independence in 2011. Nevertheless, the current war has the potential to be more destructive to the country than previous ones because both parties – President Salva Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, and his opponent, former vice president Riek Machar, an ethnic Nuer – are instrumentalizing ethnic identities and pulling their communities into their personal feud. A number of latent issues have contributed to the current crisis. These include South Sudan’s dysfunctional political system and inadequate political leadership, the historical distrust between the Dinka and the Nuer, and the country’s unhealthy EDITION dependence on oil rents. The civilian population is carrying the cost of the conflict. More than 10,000 people have been killed and more than one million displaced since the outbreak of the latest violence. Livelihoods have been destroyed and more than 3.7 million people, approximately a third of the population, are estimated to be at risk of food insecurity. The short- and long-term economic consequences for South Sudan are harsh. Oil production has dropped by 40 percent, severely affecting the state’s budget. Trade has suffered. In the long run, political instability will jeopardize foreign direct investment in South Sudan. English The international community’s reaction has been varied: Neighboring countries have supported the government diplomatically and militarily, while the United States and the European Union plan to impose sanctions on the leaders of both sides of the conflict. China has taken an active role in the ongoing peace process. Keywords: South Sudan, civil war, power struggle, ethnic violence, international conflict mediation www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus Finally Independence and Then War Again ulation. Although the power struggle between Ki- ir and Machar is not an ethnic one per se, it has se- The recent history of the newest nation on the vere implications for relations between the Dinka globe has been troubled. When the South Suda- and Nuer communities. The ethnic equilibrium in nese voted for independence in 2011, many of the government – a Dinka as president and a Nuer them foresaw a future of freedom, peace, devel- as vice president – has been widely viewed as an opment, and prosperity. The international com- important safeguard to preserve stability between munity expected progress, too. Yet since South the two largest ethnic communities. Sudan’s independence in 2012, the world has At 10:00 p.m. on 16 December 2013, fighting mostly received bleak news from the country. Re- erupted among the presidential guards in Juba. ports of ethnic violence, local insurgencies, wide- According to military sources, the fighting start- spread corruption, the autocratic practices of the ed when unexpected changes were made to the dominant Sudan People’s Liberation Movement guards’ deployment. An argument between the (SPLM), and border conflicts with the country’s groups is believed to have ignited the clash that northern neighbor, Sudan, have been common in left approximately 20 dead. Other reports say that the headlines. fighting broke out after President Kiir ordered the The recent political and violent conflict be- arrest of dissident politicians. Following the initial tween President Salva Kiir and former vice pres- clash, Kiir accused Machar and other SPLM offi- ident Riek Machar, both members of the SPLM, cials of attempting a coup against his government represents a new dimension of instability. The – which Machar denied. Several government offi- conflict could potentially result in a failed state, cials were arrested for their alleged links to the vi- an outcome that could destabilize the whole re- olence, including Pagan Amum. Machar fled Juba gion. This article summarizes how the crisis has for Jonglei State. In the following days, targeted evolved and which latent factors have contributed ethnic killings of civilians took place in Juba, illus- to it. Based on this analysis, it then discusses the trating the immediate ethnic implications of the humanitarian and economic implications of the political power struggle between Kiir and Machar. conflict, as well as its impact on South Sudan’s in- During the days and weeks after the clash- ternational relations. es erupted in Juba, heavy fighting between army units loyal to the government and rebel forces loy- al to Machar spread to the states of Jonglei, Unity, From Internal Power Struggle to Civil War Central Equatoria, and Upper Nile. Machar had the support of 10,000 recent army deserters and The Outbreak of Violence a number of local militias. Among the latter was The current crisis began in July 2013 when Pres- the White Army, which consists of approximate- ident Kiir sacked his entire cabinet, including ly 25,000 armed Nuer youth. The fact that 10,000 his chief rival, Vice President Riek Machar, with- troops broke rank demonstrates that almost 10 out giving any reasons. Analysts agree that Kiir’s years of security sector reform in South Sudan move exposed a power struggle that had been tak- have failed to address ethnic fragmentation with- ing place within South Sudan’s ruling party, the in the South Sudanese army. SPLM. A number of senior SPLM members, in- In December 2013, rebels held the strategically cluding Machar and the SPLM’s secretary-gener- important towns of Bor, Bentiu, and Malakal. The al, Pagan Amum, had increasingly viewed Kiir’s latter two are particularly important hubs for the leadership as autocratic. Kiir’s decision was ap- oil industry. Using aerial bombardment (alleged- parently also further driven by Machar’s aspira- ly carried out by the Ugandan army), the govern- tions to run as the SPLM’s presidential candidate ment was able to regain control of Bor and Bentiu. in the upcoming elections in 2015. Control over Malakal and Bentiu has shifted be- There is a distinct ethnic element to power tween rebel forces and government troops sever- and politics in South Sudan. President Kiir be- al times since the end of 2013. While the army has longs to the Dinka, the largest ethnic communi- secured a number of strategically important tar- ty in South Sudan with 36 percent of the popula- gets such as major towns and oil infrastructure, tion. Machar belongs to the Nuer, the second-larg- the rebels have retreated into the bush and started est ethnic community with 16 percent of the pop- GIGA Focus International Edition/English 2/2014 - 2 - attacking government troops using guerilla tactics Machar’s motives go beyond private benefits (International Crisis Group 2014, HIIK 2013). for him and his support base. Machar had a ma- jor dispute about leadership and democracy with- Failed Cease-fires in the SPLM with Kiir’s predecessor, John Ga- After fighting broke out in December 2013, the rang, in 1991. He has brought this emotional and Intergovernmental Authority on Development ideological baggage into the current conflict and (IGAD), a regional association of states includ- the accompanying peace process; he wants to see ing Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda, change at any cost in what is widely perceived as quickly mandated three envoys to broker a peace a Dinka-dominated government. These factors deal between Kiir and Machar. Under the auspic- promise to severely hamper reconciliation efforts es of IGAD, the warring parties signed a cease-fire with Kiir. deal on 23 January 2014. This deal has, however, been violated on several occasions since. On 10 April 2014, four months after the out- Factors Fueling the Current Crisis break of violence, Machar’s spokesman an- nounced that the rebels were planning to estab- The current political crisis and the armed conflict lish a nationwide rebel government intended to between the government and rebel forces loyal to “collectively and adequately address the current Machar can be partly explained by the personal concerns on peace, security as well as humanitar- motives of and struggle between Kiir and Machar. ian situation in the country” (Sudan Tribune, 10 However, there are a number of additional factors April 2014). Whether or not the rebels will achieve that have contributed to the current civil war that influence in all of South Sudan’s 10 states is de- go beyond these two actors’ individual decisions. batable. Yet their aspirations are of a new quali- ty and dimension. Other insurgencies since South A Dysfunctional Political System Sudan’s independence have been limited to cer- Formally, the South Sudanese state is well de- tain areas (George Athor in Jonglei State, Gatluak signed. It features a classic division of powers Gai in Unity State, etc.). They have been instigated (legislative, executive, and judicial branch), and by renegade army officers who aimed to increase the federal design takes into account the cultural their bargaining power and obtain a better post in and regional differences within South Sudan and the national army. In other cases local rebellions – in theory – delegates substantial decision-mak- have been a response to election defeats. In these ing power to the federal states. The fact is, howev- cases the rebel leaders have generally been bought er, that the South Sudanese central state is largely off with lucrative government or army posts. under the control of the former rebel movement, Further peace talks between Kiir and Mach- the SPLM. Former SPLM officers or persons loy- ar, mostly about the destiny of four former senior al to the group occupy most senior positions in all government officials, including sacked SPLM sec- branches of the state, including the subnational retary-general Pagan Amum, were still stalled as levels.
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