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Media Monitoring Report United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Media & Spokesperson Unit Communications & Public Information Office MEDIA MONITORING REPORT TUESDAY, 26 NOVEMBER 2013 SOUTH SUDAN Cabinet fixes dollar rate at 2.95 SSP (Gurtong.net) Finance Ministry raises 98 Million from non-oil revenues (Catholic Radio Network) Amum, Machar accused of “deliberately” causing SPLM failures (Sudantribune.com) Machar hints party decision against S. Sudan’s Kiir over repeated violations (Sudantribune.com) Lakes imposes 5% pay cut on civil servants for SPLM contribution (Sudantribune.com) Lakes state Counties report insecurity cases (Gurtong.net) Two police officers die as interior minister’s convoy is involved in an accident (Gurtong.net) South Sudan death penalty criticized (Gurtong.net) World Bank hosts parliamentary secretariat, media dialogue (Gurtong.net) UN trains Unity state officials on human rights protection (Sudantribune.com) South Sudan launches first national MDGs report (Catholic Radio Network) Jonglei residents welcome new governor (Gurtong.net) WBG starts 16 days of activism against gender-based violence (Gurtong.net) Famine weighs on school attendance in South Sudan’s Pochalla County (Theniles.org) S. Sudan to collaborate with East African journalists to boost press freedom (Sudantribune.com) SUDAN/SOUTH SUDAN Ngok Dinka hand parliament results of the referendum (Al-Maseer) Mbeki conducts contacts in Khartoum to set date for negotiations (Sudanvision.com) Sudanese VP chairs meeting on cooperation agreements with South Sudan (Sudantribune.com) Khartoum projects trade volume with Juba to double (Sudantribune.com) Mandate of UN peacekeeping force in abyei extended through May 2014 (AllAfrica.com) US envoy talks Sudans in Cairo (Dailynewsegypt.com) OTHER HIGHLIGHTS Fresh clashes between Sudanese army and SPLM-N in South Kordofan (Sudantribune.com) SRF plans unification, political transformation (Voice of Peace) Local commodities’ prices reduce in Nuba Mountains (Voice of Peace) UN, African Union condemn latest attack on Darfur peacekeepers (UN News Center) UN Security Council calls for execution of Kony arrest warrant (Sudantribune.com) Sudan seeks Chinese funding for Merowe canal (Sudantribune.com) OPINION/ANALYSIS/EDITORIAL/COMMENTARIES "They can even try to kill me, but i won't leave" (Radio Netherland Worldwide) SPLM dissolution, a step in the right direction (Sudantribune.com) South Sudan destabilizing new economic policy (Sudantribune.com) South Sudan parliament and Abyei referendum (Sudantribune.com) The wars are not over (Strategypage.com) Here comes the shocking stupidity again: The "shock therapy" experiment imposed on South Sudan (Al Bawaba.com) LINKS TO STORIES FROM THE MORNING MEDIA MONITOR Stakeholders review national curriculum (Bakhita Radio) Wulu community distances themselves from claims MP is Yau Yau supporter (Sudantribune.com) Health inspection to kick off in Yei (Easter Radio) NOTE: Reproduction here does not mean that the UNMISS Communications & Public Information Office can vouch for the accuracy or veracity of the contents, nor does this report reflect the views of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. Furthermore, international copyright exists on some materials and this summary should not be disseminated beyond the intended list of recipients. South Sudan to collaborate with East African journalists to boost press freedom (Sudantribune.com) UN, AU officials condemn latest attack on darfur peacekeepers (UN News Centre) Highlights Cabinet fixes dollar rate at 2.95 SSP Gurtong.net Juba, 26/11/2013 – The cabinet has resolved that the South Sudanese Pound exchange rate to the dollar and other international currencies should remain as it was before the decision taken by the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance to devalue the currency. The resolution was passed on Friday during a Council of Ministers meeting chaired by President Salva Kiir. “After the deliberations, the cabinet resolved that the official exchange rate before they declare unification exchange rate should continue and for that matter the new exchange rate should no longer operate but continue with the old exchange rate of 2.95 SSP per dollar,” Michael Makuei, government Spokesman told the press. (Back To Top) Finance Ministry raises 98 Million from non-oil revenues Catholic Radio Network, 26/11/2013 – The Ministry of Finance collected 98 million South Sudanese pounds from non-oil revenues in October compared to 90 million pounds in September. In a statement issued on Monday, the ministry revealed plans to cover November December salaries through increased spending discipline and refinancing loans incurred during the oil shut down in 2012. The statement added that the approved budget for non-salary spending for July-October fiscal year was 600 million South Sudanese Pounds. The ministry revealed that the actual spending was only 555 million South Sudanese Pounds which saved some money for other needs. (Back To Top) S. Sudan’s Amum, Machar accused of “deliberately” causing SPLM failures Sudantribune.com Juba, 26/11/2013 – Senior members of South Sudan’s ruling party (SPLM) have backed president Salva Kiir’s decision to dissolve the structures of the party, and blamed officials who recently fell out with the system for allegedly failing it. Officials accuse the suspended SPLM secretary general Pagan Amum and its first deputy chairperson, Riek Machar for allegedly being responsible for the poor performance of the party’s structures at all levels across the country. A senior official, who wished to remain anonymous, told Sudan Tribune on Monday that Machar and Amum "deliberately caused this confusion and the institutional weaknesses we are seeing today". The official, himself a member of the recently dissolved SPLM Political Bureau (PB), said that Amum "had not shown institutional respect" to Kiir who took over the chairmanship party in 2005 after the death of its former leader John Garang. The rift in the SPLM has seen the political allegiances formed during the civil war with Sudan return to the surface. "Amum still has the mentality of undermining him [Kiir] as happened during [the civil] war when some commanders and comrades could report directly to comrade John Garang without following [the SPLA’s] administrative chain of command, even though they knew comrade Salva [Kiir] was the direct deputy commander in chief", he said. The official, who spoke exclusively to Sudan Tribune, also referred to Machar’s split from the mainstream of the SPLM/SPLA led by Kiir and Garang in 1991. 2 "As for comrade Riek Machar, history bears witness. He does not like to be under the leadership of someone else" the official said, adding that both Amum and Machar "have different interests and ambitions" that explained their actions. Over the weekend, Kiir chaired a meeting of senior SPLM officials to discuss the process of creating the party’s new structures. Notably absent from the meeting were Machar, Amum and several other figures sacked in the July cabinet reshuffle. The SPLM leadership, according to the official, "agreed in principle" to form new party structures, which will be carefully scrutinised by "highly respected and committed" SPLM members who have a "clear and clean record". Mark Nyipuoc, a deputy speaker of South Sudan’s National Legislative Assembly said those who claimed that the SPLM had lost its direction and vision should explain why they did had not acted to avoid these perceived failures. "What prevented those who say the SPLM had lost vision and direction from acting to avert this? Who prevented them from taking corrective measures? I think these are the questions which you in the media should be asking", Nyipuoc told Sudan Tribune on Monday. Amum’s Suspension Not Enough Meanwhile, Sabrino Majok Majok, a member of the party’s National Liberation Council in South Sudan’s Northern Bahr el Ghazal, accused Amum of "deliberately" masterminding all the party’s current pitfalls. "Given what we know, Comrade Pagan is the prime cause of all internal problems SPLM is facing today. His suspension is not enough. He should be held accountable for deliberately trying to destroy this peoples’ party which liberated people of South Sudan from oppressors, for his individual’s interests", Majok wrote in a comment article circulated to various news entities on Sunday. "Comrade Pagan was the weakest link in the SPLM party, period", he said. Political Sabotage Majok’s view was echoed by Lual Bol Kuan, a spokesperson for the South Sudanese business community, who asserted that the political crisis is discouraging international investment. "We are all stakeholders in this country. This is why we are not silent. The current political situation was created by individuals who do not know their actions would create an atmosphere not favourable for investment and trade", Kuan told Sudan Tribune. He claimed that the former vice president "worked hard to undermine" president Kiir’s authority with the hope that the former would eventually resign to allow the latter take over the party leadership. "The former vice president should have played a key role in managing internal challenges [rather] than resorting [to] political sabotage and negative public criticism of the chairman. The intention behind this was to portray the president as someone incompetent to the run the affairs of the country", Kuan stressed. So public criticism was not just a tactic to undermine his [Kiir’s] authority, but they wanted to push him to eventually resign,
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