Armament Strategies and Development of the Kazakhstani Military-Industrial Complex: Stakes and Prospects
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ARMAMENT STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE KAZAKHSTANI MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: STAKES AND PROSPECTS CAP PAPERS 185 MAY 2017 Sebastien Peyrouse1 Since becoming independent, Kazakhstan has never hidden its regional ambitions. These ambitions are above all economic: its considerable mineral resources in oil, gas, and uranium, coupled with important reforms, conferred on Kazakhstan the promise of rapid growth, offsetting the collapse of the socialist bloc and enabling Kazakhstan to establish itself as the region’s economic driver. They are also political: on the basis of the country’s economic development, Kazakhstani president Nursultan Nazarbayev quickly sought to vie with neighboring Uzbekistan, the region’s demographic power, and forged an independent, multivectoral foreign policy free of coercion from Russia, China, and the major Western powers. Lastly, establishing Kazakhstan on the regional scene meant becoming a military power able to meet the challenges of the post-independence era. In theory, Kazakhstan, like its four Central Asian neighbors, does not face any conventional dangers linked to territorial issues. It still has 1 Sebastien Peyrouse, PhD, is a Research Professor at the Central Asia Program at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (The George Washington University) and a Senior Fellow at the East-West Institute. His main areas of expertise are political systems in Central Asia, economic and social issues, Islam and religious minorities, and Central Asia’s geopolitical positioning toward China, India and South Asia. 1 some border disputes (mainly with Uzbekistan), but Russia recognized the borders inherited from the USSR, and China signed a treaty to delimit and demilitarize their shared border. The region nonetheless faces great security pressures, mainly tied to non-conventional threats such as drugs and weapons trafficking, the Islamist threat, the risk of civil war, and localized conflicts. Added to the complexity of this picture are energy issues that generate gnawing interstate rivalries. To address these security challenges, the Kazakhstani president began in the 1990s to roll out programs to modernize his army, a feat made possible thanks to a growth in defense budgets. In the second half of the 1990s, Nazarbayev promoted the military sector as an emblem of the country’s political and economic power. He was determined not only to build a modern army but also to expand on the military-industrial complex (MIC) inherited from Soviet times, which was restored, modernized, and developed so as to be able to produce, use, and export its own weaponry. Since then, he has persevered in the effort to develop this sector. In October 2016, a Ministry of Defense and Aerospace Industry was established. It was given functions and powers in the sphere of the defense industry that were formerly the remit of the Kazakhstani Ministry of Defense, and was placed under the leadership of a former governor of South Kazakhstan oblast, Beibut Atamkulov, underscoring Kazakhstani ambitions in this sector.2 This paper will examine the ambitions, strategies, and stakes of the development of the Kazakhstan military-industrial complex. The first section analyzes Kazakhstan’s views of the risks with which it has to contend and the military doctrine it published in 2011 in response to these risks. The second section examines the development of Kazakhstan’s military-industrial complex in light of its ambition to become a regional military leader. The third section goes on to discuss the other prong of Kazakhstani amibition, namely its goals of developing international cooperation in weapons acquisition and its military-industrial complex, and of rebalancing Kazakhstan’s relations between its main partner, Russia, and other world military powers, including China, Turkey, and the West. The paper is based on research and interviews conducted during several stays in Kazakhstan between 2012 and 2015. Some of the interviews have been anonymized at the request of interviewees. Perception of risks and military doctrine Several essential points structure the nature of Kazakhstan’s defense policy. The country has a clearly stated ambition to assert itself in the face of its two great neighbors, Russia and China. From this point of view, it wants to develop its military capabilities in order to thwart possible future threats on its territory, or even on the territories of its neighbors.3 Kazakhstan indeed considers that the incapacity of Central Asian states to manage their own defense strengthens the positions of Russia and China, which take on the role of drivers of regional security. Thus, Astana wants to consolidate its decision-making autonomy, pursue its so-called multivectoral foreign policy, and avoid geopolitical deadlocks that might excessively curtail its room for maneuver. Adylbek Dzhaksybekov, Kazakh defense minister from June 2009 to April 2014, 2 “Ministerstvo oboronnoi i aerokosmicheskoi promyshlennosti obrazovano v Kazakhstane,” Informburo.kz, October 6, 2016, https://informburo.kz/novosti/ministerstvo-oboronnoy-i- aerokosmicheskoy-promyshlennosti-obrazovano-v-kazahstane.html. 3 Interview with Sanat Kushkumbaev and Bolat Sultanov, Almaty, December 2012. 2 made this explicit, openly stating that “the only means to protecting national sovereignty was to find a balance in terms of defense policy between the three major players of Moscow, Washington, and Beijing, while developing a strong and capable army backed up by a modern defense industry.”4 Risk assessment Ten years ago, the Kazakhstani authorities became aware of the need to broaden their concept of security. Advances have most certainly been made in their perception of the threats shaking the Central Asian area: in a period lasting two decades, Kazakhstan had to deal with the Tajik civil war from 1992 to 1997 (a battalion of the Kazakhstani army comprises part of the peace-keeping forces deployed in the country); incursions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan into the mountainous areas of the Tajik and Kyrgyz Ferghana Valley in 1999 and 2000; and risks of destabilization emanating from Kyrgyzstan, its closest neighbor, in the revolutions of 2005 and 2010 (as well as eruptions of violence in the Ferghana Valley in 2010). The Kazakhstani battalions that participate in the Rapid Intervention Forces of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) train, for example, to intervene in mountainous regions, and the special troops attached to the force structures do not rule out the possibility of intervening in Kyrgyzstan in case of a major destabilization. Astana thus seeks to demonstrate its ability to ensure the security of its territory and also to undertake interventions outside its borders in a legally authorized framework. Although it has no common border with Afghanistan, Kazakhstan has been concerned about the failure of the international community to find a solution to the Afghan conflict. Afghanistan supplies Central Asia with drugs – as well as, potentially, Islamist networks – and Kazakhstan is an essential point of passage for drugs headed toward Russia, which, along with Iran, is the world’s largest per capita consumer of heroin. Another zone of tensions, the Caspian Sea, is the site of unresolved border disputes with Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Iran, and the risks of piracy and poaching are great. Rear admiral Zhandarbel Zhanzakov, commander in chief of the Kazakhstani naval forces since 2009, has not hidden his dismay at the growing militarization of the bordering countries: in an interview, he singled out two Russian frigates equipped with modern missile systems, The Tatarstan and The Dagestan, as well as the new generation vessel Astrakhan.5 Military doctrine Accordingly, Kazakhstan’s military doctrine, adopted in 2011, lists the potential threats to which the various army corps ought to be able to respond in the coming years.6 The foreign threats that it mentions include: 4 Peter Dunai, “Interview: Adylbek Dzhaksybekov, Defence Minister of Kazakhstan,” Jane's Defence Weekly, February 13, 2012. 5 Joshua Kucera, “Kazakhstan: We're Building Up Navy to Compete with Neighbors,” Eurasianet.org, December 21, 2011, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64746. 6 Roger McDermott, “Kazakhstan – Russia. Enduring Eurasian Defence Partners,” DIIS Report, no. 15, 2012. 3 1. the sociopolitical instability of the Central Asian region and possible armed confrontations between countries of the region; 2. possible confrontations in the border areas of Kazakhstan; 3. political or technological pressures exerted by foreign states or organizations to intervene in domestic affairs; 4. terrorist activities, including cyber-terrorism and religious extremism; 5. the production by some countries of weapons of mass destruction.7 The domestic threats identified include: 1. separatist, nationalist, or extremist movements; 2. illegal armed groups; 3. illegal proliferation of arms. Between the military doctrines of 2007 and 2011, the number of foreign threats identified went down from 8 to 6, and domestic threats from 4 to 3. Astana lowered the risk level of a terrorist attack but increased the risk level of regional military conflicts, probably due to tensions between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The doctrine is premised on the failure of the regional security system and thus anticipates that each state will pursue its own defense policies, despite the importance of crossborder issues such as water or energy. The doctrine also revisits – a novelty – the links between