The Market for Undersea Warfare Systems
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The Market for Undersea Warfare Systems Product Code #F676 A Special Focused Market Segment Analysis by: Warships Forecast Analysis 4 The Market for Undersea Warfare Systems 2011-2020 Table of Contents Executive Summary .................................................................................................................................................2 Introduction................................................................................................................................................................4 Trends..........................................................................................................................................................................6 Competitive Environment.....................................................................................................................................23 Market Statistics .....................................................................................................................................................25 Table 1 - The Market for Undersea Warfare Systems Unit Production by Headquarters/Company/Program 2011 - 2020 ..............................................29 Table 2 - The Market for Undersea Warfare Systems Value Statistics by Headquarters/Company/Program 2011 - 2020...............................................37 Figure 1 - The Market for Undersea Warfare Systems Unit Production 2011 - 2020 (Bar Graph) ...................................................................................45 Figure 2 - The Market for Undersea Warfare Systems Value Statistics 2011 - 2020 (Bar Graph)....................................................................................45 Figure 3 - The Market for Undersea Warfare Systems Market Value Breakout 2011 - 2020 (Pie Chart) .........................................................................46 Table 3 - The Market for Undersea Warfare Systems Unit Production % Market Share by Headquarters/Company 2011 - 2020 ..................................47 Table 4 - The Market for Undersea Warfare Systems Value Statistics % Market Share by Headquarters/Company 2011 - 2020...................................50 Figure 4 - The Market for Undersea Warfare Systems Unit Production % Market Share 2011 - 2020 (Pie Chart) ..........................................................53 Figure 5 - The Market for Undersea Warfare Systems Value Statistics % Market Share 2011 - 2020 (Pie Chart)...........................................................53 Figure 6 - The Market for Undersea Warfare Systems Segment Unit Statistics % Market Share 2011 - 2020 (Pie Chart) ..............................................54 Figure 7 - The Market for Undersea Warfare Systems Segment Value Statistics % Market Share 2011 - 2020 (Pie Chart)............................................54 Conclusion ...............................................................................................................................................................55 * * * ©2011 March 2011 Product Code F676 The Market for Undersea Warfare Systems PROGRAMS The following reports are included in this section: (Note: a single report may cover several programs.) A-184/Black Shark A-244/S A/N37U-1 Mine Clearing Set (MCS) AES-1 AQS-14/AQS-24 BLQ-10 ESM BQQ-5(V) CSU-90 DM2A4 Torpedo Double Eagle DSUV-62 Mk 46 NEARTIP/Mk 54 Torpedo Mk 48 ADCAP Torpedo MU-90 Impact Spearfish SQQ-89(V) Surface ASW Combat System SQS-53(V) SQS-56(V)/DE-1160/DE-1164 Surface Ship Torpedo Defense Torpedo 2000 TSM-2233 Eledone Type 2076 Type 2087 Type 2093 Sonar UMS-4100 WLY-1 ©2011 March 2011 Product Code F676 The Market for Undersea Warfare Systems Introduction In March 2010, the importance of undersea warfare was two primary thrusts of undersea warfare evolved from starkly underlined when the South Korean corvette this perception. Minefields were a means by which Cheonan was torpedoed and sunk by a North Korean specific key areas could be protected against seaborne coastal submarine. The Cheonan broke in half as the attack. Submarine warfare was the result of a search for result of a hit from a North Korean CHT-02D an equalizer by which the available defensive forces heavyweight torpedo and went down with the loss of 46 could be assembled and concentrated without their lives. The implications of the sinking are worrying for position and intentions being revealed to an enemy. all nations that have to carry out maritime presence The search for viable undersea warfare capabilities operations in littoral waters. The Cheonan was a small quickly mutated from the hunt for an "equalizer" to an and old corvette of relatively little fighting power, but effort to come up with a wonder-weapon that would the torpedo hit that sank her would have done just as completely nullify the current balance of sea power. efficient on job on a much larger and more capable Such efforts have always been futile since the balance ship. Indeed, a DDG-51 class destroyer or LCS-1 between offense and defense has always had a shifting, Littoral Combat Ship would also have been sunk by a transitory nature, making today's wonder weapon single such hit. tomorrow's helpless target. Yet, regardless of whether During the 1970s and 1980s, undersea warfare was very the target was an equalizer or a wonder weapon, these close to being at the top of most maritime forces' undersea warfare efforts have always run into the same priority list. The threat of the Soviet submarine fleet inherent contradiction. The level of technology required focused attention on anti-submarine operations, while for the successful prosecution of an undersea warfare the hazards posed by minefields used to blockade ports campaign was available only to those who also had the and attrite naval assets received dedicated attention. technical and economic resources for a large surface During the two decades that followed the end of the fleet. Cold War, undersea warfare sank to, if not the bottom of This paradox is best illustrated by examining the the priority list, somewhere very close to it. Last year primary weapons of undersea warfare: the mine and the we remarked that this was a situation that could not last. torpedo. These weapons are much more closely related Submarines are simply too effective as ship-killers for than their apparent natures would suggest. Mines, their abilities to go uncountered. With the sinking of whether placed in a seaway or under the hull of an the Cheonan, a new undersea enemy has entered the enemy ship, were the original submarine weapon. arena, and it is likely that the next decade will see the Equipped with motors to allow the launching platform response being expressed in increased procurement and to stand off at a safe distance, mines evolved into research funding. torpedoes. Yet, effective minefields require huge Highway or Roadblock? numbers of efficient mines, which require a sophisticated mass production industrial infrastructure. Historically, the sea served not only as a barrier against Large-scale mine warfare had to wait until a invasion, but also as a highway by which a shipborne standardized mine was developed that could be mass- enemy could arrive unexpectedly and wreak havoc upon produced by industry. Torpedoes are an extreme case of a coastal community. The problem was that naval the same concerns; in effect, they can be considered forces used for coastal defense were either essentially mini-submarines, requiring the quality engineering and immobile and would, therefore, be defeated in detail, or fine tolerances of submarine construction combined were mobile and concentrated but unresponsive and with the mass production quantities of mine warfare. arrived too late to defend the area under attack. These limitations were exacerbated by the inadequacies of The Industrial Component of Strategy command and control, which meant the arrival of The weapons of undersea warfare require the same enemy forces could not be predicted. Thus, a nation industrial and scientific infrastructure needed to produce that relied upon sea power could concentrate its forces a surface fleet. In order for submarines to be practical, where and when it chose. In the words of several technologies had to come together: the diesel Admiral A.T. Mahan, "It could take as much or as little engine, efficient batteries, and optically effective of the war as it pleased." periscopes, followed later by sonars, missiles, and The situation was expressed by two emotive phrases: nuclear powerplants. Moreover, it took (and very much The ability to use the sea as a barrier was referred to as still takes) high-quality engineering to produce the "the sovereignty of the seas," while its use as a highway Continued… became known as "the command of the oceans." The ©2011 Anti-Submarine Warfare Forecast Type 2076 Outlook Unit Production Forecast 2011-2020 British defense review endorses Astute class production 1 Advanced Type 2076 may be adopted for SSBN(R) Delay of SSBN(R) opens gap for production of two additional Astute class SSNs Next 12 months may clarify situation enough to allow an expanded forecast 0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Units 0111100000Units Orientation Description. The Type 2076 sonar is a fully Status. In service. integrated passive/active search and attack sonar suite. Total Produced. A total of four Type 2076 sonar It is scheduled to be installed on the Astute class and as systems are being produced for Trafalgar class part of the midlife update of the Trafalgar class submarines,