Exemplarising the Origin of a Science
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Exemplarising the Origin of a Science A Path to Genetics: From Mendel to Bateson Yafeng Shan Doctor of Philosophy University College London I, Yafeng Shan, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. 2 Acknowledgement First of all, I would like to thank my primary supervisor, Emma Tobin, without whom the thesis may have never been close to completion. It has been a great fortune to work under Emma’s supervision in the past three years, not only as a PhD student, but also as a teaching assistant. I benefit so much from her insightful and helpful comments on my thesis writing, as well as her support and advice on my academic life. For me, Emma is much more than a PhD supervisor. I am also extremely grateful to my secondary supervisor, Brendan Clarke, for his critical comments on my writings and useful advice on my job application during the different stages, especially for his suggestion, which encouraged me to look for a case study from the history of biology. I have a great time at UCL, especially STS department. I owe a lot to the support of the STS community, including my PhD colleagues, faculty members, and honourary fellows. I also benefit enormously from the discussions in the reading groups held around UCL, especially the Metaphysical and Scientific Club and the Centre on History of Evolutionary Studies. Special thanks to Jon Agar, Chiara Ambrosio, Jonathan Everett, Toby Friend, Andy Gregory, Andy Hammond, Frank James, Julia Sanchez-Dorado, and Noberto Serpente. I wish to thank Joe Cain, head of the STS department, for his mentoring and encouragement throughout my study at UCL. In addition, I would like to thank Mike Buttolph, who is a great friend and mentor, for the discussion on Mendel and the history of genetics, his careful reading and commenting the various drafts of this thesis, and sending me valuable material on the early history of genetics. I would also like to record my thanks to the wider philosophy community in London. In particular, I thank Hugh MacKenzie and Taichi Miura for the great Trio-Plato Meetings, which enable me to refuel my energy from reading Plato! The early drafts of some chapters of this thesis were presented in the following conferences and workshops: The 8th Integrated History and Philosophy of Science 3 Workshop (Aberdeen, UK), STS Annual Research Day 2013 (London, UK), International Society of History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology Biennial Conference 2013 (Montpellier, France), the 9th Integrated History and Philosophy of Science Workshop (Leeds, UK), the 2nd Singapore Workshop for Integrated History and Philosophy of Science in Practice (Singapore), the 10th Integrated History and Philosophy of Science Workshop (Durham, UK), International Society of History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology Biennial Conference 2015 (Montreal, Canada), and the 15th Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science (Helsinki, Finland). I would thank the audience there for their comments and questions. In particular, I would like to thank Garland E. Allen, Hasok Chang, Lindley Darden, Michael Friedman, Jonathan Hodge, Frank James, Greg Radick, Peter Vickers, and C. Kenneth Waters for their stimulating comments and encouragement, which they may have not realised are so much helpful for this thesis. In addition to these expressions of gratitude, I cannot conclude without some personal thanks. Thanks to Brothers wd, and my brothers in Fei Wo: Ajiao, Kai, and San, who always stand behind me wherever I am. This thesis would not be possible without the support of my family. I would like to thank my wife, Zifei, for her companion and understanding of what I have been doing. This thesis is dedicated to my parents. I am grateful to my parents for their love and support for my study in the UK. 4 Abstract This thesis aims to propose and defend a new way of analysing and understanding the origin of genetics (from Mendel to Bateson). Traditionally philosophers used to analyse the history of genetics in terms of theories. However, I will argue that this theory-based approach is highly problematic. In Chapter 1, I shall critically review the theory-driven approach to analysisng the history of genetics and diagnose its problems. In Chapter 2, inspired by Kuhn’s concept “exemplar”, I shall make a new interpretation of exemplar and introduce an exemplar-based approach. Before introducing my exemplar-based analysis, I find it necessary to scrutinise the origin of genetics from Mendel to Bateson. In Chapter 3, I shall reinterpret Mendel’s work on Pisum by re-examining Mendel’s paper (1865) and its historical research context. In Chapter 4, by carefully examining the conceptual changes, I argue that the rediscovery event in 1900 should be better characterised as attempts of incorporating Mendel’s work with the work of “rediscoverers” (i.e. de Vries, Correns, Tschermak, and Bateson) rather than a mere reintroduction to Mendel’s work. In Chapter 5, I shall use the exemplar-based approach to analysing and interpreting the origin of genetics from Mendel to Bateson. In Chapter 6, I shall defend my exemplar-based characterisation of the origin of genetics by dismissing the potential responses from the theory-driven one, critically examining a potential mechanism-based analysis, and making the further notes on the implication of taking the exemplar-based approach to investigate scientific practice. 5 Contents 0. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 10 1. The Theory-Driven Approach, the Theory-Centric View, and the Philosophical Analyses of the History of Mendelian Genetics ........................................................................... 20 1.1 Philosophy and the History of Genetics .............................................................................. 20 1.2 Traditional Philosophical Understandings of Mendelian genetics: From Laws to Patterns of Reasoning ........................................................................................................................ 26 1.3 Criticisms of the Theory-Driven Approach and Theory-Centric View .................. 42 2. An Introduction to the Exemplar-Based Approach ............................................................... 50 2.1 The Kuhnian Analyses of Mendel’s Contribution ........................................................... 50 2.2 Revisiting Kuhn’s Paradigm ..................................................................................................... 53 2.3 The New Definition of Exemplar and the Exemplar-based Approach .................. 62 3. Mendel’s Versuche Revisited ........................................................................................................... 68 3.1 Gärtner’s Legacy and Mendel’s Real Concern .................................................................. 69 3.2 Mendel on his Achievement: The Ratios and Laws ....................................................... 88 3.3 Understanding Mendel on Pisum: It isn’t about Heredity at all! .............................. 98 4. Demystifying the Rediscovery Story ........................................................................................ 106 4.1 The Problem of Independence ............................................................................................ 106 4.2 “Rediscovery”: A Misleading Characterisation ............................................................. 132 4.3 The Great Incorporation: When Mendel Met Heredity ............................................. 150 5. Exemplarising the Prelude of Genetics .................................................................................... 155 6 5.1 The Problems of the Theory-Driven Analysis of Mendel and the Rediscoverers ................................................................................................................................................................... 155 5.2 Mendel’s Exemplary Practice on Pisum ........................................................................... 159 5.3 The Rediscoverers’ Exemplary Practices ........................................................................ 172 5.4 The Road to 1900: Mendel’s Legacy .................................................................................. 181 5.5 Reconsidering the Problem of Long Neglect ................................................................. 192 6. Why Exemplars? A Defence and Further Articulation ...................................................... 203 6.1 The Potential Responses and Challenges from the Theory-Driven Approach 203 6.2 A Mechanistic Salvage? ........................................................................................................... 214 6.3 Further Notes on the Exemplar-Based Approach ....................................................... 222 7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 226 Appendix 1 ................................................................................................................................................ 230 Appendix 2 ................................................................................................................................................ 234 Appendix 3 ...............................................................................................................................................