The South African Offensive Operations in Southern Abyssinia, 1940–1941

international journal of military history and historiography 38 (2018) 34-66 IJMH brill.com/ijmh

Evert Kleynhans Stellenbosch University, South Africa [email protected]

Abstract

The Italian declaration of war in June 1940 placed the British possessions in East Africa under threat of invasion from the neighbouring Italian colonies. In July 1940, the Ital- ians launched limited offensives towards the frontiers of Kenya and the Sudan, and completely overran British Somaliland by August. By November 1940 the First South African Division (1st sa Div) deployed to the Northern Frontier District (nfd) of Kenya, ready to launch offensive operations into Southern Abyssinia against the Mega-Moyale complex. The South African belief in mobile warfare found expression in the ensuing operation, where Maj Gen George E. Brink, the Division’s commander, essentially manoeuvred to fight during the offensive operations. This article critically discusses the objectives allotted to Brink for his offensive operations in Southern Abyssinia. The objectives allocated to the Division are measured against the overall successes of the South African operations in the south of Abyssinia during 1941.

Keywords

Union Defence Force – East Africa – First South African Division – Maj Gen George Brink – Southern Abyssinia

* Evert Kleynhans, MMil (Stell), is a doctoral student in the PhD (Mil) programme, De- partment of Military History, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. He has published a number of academic articles on the South African participation in the First and Second World Wars in relevant peer-reviewed journals. He currently resides in Potchefst- room, South Africa. This article is drawn from his MMil dissertation.

The South African Offensive Operations in Southern Abyssinia 35

Introduction

In a 2012 article David B. Katz argued that the quantity and quality of the military historical works produced on the South African participation in the Second World War drastically lagged behind concurrent international historiographical trends. He correctly maintains that the nadir of the writing up of the history of the South African participation in the war was ushered in when the Afrikaner Nationalist Party assumed power in 1948.1 A number of official and semi-official histories on South Africa’s participation in the Second World War did, however, appear. Unfortunately, the Union War Histories Section, tasked with writing the official histories, was closed down permanently in 1961 after the appearance of only three publications.2 These were: Crisis in the Desert (1952),3 The Sidi Rezegh Battles 1941 (1957),4 and War in the Southern Oceans (1961).5 From 1961 the recording of South Africa’s war effort remained rather haphazard, with both the Nationalist Government, as well as citizen force and ex-servicemen’s associations, all at one point or another undertaking projects aimed at resuscitating the memories of South Africa’s participation in the Sec- ond World War. This led to the publication of a number of historiographical works, some of which were of dubious quality and often hagiographic in out- look. There are also only a few revisionary-type scholarly works that have re- examined certain aspects of South Africa’s wartime history, despite the wealth of declassified primary archival documents available to researchers.6 The deployment of the 1st sa Div to East Africa during the Second World War has been the subject of a number of historical works. The first works published on the South African deployment to East Africa was Springbok Victory7 by Carel Birkby and Vanguard of Victory: A Short Review of the South

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 David Katz, “A Case of Arrested Development: The Historiography Relating to South Africa’s Participation in the Second World War”, Scientia Militaria 40 (3) (2012): 282–284. 2 Jeffrey Grey, “‘Standing Humbly in the Ante-Chambers of Clio’: the Rise and Fall of Union War Histories”, Scientia Militaria 30 (2000): 260–264. 3 John Agar-Hamilton and Leonard Turner, Crisis in the Desert, May-June 1942 (Cape Town, 1952). 4 John Agar-Hamilton and Leonard Turner, The Sidi Rezegh Battles, 1941 (Cape Town, 1957). 5 Leonard Turner, H. Gordon-Cumming and J. Betzler, War in the Southern Oceans, 1939–1945 (Cape Town, 1961). 6 Katz, “A Case of Arrested Development”, 284–287. 7 Carel Birkby, Springbok Victory (Johannesburg, 1941).

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African Victories in East Africa 1940–19418 by Conrad Norton and Uys Krige, both of whom appeared in 1941. All three authors were deployed with the South African Division during the campaign, and their works thus offer a rare, in- depth, narrative on the campaign. The works are, however, propagandistic in nature, and were published to bolster wartime morale. Other wartime publications which suffer from the same pitfalls include Birkby’s It’s a Long Way to Addis,9 John S.M. Simpson’s South Africa Fights10 and Andrew M. Pollock’s Pienaar of Alamein: The Life Story of a Great South African Soldier.11 These publications do, however, have their merits and add to the discussion on the South African offensives operations in East Africa. In 1960, Eric P. Hartshorn’s Avenge Tobruk12 was published. The author, as the officer commanding of the Trans- vaal Scottish during the campaign, offers a unique perspective on the offensive operations in East Africa, with some rather colourful, and highly doubtful, de- scriptions of Anglo-South African relations at the operational level of war. The focus of the work is, however, only on the First South African Brigade (1st sa Bde) and its operational employment throughout the campaign as part of the 11th and 12th African Divisions. Harry Klein’s Springboks in Armour: The South African Armoured Cars in World War ii,13 which appeared in 1965, addresses the South African deployment of armour during the East African and North Afri- can campaigns. Although an invaluable source, the publication suffers from some flaws. Klein, a former armoured car company commander in East Africa, barely attempts historical objectivity in his analysis of the successes and fail- ures of the South African armour operations during the campaign. An official history of the South African deployment to East Africa during the Second World War, though planned, never materialised. Neil Orpen, work- ing under the auspices of the Advisory Committee on Military History, which was formed at the initiative of a number of veteran’s organisations, was tasked to ensure that the publication programme of the Union War Histories Sec- tion would continue.14 The Advisory Committee on Military History hoped 141312111098

8 Conrad Norton and Uys Krige, Vanguard of Victory: A Short Review of the South African Victories in East Africa 1940–1941, (Pretoria, 1941). 9 Carel Birkby, It’s a Long Way to Addis (London, 1943). 10 John Simpson, South Africa Fights (London, 1941). 11 Andrew Pollock, Pienaar of Alamein: The Life Story of a Great South African Soldier (Cape Town, 1943). 12 Eric Hartshorn, Avenge Tobruk (Cape Town, 1960). 13 Harry Klein, Springboks in Armour: The South African Armoured Cars in World War ii (Johannesburg, 1965). 14 Ian van der Waag, “Contested Histories: Official History and the South African Military in the Twentieth Century”, in The Last Word? Essays on Official History in the United States and British Commonwealth, ed. Jeffrey Grey (Westport, 2003), 36–41.

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The South African Offensive Operations in Southern Abyssinia 37 to complete the history of South Africa’s participation in the Second World War. The publications which emanated from this endeavour is best classified as semi-official histories, lacking in original research, and which relies too heavily on the unpublished manuscripts of the Union War Histories Section. As such, they add very little to the general body of knowledge on South Af- rican participation in the war.15 The first volume of the South African Forces in World War ii series appeared in 1968, under the title the East African and Abyssinian Campaigns.16 Though essentially a campaign history, Orpen’s work is the most complete publication to have appeared in terms of explaining the South African operations in East Africa. The book fails to effectively place the South African operations during the campaign into context against the backdrop of the larger Allied offensive operations in the theatre. As such, it remains a rather warped and one-sided version of the campaign. In 1979 Orpen and Henry J. Martin published South Africa at War17 as a part of the aforemen- tioned series. This book helped to explain a number of aspects of the South African home front during the war, including an overview of the development of the Union Defence Force (udf) during the interwar period as well as the logistical and administrative efforts undertaken by the Union Government to supply the Allied Forces in East Africa with much-needed war materiel. In 1981, Orpen and Martin produced the first volume of Salute the Sappers,18 which covered the South African Engineer Corps (saec) deployments to the East and North African theatres during the war. The book helped to understand the important influence of geography on the offensive operations in East Africa during the campaign, as well as the strenuous efforts of the South African en- gineers to provision the Allied Forces with sufficient water. In 1987, Birkby produced a biography of George Brink, titled Uncle George: The Boer Boyhood, Letters and Battles of Lieutenant-General George Edwin Brink,19 which allowed for an interesting view on the strategic, operational and political decisions behind the South African campaign in East Africa. This work also adds valuable insights on the innovative employment of South

1918171615

15 Katz, “A Case of Arrested Development,” 294–295, 308. 16 Neil Orpen, South African Forces World War 2, Volume 1: East Africa and Abyssinian Cam- paigns (Cape Town, 1968). 17 Henry Martin and Neil Orpen, South African Forces World War 2, Volume 7: South Africa at War: Military and Industrial Organization and Operations in Connection with the Conduct of the War, 1939–1945 (Cape Town, 1979). 18 Neil Orpen and Henry Martin, South African Forces World War 2, Volume 8: Salute the Sap- pers – Part 1 (Johannesburg, 1981). 19 Carel Birkby, Uncle George: The Boer Boyhood, Letters and Battles of Lieutenant-General George Edwin Brink (Johannesburg, 1987).

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38 Kleynhans

African armour throughout this campaign, while offering a unique insight into the leadership and battle handling of the South African division during the campaign in East Africa. In 1990, James A. Brown produced The War of a Hun- dred Days: Springboks in Somalia and Abyssinia 1940–1941.20 While adding to the military historiography available on the South African campaign in East Africa, Brown failed to add new information and perspectives on the subject. The publication fails to account for a number of operations in which South African troops were involved and erroneously concludes that the udf participation in East Africa ended after Addis Ababa was liberated in April 1941. The book formed part of Ashanti Publishing’s South Africa at War series, which was sponsored by the National Party Government in the hope of drawing western sympathy and attention to South Africa’s contribution to Western military interests on the eve of the negotiated political settlement in South Africa. Un- surprisingly, the series adds little to the available historiography on the South African participation in the war.21 In 2012 Gustav Bentz wrote an article titled From El Wak to Sidi Rezegh: The Union Defence Force’s First Experience of Battle in East and North Africa, 1940– 1941,22 which provided some fresh perspectives on the campaign. Although his approach is limited to an analysis of the battle of El Wak, Bentz fails to provide a critical evaluation of the South African campaign in East Africa. This article is mainly a reduction of Bentz’s 2013 MMil dissertation, titled Fighting Springboks – C Company, Royal Natal Carbineers: From Premier Mine to Po Val- ley, 1939–1945,23 in which he devotes an entire chapter to the South African deployment to East Africa. It is a seminal work as he utilises a company of men from the Royal Natal Carbineers as a lens through which to provide unprecedented insight into the personal experiences of South African troops during the campaign. His analysis of the campaign, as with Hartshorn, is, however, limited to the offensive operations of the 1st sa Bde during the campaign. Da- vid Katz’s 2014 MMil dissertation, Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk: Two South African Military Disasters Revisited 1941–1942,24 though not exclusively focusing on the

23222120 24

20 James Ambrose Brown, The War of a Hundred Days: Springboks in Somalia and Abyssinia 1940–41 (Johannesburg, 1990). 21 Katz, “A Case of Arrested Development”, 285, 302. 22 Gustav Bentz, “From El Wak to Sidi Rezegh: The Union Defence Force’s First Experience of Battle in East and North Africa, 1940–1941”, Scientia Militaria, 40 (3) (2012). 23 Gustav Bentz, “Fighting Springboks – C Company, Royal Natal Carbineers: From Premier Mine to Po Valley, 1939–1945”, MMil Thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2013. 24 David Katz, “Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk: Two South African Military Disasters Revisited 1941– 1942”, MMil Thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2014.

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The South African Offensive Operations in Southern Abyssinia 39

East African campaign, provides some discussion on the deployment of the udf to this theatre. Katz highlights the many shortcomings during offensive operations and discusses the implications which this had on the subsequent deployment of the South African forces to the Western Desert. The author’s MMil dissertation, Armoured Warfare: The South African Experience in East Africa 1940–1941,25 critically focused on the deployment of South African armour during the campaign in East Africa, and in doing so addressed an aspect of the South African offensive operations which previously received little or no scholarly attention. In 2015 Ian J. van der Waag’s A Modern Military History of South Africa26 was published, in which the author discussed the South African involvement in the Second World War at length in one of the chapters. Van der Waag’s carefully researched book places the South African participation in the Second World War into context, in that it provides an unprecedented analysis of the socio- political and economic factors which underpinned the military involvement of the udf during the war. Van der Waag’s discussion of the East African campaign is, however, cursory at best, and he fails to discuss the strategic and operational consequences of the first South African operational deployment during the war. The latest work to appear on the Allied campaign in East Africa was published as recently as 2016. Andrew Stewart’s The First Victory: The Second World War and the East Africa Campaign27 is a welcome addition to the historiographical body of work surrounding the campaign in East Africa during the Second World War. Stewart’s book provides a highly critical account of the entire campaign in East Africa, with a detailed discussion at the operational and strategic levels of war. Stewart, while acknowledging the significant role played by the udf during the campaign, rather surprisingly, only casually glances over the offensive operations fought by Brink and his Division in Southern Abys- sinia in a mere paragraph, while the offensive operations through Italian So- maliland and Eritrea received the bulk of attention in his book. This is rather unfortunate, as the bulk of South African troops in the theatre were, in fact, deployed with the 1st sa Div in Southern Abyssinia. Despite the recent analysis of the East African campaign, several hiatuses remain, particularly in evaluating the South African operations in the theatre from a strategic and operational context. The offensive employment of the 25 26 27

25 Evert Kleynhans, “Armoured Warfare: The South African Experience in East Africa, 1940– 1941”, MMil Thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2014. 26 Ian van der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa (Cape Town, 2015). 27 Andrew Stewart, The First Victory: The Second World War and the East Africa Campaign (London, 2016).

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1st sa Div in Southern Abyssinia, though limited, needs to be reassessed and placed into context as part of the overall Allied strategy in the East African Theatre. This article briefly discusses the South African preparations for the campaign in East Africa, while paying specific attention to the strategic and operational considerations which dictated the deployment of Brink and his Division to Southern Abyssinia. In doing so, the operational objectives allocated to the Division are measured against the overall successes of the udf operations in the south of Abyssinia during 1941. This allows for a reinvestigation of the South African operations in Southern Abyssinia, which to date remain largely disregarded and overlooked by international scholars. As a result, this article re-evaluates the key role South African forces played in securing the first campaign victory of the Second World War.

The South African Deployment to East Africa

Throughout the interwar period, the udf was characterised by a severe state of unpreparedness, which had inherently created an atmosphere conducive to muddled thinking about future trends in warfare, modernisation and military innovation.28 During this period, James B.M. Hertzog and Oswald Pirow, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence respectively, maintained that the Union of South Africa had no immediate threat to its sovereignty.29 Benito Mussolini’s Italian armies annexed Abyssinia and parts of Somaliland in East Africa in May 1936 and soon displaced this notion.30 Despite a heightened threat level brought about by Mussolini’s expansion in Africa, the South African government remained firm in its belief that the sole purpose of the udf was to protect the Union’s neutrality.31 Politically it was felt that South Africa should 31302928

28 Kleynhans, “Armoured Warfare”, 4–16. 29 South African Department of Defence Archives (dod Archives), Diverse, Group 1, Box 65, File. Secret Memorandum on ‘The necessity for the Maintenance of Defence Forces in the Union of South Africa’ and dod Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 65, File. Defence Policy 1933. 30 Colin Bayne-Jardine, Mussolini and Italy (Harlow, 1966), 58–61; dod Archives, Chief of the General Staff (cgs), Group 2, Box 498, File 898. Ethiopia – 30 October 1935 and dod Archives, cgs, Group 2, Box 519, File 944/11a. Memorandum in Connection with Matters Discussed with the Minister by Major-General Brink and Brigadiers Botha and Collyer at Pretoria on Tuesday 18 August 1936. For more on the Italian invasion of Abyssinia see John Gooch, Mussolini and His Generals: The Armed Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy, 1922–1940 (Cambridge, 2007), 252–314. 31 dod Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 65, File. Notes on Minister’s Outline of Defence Policy – Defence Council Meeting 15 June 1935.

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The South African Offensive Operations in Southern Abyssinia 41 remain neutral in the event of a European conflict, especially one involving Germany and Britain. In this context, South Africa would come to the aid of Britain only if Germany declared war on her. By the latter half of the 1930s, with tensions mounting in Europe and a changing geopolitical landscape in Africa, the inadequacies of Pirow and the failed South African defence policy began to affect the Union detrimentally in its preparations for the looming global war.32 The South African declaration of war on Germany on 6 September 1939 was the catalyst needed for the transformation of the udf from an ageing peace- time defence force into that of a modern armed force capable of projecting offensive power within Africa.33 From the outset of the war General Jan C. Smuts, the new Prime Minister, advocated active participation in the war at the be- hest of Britain where needed. Throughout the 1930s, Smuts had argued that the Union’s first line of defence be further afield in the subcontinent of Africa, and not simply beyond its immediate borders.34 On 7 September, Smuts contacted the British War Office and proposed to send an initial South African force to Kenya as a vanguard, with a further two divisions earmarked for deployment to East Africa once trained.35 The Chief of the General Staff (cgs) of the udf, Lt Gen Sir Hesperus A. van Ryneveld, consequently warned Defence Head- quarters of Italy’s possible belligerence on the side of Germany. He argued that Italian armies could simultaneously overrun Sudan and Egypt after which its forces might threaten the British possessions of Kenya and Tanganyika, and possibly even South Africa. During December, Anthony Eden, the British Sec- retary of State for Dominion Affairs, informed Smuts that his Government believed that the Italian presence in Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland did not directly threaten Kenya. They also did not wish to provoke Italian aggression by deploying large numbers of troops to East Africa. On 20 December, the British Government intimated that a possible move of South African troops to Kenya might only become necessary during 1940. This step would only be required if the geopolitical situation in the area should change drastically.36 The Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East, Lt Gen Sir Archibald P. Wavell, argued during January 1940 that Britain should defend her possessions in East

343332 35 36

32 Ian van der Waag, “The Union Defence Force Between the Two World Wars”, Scientia Mili- taria 30 (2) (2000): 183–184, 212–219. 33 Kleynhans, “Armoured Warfare”, 21–23. 34 dod Archives, cgs, Group 2, Box 519, File 944/11a. Memorandum in connection with matters discussed with the Minister by Major-General Brink and Brigadiers Botha and Collyer at Pretoria on Tuesday 18 August 1936; Stewart, The First Victory, 18–19. 35 Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, 23–24. 36 Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, 4–5; Stewart, The First Victory, 42–43.

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Africa in the event of war with Italy. He contended that if sufficient Allied troops deployed to this theatre, the Allies could even consider launching an offensive against the Italian forces in Abyssinia, Eritrea and Somaliland.37 Smuts subsequently received a telegram from London that February, cordially reminding him of his suggestion the previous year that the udf could provide troops for service in Kenya. The Union was asked to send a udf brigade to Kenya as soon as possible as a mere precautionary measure.38 Smuts accepted the British pro- posal, and on 7 February, the South African Parliament was informed that udf operations would now extend as far north as Kenya, and an Africa Service Oath was introduced to circumvent the deployment limitations of the South African Defence Act. The first South African soldiers began to arrive in Kenya by the start of June 1940 to help protect the vital port of Mombasa.39 On 10 June 1940, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the British Ambassador to Rome that as of midnight Italy would be at war with Britain. The Union followed suit and declared war on Italy on the next day. The nearest threat to South African sovereignty was now located on the border between Kenya and Abyssinia.40 Towards the end of June, the Supreme Commander of the Italian forces in East Africa, Prince Amadeo of Savoy, the Duke of Aosta, ordered tentative thrusts into British territory to gauge the resilience of the Allied defences. During the first week of July, Italian forces launched a series of attacks on the British outposts at Moyale in the Northern Frontier District (nfd) of Kenya, Kassala in the Sudan and Gallabat on the Sudan-Abyssinian border. By mid-August, Maj-Gen Alfred R. Godwin-Austen’s 12th African Divi- sion had been forced to abandon British Somaliland after a swift Italian invasion.41 These offensives, albeit somewhat limited, highlighted the numerical inferiority of British troops in East Africa and caused some concern for the British War Office, although Winston S. Churchill, the British Prime Minister, believed that the possibility of an Italian expedition advancing across the nfd

40393837 was41 inconceivable.42 42

37 Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, 5. 38 South African National Archives (sana), Pretoria, Field Marshal J.C. Smuts Collection (A1). Vol. 29, Item No. 7. Telegram referred by High Commissioner, Cape Town to Prime Min- ister Regarding Situation in Middle East – 22 March 1940. 39 Van der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa, 174–175. 40 Stewart, The First Victory, 48. 41 For a comprehensive discussion on the Italian attacks on Moyale, Kassala and Gallabat, as well as the British defeat in British Somaliland, see Stewart, The First Victory, 48–94. 42 Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, 22–24 and dod Archives, Union War His- tories, Box 121, File 45/C/14 – C-in-C’s Conference at ghq Middle East 1–4 Dec 1940. Situa- tion in Italian East Africa by d.d.m.i. – 1 December 1940.

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The South African Offensive Operations in Southern Abyssinia 43

A steady stream of South African units arrived in East Africa via road and sea throughout the latter half of 1940. These groups proceeded by rail to the South African Advanced Supply Depot at Gilgil in the Kenyan Highlands, where the troops received further training moulding them into an efficient fighting force.43 On 13 August, the 1st sa Div was established under the command of George Brink and comprised the First, Second and Fifth South Afri- can Brigades (2nd sa Bde and 5th sa Bde) under the command of Brig Daniel H. Pienaar, Brig Ferdinand L.A. Buchanan and Brig Bertram F. Armstrong respectively.44 By the beginning of December, the entire 1st sa Div was in the theatre and took over the defence of the Marsabit area. Brink subsequently established his headquarters 280 kilometres (km) to the north of Gilgil at Isiolo in the nfd. The South African troops undertook some intensive patrols from Isiolo towards the border of Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland in search of the Italian vanguard.45

The Strategic and Operational Considerations

A strategic meeting was held at Khartoum in the Sudan towards the end of October 1940 between Smuts, Eden, Wavell, Maj Gen William Platt, Van Ryneveld, and Brig Douglas P. Dickinson. The participants agreed that if a series of coordinated attacks were launched from Kenya, and the Sudan, the Italians could be driven from East Africa and valuable forces would be freed to join the Allied defence of the Middle East.46 The Allies would need to capture the strategic port of Kismayu before an all-out invasion of Abyssinia could be consid- ered, as this would drastically shorten the Allied lines of communication. They

46454443

43 Martin and Orpen., South Africa at War, 67; Bentz, “Fighting Springboks”, 34–37; Simpson, South Africa Fights, 174–182. 44 Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, 50. The infantry and armour complement of the 2nd sa Bde comprised the 1st Natal Mounted Rifles, 1st Field Force Battalion, 2nd Field Force Battalion and No. 2 sa Armoured Car Company. The infantry and armour of the 5th sa Bde comprised of the 1st South African Irish Regiment, 2nd Regiment Botha, 3rd Transvaal Scottish Battalion and No. 1 sa Armoured Car Company. The Divisional Artil- lery comprised three batteries of the Transvaal Horse Artillery, with the 3rd Anti-Tank and 6th Anti-Aircraft batteries attached. 45 Kleynhans, “Armoured Warfare”, 48–49 and dod Archives, uwh, Civil, Box 121, File 45/C/14 – C-in-C’s Conference at ghq Middle East 1–4 Dec 1940. Notes on Future Plans in Middle East. 46 dod Archives, uwh Civil, Box 121, File 45/C/14 – C-in-C’s Conference at ghq Middle East 1–4 Dec 1940. Notes on Future Plans in Middle East.

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44 Kleynhans also agreed that the offensive operations in East Africa were dependent on the rainfall, and hence decided that the offensive operations had to be effected between December and March when a gap in the rainy weather conditions existed. By the end of the conference, it was agreed that the Allied offensive in East Africa would start early in 1941. Eager to ensure that the udf take part in the ‘fighting’ war, Smuts and the South African general staff became increas- ingly forceful in their opinions regarding the strategic direction of the campaign in East Africa.47 At the end of the meeting, Lt Gen Alan G. Cunningham was appointed as the new General Officer Commanding East Africa Force. He replaced Dickinson, who was recalled after an apparent disagreement with Smuts over the overall strategy and employment of South African troops under his command.48 During the first week of December, Wavell called for a further conference with the commanders of East Africa and the Sudan, Cunningham and Platt, to decide on an overall plan of action for the East African offensives scheduled to start in early 1941. During the conference, Wavell emphasised the importance of synchronising the respective offensive operations.49 Wavell and his staff were convinced that the Massawa-Asmara area, Djibouti and Addis Ababa served as the strategic nerve centre of Italian East Africa, and if threatened in unison, its resistance would crumble piecemeal. The combined offensives in East Africa rested on three pillars.50 First, in the Sudan Platt’s forces were to capture the Kassala-Sabdarat-Tessenei triangle on the Sudan-Eritrea border. Second, from Kenya Cunningham had to advance on, and capture, Kismayu, which would deny the Italians the use of the port, thereby severing all their logistical ties with the Italian mainland. A further operation from Kenya would threaten the area to the north and northeast of Lake Rudolf. Lastly, Wavell advocated that it was necessary to spark, and lead, a patriotic Shifta revolt in Abyssinia, which would harass the Italian lines of communication and make the countryside ungovernable.51

50494847 51

47 Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, 58–59. 48 Stewart, The First Victory, 106–107. 49 dod Archives, uwh Civil, Box 121, File 45/C/14 – C-in-C’s Conference at ghq Middle East 1–4 Dec 1940. Notes on Future Plans in Middle East. 50 Stewart, The First Victory, 115–116. 51 dod Archives, uwh Civil, Box 121, File 45/C/14 – C-in-C’s Conference at ghq Middle East 1–4 Dec 1940. Notes on C-in-C’s Conference with goc East Africa and goc Sudan – 2 Decem- ber 1940 and dod Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 16, File 23. Security of East and Southern Africa – An Appreciation of the Situation from the Point of View of the Chief of the General Staff of Information of the Minister of Defence – December 1939 to March 1940.

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The South African Offensive Operations in Southern Abyssinia 45

Upon his return to Nairobi in December 1940, Cunningham decided that the offensive operation aimed at capturing Kismayu, designated Operation Can- vas, would be postponed to May/June 1941. His decision, contrary to Wavell’s original plan, was based on several considerations. Firstly, Cunningham argued that a shortage of water supplies52 would prevent the movement of a large body of men over an area virtually devoid of water. Secondly, Italian morale was thought to be extremely high after the capture of British Somaliland and, thirdly, some of his troops were not yet fully trained for offensive operations. Finally, Cunningham argued that he did not have the disposal of sufficient mo- tor transport to provision his forces on the long lines of communications that would be created by an advance on Kismayu.53 Cunningham thus decided that an advance on the frontier with Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland should be effected immediately to establish a defensive line. These movements were col- lectively known as the ‘cutting out’ operations, and would culminate in the es- tablishment of a series of administrative facilities and supply depots along this defensive line to secure sufficient stockpiles before the main Allied offensive began in January 1941.54 Cunningham expressed his wish that the operations in the area to the north and north-west of Lake Rudolf were to start as soon as possible. The South- ern Abyssinian province of Galla-Sidamo was to be attacked by Brink and his Division, and Wavell instructed Cunningham to employ these South African troops on irregular lines. He argued that small, mobile columns should be used to harass and occupy Italian outposts, attack their lines of communication and foment a Shifta revolt in Southern Abyssinia.55 This style of warfare, it was argued, suited the udf psyche for mobile operations, largely consid-

ered545352 to be South Africa’s national arm.56 Despite the Somaliland operations 55 56

52 Gideon Visser, “South African Military Water Diviners in Kenya during World War ii”, Wa- ter Wheel 10 (2011): 32–35; and Gideon Visser and Ezekiel Nyanchaga, “The South African Engineer Corps’s water supply operations in Kenya during the Second World War: Its wartime impact and postwar legacy”, Journal for Contemporary History 30 (2012): 32–51. 53 Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, 69. 54 dod Archives, uwh Civil, Box 121, File 45/C/14 – C-in-C’s Conference at ghq Middle East 1–4 Dec 1940. Notes on C-in-C’s Conference with goc East Africa and goc Sudan – 2 Decem- ber 1940 and dod Archives, uwh Civil, Box 121, File 45/C/14 – C-in-C’s Conference at ghq Middle East 1–4 Dec 1940. Messages – MIDEAST to TROOPERS – 2 December 1940. 55 dod Archives, uwh Civil, Box 121, File 45/C/14 – C-in-C’s Conference at ghq Middle East 1–4 Dec 1940. Notes on C-in-C’s Conference with goc East Africa and goc Sudan – 2 Decem- ber 1940. 56 Klein, Springboks in Armour, vii; John Collyer, The Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914–1915 (Pretoria, 1937), 165–173; John Collyer, The South Africans with General Smuts in

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46 Kleynhans receiving priority, Cunningham realised that Brink and his Division could play an active role in threatening Addis Ababa before the arrival of the rain season.57 On 15 January 1941, the Allies launched a combined offensive across East Af- rica. Cunningham and his staff had allotted several pertinent objectives to the 1st sa Div. The South Africans were to secure the area around Dukana, Hobok and Gebel Affur, with the object of protecting and developing communications in these parts to assist in the eventual invasion of Abyssinia from this sector. Brink was furthermore tasked to use flying columns, invariably consisting of both the South African Tank Corps (satc) units in his Division, to support the Shifta Rebellion forming in the general area of Lake Chamo north of Banno. Lastly, the Division was ordered to capture Namaruputh, Todenyang and Kalam in conjunction with elements of the Equatorial Battalion of the Sudan Defence Force. The latter would be the responsibility of the 25th East African (ea) Bde under the command of Brig W. Owen, who was attached to the 1st sa Div.58 Cunningham visited Brink at his headquarters at Marsabit on 12 January 1940, to discuss his upcoming offensive operations. The attachment of Pienaar’s 1st sa Bde to the 12th African Division, had been a bone of conten- tion ever since the arrival of the South African troops in East Africa.59 Brink once more approached Cunningham with the suggestion that Pienaar and his men join the ranks of the 1st sa Div. He argued that the addition of the 1st sa Bde would allow him to encircle Buna through Derkali and Burduras, while his 2nd and 5th sa Bdes advanced through El Gumu and Kunchurro with the object of securing the Moyale-Mega-El Dokelle area. A bonus would be the capture of Neghelli and Yavello before the arrival of the ‘long’ rains in March, which would open an alternate route of advance on Addis Ababa via the motorable

57 58 59

German East Africa, 1916 (Pretoria, 1939), v–xvi and dod Archives, Chief of the General Staff (cgs), Group 2, Box 519, File 944/11a. Memorandum in Connection with Matters Dis- cussed with the Minister by Major-General Brink and Brigadiers Botha and Collyer at Pre- toria on Tuesday 18 August 1936. For a more contemporary interpretation of this school of thought see Roland De Vries, Eye of the Firestorm: Strength Lies in Mobility (Tyger Valley, 2013); Roland De Vries, Mobiele Oorlogvoering: ‘n Perspektief vir Suider Afrika (Menlopark, 1987). 57 dod Archives, War Diaries (wd), Box 284, File 1 sa Div. 1(s.a.) div. Report on Operations in Kenya and Abyssinia – December 1940 to April 1941. 58 dod Archives, wd, Box 283, File 1 sa Div Operation Instructions. Secret Correspondence Between Brink, Buchanan and Armstrong re General Situation on East African Front – 1 January 1941; Klein, Springboks in Armour, 35–36 and Birkby, Uncle George, 108–110. 59 Hartshorn, Avenge Tobruk, 40–45.

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The South African Offensive Operations in Southern Abyssinia 47

Neghelli-Dolo road and the Lakes of central Abyssinia. The advance on Addis Ababa was, however, not to be, as Cunningham had earmarked Pienaar and his Brigade for the offensive operations in Italian Somaliland. Brink would have to do without Pienaar and his Brigade.60

The ‘Cutting-Out’ Operations

By the beginning of January 1941, Brink manoeuvred his Division into the no- mans-land of the nfd, ready for the commencement of the Allied offensive operations on 15 January. At this stage, Buchanan and his Brigade occupied Dukana, while Armstrong and his men were at Marsabit. Cunningham, real- ising that a frontal attack up the steep forested slopes of the Moyale escarpment would be impossible, ordered Brink to conduct a wide flanking attack on the Mega-Moyale escarpment via the Chalbi Desert.61 Brink decided that his Division would envelop the Mega-Moyale escarpment through a series of tactical and operational bounds. The 1st sa Div would first rid the nfd of the Italian presence by capturing El Yibo, El Sardu and the Turbi Hills, whereafter the attention of the offensive operation would turn towards the capture the heavily defended Italian garrisons at El Gumu, Gorai, Hobok, Banno, El Sod, Mega and Moyale.62 The Italian 21st Colonial Division, commanded by Lt Gen Pietro Gazzera, defended the Mega-Moyale area. The Italian garrison at Mega comprised the Italian 9th Colonial Brigade, with the 2nd, 54th, and 60th Colonial Infantry Battalions, as well as the 585th Blackshirt Battalion and 9th Pack Bat- tery. The Italian 25th Brigade, with the 7th and 12th Colonial Infantry Battalions, 105th Blackshirt Battalion, and 25th Pack Artillery Group under its command, defended the Moyale sector.63 Brink realised that water, and the access to it, would be the single biggest factor which would either confer success or defeat upon his Division during the coming offensive. To sustain the physical and mechanical needs of his men and their vehicles, and to deny the Italians the use thereof, Brink’s Division

60 61 62 63

60 Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, 92–94; Stewart, The First Victory, 107. 61 dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File 1 sa Div. 1(s.a.) div. Report on Operations in Kenya and Abyssinia – December 1940 to April 1941 and Van der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa, 197. 62 Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, 95. 63 Birkby, Uncle George, 110; dod Archives, cgs, Group 2, Box 92, File 160/2 Military Intel- ligence Appreciations – General. Data on Italian Forces in i.e.a. and dod Archives, cgs,

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48 Kleynhans

Map 1 1 The st sa Div Area of Operations in Southern Abyssinia64 would have to capture and control all the water sources along the Kenyan frontier as part of Cunningham’s ‘cutting-out’ operations. This would in turn directly relieve pressure off of his already stretched lines of communication.65 It was decided that the area around the wells at El Yibo-El Sardu would first have to be cleared of all Italian soldiers, whereafter active patrols to the Abyssinian frontier would be undertaken along the Dukana-Gorai Road. This would give the South African Engineering Corps (saec) the necessary time needed to de- velop the water supplies in the Dukana and North Horr areas to such an extent that it could support the South African advance into Abyssinia.66 The first battle for Brink’s Division was fought between 16–18 January, when Buchanan’s 2nd sa Bde was ordered to occupy and hold the wells at El Yibo and El Sardu. The Battle of El Yibo, however, was no more than a staccato affair.67 The plan was to envelop the Italian forces occupying the area around El Yibo by infantry and armour acting in a mutually supportive role. The three biggest ob- stacles facing the South African fighting patrol were the extreme heat, the lack of adequate maps and a severe shortage of water. The main problem during the Battle of El Yibo, however, was that of command and control which surfaced at

6564 66 67

Group 2, Box 92, File 160/2 Military Intelligence Appreciations – General. Banda – 17 July 1940. 64 Map drawn by the Author. 65 dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File Operational History of 1 s.a. Div. Report on Ops El Yibo-El Sardu. 66 dod Archives, wd, Box 283, File 1 sa Div Operation Instructions. 1 s.a. Div Operation In- struction No. 5 – 9 Jan 41. 67 Norton and Krige, Vanguard of Victory, 15–16.

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The South African Offensive Operations in Southern Abyssinia 49 the tactical level during the battle. Unity of action and command between the armoured cars and the infantry remained an issue throughout the operation to the extent where the fighting patrol’s effective deployment was negated during the battle. It seems as if the infantry just did not understand the doctrine that governed the employment of armour during operations. It was even felt that infantry officers should not issue direct orders to individual armoured cars in battle.68 For the relatively small cost of one man killed and three wounded, the South Africans achieved success at El Yibo. The Italian losses comprised twenty-two men killed, forty wounded and two taken prisoner. The capture of El Yibo and El Sardu, along with the actions fought by reconnaissance patrols of the 5th sa Bde in the vicinity of the Turbi Hills and Sololo during this period, expelled the last Italian outposts from the Dukana sector of the nfd and secured valuable water sources for Brink’s ensuing offensive.69 These actions had convinced Brink and his men that the nature and speed of their operations called for the accepted doctrine to be abandoned in lieu of tactical and operational requirements. This would become a hallmark of the South African offensive operations during the East African campaign.70 Brink and his Divi- sion were now in complete mastery of their sector of the nfd and were poised to launch their limited offensive into Southern Abyssinia.

The Operational Envelopment

Late in the afternoon of 31 January, the lead elements of Brink’s 1st sa Div started to cross the Kenyan frontier into Southern Abyssinia. During the morning of 1 February, the two South African Brigades formed up in battle order and continued their advance in a box formation. The presence of two separate Italian outposts directly impeded the advance into Abyssinia. Brink had tasked Buchanan to attack towards the vicinity of the Gorai crater with his Brigade, which was located on the eastern extremity of the South Afri- can axis of advance. Armstrong and his Brigade were tasked to capture the

706968

68 dod Archives, wd, Box 215, File e.a. 25. No. 2 Armoured Car Company War Diary from 1/1/41 to 31/1/41 and Klein, Springboks in Armour, 38. 69 Norton and Krige, Vanguard of Victory, 15–16 and dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File Opera- tional History of 1 s.a. Div. Report on Ops El Yibo-El Sardu. 70 dod Archives, uwh Civil, Box 120, File narep ea 2 – East African Campaign s.a.t.c. in Action. How Abyssinia Was Won – Lt Col G.K. Roodt and dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File 1 sa Div. 1(s.a.) div. Report on Operations in Kenya and Abyssinia – December 1940 to April 1941.

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50 Kleynhans

Italian fort at El Gumu, which commanded the critical road junction between Yavello-Kunchurro-Hobok.71 The 2nd sa Bde immediately made for the Italian fort at Gorai. At first glance the fort appeared difficult to attack because it was situated on the Southern tip of a crater, surrounded by broken ground.72 A diversionary attack by six armoured cars on an Italian outpost, located thirteen km from Gorai, pre- ceded the main assault. The armoured cars encountered only slight resistance at the Italian outpost, which was quickly brushed aside, whereafter the fighting column continued their advance unhindered. By late afternoon the main attack on Gorai developed after an initial aerial bombardment by the South African Air Force (saaf).73 Two infantry companies conducted the main attack, with four armoured cars offering them mobile fire support. The initial attack by the infantry yielded almost immediate results, with the Italian commander of the fort decapitated by the accurate, and at times lucky, South African mortar fire.74 The rapid advance of four armoured cars managed to breach the outer perimeter of the fort, whereafter the armour silenced the Italian machinegun emplacements piecemeal. The swift and sharp armour attack caused a general retreat amongst the Italian defenders,75 and the South African infantry merely had to consolidate the position at Gorai. The South African casualties after the attack on Gorai were only two men killed and seven wounded. The Italian losses were much heavier, with twenty-eight men killed and a further forty-nine wounded. The South African attack on Gorai was a well-executed affair, which included a mutually supportive attack by infantry, armour and the air force. Brink and his men, it seems, had correctly estimated the merits of the combined-arms approach during offensive operations.76 During roughly the same time as the attack unfolded at Gorai, the lead elements of the 5th sa Bde broke through the dense scrubland before El Gumu. Reminiscent of a cavalry charge of old, the armoured cars dashed towards the

74737271 75 76

71 Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, 115–116. 72 dod Archives, wd, Box 283, File Gorai. Operations Gorai – El Gumu – Dillo 2 Feb 1941. 73 dod Archives, wd, Box 283, File Gorai. Report on Action by Armoured Cars on Attack on Gorai 1-2-41. 74 Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, 113–120 and Birkby, Uncle George, 126–128. 75 dod Archives, wd, Box 215, File e.a. 25. No. 2 Armoured Car Company War Diary from 1/2/41 to 28/2/41 and dod Archives, wd, Box 283, File Gorai. Report on Action by Armoured Cars on Attack on Gorai 1-2-41. 76 dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File Operational History of 1 s.a. Div. Report on El Gumu- Gorai-Hobok and Norton and Krige, Vanguard to Victory, 16–19.

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The South African Offensive Operations in Southern Abyssinia 51 defences of El Gumu and overran the Italian positions, causing the remaining defenders to flee in the direction of Hobok and Kunchurro where larger Ital- ian forts were situated.77 The entire contact at El Gumu lasted no longer than an hour and bore testimony to the offensive capabilities and tenacity of the soldiers of the satc, with the armoured cars routing the Italian defenders and capturing El Gumu by themselves without a loss. The accompanying infantry had the relatively straightforward task of securing the village and rounding up some prisoners. The Italian defenders suffered thirteen dead, and a further five men wounded during the swift engagement.78 The advance of the 1st sa Div into Abyssinia on 1 February, and the subsequent victories at Gorai and El Gumu on the same day, bears testimony to the varied employment of the South African infantry and armour during offensive operations. Cunningham argued that, had it not been for the courageous action of the armour during the attacks on Gorai and El Gumu, the South Africans would have suffered more casualties.79 Following the South African successes at Gorai and El Gumu, Brink planned a further offensive thrust towards the Italian fort at Hobok on 2 February. The fighting at Gorai and El Gumu were not as intense as expected, owing to poor Italian intelligence which failed to detect the South African advance. The Italian defence at El Gumu and Gorai also remained wanting, and it seemed as if no word had reached the Italian headquarters of Brink’s advance, let alone of the Italian battlefield reverses.80 The South African advance was next directed towards the Italian fort at Hobok, situated approximately thirty-two km west of El Gumu. After the de- feats at Gorai and El Gumu, the remainder of those garrisons retreated towards Hobok in the hope of consolidating an unattainable position and making good the defence of the immediate area. Brink decided that Armstrong’s brigade

797877 80

77 dod Archives, wd, Box 287, File 1 sa Irish. 1st South African Irish History to June 41 and dod Archives, wd, Box 283, File Gorai. Report Armd C in action El Gumu, Gorai, Hobok 31 Jan – 2 Feb 41. 78 dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File 1 sa Div. 1(s.a.) div. Report on Operations in Kenya and Abyssinia – December 1940 to April 1941 and dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File Operational History of 1 s.a. Div. Report on El Gumu-Gorai-Hobok. 79 dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File Operational History of 1 s.a. Div. Report on El Gumu- Gorai-Hobok; Klein, Springboks in Armour, 50–52 and dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File 1 sa Div. 1(s.a.) div. Report on Operations in Kenya and Abyssinia – December 1940 to April 1941. 80 dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File 1 sa Div. 1(s.a.) div. Report on Operations in Kenya and Abyssinia – December 1940 to April 1941 and dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File Operational History of 1 s.a. Div. Report on El Gumu-Gorai-Hobok.

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52 Kleynhans would lead the advance on Hobok.81 The excellent use of wireless communication between the fighting column and brigade headquarters during the approach march from El Gumu to Hobok, allowed Armstrong to remain up to date with the operation’s developments. The good visibility and open- ness of the country encountered during the approach march enabled the armoured cars to deploy in a line abreast formation, straddling the El-Gumu- Hobok road. The open terrain held up until about five km from the fort, whereafter the open ground fell away to severely broken, dense scrubland, crisscrossed by a series of small ravines. The Italian troops, who retreated towards Hobok, set fire to the surrounding scrubland in an attempt to force the armoured cars acting in the van of the column to return to the narrow confines of the road. The fire prevented the armoured cars from the freedom of movement and channelled the fighting column into a predetermined Italian ambush.82 Approximately three km from the fort, the two leading armoured cars established contact with an advanced Italian roadblock. While the armoured cars engaged the Italian defenders, the saec cleared the obstruction. The armoured cars executed an aggressive reconnaissance towards the outpost’s defences and immediately came under sustained fire from the fort at Hobok.83 Armstrong decided that the final attack on Hobok would consist of a combined aerial and artillery bombardment followed by an infantry advance, with the armoured cars charging towards the heart of the Italian defensive positions.84 The combined-arms attack on Hobok started during the late afternoon, and as the assault commenced all radio communications between the forward elements and brigade headquarters broke down. The main attack on Hobok developed under the blanket of a supporting aerial bombardment and artillery barrage, whereafter the armoured cars surged forward and drew an immense volume of fire from the Hobok defences.85 The armoured car advance was so rapid that the South African Artillery (saa) commander had to call off the artillery barrage for fear of hitting the advancing armour and infantry. The dash and

8584838281

81 dod Archives, wd, Box 283, File 1 sa Div Operations General. Report on the Battle of Hobok and dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File Hobok. Information at Hobok. 82 Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, pp 120–121 and Klein, Springboks in Ar- mour, 50–52. 83 dod Archives, wd, Box 214, File e.a. 25. No. 1 Armoured Car Company War Diary from 1/2/41 to 28/2/41. 84 dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File Operational History of 1 s.a. Div. Report on El Gumu- Gorai-Hobok and Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, 122–125. 85 Klein, Springboks in Armour, 55 and Birkby, Uncle George, 129–131.

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The South African Offensive Operations in Southern Abyssinia 53 tenacity of the armoured cars brought about the desired effect, for the Italian defenders broke cover and tried to charge at the armoured cars as they passed through the wire entanglements surrounding the fort. Close cooperation between the armoured cars ensured that the entire fort was soon surrounded and cleared of all its defenders.86 The South Africans captured only five defenders, along with a large quantity of equipment and ammunition. The South African casualties were only three wounded. The capture of Hobok further yielded access to a water supply of over 20,000 gallons per day, which eased the pressure of Brink’s lines of communication. The attack on Hobok was a textbook affair, and the close cooperation with the saa and saaf once more demonstrated the advantages of the combined-arms approach to the South Africans.87 In order to secure the western flank of the area of operations assigned to the South Africans, Brink realised that he needed to capture the Italian position at Banno. The capture of Banno was necessary before an attack on the Ital- ian mountain fortress at Mega could be launched. The occupation of Banno would also afford the South Africans the ability to make easier contact with the Shifta leaders in the Yavello area. The plan for the assault on Banno was a double envelopment by two fighting patrols from the South Africa brigades. Such a move, Brink argued, would yield the best possible operational results.88 According to saaf aerial reconnaissance, their path of advance lay across an open plain covered by a light bush that would not hamper the South African advance. The opposite was, however, true. In fact, the actual terrain encountered slowed down the advance to a mere five km per hour. This was partly due to poor terrain intelligence and maps, while the excessive heat also adversely affected the men, machines and water supplies. The fighting columns were forced to leaguer for the night, a mere eleven km from their objective at Banno, due to the difficult approach march.89

888786 89

86 dod Archives, wd, Box 283, File 1 sa Div Operations General. Report on the Battle of Hobok. 87 Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, 122–125 and dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File 1 sa Div. 1(s.a.) div. Report on Operations in Kenya and Abyssinia – December 1940 to April 1941. 88 dod Archives, wd, Box 283, File 1 sa Div Operation Instructions. 1 s.a. Div Operation In- struction No. 34 – 5 Feb 41. 89 dod Archives, wd, Box 283, File Banno. Report by sa Irish on Banno and Approach and dod Archives, wd, Box 214, File e.a. 25. No. 1 Armoured Car Company War Diary from 1/2/41 to 28/2/41.

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54 Kleynhans

At dawn the next morning, the march on Banno was resumed and the Ital- ian outpost was sighted by mid-morning. The armoured cars moved ahead and reconnoitred the Banno defences unopposed. By noon, the South Af- ricans had advanced to the proximity of the fort without drawing fire, as there were no visible signs of the Italian defenders. Aerial reconnaissance by the saaf also yielded no results, nor did a low-level attack on the fort. Some of the armoured cars even advanced to within the fort, but even these actions failed to draw any response from the Italian defenders.90 At Banno, the Italians showed great tenacity and tactfulness, by luring the South Af- rican soldiers to within the confines of the fort in the hope of ambushing them once they entered the predetermined killing area. As the South African infantry arrived at the fort, the Italian defenders who had remained hidden in well-sited defensive positions on a ridge to the north-west of the fort laid down an immense volley of accurate fire. The Italians had fortunately mis- judged their attack, and the South African infantry was able to debus safely and continue their advance on foot, and the ensuing firefight was one of the most intense of Brink’s entire campaign. The South African infantry could only proceed to take over the brunt of the fighting after two sections of armoured cars delivered a sustained fire-belt action that temporarily silenced the Italian fire.91 By midday, the full weight of the South African attack materialised when elements of the saa started to arrive at the scene of the fight. The combined firepower of the South African infantry, armour and artillery managed to silence the Italian fire during the late afternoon, whereafter the Italian defenders retreated towards the Gundile Mountains. The poor state of the vehicles and terrain prevented a pursuit, and during the night of 9 February

90 91 92

90 dod Archives, wd, Box 287, File 1 sa Irish. 1st South African Irish History to June 41; dod Archives, wd, Box 214, File e.a. 25. No. 1 Armoured Car Company War Diary from 1/2/41 to 28/2/41; dod Archives, wd, Box 283, File Banno. Report by sa Irish on Banno and Approach and dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File Banno Air (saaf). Reconnaissance Reports Banno – El Buto – 8–9 Feb 41. 91 Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, 129–134 and dod Archives, wd, Box 287, File 1 sa Irish. 1st South African Irish History to June 41. 92 dod Archives, wd, Box 283, File Banno. Report by sa Irish on Banno and Approach and dod Archives, wd, Box 214, File e.a. 25. No. 1 Armoured Car Company War Diary from 1/2/41 to 28/2/41.

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The South African Offensive Operations in Southern Abyssinia 55 the Italian forces reoccupied the positions around Banno to harass the South Africans.92 The South African casualties amounted to one man killed, while the Italian losses were difficult to gauge as they removed their casualties from the battlefield. Despite the capture of Banno, the operations in its immediate vicinity were not yet complete. In an attempt to establish the best possible route of advance towards the Italian outpost at Yavello, Brink ordered long-range reconnaissance patrols from Banno towards Yavello to make contact with the Shifta leaders in that area to help foment a Shifta rebellion.93 The 25th ea Bde, concurrently, was far less successful in their offensive operations in western Abyssinia. The tribal war between the Turkana and Merille tribes in that area forced Brink to abandon the idea of advancing into Abys- sinia on that front. Throughout the actions at El Yibo, El Sardu, El Gumu, Gorai, Hobok and Banno, the South Africans showed immense courage and dash in the operations, helping to inflict more than three hundred casualties on the Italian defenders of Southern Abyssinia while outflanking the Mega-Moyale complex.94 During the attacks on Gorai, El Gumu, Hobok and Banno, the South Africans met only token resistance from the Italian colonial and irregular defenders, while the armoured cars showed immense courage and dash during each attack.95 Brink and his men first adequately judged the fighting quality of the Italian soldiers during the battle of El Yibo. The poor fighting ability of the Ital- ian colonial and irregular soldiers was immediately realised after this fight, and the bold employment of the South African forces during the latter offensive operations in Southern Abyssinia bears testimony to this. As the campaign unfolded, it became evident that the Italian soldiers were demoralised and that they realised the futility of trying to defend their tactical positions against the might of a South African combined-arms attack.96 The waning fighting char- acter of the Italian soldiers in East Africa ensured that when a South African

959493 96

93 dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File 1 sa Div. 1(s.a.) div. Report on Operations in Kenya and Abyssinia – December 1940 to April 1941 and Klein, Springboks in Armour, 65–66. 94 dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File ea 109. Operational History of 1st sa Div 15 August 1940 to 1 March 1941 and Birkby, Uncle George, 132–134. 95 Kleynhans, “Armoured Warfare”, 114–137. 96 dod Archives, Deputy Chief of Staff – Chief of the General Staff (dcs – cgs), Box 44, File udf/132G – Lessons Learnt in East African Campaign – 6 January 1942.

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56 Kleynhans armoured attack struck, the accompanying infantry was often left with only mopping up operations around the various objectives. The growing boldness of the South African employment of armour, however, annoyed Cunning- ham to such an extent that in a letter to Brink he stated that it should be used primarily as an infantry support weapon, and that their firepower should be protective and not offensive. Brink in return scribbled a note on Cunningham’s letter to the extent “[…] but my object in using the Armoured Cars boldly was to put the fear of God into the enemy’s […] troops and in this we were most successful”.97 The fact that most of the Italian defenders fled at the first sight of the armoured cars, or after a brief skirmish, was ample evidence of the effect Brink sought. Some observers of the campaign even labelled the South Africans as the ‘Apostles of Terror’ in reference to their operational employment.98 The strongest Italian bastion left in the south of Abyssinia was the fort at Mega, which dominated the surrounding plains from its position high on a mountain plateau. Experienced Blackshirt and Colonial Infantry battalions, along with heavy artillery and a series of minefields, protected Mega and its approaches. Brink appreciated that the attack on Mega would be the first in- stance during the campaign where his South African troops would face a pre- dominantly white Italian force.99 The plan for the assault on Mega was two-fold. First, to cut the Italian line of retreat northwards into the Abyssinian hinterland, and second, to prevent the Italian garrisons at Yavello, Neghelli and Moyale from interfering with the main attack. Brink thus tasked Buchanan to advance and occupy El Sod, which would secure the Mega-Neghelli road. A detachment of troops would also hold Medaccio which would give the South Africans complete control over the Mega-Yavello and Mega-Kunchurro roads. The main body of the 2nd sa Bde would then advance to the south and east to cut the Mega-Moyale road to prevent interference from the south. Armstrong was tasked to move from El Gumu via El Gobso, and then threaten Mega from a northerly direction. Once these moves were complete, the 1st sa Div would have effectively enveloped

97 98 99

97 Birkby, Uncle George, 118. 98 Hartshorn, Avenge Tobruk, 47–49. 99 dod Archives, wd, Box 283, File A – 2 s.a. Inf Bde Mega-Moyale. Report on Operations Mega 14–18 February 1941.

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The South African Offensive Operations in Southern Abyssinia 57

Map 2 The South African operations around Mega, 14–18 February 1941100 100

100 Map drawn by the Author.

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58 Kleynhans the Italian defences at Mega, whereafter coordinated attacks on the stronghold would be launched.101 On 14 February, the 2nd sa Bde advanced towards Mega, and successfully cut the Mega-Yavello road as planned, and occupied Medaccio without any Italian interference. As Buchanan’s troops crossed the Yavello road, he opted to deviate from the plan of attack and act on his own accord. He chose to leave an infantry company and two armoured cars astride the Mega-Yavello and Mega-Neghelli crossroads for protection, while the rest of his Brigade occupied El Sod where they leaguered for the night. The 5th sa Bde had reached their staging area at El Gobso without interference and also bivouacked for the evening. Having enjoyed only successes during their campaign thus far, and lulled into a false sense of security by the lacklustre attitude of the Ital- ian defenders previously encountered, the South African stopper group at the crossroads failed to adhere to the appropriate defensive standing orders that night.102 During the early hours of 15 February, the South Africans soldiers at the crossroads were awakened by the sound of two Italian supply trucks approaching their position. These vehicles, destined for Mega, had driven unopposed into the undefended South African leaguer. The South African soldiers mistook them for friendly forces, and in the ensuing confusion the Italian soldiers debussed and opened fire on the unsuspecting men. The two armoured cars drew the mainstay of the Italian fire and proceeded to engage the Italian troops with their guns. The attackers soon withdrew, and the armoured cars advanced to a position further up the road in anticipation of a counterattack.103 At daybreak, a strong Italian fighting patrol, which included fifteen light tanks, attacked the South African position once more. The Italian armoured attack, possibly one of the most effective Italian armoured attacks of the campaign, succeeded in surrounding the South Africans and caused the infantry to flee towards the relative safety of El Sod. The Italian patrol, content at having caused the South Africans to flee, returned towards Yavello. The South African losses during the morning’s skirmish, amounted to two men killed, four wounded,

102101 103

101 dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File 1 sa Div. 1 sa Div Operational Instruction No. 43 – 13 Feb 41 and Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, 136–138. 102 dod Archives, wd, Box 283, File A – 2 s.a. Inf Bde Mega-Moyale. Report on Operations Mega 14–18 February 1941; dod Archives, wd, Box 218, File ea 31. War Diary 2 ffb February 1941 dod Archives, wd Box 206, File ea 15. War Diary of 5th Inf Bde hq February 1941. 103 dod Archives, uwh Civil, Box 120, File East African Campaigns. 2 sa Armd Car Coy 4 Jan 1940 – 30 Apr 1941.

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The South African Offensive Operations in Southern Abyssinia 59 and a further eleven taken prisoner.104 Upon hearing the news of the South African defeat, Buchanan ordered a fighting patrol to pursue the Italian force. The patrol made good its pursuit and soon closed in on the Italian force. Aerial interdiction by aircraft from the saaf hampered the Italian force’s return jour- ney to Yavello and caused some damage to them. The South African pursuit, however, soon petered out, and Buchanan recalled his men to the safety of El Sod. Despite the South African defeat that morning, the short action fought and the subsequent pursuit had prevented the Italians from reinforcing Mega from Yavello with a strong complement of armour and infantry.105 The main attack on Mega was, primarily, a South African infantry affair, with the accompanying armour offering only negligible assistance in the form of long-range reconnaissance patrols and the provision of rearguard and flanking duties. Brink scheduled Buchanan and Armstrong to start their attack simultaneously the next morning.106 Armstrong started his advance on Mega early on the morning of 16 February but was soon forced to halt and consolidate his position along a ridge of hills,107 because Buchanan and his Brigade only reached the starting line for the attack by the late afternoon. Buchanan’s advance was hampered by a shortage of water, adverse weather, poor lateral communication and a general state of confusion regarding Brink’s orders. Buchanan and his men had, however, managed to cut the Mega-Moyale road by nightfall, thereby at least accounting for one of their allotted objectives. From this position patrols were undertaken south but failed to make contact with any Italian forces, whereafter it became apparent that the Italian garrison of Moyale had withdrawn towards Neghelli. Brink was compelled to order both his brigades to bivouac for the night and resume their attacks the following morning.108 The South African attack on Mega developed throughout the morning of 17 January. Towards the south of Mega, Buchanan’s infantry worked their way

105104 106 107 108

104 dod Archives, wd, Box 283, File A – 2 s.a. Inf Bde Mega-Moyale. Report on Operations Mega 14–18 February 1941; dod Archives, wd, Box 218, File ea 31. War Diary 2 ffb February 1941 and Klein, Springboks in Armour, 69–70. 105 dod Archives, wd, Box 215, File e.a. 25. No. 2 Armoured Car Company War Diary from 1/2/41 to 28/2/41; Klein, Springboks in Armour, 70–71 and Birkby, Uncle George, 141–142. 106 dod Archives, wd, Box 283, File A – 2 s.a. Inf Bde Mega-Moyale. Report on Operations Mega 14–18 February 1941. 107 dod Archives, wd, Box 222, File ea 36. War Diary 3rd Bn Transvaal Scottish February 1941 and dod Archives, wd, Box 287, File ea 112. 1st South African Irish History to June 41. 108 dod Archives, wd Box 206, File ea 15. War Diary of 5th Inf Bde hq February 1941 and dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File ea 109. Operational History of 1st sa Div 15 August 1940 to 1 March 1941.

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60 Kleynhans along the high ground along the Moyale Road. Their progress was, however, extremely slow, and directed at the wrong sector of the Mega defences.109 To- wards the north, Armstrong’s men had made some progress in their advance towards the central Italian defensive lines around Mega despite the presence of extensive minefields and accurate artillery fire. By the early afternoon, Arm- strong had managed to bring his artillery forward, which resulted in effective counter-battery work by the saa. By the end of the day’s fighting, the South Af- rican infantry had advanced to within striking distance of Mega Hill, poised for a final push aimed at the heart of the Italian defences. Without the necessary support afforded by Buchanan and his men from the east, Armstrong and his men were forced to spend another night bivouacked out in the open just short of their final objective.110 On the morning of 18 February the attack on Mega resumed, with promises from Buchanan that his troops would support Arm- strong’s push on the Italian central positions at Mega from the south and east. The infantry of the 2nd sa Bde subsequently launched a surprise attack on the Italian artillery positions from the east, after scaling the dominating heights of Consulate Hill, and in doing so silenced the Italian artillery that had plagued Armstrong’s men during the previous day’s action.111 Towards the north, Arm- strong’s men managed to capture Mega Hill and Fort Hill shortly after midday, the former after a successful bayonet charge. Armstrong subsequently ordered his infantry forward for the final assault shortly after 16h00, and soon after that, the Italian garrison surrendered with approximately one thousand men and large quantities of military materiel and equipment. The South African losses were eight men killed, nine men wounded and a further eleven missing from the crossroads action.112 After the occupation of Mega the 1st sa Div continued to undertake long- range reconnaissance patrols throughout Southern Abyssinia without meeting any noticeable Italian resistance. The 1st sa Div’s fighting role during the East African campaign was essentially over, and Brink and his men moved to

109 110 111 112

109 dod Archives, wd, Box 218, File ea 30. War Diary 1 ffb February 1941 and dod Archives, wd, Box 218, File ea 31. War Diary 2 ffb February 1941. 110 dod Archives, wd, Box 222, File ea 36. War Diary 3rd Bn Transvaal Scottish February 1941; dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File ea 109. Operational History of 1st sa Div 15 August 1940 to 1 March 1941 and dod Archives, wd Box 206, File ea 15. War Diary of 5th Inf Bde hq February 1941. 111 dod Archives, wd, Box 218, File ea 30. War Diary 1 ffb February 1941 and dod Archives, wd, Box 218, File ea 31. War Diary 2 ffb February 1941. 112 dod Archives, wd, Box 222, File ea 36. War Diary 3rd Bn Transvaal Scottish February 1941 and dod Archives, wd, Box 287, File ea 112. 1st South African Irish History to June 41.

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The South African Offensive Operations in Southern Abyssinia 61

Nanyuki for rest and refit. The Division remained at Nanyuki, ready to revert to an offensive role if Cunningham so wished, but the campaign in Italian So- maliland proceeded without the need of reinforcement by Brink and his men. The 1st sa Div Headquarters and the 5th sa Bde embarked for Egypt during April 1941, to reinforce the Allied forces in the Western Desert, while the 2nd sa Bde remained in East Africa to back up the Allied invasion of Italian Somaliland.113

Evaluation of the South African Offensive Operations

The South African offensive operations in Southern Abyssinia were executed between 15 January and 18 February 1941, a mere thirty-four operational days. The operations were a complete success, and the objectives set to Brink by Wavell and Cunningham were all met. It is important to evaluate these objectives to gauge the effectiveness of the South African operations. First, Brink was ordered to attack the Southern Abyssinian province of Galla-Sidamo and employ his South African troops on irregular lines to harass and occupy Italian outposts in the vicinity of the Mega-Moyale escarpment, and to attack their lines of communication.114 Brink did just that, and the South African penchant for manoeuvre warfare became evident during the ensuing offensive operations which were marked by a high degree of operational mobility. By outflanking the Mega-Moyale escarpment, through an operational envelopment, Brink had caught the Italian defenders unaware as they expected the advance to oc- cur via Moyale up the escarpment towards Mega. Throughout the offensive operations Brink manoeuvred to fight, and used the combined-arms approach, along with his Division’s high degree of mobility, to obtain complete mastery of the Southern Abyssinian battlespace. In doing so, he attacked the Italian outposts and severed their lines of communication piecemeal.115 The South African offensive in the south of Abyssinia furthermore proved to Cunningham

113 114 115

113 dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File ea 109. Operational History of 1st sa Div 15 August 1940 to 1 March 1941. 114 dod Archives, uwh Civil, Box 121, File 45/C/14 – C-in-C’s Conference at ghq Middle East 1–4 Dec 1940. Notes on C-in-C’s Conference with goc East Africa and goc Sudan – 2 Decem- ber 1940 and dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File 1 sa Div. 1(s.a.) div. Report on Operations in Kenya and Abyssinia – December 1940 to April 1941. 115 David Katz, South Africans vs. Rommel: The Untold Story of the Desert War in World War ii (Guilford: Stackpole, 2017). Katz explores the unique South African military doctrine that governed the udf operations during the Second World War. He highlights the fact that the South Africans had a preference for manoeuvre warfare over that of positional

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62 Kleynhans that the preconceived superior Italian morale had in fact been a ruse throughout and that Italian defence of Southern Abyssinia was wavering.116 Second, Brink was tasked to help foment a Shifta revolt in Southern Abys- sinia that would harass the Italian lines of communication and make the countryside ungovernable. George Brink deployed his flying columns, invariably consisting of both the satc units in his Division, to help support the Shifta rebellion forming in the general area of Gardulla and Kalam. The ability of the armoured cars to traverse vast distances, meant that they were best suited to act as a link between Brink and the Shifta leaders in Southern Abyssinia.117 During January, Brink established contact with Haille Degaga, an influential Shifta leader from the south, to forge a strong partnership that would reignite the Shifta revolt in Southern Abyssinia. The successful South African occupation of Banno, afforded the South Africans the ability to make easier contact with the Shifta leaders in the Yavello area, and Brink subsequently learnt that Haille Degaga and his Shifta bands had successfully entered Yavello without a fight on 22 February.118 Third, Cunningham hoped that Brink and his Division could play an active role in threatening Addis Ababa before the arrival of the rain season. The capture of Mega, before the advent of the East African rains, gave Cunningham an alternate route of advance towards Addis Ababa. The rapidity of the South African advance had made this a possibility. The occupation of Mega further nullified the Italian position at Moyale, and a party of Abyssinian irregulars, under the command of the 2nd sa Bde, occupied Moyale without opposition on 22 February. Thus, on the same day that the South Africans occupied Mega, the Italians abandoned Moyale.119 The loss of Mega and Moyale forced the Italian 117116 118 119

warfare, and that they successfully used motorised infantry as a means to an end in this regard. Katz’s manuscript is due to be published by Stackpole during October 2017. 116 Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, 69. 117 dod Archives, uwh Civil, Box 121, File 45/C/14 – C-in-C’s Conference at ghq Middle East 1–4 Dec 1940. Notes on C-in-C’s Conference with goc East Africa and goc Sudan – 2 December 1940; dod Archives, wd, Box 283, File 1 sa Div Operation Instructions. Secret Correspondence Between Brink, Buchanan and Armstrong re General Situation on East Af- rican Front – 1 January 1941 and dod Archives Reference Library, Unsorted Pamphlet Col- lection – udf Armoured Car Training Manual 1940 (Volume i & ii). 118 Birkby, Uncle George, 150–151 and dod Archives, wd, Box 283, File Banno. 1st sair Opera- tional Order No. 27 – 7 February 1941. 119 dod Archives, uwh Civil, Box 121, File 45/C/14 – C-in-C’s Conference at ghq Middle East 1–4 Dec 1940. Notes on C-in-C’s Conference with goc East Africa and goc Sudan – 2 Decem- ber 1940 and dod Archives, wd, Box 284, File 1 sa Div. 1(s.a.) div. Report on Operations in Kenya and Abyssinia – December 1940 to April 1941.

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The South African Offensive Operations in Southern Abyssinia 63 forces to fall back upon their positions at Yavello and Neghelli, and these posts were subsequently captured by elements of the East Africa Force on 21 and 24 March respectively without encountering much resistance.120 Two of the four largest Italian bastions in Southern Abyssinia had thus been secured by the end of February, partly thanks to Brink’s calculated operational envelopment of the Mega-Moyale complex. It is important to realise that Brink had accounted for his allotted objectives by 18 February, while the 11th and 12th African Divisions were still systematically advancing through Italian Somaliland. The arrival of the East African rains effectively negated an advance on Addis Ababa from Mega via Yavello and the lakes of central Abyssinia, due to impassable terrain and poor lines of communication. This option did, however, become available to Cunningham well before the successful occupation of Italian Somaliland. The capture of the strategic ports of Kismayu and Mogadishu during February, denied the 1st sa Div the opportunity to continue their advance on Addis Ababa through Southern Abyssinia, as the now shortened lines of communication convinced Cunningham and his staff that such an advance would be best effected via Harar along the tarred Strada Imperiale through Ital- ian Somaliland. The surrender of Addis Ababa was accepted by elements of the East Africa Force on 5 April.121

Conclusion

The South Africans executed their offensive operations in Southern Abyssinia between January and February 1941. A high degree of tactical and operational mobility underpinned these actions. The South African belief in manoeuvre warfare, found expression through the ensuing offensive operations aimed at outflanking the Mega-Moyale complex, and by 18 February the 1st sa Div could account for all the military objectives allotted to them. The combined-arms approach, as practised by Brink and his subordinates throughout the offensive, became a hallmark of the South African operations in Southern Abys- sinia throughout 1941. The South African offensive operations in the south of Abyssinia, though limited, afforded Cunningham the option of an alternate

120 121

120 Hubert Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890–1945 (Uckfield, 2012), 523; and National Library of Australia, The Examiner, Neghelli Taken – Monday 24 March 1941 (http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/ article/52409642, Accessed on 5 May 2016). 121 Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, 214–223 and Birkby, Uncle George, 150–157.

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64 Kleynhans route of advance towards Addis Ababa. The capture of the important ports of Kismayu and Mogadishu and the arrival of the East Africa rains convinced Cunningham that the most viable route of advance on Addis Ababa was to be through Italian Somaliland. This decision negated the further deployment of the mainstay of the 1st sa Div in offensive operations in Abyssinia. The 1st sa Div did, however, play a vital role in securing the first Allied campaign victory of the war, despite its offensive employment being totally overlooked by some contemporary historians. The offensive operations in Southern Abys- sinia, though a resounding success, failed to prepare the 1st sa Div for its future deployment in the North African theatre. The South African successes in East Africa were thus somewhat of an anomaly when considering that the lessons learned in East Africa would, in fact, have to be re-learned in the Western Des- ert where the nature of the enemy, and his weapons and tactics, drastically changed.

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