Article in PDF Format
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Nordic Journal of African Studies 9(2): 85-104 (2000) Patriots or Bandits? Britain's Strategy for Policing Eritrea 1941-1952 NENE MBURU University of London, The United Kingdom ABSTRACT This article analyses counter-banditry policies during the British military administration of Eritrea from 1941 to 1952. The study dismisses the claim that post-Second World War Eritrea was too fragmented along ethnic and religious lines to be allowed to gain political independence. Its finding is that such claims were calculated to influence the political future of the territory through an international compromise deal that allowed Ethiopia to administer, and later to colonize Eritrea. Britain’s counter-banditry measures failed because she did not deliver the liberation promises made to the people of Eritrea during the World War, there was little investment in will and resources, and her wider imperialistic designs in the Horn of Africa came on the way. The article concludes that, whatever the ethnic or religious identity of Shifta bandits, the causes, course, and resolution of banditry could not be isolated from the uncertainty and complexity of determining Eritrea’s sovereignty. Hence the political protest that was treated as banditry during the British Military Administration of Eritrea from 1941 to 1952 crystallized into four decades of formidable liberation struggle against Ethiopia’s administration. INTRODUCTION The existing position is that we are unable to control banditry in Eritrea to an extent which makes it possible for us properly to discharge our share of implementing the UN resolution in Eritrea or to enable the UN Commission to discharge his (FO 371/90320).1 The relationship between civilians and the military in post-Second World War Eritrea was based on the general directive for occupied enemy territories issued by Britain to its military commanders at the strategic level. The instructions provided British strategic commands with the flexibility to continue active military operations, maintain active military control even after the cessation of active military operations, and to revert to civilian control in the case of an armistice or treaty agreement. This guideline for the employment of troops in the maintenance of internal security in all the African territories captured from Italy was known as “Duties in aid of the civil power, 1937" issued by the War Office (WO 230/17). 1 Foreign Office (FO) and War Office (WO) records have been obtained from the Public Records Office Kew Gardens, London. Similarly, research evidence from The Kenya National Archives Nairobi is abbreviated KNA. 85 Nordic Journal of African Studies Military commanders in specific liberated territories formulated their Standing Operating Procedures to address any peculiarities obtaining in their territory but consulted the civil-military-relation handbook from the War Office as a guide. Unlike British colonies, the administrative Headquarters for the African territories liberated from the Axis powers was not based in London but in the British Middle East Command before relocating to Nairobi in 1944. Given such unambiguous regulations, the direct linkage between the military, the occupied territory, and the prevailing euphoria of emancipation from fascist repression, one could expect peace and tranquillity to mark the post-war period. Yet Eritrea is a case in point whose post-war history indicates widespread internal security problems and anything but friendship between the ‘liberator’ and the ‘liberated’. Any analysis of Eritrea’s political history from 1941 to 1952 should grasp the wider picture by balancing the significance of Shifta banditry against various counter-measures by the British Military Administration (hereafter BMA). It is the view that the period has not received adequate scholarly attention despite being the genesis of Africa’s longest armed struggle against ‘foreign’ domination that was to last four decades. This opinion is based on a review of the literature on the region that, albeit a generalization, leads to the categorization of scholars as being sympathetic to either Ethiopia or Eritrea. For example, Okbazghi defines the Shifta as ‘terrorists’ that attacked ‘nationalists’ a definition that precludes the existence of bandits among pro-independence Eritreans. Not surprisingly, the scholar fails to analyse why the steps taken by the BMA to establish law and order failed. Similarly, by defining the Shifta as “armed gangs of Christian Abyssinia”, meaning pro-union sympathizers, Trevaskis' (1975: 96) has not given a fair crack of the whip to both sides. The scholar further interprets the problem of post-Second World War Eritrea in terms of ethnic and religious fragmentation. This article contests the above definition of the bandits of the period by marshalling evidence to support the view that both pro-union and pro-independence Eritreans had sympathizers among the gunmen. Pankhurst’s 1952 publication is very brief on post-war security arrangements in Eritrea but establishes a firm anchor of post-war lawlessness to Britain’s inequitable distribution of economic opportunities in favour of Italian nationals. In 1953 she co-authored a more contextualized account that is a deeper discussion of some of the draconian measures undertaken by Britain to suppress banditry in Eritrea. Greenfield (1965) claims that Pankhurst (1952, 1953) is sympathetic to pro-independence Eritreans yet he struggles to mask his pro-union bias by omitting a discussion of banditry despite its undeniable significance in the political history of the territory. Generally, all of the studies discussed beg the question, given Britain’s military supremacy during the Second World War and unrivalled experience of colonial policing, of why counter-bandit strategies failed in Eritrea. Gebre-Medhin (1995: 181-190) summarizes the impasse in the internal security situation as emanating from Britain’s lack of interest and its lack of material and personnel resources to enforce security. True, after World War Two Britain's economy was unstable, a situation that was aggravated by the mounting expenses of running her disintegrating colonial empire (KNA: Secretariat 1/11/41; 86 Patriots or Bandits? KNA: Secretariat 1/4/3; KNA: CS 2/7/36). Taking into consideration that imperial outreach limited her logistical capacity to bolster security for Eritrea, Britain had also to contend with the political interests of Italy and Ethiopia while safeguarding her future strategic interests in the entire region. Accepting that the threat posed to the survival of Eritrea by domestic insecurity after 1947 was exacerbated by uncertainty over the territory’s political future, its ramifications cannot be adequately pictured unless the pre-war social-economic and political situations are fully understood. Whereas the conspiracy of the imperial powers had led to the colonization of Eritrea in 1885, a similar collusion erected obstacles over the determination of the sovereignty of the territory after the Second World War. In the context of the competing forces of imperialism under discussion, Eritrea was a territory contested by more than one party, but the injudicious determination of its sovereignty by the United Nations ignored the wishes of the people of Eritrea. This article will try to bring out Eritrea’s struggle against the vicissitudes of the post-Second World War decade, compared by Iyob with the biblical David and Goliath contest but in a case where God is openly supporting Goliath (Iyob 1995: 5). In short, the article argues that the causes, course, and resolution of post-Second World War banditry could not be isolated from the political uncertainty and complexity of determining Eritrea’s sovereignty.2 So, despite having the requisite mandate and muscle for the maintenance of law and order in Eritrea, counter-bandit strategies failed owing to a conflict of imperialistic interests that tied Eritrea’s political future in with those of the entire Horn of Africa. Although the people of Eritrea had been under intermittent foreign control spanning several centuries, it is their interaction with Ethiopian and West European imperialism in the latter half of the nineteenth century that is of immediate relevance to this study. Italian interests in Eritrea’s coast can be traced back to 1869 when merchant seafarers bought port facilities at Assab. This was facilitated by the increase in the strategic significance of the area following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Proper imperial designs were discernible after Italy captured Massawa in 1885 from Egyptian control, who in turn had earlier captured it from the Turks (Amrit 1980: 3). Davidson (1980: 11-14) persuasively argues that having preceded other Europeans in the region Britain not only approved Italy’s conquest but welcomed her as a junior partner in the scramble for the Horn of Africa. After securing Massawa, Italian conquest of the interior of Eritrea was made easy by Abyssinia’s (Amharic) territorial expansionism that in the immediate term seemed to converge with West European imperialism. Our quest for understanding the problem starts with the treaty of friendship and alliance between Ethiopia and Italy of 2 May, 1889 known as the Treaty of Wich’ale (Uccialli). Following this treaty, Italy proclaimed Eritrea an Italian colony on 1 January 1890. Italian conquest of Eritrea not only curtailed Ethiopia’s 2 The Shifta under discussion was no opportunistic smash-and-grab outlaw but a militant who used brigandage to pursue a specific political