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The Horn of Africa and International Relations

The Horn of Africa and International Relations

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Matthies, Volker

Article — Digitized Version The horn of and international relations

Intereconomics

Suggested Citation: Matthies, Volker (1974) : The and international relations, Intereconomics, ISSN 0020-5346, Verlag Weltarchiv, Hamburg, Vol. 09, Iss. 12, pp. 385-388, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02929399

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by Volker Matthies, Hamburg *

All the countries abutting on the Sea and on the as well as the East African coast will gain In economic, political, and strategic importance as soon as the Suez Canal is reopened to shipping. The present article discusses the situation in an Important of this , the so-called Horn of Africa which owes an eminent position under pollUcal and strategic aspects.

'hen the Suez Canal reopens in 1975, the alone, through its claims on vast areas of W likelihood is great that this will produce no- its neighbours, is a dangerous powder keg. Both ticeable changes in a number of countries and and Ethiopia also claim as their as to their economic, political, and military own. Since the US is strongly engaged in Ethiopia and strategic significance. For shipping, the and the in Somalia, the area is also route round the Cape will lose in importance, and tied up with the conflict between East and West. the immense shortening of maritime trade routes As both Arab and Israeli interests are touched by reflected by lower freight rates might reduce the the inner-Ethiopian struggle for Erythrea, recent exaggerated transport costs for trade between years have embroiled Erythrea more and more in and overseas, as well as for European oil international quarrels. The newest political revo- supplies. At the same time, the canal's reopening lution in Ethiopia also attracted massive interests will reduce the journeys of both eastern and west- of the outer world to the political and strategical ern navies for deploying their strength in the Indian implications of all that happens and changes Ocean, and this may very well contribute to grow- within the Horn of Africa. ing military strength and rivalry of the big powers All these different conflict formations in the Horn of in this area. The economic importance of countries Africa have combined in a highly complex pattern situated on the shores of the , on the Gulf of conflicts. It is intended to give a brief survey of of Aden, and on the East African coast will be this pattern with special attention devoted to the greatly enhanced, through the boom of their port newest developments, and to define some of the activities, as will the part they play politically and major influences there, which might lead to a shift strategically, through their control over one of the in the present balance of power in the Horn of major lanes of maritime transport, t Knowledge Africa. about political conditions and developments in this , which is important for international For a shipping and for European oil supplies, is there- fore becoming more and more essential. The frontier quarrels between Somalia and its neighbours 2 all focus on Somalia's striving after a A Complex Pattern of Conflicts "Greater Somalia" through a union with all the lands inhabited by Somali tribes in the neighbour- Therefore, it is the intention of this discussion to ing countries. This nationalist-irredentist policy of investigate the political and strategic situation in Somalia can only be explained as a historical re- an important subregion of this area, viz. the so- action to the territorial fragmentation and penetra- called Horn of Africa. Politically, the "Horn" con- tion of the ' residential areas by the former sists of Somalia, Ethiopia, the French-ruled Terri- colonial powers. Colonialisation of the Horn of tory of Afar and (Djibouti), and the north- Africa was a direct sequel to the Suez Canal be- eastern part of . From the political and stra- ing opened in 1869. By the end of the 19th cen- tegic point of view, it is a potential source of cri- tury, the Somali tribes in the Horn had become sis. From this littoral, it is possible to control the subject to a multitude of foreign masters: British, Straits of Bab-eI-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, and Italian, French, and Ethiopian. However, the So- the north-western of the . , knowing their own strong cultural and eth- Moreover, within the Horn itself, there exists no nic identity (, language, segmental nomadic mean accumulation of potential conflicts. Somalia society, etc.) were driven to defending themselves

* German Overseas Institute, 2 Important studies of this conflict include: A. A. C a s t a g n o 1 Suez: Opening Africa's Blocked Artery, in: African Development, The Horn of Africa and the Competition for Power, n: A. J. C o t t - May 1974, pp. 11 et seq.; end Neue Hafenanlagen vom Roten r e I I and R. M. B u r r e I I (eds.): The Indian Ozean. Its political, Meer bls Madagaskar (New Port Installations from the Red Sea to economic, and military importance. New York, 1972; J. B o w y e r ), in: Blick durch die ~Nirtscha, ft, No. 196, Aug. 1974, p. 2. B e I I, The Horn of Africa. New York, 1973.

INTERECONOMICS, No. 12, 1974 385 ETHIOPIA and their common civilisation against foreign malia and Ethiopia over Djibouti in 1966/67. How- overlordship. Their common aim became national ever, due to insufficient military strength, unbear- reunion in a single Somali state in the Horn of able high costs for a settlement of the conflict by Africa. force (i.a. adverse effects on Somalia's When the present of Somalia was formed exports through the blocking of the Suez Canal), in 1960 from the two former colonies, British and and lacking support of the other African states to Italian-, this aim was not yet fully met: the Greater Somalia policy (the majority of OAU In south-eastern Ethiopia, in north-eastern Kenya, members rejected all frontier revisions in Africa), and in Djibouti, there are still living "unredeemed" late in 1967, Somalia had to give up its policy of Somalis. Since it was born, the Somali Republic's confrontation, replacing it by a d6tente without, political main aim has been the completion of however, scrapping its longer-term aim of build- Greater Somalia, and to it the young Republic de- ing a Greater Somalia. voted sizeable economic, political and military forces. However, the neighbours of Somalia, being New Escalation multi-ethnic states in contrast with the ethnically From 1969 onwards, Somalia has been ruled by a homogeneous Somalia, felt threatened in their ter- military regime which began by continuing the pol- ritorial integrity as well as in their ethnic-political icy of ddtente and concentrating its efforts on fos- balance through the Greater Somalia policy, which tering the country's social and economic develop- set in movement the struggle of their Somali mino- ment. But continued negotiations for a peaceful rities for secession. There have been many armed settlement of the conflict failed, and in the early conflicts on this issue: frontier clashes, and a fron- seventies, political threats again became the tier war between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1964, the of Somalia's foreign policy, reviving strong ten- War between Somalia and Kenya that lasted sions in the Horn of Africa (OAU conferences in from 1963 to 1967/68 ~, and the crisis between So- 1973 and 1974)'. There are three notable factors 3 cf. Volker M e t t hie s, Oer Shifts-Kriegin Kenia (The Shifts War in Kenya). In: Verfassung und Recht in Obersee ( 4 cf. Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series), May 1973, pp. 2843 and Law in Overseas), No. 4, 1973, pp. 429-443. et seq.; June 1974, p. 3255 et seq.

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386 INTERECONOMICS, No. 12, 1974 ETHIOPIA which have probably contributed to the renewed Somalia had rejected an offer of Western military escalation of the conflict: (proffered by the US, , and the Federal Re- [] In the first place, the massive strengthening of public of Germany) as too small, and subsequently, Somalia's armaments with the aid of the Soviet the Soviet Union became Somalia's principal Union. Unlike in the sixties, Somalia is no longer source of military and economic aid. 9 In exchange hopelessly inferior to its main adversary, Ethiopia, for this aid, the Soviets were allowed to build - as in the military field: Ethiopia has still more soldiers the opposite number to Kagnew - a big telecom- under arms (44,000 men, against 23,000 in Somalia) munication station, and they also obtained naval but some of the Somali units are much more bases there. strongly equipped with armoured vehicles, war Revived American Engagement? planes, and artillery, s [] Secondly, as commercially significant gas and For the Soviet Union, Somalia's main importance is oil strikes have been reported from south-eastern of naval strategic (establishment of a chain Ethiopia, the conflict has gained a new dimen- of naval bases across the Indian Ocean). lo In July sion. 6 1974, Soviet President Podgorny visited Somalia, which strengthened the ties between it and the [] Thirdly, Somalia, after its disappointment over Soviet Union. On the other hand, the lease agree- the attitude of the "Black African" states in the ment for Kagnew was on the point of running out, frontier question has joined the , thus and satellite surveillance became more and more finding new support through the Arab-Islamic important and thus made Kagnew's operations less states. crucial, which all let to the Americans tending slow- As Somalia continues to adhere to its Greater So- ly to disengage themselves from Ethiopia. But in malia policy and can now give it more forceful sup- view of the Soviet's massive engagement in Soma- port through its own military strength and through lia, more recent trends in the US seem to turn round its new alliance, it is now not at all impossible that to a revival of its engagement in Ethiopia. 11 new military clashes may break out in the Ethio- Discussions about the future of Djibouti after pian-Somali frontier area within the foreseeable will have left the (independence; future. partition; a full takeover by either Somalia or Ethio- pia; an international administration, possibly by the East-West Rivalries UN) 12 seem to have little significance at present. In the spring of 1973, the late French president, M. The frontier conflict and the armament race caused Pompidou, visited Djibouti, and Djibouti port is con- by it in the Horn of Africa gave the main opponents stantly being enlarged and modernised. More and in the East-West contest a fulcrum for looking after more French troops and Marine units are being their global strategic big-power interests in the sent there, clearly demonstrating French intentions region. 7 The US engaged itself in Ethiopia, the to retain France's presence there and in the ad- Soviet Union in Somalia. As an equivalent for sub- jacent seas. stantial military and economic aid, the two were granted claims to military bases and political in- The Conflict Round Erythrea fluence. The Erythrean Liberation Front (ELF) which, during Since the end of World War II, the Americans ex- its early days, still was a relatively wide reservoir tended their intelligence base near in the into which flowed all opposition of both Christian Ethiopian province of Erythrea to one of the most and Moslem parts of the population, who wanted important links in their worldwide military tele- to fight the overlordship of the Central communications network. = In exchange for this, 9 cf. Wynfried J o s h u a and S. P. G I b e r t, Arms of the Third they armed the Ethiopian Army, trained it and sup- World. Soviet Military Ald Dlplomacy. Beltimore-London,1969, p. 40; and Falk D 6 r in g, Wlrtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen kom- plied it with advanced armaments systems. After a munlstischen Staaten und Entwicklungsl~tndern (Economic Rela- time-lag of several years, the Soviets did approxi- tions between Communist States and LDCs), lg6G-lg7O, Vol. Vh Nepal-Somalia, pp. 370-406. Studies and Reports of the Research mately the same in Somalia, thus outbalancing US Institute of the Frledrich Ebert Foundation. Influence in Ethiopia. In 1963, the government of lo cf. Edward W e g n e r, Moskaus Offensive zur See. Elne Un- tersuchung der seestrategischen Rolls der sowjetischen Marine- streitkr~ffe Im Ost-West-Konflikt (Moscow's Offensive at Sea. A s cf. The Military Balance 1974-75, London, Institute for Strategic Study of the Naval Strategy of the Soviet Naval Forces in the Studies, 1974, p. 42 at seq. East-West Conflict). Bonn--Bad Godesberg, 1972. 6 cf. Gas Starts the Oil Rush, and: Oil Fever Grips the Horn of " see: Neue Z/~rcher Zeitung, Foreign Edition No. 197, July 20, 1974, Africa. Both in: African Development, May 1973, p. 5, and Decem- p. 5. ber 1973, p. 14, respectively. 12 cf. T h o m p s 0 n and Richard A d I o f f, Djibouti and ;' cf. SIPRI ( International Peace Research Institute), The the Horn of Africa. Stanford, Calif., 1968; Nancy A. S h i I I i n g, Arms Trade with the Third World. Stockholm 1971, pp. 849-655. Problems of Political Development Jn a Mini State: The French 8 cf. Hearings before the Sub-Committee on United States Security Territory of the Afars and the Issas. In: The Journal of Developing Agreements Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations. United Areas. Vol. 7, July 1973, pp. 613-634; Thomas A. M a r k s, Dji- States Senate, 91at Congress, Second Session, Part 8, Washington, bouti: France's Strategic Toehold in Africa. In: African Affairs, June 1970. VoL 73, No. 200, Jan. 1974, pp. 95-104.

INTERECONOMICS, No. 12, 1974 387 ETHIOPIA

Government, has become, during recent years, an up comparatively favourable conditions for the so- instrument of a purely Islamic resistance move- cial and economic development of Ethiopia. How- ment, which presses for separation of Erythrea ever, it seems that the scope for reforms by the from the Ethiopian state ~3 The movement receiv- military regime is rather restricted. Potential con- ed support from -Islamic states, whose main flicts within the army, the country's underdevel- interest lay in controlling the Erythrean littoral oped infrastructure, the basic conservatism of the along the shores of the Red Sea, in order to be rural population, the rising in Erythrea, and ex- able to interfere with Israeli shipping from there. ternal dangers lurking from Somalia all Impose Conversely, has helped Ethiopia in its fight serious obstacles on action by the military rulers. against the Erythrean rebellion. Nonetheless, after There seems to be no option for them but to con- the recent Arab-Israeli war, Ethiopia - as other tinue along the basic lines of the previous regime's African countries did - broke off relations with foreign policies, perhaps with a more neutralist Israel under the pressure of the . and nationalist slant. But for the time being, it is In view of the external threat from Somalia, the new highly likely that the US will remain Ethiopia's most military will surely be inter- reliable ally and its main source of economic and ested in settling the conflict in Erythrea as quickly military aid. as possible but, in view of new oil strikes and of the The permanent presence of latent and open con- economic and strategic importance of Erythrean flicts in the Horn of Africa might, in the long run, ports, the officers in charge of Ethiopian govern- have two important effects: ment power could hardly tolerante complete se- cession of the province. Threats of the ELF to take [] The fantastic amounts that are being spent for up again guerilla warfare have already been an- armaments and the incessant thought of the So- swered by the new Government with and Ethiopian governments of having to deal military force. At best, the Ethiopian army leader- with conflicts might deflect them from their true ship might be willing to make a compromise with and most decisive tasks: how to foster economic Erythrea, granting it a large measure of autonomy and social development of their respective coun- but on condition that the territorial integrity of tries, which are among the poorest of the whole Ethiopia must be preserved. world;

Changes Within Ethiopia [] They might, in a similar way as in the or, more recently, in Cyprus, bring forth un- No knowledgeable observer of the Ethiopian scene controlled escalation of political and military ten- can have felt great surprise at the replacement of sions and drag the Big Powers once more into the old regime by a military regime, since the Ethio- regional conflicts. pian army was the only political force, able to fill the power vacuum that was bound to follow the In any case, the Horn of Africa is very likely to Emperor Hails Selassie. ,4 The new system has set remain a source of unrest for international rela- tions, and It must therefore be keenly watched. t3 cf. Pierre R o n d o t, La Guerre d'Erythr6e. In: Revue Franc;:alse d'Etudes politiques afrlcaines. Jan. 1971, pp. 21-34; John F Campbell,The Red Seaand Suez. In:A. J. Cottrelland 14 cf. Volker Matt hie s, MIl[tlir, Gesellecheft und Gewalt in R. M. B u r r e ] I (ede.), op.clt., pp. 129--153; Mordecha! A b I r, ~,thlop~en (The Military, Society, and VioIence in Ethiopia). in: Red Sea Politics. In: Conflicts in Africa, Adelph Paper No g3, Quarterly Research Reports of the Research Institute of the Fried- London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972, pp. 25--41. rich Ebert Foundation, No. 54, Dec. 1973, pp. 355-374.

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388 INTERECONOMICS, No. 12, 1974

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