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The Case of Urta, Yukori and Quyi Chirchik
Irna Hofman Wageningen, April 2007 Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ir. Arthur P.J. Mol Environmental Policy Group Social Science Group Wageningen University
Front cover: The heading of the newspaper ‘Uzbekistan Today’. The picture is taken in Yukori Chirchik in October 2006; a cotton field just before the harvesting.
2
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TTTTTThhhhhheeeeee PPPPPPaaaaaatttttthhhhhhwwwwwwaaaaaayyyyyy ttttttoooooo SSSSSSuuuuuussssssttttttaaaaaaiiiiiinnnnnnaaaaaabbbbbbiiiiiilllllliiiiiittttttyyyyyy??????
The Case of Urta, Yukori and and Quyi Chirchik
Irna Hofman
Wageningen, April 2007
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ir. Arthur P.J. Mol
Environmental Policy Group Social Science Group Wageningen University
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4 PREFACE
‘All the agricultural is politics…’
After three months staying in Uzbekistan to conduct the field work for my M.Sc. thesis, this statement came up in my mind. In Dutch we say ‘al het persoonlijke is politiek’ (all the personal is politics) when personal considerations and priorities interfere with and determine political objectives. In Uzbekistan this expression is better phrased as ‘al the agricultural is politics’. It are the agricultural priorities that dominate and influence the political structure and decisions. The other way around is also true over there; all the politics is agriculture; much of the political decisions in Uzbekistan are related to agriculture. Science and research, education, holidays, employment, many are adapted to and focussed upon agriculture. As a social scientist with the objective to do research in agriculture this implied that I had to be careful in my research, working in a political sensitive area. The political primacy of agriculture is abundant in Uzbekistan. Although I had some hard times, I also enjoyed it to walk hours through Tashkent and to bargain on the bazaars to buy stuff against extraordinary low prices, and to try to communicate with people by talking in Russian, English, German, and very little in Uzbek… I learned to be flexible, not to rely upon fixed time appointments and to question provided data and information. Days never went as expected. After all, I can say this experience has really benefited my personal development. Yet the difficulties that I had to conquer during the field work have motivated me to seek for further, comparable working situations and to make my life more challenging. Much of this report might appear rather negative about Uzbekistan. I want to emphasize that this is foremost my perception about the repressive system; thanks to the friendly people and their culture I really enjoyed my stay.
I am greatly thankful to all those that supported me at distance… all the emails to rationalise my desperate thoughts and concerns, the phone calls and post that enabled me to proceed. I should thank first of all Arthur Mol, my supervisor, that initiated me to go to Uzbekistan and has assisted me in the conducting of the research, with this report as the final result. Frequently he could calm me by emailing that everything would be alright and that I had to adjust to the circumstances that would emerge. I would also like to mention Ewa Wietsma, Alim Pulatov and the students from Ecogis that enabled me to go to Tashkent, to work there with all the facilities that were provided. Without them I would never have found my way in Tashkent and to learn about the Uzbek culture and people. Moreover I am greatly thankful to all the other researchers that worked in Uzbekistan that have provided my all their information, their experiences, expectations and that could help me to gain the essential knowledge on different aspects. Although the contact with them was merely on the basis of email, it has been very meaningful. At last, as my primary backbone on the other side of the world, I must thank my family and friends. Thanks mama, papa, and all the others… for your support. It has been quite a challenge, both for you and me to be at such a distance although only for three months. And of course I would like to thank Sinterklaas… I’ll never forget that he could realize it on the 5 th of December to bring me presents……..
At least now I dare to say… I can travel the world….
Irna Hofman, Wageningen, April 2007
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6 SUMMARY
The Republic of Uzbekistan became independent in 1991 after more than 60 years under Soviet domination. By that year the transition process commenced, which should envisage the transformation of the political domain, the economy and not at least the society. Socio-economic transition processes result in changing institutions and land-use patterns that affect the condition of the environment. Agrarian reform is an essential element of transition.
Up till today the agricultural sector in Uzbekistan is confronted with two major problems: the transition process and sustainability. Agriculture has been in the public domain with the state or collective as governing entity for the entire Soviet period. The sector was largely focussed upon the production of cotton. From 1991 onwards the first steps were taken to transform the agricultural sector from the collective structure towards a more individual mode of farming. This has resulted in a three- tired system of agricultural producers today: a decreasing number of shirkats with an increasing amount of individual farms, and the dehkan farmers. The primary environmental constraints for agriculture have resulted from irrational use of natural resources in the past. With the current condition of the environment it is obvious that diversification of the Uzbek agriculture is pressing: it has the potential to reduce and change the harmful institutionalised and continued farm practices that have become a routine and are far from sustainable.
Nowadays the concepts of ownership, property and managerial rights are fundamentally changing and are much in debate the last years; this results in considerable changes in the institutional arrangements and the institutional environment. The decision-making and participative power of actors and governance is transferred to other or new agencies and actors. Development of effective institutions, such as the transfer of property rights over land and market mechanisms, is a prerequisite for environmental sustainable land use. This research has examined the current institutional lay-out of the agricultural sector in Uzbekistan, consequently it is assessed whether this lay-out enhances or constraints sustainable farming. The empirical data that are derived through a case study in Tashkent Oblast are analysed through use of the Agri-environmental Action Scenario. Within this conceptual unit of analysis the Bundle of Rights Theory is explored. This allowed for the examination of the different actors that are involved in agriculture and to assess their influence upon the farming practices. The different elements that constitute the Agri-environmental Action Scenario are policies; governance structures; the action arena that comprises farming systems; and not at least environmental assets. The interaction that takes place between these elements is a continuous process. The Bundle of Rights comprises distinct land use rights that directly or indirectly determine the impact of agriculture upon the environment.
From the research it can be concluded that the governance structure of farming has not been reformed fundamentally, despite the liquidation of collective farming. The dominance of the state is still apparent and many of the former principals have remained in place, with quite uniform farming patterns as a result. The private farmers, the fermers, are subject to severe state control as they are surrounded by numerous state organisations that stipulate and control their farm practices. In practice every fermer is subject to state procurement quotas, primarily this concerns quotas for the strategic crops; cotton and wheat. Although officially the procurement quotas have decreased in the last years, in reality this has not changed the situation. Fermers face considerable problems in working independently. Moreover most of them are in a bad financial position which hampers them to purchase additional inputs elsewhere; this also inclines them to develop ‘hidden’ farm activities as a living strategy to increase their income. The dehkan farmers, the small holders, have their household plots at their discretion, yet these fields are restricted to only small sizes. The dehkans cultivate in general a diversity of crops, for self consumption or for commercial sales.
It is clear that the current institutional lay-out lacks effectiveness, legitimacy and transparency. This all enhances the developed of informal institutions. Within these networks farmers possess the rights to
7 decide who is involved and which transactions take place. These networks have developed rather autonomously, primarily for the exchange of knowledge and the need to acquire farm inputs outside of the state supply system.
From an environmental point of view the current situation is two-sided. On the one hand, the poor situation of fermers requires them to work economically with the inputs that are supplied by the state. The amounts of chemical inputs that are applied are much lower than during the Soviet period. Nevertheless, the general farming pattern is far from sustainable. The most fermers cultivate monocultures of cotton and wheat and diversification of farming is impeded by the agricultural policies enforced by the state. Although the dehkan farmers have a more diversified crop mix, they are not allowed to expand their production. The water systems for irrigation are outdated; due to a lack of financial capital a fundamental recover has not taken place in the last decades. In addition, the water use system is inefficient and there are no meaningful means to stimulate responsible use of water.
Future expectations are difficult to craft. It is not assumable that the government will withdraw from its prime position in the coming years, simply because of the ‘addiction’ to the revenues derived from cotton, and not at least because of personal interests. There is a general deficiency in agricultural knowledge among farmers. This altogether impedes the development towards a more diversified agriculture, which would be more sustainable. Yet, gradual liberalisation of agriculture does not lead to more sustainable farming per se. If we look at other countries, an improved financial and independent position of farmers can induce them to intensify their production and to increase the use of chemical inputs.
Key words: Agrarian Reform, Institutions, Property Rights, Uzbekistan
8 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface 5
Summary 7
Table of Contents 9
Definitions of Concepts 13
Abbreviations 15
1. INTRODUCTION 17
1.1. Problem description and background 17 1.1.1. The transition process 17 1.1.2. The agricultural reform 18 1.1.3. The environment 18
1.2. Problem definition and rationale of the research 19
1.3. Aim of the research 20
1.4. Research questions 21
1.5. Report outline 21
2. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 23
2.1. The Agri-environmental Action Scenario 23 2.1.1. Institutions: the institutional environment and institutional arrangements 23 2.1.2. The Bundle of Rights Theory 24
2.2. Sustainable agriculture: establishing a symbiotic relationship 28
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 29
3.1. Case-study approach 29 3.1.1. Data gathering 29 3.1.1.1. Theories and variables 30
3.2. Reflection on the methodology 30 3.2.1. Research in Uzbekistan 30 3.2.2. The role of the researcher and the translator 32 3.2.3. Discussion on the research strategy 32
4. A BACKGROUND ON TRANSITION 35
4.1. Countries in transition 35
9 4.2. Agrarian reform 36
4.3. A conclusion of this chapter 38
5. AGRICULTURE IN UZBEKISTAN 39
5.1. The situation through the 20 th century 39 5.1.1. The transition process in Uzbekistan 40 5.1.2. The agrarian reform 41
5.2. Government and governance of the agricultural sector 45 5.2.1. The general legislative framework related to land use 46 5.2.2. The role of the hokim 48 5.2.3. Local (self) governance 50 5.2.4. The Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (MAWR) 50 5.2.4.1. The State Committee for Land Resources (Goskomzem) 53 5.2.4.2. Uzgeodezcadastre 53 5.2.4.3. The Association of Dehkan and Private Farmers 53 5.2.4.4. The management of water supply 54 5.2.5. Science, research and education 58
5.3. The farming pattern 59 5.3.1. The cropping pattern 59 5.3.1.1. Procurement of crops 62 5.3.2. Seeds 63 5.3.3. Fertilizers and pesticides 65 5.3.3.1. The supply and use of fertilizers and pesticides 67 5.3.3.2. The control of fertilizers and pesticide storage and use 69 5.3.4. Water use 70
5.4. Concluding remarks after this chapter 72
6. THE FARMING PATTERN IN URTA , YUKORI AND QUYI CHIRCHIK 73
6.1. An introduction into the research area: Tashkent Oblast 73
6.2. Farming in the three rayons 74 6.2.1. Urta (Up) Chirchik: Saidovul 74 6.2.2. Quyi (Low) Chirchik: Toshovul 76 6.2.3. Yukori (Middle) Chirchik: Ozbekistan 78
6.3. The farming tendencies in the Chirchik rayons 80 6.3.1. The cropping patterns 80 6.3.2. The use of fertilizers and pesticides 82 6.3.3. Water use 83
7. CONCLUSIONS , DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 87
7.1. Conclusion 87 7.1.1. Who is involved? 87 7.1.2. Effective or not? 89 7.1.3. Towards sustainability? 90 7.1.4. And the future? 91
10 7.2. Discussion on the conclusion 92
7.3. Recommendations for further research 92
7.4. A comparative epilogue 93
Bibliography 97
APPENDICES A – Farm level organisation of production B – Structure pf State Administration on Agriculture C – Schematic overview of governance of the agricultural sector D – Recombining socio-technical networks E – Summary of main environmental problems in agriculture F – Agricultural production hierarchy G – Questionnaire Fermers and Dehkan Farmers H – Questionnaire shirkats
List of Figures
Figure 1.1 A map of Uzbekistan
Figure 2.1 Linkages among Rules and Levels of Analysis
Figure 2.2 The Bundle of Rights
Figure 2.3 The Agri-environmental Action Scenario
Figure 5.1 The Registration Procedure for Fermers
Figure 5.2 The organisational structure of a Water Use Association
Figure 5.3 The old structure of water supply for Collective Farms
Figure 5.4 The new situation after the establishment of a WUA
Figure 6.1 A closer look at Tashkent Oblast
Figure 6.2 The Lay-out of the farm Saidovul
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 The Production Board of the shirkat Toshovul
List of Tables
Table 5.1 Distribution of sown Land among different Types of Farms
Table 5.2 Agricultural Production of Arable Farming per Oblast
Table 5.3 Total Production of different Crops (1991-2001 excluding 1998)
Table 5.4 Percentage of State Procurement of Agricultural Products
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Table 5.5 Fertilizer Use per Hectare of Arable Irrigated Land for Cotton and Wheat (1998-2000)
Table 5.6 Comparative Analysis of Fuel, Lubricants and Mineral Fertilizer Consumption and other forms of Farming Entities (Ferms)
Table 5.7 Trends in Water Use in different Sectors of the National Economy (1988- 1998)
List of Boxes
BOX 1 The yearly mobilisation for the Cotton Campaign…
BOX 2 Nitrogen fixation by Leguminous Plants
BOX 3 Obsolete Pesticides
12 DEFINITIONS OF CONCEPTS
Agrarian reform ‘The redistribution of the agricultural resources of a country. Traditionally, agrarian or land reform is confined to the redistribution of land; in a broader sense it includes related changes in agricultural institutions, including credit, taxation, rents, and cooperatives’. (Columbia Encyclopaedia, 2006).
Agronom Agronomist
Brigadier Employee of a shirkat, responsible for a certain unit of the agricultural production
Dehkan farmer Uzbek small holder, peasant farmer
Farmer(s) In this report this term is used to refer to dehkan farmers and (private) fermers together
Fermer Commercially oriented farmer, ‘private farmer’, in Uzbek: firmer ho’jaligi
Hokim The chairman of the local council and head of local administration at oblast or rayon level, ‘deputy ruler’
Hokimiyat The executive branch of local governments
Institution This research is focussed upon institutions as ‘generally agreed upon, relatively stable and integrated sets of symbols, beliefs, values, customs, norms, roles and statutes relating to some aspect of social relief, such as property rights regimes and government structures’ (Rabbie, 1980 in Ho, 2005). In short terms: ‘Rules invented by society to govern behaviour’ (FAO, 2005). In other cases an institution is often also used to describe ‘a public or private organisation, such as a governmental or educational organisation. Within this research the term ‘organisation’ or relating terms is used to describe these entities.
Kishlak A rural settlement, which may include different neighbouring localities or mahallas and which is represented by an assembly of it’s citizens (a ul in Kara- Kalpak)
Kolkhoz Soviet term for a large-scale collective farm, with comparable characteristics as the sovkhoz, with the difference that the kolkhoz type of farm was not state- owned.
Mahalla Local community referring to a community of people residing in a specific territory. The size of a mahalla ranges from 150 to 1500 families (average 2000 residents). Originally the mahalla was explained as a traditional neighbourhood found in older Uzbek cities; nowadays the mahalla refers to neighbourhoods as units of local self-governance, all over the country. In rural areas several small villages can be grouped under one mahalla.
Mirab The local water provider of a kishlak or within a shirkat, former kolkhoz or sovkhoz, ‘he who provides the water’.
13 Oblast District or province; every oblast consists of a number of rayons (Uzbek: viloyat ).
Procurement quota Procurement implies that farms have to produce a certain amount (defined as the quota) of a particular crop to the state, against fixed state prices.
Property rights ‘The bundle of rights that includes access , withdrawal (use of resource units), management (how and when the resource is accessed or maintenance is performed or use is monitored), and exclusion (determining who can and cannot access or use the resource). Those who hold all these rights are sometimes known as ‘proprietors’. Management and alienation (sale of the resource) rights are usually exercised in a collective-choice context along with other proprietors’ (Hackett, 1998).
Pudrat A contracting unit based upon production by a family
Rayon Region within an oblast (Uzbek: Tuman )
Rais President of a shirkat, kolkhoz or sovkhoz
Shirkat Stock-holding farm enterprise
Sovkhoz Soviet state farm
Sustainable Land Use ‘Use of land management measures and concepts that leave the land in the same, or better condition and that can continue indefinitely without resource depletion’. (Sonoma County Conservation Council, 2005)
This research has assessed the concept of sustainable land use according to the author’s perceptions, which implies an adaptation of practices to the local environment, rational water use and no or limited use of chemical inputs.
Tamorka Household plot; according to law every family living in the rural areas has the right of lifelong heritable tenure of a household plot. Literally translated as ‘president’s land’.
14 ABBREVIATIONS
CER Center for Economic Research The CER is an Uzbek independent think tank that provides various studies. Among others it is funded by UNDP
FSU Former Soviet Union
GDP Gross Domestic Product
MAWR Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources
MTP Machine Tractor Park
UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Committee
USSR Union of Soviet Socialists Republic
WUA Water Use Association
15 16 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problem description and background
The Republic of Uzbekistan, situated in Central Asia, officially exists since its independence in 1991. The country was included in the Soviet Union for more than 60 years. The inclusion in the Soviet Union implied a fundamental shift in the economic, political and societal arena. The powerful regime in Moscow implied all-union laws and policies, which had to be implemented and obeyed by all the republics. Every republic, and consequently all the soviet citizens had the duty to contribute towards the welfare of the union; the union should become self-sufficient and independent of the ‘outside world’. Each state had to specialize in certain sectors of economy which caused a strong interdependency between the states. This resulted in the unification of agriculture, a command economy whit creation of monocultures of crops in the most republics. Large scale farms were established with a large number of workers that should produce compulsory quantities of crops. Uzbekistan should become the ‘cotton country’. Yet the small household plots, cultivated with a variety of crops oriented at subsistence farming, upheld their importance for the rural population. Together with the large-scale farms this created a dual structure in the rural areas which sustained over the years. After independence the government devised the transition process which comprised agrarian reform. Uzbekistan is divided into 12 oblasts and the autonomous republic Karakalpakstan; the oblasts are again subdivided into a number of rayons. Uzbekistan has a continental climate. The country is rich in mineral and other natural resources that are of primary importance for the national economy. About 75% of the foreign exchange earnings are stemming from export of primary commodities. The agricultural sector is one of the primary contributors to the Uzbek GDP of which cotton is the first contributor, the cotton crop accounts for 35-40% (ADB, 2004). Moreover, more than 60 % of the population lives in the rural areas. Agriculture is of high priority for the government, hence it is under strict control by the government; on the national, oblast and rayon level the sector is highly controlled and monitored.
Figure 1.1 A map of Uzbekistan (source: Spoor, 2006)
17 1.1.1 The transition process After the dissolution of the USSR there was pressure for economic and political transition in all the former republics. The former central governing regime should withdraw its dominant position and should provide incentives for reform towards a market oriented economy. The transition process was initiated by the government, moreover it was pressured by the (Western) international community, driven by the conviction in the ‘Washington Consensus’ of liberal democratic development as the means to achieve sustainable economic growth.
1.1.2 The agricultural reform The agricultural transition would be an essential step towards modernisation and capitalism. Reform is often seen as necessity to eradicate poverty as the capitalist mode of production will stimulate farmers to increase the efficiency of their farm (Sobhan, 1993). The issue of private property became very important and debatable after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Private property is by many understood as being a prerequisite of liberal development and moreover social welfare. In Uzbekistan the process of agricultural reform has been gradual and relatively slow until now, while in other countries the reforms have taken place quite radical. In the Former Soviet Union (FSU) private property was outlawed or restricted and replaced by state or collective property (Ho, 2005). Agrarian reform in most of the FSU should incite especially privatisation, redistribution of land and diversification of farming. The interdependent trade ties between the republics disappeared, which resulted in a rise of imminent food shortages: it made clear that the agricultural sector should diversify. The Uzbek government redistributed small plots to households in order to give the rural population a minimum standard of livelihood. The reform would imply a fundamental change of the agricultural sector in Uzbekistan. The large scale farms were urged to transform into (smaller) more efficient modes of farming. It should relieve the state budget, yet it could also imply a loss of control over the agricultural sector. Up till today the state has upheld its dominant though ambiguous position. With apparently stringent control to secure the production of cotton and wheat the structure of the agricultural sector has been and still is in a process of change. The large-scale farming systems have practically been replaced by smaller individual farms that are nevertheless enlarging again. Ownership of land is merely in hands of the government. The state structure is featured by characteristics of the Soviet regime, in particular with regard to the continued centralist mode of governance (Kandiyoti, 2001; Spoor, 2005). The government shivers to withdraw control over cotton and wheat production. Uzbekistan is ranked on the 6th position of the world’s largest cotton producers. With production rates of 1.6 million and 5.5 million tonnes 1 of cotton and wheat respectively, the crops are of strategic importance (FAO, 2007; USDA, 2006-2007). Cotton still provides the main share of foreign currency and thus is of high importance for the national economy. The weakening of state control could be a means to relieve the state budget and the national economy could benefit form a more market-oriented agricultural sector.
1.1.3 The environment The environment in Uzbekistan is confronted with severe environmental problems, caused by and related to agriculture that impose a threat to ecosystems and human health. Evidently the intensive irrigation and the badly maintained drainage systems are the primary causes of the poor condition of the environment in many areas. With irrigation and drainage, large areas were transformed for agricultural purposes. The large scale state-owned and collective farms demanded high amounts of irrigation water and the yields had to increase by intensive application of chemical pesticides. It caused declining soil fertility due to mono-cropping practices, soil erosion, frequent droughts and diminishing water resources caused by the destruction of vegetation in catchment areas. With the monoculture of cotton the production of other crops diminished. The agricultural sector is almost completely reliant upon irrigation systems. Payment for water use is only a basic fee and for households free of charge. Annually a water amount of 60 km 3 is being distributed in Uzbekistan; the majority of this is surface water. The most important water resources are the two trans-boundary rivers that traverse the country, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya. Only 20% of the water that is used in
1 Including 5.14 million tonnes of wheat, 140 000 tonnes of maize, 180 000 tonnes of paddy rice and 90 000 tonnes of barley (FAO, http://www.fao.org/giews/english/countryupdates/0906e/0906e02.htm
18 Uzbekistan is internally collected. The remaining 80% of Uzbekistan's total water needs for agricultural irrigation and domestic consumption are distributed from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The table of Appendix E provides a summary of the main environmental problems observed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (MAWR, 2000 in UNECE, 2001) Approximately 25% of the Uzbek population is negatively affected by environmental factors originating from cotton production. Cotton fields are in general located near rural settlements. The impact upon the rural population and the environment is especially caused by water and air pollution (Spoor, 2006). According to the World Health Organisation (WHO) the main health problems are related to the usage of pesticides and mineral fertilizers (State Committee on Environment, 1999). Throughout the years under Soviet repression a large amount of land has been harmed and has lost its fertility due to unsustainable land use practices. In addition, the combination of run-off of water with intensive use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides has resulted in soil salinity and severe pollution of areas. In the rural areas underground waters and open water reservoirs are contaminated with discharges from farms and fertilizers floating from the fields. The chemicals accumulate in water sources and soils. The most dangerous are Nitrogen fertilizers due to the Nitrate Nitrogen mobility (State Committee on Environment, 1999). The water contains a high level of nitrates, pesticides and hydrocarbons. Contaminated waste water is used to irrigate vegetables without treatment. The worst health impact is caused by the critical situation of the area surrounding the Aral Sea, and in those oblasts where pesticides are intensively applied. The former sea beds of the Aral Sea are contaminated with pesticides that can flow up in dust storms. The desiccation of the Aral Sea is caused by the diversion of the main rivers that flow to the Sea for irrigation of agricultural fields. The autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan, the surrounding of the Aral Sea, is one of the oblasts which is at worse confronted with these environmental problems. The problematic situation of the area has raised much international attention.
1.2 Problem definition and rationale of the research
The agricultural sector in Uzbekistan is confronted with two major problems: the transition process and sustainability. Only 10% of the total land area is arable, which implies a surface of 4.4 million hectares. The primary constraints for agriculture have resulted from irrational use of natural resources in the past. With the current condition of the environment it is obvious that the agricultural sector must modernise and transform into a more environmental-friendly mode of farming; the large-scale farming systems have demonstrated to have damaging impact upon the environment in Uzbekistan. In addition, there is a lack of experienced farmers, farm inputs and equipment suppliers which result in simple production systems (either for food or for cash); increasing costs of agricultural inputs such as mineral fertilizers, pesticides and machinery; and for the new smaller farm units there are not always appropriate production technologies available (Nasyrov et al., 1992). Transition is a phenomenon that pressures for institutional changes. The present changes affect land use, which for the last sixty years have been in the public domain with the state or collective as governing entity. The redistribution and so-called ‘privatisation’ of land and wells cause major debate, often based on a limited understanding of the options for land tenure, use and management. Nowadays the concepts of ownership, property and managerial rights are fundamentally changing; this results in considerable changes in the institutional arrangements and the institutional environment. The decision- making and participative power of actors and governance is transferred to other or new agencies and actors. Relationships between actors, such as the state, organisations, institutions and actors at local level alter. Development of effective institutions, such as the transfer of property rights over land and market mechanisms can give farmers the responsibility and incentives to work in a more environmental sustainable and productive way. The changes and the redistribution of land should enhance the agricultural sector in terms of the economy, society and not at least the environment. By innovation, modernisation and more efficient and appropriate practices, the sector could become more sustainable. In the former collective farms the workers received a fixed income and additionally inputs for their own small household plots. Both are assumed to have enhanced free rider behaviour within the collectives. The so-called kolkhozniks and sovkhozniks were directed to certain farming practices
19 by order of higher staff, indirectly the government. They did not possess any rights over the production. Up till now the transition of the agricultural sector towards a more segmented, liberalised model has been very slow and impeded by a number of factors. The dominance of the government is still apparent. This, in combination with a lack of appropriate mechanisms and facilities (i.e. institutions) results in fundamental constraints for farmers to become more independent and able to develop their own farming style; to diversify their activities. The uncertainties together enhance risk avoidance of farmers. Diversification of the Uzbek agriculture is pressing: it has the potential to reduce and change the institutionalised farm practices that have become a routine and are far from sustainable. According to Spoor (2006) the impact of the reform on the environment has been twofold until now, slightly positive and rather negative. On the one hand the economic collapse after independence has increased the prices of (chemical 2) inputs, which made farmers more price-conscious. The farmers (re)invented the use of alternative inputs, in particular animal manure. These alternatives and less use of chemicals have definitely been beneficial for the environment. On the other hand, the implementation of procurement quota for wheat has resulted in an enlargement of the total acreage cultivated with wheat. It were in particular traditional (fodder) crops that were replaced by wheat, such as alfalfa (Spoor, 2006). Previously these leguminous crops rotated with cotton and the combination benefited the soil. Additionally these crops did not require large quantities of chemical fertilizers 3.
1.3 Aim of the research
The objective of this research is to examine the recent modifications in governance institutions of the agricultural sector in Uzbekistan and to assess whether the current governance institutional structure advances or constraints sustainable agricultural practices.
The situation in Uzbekistan is very complex. The entire process of agrarian reform, existing property rights and management structures is of mixed nature without much direction. Despite this complexity which is what make it more interesting, this research is aimed at providing insight in the relationship between institutions and agricultural practices that affect the environment. It consists of an examination, whether and to what extent the institutional layout in Uzbekistan enhances or affects land use practices regarding environmental sustainability. The use of natural resources by individual or collective actors is determined by the condition of the actual natural resource and regulated by institutions that should safeguard appropriate use of natural resources.
The overall effect of agrarian reform does not lead to stable economic development, well-functioning markets and improvements in land use per se and everywhere . There exist large differences worldwide. This can partially be explained by differences in governance, reform strategies and the grounds for agrarian reform. The Uzbek government has consciously opted to refrain from privatisation until now, while reserving the ultimate control over land for the state. This is similar to the situation in countries like China and Vietnam, but the grounds for preserving state ownership, and the outcomes are quite different from the Uzbek situation until now (Ho et al., 2005). In Uzbekistan it seems first of all found upon the government’s priorities of cotton and wheat production.
It is often argued that citizen participation and empowerment in defining social and environmental circumstances is one of the key requirements for sustainability and sustainable development. One way to encourage participation is by decentralisation and the transfer of responsibility and authority to lower levels of authorities and to communities. Previously executed research in Uzbekistan suggests that the individual fermers prioritise the results of their own work. In case they are confident in their land tenure, this can induce them to make long term investments into their farm that enhance the sustainability. However questions arise to which extent rights, and which rights, are actually
2 Chemical and mineral are often used interchangeable. The author prefers to use the term ‘chemical’. 3 Personal communications, Max Spoor (Associate Professor of Transition Economics, Institute of Social Studies, ISS, The Hague), 10/07/2006
20 transferred to farmers. A lack of well-defined rights relating to land-use can exert a negative incentive on productive activities and investment behaviour, which can lead to substantial environmental degradation (Koasa-ard et al., 2000; Slangen, 2001). Yet if farmers have the freedom to make independent decisions over their practices this results definitely in different outcomes. It is assumable that this would lead to a diversification of agricultural practices and perchance more sustainable land use. Grounded on this assumption and with regard to the agrarian reform one can thus examine whether this has enhanced sustainable land use (Koontz, 2006). The research is focussed upon arable farming. Although livestock production occupies the largest share of agricultural land, the assessment of both livestock and crop producing agriculture would be to elaborative within this thesis research. Therefore the decision is made to restrict the research to arable agriculture.
1.4 Research Question
Overall Research Question:
‘What has changed in the governance institutions of the agricultural sector in Uzbekistan as a result of the agrarian reform, and how and to what extent does the current governance lay-out affect sustainable farming?’
This research question is unfolded in 2 parts: an examination of the institutional lay-out and an assessment of the impact of farming upon the environment. Subsequently these central questions are divided into sub-questions.
• What is the current institutional lay-out of the agricultural sector on national, regional and local level? What is the current formal governmental setting and what is the role of different governmental bodies? What kind of (agricultural) organisations can be distinguished that play a role in the agricultural sector and what is their position? Who are the decision-makers and relevant actors at national, regional and local level with regard to the agricultural sector?
• How and to what extent does the current governance lay-out affect sustainable farming? How are day-to-day farm practices influenced by (formal and informal) institutions and agricultural policies? What are current farmers’ perceptions of sustainable land use? To what extent are current farm practices sustainable?
1.5 Report Outline
After this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 starts with the theoretical framework. The Agri- environmental Action Scenario developed by Eleanor Ostrom is the conceptual unit of analysis; within the scenario the Bundle of Rights Theory is explored. In addition the concept of sustainable farming is discussed. Chapter 3 explains the research methodology. This research is executed by a case study which is explained in this chapter. The questionnaires that were part of the case study were based upon variables and theories that are shortly described in this chapter. After this the methodology reflected. Since research in social sciences and not at least on agriculture in Uzbekistan is a rather sensitive area, this receives special attention. Chapter 4 outlines the concepts of transition and agrarian reform. This should serve as a framework to assess the transition process and the agrarian reform that is taking place in Uzbekistan since 1991. This process is consequently described in Chapter 5. It follows with more detail for the agrarian
21 reform as a major part of the transition. Furthermore Chapter 5 discusses the structure of government and governance in Uzbekistan, ending with the general farming patterns. Although much of this chapter might appear descriptive and introductory, it is provided to understand the context of case study. The sections are constituted by information derived primarily through the case study, supplemented with other research data. . In Chapter 6 the empirical research findings are discussed. Starting with an introduction into the three mahallas, then the identified general tendencies in farming are clarified. Finally all these chapters together result in the conclusion, discussion, recommendations and a comparative epilogue which all comprise Chapter 7.
22 2. The theoretical framework
2.1 The Agri-environmental Action Scenario
This chapter describes the Agri-environmental Action Scenario as the conceptual unit of analysis of this research. Agricultural policies and the environment are strongly interrelated. The Agri- environmental Action Scenario enlightens and elucidates the process of interactions and interconnectedness between different levels of decision-making, authorities, institutions and individual actors. The different elements that constitute the Agri-environmental Scenario are policies; governance structures; the action arena that comprises farming systems; and not at least environmental assets. The interaction that takes place between these elements is a continuous process. Agricultural policies are governmental interventions that are implemented by governments with the purpose to influence the social and economic context within which agricultural production takes place (Chen, 2007).
2.1.1 Institutions: the institutional environment and institutional arrangements The actual effect and the impact of agrarian reform upon the environment is stipulated by different interactions, actors and institutions. Institutions are formal and informal rules, organisations and networks, beliefs, norms and values that shape social interactions and structure processes. Following North (1990/92 in Poos (2007)) ‘Institutions are to be distinguished from actors/organisations/networks (as political actors, who follow the rules), and the organisations, in which the rules are embedded’ (Poos, 2007). Actually one could argue that social systems interact with ecological systems by means of institutions. Institutional arrangements play an intermediary role; they regulate not only relationships between people, but also relationships between ecological and social systems (Gatzweiler et al., 2001). The impact upon the environment is the result of decision-making processes at three different levels, pictured in figures 2.3. The state, the market and the community all affect the coordination of resource allocation and hence influence the condition of natural resources and the environment (Koasa-ard et al., 2000). In basic terms, the institutional environment is the environment where political, economic and social conditions – possibilities, constraints and opportunities – are structured and in which in turn institutional arrangements are created, developed or influenced. The institutional environment coordinates collective or individual action by providing a regulatory framework. According to Slangen (2001) ‘the institutional environment delineates the rules of the game within with the institutional arrangements actually operate. It prescribes or determines the rule of conduct within which human actions take place’ (Slangen, 2001). Formal legislation, but also customary or informal land use arrangements are institutional arrangements that exist in many varieties (Ho et al., 2005). The institutional arrangements are often defined as governance structures or networks, which are divided into three primary forms: markets, hybrids and organisations. They can be formal or informal, self- organised, hybrids such as farmers’ associations, or established by the government (Gatzweiler et al., 2001; Slangen, 2001). The institutional environment and the institutional arrangements mutually transform each other (formal and informal) and develop as a result of continuous interaction between actors. Together they are often labelled institutions. Together they direct every day practices. Therefore it is crucial to take both the both forms of institutions in consideration. Often informal institutions are viewed as symbolic and less powerful compared to government institutions. Nevertheless in situations where the population holds a reserve and defensive position towards the (strong) state, the population can give preference to informal institutions. Many ‘rules of the game’ that structure political and social action are created, communicated and enforced informally outside of official channels; they influence the effectivety, performance and thus the outcomes of formal institutions. Agrarian reform and the development of related institutions are interdependent. It is therefore that agrarian reform should envisage both the formation of market-oriented producers and the establishment of markets and agricultural infrastructure. Despite farmers’ willingness, without appropriate provisions and services it is impossible to create a sustainable agricultural sector or to
23 develop agrarian reforms (Khaitov et al., 2005). Institutions determine the room for manoeuvre in the operational level, and thus for farmers to make choices about their farming practices (Benjamin et al., 1994). Ineffective institutions, or as Ho (2005) terms them ‘empty institutions’ can result in inefficient use or mismanagement of (natural) resources, environmental degradation and social conflicts. Inefficiency or mismanagement can also occur when decisions are made at higher levels of authority that do not fit the local circumstances (Gatzweiler et al., 2001; Ho, 2005). Ineffective institutions often have a lack of legitimacy, for instance when a particular institution is not accepted by society. It is often observed that exogenous implemented institutions or new technologies are not accepted by society. Peasant resistance appears in those situations when peasants feel threatened and want to preserve their, sometimes ancient practices. Without acceptance of newly implemented or established institutions sustainable agriculture will not be achieved. In order to achieve sustainable agriculture, it is a prerequisite to getting the institutions right . Laws, markets, informal norms and values should enable an appropriate style of farming. If economic, environmental and social aspects are not valued equally, sustainable agriculture will not be achieved. Decreasing production numbers, environmental degradation or social struggles can occur when there is no appropriate weighing of aspects.
2.1.2 The Bundle of Rights Theory Property rights over land are core aspects that can alter in a situation of agricultural reform. In the course of transition there are contemporaneous changes to a range of different property rights (Van Dusen et al., 2003). Yet these rights determine the impact of agricultural practices upon the environment. Agrarian reform often leads to decollectivisation of work and a (re)distribution of land. Regarding land, ownership is not divided in exclusive and non-exclusive ownership. Rather property rights can be explained as existing from a bundle of rights, in which each right represents a distinct and separate right. The separate rights can be appointed to individual and collective actors and refer to different levels of decision making. Full ownership implies the full bundle of rights (Dedeurwaerdere, 2005; Meyer, 2000). Land use is the relationship between social actors regarding land and natural resources. As such, every distinct right that forms part of the bundle of right is an institution: it is a generally agreed upon appointment or registration between different actors of society. It governs behaviour of individuals or groups in society (FAO, 2005).
The property rights bundle in relation to land is based upon the following four rights: 1. Access, Extractions and Withdrawal 4 – the right to enter a defined physical area and obtain resource units or products of a resource system; an actors that only possesses this right, is called an ‘authorized user’. 2. Management – the right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource by making improvements; 3. Exclusion – the right to determine who will have right of withdrawal and how that right may be transferred; 4. Alienation – the right to sell or lease withdrawal, management and exclusion rights. (Agrawal et al., 2001)
Rights are the products of rules, and refer to particular authorized actions. Rules can be defined as ‘generally agreed upon and enforced prescriptions, that require, forbid or permit specific actions for more than a single individual’ (Ostrom E., 1986; Ostrom V., 1976). As stated, the separate rights refer to different levels of decision making. Day to day farm practices, such as harvesting and ploughing the land, can be categorized as access, extraction and withdrawal . The decisions about how, when, and in what way this is done, are made by actors who possess the right of management. Thus: directly and/or indirectly each right impacts the condition of the environment.
4 These three rights together classified as usufruct rights. The term originates from civil law, where it is a real right of temporary duration on the property of another. The holder of a usufruct, known as the usufructuary, has the right to use and enjoy the property, as well as the right to receive profits from the fruits of the property. The Latin words usus and fructus refer to the rights of use and fruit respectively. The term fruits refer to any replenishable commodity on the property, including actual fruits, livestock, and even rental payments derived from the property (Wikipedia, 22 jan 2006)
24 Figure 2.2 describes the classification of usufruct and decision rights that correspond with different levels of decision making. Usufruct rights are the rights that are exercised at the operational level; collective choice rights are defined and operationalised at the collective choice level (Dedeurwaerdere, 2005).
Following Ostrom (1990) the three levels of decision-making are explained as 5:
• The constitutional level is the level where procedures and rules are being made about decision rules, in brief: rules about rule-making, following Ostrom: ‘Constitutional-choice rules affect operational activities and results through their effects in determining who is eligible, and determining the specific rules to be used in crafting the set of collective-choice rules that in turn affect the set of operational rules’ (Ostrom, 1990: 52; emphasis in original). This is done by processes of formulation, governance, arbitration and modification, as becomes clear from the figure below. It is often, certainly in autocratic states, the highest level of authority that decides who will have decisive power and who is involved in policy-making (Ostrom, 1990).
• At the collective-choice level collective decisions and rules are devised that affect rights, practices and activities of the operational level. They are authority rules that can give actors the authority and power to act at the operational level (figure 2.1 and figure 2.3). Accordingly these decisions are very powerful and determine the actual activities that can be undertaken (Ostrom, 1992; Ostrom, 1999). They can be formal, such as state policies, to determine, enforce, continue or alter actions authorised by institutional arrangements, or informal, such as arrangements, norms and values shared by farmers or communities. Collective choice rules are made by policy-making, management and arbitration (figure 2.1). The property rights at the collective-choice level are the rights to management , exclusion and alienation. At the second level, policies are made and the rules in use are determined, in which managerial rights are very important (Ostrom, 1990).
• Day-to-day decisions are made at the operational level . The rules in use are crafted on the collective choice level (figures 2.1 and 2.3), and constrain or create opportunities for certain activities. The rights of access , extraction and withdrawal are exercised at this level. These are the rules in use, which can be enforced, executed and possibly adjusted to local circumstances (to the extent that that is allowed) by appropriation and provision. The activities undertaken by primarily individuals at the operational level can exist from a wide variety that directly impact on the environment (Ostrom, 1990).
As the figures 2.1 and 2.3 clarify, the decisions and rules of the collective-choice level stipulate rules, rights and decisions on the constitutional choice level, which together determine the rules exercised in the operational level. Agricultural policies, laws and regulations prescribe that certain actions are prohibited or compulsory. The distinction between rights and rules at the collective choice level and the operational level is essential. It is clearly the division between the right to define a rule and the right to execute, to exercise a right (Ostrom et al., 1992). It must be emphasized that the three levels do not refer to three different levels of authority. In central governed, autocratic states the national authorities define the rules in the constitutional, collective-choice and operational level. Lower level of authorities and citizens do not participate in policy-making and do not have much ability to give direction to their own practices. Consequently policies are is uniform and there is little attention for local circumstances. Conversely, in constitutional states with a parliamentary democracy, national as well as local authorities and communities often participate in the collective-choice level by policy- making, voting and establishing institutions. In those countries a monopoly of violence of the state is limited by laws and rules, and the government protects and enforces rights. Agricultural policies are adjusted in time, in order to respond to market fluctuations. The constitution and the rule of law are
5 A comparable categorisation between the three levels of governance is made by Kooiman (2003). He labels them first , second and third order governance; similar to the operational, collective-choice and constitutional level respectively (Kooiman, 2003).
25 (more or less) permanent; they construct the institutional environment in which (agricultural) policies are crafted or changed (Slangen, 2001). In general the constitutional rules are most permanent; compared to collective-choice rules and operational rules they change more slowly. Governmental institutions determine the rules, laws and structures that governmental actors and individuals are subject to. In that way institutions influence individual behaviour. By voting and democratic decision making (governmental) actors and individuals can pressure upon governmental institutions for adjustments in the creation of rules (Koontz, 2006). In order to possess authority, the rules at the constitutional level should allow this (Agrawal et al., 2001). Within the action arena the farm practices are determined, performed and shaped by different factors. These practices are not only determined by decisions taken at higher levels of authority, such as formal legislation and policies. The different levels of decision-making exist in every societal network community. The main actors in networks determine who is eligible and who constitutes the rules; following rules are crafted and practices are employed. In the case of the formal state system the different levels are often vertically ordered in a hierarchical way, whereas in informal networks the levels are more horizontal when constitutional rulers are the same actors that practice the activities on the operational level. This is in particular true when it concerns socio-technical networks between farmers. Within these networks, farmers collectively pursue their goals. Together farmers decide which transactions actually take place that influence the possibilities of the day-to-day activities undertaken by the farmers themselves. They also decide who is involved, who has access to their socio-technical network and what is transacted. In general the networks develop rather autonomous and are interrelated with other social networks within communities. Within socio-technical networks, farmers are interdependent and rely upon each other for exchanges. Socio-technical networks are prominent at the community level where transactions primarily take place outside of official markets in a hybrid form. Transactions include (or first of all) aspects related to resources: knowledge dissemination, monitoring, conflict resolution and sanctioning (Sikor, 2003).
Rules Constitutional Collective Choice Operational
Level of Constitutional Collective Choice Operational Choice Analysis Choice
Processes Formulation Policy-making Appropriation Governance Management Provision Arbitration Arbitration Monitoring Modification Enforcement
Figure 2.1 Linkages among Rules and Levels of Analysis (source: Ostrom, 1990:53)
Figure 2.2 The Bundle of Rights (source: Dedeurwaerdere, 2005)
26 Institutional adjustments can be required and even become crucial when phenomena occur or in situations to protect the environment. The problem with natural resources such as water and air, concerns their properties of non-rivalry and non-excludability. Appropriate institutions should secure right behaviour of actors using these resources, as for example markets will not standardise conservative behaviour. Institutions should stimulate or enforce responsible use of natural resources (Slangen, 2001). The different factors that can give rise to institutional changes can be classified:
1. Features and implications relating to the environment and ecosystems.. 2. Characteristics and objectives of the actors involved. The changes within institutional arrangements are influenced by the involved actors, who have different interests. Individual actors can enforce their interests by establishing new institutions or demand a change in governance. (Gatzweiler et al., 2001: 10)
Institutional adjustments can result in changes in property rights regimes and governance structures and conversely as a reaction to environmental degradation institutions can be readjusted (figure 2.3). Reforms in the institutional environment and the institutional arrangements are a prerequisite for successful agrarian reform. As Ho (2005) argues, if neither institutions nor socio-economic conditions are favourable to socio-economic change, reforms of property rights are likely to fail’ (Ho, 2005: 2).
Figure 2.3 The Agri-environmental Action Scenario (source: Ostrom et al., 1994).
27 When specific policies and styles of farming have become longstanding it can be said that they are ‘institutionalised’. Paradigms, development paths and practices are created. Institutionalisation includes a ‘co-evolution’ of society, nature and technology. It is a multi-level, multi-aspect process. Initially individual and subjective behaviour is imitated and repeated in time and develops into a collective and objective pattern of behaviour. It becomes detached from the individual. Institutionalisation creates path-dependency, once taken decisions and directions influence the future and the direction is not altered easily. Therefore a change in policies or structures requires a fundamental reform of different actors and elements of society.
2.2 Sustainable agriculture: establishing a symbiotic relationship
The concept of sustainability became ubiquitous and very popular after the publication of ‘Our Common Future’, the famous Brundtland report in 1987. Sustainable development was one of the main issues elaborated on in the report. In this report it was described as: ‘Sustainable Development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WECD, 1987: 43).
The many publications on sustainability agree on the fact that there are many different concepts of sustainability employed. Sustainability refers to economic, environmental and social sustainability. Although the three domains, especially economic and environmental sustainability, often seem to compete, economic growth and the condition of the environment can enhance each other by a positive interplay. The exact definition if sustainability is disputable. Gibbon (1995) argues the importance of the use of sustainability, despite the lack of consensus: ‘Many would agree that it is important to define what sustainability is, or might be, before any actions can be taken towards setting up more sustainable agricultural practices. We do not necessarily subscribe to the need to define sustainability in order to practise it, but the exercise of definitions is one useful way to examine several perspectives and to understand complex views’ (Gibbon et al., 1995 in Bell et al., 1999: 9).
Agriculture and the environment are often in struggle. On the one hand, farming should extract or exploit resources from nature to produce food or acquire other products. In this way environmental degradation occurs easily without any notice. Yet on the other hand nature conservation can be one of the core tasks of farmers. Their activities, when of proper kind, can be considerably beneficial for the (local) environment. Environmental sustainable agriculture combines the two sides of extraction or use of nature with conservation practices: they should found a symbiotic relationship. Sustainable agriculture can be understood as a process in which natural resources are withdrawn or converted by farm practices to obtain food, raw materials, ornamental plants and rural amenities in an economically efficient, socially acceptable and environmental friendly way (Slangen, 2001). Agriculture does not only utilise the environment and all its living elements, it also transforms, enriches or depletes it (van der Ploeg, 2003). The resources that are derived from nature remain part of nature but are in the mean time influenced or manipulated. Sustainable agriculture is focused upon the ability of agriculture to maintain or improve the condition of the environment and its natural resources while reducing harmful effects upon the environment of farming practices and enhancing beneficial ones (Slangen, 2001). Since the condition of the environment is very site-specific, strictly unified agricultural practices (on national, regional, but even on the local level) are not appropriate.
Sustainable agriculture is often attached to food security, but this is merely the explanation in economic terms. It is also this economic explanation that gives leeway for the argument that high-yield farming would be more sustainable than organic farming. In addition to the economic and environmental aspects and not of less importance, the social aspects of sustainable agriculture are of high importance. Social sustainability is concerned with the institutional environment: norms, values, rules and rights. These (formal or informal) institutions should secure equal distribution and fair trade, and should enable reciprocity, trust and acceptability of activities, especially on the local level. Informal but longstanding institutions such as tradition and culture play important roles.
28 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research is of qualitative nature. In order to understand the complex context within which different actors (institutions, organisations and other (individual) actors) interact and that surround and influence the fermer as the main actor that practices day-to-day activities, a qualitative research is preferred above a quantitative approach. This is conducted by an in-depth analysis of farm practices, farmers’ perceptions about their farm strategy and the position of the state, institutions and agricultural organisations. The role, structure and (inter)relationships of different governing bodies, institutions and other actors are examined that together determine the impact of farming upon the environment. A relevant question therefore is ‘Who owns what property and where do property rights come from?’
3.1 Case-Study approach
This research has conducted a case study in three mahallas in three different rayons located in Tashkent Oblast. The field work has been executed from September until December 2006. Case study research is applied with the desire to understand complex social phenomena, it allows an investigation of a particular setting, with an holistic focus in order to preserve meaningful characteristics (Robert, 1984). It is characterised by direct observation of a real-life situation. A case study takes place within a bounded system, which makes clear that it is restricted; generalisations should be made with caution. The value of data is in the comparability and is not universally applicable. The results are strongly time- and area-specific. Not only in the execution of the research the importance of comparability must be recognised, also concerning the research conclusions, as this research is attached to unique circumstances. It is the problem of ‘the general versus the unique’ that hampers the building of general ideas and conclusions. This research does not allow a generalisation for all or rural Uzbekistan. However, it is tried to retain the most important contextual features within a framework, to be able to draw some assumptions and conclusions that allow for comparisons over other studies and circumstances (Benjamin et al., 1994). These characteristics of the case-study approach are all of relevance to give answer to the main research question of this research. As mentioned, the aim is to identify the institutional lay-out of the agricultural sector and to assess how and to what extent this affects sustainable farming. The answer to this question requires an holistic approach. One must know the context in which farmers work; which factors influence their practices and to identify ((inter)dependent) relationships with other actors. The case study approach is selected as the suitable strategy to achieve this. The case study is executed within one oblast to enable the understanding of the particular local setting in which farmers act. As Robert states: ‘The essence of a case study, a central tendency among all types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or a set of decisions why they were taken, how they were implemented and with what result’ (Robert, 1984). By relating farmers’ information to the context in which they are working it is possible to gain insight in their practical situation. This case study can be defined as a collective case study. The three rayons, Urta (Up), Yukori (Middle) and Quyi (Low) Chirchik, are surrounding the city of Tashkent. The mahallas were randomly selected, including however advice of research assistants and practical reasons. Furthermore, by a so- called ‘snowball effect’ a number of other relevant actors of the agricultural sector have been interviewed to acquire additional information on the complex Uzbek situation. This is supplemented with reviewing previous executed studies on the Uzbek agricultural sector. It must be noticed that there have been difficulties in accessing governmental information and officials which have created deficiencies in information. To overcome problems in reliability a number of (foreign) scientists working in Uzbekistan are consulted.
3.1.1 Data gathering Empirical qualitative and quantitative data are used which are gathered by semi-structured in-depth interviews and literature research. To lay the foundation for field work a literature research is executed. This enabled to get an understanding of the situation in Uzbekistan and to select research subjects and applicable theories.
29 Within the case study a number of oral interviews are being conducted. Initially two standard questionnaires were prepared for interviewing dehkan farmers and fermers and for shirkats (Appendices G and H). During the research the interviews have been adjusted. The questionnaires were semi-structured; depending on the the person interviewed, the conversation was extended. The interviews were focussed upon the particular farm practices, the organisational structure of the farm and relationships with governmental and non-governmental organisations and external actors. The questionnaires might appear rather long; it must be emphasised that the questions that are numbered were part of the discussions; the oral interviews were not ‘a flow of questions’ but took rather place in the way of more informal discussions in which the information was acquired. Meetings with other actors discussed different issues in agriculture, depending on the working area of the specific person. These meetings were prepared beforehand but without use of a questionnaire. Here again a comment must be made; contact was often not easily established since there was a lot of distrust to overcome. Therefore electronic recording material has not been used, and thus full transcriptions were not available, limiting analyses.
3.1.1.1 Theories and variables The questionnaires and topics of conversation were based upon the theoretical framework discussed in chapter 2, specifically the Agri-environmental Action Scenario and the Bundle of Rights Theory; and a part was focussed upon environmental aspects (variables) to assess sustainable land use. The Agri-environmental Scenario, developed by Eleanor Ostrom, allows a thorough analysis of the interconnectedness and interactions between different actors, institutions and authorities with regard to agri-environmental policy making. Together these different bodies and processes constitute the institutional environment and institutional arrangements. As the result of agrarian policies and interactions and interpretations, day-to-day activities are determined that impact upon the environment. Initially the scenario has been developed in order to explain relationships between actors regarding common pool resources. To identify and define the different existing forms of property the Bundle of Rights Theory is used. Property rights establish relationships among participants in any social and economic system. The Bundle of Rights Theory explains that ownership of real property consists of a bundle of rights, in which each right represents a distinct and separate right (Meyer, 2000). This research examines the impact of farming on the environment by basic variables and it must be emphasized that the assessment is limited to a small number of factors. These factors have been integrated in the questionnaires for the agricultural producers. Sustainability is restricted to environmental sustainability. The assessment is drawn upon the questionnaires; farm site visits (observations); statistical information and data analysis. It is aimed to approach the concept of sustainability from an environmental view. The variables relate to farm practices and intentions or actual results of farm practices upon the production and the environmental condition of the land. To assess sustainability, the following indicators are used: 1. Crop diversity; Farmers that practice rotation and cultivate different crops avoid exhaustion of the soil. 2. Use and sort of inputs; high amounts of chemical inputs are considered to have a negative effect upon sustainability. 3. Use of water; the factors that determine the amounts and methods of water use. 4. Farmers’ perceptions and intentions about the environment and agriculture.
3.2 Reflection on the methodology and theory
3.2.1 Research in Uzbekistan Working and conducting research in Uzbekistan is both challenging and difficult, as is stated in the preface: ‘All the agricultural is politics…’. With respect to freedom in working Uzbekistan is not the most favourable country and not at least when the research is executed in the proximity of the capital Tashkent as the center of the country. Spoor, as an experienced researcher in Uzbekistan described it
30 ‘the closer to the center, the more control you will face’ 6. Since agriculture is of crucial importance for the government the sector is very ‘sensitive’; hence, the system should not be questioned nor criticised. After a violent event in Andijan 7 the government is reluctant and sometimes hostile towards foreigners. With a fear for revolutions, comparable to those in Georgia and the Ukraine, ties with in particular United States (aid organisations and companies) are broken. It has not been possible to obtain official permission for research and therefore the possibilities for interviews and access to information were limited. Governmental officials are reluctant to provide information, in particular when it concerns information requested for by foreigners; without permission this is even more problematic. Wall (2005) distinguishes three types of subjectivity that appear when conducting research in an authoritarian country like Uzbekistan: situational , protectionist and reactive subjectivity (Wall, 2005). An ethnographic research analyses people’s perceptions and the behaviour that is influenced by a number of factors. For every respondent this is influenced by his or her economic, social, political and familial status and therefore it does not allow directly for a generalisation of common behaviour within one community or focus group. This is defined as situational subjectivity; every individual is situated within a specific individual arena (the context) of actors and influences, which shape norms, values and behaviour. Protectionist subjectivity is in particular relevant within ethnographic research in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is not an open society and self-protectionist behaviour seems to be prevalent (Wall, 2005). Farmers are aware of the stringent control and are cautious in answering questions. It can be described as a kind of risk management, to prevent harm or ‘loss of face’ (Wall, 2005). As mentioned, the current political situation, in particular concerning the agricultural sector hampers many people to talk freely about thoughts and behaviour. Agriculture is a politically sensitive topic of conversation which was observed all over this research. Many (in-depth long term) researches in Uzbekistan, such as conducted by Wall (2006) and Wegerich (2006) 8 have indicated that suppression of farmers and stringent control of the sector enhances ‘hidden action’ (Wegerich, 2006) or non-compliance, which can be explained as a coping strategy. Since this has not really been observed in the case study it can be assumed that protectionist behaviour was prevalent among respondents. The most farmers have given clear, straight answers that seem in line with the expectations based upon literature. In some situations data was messed up by giving contradictive information during a second visit. This is also experienced and confirmed by Wall (2005) who states ‘fermers intend to give information about official methods, rather than the reality’ (Wall, 2005). In some situations disinformation was abundant and it was difficult to cross-check information. There are severe restrictions in freedom of speech, movement and education and in some cases respondents have asked whether their answers would be treated with care and would not be used to attack the government. At last, reactive subjectivity; this is assumed to emerge in general in ethnographic researches. Someone that is aware that he or she is being observed and is subject to research tends to change behaviour. Respondents want to give representative answers to show ‘the way things normally go’ and that are typical for the topic concerned. Protectionist subjectivity can be embedded in reactive subjectivity. When one knows he or she is being studied or in case questions are posed, the answers can change in order to give an idealistic picture or official information about the way it should be like, in confirmation with rules and policies, in a political correct manner. Although it was prohibited to pose any questions with political sensitivity, the focus of this research upon agriculture made the research inherently political. In addition typical ‘Western’ thoughts and critique on the current system are not widely and overtly shared and thus one must take up a precarious position. There have been considerable problems in compiling a consistent series of data
6 Personal communications, Max Spoor (Associate Professor of Transition Economics, Institute of Social Studies, ISS, The Hague), November 2006. 7 In a demonstration against the trial of people accused of belonging to a radical Islamitic group, and to demand the observance of human rights and improvements in living conditions, many people have been arrested and large groups tried to fly to Kyrgyzstan. 8 For further reading: Wall, (2006): ‘Knowledge Management in Rural Uzbekistan: Peasant, Project and Post- Socialist perspectives in Khorezm’ ; Wall (without date), ‘Peasant Resistance in Khorezm? – The Difficulties in Classifying Non-Compliance in rural Uzbekistan’ ; Wegerich, K. (2006), ‘Illicit’ water: un-accounted, but paid for. Observations on rent-seeking as causes of drainage floods in the lower Amu Darya Basin’ .
31 and therefore all data provided should be used with caution. Yet with the supplementation of previous executed researches the overall trends have become clear. It must be noted that indirectly many objections of fermers are observed in this research, with respect to the current agricultural structure and therefore it is assumable that the majority of fermers are cautious to express their complaints and doubts. Some of the people that assisted during the research that have fermers in their family confirmed the restrictive system and the willingness of fermers to change or innovate in farming. Yet others emphasized the need of the current agricultural system that should be continued. Cotton and wheat are of primary importance for the country and fermers choose themselves to be a fermer.
3.2.2 The role of the researcher and the translator The role of the researcher and the translator is an important influencing factor in ethnographic researches, both from the side of the interviewer and from the side of the respondent. From the side of the respondent this is strongly attached to reactive subjectivity as respondents react in a different way to every researcher. Being a foreign researcher can influence people’s attitude and answers. From the side of the researcher there are also important points of discussion which are relevant for every individual. Given answers and information are interpreted by every individual in a different way and the researcher is influenced by the image and attitude of the respondent. A researcher must make judgements on the validity of truthfulness of the given information; one must be aware that many knowledge and thoughts can be inherent, tacit or implicit and hence, more difficult to analyse or to observe. Not less important is the role of the translator and the relationship and interactions between the translator and the researcher. In this research translation was of high importance in accessing information. Alike the researcher, the translator also affects the empirical research findings. Within this research the translation was taken up by a student in environmental sciences from the Tashkent Irrigation and Melioration Institute (TIIM), which can be understood as ‘part of the state system’. This definitely has influenced respondents’ reactions and given information. Without introduction on the research by the translator it was not possible to get access to information, with the drawback that this introduction emphasized that there was talk of a research. In some cases this clearly constraint research outcomes and in some situations even made research impossible, as was experienced in Ozbekistan where the shirkat staff was not willing to give any information without prove of governmental permission. As mentioned in the previous paragraph some respondents were cautious to give information with the fear it would harm them or the government. A last note must be made about the interaction and relationship between the researcher and the translator. As a student educated by TIIM, the translator was experienced in agriculture and the attached official farm practices. In some cases this resulted in confusions and discussions between the researcher and the translator; some questions were steering towards in the translator’s perception ‘over-obvious’ answers. This confusion – or sometimes friction – took place frequently, in particular in the first weeks of the field visits. In addition, the research was facilitated by staff from TIIM which are involved in the agricultural sector and do work within the state system. Comparable to the translator’s reactions to the research questions, the staff had difficulties to have understanding for the research aims and questions as it was all over-obvious and they themselves could simply provide clear answers.
3.2.3 Discussion on the research strategy In line with the previous section, it is clear that a lot of constraints had to be conquered in order to acquire somewhat reliable data. Therefore this research strategy is open for debate, as are the outcomes. It must be emphasized that this case study does not allows a generalisation of the situation in Uzbekistan. The case study describes the situation in the specific setting of the agricultural sector in Tashkent Oblast. The scale of research is small with a low number of farmers and other actors interviewed. As mentioned before Tashkent Oblast was one of the last areas (or even the last) where shirkats had to be dismantled which implies that an expansion of individual farming will take place from 2007 onwards. In other areas in Uzbekistan this process has taken place already some years before. The rural areas surrounding Tashkent Oblast contrast with other rural areas in that it is posited in the proximity of the capital, which assumingly affects the living circumstances and thus agricultural practices. The Chirchik rayons are closely located to the suburban and urban areas, which undoubtedly
32 influences the cultural and traditional practices. In addition, as stated, it can be assumed that there is more governmental control in the proximity of the capital (i.e. the center) (Spoor, 2006) 9. The case study consisted of interviewing relevant actors in the agricultural sector: farmers, governmental officials and other stakeholders. In particular the farm visits were short in which it was difficult to assess the truthfulness of the provided information, in particular when one considers that it is crucial to have a mutual feeling of trust. Farmers have been visited two or three times for interviews. This was essential to identify farmers’ perceptions and to explain the factors influencing their day-to- day behaviour. Yet it did not allow for in-depth research, with the difficulty to observe any non- compliance. Nevertheless given the specific context in which this research has been conducted, this particular research design was inheritable. Despite the disadvantages this research has resulted in clear conclusions. The contacts with the TIIM and the university facilitated the contact with different important actors in the agricultural sector in the Chirchik rayons, which could provide important information and expertise about different agricultural aspects.
9 Personal communications, Max Spoor (Associate Professor of Transition Economics, Institute of Social Studies, ISS, The Hague), July 2006.
33 34 4. BACKGROUND ON TRANSITION
This chapter describes the common characteristics of transition processes and agrarian reform. It offers the framework within which the complete process of transition and agrarian reform is taking place in Uzbekistan, which is described in the later chapter (5).
4.1 Countries in transition
A clear definition of the term transition is given by Wehrheim: ‘a set of reforms and the timing and sequencing of reform with which a country implements the system switch from planned to market’ (Wehrheim, 2003 p.11). Yet this is a somewhat narrow definition; transition towards a market economy is often accompanied by a plurality of changes; profound transformation in also political and social spheres. Not necessarily a country in transition is reforming in all spheres of society, but the co- existence of a communist and partial liberalised economic system can seem rather contradictive at first sight. A country can gradually progress from a central planned economic system towards a more market-based economy, with the continuation of a communist political system, such as in China, Mongolia and Vietnam. Nevertheless most transition countries are in a multidimensional process in the political, economic and social domains, towards a pluralistic democratic society and economic liberalisation in which decentralisation of political and economic (power) structures has taken place and a more market-based economy is being developed (Mee, 2001; Schmidt, 2003, Spoor, 2003). The political and economic structure in most transition countries has been centralized and ruled in an authoritarian way for a long time logic for a planned economy. The process of transition is in general a long path: there are profound changes required throughout all elements of society. Institutions and state organisations must be dissolved, readjusted or newly established, new trading links should be created and the roles and relationships between organisations, institutions and society must be transformed. The initiation of transition often goes together with the demise of (former) institutions which should be replaced immediately. Effective institutions are the prerequisite, the vehicle for a profound transition. The importance of the build-op of markets and their corresponding institutions is often ignored (Spoor, 2003). No blueprint for reform exists; every country follows a unique path of reform and development depending on the context which comprises various factors: the interests of the ruling government, the political, socio-economic and societal background and the current situation, the existence or non- existence of an active civil society. First of all the historical background from which a transition departs diverges; a (civil) war can appeal for change within a country, whereas in other states it is the state policy that is changed and aims at transition. In some Central and Eastern European countries the transition commenced from bottom-up. Secondly, the scope of change varies worldwide but also on local scale. In some countries a gradual, guided path with a precarious introduction of market-based economic principles is being followed whilst elsewhere development of ‘pure capitalism’, a shock therapy in all spheres of society occurs (Ho et al., 2005). Also within countries large differences on local scale can be observed: near the capital, capitalism can be ‘booming’, while in the rural areas the situation appears to remain quite comparable to the situation preceding the reforms. Transition processes are commonly executed by national governments, nevertheless often started by external pressure: international agencies and foreign countries that are driven by the conviction in the ‘Washington Consensus’ of liberal democratic development as the means to achieve sustainable economic growth, moreover social welfare (Ho et al., 2005). According to Hann (in Ho, 2005, pp. 9,10) ‘Most post-communist governments and their Western advisers were ideologically committed to a very pure version of the liberal model. When they found themselves in the awkward situation of having to design and enforce structures that were supposed to evolve ‘naturally’. Ministries of Privatization were set up to expedite the transfer of ownership rights away from the state, a step seen as indispensable to ‘systematic transformation’ (Ho, 2005). Nonetheless internal changes can also initiate transitions. In some Central and Eastern European countries the people’s velvet revolution called for reforms already preceding the fall of the Berlin Wall.
35 As said, the outcomes of transition depend largely on the context and considering the long time path, the process is not ended in one or two years. Transition is frequently focussed upon the following three domains of society: • The political system: from a centralized, one party system towards a multiple party system, a pluralistic democratic political structure in which decentralisation of power has taken place. The relationship between the state and its population changes; political participation is appearing or disappearing and transition can result in a demise of public services. In the former USSR political membership was obligatory, although it is often supposed to be rather ‘cosmetic’: people participated without a voice. In some FSU states the dissolution of the Soviet Union did not result in an increasing interest in politics but rather in political distrust caused by the experiences with the former regime. Preceding the eradication of the Soviet ‘empire’ the degree of autonomy between the republics differed. Some of the CEECs had the prospect of becoming a European country and focussed upon accession to the European Union. On the other hand there were countries that had to be founded as new ones, like those in Central Asia, which had been dominated by other states since their creation as nation states (preceding forms of government such as emirates were not nation states in the modern understanding). • The economic system: from a centralized, planned economy towards a (more) market-based liberalised economy. Transition of the economic sector implies the privatisation of state enterprises, (re)distribution of land and in some situations the close-down of outdated polluting industries. New legislation is created and tax and subsidy systems change. Communist states with a planned economy often support the domestic economic sectors by subsidy systems despite possible inefficiency and low production. The economies are largely self-subsistent, relying upon ‘own’ resources and focussed upon national consumption patterns with restrictions on international trade. The Soviet economy could be understood as one entity. The economies of the separate republics were adjusted to each other and highly specialised. Consequently there was a one-sided republican division of labour. By no means were the republics self-subsistent themselves. After transition this caused considerable economic problems in more or less the entire former SU. The economic situation prior to change in transition countries is differing largely between states. Some countries are industrializing and can be described as relatively rich compared to others which are (still more) agrarian-based and rather poor. Economic transition is no panacea for everyone: it can result in growing disparity and tensions between regions and groups within a country. • The society: from ‘the collective’ towards a ‘society of the individual’: individuals should become active in society. The structure of society and the relationships between people change, modes of production are altered, feudalism can be eradicated or, on the other hand, it can result in increasing disparity. The society should be in interaction with the political system; the emergence of a pluralistic political structure requires active citizens that make full use of democratic principles. Societal changes are affected by the religious structure and the egalitarian or non-egalitarian norms and values. Ethnicity and religion can gain importance and create more disparity between people and regions. Especially in countries of the FSU the society can be described as mixed and internally fragile with many ethnic groups. Many people were ‘dislocated’.
4.2 Agrarian reform
Agrarian reform is an essential element of transition. The pressure for agrarian reform is often validated as being the instrument to achieve a capitalist mode of production; this should increase the productivity by providing incentives to the rural population which results in intensification of farming. As mentioned, in many countries the pressure for reform comes first of all from the international community, in particular the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These financing institutions required dissolution of large-scale collective and state-owned farms (described as
36 ‘borrowing conditionalities’ 10 ). Privatisation is marketed with the optimistic view (or, like Lerman (1998) describes it as ‘naïve’ (Lerman, 1998 in Spoor et al., 2001)) as the means to achieve a more efficient and productive agricultural sector, and not at least to combat poverty and famine in the rural areas. In addition the argument is favoured by examples of the successful reforms implemented in Vietnam and China (Spoor et al., 2001), which have also served as reform examples for the Uzbek government. In line with the privatisation paradigm Ho (2005) states ‘by means of land reform programs three objectives should be achieved: social justice, political health and agricultural output expansion’ (Ho, 2005). Nevertheless, agrarian reform does not necessarily result in equal land distribution, social justice and political stability. In many transition countries agriculture has an important position: a large part of the population is employed by agriculture and is living in the rural areas. In many cases the decollectivisation of farms has lead to a loss of employment and family farms have turned into (fall back) food security nets. In virtually the entire FSU, farming has been collectivised and for more than 60 years agricultural production was stipulated and secured by the government which provided all input requirements and coordinated the output. The state farms were large-scale and private ownership and small-scale farming was outlawed as it would make it rather impossible for the state to control over the production, marketing and consumption of the (rural) population. The social mode of production was in essence the dominant mode of production with the means of production being collective property (Sobhan, 1993). To date in some of those countries the agricultural sector could and still can be characterised as heavily state-controlled, specifically in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Nevertheless it must be noticed that also in many western countries the domestic sector is indirectly supported by various subsidies and services and the government controls and regulates the production. According to Harriss (1997) agrarian reform is primarily a political process that is situated in the political arena. It aims first of all at coordinating the rights and claims over resources, and conflicts about them. The concept of powe r is very important. Within the context of institutions of rules and norms, actors negotiate and struggle to (re)distribute the access and rights to resources, not at least the rights of access to land. Those who hold power, primarily the dominant classes in society, will aim to secure their interests (Harriss, 1997). To achieve capacity for a profound agrarian transformation, to build capacity and understanding, participation of different actors is essential. Only then the power that is executed can become a productive aspect, when executed power develops into a productive network in which knowledge is shared and created. Agrarian reform is often confronted with complicated issues caused by considerable differences in interests and perceptions between the ‘center and the margins’ (the states and the markets versus the rural areas or, the core and the periphery). Governments are often controlling the development of scientific knowledge which should secure and justify the path of development. In many countries the state lacks sufficient knowledge of traditional practices and crops and the central regime does not acknowledge the importance of local knowledge; this can result in a lack of extension and support for traditional practises. Knowledge of traditional (farm) practices can be eroded by an imposed mode of farming. The farm practices become detached from their locality such as imposed changes in cropping patterns. The rural areas are often appointed to produce high value crops for the urban center. In the rural areas the interface between cultural, local and economic aspects plays an important role. Although the IFIs (International Financing Institutes, the World Bank and the IMF) still postulate their optimistic ´blueprint for reform´ several paths of agrarian reform can be identified and outcomes are diverging worldwide (Spoor et al., 2001). The outcome of agrarian reform depends upon different factors. Sobhan (1993) outlines a number of factors: the social origins of reform; the availability of land; the proportion of households that (should) benefit from reform and the actual distribution of land ownership, in relation with the proportion of households that remain without land entitlement in the aftermath of reform (Sobhan, 1993). A last Sobhan (1993) mentions the capacity of agrarian reform to transform the modes of production by effecting a transition from one mode to another. As he states: ‘A change in the social balance of power which precipitates may be expected to impact on the dominant class which exercises power within the rural communities’ (Sobhan, 1993: pp.13). It is therefore to expect that the dominant classes are reluctant to implement a fundamental reform. It would imply a
10 The World Bank, and more IFIs such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) are actively involved in social engineering programs.
37 loss of power and control over agriculture; consequently a loss of financial flows as the profits would probably be distributed more equally. In feudal agricultural systems the sector is often unified to a large extent; the agricultural production is stipulated from above and heavily controlled. In the FSU the concepts of ownership and property rights were in the past basically only referring to the state. In many Asian countries capitalism has evolved without complete replacing feudalism. In those countries agrarian reform has not eradicated the unequal structures within society: the power balances remained unchanged and the dominant classes of society still hold power (Sobhan, 1997). This takes place when reform is implemented from above without entitling genuine rights to the rural population. The structure or mode of farming can be changed while the rural population remains subject to strict orders. Yet when power is transferred downwards, farmers can perceive freedom to innovate and diversify their practices. Cropping patterns can change and farmers can expand or decrease their farm and look for different modes of farming.
4.3 A conclusion of this chapter
From the description in this chapter it follows that transition processes and agricultural reform are multidimensional; in orders to succeed they require a holistic approach from different actors of society. Between and within countries, agricultural reform leads to different types of governance, land ownership and land use. Some governments have chosen to provide only usufruct rights whilst others have entitled private property rights to the rural population; sometimes it is based on share distribution, in other cases physical plot distribution. . Now the common characteristics and elements of transition and agrarian reform have been described this allows for a further investigation of the processes that have taken place in Uzbekistan. As is articulated there is no blue print for reform and outcomes are diverging all over the world.
38 5. AGRICULTURE IN UZBEKISTAN
This chapter consists of a number of sub-paragraphs about the situation of the agricultural sector in Uzbekistan. Although it might appear as a continuous amounting stream of information, the procedures that are described are of importance to understand the later findings described in Chapter 6. This chapter starts with a short description of the historical background of agriculture, with a follow up of the transition process and agrarian reform. As most important then the agricultural sector is portrayed.
5.1 The situation through the 20 th century
Today’s agriculture has inherited many practices from the Soviet period; although it might be phrased different: ‘many practices have retained after independence’, with the intensive production of cotton as the most important practice. Initially in the early 1920s, the Soviet regime promoted individual farming by the distribution of land to peasant families with the right of long-term and inheritable land lease and despite the high productivity of these farms (cotton yields doubled within two years), a rapid transformation was implemented again (Tarr et al., 2005). Stalin urged to transform the peasant farms into collectives; peasant farmers could no longer possess economic rights. Strictly state controlled large scale collective farms employed large numbers of workers which was implemented in the entire USSR. The sovkhozy and kolkhozy obtained the majority of agricultural land. Sovkhozy were solely owned by the state and were financed directly from the state budget. The entire production was acquired by the state. The kolkhozy were large scale collectives of non-governmental nature yet this apparent independence did not free the kolkhozy from governmental intervening. These farms possessed de jure the right to independently decide about their sales and marketing, but de facto the state stipulated their possibilities by controlling over input and credit resources. Nevertheless the rural population was allowed to preserve the household plot that was mainly oriented at subsistence farming and served as a food security net. The collectivisation of agriculture was accompanied by a dramatic decline of crop diversity. It resulted in the ‘omni-presence’ of the cotton crop (Spoor, 2006). The reduced cotton import from the USA led to a shortfall in cotton and the Soviet rulers decided that Uzbekistan should become the domestic supplier of cotton for the union. The cotton policy was implemented in 1935. The raw cotton was exported to other parts of the Union where the processing took place for mainly the military and textile industry. The production was enforced and stimulated by high price incentives which were raised to a third above the international prices, while for wheat and meat the average procurement prices were much lower. Whereas in other parts of the USSR collectivisation was an institutional vehicle for extracting agricultural resources, cotton was granted extraordinarily favourable terms by means of these price incentives in comparison to other agricultural products of the Soviet agriculture (Kahn, 2005). The predominance of cotton resulted in major shifts in land use and an increase in demand for rural employment. The favourable procurement pricing implemented by the central regime, which benefited the cotton production not at least, slowly declined in the 1950s, but in later years the price-cost ration for cotton was enhanced again in order to stimulate the production (Kahn, 2005). The production of the crop maintained its priority given that the self- sufficiency in cotton had to be ensured. Among the other Soviet republics Uzbekistan was one of the prominent states in economic performance, above all built upon the agricultural (cotton) sector. Compared to the situation in Kyrgyzstan where the cash crop was not grown to the large extent, Uzbekistan was a rather wealthy republic 11 . It resulted in an unusual pattern of economic growth; the living standards in the rural areas rose considerably and a relatively low urban-rural income differential which weakened the incentive to emigrate to the urban areas (Kahn, 2005). After the 1980s the export and production of cotton declined but in Uzbekistan this was only modest (Karaev, 2002). Eventually Uzbekistan took care of 90% of the cotton produced of the entire USSR.
11 Personal communications, Kirsten Kienzler (Ph.D. candidate ZEF, Bonn), 15/02/2007
39 5.1.1 The transition process in Uzbekistan The transition process in Uzbekistan was initiated in 1991 directly after independence. The Soviet regime was replaced by a national government with the president as the only political principal. The government can be described as authoritarian ruled by the president Islam Karimov, who was elected in 1991. The lower levels of authority hold only marginal power. From the national to the local level of government the president has the exclusive right to appoint, monitor and dismiss the prime minister, ministers, and diplomats; establish or dissolve ministries, agencies and organisations and the president can suspend and repeal acts of the hokim (Pashkun, 2003). It can be said that the transition towards a pluralistic democratic society has not developed. In general the Republic of Uzbekistan is described as a fragile 12 autocratic state yet in a rather stable situation. Within fragile autocratic states the state government possesses a dominant role but it is functioning inadequate. The government is not capable to act, as is denoted with Western terms, as a ‘functioning statehood’: the political control over power and the judiciary system are insufficient, in reality sometimes even non-existent and the government is failing to protect its citizens against violence (Poos, 2007). The formal government is not responsive to the needs of the population. One of the core factors that constrain changes is that many principals of the former Soviet system have not been replaced. They have achieved high positions within the current governmental system. Although decentralisation of power has taken place to some extent the national government is still dominating all levels of authority. But yet in such a country self-governance systems and social networks are granted an important role in daily life. The functional deficiencies of a highly centralised political system that already existed in the last Soviet years have caused the emergence of parallel (informal) political structures, social networks as a kind of compensatory social insurance. After independence important public services (further) demised and this has called for a peripheral system that is characterised by independent action from society. Some degree of decentralisation was implemented with the implementation of the law ‘On Citizens’ Self-governing Bodies’ in 1993 (with an amendment in 1999). The mahalla, the lowest administrative unit became the primary official unit engaged in local self-government, covering 150 to 1500 families (average 2000 residents) (Pashkun, 2003). It was transformed into a level of formal state government. The implementation of the law implied a decline in autonomy of the mahallas. The government made the mahallas the primary source of social services that nowadays supersedes the state in providing public services Poos, 2007 . Different kinds of local-self governance existed already for years in the rural areas, but with the adoption of this law self-governing bodies also had to be established in urban neighbourhoods. The implementation of the official mahalla system should encourage citizen participation and should demonstrate the government’s aim of decentralisation of power and a transfer of state functions. The mahallas have been endowed with several rights concerning environmental protection and monitoring and enforce control over land use (stated although ‘within their competence’). The government has also appointed nature protection societies, scientific societies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to monitor land use practices within their local surrounding. Yet the purpose of these decentralisation measures can be questioned; it has strengthened and eased the control of the formal government on the local level and not less important the control on the agricultural sector. As such it can be understood as a concealed state intervention in local self- governance (Sievers, 2002). t has become increasingly difficult to make a clear distinction between state government and community governance. Nevertheless it is observed that many people make a distinction between the administrative and the social mahalla (Sievers, 2002). According to Poos (2007) the extended family-unit, the social mahalla and the administrative mahalla form the most important ‘risk-spreading’ institutions nowadays (Poos, 2007). The majority of the Uzbek population seems (still) not able and accustomed to be active participating in society, with the stress upon the difficulty to be indeed active. NGOs are facing severe constraints as they are considered by the
12 Different International agencies use different terms to describe ‘fragile’ states: the World Bank describes fragile states as ‘LICUS’ (Low Income Countries under Stress), countries that have very weak policies, institutions and governance. The OECD uses the expression of ‘difficult partnership’. Other comparable terms are ‘poor performers’ as the opposite of states executing ‘good state performance’ reflecting the Western idea of a functioning statehood. The Republic of Uzbekistan is considered by all of these agencies as a ‘fragile’ state. (see: Francois/Sud 2006 in Poos, 2007)
40 government as a threat to the current system, moreover elections and political parties are quite cosmetic 13 . Transition of the economy was constrained in the first years after independence due to an economic collapse, which occurred in almost all the FSUs. Although there are still a large number of state companies to day, the private sector is emerging. Modernisation of urban areas is taking place, such as the surrounding and city of Tashkent. International trade has developed despite the current frictions. Nonetheless, in particular in the most important sectors like energy and agriculture the state upholds its powerful position.
5.1.2 The agrarian reform Despite a worsening economy after independence, the agricultural sector continued its performance and the rate of decline of the sector was much lower than that of other sectors of industry. The agricultural sector formed the backbone of the Uzbek economy and the transition process benefited from earnings derived by the production of cotton. This reinforced the national importance of agriculture; logically the strategies of reform were strongly influenced by the cotton sector (Karaev, 2002). The process is often described as based on ‘trial-and-error’ policies inspired by various developments in surrounding countries; some with a comparable background but also China and Vietnam. In addition the pressure of Western consultants has influenced the agrarian reform. After independence the shift towards a more diversified agricultural sector was urgently needed, as the former system was dominantly determined by the growing of cotton. The interrelated trading links with other republics implied the demise of the exchange of agricultural crops, primarily food crops. Thus it was evident that the Uzbek farming sector had to diversify in order to satisfy the food demands of the increasing population. From the start of reform it has been concentrated upon the abolishment of loss-making shirkats; decollectivisation and individualisation of farming were enforced. The process of agrarian reform has been completely stipulated by the state. Until now the agricultural transition is characterised by state control and is fundamentally a top-down process legislated from above. These structures and patterns seem to have remained over the years. It is even argued that the reform of agriculture has resulted in re-regulating rather than de-regulating: the position of the state is in some aspects exacerbated compared to the situation before independence. Nonetheless the social impacts have been quite substantial; the promotion of private farming has resulted in rural unemployment which is considered to be the consequence of the elimination of concealed unemployment that the collective mode of agriculture was made to carry (Kahn, 2005) 14 .
The process of agrarian reform from the initiation in 199 until now can be divided into three phases: a. 1991-1998; b. 1998-2003; and c. 2003 till the present.
a. The first phase, 1991-1998 In 1991 when the first collectives had to reorganise Uzbekistan counted 1052 sovkhozy and 971 kolkhozy. In 1992 the first ‘Law on Peasant Farms’ was adopted as a vehicle to institute the reform of the agricultural sector. The ‘ijara contract’ was being introduced: a private long- term leasehold on collective plots of land. This was a contract between a so-called ‘fermer’ and the collective farm or hokim of the rayon (Tursonova et al., forthcoming). The state stipulated practically all the farm practices. Under state order the fermers were compelled to produce the strategic crops cotton and wheat and to sell the harvest to state-owned cotton gins and wheat plants against fixed low procurement prices. Government programs came into being directed towards the facilitation of an efficient commercial sector. Mini-banks, trade networks for selling fuel, lubricants, fertilizers and pesticides and alternative Machine Tractor Parks (MTPs) (outside of those that existed already for years on large-scale farms) were
13 It must be noticed that real autonomous NGOs hardly exist in Uzbekistan. The government has established so called ‘QuaNGOs’ (quasi NGOs) that act like NGOs but that are constraining the work of ‘real’ NGOs. Most NGOs are perceived as a threat to the suppressed political situation as they can mobilise people. 14 For further reading: Kahn (2005) ‘Land system, agriculture and poverty in Uzbekistan’.
41 established that should serve fermers to build up their farm. Nevertheless these mechanisms were organised without fermers’ participation; the facilities were all coordinated by state authorities. The provisions enabled individuals to establish a (small) commercial farm though with severe restrictions. The land remained state-owned, fermers were thoroughly monitored and in case the fermers could not comply the production plans or the commercial farm turned into a loss-making entity the land was withdrawn from the leaseholder. Already during the Soviet period the most rural households were endowed a small household plot in addition to their home garden (of 0.12 ha), as a kind of insurance for the satisfaction of basic food needs. The economic hardship on the population had to be reduced (Kahn, 2003). In 1993 a large number of the sovkhozy were dissolved and transformed mainly into other collective structures and some smaller farms; they were considered to operate very inefficient. Nevertheless a more important reason for the conversion was that it should relieve the state budget (Kahn, 2005). Through the years various initiatives were taken to stimulate private farming and apparently the autonomy of fermers should increase. The ‘Law on Land’, the ‘Law on Cooperation’ the ‘Law on Lease’ and the ‘Law on Dehkan Business Entities’ were created. Together the new legislation should enhance the formation of a multiform agricultural structure and economy (CER, 2005a). Land endowment for households began to increase resulting in a rise in the number of dehkan farms. Many of the first dehkan farmers were former workers of the kolkhozy, the ex-kolkhozniks. The kolkhozy were transformed into shirkats with shareholders and some started to (re)distribute parts of their land to enable the set up of new commercial farms. Most important impact on the land allocation in this phase was the elimination of the monopoly position of cotton. The newly implemented policy to achieve self-sufficiency in wheat directed fermers and shirkats to expand their wheat production. Consequently the area under wheat cultivation increased by more than 200% (UNECE, 2001). Comparable to the cotton and wheat quotas, fermers within particular rayons were directed to production other crops which previously did not satisfy consumption requirements, in order to decrease the need of food imports. The state order system stabilised the output nonetheless with a decline in freedom of fermers. In order to improve the food security of households, the maximum size of the tamorka was expanded from 0.12 to 0.25 hectares. Most of the reforms on farm organisations that were implemented in the first phase were cosmetic and only of formal nature. Many elements of the old system had retained and the system of state procurement of crops at very low prices was continued. The old system of management continued: brigades as production units cultivated the land and the staff remained in place (Tursonova et al., forthcoming). There was a lack of stimuli for especially the transformed collectives to enhance their efficiency and many workers and leaders lacked knowledge on new legislation and forms of organisation. Ownership of land was unclear. A decree in March 1997 enabled private fermers to possess an independent juridical status by separation from shirkats. The decree made it possible for them to enter into transactions with suppliers and buyers independently of shirkats. Nevertheless, all the setbacks called for a more comprehensive and better grounded reform. Partial changes had appeared to be inappropriate; the government should have taken all the aspects into consideration, economic, organisational and legal. Social and environmental elements were ignored. b. The second phase, 1998-2003 The second period started with adjustment, revision and implementation of legislation: the ‘Land Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan’ (adopted on 30-04-1998), the ‘Law on Agricultural Cooperatives’ (Shirkats) (adopted on 30-04-1998), the ‘Law on Farming Enterprises’ (adopted on 30-04-1998) and the ‘Law on Dehkan Business Entities’. The ‘Law on State Land Cadastre was’ adopted on 01-08-1998. The Land Code provides the overall legislation relating to land use. According to the Code there are three main legal types of agricultural producers, namely shirkats, farms and dehkan farmers. It draws a clear distinction between commercial and dehkan farms (Winrock Int., 2005). Through the years the number of dehkan farmers increased but in the first years their establishment needed approval by the shirkat and regional administration. The law generated opportunities for more individual engagement in farming. Dehkan farmers could gain a share in a shirkat which gave them the right to receive a part of the earnings. Remarkably the Land Code stated that shirkats should become the most
42 efficient organisational and legal mode of agricultural enterprises. The partial transfer of responsibility should create a stable individual responsibility for land and as such enhance the efficiency and overall output of the shirkat. Workers and shareholders managed and organised part of the production process while the shirkat provided the most important services and took care of the inputs. The individual workers earned a share of the revenues. The majority of shirkats turned out to be unable to pay dividend to the members. Pudrats and individuals were enabled to lease or work a part of the shirkat land on the basis of a sharecropping arrangement. These units replaced the brigades of the former kolkhozy. Starting with the most successful ones, by 2002 nearly 90% of the former collectives had been transformed into shirkats. Unprofitable collectives were given a period of two years to enhance their capacity and to restore the functioning of the farm. Those that failed to enhance the efficiency were again dissolved and the land became open for tender 15 for individual fermers. In some oblasts the authorities – the hokimiyats – proposed to transform all the shirkats into individual farms which was accepted by the national government. c. The third phase: 2003 till the present With the ‘Decree of Agricultural Reform’ in October 2003 the third phase commenced. This decree appointed the private farm the principal form of agricultural enterprise for the future. Consequently the ‘Concept of Farm Development for 2004-2006’ was presented in which the development of individual farms was being prioritised (CER, 2005a). By 2004 the state had almost completely withdrawn from ownership of the agricultural sector as the numbers of table 5.1 indicate. Nearly complete non-governmental agricultural production was achieved, with only 1% of the farming sector remaining under state ownership. Nevertheless the strictly controlled system has remained with the argument to achieve the objective to create an efficient well-functioning agricultural sector. Assumingly aspects as personal interests, power and financial flows are underlying reasons. Yearly approximately 1% of commercial farms is being liquidated, mainly due to a lack of profitability. It is questionable whether the governmental control over cropping decisions and in- and output has indeed declined; many mechanisms have remain in place or the strict procedures are continued by local authorities (ADB, 2004). Considering that all the shirkats should be dissolved by the end of 2006, the three-tired system of the last decade will evolve into a structure of bi-modal nature of private and dehkan farms.
Year Kolkhozy/Shirkats Sovkhozy Fermers Dehkan Others Farmers 1990 34.9 58.7 - 0.1 6.3 1994 75.3 1.0 - 2.1 21.6 2004 48.6 - 34.5 10.4 6.5 Source: State Committee on Statistics Table 5.1 Distribution of Sown Land among different Types of Farms (source: Khan, 2005)
The overwhelming majority of households has a small holding whereas on the other hand there is a minority of fermers that is endowed with a landholding averaging 200 times or more of the holding size of the masses (Kahn, 2005). During this research the three-tired system of shirkats, commercial individual farms and dehkan farms was still in place. The different types of farms that co-exist differ in land use practices, management structure and relationship with authorities (Kahn, 2005), are the following;
Private commercial farms ; nowadays the majority of agricultural land is occupied by the individual farms. It must be noted that the term ‘private’ is rather spurious since the land remains under state ownership; only lease holding is possible (Spoor, 2006). Newly started fermers receive a two-year credit and are exempted from land tax; enterprises in distress receive financial support. Every person or organisation that establishes a farm should be officially registered at the local authorities. After registration of the farm at the oblast
15 The tender procedure is explained in chapter 5.2.2.
43 hokimiyat the farm has acquired the status of a legal person. The single form of tenure structure of individual farms is the leasehold structure. The leasehold of land is allocated through a tendering process 16 . For farms specialised in crop production – primarily cotton and wheat – the minimum size is stipulated on 10 hectare 17 ; 30 heads of animals for livestock farms and for farms specialised in horticulture, viticulture, gardening or vegetable production the minimum size is 1 hectare. (Kahn, 2005). The government has not stipulated an upper size of a farm. Through the years a number of successful fermers have succeeded to expand their farm up to 200 hectares, whereas others have to remain rather small with 30 hectares. Consequently there are large differences between farms and it is expected that the differences will further increase. The actual size of the land that is allocated to the fermer is determined ‘case-by-case’ by the hokim and depends officially upon the number of workers, the equipment and the local environment. In reality it appears often to be related with financial and social capital of a particular fermer. Most fermers wish to create a large farm with expansion in later years. Initially in the first years of reform the starting farms were of relatively small size, between 10 and 20 hectares or even smaller. The average parcel of land distributed to the newly created farms has been rising. Nowadays new fermers can start directly with large farms of over 50 hectares. The number of private farms is growing in combination with an increasing average size of the farms, but it is expected that this process will come to an end after the last shirkats have been converted into commercial farms. After then, further selection and expansion of well-functioning, profitable (as defined by the government) commercial farms could take place. Following Kahn, the current policy of the government is opted to create very large farms again (Kahn, 2005). It is implicitly included in the current agricultural policies. Land scarcity is a major dilemma and with the expected scale enlargements many of the yet created commercial farms will cease to exist again to create space for scale enlargement of others. In many practices fermers are constrained to operate independently; they are discouraged by difficult access to markets, organisations and institutions. All fermers are subject to state procurement quotas, which concerns primarily the production of cotton and wheat. Within a few rayons per oblast, fermers are appointed to produce other crops, and in other places fermers can be contracted individually to produce vegetables or fruits. Nevertheless, the cotton and wheat production dominate all over the country. As a result the cropping patterns are quite standard 18 . Lessees cultivating land within private commercial farms Regularly fermers employ only individual wage workers. There are a number of fermers that rent a part of land to lessees, which are regularly dehkan farmers themselves. There are different kinds of agreements; some fermers rent out their land along the year against a payment, whilst others only rent out land for the second harvest period, covering only three or four months. In general when it concerns a payment construction there are no land use obligations. Regularly lessees decide to grow cash crops, mostly vegetables. Some fermers use pudrat-unit constructions as a kind of sharecroppers. In that case the lessee is subject to production requirements. In general the fermer then decides upon the used inputs; the lessee (or dehkan farmer) is responsible to purchase seeds. Dehkan farms ; the dehkan farm is the smallest of the three different types of farms. By law the dehkan farm is explained as ‘a family small-scale marketable economy producing and selling agricultural products on the basis of personal labour inputs of the family members on the household land lot provided to a head of family into inheritable possession’ (Winrock Int., 2005). Every person (regardless its background, work, family) living in the rural area has the right of a tamorka , a household plot, into inheritable possession for farming with an upper size of 0.35 hectare in irrigated land to 0.5 hectare in non-irrigated (rain-fed) land, whereas in steppe and desert zone the size is up to 1 hectare in rain-fed land. Subsequently this mode of farming encompasses the entire rural population and a substantial part of the urban population.
16 Ibid. 17 For live stock production the minimum size is 0.45 ha per head of cattle on irrigated lands and 2 ha per head of cattle on non-irrigated land. 18 The cropping pattern is discussed in paragraph 5.3.1
44 In addition citizens can acquire the right of inheritable possession of a garden or small tamorka with the size up to 0.06 hectare through a tender procedure 19,20 . In some villages dehkan farmers are enabled to purchase small amounts of land from the kolkhoz or shirkat that redistributed land, others can rent a field from a fermer to raise the income or to have more food for family consumption. Nearly every family cultivates the tamorka with food crops and constitutes as such a dehkan farm, although not all of them are officially registered. The small production is considered by the state to be too marginal to enable the control over these farms. Dehkan farmers have the right to organise their farm production according to their own needs. There are no inspection visits and they hardly have any contact with state officials concerning their land use. Most dehkan farmers have a mixed farming system: they produce vegetables and fruits and breed some cattle. In 2004 it was estimated that the dehkan type of farm possesses 12% of the total sown land (table 5.1) with an average size of 0.1 hectare. Citizens can unite in horticultural and viticulture or gardening partnerships. The land should be used for vegetable production, potato and melons; the minimum size is determined on 0.06 hectare per member of a horticultural and viticulture partnership and 0.08 hectare per member of a gardening partnership (Winrock Int., 2005). Shirkats ; as is described in the previous section the collective farms possessed the largest of total agricultural land in the past. Only shirkats could be endowed land into permanent possession on the condition that it is purposed for agriculture. A shirkat is a group of families or shareholders, and regularly the shirkat employs individual workers and pudrats. The Land Code and the ‘Law on Shirkats’ prescribe the organisational structure, rights, obligations and regulations relating to shirkats. According to the Land Code the shirkat type of organisation is ‘the basic organisational and legal form of agricultural enterprise that is based upon shared participation with the aim to produce marketable agricultural products. Shirkats shall unite members-owners of property shares who personally participate in the production activities, primarily on the basis of the pudrat contract’ (Winrock Int., 2005). Shirkats are obliged to allocate land to their members and workers for family consumption in inheritable ownership with a maximum size of 0.2 hectare of irrigated land and over 50 hectares of non-irrigated land (USAID, 2005). The actual size depends upon a number of factors and is determined by the rais. The rais is although subordinate to the hokim, a powerful person. Workers that have been employed on a shirkat for more than 5 years should receive additional land on the shirkat territory or pasture land for their cattle (USAID, 2005). Shirkats should establish funds for their shares and for the implementation of measures to improve soil fertility and the irrigation systems. Particularly the Land Code denotes the role of shirkats that exceeds that of agricultural producers: the responsibility to develop social and production infrastructure, and solve other general social and economic issues. The rais decides upon the yearly payment of dividend to the shareholders, pudrat members and workers, on the basis of the overall economic performance of the shirkat. The individual workers are appointed to specific tasks like tractor driving; mirabs allocate water to all the shirkat fields in cooperation with the pudrats, which do the main work on the field. Out of one shirkat approximately 30-60 individual farms can be created. Nowadays most shirkats have ceased to exist and it is intended by the government that all shirkats are dismantled by the end of 2006. According to the Center for Economic Research (CER), in line with the Concept for Farm Development in 2004-2006 1020 shirkats should be transformed into individual farms (CER, 2005b). Pudrats A pudrat is a family unit that cultivates a part of shirkat land in a share cropping arrangement. Regularly pudrats have to meet the state procurement quotas at a fraction of the prices received by the shirkat. Each pudrat has an individual agreement, a pudrat contract. The Land Code details the elements that should be included. The pudrat contract is the principal form of
19 The tendering process for dehkan farmers is less comprehensive than that for fermers. It is easier to acquire an additional (small) part of land for family farming. 20 Citizens residing in rural area and having livestock in their possession may be provided with land on a temporary basis for hay and livestock’s grazing (Winrock Int., 2005).
45 on-the-farm organization of production and labour based on personal participation of family members in the production of agricultural production on the shirkat land. The contract is concluded by the shirkat rais and the pudrat leader (in general the head of the family) on an annual base. It must specify the size, the location and the condition of the land with the predetermined type, quantity and quality of crop that should be produced. Moreover the contract should include detailed information on crop rotation, means to improve crop yield and soil fertility; the agreement about sharecropping, the payment conditions and sale of the production; and the schedules for supply and use of irrigation water, inputs and equipment (Winrock Int., 2005). Pudrats are supplied with chemical inputs by the shirkat and seeds have to be purchased by the pudrat family. The contract also specifies the fraction of the revenues that are earned above the quota sales (except cotton) that has to be shared with the shirkat. In general the pudrat is allowed to use a large part of the surpluses for family consumption or sales (Kahn, 2005). In some cases they are allowed to grow a second harvest for household consumption. The payment for labour is determined by the final results provided for by the contract concerned: the quantity, quality and price of the particular production. Pudrats are not subject to a payment for the land provided by the shirkat; the land tax concerned is to be paid by the shirkat. Pudrats are not allowed to transfer their land to third parties.
5.2 The government and governance of the agricultural sector
Agrarian reform cannot occur in a vacuum and has to be accompanied by legal reform. Without reform of property rights and land tenure rules the structure of the agricultural sector cannot be changed; legislation governs the property rights between (state) agencies and actors that lease and use agricultural land. Hence legislation and legal issues are core aspects of land policies established by the government (USAID, 2005). The legislative framework, the government and governance can be regarded as one system. The legalisation is created and supported by the state government through the numerous agencies and organisations. It forms the framework within which the government is working, and within with society is acting and influencing the (state) institutions, as is explained in chapter 2 by the Agri-environmental Scenario. This is the procedure in which a state system should work; in a society that respects democratic principles. From the following sections it becomes clear that the governmental system of Uzbekistan is lacking transparency and arbitrariness is apparent; democratic principles are in some situations hardly in place. This all affects the position of farmers. It could partially be ascribed to the fact that legislation is in hands of only a small number of persons in combination with imprecise legislation that creates leeway for arbitrariness. In general there is a lack of participation of society and political control of power. There are considerable differences between the government and governance of commercial individual farms (of fermers) and shirkats on one side and dehkan farms at the other. Regarding commercial farms and shirkats state bodies from the ministry and their representatives are the principal actors that govern the enterprises. At first sight local self-governance does not play a significant role in fermers’ practices. The general farm patterns, which are described in chapter 5.3 are largely stipulated by formal governmental state agencies. Dehkan farmers are less bound to the formal system of governance. They can act more autonomous within their own networks.
5.2.1 The general legislative framework relating to land use According to the USAID (2005) land tenure reform is only one aspects of overall land reform. Land tenure refers to how rights to land relate to holders of those rights. Overall land reform refers to more aspects than only land use, such as environmental issues and land administration which should be integrated in an overall land policy (USAID, 2005). There are different laws that form the legal foundation of land tenure and that appear contradictive in some aspects. The Constitution, the Civil Code and the Land Code can be regarded as the general legislation related to land use rights. The Uzbek constitution does not specifically prohibit private ownership of land: land is protected by the state but not necessarily exclusive owned by the state. Article 55 states that ‘the land with all its resources should contribute to the national wealth’. Other articles that refer to private ownership do not mention the issue of land and do not make a distinction between moveable and immoveable
46 property. Article 36 states that ‘all have the right to own property’, and according to article 53 ‘private property is inviolable and protected by the government’ (USAID, 2005). The subordinate legislation is composed of the Civil Code and the Land Code. The Land Code is considered to be the principal legal basis governing land policy and tenure (USAID, 2005). It provides a number of articles that specify the structure of farming and separate aspects of the agricultural sector. It states provisions to control political power of the government as to protect fermers’ and dehkan farmers’ rights. The Land Code includes the principles of land consolidation; land monitoring; the establishment of nature-agricultural areas; categories of land plots and state control over land use and protection. The Civil Code does not outlaw private ownership, private and state ownership are both allowed, whereas the Land Code clearly states that all land belongs to the government. Initially both the Civil Code and the Land Code stated that agricultural land for establishing a large scale, marketable production (for raw cotton and wheat production) was to be provided solely to shirkats 21 . Today the Land Code refers to ‘land’ as a national asset; there are three main legal types of agricultural producers, i.e. shirkats, private farms and dehkan farmers. Land for other farming purposes (melon, potato, horticulture production and needs for livestock production) can be leased by (other) juridical and natural persons for temporary possession and to citizens for family consumption. Arable land, hey land, pastures, reserve land and land occupied by perennial plants such as orchards, vineyards, mulberry, fruits, and berries are all classified as agricultural land. The Land Code categories four forms of property rights: permanent collective possession, permanent use, temporary use (3 to 10 years) and lease. Juridical or natural persons cannot own the subsoil of their land; neither can they acquire ownership over the atmosphere. Therefore terms like ‘private’ and ‘property’ are rather confusing. It can be concluded that the majority of the rights concerned with land are merely usufruct rights. Land is state owned and cannot be sold. All water, including water ways that traverses the land is owned by the state. Land users (i.e. fermers) have the right to obtain water for irrigation of agricultural crops and plants and other purposes from the sources of irrigation according to limits on water use. It is one of the arguments from the government against privatisation as private ownership would interfere with the public access to water. All land users are permitted to use land independently, nevertheless in compliance with its target purpose that is stipulated by the state. They are allowed to lease their land to lessees which can be individuals or families. Land users have ownership over the agricultural crops and plants, the production and the attached profits and sales; nonetheless in reality fermers hardly can sell their cotton harvests beyond state companies, which purchase products against low procurement prices. According to law they can use the natural resources that are required for the farm activities, as well as to exploit other useful land properties. State intervention or intervention from third parties on the farm is prohibited and damages, including loss of profit, caused to the farm as a result of illegitimate decisions of the state or any other body should be compensated. On the other hand many articles underline that land use may be subject to additional obligations in accordance with legislation. The Land Code should safeguard appropriate, rational land use as is stipulated by the government. The importance of rational land use is stressed in a number of articles but remarkably it is not explained into detail. The concept remains rather vague. In general the Land Code creates the assumption that agricultural producers possess decision-making power over their production and can develop the farm according to their own needs. Yet the stated rights of fermers appear often more as rewritten obligations 22 . Article 39 states that a land user has the right to ‘to use the land lot independently in compliance with its target purpose’ which could be understood as a concealed way of controlling farm practices. Non-agricultural enterprises can be given land into permanent possession for household farming for employees and food supply for public institutes such as hospitals and schools. The oblast hokim has the exclusive right to endow land to persons or organisations and at the other hand to withdraw land from land users. Every person that is given agricultural land with the right of inheritable possession is compelled to use it within one year after formal registration. All land owners are charged a land tax for
21 With reference to chapter 5.1.2: In the second phase of reform the shirkat form of agricultural organisation should become the most efficient organisational and legal mode of agricultural enterprises. 22 The USAID states in its final report on land reform assessment: ‘the rights associated with land appear to be distorted to accommodate the cotton and wheat industry and to maintain government control over one of the main production elements of the national economy’ (USAID, 2005, pp. iii).
47 the rental of land and must submit the required data on their land use practices regularly to the local authorities. Families can be exempted from payment in case of disabled or elderly family members. Agricultural land is protected in a special way; irrigated land can be used for agricultural purposes only. The regime for use and protection of the land that is granted to agricultural producers consists of several regulations about rehabilitation of soils, measures that should be undertaken against soil erosion and regulations to remove and relay soil in cases of mineral use and to increase soil fertility. (UNECE, 2001). The Land Code numbers a variety of economic incentives that are implemented by the government to encourage rational land use, such as tax advantages and assistance in improving economic and appropriate farming. Persons can be accused for a number of peculiar activities. Every land user is compelled to implement obligatory measures against water and wind erosion and to improve the soil fertility. Land users that cultivate land deviating from the directed purpose or users that exceed the term of lease are warned or banned from the land, and even so those that do not undertake measures to fight weeds and pests. The perpetrator of damages is compelled to full indemnification if damage is identified.
5.2.2 The role of the hokim The hokimiyat is the executive branch of local governments. The hokimiyat is headed by the hokim. The oblast hokim is appointed directly by the president and subordinate hokims are appointed by their superiors. Hokims are regularly appointed for a period of 2 or 3 years. They have (the sole) decision- making power on in particular the distribution of land. The rayon and oblast administrations are both responsible for various tasks relating to land use with the primary tasks for the oblast hokimiyat. At oblast level, the water fund is managed, the restructuring of shirkats is directed and the land cadastre is administered. The oblast hokim is entitled to grant every citizen a tamorka. The actual size of the tamorka is determined by the hokim and depends upon the availability of land resources and the family performance on shirkats and other agricultural ‘enterprises’ which is reported to the hokim. In previous years the hokim was also responsible to grant land to shirkats and nowadays the hokim grants land (land previously belonging to a shirkat, or ‘land in reserve’) to juridical or natural persons. This takes place after a tendering process that is executed by an area land granting commission. The allocation of land to fermers, and at the other hand the termination of possession or leasehold of land is solely in hands of the hokim. In some situations the rais of the (former) shirkat is consulted. In agreement with the contracts the actual compliance of fermers is controlled by the oblast hokim that has the sole responsibility for the fulfilment of the contract requirements. The hokim is personally accountable for the functioning of fermers. This interdependent relationship between the hokim and the fermers makes the hokim’s position quite crucial. In English term ‘tender’ is explained as a competitive bid in monetary terms, therefore this translation is somewhat odd. The original word used in Uzbek is ‘tanlov’ which should be translated literally into ‘selection’ or ‘contest’ which is officially open to (former) shirkat members and outsiders. In Uzbekistan the land is not being sold to the highest bidder or to the one who is willing to pay the highest rent (land tax, which is periodically fixed by the government) (Kahn, 2005). Although the likelihood for ‘winning’ should be equal for all participants, the application gives means to select the most appropriate farmers. It is an instrument of administrative decision-making which creates the assumption that the yet powerful fermers with status and connections (that appear to be crucial) will be able to establish or expand the farm (Kahn, 2005). After payment of a registration fee the procedure of registration follows, of which the elements are summarized in the table below. The registration should enclose personal information about the head of the farm, the number of employees and a business plan that clarifies the concrete farm practices: detailed information on the type of the activity, structure and size of the production according to its specialization that is stipulated in the Farm Charter. The lease contract must be included and a detailed description of the land (the category of land, the purpose of the use, types of arable land, boundaries, and a register number). The different components are graded and candidates with the highest ‘score’ are perceived to be the most appropriate ones to become fermers. In reality the procedure appears often to be obscure. The fermers that were included in this research described this procedure in several (vague) ways; the principles are not completely clear. The (local) authorities have the right of refusal if the registration is incomplete.
48
1. Apply to the shirkat and hokim for permission; 2. Prepare a business plan; 3. Receive permission from the shirkat commission for land use, as well as the general meeting of the shirkat; 4. Receive a certificate from the rural soviet concerning place of residence and composition of the private household; 5. Receive permission from the hokimiyat commission for land allocation; 6. Agreement between the farmer and the shirkat on land allocation; 7. Creation of a map indicating the boundaries of the private farm; 8. Preparation of stature for the private farm; 9. Obtaining stamps for all the documentation; 10. Presentation of all of the aforementioned documents to the district commission for land allocation for final decision of the hokimiyat, followed by signature of the hokim.
Figure 5.1 Registration Procedure for Fermers (source: Thurman et al., 2001 )
The lease contract is concluded by the rayon’s hokim and the fermer. The minimum leasehold is 10 years with a maximum of 50 years. In general the term of lease is determined on 50 years. Nevertheless some fermers are contracted for a shorter period despite their willingness to have a 50- years leasehold period. It is decided upon by the hokim and the actual reason why remains (sometimes) vague and unclear. Although the main elements of the leasehold contract are equal, there is no standardised model. The contracts appear often to be rather arbitrary, shaped by the interests of the hokim (USAID, 2005). The rights of leasehold are not inheritable which is for some fermers a reason to take the lease under name of the son to enable the son to continue farming in later years (USAID, 2005).
‘My lease contract is 30 years. Why? Well, I don’t know, but for the coming tender I will opt for 50 years and I want to expand my farm. I have already selected the land I would like to have and I know its bonitation rate. I think I am a good candidate to win the tender, the farm is functioning well and I have completed the plans year by year.’
(Interview fermer Zoyirkhon, Ozbekistan 18/10/2006)
Before land is allocated to a person or organisation the actual area should be plotted on a ‘land layout’. This concerns a topographical layout of the land that provides detailed information on the relief of the land, its boundaries and recent data about the condition of the land. A layout of a farm is depicted in chapter 6. The layout must be included in the registration for lease hold or other land use. It eases the state monitoring of the condition of the land and the land user’s performance. If the government regards the specific land necessary for other purposes the lease contract can be withdrawn. The reasons of termination are numerous: voluntary rejection of the lease right; bankruptcy or structural debts to suppliers or non-payment of the land tax; the death of the farm head and absence of a successor; land legislation violation including use of land that is not conform the stipulated purposes – sowing other crops then appointed by the contracting agreement – or non-use of agricultural land for one year; and irrational land use that degrades the soil fertility and overall condition of the environment. Irrational land use results in yields lower than the norm; fermers that are confronted with lower yields must have fundamental arguments which can explain the cause(s).
49 5.2.3 Local (self) governance Local self-governments and social relationships play an important role in daily life in communities. Community traditions, the local culture and norms and values are strongly related to life in the kishlaks and mahallas and these units play an import role in safeguarding local institutions. In the rural areas kishlaks and auls, which are villages, and mahallas, the residential neighbourhoods, possess a more dominant position compared to the situation in the urban areas. The mahalla overlaps with kinship and social networks (Sievers, 2002). There has always been a co-existence and interface of state and community authorities, rules and norms. The existence of large scale farms greatly influenced daily life in the rural areas through the years. The interrelationships between the collective farms, private and dehkan farmers did not only regulate agricultural practices but was also of importance for the functioning of the community and for social services and security. Different types of self-governance exist already for years, developed rather autonomous and incorporated in daily life in the community, mixed up with the official state system. Although the Soviet regime aimed to abandon nomadic life, customary law and religion, it did not abolish the mahallas; these became incorporated into the Soviet system of organisation. In the last Soviet years and from the beginning of independence the insufficient social security system of the state created insurance needs that reinvigorated the (informal) mahalla. The liquidation of collective farms has implied a shift in roles and responsibility within the mahallas. Many mahallas encompassed one large scale farm and as such formed a closed community. Schools, parental care and other public services were largely supported by the collective. Most community members were employed by the collective. Workers from the collective used the collective’s equipment for the tamorka although the equipment was not always suitable for cultivation of the small plots. But still, internal relationships form strong social networks in the mahallas. Households exchange knowledge on farming their tamorkas, seeds and other inputs. The importance of peripheral systems in autocratic states is already emphasized; peripheral systems intermix with or replace formal rules and systems, in particular when formal institutions have appeared to be ineffective or non-existent. The non-existence of appropriate purchasing potentials and education for (alternative ways of) farming result in the development of informal networks in which knowledge and other resources are transferred and exchanged. Transactions concern commodities and non-commodities. An example of a complex socio-technical network is provided in Appendix D (Jozan et al., 2005). It pictures the resources and needs of the different agricultural producers, and transactions that take place between them as to acquire the needs and exchange the resources. In particular dehkan farmers rely upon the relationships with other community members. The kinds of exchanges are quite essential, without it the dehkans would not have been able to cultivate additional land or to acquire inputs, since the state does not allocate additional land to dehkan farmers and does not supply them with farm inputs, and the costs to purchase inputs are rather high. In order to obtain the needs they work on the collective (shirkat) or for a fermer, and they share seeds and experiences. Often they can acquire farm inputs from fermers or shirkats. But also many fermers cooperate with each other by sharing machinery and other inputs, and exchanging knowledge. The transactions between fermers and shirkats are for example advice, transfer of knowledge and sharing of equipment. This particular combination of socio-technical networks shows that there are important interdependent relationships between Uzbek farmers. They are not solely and always driven by direct interests, for many fermers and dehkan farmers it is important to build capacity and social capital for the community and for the well-being of the own family. The networks often provide alternative arrangements for payment, sometimes even without immediate reciprocity.
5.2.4 The Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (MAWR) Common farm practices are all regulated and supervised by officials from the MAWR at different levels of the state administration. The MAWR itself is composed of the minister of Agriculture and Water Resources (MAWR), the consultant for agriculture and two committees: the State Committee for Land Resources (Goskomzem) and the State Committee for Nature Protection (Goskompriroda). The consultant of the MAWR advises the president and the cabinet on all issues related to agriculture. This person is also seating in the Cabinet. The Ministry has delegated the responsibility and work on different themes to various departments. In addition to the departments, numerous agricultural state organisations but also quasi non-governmental organisations are under responsibility of the MAWR as is shown in Appendix B.
50 Appendix C provides a clear overview of the governance structure of the agricultural sector. Agricultural policies are determined by the Cabinet of Ministers and are implemented by lower levels of government. This concerns first of all the yearly national quotas for cotton and wheat. The national government as headed by the president stipulates these quotas. The quota for cotton is determined by the share of contribution to the economy; the quantity of wheat is in conformation with the self- sufficiency policy in wheat calculated upon the consumptive need of the entire Uzbek population. The decrees are channelled down by the MAWR to lower levels of authority. The Agroproms are the responsible organisations for the fulfilment of the state orders for cotton and wheat. Agroprom can be regarded as the MAWR on lower level of authority. The different departments of the MAWR are represented in each oblast and rayon and are working under Agroprom, such as the Department for Crop Protection that largely determines which chemical inputs are supplied for the state production of crops. The cropping plans per oblast are based upon past experiences and the expected water availability for the coming year and are set by the MAWR. The oblast Agroproms determine the quotas for the separate rayons, following the Agroprom at rayon level determines the orders for the (former) shirkat units; the orders for fermers are channelled through the state owned Machine Tractor Parks (MTPs) (Wegerich, 2006). For each individual farm the cropping plan is determined, which is the base for the calculation of the needed farm inputs. In 2005 the MAWR established Agrofirms. According to an official from the Āallachilik Instituti the Agrofirms have been established by the need to secure a diversified food production; every Agrofirm should constitute (by the purchasing of crops) the diversified production of a former sovkhoz (Interview Āallachilik Ilmiy Tadqiqot Instituti’, Saidovul 29/09/06). Remarkably the majority of purchased vegetables by the Agrofirms is being processed or exported. The Agrofirms conclude individual contracts with fermers directly on food crops such as rice, fruits and vegetables. The Agroproms and Agrofirms are both organised according to administrative boundaries. The quotas per fermer are first of all based upon the bonitation rate of the farm fields and other technological criteria 23 . The bonitation rate is estimated once in three years 24,25 . In former times when the sovkhozy and kolkhozy dominated the rural areas these large-scale farms employed a complete staff of agricultural experts and they were provided with predetermined input supply by the state and equipped with all the required agricultural machinery, assembled in Machine Tractor Parks (MTPs). After abolishment of these types of farms the government has taken over the role of the staff in order to secure the vested interests and to maintain control over individual farming (see Appendix A; Appendix F (Trevisani, 2005)). State monopoly positions have been created for the supply of gas, chemical inputs 26 and agricultural machinery. The state-owned MTPs and the Water Use Associations (WUAs) are organised according to the former shirkat units. From the local MTPs fermers can lease equipment and machinery but they have a more important role in channelling through state orders (Wegerich, 2006). Mirabs, agronomists (‘agronoms’) and several other agricultural staff that is employed by the Agroproms, Agrofirms and WUAs regularly consult and advise the individual fermers. They form part of the channel through which state orders boil down to the farm level. State research institutes assess the fermers’ performance and they supply the calculate farm inputs and other needs. An overview of the farm level organisation of production and the distribution channel is given in Appendix C (Trevisani, 2005). The supply of cotton and wheat seeds for the planned production is organised and distributed by the Agroproms. In cooperation with research institutes and certified fermers the specific wheat seeds per rayon are being determined, selected and prepared (Interview Āallachilik Ilmiy Tadqiqot Instituti’, Saidovul 29/09/06) 27 . For the financial exchanges of state orders the PahktaBank (for cotton) and the GallaBank (for wheat) are set up . Although these banks are commercial they are under complete state control and function as a
23 According to previously executed research by Wall (2006), the required data is in reality often outdated or unavailable. This creates scope for negotiation if production orders are not met. Likewise those with political power or social and financial capital achieve to avoid punishment or sanctions (Wall, 2006). 24 This is the frequency stipulated by law. Most fermers interviewed did not know the official frequency and gave diverging time periods (1 – 5 years). Anyhow it gives the impression that it is not executed strictly by the frequency stipulated by law. 25 The bonitation rate is described in chapter 5.2.4.2. 26 The determination and distribution of chemical inputs is explained in chapter 5.3.3. 27 The supply of seeds is not explained into detail here, see chapter 5.3.2.
51 monitoring system (Karaev, 2002). All monetary exchanges associated with state orders take place by means of the fermers’ accounts; the land tax, the costs of the inputs are automatically deducted from the bank and the payment for the harvest is paid on the bank account. This implies that fermers do not have real access to their account (Wegerich, 2006). It increases the chance that fermers are working while the financial capital is decreasing; fermers can be loss-making without knowing it. Exchanges not concerned with state production take place in cash which is preferred by fermers. Payment in cash makes visible what is exchanged against what prices. Dehkan farmers normally do not have a bank account.
BOX 1. The yearly mobilisation for the cotton campaign...
For 2006 the total production of cotton in Uzbekistan amounted to 1.6 million metric tons. With th * this amount Uzbekistan ranked at the 6 place of cotton producing countries for 2006 (USDA, 2007). The production of cotton cannot take place without the yearly mobilisation of a mass of Uzbeks, beyond farmers and agricultural and governmental organisations. The cotton campaign is coordinated by the Minister of Agriculture. The sowing of cotton takes place in May. Preceding the sowing period fermers and shirkats have received the production orders and should be provided with the required inputs: seeds, fertilizers, furthermore they must be equipped by machinery. Partially depending on the rayon, around the first days of October the harvesting period of cotton starts. This is really a big event. Masses of people are mobilised for the manual picking which is mostly done by women, children and students. It is astonishing to see numbers of busses travelling to the rural areas filled with students that are forced to work ‘voluntarily’. Everyone is subject to an individual picking quota. The total mobilisation is commanded by the hokim. The entire educational system is adapted to the cotton season; it is ‘cotton before college’ (Wall, 2006). No academic can be reached during this period for educational purposes, with some exemptions for elitist schools. The academics are held personally accountable for the fulfilment of the picking orders of their students (Wall, 2006). Teachers become to perform as inspectors and coordinate the picking in cooperation with militia and local prosecutors. Fermers who fail to complete the plan for their farm are in trouble. They can replenish the shortage by purchasing cotton from other fermers but this implies they have to bribe officials. The control of the plan completing takes place at the ginnery where the cotton is weighted and checked on moisture content. During the Soviet Union the failing of farmers was not as problematic as it is nowadays. In particular in the 1980s there were widespread falsifications about the actual production of cotton. The weighing of harvests took place at distance of the farm (in another part of the USSR) which gave reason to negotiate and claim that a part of the harvest was lost on the way. Officials in Uzbekistan overestimated the production for almost 10 years and the excess payments were taken by the officials themselves. In 1986 the scandal was taken up by Gorbachev and in line with his glasnost policies he urged a fundamental research. The majority of oblast and rayon party leaders, the political elite, were removed. Together with them, hundreds of directors of kolkhozy and sovkhozy were also either fired or purged (Karaev, 2002).
*http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/psdgetreport.aspx?hidReportRetrievalName=BVS&hidReportRetrieva lID=853&hidReportRetrievalTemplateID=3
52 5.2.4.1 The State Committee for Land Resources (Goskomzem) Goskomzem was established in 1998 with the main objectives to implement state policy for rational use of land resources; to enforce the Land Code; to monitor and control the condition of land; to develop a land cadastre system and Goskomzem is the responsible state agency to register land rights. Goskomzem has directed the restructuring of the shirkats in cooperation with the oblast hokimiyats (USAID, 2005). Relating to all these activities the agency is responsible in preparing and implementing the National Programme for the Improvement of Land Use Fund. The Chairman of the Committee is the main state inspector for land use and protection (UNECE, 2001). The Institute of Soil Research and Agrochemistry forms part of Goskomzem and executes research to improve and protect the soil fertility. The monitoring of agricultural land and soil pollution, in particular in agricultural areas and around industrial cities, is executed by a special institute called Glavhydromet.
5.2.4.2 Uzgeodezcadastre (Goskomzemgeodezcadastre) Uzgeodezcadastre is responsible to develop a land cadastre system. The organisation implements projects, studies and investigations on land monitoring. It is established in 2004 after restructuring of the administrative reform of the MAWR. In the past the policy and administration of land rights for residential buildings, rural and urban lands were under responsibility of different state organisations. After reform these three categories have become the responsibility of Uzgeodezcadastre (USAID, 2005). The agency is headed by the Cabinet of Ministers. The frequency of land monitoring activities is once a year. The inspection is comprehensive and includes a number of activities; assessment of compliance with stipulated land use in conformation to the lease contract and the conducting of soil samples. Fermers are obliged to implement measures to prevent soil degradation, water logging and soil salinisation; they can be accused and brought to court if non-compliance or committed violation of the law is proved. In addition to the field visits fermers must report regularly about their farm activities and performance. In cooperation with other state agencies Uzgeodezcadastre is responsible to assess the bonitation rate of agricultural fields. The assessment of the bonitation rate has important implications for fermers and shirkats. It is a comparative assessment of the land quality and productivity with a representative level of agricultural activity and involves the analysis of the natural and human-induced soil properties. The soil properties determine the crop carrying capacity of the land. The bonitation for irrigated land has a 100-degree scale 28 . The highest score indicates that land has the highest fertility and has the maximum yield capacity of 4 ton of cotton per hectare (40 centners 29 /ha) 30 (FAO, 2003). It forms the basis for the determination of production quotas; which crops must be cultivated and what kind and to what quantity fertilizers are applied. All ferms are plotted on layouts 31 on which the fields are categorised according to their bonitation rates and soil fertility. The bonitation rate also plays an important role in tender procedures. Fermers opt to gain the best land with the highest rates. The bonitation should be determined once in three years. When the bonitation is raised this implicates higher quotas for the fermer. There is no assessment of the bonitation of tamorkas.
5.2.4.3 The Association of Dehkan and Private Farmers The Associations of Dehkan and Private farmers were established all over the republic in 1998, at first glance to become unions representing interests of dehkan and private farmers and to assist them in their work. The initiatives for the associations were taken by fermers and the government, though the associations rather seem to be established to fulfil the task of the demising experts of the shirkat and
28 The categories of land suitable for irrigation are defined as: I. Very good land capable of producing 81-100 % of the potential yield II. Good land capable of producing 61-80% of the potential yield III. Moderate quality land capable of producing 41-60 % of the potential yield IV and V. Poor land capable of producing 40 % (or less) of potential yield (FAO, 2003) 29 Yields in Uzbekistan are regularly given in centners. A centner is a hundredweight, 10 centner is 1 ton or 1000 pounds. 30 It must be noted that this maximum achievable yield counts for the cotton crop; for other crops yields higher than 4 t/ha (such as wheat) can certainly be produced. 31 A layout is shown in chapter 6.2.1.
53 kolkhozy instead of real empowerment of farmers. In the first years after the start of reform fermers were ‘recommended’ by the large scale farms what to produce (Baibagysh et al., 2006; Pomfret, 2000). The associations can be regarded as an addition to the state expertise; a supplementary means from the government to secure the performance of fermers. As the ministerial overview of Appendix B shows, the associations are supervised by the MAWR (confirmed in interview with Abduallev, I. IWMI-CAC Tashkent, 17/11/2006). This is opposed by most of the staff itself. They claim to work independent without involvement from the government (Interview with the rais from the association in Low Chirchik, 08/11/2006). Today the associations serve mainly as consulting agencies that provide juridical aid, assistance in writing business plans and concrete agricultural advice. According to Abdullaev, water management specialist from the IWMI ‘the government intends to transform the associations from unions into consulting services and has provided financial aid for the workers financially independent of the government’ (Interview Abduallev, I. IWMI-CAC Tashkent, 17/11/2006). A report from the USDA also confirms a strong relationship between the associations and the government, as it notes that ‘the fermers’ association occasionally rewards fermers with gifts once they achieve to meet the state orders year by year’ (USDA, 2002). The associations are established per rayon. They organise seasonal meetings and in that way create a meeting point for fermers to exchange knowledge and experiences. Fermers pay an annual fee for the membership and receive assistance in turn. The association provides juridical aid, assistance in the establishment of business plans and concrete agricultural advices. Evidently the associations cannot be compared to labour unions or agricultural farmers associations that can be found Western countries. In Uzbekistan they act within and to a large extent on behalf of the government.
5.2.4.4 The management of water supply Central Asia has one of the oldest systems of irrigation in the world. Early in the 20 th century in pre- Soviet time water was considered a common good which should be accessible for everyone; canals and ditches were collectively owned. Water rights were measured in ‘ditches’. Every landowner should receive the amount of water required for the irrigation of his or her particular field. ‘For example, to irrigate 1 hectare of land, one would need 3 ditchfuls of water, which would be regarded as his or her water right’ (Bartold 1970, Mukhamedjanov. 1986 in Abdullaev et al., 2005). Water management was completely distorted with the inclusion into the Soviet Union. It brought the establishment of comprehensive large irrigation systems that should serve enormous amounts of irrigated land on the large scale farms, which were owned and controlled by the state. The state facilitated the maintenance of systems and overall provision of water. The production units of the collectives received water based upon the production plans. Initially the allocation of water was unlimited and demand based, but due to water shortages this policy changed in the 1980s with the implementation of the ‘adjusted water demand principle’. This principle required a more calculated demand (Abdullaev et al., 2005). Nowadays, as is shown in Appendix C the main water distribution is still coordinated by the state. The system of water distribution has been transformed in 2003. Whereas in former times the system was organised according to administrative boundaries, nowadays it is adapted to the hydrological systems. At the highest level, the Oblvodkhoz – the oblast water management departments – have been (sub)merged into sub-basin units; the Rayvodkhozy, – the rayon water management departments – have been supplanted by the TISIMs, which are the Inter Rayon Canal Organisations (Wegerich, 2006). The TISIMs are responsible for planning the water demand and for the water distribution to the former boundaries of former kolkhozy and sovkhozy (Wegerich, 2006). The River Basin Management Organisation yearly submits a proposal for water demand for the vegetative (April-September) and non-vegetative (October-March) to the ICWC 32 , based on international agreements and projections on water availability for the coming year. The TISIMs yearly plan the exact quota of water that is allocated to the former boundaries of former kolkhozy and sovkhozy (Wegerich, 2006; UNECE, 2001) in confirmation with the ordered demands from the Water Use Associations (WUAs, in Uzbek: ‘Suvdan Foydalanish Uyushmasi’ (SFU) ). The water demand per farm is subsequently determined by WUA staff, calculated p er crop, per hectare and depending upon the agro-climatic region (Wegerich, 2006). Fermers have to submit their cropping plans to the WUA staff, which can consist of at
32 ICWC: Interstate Coordination Water Commission of Central Asia
54 maximum three crops (Wegerich, 2006). The official water limits for the different crops are established at higher levels of authority and hence, fermers can not easily acquire more water 33 . Households and dehkan farmers are depending upon their community (and thus indirectly of the WUA) in the supply of water for their tamorka. In case they rent additional land, the water is provided by the fermer concerned. In contradiction to the sub-basin units and the TISIMs that are organised according to hydrological boundaries, the WUAs are again organised according to administrative boundaries (Wegerich, 2006). Officially the TISIMs should control the functioning of the water system and measure the water levels frequently. Nonetheless, after research conducted in Khorezm by Wegerich (2006), he questions the system of control as the most pumps are rather old and accurate control of water use is difficult. Wegerich (2006) has identified that there are deviations in official data and field observations and that the information of TISIM staff is not always correct. If TISIM staff observes deviations they can call the Water Inspection Office and WUAs can be fined, but the fine is rather low, based on the ‘Water Law ’ of 1993. Wegerich concludes that it is questionable whether fines are indeed enforced. He has observed that WUA staff works not completely independent from the TISIMs; many of them have been employed in previous years by governmental departments (Wegerich, 2006). The WUAs were first of all established to hand over the costs of irrigation to the farmers. A cabinet minister’s decree of 1999 implied the birth of the first WUAs, following international aid programmes that were started years ahead in the water sector. Within the MAWR a special unit has been founded for the establishment of WUAs throughout the country. This unit provides information materials and workshops for fermers and villages. Steadily a devolution of authority to the WUAs is deployed. At the moment there are about 1000 WUAs functioning. It is expected that all the water systems in the entire country will be coordinated by WUAs by 2009. WUAs are now responsible for more than 70,000 km of irrigation and 50,000 km of drainage networks (Yalcin, 2005). Although the existence of WUAs has grown out of his ‘pioneer phase’, still many improvements have to be made. In order to create sustainable development of the water sector and the WUAs, it is essential that modern knowledge is applied and that every member and employer is aware of the own responsibility. The government has transferred the water infrastructure that previously belonged to shirkats to the WUAs, nevertheless most of it is deteriorated and in need of urgent repair. There is need of experienced staff and proper equipment (Yalcin, 2005). Until now there is no meaningful payment system for water use for fermers in Uzbekistan, in contradiction to the water use system in Kyrgyzstan, which is assumed to work more properly (Interview Bakhtior Winrock Int., Tashkent, 13/11/2006). In Uzbekistan fermers only pay for the WUA staff and the transformation of water, including pumps and pipes. The WUAs are non-profit organisations and the wages are determined by the government (Wegerich, 2006). The annual payment for water is included in the overall land tax; therefore most fermers do not know exact amounts. It is known and experienced that a payment system is essential; it enhances the feeling of (partial) ownership and participation which is crucial for the operation of a WUA. The size of the area that is covered by a WUA varies, but is at maximum approximately 2,500 hectares. Depending on the size of the area the GA consists of 30 to 250 participants.
33 This is further described in chapter 5.3.4.
55
General Assemblee Umumi Majlis
Monitoring Dispute Settlement Council Committee Committee Bashkaruv Organı Teftish Komisyası Nizalorıni Halletish Komisyosı
Manager SFU Boshligi)
Accounting Office Technical Staff Hesap-Kitap Bolimi Teknik Hadimler
Support Staff Yardomchi Hodimler
Figure 5.2 The organisational structure of a Water Use Association (partially based on Yalcin, 2005)
The WUAs are one of the only organisations in which fermers formally participate. All fermers are represented in the General Assemblee (GA). Communities have gained an independent position in the WUAs. They are represented in the WUA by an own spokesperson that should represent households’ and thus dehkan farmers’ interests. The council is the executive board and formed after an election in the General Assemblee, together with the election of the Dispute Settlement Committee and the Monitoring Committee. The council consists of a few water sector experts and is chaired by a manager that appoints the staff and the accountants. The technical staff is composed of a team of water managers, mirabs, engineers, accountants, jurists and ICT specialists, and is assisted by the support staff that consists of ordinary employees such as cleaners, guards and seasonal workers (Yalcin, 2005). The mirab is the local water provider that determines the specific amounts that are allocated to households and kishlaks. The Monitoring Committee revises and monitors the functioning of the WUA. The total staff of a WUA varies between 10 and 30 people and depends upon the numbers of pipes of the total system which are under control by the WUA staff. The establishment of the WUAs has altered the water management structures in the rural areas considerably. As is described, in former times the agricultural sector was dominated by collectives and the government distributed the water of the main canals towards the kolkhozy and sovkhozy. The large scale farms acquired unlimited amounts of water from the main canal and allocated it to the fields. Every collective covered a large area and employed their own mirabs. As such, there were only two or three units that competed for water from the point of supply. There was no negotiation or consultation between the collectives. Most communities were located in the surrounding or within the collectives and the local population was provided by water from the collective. This is shown in the figure below.
56
Main Canal
Figure 5.3 The old structure of water supply for Collective Farms
The increasing number of smaller private farms raised problems in water management. The distribution canals from the Soviet period had become outdated and there were deficiencies in maintenance and repair. Fermers were financially not capable to recover the systems. In addition there was a lack of awareness of the importance of responsible water use. Fermers used water without limitations with the result that a number of fermers suffered from water shortages in the peak seasons. The structure of water distribution is changed to make a more fair system in which fermers should have a share in the costs with participative power. Nowadays the WUAs distribute the water within the shirkats to the brigades, and in case privatised to the fermers, gardeners and households 34 , as is depicted in Figure 5.5. The advocates and initiators of the WUAs argue that fermers participation and involvement is crucial for a well-functioning WUA. Yet although fermers are represented in the GA, their participative power is rather marginal; they have hardly any possibility to influence the water supply to their fields. During the course of this research it appeared that fermers do not perceive to have any participative power in the allocation of water to their farm. And although the water supply is calculated per farm, fermers are depending on each other. The water is provided through canals by which a number of farms are provided with water. They uptake the needed water from the same canal.
34 Personal communication Kai Wegerich (Dr. Integrated Water Management WUR, Wageningen), 02/03/2007.
57
1 WUA
Figure 5.4 The new situation after establishment of a WUA
To enforce rational water use and to prevent unequal use of water the most WUAs have changed the methods of water supply. Where in previous years the start of the canal was the central point and single point of supply, nowadays most WUAs have constructed more points of supply. Fermers whose fields were located at the start of the canal were in a favoured position; they were least vulnerable for water shortages and thereupon they were not aware of problematic situations. There was no external pressure to think about responsible water use. With the implementation of this new structure, fermers are less depending on each other. The irrigation system is flowing forth- and backward, the water is supplied from the start, the middle and the end of the canal. There is no real start point.
5.2.5 Science, research and education Science, research and education that are strongly politically determined can be described as ‘politicised science’ (Wall, 2006). The Uzbek educational and academic system shares with other autocratic states that natural sciences are of more priority than social science, which is often believed to threaten the (fragile) political system. The political influence certainly matters agricultural research. Political approval for research work is required. It is allowed if the research will justify and reinforce the state policies (Wall, 2006). Agricultural research, crop improvement and extension are carried out by several state institutes. They are focussed upon different segments within the agricultural sector: irrigation, cotton, wheat, rice and vegetables. The different segments all have their ‘own’ institute that is specialised to maintain varieties and examine possible improvements in cultivation and yields (ICARDA, 2006). The Uzbek Scientific-Industrial Centre of Agriculture is a union of agricultural institutes which coordinates and directs the agricultural technological developments and transfer of international know-how to Uzbekistan, among which the Institute of Cotton and the Institute of Irrigation. Although the Uzbek government is reluctant to involve Western countries and their (international aid) agencies and companies, she does stimulate international contacts. In comparison to surrounding countries the government is more cautious to receive international aid, assumable with the fear that this will empower fermers to offer resistance. It seems like only concerning matters that are considered to infringe upon the cotton and wheat production aid projects are welcomed, which is mainly the water sector. Aid programmes for improvement of water management are executed from the 1990s on and fermers are encouraged to learn about modern equipment and technology which is not (yet) available in Uzbekistan. There are many international organisations concerned with the Uzbek water sector, such as the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) and the Asian
58 Development Bank (ADB) 35 . Their work is comparable: improving the poor condition of the systems and increase awareness among water users. The programs have the aim to empower fermers and to make them aware of the importance of a well functioning WUA and the importance to use water in a rational way. As mentioned, many fermers share machinery or lease equipment for the harvest or sowing season. They cannot afford the investment of all the necessary machinery. The majority of fermers is far from financially capable to purchase the equipment and is not willing to take innovating risks. The government organises events, such as fairs, where the newest machinery is presented which should stimulate fermers to make investments to modernise the farming practices. It appears a rather ambiguous approach from the government as the fermers are restricted in their possibilities by the current agricultural policies. Fermers should invest and innovate but in practise it is only allowed with regard to the cotton and wheat cultivation. Other innovations such as a change in cropping patterns are constrained. It seems like livestock producing fermers are more enabled to act in the international arena 36 . There is possibility to expand the farm activities with processing of milk and fermers are encouraged to trade with foreign farmers.
5.3 The farming pattern
In this paragraph the features of farming in Uzbekistan are described. The primary farming patterns are stipulated by the government. This section thus unfolds the general farming features of shirkats, fermers and dehkan farmers, which also count for the farmers in the Chirchik rayons, described in the following chapter. The farming pattern consists of different elements: the cropping pattern, the supply and use of inputs such as fertilizers and seeds, and not at least water use is considered. In the farming pattern the elements are combined that as a whole determine the impact of farming upon the environment. All the different elements are detailed in the following sections. Every farmer has his or her own style of farming but nevertheless farmers share general features, certainly in Uzbekistan where farming is still, to a large degree brought down to monocultures. The tendencies in farming are fairly common. As is repeated several times, overall the Uzbek agricultural sector is featured by domination of governmental organisations and farming practices are predetermined due to governmental interventions and policies, which are described in the preceding sections. The production of cotton and wheat must be guaranteed, which requires stringent control and monitoring over farming by governmental organisations. The national policies, combined with centralised supply of farm inputs, result in quite universal patterns of farming. The distribution channel of cotton and wheat seeds, the supply of farm inputs (i.e. fertilizers, fuel, lubricants) and the purchasing of the harvests; from cradle to grave the cotton and wheat production is surrounded by governmental involvement, not to say domination. For other crops governmental involvement is less obvious, in particular when it concerns the vegetable production of dehkan farms.
5.3.1 The cropping pattern From ancient times the environment of Uzbekistan is rich of potentials for agricultural purposes. Traditionally as before the Soviet era, a wide range of crops were cultivated in Uzbekistan. The crop- mix was much more balanced than today with grains, fruits, various feed crops and cotton as indigenous crop (Spoor, 2006). Through the years inappropriate use of natural resources has limited the possibilities of agriculture and in combination with the (after independence) continued state policy
35 The anti-Western position has constrained the work of several international agencies, some of them have been prohibited to work any longer and had to leave the country, such as Winrock Int. During the research the company had just stopped, nevertheless was trying to make a restart in 2007 (Interview Bakhtior Winrock staff, 13/11/2006). 36 Livestock holding farms were not included in the research. Since these fermers do cultivate land mainly for the production of animal fodder there has been contact with some of them. It was mentioned by several workers and dehkan farmers that The Netherlands are well-known in Uzbekistan because of the ‘super cows’ that are imported, producing high amounts of milk and meat.
59 of land allocation the crop diversity is rather low to date. The table underneath shows the agricultural production per oblast, which is quite similar over the country. The most fermers and shirkats are subject to cotton and wheat quotas and are only occasionally allowed to grow other crops. In a few rayons (per oblast) fermers are directed to grow vegetables. Crops rotate yearly, which is compelled by the state. Wheat growing fermers and pudrats can grow a second harvest during the short period between the harvest and following sowing of wheat. In the mountainous areas it is rather inefficient and impossible to cultivate cotton and wheat given that irrigation on hills enhances soil erosion and the applied fertilizers and pesticides flow away with the irrigation water. According to the CER (2005b) the land that is allocated to fermers is often of poor condition in combination with out-dated irrigation systems and inappropriate technical equipment. Notwithstanding most of the new fermers appear to achieve a higher overall output compared to the former shirkats (CER, 2005b).
Republic of Karakalpakstan cotton, rice, vegetables, melon, watermelon
Andijan cotton, wheat, orchards, grapes
Bukhara cotton, wheat, orchards, vegetables
Djizak cotton, wheat
Kashkadarya wheat, cotton, vegetables
Navoiy cotton, wheat, orchards
Namangan cotton, orchards, grapes, vegetables
Samarkand cotton, orchards, grapes, tobacco
Surkhandarya cotton, melon, watermelon, subtropical crops
Syrdarya cotton, wheat, orchards
Tashkent cotton, wheat, orchards, grapes
Ferghana cotton, wheat, vegetables, potatoes
Khorezm Rice, wheat, cotton, grapes, melon, potatoes Table 5.2 Agricultural Production of Arable Farming per Oblast (source: MAWR, 2000 in UNECE, 2001)
During the Soviet days alfalfa and cotton were the main crops that were cultivated. Alfalfa is a lucerne: the growing of the crop has a beneficial effect upon the condition and the productivity of agricultural land (UNECE, 2001). The combination and rotation of cotton and alfalfa (7-years and 3- years respectively) 37 and sometimes wheat was very important, but nevertheless the production of cotton was the predominant practice, as was described in paragraph 5.1.1.
37 Personal communications, Kirsten Kienzler (Ph.D. candidate ZEF, Bonn), 15/02/2007.
60
BOX 2. Nitrogen fixation by leguminous plants
Leguminous plants, like alfalfa, peas and beans are noteworthy; they have the characteristic to fix
atmospheric nitrogen in the soil, which improves the quality of poor soils; they enrich them with
nitrogen and other useful elements (UNECE, 2001). The crops establish a symbiotic relationship
with bacteria, in particular ‘rhizobia’ that are found in the root nodules .
Alfalfa is one of the most important crops with these abilities that can be grown in Uzbekistan;
other crops are different kinds of beans and peas. The importance of alfalfa became neglected in
the 1990s, primarily in favour of the production of wheat. The rotation of cotton and wheat
became the principal practice of fermers. Cotton and wheat production dominates the agricultural
fields supplemented by some vegetables, orchards and rice. The replacement of alfalfa by wheat
has negatively affected the soil fertility. Alfalfa could enrich the particular soil for a longer time.
The large decrease in cultivation of leguminous plants has implied a loss of nitrogen fixation;
which could be solved with unnatural additives, i.e. using mineral or chemical inputs. During the
Soviet period fertilizers were abundant.
Nowadays alfalfa is still cropped, yet to a much smaller extent and often not as the single crop,
rather in combination with other cultivation: fermers lack capital to buy nitrogen fertilizers and
practice intercropping of alfalfa (although officially it is prohibited to practice intercropping) to
fix nitrogen.
The agricultural sector in Uzbekistan is divided into different branches for the production of cotton, wheat, vegetables (rice, potatoes included), livestock, chicken, fish and fruits. The numbers in Table 5.3 show the total production of the different crops. They indicate a decrease in cotton production with a large increase in wheat production as the result of the enforcement of the self-sufficiency policy in wheat. The rice production appears to have declined considerably, but this does not count for all of the oblasts. The output of other crops did not change fundamentally over the last decade 38 (Spoor, 2004). On individual farms the production of cotton and wheat is always favoured; in times of water shortages, the water supply for the production of other crops will be minimised. The cultivation of wheat has an advantage over cotton with respect to the second harvest. The wheat cultivation ends in July and starts again with sowing in November. This implies that the fields are fallow in the months between and then a second harvest can be grown during the warmer summer months. Cotton is harvested in October, and sown again in spring.
1,000 tons 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 Cotton 4646 4116 4229 3938 3934 3350 3641 3600 3002 3263 Wheat 610 964 876 1363 2347 2742 3073 3602 3532 3690 Rice 520 unknown 515 498 328 445 386 421 155 84 Potatoes 351 365 472 567 440 490 692 658 723 735 Vegetables 3348 3494 3039 2975 2713 2481 2384 2680 2362 2763 Fruits 517 702 560 555 602 585 548 489 691 796 Grapes 480 439 381 353 621 474 512 344 609 574 Table 5.3 Total Production of different Crops (1991-2001 excluding 1998) (source: Spoor, 2004)
Incidentally fermers can be permitted to allot a small part of their land to other crops (along the year, beside the possibility to grow a second harvest). This allowance often has a drawback: frequently it is accompanied by newly imposed requirements for these crops or in other cases fermers are charged a higher land tax. This has happened in Khorezm, where rice cultivation is frequently practised and has increased the last years (often with illegal use of water) 39 . The government has intervened in the illegal cropping of rice (as stated by Wegerich: ‘they tried to avoid illegal cropping but it did not work
38 Given that there are difficulties in estimating the output of the smaller dehkan farms, the production numbers of crops other than wheat and cotton can not be completely justified. 39 Personal communication Kai Wegerich (Dr. Integrated Water Management WUR, Wageningen), 02/03/2007.
61 out’ 40 ). They did not forbid the rice cultivation, yet the government required the fermers to conclude contracts with the Agrofirms instead (Wegerich, 2006). These procedures imply severe constraints for a diversification of the cropping pattern. Moreover, diversification is impeded by the lack of knowledge of fermers, overall there is a deficiency in experience of cultivating other crops on a large scale, as the cotton production has been dominant for many years (Interview Abduallev, I. IWMI-CAC Tashkent, 17/11/2006) Somewhat in contradiction with the stipulated state orders the Land Code states that a fermer has the right to realize any type of agricultural activity not prohibited by law, as well as processing and selling agricultural products which should be in accordance with norms and quality standards of products, ecological, sanitary and other requirements. Fermers must use their land in a rational way and the crop rotation must be scientifically justified, in accordance with the local environment and the specialisation of the farm. These rights appear not to be executed (fully) in reality. Fermers are subject to state quotas; the cotton and wheat policies imply that they cannot realize any type of activity they desire. Only the second harvest period allows them to cultivate some crops of their own selection.
5.3.1.1 Procurement of crops Officially the state has reduced the procurement quotas for cotton and wheat but in practice this does not create real opportunities for fermers and shirkats. The state procurement quotas are the quantities of products that farmers are obliged to provide to the state. The table below shows that the percentages of state procurement have decreased, but it must be noted that these numbers are percentages of the planned production. By the year 2002 the government has changed the procurement system; the quotas are based on actual output instead of on planned production. The actual output is often significantly lower than the planned production which implies that fermers have to sell a much larger part of their production to the state against low state prices (Spoor, 2004). In addition there is a lack of sale potentials outside the state procurement system, in particular for cotton; the government has a monopoly in the processing and export market of cotton. In theory fermers are able to sell a part of the harvest outside of the state system but in practice they are confronted with many problems in selling the crop anywhere else. Therefore many fermers give preference to state sales over other sales potentials that are accompanied by many uncertainties. The amounts produced above the procurement can be sold to the state against negotiated prices, which can be up to 20% higher than the procurement prices.
Crop 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 Wheat 100 100 80 75 50 50 50 50 50 50* Cotton 95 85 80 750 60 40 30 30 30 30 Vegetables 100 50 50 ------Fruits 100 100 80 ------Tobacco 100 100 80 50 ------Source: CER, Tashkent. Report of National Consultant on Agriculture Note: *In 2002 it was decided by the Decree of Ministers No. 306 dated of 29 August 2002 that this procurement share would be on actual, rather than planned output. Table 5.4 Percentages of State Procurement of Agricultural Products (source: Spoor, 2004)
The preliminary procurement prices for cotton are announced in spring with the final prices in August (USDA, 2002). The state procurement prices are consistently lower than market prices with differences of 20 to 30 percent. Combined with state production targets, this makes that fermers cannot make optimal choices for their production and their income remains low, below potential as concluded elsewhere. Only when fermers achieve to produce higher yields (which is already rather difficult if they cannot supply higher levels of inputs 41 ) they could raise their income, but nevertheless state prices are fixed. The advantage of the state as sole purchaser it that the fermer can continue to obtain the farm inputs from the state. Following Rudenko and Lamers (2006) who conclude after a
40 Ibid. 41 Following Rudenko et al. that conclude ‘an increase in input use may engrave the already existing devastating ecological problems. They state in their report that in particular fuel and labour are usually overused whereas there is under use of most fertilizers’ (Rudenko et al., 2006)
62 review of different scenarios on the profitability of fermers, fermers are not the least that benefit from the current subsidized system. Although it is a severely restricted system, focused first of all upon the planned production, it enables fermers to obtain farm inputs (i.e. seeds, fertilizers, fuel, lubricants) against rather low price, compared to the world market prices. Liberalisation of the system is expected to result in substantial increase of the costs of inputs (Rudenko et al., 2006) 42 . The payments for the cotton harvest take place in two tranches; the first 50% of the procurement value of the expected output is deposited at the start of the growing season. The second tranch follows after harvesting, when the cotton is brought to the ginnery where it is weighted and controlled, in particular on moisture. If the moisture level is too high, fermers will get less money and to prevent it, fermers often dry their cotton before bringing it to the ginnery. Water could be added on purpose to increase the weight of the harvest, but nowadays fermers do not take this risk 43 . This could also be done by cotton pickers as they are being paid per kilogram 44 . Regarding other crops produced under state contract, fermers regularly can use the surpluses (above the procurement quota) for household consumption, salary for workers or sales to other fermers or on the market. This has resulted in a secondary market: fermers that cannot fulfil the state plan for a particular crop (often) try to buy the lacking amount from other fermers. As was witnessed by other researchers, it is sometimes difficult to assess real production numbers of fermers since they provide information on the amount they have provided to the state, in confirmation with the production plans. The control of completion of plans takes only place when fermers distribute their crops to the state companies 45 . As such, if needed fermers can purchase lacking amounts from others. According to the CER it is crucial to improve the current situation of procurement of agricultural production outside the state procurement system. The major part of vegetables for domestic consumption is produced by dehkan farmers. At local bazaars numerous vegetables and fruits can be found that are produced primarily by dehkan farmers, supplemented by imported products, which concern mostly fruits, like bananas and oranges. Dehkan farmers and fermers (for the latter this concerns primarily the second harvest) sell the bulk of their production at the local bazaars. The lack of appropriate infrastructure for non-state sales results in losses of crops, sometime even up to 25-30% of the total output annually (CER, 2005b). The state procurement of vegetables and rice is in hands of the Agrofirms; for non-state-order crops the sales is mostly organised by middlemen. The vegetables purchased by the Agrofirms are considered to be of better quality and the amount is guaranteed through the quotas, and of unvarying type. The Agrofirms coordinate the exporting and processing of crops, for domestic consumption they cooperate with other state-owned enterprises and organisations such as hospitals, schools and the military (CER, 2005b). A large part of the vegetables produced under contract are processed or exported to especially Russia. The trade between middlemen and fermers and dehkans primarily takes place in cash. This enables fermers to obtain cash money outside of the state banking system. Fermers cannot make a living solely on the base of the bank account; they cannot easily acquire cash money from it and many fermers do not have real insight of their account. Cash is needed for (household) expenses, salary for workers and farm inputs that have to be obtained outside of the state supply system.
5.3.2 Seeds Along the years under the Soviet regime, different seed varieties have been improved by advanced selection methods. Many kolkhozy and sovkhozy were specialised in breeding and selecting varieties of crops besides cotton and wheat, whereas governmental institutions solely focussed upon the enhancement of cotton and to a smaller degree wheat seeds (Wall, 2006). This, as Wall terms it ‘myopic policy’ has resulted in devaluation of the quality of genetic material for in particular, fodder and vegetable crops. Especially concerning the seeds that are not considered to be of prime importance for the state (many vegetables, fruits and fodder crops) the system of seed selection has demised after
42 For further reading see Rudenko et al., 2006: ‘The comparative advantages of the present and future payment structure for agricultural producers in Uzbekistan’. 43 Personal communications, Kirsten Kienzler (Ph.D. candidate ZEF, Bonn), 15/02/2007. 44 Ibid. 45 This was the case with one Uzbek student. Information provided by state organisations contradicted with production numbers given by fermers. Fermers remained vague about their real (own) yields.
63 independence. It has increased the reliance upon foreign seed sources (Wall, 2006), yet it must be noted that the majority of farmers prefer reproduced seeds either from themselves or through informal exchanges. The selection, breeding and distribution of cotton and wheat seeds are of primary importance and for other crops it is difficult to obtain high qualitative seeds. Officially fermers and shirkats can only cultivate the state provided seeds to complete the state quotas and for other crops fermers and dehkan farmers have to obtain or reproduce their own seeds. Private involvement in the distribution channel of cotton and wheat seeds hardly exists; it is entirely in hands of governmental organisations. There are a number of governmental research institutes involved in the supply of cotton, wheat, and also rice seeds, focussed upon separate divisions like selection, quality control and quarantine. Cooperatively they determine what kind of seeds and which amounts are provided to fermers and shirkats, based on the annual resolutions from the government. The sales of cotton and wheat seeds to fermers and shirkat can take place on credit, with reimbursement after the harvest. The prices are determined by the government and the prices differ for different qualities. The highest quality seeds with a premium price are the breeder seeds, followed by foundation seeds (ICARDA 2006). Seed quality control and certification is carried out by the government; the seed legislation is elaborative and consists of several laws and regulations (ICARDA, 2006). The elaborative quality assurance programme from the MAWR should safeguard and maintain the quality of different varieties of crops. There are field inspections and oblast departments of the central seed laboratory of the State Seed Certification and Seed Control Center execute tests of several samples of crops each year according to state procedures (ICARDA, 2006). Officially all seeds should be labelled and have a kind of ‘seed passport’ which contains the scientific standards of the type of seed which enables the selection of suitable type of seed in each area. The yield achievability is of highest priority for the government. Subordinate appear aspects as the water demand and the nutritive value. Poorly adapted seeds lead to lower yields and concerning wheat, the produced flour results in bread with lower protein content. The enormous increase in wheat production of the last decade, shown in Table 5.3, can partially be attributed to the use of imported high-yielding wheat varieties, mainly from Russia and surrounding countries. Approximately 500 tons is imported each year (ICARDA, 2006). In combination with an expansion of land allocated to wheat, the production growth has been considerable. In the last years problems emerged that made clear that there is need to improve the domestic sector for wheat seed breeding. A number of projects have been initiated by international agencies and the government to improve the weak domestic seed sector. The import of seeds implies high transporting costs, the mixing of varieties and in addition most imported seeds are inadequately adapted to the climate conditions. Inappropriate seeds, in combination with poor land quality, a short vegetation period and a lack of appropriate sowing equipment enforce high application rates of seeds 46 in order to safeguard the production of state orders. The main bases in Uzbekistan where the wheat seed breeding is concentrated are Andijan, Djizzakh and Khorezm, of which the center in Khorezm has only recently been established 47 . Andijan oblast, for the irrigated areas, is the most important. In Djizzakh the seeds for non-irrigated areas are breeded, where it must be noted that only a marginal part of land is non- irrigated. From these bases, the breeder seeds are distributed to local departments, after which certified fermers often reproduce the foundation and later generation seeds; these are increasingly produced by elite farms. The several efforts aimed at enhancing the seed sector clearly point at deficiencies of the current situation and there are fermers that are not convenient about the supplied seeds, but they cannot easily express their complaints. Fermers that complain and request for a reassessment of the seed determination are largely ignored and are threatened to be liquidated if they cannot complete their quotas. Re-sowing of land hardly takes place and is very expensive. It increases the farm costs. Private involvement in the official distribution channels of vegetable seeds is increasing, with rather high prices as they are based upon market forces (ICARDA, 2006). For the most crops it is allowed to produce and market seeds, but the informal market (mainly of reproduced seeds) appears more important than the official distribution channels. For self-pollinated crops farmers can easily reproduce
46 In particular the application rates of cotton seeds are very high compared to other cotton producing countries like the U.S. and Australia. Some numbers indicate rates of 60/80 kg per hectares whereas in other countries the rates are estimated on 15/20 kg per hectares (USDA, 2002). 47 Personal communication, Kirsten Kienzler (Ph.D. candidate ZEF, Bonn), 15/02/2007
64 seeds and hence often choose to reproduce their own seeds. This occurs without labelling or certification. Moreover, varieties can easily intermix with each other by transport or in local rice or grain mills. The reproduction of seeds has many advantages over purchasing seeds from companies or ‘strangers’. The particular variety is adapted to the local circumstances through (natural) selection and the crop yields become more stabilised through the yields of genetically broad-based varieties for ecotypes. The informal trade of seeds is also beneficial with regard to the preservation and safeguarding of crops that are not handled by the formal sector, but which are essential for resource poor farmers (ICARDA, 2006, pp. 13). Fermers, some pudrats and nearly all dehkan farmers reproduce or exchange their vegetable seeds with relatives and neighbours, sometimes in loan for labour or wheat; others opt to make a profit out of it. The informal market enables farmers to obtain seeds against reasonable prices. So far the Uzbek government has prohibited the use of Genetically Modified (GM) seeds. Some farmers try to obtain seeds from foreign countries. For those that can afford them, private companies can provide imported seeds, and especially seeds imported from Western companies are well-known. In the 1990s a number of dehkan farmers started to grow tomatoes from European companies in small greenhouses that were of good quality and could be exported. Due to constraints such as unreliable gas supply many of them stopped in the last years 48 . Thus there are different purchasing potentials for vegetable seeds, but the majority of fermers, dehkan farmers and pudrats prefer to obtain seeds from the same source year by year.
5.3.3 Fertilizers and pesticides The application of fertilizers and pesticides is predetermined by agricultural state officials and the variety that is used depends upon different factors: the soil and climatic conditions, the soil nutrient content, the use of organic fertilizers, and the current prices of fertilizers and the crops (FAO, 2003). Due to the centralised supply and the prominent role of officials from the Ministry, most fermers (that is, at least within a particular area) apply the same variety of chemicals. The most frequently applied fertilizers are combinations of Nitrogen, Phosphorus and Potash fertilizers. The main used treatments on cotton to combat pests and insects are of biological nature, treatments as ‘Golden Eye’, ‘Trichogramma’ and ‘Bracon’. Golden Eye (Chrysopa) is a common lacewing that is applied in order to combat aphids and trips. Bracon and Trichogramma are used for the cotton crop to keep the cotton bollworm in check (Helicoverpa armigera) (Matthews, 2001). These biological insect control measures against trips and the cotton boll worm are taken during the growing period. Farmers have pheromone traps on their fields to see which insects are presently around and then they send out small flies in the evening 49 . Pesticides can be divided into different categories; insecticides, defoliants, herbicides and fungicides which are not all applied. Mainly defoliants are used for cotton in the maturing/picking stage. Due to the extremely high prices chemical pesticides are hardly used in practice. It must be noted however, that pesticide application (mainly for wheat production) is becoming more and more interesting to fermers when they have more money 50 .
48 Personal communication, Abdullah Karimov (TIIM/Ecogis staff, Tashkent), October 2006 49 Personal communications, Kirsten Kienzler (Ph.D. candidate ZEF, Bonn), 16/02/2007. 50 Ibid.
65
BOX 3. Obsolete Pesticides Talking and thinking about pesticides, many people remember the high application rates during the Soviet period, with the famous pictures of airplanes flying over the farm fields while people, mostly women, are working on the land. The inappropriate centralised distribution, storage and use of highly toxic agro-chemicals and other inputs resulted in high losses and serious pollution of natural resources. The control and monitoring of handling of chemicals was under responsibility of separate institutions and was inadequate. In many places the * environment is scarred by these incorrect practices (GRID, 2002) . Inherited from the Soviet era, ‘Obsolete Pesticides’ have become a considerable problem in the former Soviet republics and not the least in Uzbekistan. Merely in Uzbekistan an amount of 1,500 tons of obsolete pesticides have been identified, but it is estimated that more than 17,000 ton is banned and kept in underground warehouses which are not possible to visit without ** protection (WECF, 2005) . During the Soviet period the central regime distributed large quantities of chemical pesticides to the collective farms regardless of need. Herbicides and pesticides were applied at high rates to combat pests and diseases that had acquired immunity due to the monoculture of cotton, and by the usage of defoliants the mechanical harvesting of cotton should be eased. Fertilizers were applied to rehabilitate the exhausted and over-washed soils (FAO, 2003). Despite the high application rates of agro-chemicals, large surpluses of mainly pesticides accumulated which are stored in old warehouses until now. Today the packages are deteriorated and the contents have become unclear. Not only former Soviet republics struggle with the problem of obsolete pesticides; worldwide in particular the developing and under-developed countries face the problem of large stockpiles of obsolete pesticides. The FAO defines Obsolete Pesticides as: ‘stocked pesticides that cannot be used any longer for their original purpose or any other purpose, and therefore require disposal’ (FAO, 1995). Obsolete pesticides pose a serious threat to human and environmental health; according to the World Health Organisation (WHO) yearly three million people are affected by pesticide poisoning and even 20,000 die because of unawareness of the risks involved with handling the toxic substances (FAO, 1995). It concerns predominantly Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) such as DDT and DDE which have been banned for human health and environmental reasons. In particular for those living in the proximity of warehouses the stockpiles entail serious health risks due to leakages into water and soil resources; but also the reuse of warehouses for other purposes can cause poisoning. The local environmental condition can worsen by pollution of the air, soils and ground water sources; moreover substances can migrate globally by air and *** food chains (Milieukontakt, 2006 ; WECF, 2005). In the 1990s the urgency of the problems and effects of obsolete pesticides became acknowledged and the pro blems were addressed on the international scale. Most (under)developing countries do not have the facilities, financial capital and knowledge to repackage and eliminate the stockpiles. In many countries international aid organisations and NGOs have initiated projects to clean the warehouses and repackage the chemicals and to raise awareness on the risks involved among the (local) population. The need for precautionary measures must be emphasised that can prevent a recurrence of accumulation of pesticides.
* From http://www.grid.unep.ch/product/publication/CEO-for-Internet/CEO/ch1_2_1_3.htm ** From http://www.wecf.de/cms/articles/2005/06/hch_forum.php *** From http://www.milieukontakt.nl/index.php?show=projects&country_id=23
66 During the Soviet era the Potassium and Phosphor fertilizers were imported from Russia and Kazakhstan whilst Nitrogen fertilizers were produced by Uzbek state enterprises (UNECE, 2001). Following the collapse of the USSR and the break-up of the strong interrelated trading links between the republics, the prices of inputs increased considerably and purchasing potentials became infringed. In the past mineral fertilizers and pesticides were only allocated to shirkats by central government agencies (CER, 2005b). Compared to the Soviet period the application of fertilizers and pesticides has considerably reduced, mainly because of economic reasons: the majority of fermers and dehkan farmers cannot afford to purchase large quantities of chemical fertilizers. The usage of Nitrogen and Phosphor fertilizers have decreased for the production of cotton, but not for other crops; concerning wheat and rice the use of fertilizers has increased51 (FAO, 2003). According to the FAO (2003), in the past the rates of application amounted up to 250 kilograms per hectare, whilst nowadays it is around 180 kg/ha. Fermers are applying smaller amounts than is recommended by scientists to have a higher price-cost ratio (FAO, 2003). Yet by international standards the application rates on Uzbek farms are still high, although they have definitely decreased after independence (FAO, 2003). Research has indicated that overuse of fertilizers still takes place and that in some parts of the republic the last decade peaked in annual fertilizer use. This concerns foremost for vegetables grown on dehkan farms and probably wheat, but overuse of chemicals for the cotton production is not assumable 52 . According to the UNECE different food products still do not meet food quality standards, which is caused by pollution in industrial enterprises and in agriculture by overuse of chemical inputs (UNECE, 2001).
5.3.3.1 The supply and use of fertilizers and pesticides Since 2004 free trade is being introduced but already years before domestic agro-chemical producing enterprises were established to provide the most frequently used fertilizers. Nowadays there are two ways in which shirkats and farmers obtain fuel, lubricants, fertilizers and pesticides (CER, 2005a). The government has reorganised the system of distribution in order to facilitate and stimulate access for fermers to purchase channels. 1. For the planned production and the fulfilment of quotas fermers and shirkats have a direct agreement with the chemical plant 53 . The direct agreement concerns the provision of inputs within the allocated limits determined by the state, the prices are regulated by the state. Fermers and shirkats are exempted from tax rates for these inputs. Despite these mechanisms and state support the system has not really improved. Shirkats and fermers are compelled to purchase the stipulated amounts and the debt that many fermers and shirkats face, increases anyhow with or without tax (CER, 2005a). Nevertheless, the prices of state supplied inputs are lower than prices of the same inputs on the world market (Rudenko et al., 2006). 2. Free participation of fermers, dehkan farmers and shirkats in market trades at commodity exchanges. This is the legal way in which fermers, dehkan farmers and shirkats can purchase chemicals for the production of crops that are not associated with state orders. Officially for dehkan farmers this is the only channel to purchase fertilizers and pesticides. The prices are market-based. For Ammonium Nitrate there is an exception. Ammonium nitrate is supplied in line with a special regime due its explosive characteristics (Field interview Saidovul, 25/10/2006; CER, 2005b).
The government has reorganized the distribution system of the chemical fertilizers 54 . This should ease the fermers access to the inputs. Nonetheless the CER has observed that fermers are unconfident; fermers indicate that the system of input supply (the concerned wholesale and retail network) is functioning inadequate. This can be explained by the retention of centralised distribution methods of providing fermers with the resources needed for fulfilling state orders. Within the government the Department of Crop Protection coordinates the supply of fertilizers and pesticides for fermers and shirkats for the state production. Local agricultural officials of the MAWR examine and instruct which
51 For further reading: FAO (2003): ‘Fertilizer use by crop in Uzbekistan’ , Rome: FAO 52 Personal communications, Kirsten Kienzler (Ph.D. candidate ZEF, Bonn), 15/02/2007. 53 For fuel and lubricants this is UzNeftMakhsulot JSC and for chemicals this is UzKishlokHujalikKimyo JSC. 54 UzKishlokHujalikKimyo Company’ is transferred into ‘Uzkhimprom State Joint Stock Company’ (CER, 2005a.
67 fertilizers and pesticides should be used. They compose a contract with the chemical plant. All fermers should apply the fertilizers which are distributed by the agricultural specialists and they are advised on the method of application . The new established company ‘Uzkhimprom SJSC’ has been appointed to establish a network of local warehouses, which are primarily located on the territory of reorganised shirkats (CER, 2005b). Despite these efforts the Center for Economic Research (CER) has experienced some major constraints in the functioning of the chemical plants. It appears that the warehouses of the fertilizer company are reluctant to work with fermers on the basis of fixed contracts. This could be explained by the lack of market mechanisms and competition due to the monopolistic position of the only chemical plant. The terms of agreement are often violated in practice, with untimely delivery of resources occurring practically all over the country (CER, 2005a). The prices of the inputs concerned are as mentioned, subsidised. International trade is based upon market prices which are substantially higher. From an economic point of view, as is stated by the CER, the existing system of price support restricts the emergence of market principles, such as free price formation and choice of contractors, and it enables the government to continue its controlling position. This all reduces efficient resource utilization and profitability of fermers. Fermers have to cope with shortages and they are more or less forced to obtain resources of lower quality. This negatively affects the harvest. In addition many fermers declare that they are not always provided with the amounts of fertilizers and fuel and lubricants that are stipulated in the agreements. Altogether this makes clear that fermers are facing high transaction costs considering the current system of input supply. According to the CER many fermers would give preference to privatisation of the chemical plants which are currently still strictly state controlled (CER, 2005b), yet other research indicates that fermers benefit more from the current subsidized system, which is also concluded by Rudenko and Lamers (Rudenko et al., 2006). The following table provides the average rates of fertilizers used for the production of cotton and wheat. The numbers show that the applied quantities are well below the by Uzbek scientists recommended amounts. Since the common applied fertilizers are combinations of Nitrogen, Phosphorous and Potassium (K) it is difficult to assess the real recommended quantities and it has been impossible to identify the maximum allowed quantities.
Use of mineral fertilizers, thousand tonnes
Crop/Year Total Nitrogen Phosphorus Potash Yield (t/ha) (N) (P 2O5) (K 2O) Cotton Recommended 215-250 145-165 95-110 1998 385 290 69 26 2.1 1999 411 299 83 30 2.4 2000 355 291 62 2 2.2 Wheat Recommended 150-200 100-120 50 1998 266 214 30 22 2.3 1999 259 221 36 2 2.3 2000 247 201 35 11 2.7 Note: the numbers are determined upon the average rates for different varieties of the crops Table 5.5 Fertilizer Use per Hectare Arable Irrigated Land for Cotton and Wheat (1998-2000) (source: FAO, 2003)
The following Table 5.6 gives an indication about the differences in input use between shirkats and other farm types which are primarily fermers. The CER states that fermers do turn out to be more concerned about the economic, efficient use of inputs than shirkats which are sometimes described as ‘ownerless’ (CER, 2005b). The numbers of Table 5.6 justify this statement and could be used to validate the assumption that privatisation, or rather in the Uzbek situation individualisation, is an incentive to more economically mode of farming. Nonetheless it is questionable what the reasons for economic farming really are. First of all this should be explained by the high prices for the inputs and the bad financial situation of fermers. They are forced to allocate their resources in the most efficient way. Therefore the decrease in overall consumption of inputs should first of all be attributed to the
68 financial position of fermers. Shirkats were provided by inputs by the state whereas fermers nowadays are only supplied with subsidised inputs for the state related production (not free of payment). Fermers can acquire additional inputs through legal channels but these are not subsidised (Rudenko et al., 2006). Nevertheless free, individual access to resources is crucial for ensuring the autonomy of newly- established farming entities. Only in this way fermers can become independent. The set up of free purchase and sales potentials creates the assumption that fermers are more autonomous nowadays, but it is obvious that most of them do not really possess decision-making power over their inputs. Moreover, as is reported above, fermers seem to benefit from the current subsidized system. Without this structure their ability to obtain inputs would probably be much worse.
Consumption per hectare (kg/ha) Fuel and Lubricants Mineral Fertilizers Region 2003 2004 +/- 2003 2004 +/- (shirkats) (other farm types (%) (shirkats) (other farm types (%) on the same plots on the same plots of land) of land)
Karakalpakstan 317.3 234.5 - 26.1 406.8 320.0 - 21.3
Andijan 391.0 135.8 - 65.3 308.0 241.5 - 21.6 Bukhara 266.0 252.0 - 5.3 336.0 335.0 - 0.3 Djizak 233.0 211.0 - 9.4 438.0 385.0 - 12.1 Kashkadarya 149.0 128.0 - 14.1 231.4 183.0 - 20.9 Navoiy 319.0 272.0 - 14.7 417.0 386.0 - 7.4 Namangan 203.0 182.0 - 10.3 401.0 291.0 - 27.4 Samarkand 351.0 285.0 - 18.8 416.0 425.0 + 2.2 Surkhandarya 353.0 325.6 - 7.8 556.4 504.9 - 9.3 Syrdarya 331.0 291.0 - 12.1 318.0 286.0 - 10.1 Tashkent 252.1 188.7 - 25.1 268.0 253.5 - 5.4 Ferghana 360.0 291.0 - 19.2 427.0 403.0 - 5.6 Khorezm 343.0 233.0 - 32.1 366.0 273.0 - 25.4
Uzbekistan 266.1 210.4 -20.9 326.1 310.0 -14.4 * Comparison of indicators of 284 shirkats (2003) and 12,600 farming entities established on their basis in line with the Cabinet of Ministers Resolution #476 dated 30 October 2003. Table 5.6 Comparative Analysis of Fuel, Lubricant and Mineral Fertilizer Consumption under Shirkats and other forms of farming entities* (Ferms) (source: based on table published in CER, 2005b)
5.3.3.2 The control of fertilizer and pesticide storage and use The application of fertilizers and pesticides are controlled by inspectors of the MAWR. They do not specifically monitor the application but rather whether the provided amounts are indeed applied on the fields and are not stored anywhere. Although there are general requirements regulating procedures for storing and selling fertilizers and pesticides, there are no regulatory documents specifying operations of these facilities. In 2004 several storehouses of chemical plants had to close down because they could not satisfy the standards on fertilizer and pesticide storage (CER, 2005b). Governmental officials argue that the main reason for the ban on storage (in particular by fermers) is that some chemicals are very toxic or dangerous 55 , but it is assumable that they want to prevent fermers to use the chemicals for production for non-state purposes, and for non-agricultural purposes as some chemicals have rather explosive characteristics. Officials of the MAWR claim to have complete control over the application of the fertilizers, yet it is known that there are many fermers that save a part of the state provided fertilizers for other crops; they allocate it to cash crops that have a higher marketable value for fermers. Even more, some fermers try to smuggle chemical inputs to
55 It must be noted that in principle (in original form) every chemical is toxic. It depends merely on the concentration and the method of the application if the chemical will have toxic effects. As described earlier, only for the supply and use of ammonium nitrate there holds a special procedure.
69 neighbouring countries in order to obtain high prices for it and thereupon decrease their debts (Guadagni et al., 2005) 56 . They are however, subject to the plans which they have to complete and cannot risk loosing too much of the production of cotton and wheat. Besides the control on application there is no additional monitoring on tamorkas or other fields. The quality of food crops is monitored by the MAWR and the Sanitary Epidemiological Service (SES) from the Ministry of Health. This monitoring is conducted at the bazaar or wholesale.
5.3.4 Water use Until now, the government of Uzbekistan is responsible for the main irrigation canals, though this is no guarantee of proper operations. The current drainage system is known to be very inefficient. After the collapse of the Soviet Union governmental organisations of the independent states became responsible for maintenance and operation of the drainage systems. Due to other priorities and the economic collapse the maintenance lost attention and fell into disrepair, they became out-dated. From the 1990s onwards the feeling of urgency to improve the water management and water supply in the rural areas increased. In general there is a lack of awareness among fermers. The majority of fermers does not directly perceive problems, only those that are confronted with water shortages. Fermers and shirkats apply old technologies for irrigation of their land and have not been able to execute a fundamental renovation of the system, mainly due to a lack of financing. The efficiency of the water use is rather low. Loss of water caused by to leakages sometimes increases up to 50% and over irrigation intersects with water flowing of the field including essential soil components and fertilizers. It implies a loss for fermers but even more it causes diffuse pollution of ground water sources and soils. Table 5.7 obviously indicates the large quantities of water used by irrigation and drainage systems. Over 90% of the total water use is allocated to irrigation and drainage purposes. Although the numbers are somewhat outdated, they are still relevant today, but it must be acknowledged that agriculture is one of the highest water consumers worldwide, also in other countries. Over the years a declining trend can be seen in total water use and in water used by irrigation and drainage. It must be stressed that the share of water used by irrigation and drainage remained fairly equal; nonetheless the volume of water did decrease. This has been the result of slight technological improvements, reduced water supply for irrigation and some changes in the cropping patterns. It is clear that the improvements and renovations have only been marginal; fundamental recovery of the systems has not been implemented.
Total Drinking-water Agricultural Industrial Fishery Irrigation and supply water supply* water supply Drainage
million million as of % million as of million as of million as of % million as of % m3 of total % % m3 of total m3 of total m3 m3 of m3 of total total
1988 68,068 1,609 2.3% 1,022 1.5% 1,990 2.9% 475 0.7% 63,972 92.6% 1990 63,610 2,353 2.7% 723 1.1% 1,298 2,0% 1,080 1.7% 58,156 91.4% 1992 63,271 2,051 3.2% 839 1.3% 1,260 2.0% 783 1.2% 58.338 92.2% 1994 58,564 2,580 4.4% 950 1.6% 1,100 1.9% 534 0.9% 53,400 91.2% 1996 54,974 2,354 4.3% 712 1.3% 844 1.5% 503 0.9% 50,561 92.0% 1998 57,920 2,205 3.8% 1,120 1.9% 902 1.6% 821 1.4% 52,872 91.3% * Excluding irrigation Table 5.7 Trends in Water Use in different Sectors of the National Economy (1988-1998) (source: National Environmental Action Plan, State Committee for Nature Protection, 2000 in UNECE, 2001)
56 Personal communication Kirsten Kienzler (Ph.D. candidate ZEF, Bonn), 15/02/2007 for further reading see: Djanibekov 2005, Guadagni et al. 2005.
70 There are essential differences between crops in water demand, but these differences depend upon different factors. In pure biological terms the differences might by only marginal; the actual differences in water consumption result from the specific irrigation practices that the crops require, the vegetative period and the particularities of the land concerned (Interview Abduallev, I. IWMI-CAC Tashkent, 17/11/2006). Regarding the cubic meters (qm) that are allocated to cotton and wheat, arguably cotton needs more water because of high leaching requirements. On the contrary in biological terms cotton (and also alfalfa) do not benefit from high amounts of water whereas the cultivation of wheat requires substantial more water, not to speak about rice. Logically during the warmest season the water demand of crops is at its highest. The enlargement of wheat cultivation has required a prolonged use of the drainage system. The vegetation period of wheat covers nine or ten months, which implies that drainage systems have to be in process for almost the entire year. For other crops the drainage systems are not active during the winter period. The winter season used to be the period to clean and maintain the water systems but the cultivation of wheat has made this rather difficult (Interview Abduallev, I. IWMI-CAC Tashkent, 17/11/2006). For rice, Uzbek fermers practice flood irrigation during the entire vegetation period. It could also be irrigated by furrows, but this is not practiced by Uzbek farmers 57,58 . Flood irrigation increases the groundwater table. The production of cotton is associated with the environmental disaster of the Aral Sea. It is by many blamed guilty for the worse condition of the Uzbek environment, in particular by the international community. Remarkably the production of the cotton crop as such is not the main problem; it is rather the induced cotton policy of the past half century that demanded huge amounts of irrigation water. The enormous water irrigation systems, in combination with heavy use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, have and in some areas still do, polluted water and soil resources; mainly as a result of the strongly subsidised system. There were no incentives to efficiently and carefully apply inputs. The subsidised systems were not really typical for the SU; on international scale it was a common practice from the 1950 onwards 59 . The negative impact caused by irrational water use is not only experienced on agricultural fields; the surrounding area is also suffering from water logging, the return of drainage water and high ground water tables . ‘Drainage water is allowed to be contaminated to a small extent as it is the drain of the irrigated field, yet if it is reused again to irrigate fields without treatment this can cause problems’ 60 . Dehkan farmers allocate water according to the needs of their crops, depending upon the availability of water after the consumption for (other) household needs. Some households receive water by turn, other have permanent water supply. For shirkats and fermers the irrigation of fields takes place in a similar way. A canal with side branches flows at the high side of the field and in this way the water ‘streams’ over the fields. This common practice is inexpensive but known to be inefficient. Fermers conclude a water contract with their Water Use Association (WUA) for the entire year. The allocation of water to fermers and shirkats is limited. The planning of water allocation to individual fermers is based upon the planning of their cropping pattern, but it is restricted to a maximum of three crops. Since cotton and wheat are fixed in the pattern for most fermers, the other crop concerns often rice or a kind of vegetable. For the crops different official water limits are determined (Wegerich, 2006). Water is supplied in frequencies along the year in sufficient amounts, at least in water-rich years. Following Wegerich (2006) the allocation of water to fermers is based upon three factors: a. the structure and the area of cropped land; b. the irrigation regime (method, norm, period); and c. efficiency of the irrigation network and irrigation technique. (World Bank, 1996; Tacis, 1997 in Wegerich, 2006) It is clear that the water availability for other crops depends upon the amount of water that is used for the production of cotton and wheat. As long as the cotton and wheat production are guaranteed, excessive water can be used for other crops. Wegerich (2006) has observed in Khorezm that fermers
57 Personal communication, Iskandar Abdullaev (Water Management Specialist, IWMI Tashkent), 16/02/2007 58 Wet rice was introduced by the Koreans during the Soviet Union, before there was only dry rice cultivation. (Personal communications, Personal communication Kai Wegerich (Dr. Integrated Water Management WUR, Wageningen), 02/03/2007) 59 Personal communication Kai Wegerich (Dr. Integrated Water Management WUR, Wageningen), 02/03/2007 60 As stated by Kienzler, personal communication, Kirsten Kienzler (Ph.D. candidate ZEF, Bonn), 15/02/2007
71 under-irrigate the state-order crops in order to have more water available for cash crops. Another method to save water for cash crops is to refrain from leaching during the winter season, but this is not possible for all crops since not all crops are grown during that period, which is the ‘non-vegetative’ period. Through a more official procedure 61 to acquire additional water, fermers can demand additional water from the WUAs against payment 62 . This is a means for the WUAs to obtain some additional income (Wegerich, 2006).
5.4 Concluding remarks after this chapter
After this comprehensive chapter it is noteworthy to make some concluding remarks. This chapter is written to serve as background information for Chapter 6, in order to understand the underlying rules and procedures under which fermers, dehkan farms and shirkats in the Chirchik rayons operate. Beginning with the transition process and agrarian reform, it has become clear that the transition in Uzbekistan has been a gradual process until today. The political system is autocratic with marginal involvement of the society and a lack of political control over power. The historical background of agriculture of the last century has clarified the situation out of which the current structure of farming has developed. Cotton has been of high priority in almost the last 90 years . The agrarian reform that was initiated after independence and that proceeds until now, has not fundamentally altered the state influence upon agriculture and the related top-down decision-making. These procedures, mainly based upon the command economy and state production management of the Soviet regime have remained intact. The legislative framework concerning land use gives leeway for arbitrariness and in reality it does not state provisions to hold governmental agencies or officials accountable for their practices (as said, there is no political control over power). The numerous agencies and actors involved in the governance of agriculture have been described in the latter section, which validate that involvement and participation of fermers over their farm patterns is only marginal. The hokim possesses a crucial position in the establishment and continuation of an individual farm. He has the right to allocate land or on the other hand liquidate farms. The dominance of the government results in the consequences explained in the general farm patterns, which are quite uniform all over the republic, at least when it concerns fermers’ patterns. The crop diversity in Uzbekistan is low and the entire system of supply and procurement of agricultural inputs is organized by governmental institutions. Individual fermers face severe constraints in their working; the payment for the state production is often late and supply of input is not in accordance with the agreements, which negatively impacts the harvest. For the household production fermers and dehkan farmers have more freedom, which results in a high(er) diversity of crops. The inputs used for this are primarily obtained through informal distribution channels. The allocation of water is limited to some extent and fermers are dependent upon the calculation conducted by staff of the WUA, yet there are fermers that succeed to obtain more water through different procedures. Nevertheless from an environmental and social point of view the establishment of the WUAs has improved the system of water use. The changed structure of points of supply guarantees a more equal supply of water to all the water users located at one canal.
61 It is not known (by the author) whether this is a legal procedure. 62 Wegerich (2006) has described the different procedures in the Khorezm region, for further reading: Wegerich (2006): ‘Illicit’ water: un-accounted, but paid for. Observations on rent-seeking as causes of drainage floods in the lower Amu Darya Basin’.
72 6. THE FARMING PATTERN IN URTA , YUKORI AND QUYI CHIRCHIK
With the previous chapters in mind, now it is time to focus upon Urta, Yukori and Quyi Chirchik and to zoom in upon farming over there. This part provides an introduction into the communities, followed by the farming patterns in the Chirchik rayons.
6.1 An introduction into the research area: Tashkent Oblast
Tashkent Oblast is divided into 15 rayons and is located in the North-Eastern part of the country. It is located 350-500 meters above the sea level in the northeast part of Uzbekistan between the western slopes of the Tien-Shan mountain ranges and the Syr Darya River. The primary water source is the Chirchik River that springs in the mountains in Kyrgyzstan and traverses the oblast. It is a tributary of the Syr Darya. Tashkent oblast is located in the middle of the Syr Darya Basin. The total area covers 15,300 square kilometres. The climate is continental with moderate and humid winters and hot and dry summers; the sun is abundant in the summer season and together with rather fertile soils and sufficient water availability the agricultural production can be high and diversified (Karimov, without date). There are favourable conditions for farming. The environmental problems that are sometimes observed in other parts of the country and that limit farmers’ possibilities, such as shortages in water supply, incidental droughts and soil erosion are not really experienced in Tashkent Oblast (Interview Abduallev, I. IWMI-CAC Tashkent, 17/11/2006). The bonitation of the agricultural fields seems rather high compared to other areas. Within this research the bonitation of the farms visited varied between 45 and 70. The agricultural production comprises primarily cotton and wheat and a variety of other crops, important vegetables and fruits like pomegranate, grapes, melons and cherries. Within the surrounding viticulture is employed. Urta (Up), Yukori (Middle) and Quyi (Low) Chirchik surround Tashkent in the north, east and south. Saidovul and Ozbekistan are located close to Tashkent, on about 20 kilometres of the capital, whereas Toshovul is at a distance of 50 kilometres. Although the rayons are closely boundering with suburban and urban areas, until now agriculture has maintained its importance but is seemingly loosing its prime position. Life is strongly related with farming but many people are working in the proximity of Tashkent, in particular young people are increasingly applying for off-farm work. The disappearance of the shirkats forces former workers to look for new or other employment. Countrywide agricultural employment declined but wages per employed worker have risen (Kahn, 2005).
Figure 6.1 A closer look at Tashkent Oblast (source: Karimov (without date))
73 Tashkent Oblast is one of the last rayons where shirkats are being dissolved; the shirkats included in the survey will be dissolved by the end of 2006. In nine of the rayons in Tashkent oblast the fermers and shirkats are subject to cotton and wheat state quotas; in the other six they are directed by the government to grow other crops, such as carrots, cucumbers, potatoes and tomatoes. These rayons are Ahangaran, Parkent, Kibray, Sangota, Tashkent Rayon and Bustonlik (Interview Āallachilik Ilmiy Tadqiqot Instituti’, Saidovul 29/09/06). As becomes clear from the following portrayals, the three settlements share at least one feature: there is a small number of individual farms supplemented by many households. In Toshovul and Ozbekistan there was a shirkat in operation, although both were in their last year of existence.
6.2 Farming in the three rayons
6.2.1 Urta (Up) Chirchik: Saidovul Saidovul is a small kishlak composed of approximately 150 families. In the past all the agricultural land surrounding Saidovul was owned by the shirkat ‘Kimpen Hwa’. The shirkat has been closed down in 2000. By that year private farming really started with the distribution of land to fermers, most of which were former shirkat staff and workers that were able to tender for land. Today there are four private farms in Saidovul, of which three fermers have worked at Kimpen Hwa. Initially more fermers started to work individually but some were forced to stop, failing to fulfil the state orders. People in the village are reluctant to talk about those, apparently sensitive, issues and names are not mentioned. A fermer that does not succeed to comply to the contract requirements is given an exemption of one year. If he fails again the next year the fermer is forced to give up his farm and look for other employment. Regularly such a fermer tries to find work on another farm. The liquidation of (in governmental perception) unprofitable farms enables other fermers in the surrounding to expand the size of their farm; the four in Saidovul are now of considerable size after frequent increases and they appear to be eager to enlarge further. All ferms produce rice next to cotton and wheat. Recently one of the fermers constructed a rice mill and another rice mill was built two years ago by a pudrat cultivating rice on a shirkat at distance. The pudrat can keep a surplus of rice produced above the quota for own consumption and sales. The rice mill is not only used for own production; other families also make use of it. The largest farm ‘Saidovul’ is certified by the Āallachilik Seed Institute to reproduce wheat seeds. In the Chirchik rayons the ‘ Āallachilik Ilmiy Tadqiqot Instituti’ is responsible for the distribution of wheat seeds to fermers. The institute cooperates with state research institutes and local fermers, in order to provide suitable wheat seeds to fermers. The few selected ferms have professionalized their seed reproduction and preparation and have been certified; they distribute the foundation seeds to other fermers. The priority is to fulfil the state quota; the seeds for reproduction are generated from the surplus produced above the amount procured by the state. In turn these certified ferms receive additional income for their production. On the farm Saidovul investments have been made in plants for processing grain (husking and cleaning of wheat and rice) which enables the fermer to deliver ‘ready-made’ seeds to other fermers. The fermer receives a much higher procurement price for wheat for the provision of processed grain from the processing plant (Kahn, 2005). Apparently the specialisation and favourable position grants the fermer a luxury position. The farm has increased in size the last years step by step and comprises more than 300 hectares nowadays. According to a previously executed case study by Kahn (2005) the initial size of the farm Saidovul was 200 hectares and there is a mixed farm system; arable farming in combination with livestock production 63 . The same case study mentioned that the fermer was an elderly man that started with his three sons. The fermer was granted the large amount of agricultural fields due to his capital and proof of worthiness for bank loans, and based on the arguments that he was highly educated and experienced in management, building and construction. Because he did not live on the farm and did not have experience in farming, he hired a highly qualified agronomist as a deputy (Kahn, 2005). Workers on the farm expect that the farm will expand more in the coming years, possibly even up to a size of 1000 hectares. There is no second harvest production, simply because there is no need and time for it. The
63 During the interviews there was no talk of livestock farming, there was no information provided on it neither did the interviewer got the impression on the farm itself that there was any livestock production.
74 cotton and wheat yields are sufficiently high and profitable. Yearly the fermer purchases additional chemical fertilizers to enhance the production and as a safeguard if the state deliveries are late. Late application of fertilizers affects the production and thus the yields will be lower. From the government’s supply he applies two times Ammofos (Mono-ammonium Phosphate) (120 kg/ha) and once Cilitra 64 (120 kg/ha). In total, with the additionally bought fertilizers, the total amounts are approximately 200 kg/ha per application. There is a high degree of mechanisation and the fermer owns a variety of machinery which is also borrowed by other fermers. Although the others fermers in Saidovul have also increased in size the last years, they are not larger than 85 hectares, it is evident that the farm Saidovul dominates over the others.
Figure 6.2 The Lay-out of the farm Saidovul. The table at the left classifies and ranks the fields according to their bonitation rate. At present the farm comprises 195 hectare 65 .
One of the fermers, Ulugbek Javlonbek, is permitted by the government to grow fruits under a contracting requirement with an Agrofirm. He has started to grow an orchard on 5 hectares of his land, but the trees do not produce fruits yet. The fermer applies chemical fertilizers for the entire production except for the crops grown on the tamorka. The chemicals for the orchard are provided by the government, comparable with the state deliveries for cotton and wheat. The application rates have increased over the years. All the dehkan farmers and fermers fertilise their land with animal manure, in particularly the use of chicken manure is considered to be very beneficial. This common practice was taken over by all fermers from Kimpen Hwa.
64 Cilitra is a frequently mentioned that is applied by fermers; unfortunately it was not possible to identify the exact elements where cilitra consists of. 65 During the interview on the farm, it was said that the present size of the farm is 195 ha. This seems contradictive to the information provided in the case study of Kahn (2005). Unfortunately these inconsistencies were only noticed afterwards.
75 There are some dehkan farmers that grow vegetables on the tamorka for sales and a small number of them has a sharecropping arrangement with fermers in the surrounding, cultivated for commercial purposes. Dehkan farmer Nishonov Anvar rents 1 hectare of a fermer nearby every year. He cannot rent the same part of land ever year but he aims to get a good field every year. The bonitation rate is unknown; but the dehkan farmer can assess the fertility of the fields on his experience. He is free in crop selection; the rent is tax-based. On this so-called ‘arenda’ he grows one specific crop per year, which he can harvest for two or three times. The field is solely cultivated for commercial purposes to supplement the household income. Nishonov is not a full-time farmer; he has other off-farm employment. Throughout the years his experience as a farmer has increased and therefore he is consulted by relatives and neighbours for advice about seeds and other farm practices. He says to be careful with giving concrete advices, afraid to be blamed when expectations will not ‘come out’. According to the dehkan farmer, first of all the application of animal manure is essential for the soil fertility, supplemented with the fertilizers Ammofos and Cilitra and chemical additives. All the chemicals are bought from local dealers. The additives are used to make the crops look more attractive. In 2006 he grew cucumbers from Dutch seeds and the additives were also imported from the Netherlands. He considers the amounts of fertilizers to be minimal; from both the fertilizers around 150 kilograms per hectare are applied. According to the dehkan farmer the maximum allowed quantity is 200 kg/ha 66 . This amount is fairly equal with the amounts applied by fermers on cotton and wheat fields. On the tamorka there are no chemicals used. The work on the arenda is done by the family; only under time pressure other people are hired. He owns a small tractor for the rough work. The tamorka of the family is solely grown with crops for family consumption, such as potatoes, tomatoes and carrots. Some other dehkan families in Saidovul that are able to obtain fertilizers from the fermer or shirkat on which the head of the family is working are applying small amounts of fertilizers on their tamorka, but these amounts are not known precisely. In general the dehkan farmers only use animal manure to fertilise the tamorka. The local Water Use Association (WUA) coordinates the water supply to all the fermers in Saidovul. The households receive water free of charge. Some houses have their own pumping system; others receive water by turn in negotiation with neighbours.
6.2.2 Quyi (Low) Chirchik: Toshovul Compared to Saidovul, Toshovul is a larger kishlak; there are living about 1,000 families. Within the settlement there is one shirkat and there are currently four individual fermers. Larger scale private farming will really start by 2007 when the shirkat is dissolved. All land purchased by the fermers was previously owned by the shirkat. The shirkat was established in 1929 as a kolkhoz and covered about 1800 hectares. In 1999 the kolkhoz was transformed into a shirkat, but already since the early 1990s small fields were distributed to local residents and the first fermers. The transformation of the kolkhoz implied first of all the (partial) transfer of responsibility over the production from individual workers to pudrats. The last years the yields of the shirkat are declining, and according to the government’s decree the shirkat will end operating at the end of 2006 67 . Today the size of the shirkat is about 1750 hectares and it is expected that the land will be divided into approximately 50 fermers. The shirkat possesses a prominent place in Toshovul. Many local residents are employed by the shirkat and a large number of families are working as pudrats. Everyone knows each other quite well. The agronomist of the shirkat cycles daily through the street on his old bike and greets everyone, visits pudrats and their fields. Individual workers that are employed as tractor drivers are allowed to use the tractor for the household tamorka. In the past the kolkhoz had a mixed farming system with livestock and arable farming and the variety of crops was diverse: wheat, cotton, rice, watermelon, onions, potato, carrots, cabbage, and maize. In addition a part of land was allocated to seed reproduction. Nowadays in light of the liquidation the crop mix has declined, with cotton and wheat occupying the major part of land.
66 It has not been possible to compare these amounts with standards or regulations 67 As mentioned the liquidation of shirkats was in its last phase in 2006; countrywide most shirkats have been dissolved already in previous years.
76
(the numbers are of a previous year) Figure 6.3 and 6.4 The Production Board of the Shirkat Toshovul Most shirkats advertised the production numbers on these kinds of boards, which state the information concerning the farm production (for livestock and crops). Underneath the one for cotton, providing information such as the number of pudrats for cotton, the number of hectares grown with the crop and the yields.
Land use concerning cotton and wheat and the related quotas is regulated by the government; for other crops the shirkat board, consisting of 11 members, determines the cropping pattern. The board stipulates the pudrat contracts which specify which crops and what quantities have to be produced. If pudrats do not accomplish their contract requirements they will have to obtain the deficit amounts of harvest elsewhere or acquire understanding from the board for particular (natural) constraints, such as an incidental drought. In order to become a pudratchi, families have to go through a kind of application. The reputation of the family within the local community is of importance; it largely determines the possibilities for the family to become a pudrat. The room for manoeuvre and the opportunities of pudrats are largely determined upon the agricultural performance and reputation. They have to prove their experience, give information about their financial capital and family members. The average size of a pudrat land on this shirkat is 25 hectares. The supply of fertilizers and pesticides alike the water distribution, is coordinated by specialised staff. Pudrats are not involved in these practices. Pudrats that produce vegetables are responsible to purchase appropriate seeds; most of
77 them are cultivating the same crops every year and have developed knowledge on the particular crop and the appropriate variety. The money is reimbursed by the shirkat afterwards. Crop rotation is obligatory which implies that most of the pudrats yearly move to other fields. The full harvest of cotton is purchased by the state, for the other crops the shirkat sells the production to the wholesale and middlemen. Depending on the sharecropping agreement a part of the surpluses of wheat, rice and vegetables that are produced are at the pudrat’s discretion. Occasionally pudrats that perform well are granted land for free use by the rais. At the moment four fermers work independently outside of the shirkat. Three of them established their farm after the law of 1992; the ‘Law on Peasant Farms’ while the last one started three years ago. The individual farms are of relative small size compared to fermers in the surrounding that have started in later years, but all the four fermers will tender for land in 2007 to expand the size of their farm. Fermer Sherbek is part-time fermer; he leases only 3.5 hectares and has off-farm work as a teacher. He started in 1994 and learned farming from his parents. He produces wheat on 2 hectares and rotates maize and mosh (peas) on 1.5 hectares of land. The fermer’s fields do not satisfy the requirements for the production of cotton; it is needed to have stretched fields. Sherbek is going to tender for land to expand the size up to 30 or 40 hectares and this will imply that he will have to produce cotton in addition to his current crops. He says not to be hampered in farming and perceives no restrictions in his freedom of working. The latest started fermer in Toshovul leases 15 hectares, of which 0.35 hectares is built with greenhouses for tomatoes. On the major part of land the fermer yearly rotates cotton and wheat. The initiative to grow tomatoes was taken by the fermer after an advertisement of a dealer. The 7 individual workers that are employed by the fermer were all working on the shirkat preceding this work. The allocation of water is determined by an external mirab and the fermer hires additional workers to irrigate the land. The fermer purchases chemicals for the tomatoes in addition to the use of animal manure. The fertilizers for wheat are provided by the state. The fermer himself is not actively working on the fields, frequently he visits the fields to control the workers 68 . The dehkan farmers in Ozbekistan are working comparable to those in Saidovul. The majority of them does not apply any fertilizer at all, although some of them could obtain it from the shirkat. The possibility for dehkan farmers to obtain a small field from the shirkat to extend the tamorka was limited to small sizes of less than 1 hectare. A number of dehkan farmers can make temporary use of equipment from the shirkat for their household production if needed. Some of the people do not live permanently in Toshovul; they live and work in Tashkent and have a datcha (a small second house in the rural area) in Toshovul.
6.2.3 Yukori (Middle) Chirchik: Ozbekistan Ozbekistan is the largest settlement of the three included in this case study. The shirkat Ozbekistan is in its last year of operation and will close-down by the end of 2006 69 . The shirkat still occupies the major part of agricultural land but the staff is preparing for the close-down. Already in the years before the shirkat has started to distribute land to former workers that wanted to establish an individual farm. It is said that there are around 20 farms today that are established on former shirkat land, of which five are located in Ozbekistan. Many local residents are employed by the shirkat either as individual workers or families in the form of pudrats. Some of the fermers have sharecropping agreements with households. The most pudrats intend to start an individual farm after the liquidation of the shirkat since they have acquired much experience in farming through the years. One of them is pudrat-leader Muhktar. He is cultivating land of the shirkat for 24 years already. He is satisfied with the land, with bonitation rates varying between 40 and 70, and intends to tender for these particular fields. Mukhtar has always been agronomist on the shirkat and this enabled him to start as a pudrat-leader. He is responsible for the cultivation of 17 hectares of cotton and 15 hectares of wheat. The cotton harvest is fully obtained by the state and after fulfilment of the wheat quota the pudrat is allowed to keep 60% of the produced wheat surplus for family consumption as a part of the salary; the left 40% is obtained by the shirkat. The quotas are rather high in comparison to other fermers; 4.2 t/ha for wheat and 3 t/ha for
68 The workers were not allowed to talk about the farm without permission of the fermer. 69 Unfortunately it was impossible to visit the shirkat and the information about the shirkat provided by pudrats and workers appeared deviating and thus unreliable.
78 cotton. After the wheat harvest the pudrat is allowed to grow a second harvest, nonetheless 10 hectares (of the 15 ha.) have to remain fallow after the wheat harvest. This is stipulated by the shirkat staff and is the consequence of water availability and the need to give the land time to ‘recover’. The second harvest serves for household consumption and is partially sold to supplement the income. The crops are selected by demand of the market and the work-load, which should not be too heavy. The seeds for the second harvest are mainly from own reproduction and additional seeds are bought from different suppliers. Seeds for the cotton and wheat production are distributed by the shirkat that is again supplied by the shirkat ‘Gullistan’ nearby that reproduces certified seeds. The chemical fertilizers, (Ammofos, Sulphate, Carbamide) are also provided by the shirkat and the pudrat-leader does not know the exact amounts. For the second harvest only animal manure is applied. According to Muhktar the harvest looses its quality if he would use chemicals; they are not considered necessary. The pudrat- leader expects that many things will improve after the establishment of an own farm. He will not depend on the shirkat any longer for the supply of water, chemical inputs and the use of equipment. Moreover he can directly contract workers, hire machinery and can bargain for prices. Unfortunately the total amount of water that is provided will remain equal and thus the water availability will remain a constraint for the second harvest. One of the newest established fermers, Todjiboy, started in 2005 immediately with 95 hectares of land. He had been agronomist and rais of the shirkat but in 2004 he decided to start as an individual fermer. A joint project of the shirkat with an American enterprise (Chicago MGP) that was focussed upon cotton seeds had failed and he was afraid to loose his job. Another reason for his decision was that he had developed ideas for a new way of farming. The fermer is fascinated by an alternative way of farming where he has been reading about; he is convinced that astronomic influences can enhance the agricultural production and intends to start experiencing with it, but he has not shared his ideas with others yet. He is informed by articles and books that detail how the farming practices should be adjusted to the position of the moon and stars. Nonetheless the fermer is applying chemical fertilizers according to the state orders and he does not perceive it as harmful or against his ideas. He argues that the amounts applied in the past were much higher and that everyone is trying to reduce the use of chemicals. To combat pests he sprays a liquid from plant roots of tomato and potato which works to a certain degree. Todjiboy has witnessed that in general yields increase when land is taken over by fermers. Evidently not all fermers in Ozbekistan are in a favourable position. Fermer Jarabek established his farm in 2000 with a size of 9 hectares. He and the family were already working for years as a pudrat. He wanted to become more responsible for the production and to become aware of the money and input flows. The fermer does not know the bonitation of his field but he has experienced that some parts of his land are not very fertile. He has difficulties to accomplish the wheat plans and is very afraid that he will have to give up his farm since the problems are worsening with increasing quotas year by year. This makes the future pretty uncertain. Until now he achieves to produce wheat exactly in agreement with the state quota: 3 tons/hectare. For cotton he is able to produce 3 tons/ha with the state quota of 2.7 tons/ha. According to the fermer the wheat seeds are not appropriate for his fields. He has requested for others several times and discussed the problems in meetings of the fermers’ association but until now no re-assessment for seeds has taken place.
‘I don’t know about the future. The last years have been difficult. The wheat seeds do not fit my fields; I cannot accomplish the state plans and I have consulted the fermers’ association and the agronom several times for help. I need another type of seed. But until now nothing has changed. It seems like I’m the only one with such problems. I’m really concerned about the wheat yields. I’m afraid I will loose my land.’
(Interview fermer Jarabek, Ozbekistan 03/11/2006)
Because a large part of the farm land is very stony, Jarabek is permitted to grow an orchard and to build greenhouses for vegetables, with the prerequisite that he will fulfil a state plan for it. He
79 explicitly says not to be involved in the determination of fertilizers use; he just applies them according to the government’s advice. Only for cotton and wheat chemicals are used, for the vegetables and orchard animal manure is sufficient. In total he applies approximately 500 kg/ha of fertilizers, consisting of Ammofos, Sulphate, Cilitra and Carbamide. This total amount seems rather high compared to other fermers. He is frequently visited by experts that advice him in his work. The fermer is not in a good position for the water supply. He is strongly dependent of others’ water uptake since he is located at distance from the central point of supply and experiences problems in peak seasons. One of the livestock producing fermers in Ozbekistan, Tano, has recently imported cows from The Netherlands. Ergash, a sharecropper on his farm is cultivating rice and alfalfa and soya for the cattle, 1.5; 30 and 1.2 hectare respectively. The sharecropper is very enthusiastic about the Dutch agriculture and the coming of the cows is known by many people in Ozbekistan. Ergash cultivates the crops under contract; the quotas are determined by the fermer and the surpluses of the production are for the sharecropper; it is sold at the bazaar and used for household consumption. There is no additional payment for the use of the land. The use of fertilizers (400 kg/ha of Ammofos and 300 kg/ha of Cilitra) for the cultivation of rice and soya is determined by the fermer who also provides the chemicals; for alfalfa no fertilizers are applied. Ergash does not buy additional fertilizers although he would prefer to use more. He prefers to weed manually as this benefits the crops. Nevertheless for rice a herbicide is used. Since the fermer knows a good type of seed for alfalfa he supplies the seeds for it. For rice and soya Ergash has to buy the seeds himself, which are familiar to him, on the market.
6.3 The farming tendencies in farming in the Chirchik rayons
As becomes clear from the stories above, governmental intervention and influence differs among farms; the large elite farm Saidovul with a specialised seed breeding plant is given a high degree of autonomy, whereas Jarabek as a ‘problem fermer’ is strictly controlled and more depending on external (state) assistance. The position of this fermer seems not to differ much from the freedom that any particular pudrat possesses, like Mukhtar. It is assumable that the state does not completely trust these smaller farms and questions their knowledge and experience in farming; the production of state quotas should be satisfied and therefore strong state involvement is needed. In interviews fermers express varying perceptions regarding their freedom in farming. Some feel really restricted in their practices; they would like to produce a variety of crops and have more decision-making power whereas others express that they are feeling confident with the current situation.
‘We do what we have to do...’
(Interview renter Ergash, Ozbekistan 01/11/2006)
6.3.1 The cropping patterns Fermers and shirkats in Up, Middle and Low Chirchik are subject to cotton and wheat state quotas and only occasionally fermers grow vegetables or fruits under contract. Most dehkan farmers cultivate their tamorka with a number of different vegetables and fruits, primarily as to respond and complement the daily needs, or to feed their cattle. The diversity of crops is high on the small fields. Most dehkan farmers select crops that can be stored for a longer period, especially regarding the winter season. Early in the warmer season period dehkan farmers grow tomatoes and cucumbers, and for storage during the winter season cabbage, carrots and potatoes are the dominant crops. The autonomous position of the more commercial dehkan farmers enables them to experiment and react on market fluctuations and trends, like there can be found rather new vegetables such as courgettes and broccoli at the bazaar in Tashkent. These are produced by dehkan farmers from imported seeds. Dehkan farmers can give more attention to their small tamorka and thus can grow crops that require more (manual) labour such as fresh herbs. On the shirkats the cropping pattern is yearly decided by the shirkat board with the related production quotas for pudrats; only the cultivation of cotton and wheat is stipulated by the government. The majority of pudrats (on condition that they are performing well) are directed to grow a certain crop for a number of years.
80 For many fermers the production of a second harvest is a meaningful production to acquire a reasonable income as the obliged production of cotton or wheat is far from profitable. However, many of them lack time to work intensively on the second harvest crops and for some fermers the second harvest is not of top priority. Consequently the majority of fermers included in this research prefer to grow crops that do not require a lot of work effort. The most common crops that are grown by them are fassol (beans) and mosh (mung beans). Next to supplement the farm income, some fermers know that these crops have beneficial abilities to enhance the condition of the soil. Not all crops are suited to grow as a second harvest after the wheat production; they should have a relatively short vegetation period ending before the preparation of the fields for the next wheat sowing. Some fermers give the land for temporary use to their workers as kind of salary or rent it during these months to dehkan farmers. The quotas for cotton and wheat for the fermers included in the research were determined on average on 3 t/ha, which was fairly equal for all of them. The yields vary among the farms. Over 2006, apparently the farm Saidovul achieved the highest yields: for wheat this was 4.3 up to 5.4 tons/ha, for cotton 2.9 up to 4 tons/ha, while fermer Jarabek in Ozbekistan produced for both wheat and cotton 3 tons/ha 70 . According to the International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) 71 the average wheat yields over 2005 was 4.2 tons/hectare (ICARDA, 2006) and for cotton the Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimated the average yields over 2000-2004 on 2,2 tons/ha (ADB, 2006). Most of the fermers indicate that the yields have been increasing up till now since they started as fermers, yet this resulted in an upwards spiral. Once fermers achieve to produce higher yields, this forms an incentive for the government to increase the state quotas. According to one of the fermers in Saidovul the increase in yields can be ascribed to different factors. During the Soviet period the regime accepted the achieved harvests and did not demand higher harvests; there were no incentives for workers to have a higher rate of productivity since they did not feel much responsibility for the farm production; and not the least important: the central state supply of (sometimes low qualitative) farm inputs was often unreliable and unstructured. Nowadays fermers aim to achieve high yields as it means more profit; fermers are working more efficient and with more responsibility. The cultivation of cotton requires large fields, which can be a reason for the government to permit fermers to grow only wheat under quota and in addition another crop. For fermers this is often the only possibility to grow other crops to a larger extent along the year different from cotton and wheat, like fermer Jarabek and the fermers in Saidovul that are producing rice. Rice cultivation is only allowed on peculiar there for appointed fields. It is restricted to specific areas which are inappropriate for production of other crops, in particular because of a high groundwater table. Most rice fields can be found at the tale of canals. As mentioned Tashkent oblast is located in the middle of the Syr Darya Basin and expansion of rice cultivation would affect the ground water table and harm water systems and consequently the environment. In other oblasts such as Khorezm rice cultivation is a more common practice. The ratio of land allocated to cotton and wheat on the farms is regularly around 50:50. Fermers that have livestock should also grow crops for animal fodder, such as corn and alfalfa. Since these crops are (indirectly) produced for state purposes the government distributes and coordinates the supply of inputs 72 . In the Chirchik rayons the supply of wheat seeds is coordinated by one institute, the ‘Āallachilik Ilmiy Tadqiqot Instituti’. The institute cooperates with several organisations and fermers, and a university in Tashkent. In general fermers do not express any peculiarities about the seed supply and rely upon the government for the supply of seeds, only fermer Jarabek observed and clearly expressed problems with the wheat seeds. The products grown under state contract are procured by the Agroprom and Agrofirm, for other crops fermers sell vegetables primarily to middlemen. The most dehkan farmers prefer to sell their products at the bazaar themselves to prevent the intermediate trade of (corrupt) middlemen which can make abuse of their powerful position at the bazaar. Direct sales is more profitable as farmers directly sell
70 There were considerable problems in compiling a consistent series of data. Not all fermers have given clear answers and during the second visit sometimes other numbers were given. Therefore all data provided should be used with caution. Nevertheless the overall trends become clear. 71 Since the numbers of yields given in Table 5.3 are from earlier years the choice is been made to give more recent numbers in this chapter 72 It must be noted that livestock farming was not included in the research.
81 the products against consumer prices. In general dehkan farmers produce small amounts of crops but most trade and sales takes place by middlemen; they obtain the products from different farmers. Due to a lack of time most dehkan farmers are not able to sell their own products at the bazaar. In general the seeds for the different vegetables grown on the tamorka are purchased by families in the most easy and cheapest way; primarily of own reproduction or from neighbours and relatives, occasionally seeds are purchased on the market. The commercially-oriented dehkan farmers and fermers sometimes obtain seeds through official distribution channels where they buy there seeds ad random or on advice of salesmen, like dehkan farmer Nishonov.
6.3.2 Use of fertilizers and pesticides Some fermers say they do not know exactly which kind and what quantities of fertilizers they receive and should apply 73 . This is confirmed by Kienzler (2006), as she states: ‘in Uzbekistan fertilizers are applied to staple and cash crops with only restricted knowledge by the farmers of the exact composition of fertilizer (N:P:K), the amount of Nitrogen, Phosphor and Potassium needed and the timing of application. Although many aspects in the fertilization process are known, the present recommendations are established to obtain a maximum output’74 . The most frequently mentioned chemical fertilizers that are applied for cotton and wheat are combinations of Nitrogen and Posphate fertilizers such as Ammofos, Cilitra and Carbamide. Ammofos is Mono-ammonium Phosphate and Carbamide is another term for Urea. The quantities average around 150 kilograms per hectare per application; some fermers apply fertilizers only once a year, others twice 75 . Rarely fermers purchase additional amounts of chemical fertilizers; primarily they do not because of economic reasons. Within this research the farm Saidovul was the only one that purchased additional chemical fertilizers for the cotton and wheat production. Other fermers only occasionally buy chemicals for other crops. Most of the fermers consider the provided amounts to be sufficient to fulfil the quotas. Overall, none of the fermers included in the research have objections against the use of chemicals. Fermers simply cannot accomplish the quotas without the application of chemicals.
‘The soil is addicted to it, without fertilizers I will not achieve sufficient yields...’
(Interview dehkan farmer Nishonov, Saidovul 25/10/2006)
Some fermers complain about the late supply of inputs whereas others say this is largely depending upon the fermer’s administration. They argue that if the fermer submits his papers on time the inputs will be provided on time. If not, it is his own fault. For additional fertilisation of the soil fermers prefer to apply organic manure. Organic manure is extensively used without limitations. Dehkan farmers make only occasionally use of chemicals; a difference can be identified between commercial and family production. Once dehkan farmers are more commercially-oriented and sell the crops on the market, or when they are working with chemicals themselves on shirkats or individual farms, this seems to enhance the likelihood that they apply (small amounts of) chemical fertilizers. Often the more commercially-oriented dehkan farmers work in a more professionalized way compared to the dehkan farmers that only farm for household consumption. They have noticed the benefits of it or consider it crucial for the production of crops. Nevertheless it must be noted that the majority of dehkan farmers grow crops at low intensity only for family consumption and cannot afford it to purchase expensive chemicals. In essence they apply only organic manure from their own cattle. They are not subject to state obligations and accept the given circumstances; the weather conditions and the condition of their plot. Some of them explicitly express that they do not want to use chemicals, even when they can obtain easily (and probably cheaper) from
73 Note: data should be treated with caution; it is possible that fermers were not willing to inform about precise quantities. 74 For more details see Kienzler, K. forthcoming Ph.D. thesis (ZEF): ‘Potential for Increasing Nitrogen Use Efficiency in Cotton and Winter Wheat for Irrigated Agriculture in Khorezm, Uzbekistan’ 75 A number of fermers did not explicate exact amounts of fertilizers used or gave rather vague answers.
82 a fermer or shirkat where the head of the household is employed at. They regard chemicals as harmful and want to keep the tamorka in a healthy condition for their children in the future.
‘I care for my land. It will belong to my children and their children in the future and therefore I’m careful and I do not want to spoil the soil with chemicals.’
(Interview dehkan farmer, Saidovul 03/10/2006)
The use of pesticides is not a wide-shared practise; pesticides are only incidentally provided by experts on fermers’ request if they face problems in crop production. In Toshovul biological treatments are breeded by a sovkhoz nearby. Above all, most farmers prefer to prevent insects and herbs by weeding and manual work; it is considered to be more beneficial for the crop and free of payment .
6.3.3 Water use In all the three communities the water supply is organised by a WUA. Fermers are located along a canal one by one with branches to their fields and as was mentioned in Toshovul and Ozbekistan the fermers are depending on each other in the provision of water for their fields.
‘My fields are located at the start of the canal; I never face problems of water shortage.’
(Interview fermer Toshovul, 13/10/2006)
Sometimes this raises seasonal problems; water shortages can occur in periods of droughts or during peak seasons with high irrigation frequencies. Some fermers do not determine the irrigation frequencies themselves or employ a mirab for it. It is often determined by external mirabs and engineers, as is explained in chapter 5.3.4. Fermers are neither stimulated, nor in the position to consider water demand as a reason to change their water use practices. They simply cannot change their cropping patterns; cotton and wheat must be produced and for many fermers the second harvest is crucial to have some real profit. Only for the second harvest they are able to select and realize any production according to their own needs, except the production of rice. Hence they could choose crops that are less water demanding but anyway in reality the second harvest crops are not calculated in the total amount of water that is provided along the year, as is explained in the preceding chapter. The availability of water for the second harvest, and for other crops, largely depends upon the amount that is ‘left (or excessive)’ after the production of cotton and wheat. For the second harvest there are other reasons that determine their crop selection. Remarkably fermers do not express any notion of participative and decision-making power concerning the water supply as should be assumed according to the structure of the WUAs. Dehkan farmers can use the amounts of water that is required for the production and irrigate the tamorka according to the water need of the vegetables. The water use of dehkan farmers is facilitated by the farmer itself, irrigation of the tamorka is determined by the water need of the crops and not following strict rules. In general dehkan households are independent from others in water supply but some families receive water by turn: they share the point of supply with neighbouring households. Thereupon they have to negotiate for water use which is not perceived as being a problem. Water is used for multiple purposes; drinking water, household use and irrigating the crops on the tamorka.
Fairly all fermers included in the research are members of the ‘Association of Dehkan and Private Farmers’, while remarkably none of the dehkan farmers is involved. This observation is comparable to case studies conducted in other areas in Uzbekistan76 . It can be assumed that dehkan farmers do not really consider the association to have any rationale for them, certainly not when they are only
76 Thurman et al. (2001) observed comparable perceptions in the RESP survey conducted in several rayons in Uzbekistan. For further reading: Thurman et al., 2001: ‘Agriculture in Uzbekistan: Private, Dehqan, and Shirkat Farms in the Pilot Districts of the Rural Enterprise Support Project’
83 producing for family consumption. Most fermers however perceive it as important. As one of them said:
‘It is whether you want to have profit or not. It is for your own benefit.’
(Interview fermer Toshovul, 30/10/2006)
The association visited in Low Chirchik seemed like a shirkat, with the difference that it is located in a modern office with relatively young people working. At large the organisational structure of an Association of Dehkan and Private Farmers is comparable to the structure of a shirkat board with a rais on top and agricultural staff. It does not give the impression that fermers (nor dehkan farmers) are actively involved in the organisation.
Fermers make a clear difference between the agricultural fields belonging to the commercial farm and their household tamorka with regard to the crop mix, labour and other inputs. The tamorka is regularly cultivated with a variety of vegetables for family consumption and according to their needs; the work is done by family members, which concerns primarily the women and children. The crops on the tamorka are primarily grown from reproduced or exchanged seeds, either from themselves or from relatives or neighbours. Occasionally seeds are bought from official suppliers. This in contrast to the farm fields that are primarily allocated to cotton and wheat. The fermer manages the work which is mostly done by wage labourers. All the fermers employ a number of local residents, which are in practice dehkan farmers themselves. The most workers are hired throughout the year and most of them are experienced in farming obtained in previous work. In peak seasons during the cotton harvest there are more local people working on the farm fields, mainly women in order to satisfy the higher demand for labour. Family members only incidentally work on the farm fields whereas the work on the tamorkas is solely done by family members. The tamorka of fermers is regularly used for comparable purposes as the tamorka of dehkan families. The majority of fermers express that they do not use chemicals for the tamorka whereas the farm fields cultivated under state contract are always fertilized by chemicals. Despite the seemingly fixed farming practices, fermers are eager yet cautious to learn about new technologies. Joint projects with foreign (agricultural) organisations can be of considerable value for the Uzbek agriculture, but the constraints in international cooperation make this rather difficult. In surrounding countries there are a number of projects for farmers that clearly benefit the farmers; after years of collective farming during the Soviet era they learn how to work in a more efficient way, how the liberalised market (e.g. in Kyrgyzstan) is working and how to organise sales and production. It was well expressed by an Uzbek man working for Winrock Int 77 :
‘In Uzbekistan fermers are kept asleep; they are being passive, listening to state orders... Anyway, those who do not possess any freedom also do not hold any responsibility.’
(Interview Bakhtior Winrock Int., Tashkent, 13/11/2006)
The Uzbek government is stimulating modernisation of farming but within restrictions, and the most important factor that hampers modernisation of farming is the financial situation of the fermers. Although they might be willing to invest in new more efficient equipment, most of them are not able to actually do so and are working with old machines. One of potentials for the Uzbek agricultural sector is ‘Conservation Agriculture’. In the three Chirchik rayons the FAO executed a project in cooperation with the Tashkent Irrigation and Melioration Institute (TIIM). The fermers involved were
77 Winrock Int. is an American company that has been forced to stop working in Uzbekistan due to governmental interventions. The (trade) ties with the enterprises and organisations have been broken in 2006. Nevertheless Winrock Int. expects to make a restart in the coming years again. The company is still working in neighbouring countries on several programs.
84 selected by TIIM on advise of the Association of Dehkan and Private Farmers, and could decide themselves how much of their land they would devote to the experiment since they could not risk to loose too much of their yield if the experiments would fail and the Ministry was informed after fermers had subscribed to participate in the project. Fermers were surprised by the end results. Conservation agriculture, as the name expresses, focuses upon a more efficient way of farming which is less labour and input intensive. It lowers the farm expenses. Most of the fermers that were involved in the FAO project had achieved the same or even higher yields compared to their conventional way of farming.
85 86 7. CONCLUSION , DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this closing chapter the findings are concluded, that acquired by the empirical and theoretical research and supplemented with the information from secondary sources. This research aimed to answer the research question: ‘What has changed in the governance institutions of the agricultural sector in Uzbekistan as a result of the agrarian reform, and how and to what extent does the current governance lay-out affect sustainable farming?’ In the introduction the research question was unfolded into sub-questions. This conclusion gives the definite answer by referring to the three elements that comprise the research question: the actual institutions that are in place; their effectiveness (to what extent they influence the day-to-day farm practices) and their eventual impact upon the environment. The conclusion is followed by a discussion and ending with recommendations for further research.
7.1 Conclusion
7.1.1 Who is involved? Referring back to the chapter 4 and 5 in which the characteristics of transition processes and the transition in Uzbekistan are described, it can be said that the transition in Uzbekistan has taken place only partially. The transformations of political, economic and social elements are diverging. Despite the disappearance of the communist Soviet regime the governance structure is still predominantly autocratic with marginal power for lower levels of authority, private and non-governmental parties. Democratic principles are not in function; privatisation of the economy is still in its pioneering phase and the society has not been empowered to become active participants in policy-making. Old structures have remained in place. These deficits have their consequence upon the entire agricultural sector. As is stated in the introduction, institutional adjustments can be crucial when there are changes in the actors involved or when there are features and implications relating to the environment (Gatzweiler et al., 2001: 10). In the Uzbek situation, there have been changes in the actors involved in the agricultural sector: instead of the large scale farms, the agricultural sector consists nowadays of a large number of smaller farms. However, the formation of individual farms and the dissolution of large scale collectives have not altered the dominant position of the government, neither did agricultural policies really change. Besides the governmental structure, also the social infrastructure of education and public health is still related to the old parastatal or collective structures. The government hesitates to change the current structure of governance and hampers the transfer of property rights to farmers because it could result in a decrease in the production of cotton and wheat. This was one of the arguments that students often used to advocate the current structure of the agricultural sector 78 , but it are rather other reasons that give reason for the government to continue the current structure. A loss of power of the government over farming and loss of financial flows are assumingly more important factors. In addition, a fundamental change of agriculture will mean the demise in personal power of many of current powerful persons and organisations. As a result, the peculiar situation is that it is the agricultural policies that devise the rules over property rights and government structure, which is clearly illustrated in the Agri-environmental Action Scenario in Chapter 2. The cotton crop is still remunerative as the crucial earner of foreign exchange. The powerful sectoral interests are effectively being supported by the central government that states to espouse reform targets but relies heavily on agriculture for revenues. The production of cotton must be maximised and safeguarded by strict control over fermers. This all in spite of less taxation and higher prices for cotton output (Spoor, 2006). Next to cotton the production of wheat is enforced to ensure national food security. Although the official procurement quotas have decreased throughout the years, in practice this has not resulted in more freedom for fermers. Even more, the establishment of the Agrofirms recently in 2005 can be understood as an additional means from the government to impose targets on fermers, instead of granting more freedom and liberalise the production of vegetables. The
78 This argument was frequently mentioned by different students and during the course of the research; assumingly this is ‘what they have learned’ (personal perception of the author).
87 governing role of the former shirkats and longer ago of the sovkhozy and kolkhozy is replaced by the government through the establishment of several organisations that are all, to diverging extents operating within the state system: the Agroproms, Agrofirms, the Machine Tractor Parks, and more indirectly (or implicitly) the Associations of Dehkan and Private Farmers and the Water Use Associations. All together these organisations form the channel through which state orders boil down to the farm level and that, in combination with the central supply of farm inputs, determine to a large extent the farm practices. This is adequately illustrated in Appendix F (Trevisani, 2005). The rural ‘nomenklatura’ has remained in a comparable place, although named differently. Many staff of shirkats and collective farms have achieved high employment within the government. Former workers and pudrats of shirkats have become fermers; they are still controlled by higher levels of authority. Only those with ‘good’ connections and fermers that outperform others in view of production rates are easily granted large amounts of agricultural land as was witnessed in Saidovul with the farm Saidovul. The importance of networks in terms of political and social capital is still very important; this grants power to those who are often already wealthy and in high position. The former officials are often strongly connected and appear reluctant to change their practices. They do not criticise each other, like for instance was indicated by the study of Wegerich (2006). The TISIMs appear to be soft in fining the WUAs for exceeding the water limits since they are former colleagues (Wegerich, 2006). The Bundle of Rights distinguishes the rights of access, extractions and withdrawal ; management ; exclusion and the right of alienation . Following the legislation, only lease rights for a period of at maximum 50 years are possible for fermers; full ownership of land is not in place. The right of alienation and exclusion is merely in hands of the government, in particular executed by the hokim. The hokim and fermers have an interdependent relationship: on the one hand the hokim decides over the land allocation and continuation of farming of fermers, yet on the other hand the functioning of the hokim is assessed by fermers’ completion of state quotas. Therefore the hokim frequently contacts and controls fermers. Not only the national importance of production must be guaranteed, there are also personal interests of the hokim at stake. As Giddens states: ‘All power relations, or relations of autonomy and dependence, are reciprocal: however wide the assymetrical distribution of resources involved, all power relations manifest autonomy and dependence in both directions’ (Giddens, 1979:149, in Bryant, 1992). Fermers have to go through the elaborative arbitrary application procedure before registration; the eligibility of a fermer depends upon the hokim. Together with several state organisations the hokim determines whether a fermer is working in the intended way and if the fermer can continue working. The planned system of cropping patterns points at the rights of management . Decision-making with regard to the state-order production is in hands of the government. Once fermers cannot fulfil the state orders and are considered to be unproductive and unprofitable, their farm can be liquidated. Although the farm practices are largely stipulated by the government, fermers cannot easily hold the state organisations accountable when they face problems, as was witnessed with fermer Jarabek in Ozbekistan with his wheat seed problems. This implies that there are always factors of uncertainty for fermers, strengthened by the apparent arbitrary characteristics of the Uzbek government. In addition the legislation concerning land use is rather vague when it refers to monitoring of ‘rational’ land use. This creates leeway for arbitrariness. The managerial space for fermers’ own production (the crops not concerned with state contracts) is severely restricted and thus marginal; dehkan farmers do possess full managerial rights with this regard. Thereof informal networks appear to be the principal modes of governance, besides the formal self-governance that is nowadays internalised in the state system as is explained in paragraph 5.1. Dehkan farmers, but also fermers, acquire their inputs through informal channels. They exchange seeds, knowledge and are managing their farm independent from the government. They can grow indigenous races and adapt their production to fluctuating circumstances. If we compare the governmental structure that was in place in the past with the current system it is thus questionable whether the current system has endowed fermers more participation and decision- making rights. Are the shifts ‘real’ or only cosmetic ones, in which the government has taken over the role of the large scale farms in order to retain the control over fermers’ practices? Only those that have been of importance in the past (thus have certain power), or those that perform extraordinary good can acquire and possess participative power. In summary this all illustrates that real changes in the institutional layout seem not to be implemented. Although shirkats are (almost) completely dismantled and collective farming has disappeared, these
88 institutions still exist ‘in disguise’. Most fermers have no power to influence the decision-making procedures of the state and to demand institutional changes. Their position appears sometimes comparable to that of a pudrat. They are not able to act collectively to pursue their goals or to enforce individual interest. Following the Agri-environmental Action Scenario, pressure for institutional change can be executed by lower levels of decision-making, as is illustrated in the scenario depicted in Chapter 2. The arrows from the operational level to the higher levels symbolize this pressure. Effective governments are responsive to such pressures, as is explained below. It is obvious that this process hardly takes place in Uzbekistan. In response to the formal governance structure, the informal networks have appeared of high importance, in particular for the resource-poor farmer, which concerns first of all the dehkan farmers. The social networks have many advantages over formal distribution channels for farmers; without these networks they would not have been able to obtain essential inputs
7.1.2 Effective or not? From the findings described in Chapter 5 and 6 and from what is described above it can be concluded that fermers are evidently still not involved in the creation of policies, in determining the crop mix, the amounts of water and other farm inputs that are provided. At least, it must be said, this concerns the farm practices related to the state-order system, but that is the most dominant mode of working for fermers. Their other practices, i.e. the second harvest and in some cases the production of other (food) crops is also (although seemingly less) subject to state involvement, with regard to the scope of production. This is as mentioned restricted by the government to only a marginal part of the farm work, yet for the fermer in terms of profitability perhaps more important than the state-order production. Although it was not observed in the case study, it is confirmed that many fermers have developed strategies to obtain profits outside of the state procurement system. Therefore the effectiveness of the formal institutions can be questioned. The current system of governance lacks legitimacy. Hence the effectiveness of the governance structure, the institutional lay-out of agriculture can be questioned. Does the current lay-out result in the outcomes that are aimed at or do they in fact incite hidden action and adverse behaviour by fermers, as a coping strategy to make a living? Referring to what is stated in chapter 2, there is indeed talk of what Ho (2005) calls ‘empty institutions’, in particular considering the state institutions. Empty, ineffective can cause inefficient use or mismanagement of (natural) resources, environmental degradation and social conflicts. In the Uzbek situation, fermers are squeezed to comply with state orders, yet on the other hand they must make a living. This results in (social) conflicts and environmental degradation: farm practices are not allowed to be adapted to local circumstances (Gatzweiler et al., 2001; Ho, 2005). Problems of fermers are often not acknowledged and farm practices are not adapted to local circumstances. Farmers are inclined to develop illegal farm practices, simply to cope with their peculiar situation. For instance they partially reallocate state-provided inputs to cash crops, such as water or chemical fertilizers for rice or other food crops. For many fermers non-state-order cash crops are the only way to have some profit, with the advantage that the cash crops are traded by themselves ‘in cash’, in contrast to the trade in cotton and wheat that take place outside of fermers involvement by their bank account. To further unfold the analysis we can look back to the Agri-environmental Action Scenario (Ostrom, 1990) which is explained and illustrated in chapter 2. In summary it can be concluded that:
• With regard to the Constitutional Level , farmers primarily possess rule-making power over informal networks. In the socio-technical networks farmers together decide who is involved and what kind of transactions takes place. In policy- and rule-making concerning the formal (state) government, farmers are not involved. They have no decision-making power and cannot influence who is eligible. Although fermers participate in the General Assemblee of the Water Use Associations this does not really empowers them to influence the functioning of the WUAs. • On the level of Collective Action the same is true: the state-orders are managed by the numerous state agencies involved; only the non-state-order production is managed by farmers. For that part of the farm practices the farmers collectively pursue their goals by engaging in informal exchange networks to provide resources to others and acquire needs. They themselves decide what they will grow and what kind of inputs they will use. This is
89 depending on the resources that can be acquired through different networks and distribution channels, thus depending upon formal as well as informal institutions. • The Operational Level is the level that reveals the effectiveness of institutions. Day-to-day farm practices clarify which rules and policies are indeed implemented and followed by fermers and dehkan farmers, and how strongly they are enforced and controlled by policy- makers. As such, this level reveals the actual power of farmers. Fermers grow the crops according to the state-orders and use the state provided inputs. Nevertheless, as is indicated by other studies (Wall, 2006; Wegerich, 2006) the dominant role of the formal government seems to enhance hidden farm practices that go against the stipulated governmental policies. This is simply a coping strategy, crucial for fermers to make a living. Thus it is evident that the eventual operational rights of the farm are in hands of farmers, but nevertheless if they do not comply with the state orders they create high risks. Dehkan farmers are working more independently; though their work is also affected by the formal government and the implemented agricultural policies. Through informal networks they are enabled to make use of state provided farm inputs from fermers, like machinery and fertilizers that they acquire as a salary or against a payment.
In conclusion informal networks and institutions outperform the formal system with respect to legitimacy and effectiveness. Since farmers themselves are the constitutional rulers within these networks, they are accountable for what is happening; they decide which resources are exchanged against what kind of reciprocity. It enables farmers to trade or exchange in a more flexible way; regularly against reasonable prices. In addition the networks make alternative arrangements for payment available, sometimes even without immediate reciprocity.
7.1.3 Towards sustainability? How can we judge the institutional layout and sustainable land use thereof? Many social scientists argue that private ownership is a prerequisite for productive and more sustainable farming, yet others oppose this; privatisation is not the panacea nor it is a crucial necessity to develop a productive agricultural sector. This can be confirmed by the example of China’s agricultural reform, which is described in the epilogue. Without formal, full ownership of land farmers can be able to develop a productive farm. Rather the key towards more sustainable land use and investment behaviour is probably the security in land tenure; uncertainties impede investment behaviour. Moreover freedom to act seems important; fermers that can shape their own mode of farming. Yet in the Uzbek situation there is little room for manoeuvre. Fermers’ practices are restricted, and although dehkan farmers have their tamorka at their discretion they cannot expand their production. The size of the household plot is severely limited. The current system limits crop diversity and adaptation of farm practices to local circumstances. Efficiency and improvements in water use are not employed. Chapter 5 explains that in general farmers are disabled in access to input markets, either for financial reasons or for a lack of market infrastructure. Chemical fertilizers are scarce due to financial constraints to purchase and use them. The current system seems to enhance efficient or economic use of farm inputs, and as is mentioned fermers appear to benefit from the current subsidized system (see Rudenko et al., 2006). The worse financial position of most farmers has a positive side-effect upon the environment. Scarcity of chemicals enhances efficient use of it and thus over use will not take place easily, although the UNECE states in its Environmental Performance Review (2001) that over use of chemicals still takes place (UNECE, 2001). The agricultural policies severely limit crop mix; monocultures of cotton and wheat are abundant and fermers cannot diversify their cropping patterns even though other crops would be more appropriate to grow. This concerns the environment, but also with regard to profitability. It is widely acknowledged that monocultures cause exhaustion of soils and enhance the risks of pests and other crop diseases. Only dehkan farmers can have a high crop diversity and often do produce a high variety of crops for household consumption. Informal networks influence the farm practices to a lesser extent than the formal government system, though they seem to have some positive effect upon the environment, but also with regard to social capital. It seems the logic response to the repressive formal government and the strategy to deal with the bad (financial) situation of most farmers. The use of local inputs and knowledge and the efficient
90 exchange of inputs can be regarded as positive from an environmental point of view. As explained earlier, use of local inputs has many advantages over inputs (such as seeds) acquired elsewhere. Local seeds have evolved according to the local circumstances and the people have gained experiences in growing the crops over the years. In this way the local networks are means to preserve the biodiversity. Altogether it can be concluded that institutional lay-out, (this is: the formal and informal governance structure together) is two-sided with respect to sustainable land use: positive in the sense of scarcity of chemical inputs; negative with regard to crop mix, water use and investment behaviour. Nevertheless the current situation of the farming sector is far from sustainable, thus concluding it does not enhance sustainable farming.
7.1.4 And the future? It is difficult to foresee what the situation would be like when the farm sector would be liberalised (completely) and farmers would be granted more decision-making and participative power over policies and their own practices. Diversification of farm activities would probably take place. This implies that the crop diversity increases, at least on most farms. Most fermers assumingly allocate their land to the most profitable crops and might start experimenting with new practices. New markets could develop with the increase of private involvement and fermers might start processing or cooperating in new forms of enterprises. If this will enhance sustainable farming is debatable. Increasing access to input markets in combination with a better financial situation of farmers might incite them to increase the application of chemicals and to intensify and expand their production. Kahn (2005) postulates after conversations with policy makers that the structure of agriculture will develop towards large-scale farming again, however now in hands of fermers. As is described in paragraph 5.1.3 Kahn identified that the current policy of the government is aimed at creating large-scale farming again (Kahn, 2005). With the ambiguous position of the government and with the situation of the environment it is rather difficult to give any indications about the future, and with this: on which term? Among international agencies and NGOs there are deviating opinions. With the ‘myopic’ government’s objective of reform it is difficult to make any judgements. On the one hand, fermers are strictly controlled with fixed cropping patterns and centrally supplied and determined inputs. With continued interests in cotton this is not expected to change in the years ahead. Yet on the other hand, the government says to be willing to enable fermers access to the private market i.e. to freely purchase fertilizers and machinery, which is at present hardly possible for them. Today’s fermers are stimulated to innovate within restrictions. Nonetheless, even if their financial position would be better it is uncertain if fermers are willing to invest in their farm. As mentioned land tenure is not safeguarded. A number of fermers are in an uncertain situation about the future. Their land can be withdrawn by an arbitrary hokim. This means a considerable disincentive to invest in the farm and to develop innovations. After the successful implementation of the FAO project in Tashkent Oblast on Conservation Agriculture there were some positive voices about the future, Conservation Agriculture could serve as a good example for the future of the Uzbek agriculture. On the opposite Wall (2006) has observed that fermers are reluctant to adopt new (foreign) technology 79 (Wall, 2006). A review report by Rudenko and Lamers (2006) indicates that many of ‘today’s farmers are not farmers by tradition’ and that there is a general deficiency in agricultural knowledge among farmers (Rudenko et al., 2006). There is a lack of education and extension of agricultural practices, resulting from the mono practices from the past and the deficit in knowledge transfers from external (foreign) experts. In general there is no experience and knowledge in the production of food crops. At present only cotton and wheat are grown on large scale, with the effect that many fermers are not experienced in large-scale production of other crops. Dehkan farmers are only cultivating smaller fields. This can impede improvements in crop diversity and a movement towards a more sustainable way of farming. The current position of the government creates impediments for aid and knowledge transfers from foreign sources, with the result that innovations are constrained. There are for instance successful farmer-to-farmer programmes set
79 Personal communications, Theodor Friedrich (Senior Officer AGPC, FAO Rome), 04/12/2006, for further reading: Wall, C. (without date), ‘Peasant Resistance in Khorezm? – The Difficulties in Classifying Non- Compliance in rural Uzbekistan’ , ZEF: Bonn
91 up by Winrock Int. in neighbouring countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) but the government has excluded Winrock Int. from working in Uzbekistan, while agricultural extension could in fact improve the farm productivity while protecting the environment. In addition uncertainties about the environmental situation must not be forgotten. In some areas water shortages have been observed in the past years and it is difficult to foresee which developments will take place in the years ahead. In the epilogue the outcomes of the Kyrgyz and Chinese reform are described. Although there are large differences, it might provide a glance of future possibilities for Uzbek farmers.
7.2 Discussion on the conclusion
Some aspects of this research are discussed in Chapter 3: the reflection on the methodology. But of course the conclusion also requires discussion; there are debatable and diverging points of view. This research was primarily focussed upon the role of institutions as important ‘actors’ that steer farmers’ behaviour. Although indeed, the role of institutions is apparent and important, the power of farmers must not be neglected. As is concluded, farmers can partially determine their day-to-day activities, which directly affect the environment. As is concluded the current institutional lay-out does not enhance sustainable farming, as farmers, in particular the fermers, are subject to many orders that stipulate their farm practices. But despite this, it is questionable if these fermers would act in a more environmental friendly way if the institutional lay-out provided appropriate facilities for sustainable farming. Like a water expert from the IWMI stated: ‘Some practices are almost in built into peoples minds. Therefore change should be at mind level of farmers. But from their side, it is not expected that they will work in a more sustainable way. Farmers have to make profit; despite the environment’. (Abduallev, I. IWMI-CAC Tashkent, 17/11/2006). This issue is discussed further in the epilogue.
7.3 Recommendations for further research
As is pointed out repeatedly this research has been short term based upon interviews with actors. In order to make more thorough observations it is recommended to allocate more resources to an in-depth case study. By staying in communities trust among researchers and their subjects could be improved which can enhance the finding of more reliable data, such as more reliable information on ‘behaviour in reality’ (covert action) instead of merely information about ‘official practices’ (overt action). A participatory approach would have been more beneficial in accessing information. In that case there should be no language barriers too. Language barriers constrain the communication with research subjects. The role of a translator (certainly in this particular case of the student from Tashkent) definitely influences interview results. Another aspect for improvement is to execute a research like this, in which social sciences are partially combined with natural sciences, by a multidisciplinary team (or set of a natural and social scientist). Dialogue and cooperation between the both sides of science would probably enhance a more scientific validated conclusion with respect to sustainable farming. With respect to the used theories other approaches could be applied that give more insight in other factors of relevance as to unveil what constructs farmers’ every day behaviour and to assess the peculiar role of formal and informal institutions in comparison with other factors. Further research could aim at identifying the factors and needs for farmers that could support and empower their position and that could sustainable farming. This research has emphasised the importance of the current institutional lay-out that impedes sustainable farming. Further research could clarify what is needed to transform this structure; to point at the deficiencies of the agrarian reform. Moreover which provisions (such as educational programmes, farmer-to-farmer projects) are required that should accompany this.
92 7. 4 A comparative epilogue
If we compare the agrarian reform and current situation to the farm sectors in Kyrgyzstan and China 80 , some comparisons can be drawn, nevertheless the differences that arise are principal. Although both countries have a totally different background, the developments of their agricultural sectors are in a way comparable to the situation in Uzbekistan. The path of reform and their actual outcomes could serve to make some future expectations for Uzbekistan to identify what kind shortfalls there are in the current system that deprive the farming sector from improving.
Before independence the structure of the rural areas in Kyrgyzstan was comparable to that in Uzbekistan. It consisted primarily of large-scale collective farms. Yet after independence the Kyrgyz government has chosen a significantly different path of reform, in comparison to the government of Uzbekistan. The government of Kyrgyzstan decided to redistribute most of the former collective land among peasant families in the form of land shares after independence. This was a means to secure equal distribution of land entitlement in the rural areas. Nowadays the land entitlement is extended to 99 years. In 1998 the government adopted a new law to grant full ownership of land to peasant families. The moratorium on the right to sell land was rescinded in 2001. These policies considerably changed the structure in the rural areas in Kyrgyzstan: from the large scale collectives towards a segmented structure of a large number of small peasant farms. The Kyrgyz government has neither minimised nor stipulated an upper size of a farm and has liberalised the sector completely. At the outset of reform the terms of trade for agriculture deteriorated and the system of input delivery was extremely unreliable; the reform was not accompanied by complementary policies of improved incentives and input delivery. However, yet the Kyrgyz agriculture achieved prudent and egalitarian growth to an extent that rural poverty declined in the late 1990s (Kahn, 2005).
China’s agrarian reform is often denoted as one of the examples of ‘best practices’ for the Uzbek government, for instance by Pomfret (2000) when he questions, ‘Why has the Chinese model failed to deliver?’ (Pomfret, 2000). However, the reform in China was characterised by frequent interventions from the government and modifications in agricultural policies along the years. Therefore to state it as ‘successful’ might perhaps be too positive. It was rather a process of trial-and-error that was accompanied by a lot of conflicts over land rights. Yet today’s situation of agriculture can be described as positive, at least in terms of productivity and farmers’ freedom. A fundamental reform was stipulated by Mao Zedong in 1949. Preceding the reform China was a peasant economy based on subsistence farming with the family as central unit of production and consumption. There was a feudal system of land ownership. The revolution of 1949 led to a transformation of the rural areas: hunger should be solved and the reform should result in equal and guaranteed distribution of land. Land became public ownership and labour was being organised into collective strategies of work in the mode of communes. Procurement quotas were implemented, attached to so-called ‘grain rationing’ in the urban areas, to guarantee and optimise grain purchasing and consumption (Chen, 2007). The structure of organisation within the communes was comparable to the structure within the Uzbek kolkhozes with production brigades. The policy was changed after Mao’s empire: the agricultural production deemed not to be enough to feed the rapid growing population and therefore reforms were implemented steadily to guarantee social stability. In the 1970s the introduction of the Household Responsibility Scheme (HRS) implied a return back to individual farming while the communes still owned the land. User rights were transferred to the rural households for a period of 1 to 3 years, which was expanded in the 1980s to 15 years and eventually in the 1990s to 30 years and made inheritable (Chen, 2007). Total decollectivisation of farming took place by the mid 1980s. Households became self-sufficient and started to innovate with assistance from extension services. They could receive increasing prices and bonus payment for extra supplies. Initially the grain purchasing was entirely in hands of the state but in later years a free market developed and private
80 The detailed comparison with China’s agrarian reform was possible with the recent publication of, and with reference to: Chen, L. (2007) ‘ Grain Market Liberalization and Deregulation in China: The Mediating Role of Markets for Farm Households in Jiangxi Province’ , Wageningen: WUR
93 involvement was allowed. Although the government tried to restrict this again later on without success, which resulted in the creation of a parallel market. Capitalist elements were introduced in the planned system yet there was no full replacement by a liberalised market-based system (Guadagni et al., 2005). Workers were hired on contract instead of for life-time. Free entrepreneurship was being recognised. In 1995 the Governor Responsibility System was being introduced, seemingly similar to the role of the Uzbek hokim that must enforce fermers’ compliance of state quotas. The governor should coordinate both sides of production by farmers and consumption by the population. In summary China’s reform went beyond land reform as it was accompanied by reforms in other sectors; the input supply, labour market and banking sector have been liberalised which facilitated the access to these sectors for individual farmers (Pomfret, 2000). Nevertheless the agrarian reform did not result in a continued ‘output boom’. Even after 2000 there have been serious drops in production (in the case of grain) as a result of disappearing price protection, in combination with better employment opportunities in the urban areas (thus decrease in agricultural workers/farmers) (Chen, 2007). Nowadays farmers in China can decide over their crop mix without state targets, and although agricultural companies are still state-owned, farmers have more sales potentials (Chen, 2007; Pomfret, 2000). Since 2004 the focus is on liberalisation and deregulation of agriculture. International trade is promoted. The financing system is changed, taxes have been removed and land and water taxes are implemented that incite farm productivity. Overall the reforms have resulted in considerable increases in farm productivity and efficiency (Guadagni et al., 2005). Yet whether the current system is beneficial in environmental terms is debatable. The improved access to input markets facilitates the use of chemical fertilizers which are considered to be quite high 81 ; there are no meaningful incentives for efficient use of inputs. If we compare China’s reform with the reform implemented in Uzbekistan after independence, a number of similarities and differences become clear. In Uzbekistan the reform was primarily insisted from above; old farms have existed until now as parallel institutions with the effect that local elite’s control maintained. This contrasts with the situation in China, where collective farming and their role as institutions completely disappeared in the 1980s. The reform that was implemented by Mao in 1949 was initially comparable to the Uzbek situation with communes and kolkhozes. Also the Household Responsibility Scheme (HRS) was comparable to the development of individual farms in Uzbekistan now, with user (or in other words: lease) rights on a stipulated maximum term. Yet the transfer of responsibility by implementation of the HRS in China resulted in an ‘output boom’ (though of short term, not continued over the years), whereas the establishment of individual farms has not resulted in such a significant production growth until now. Differences can be distinguished in particular in the positions of both governments and in farmers’ freedom nowadays. The Uzbek government depends (too) much on revenues from agriculture, in contrast to the Chinese situation where state-owned industrial enterprises were the state’s cash cow during the early reform period (Pomfret, 2000). The Chinese government has made impressive alterations and withdrew from its dominant role. Procurement quotas have disappeared and farmers possess freedom over their crop mix. Yet, although the changed situation in China assumes to benefit farmers, there are drawbacks on the environmental point of view, in particular with regard to the use of chemicals. Compared to the situation in Uzbekistan Chinese farmers are more inclined to purchase and apply chemical fertilizers. This is not solely ascribed to their larger degree of freedom but rather to their better financial position. The results of the Chinese agrarian reform enable a cautious forecast for the Uzbek farming sector if it would be liberalised. Then it can be expected that the crop diversity will increase, nevertheless with an increase in use of chemical inputs, depending upon the financial situation of farmers. Farm productivity can increase and farmers can be stimulated and more motivated to invest in their farm. In that case the old water systems might be recovered; new technologies (such as drip irrigation that can surely be considered to be more water efficient, thus more environmental friendly) could be developed and fermers would be more stimulated to experiment and to engage in for instance projects on Conservation Agriculture. When farmers acquire more freedom and more autonomy the potential benefits of experiments and innovations will directly increase their profits and improve the functioning of their farm. Up till now in both countries full ownership of agricultural land is not possible.
81 Personal communications, Kirsten Kienzler (Ph.D. candidate ZEF, Bonn), 15/02/2007
94 Nevertheless, as the Chinese situation illustrates this is not per se a prerequisite for a more productive farming sector in which innovations and improvements are being developed.
95 96 BIBLIOGRAPHY
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97 Harriss, J. (1997), ‘Wageningen contributions to rural development theory: The making of rural development: actors, arenas and paradigms’, Paper presented at the seminar celebrating 50 years of Wageningen Sociology, Wageningen Ho, P. (2005), ‘Institutions in Transition: Land Ownership, Property Rights and Social Conflict in China’, Oxford: Oxford University Press Ho, P.; Spoor, M. (2005), ‘Whose land? The political economy of land titling in transition economies’. Land Use Policy: A Special Issue, 2006, Vol. 23, No 4., pp. 580-642 International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA-CAC) (2006), ‘Focus on Seed Programmes (18): The Uzbekistan Seed Industry’, Aleppo Syria: WANA Seed Network ICARDA Jozan, R., Florent, R., Martin, S., Munos, O., Panarin, M. (2005), ‘Combining socio-technical networks in the Uzbekistani agrarian system’, paper presented at the conference ‘Cotton Sector in Central Asia: economic policy and development challenges’, November 2005 Kahn, A. R. (2005), ‘Land system, agriculture and poverty in Uzbekistan’, Riverside: University of California Kandiyoti, D. (2001), ‘Pathways of Farm Restructuring in Uzbekistan: ‘Pressures and Outcomes’, in M. Spoor (ed.), ‘Transition, Institutions and the Rural Sector’, Oxford: Lexington Books Karaev, Z. (2002), ‘Political Economy of the Changing Patterns of the Cotton Industry in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: Past and Present’ , Rubikon E-Publication, retrieved from http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/zainiddin.htm Karimov, A. (without date) ‘Soil fertility monitoring using RS data in Tashkent region of Uzbekistan’ (draft PhD proposal), Tashkent: TIIM. Koasa-ard, M.S., Rerkasem, B. (2000), ‘The growth and sustainability of agriculture in Asia’, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press (China) Ltd. Kooiman, J. (2003), ‘Governing as Governance’ , Thousand Oaks (CA): Sage Publications Koontz T.M. (2006), ‘Collaboration for sustainability? A framework for analyzing government impacts in collaborative-environmental management’, Vancouver B.C.: University of British Columbia of Forestry Koontz T.M. (2003), ‘An Introduction to the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework for Forest Management Research’, Vancouver B.C.: University of British Columbia of Forestry Larson, B.A,; Bromley, D.W. (1990), ‘Property Rights, Externalities and Resource Degradation: Locating the Tragedy’, Journal of Development Economics VolumeNr. 33 pp. 235-262 Lerman, Z.; Csaki, C.; Feder, G. (2004), ‘Evolving farm structures and land use patterns in former socialist countries’, Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture (2004) VolumeNr. 4 pp. 309-335 Matthews, G. (2001), ‘Crop protection in Turkmenistan’, Pesticide Outlook (2001) VolumeNr. 12(4) pp. 149 Cambridge: Royal Society of Chemistry Milieukontakt Oost-Europa (2005), ‘Elimination of acute risks of obsolete pesticides in Moldova, Armenia and Georgia’ , Amsterdam: Milieukontakt Oost-Europa, retrieved from http://www.milieukontakt.nl/project_more.php?id=46 , on 12-04-2007 Nasyrov, M., (1992), ‘Karnab Chul, Samarkand, Uzbekistan: framework of assessment methodology , Samarkand Uzbekistan: Samarkand State University Ostrom, E. (1986), ‘An Agenda for the Study of Institutions’, Public Choice VolumeNr. 48 pp 3-25 Ostrom, E, (1990), ‘Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action’ New York: Cambridge University Press Ostrom, E.; Schlager, E. (1992), ‘Property Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis’, Land Economics VolumeNr 68 No.3: pp 349-262 Ostrom, V. (1976), ‘John R. Common’s Foundations for Policy Analysis ’, Journal of Economic Issues VolumeNr. 10(4): 839-857 Pashkun, D. (2003), ‘Structure and Practice of State Administration in Uzbekistan’ , Budapest: Open Society Institute Perman, R.; Ma, Y.; McGìlvray, J.; Common, M. (1999), ‘Natural Resource and Environmental Economics’, 2 nd edition, Essex: Pearson Education Ltd. Ploeg, van der J.D. (2003), ‘The Virtual Farmer’, Assen: Royal van Gorcum
98 Pomfret, R. (2000), ‘Agrarian Reform in Uzbekistan: Why has the Chinese Model Failed to Deliver?’, Economic Development and Cultural Change (2000), VolumeNr. 48(2) pp. 269-284 Poos, W.H. (2007), ‘Local (self-) governance and social goods in post-soviet southern Uzbekistan - Modes of redistribution shaping social order and statehood in the peripheries of a centralised state-’ Bonn: ZEF –unpublished draft PhD-proposal Punch, K.F. (2005), ‘Introduction to Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches’, London: Sage Publications Rudenko, I.; Lamers, J. (2006), ‘The comparative advantages of the present and future payment structure for agricultural producers in Uzbekistan’, Bonn: ZEF Ryan, R.; Vlek, P.; Paroda, R. (eds.) (2004), ‘Agriculture in Central Asia: Research for Development’, Aleppo: International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) Schlager, E. (1999), ‘A comparison of Frameworks, Theories and Models of Policy Processes’. in P. Sabatier, (ed.) ‘Theories of the Policy Process’, Boulder Colorado: Westview Press Sievers, E.W. (2002), ‘Uzbekistan’s Mahalla: From Soviet to Absolutist Residential Community Associations’, The Journal of International and Comparative Law at Chicago-Kent Volume 2 – 2002 pp. 91 - 155 Sikor, T. (2004), ‘The commons in transition: agrarian and environmental change in Central and Eastern Europe’, Environmental Management 34: pp. 270 - 280 Slangen, L.H.G. (2001), ‘Sustainable agriculture – getting the institutions right’, CEESA Discussion Paper VolumeNr. 1 (1/2001) Sobhan, R. (1993), ‘Agrarian Reform and Social Transformation’, New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd. Spoor, M. (2006), ‘Cotton, Environment and Poverty: The Case of Uzbekistan’, The Hague: Institute of Social Studies (ISS) Spoor, M. (2005), ‘Cotton in Central Asia: ‘Curse’ or ‘Foundation for Development’? The Hague: Institute of Social Studies (ISS) Spoor, M. (ed.) (2003), ‘Transition, Institutions and the Rural Sector’, Oxford: Lexington Books Spoor, M.; Visser, O. (2001), ‘The State of Agrarian Reform in the Former Soviet Union’, Europe- Asia Studies VolumeNr. 53(6) (2001): pp. 885-901 State Committee of Environment of the Republic of Uzbekistan (1999), ‘National Environmental Health Plan of the Republic of Uzbekistan’ , Tashkent: Government of Uzbekistan Tarr, D; Trushin, E. (2005), ‘Did the Desire for Self sufficiency in cotton contribute to the Aral Sea environmental disaster?’ in Tarr D. ( ed.) ‘Trade Policy and WTO Accession for Development in Russia and the CIS: A Handbook’, Ves Mir , Washington D.C.: The World Bank Thurman M.; Lundell M. (2001), ‘Agriculture in Uzbekistan: Private, Dehqan, and Shirkat Farms in the Pilot Districts of the Rural Enterprise Support Project’ , Washington D.C.: World Bank Torhonen, M.-P. (2002), ‘Land Tenure in Transition: Case Uzbekistan ’, Helsinki: FM-International Oy FINNMAP Tursonova, Z., Bock B.B, Mollinga P. (forthcoming), ‘Gender dimensions of rural livelihoods in Uzbekistan; the importance of emergent entrepreneurship and migration’, Bonn: ZEF research paper United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Committee (UNECE) on Environmental Policy (2001), ‘ Environmental Performance Review Uzbekistan’ Geneva: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2002), ‘Caucasus Environment Outlook (CEO) 2002’, Tiblisi: GRID (retrieved from http://www.grid.unep.ch/product/publication/CEO-for Internet/CEO/ch1_2_1_3.htm United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) (2002) retrieved from , http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/psdgetreport.aspx?hidReportRetrievalName=BVS&hidRep ortRetrievalID=853&hidReportRetrievalTemplateID =, on 24-01-2007 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2005), ‘Uzbekistan Land Reform Assessment: Final Report’ , Washington DC: USAID Wall, C. (2006), ‘Knowledge Management in Rural Uzbekistan: Peasant, Project and Post-Socialist perspectives in Khorezm’ , Bonn: PhD Inauguration Dissertation for Phyilosphical Faculty, Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitat
99 Wall, C. (2005), ‘Working in Fields as Fieldwork: Kashar, participant observation and the Tamorka as ways to access indigenous knowledge in rural Uzbekistan’ , (draft version) Wall, C. (without date), ‘Peasant Resistance in Khorezm? – The Difficulties in Classifying Non- Compliance in rural Uzbekistan’ , ZEF: Bonn Wegerich, K. (2006), ‘Illicit’ water: un-accounted, but paid for. Observations on rent-seeking as causes of drainage floods in the lower Amu Darya Basin’, Wageningen Wel van der, P. (1997), ‘The Relevance and Feasibility of economic cost-benefit analysis in transition with special reference to Uzbekistan’, The Hague: Institute of Social Studies (ISS) Winrock Int. (2005), ‘Land Code of the Republic of Uzbeksitan ’, added on 17-02-2005, retrieved 28 January 2007 from http://www.wuasp.uz/modules.php?name=UpDownload&req=viewsdownload&sid=8 World Bank (2003), ‘Uzbekistan Living Standards Assessment’, Washington D.C.: World Bank Women in Europe for a Common Future (WECF) (2005), summary of the results of ‘The 8th International HVH and Pesticides Forum’ from http://www.wecf.de/cms/articles/2005/06/hch_forum.php World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), ‘Our Common Future’, Oxford University Press Wordreference (2006) http://www.wordreference.com/definition/establishment on 18 July 2006 Yalcin, R. (2005), ‘Governance, institutions and participation: Case study the Amu Darya Basin Uzbekistan Country report’, Bonn: ZEF University (final draft)
100 Appendix A Farm level organization of production
…production outputs…. Oblast Hokim …production inputs…
Cotton ginnery Oblast Department of MAWR (former MTP WUA RaySelVodkhoz ) Wheat factory Seed plant Bio- laboratory
Market Uzneftgaz Fertilizers and Pesticides Bank: state controlled agricultural credit system Fermer (Pahkta and Gallabank)
land labour
(Based on ‘Agricultural production hierarchy in ‘The Emerging Actor of ‘Decollectivisation’ in Uzbekistan: Private farming between newly defined political constraints and opportunities’, Trevisani T. (2005))
101 102 Appendix B
Structure of State Administration on Agriculture
President I. Karimov Chairman of Cabinet
Prime-Minister U. Sultanov
‘Agriculture’ T. Kholtaev
Ministry of Agriculture T. Khaltaev
Committee for Land Resources E. Kurbanov
Committee for Nature Protection Sherimbetov
Uzhlopkopromsbyt; Uzhleboproduct; Uzselhozsnabremont; Uzryba; Uzvodstroy; Uzgoshlebinspektsiya; Pakhta-Bank; Galla-Bank; Agency for Realization of Cotton Projects; Experts group on Goshimkommissiya; Uzbek centre ‘Sifat’; Assoc. of dehkans and farmers; Science & Practice Centre for Agriculture Uzbekohotrybolovsoyuz; Uzptitseprom; Assocation ‘Uzbek karakuli’; Territiorial unions ‘Mevasabsavot’; BVO ‘Syrdarya’ ; BVO ‘Amudarya’ ; Aral Salvation Fund
The structure of the State Administration on Agriculture (source: Pashkun, 2003)
103 104 Appendix C
105
IF-->CF Cotton surplus; remuneration of CF specialists; specific equipment CF-->IF INDIVIDUAL FARM Cotton Surplus to IF located in Resources Needs non-appropriate land for cotton 1st order 1st order production; equipment; consulting Land and technical knowledge; water Capital Labour force resources Cash flow Specific equipment (to rent) Social Network Organic Material Cotton surplus 2 nd order 2 nd order COLLECTIVE FARM
Inputs (through land and social Land (general constraints) Resources Needs network) 1st order 1st order Water (through land and capital) Human competences (technical IF-->SH knowledge and social networking) Cash-flow to pay wages Equipment Employment (if registered) ; IF-->IF Land Wage; inputs; water; second 2° order 2°order harvest production. Cotton, specific Cash-flow (inconsistent) Land (general constraint) equipment, water Brigade Human competences (logistical, managerial)` Cotton surplus Equipement SH- ->IF Second harvest production Land Inexpensive and abundant labour Capital force; sale of organic material. Pudrat WheatCashflow surplus Social network CF-->SH SMALL-HOLDING Employment (if registered); Wage; inputs; crop residues; water; Resources Needs second harvest production. 1st order 1st order Labour force Access to land Organic material Access to water Fodder Inputs (fertilizers) SH-->CF Mechanization 2° order 2°order Inexpensive labour force
Appendix D. Recombining socio-technical networks (Based on ‘Recombining socio-technical networks in the Uzbekistan agrarian system’, source: Jozan et al., (2 005))
107
108 Appendix E Summary of main environmental problems in agriculture
Land Problems Causes, consequences and effects Suffered oblasts and spreading Required measures Soil salinity - 50% of arable land is saline - upper basin of rivers (less than 10%) - improvement of drainage capacities, in - of this amount 500,000 ha of land is - lower basin about 95% particular vertical drainage hardly and average salinised; - total 200,000 ha of land is high in salinity - arid zone climatic conditions, - Karakalpaksan, Bukhara, Khorezm, which speed up soil mineralisation Navoi, Syrdarya - large-scale irrigation is a cause of secondary soil salinity
- affected areas by erosion account to 65- - planting forest belts and multi year grass Soil erosion - strong, dry winds 98% in Bukhara, Navoi, Fergana, bands - excessive irrigation Kashkadarya - creation of terraces on the slopes - over grazing - affected land by water erosion accounts - implementation of appropriate - cultivating on slopes to 50-60% in Tashkent, Namangan, agromeliorative and hydrotechnical Andijan methods in specific erosion cases
- in the past almost 90% of land was - wise use of agrochemicals Soil contamination - use of fertilizers and pesticides contaminated by pesticides and fertilizers - introduction and implementation of - contamination reduced by 4 times since 1990 - biggest quantity of nitrates, posphates has integrated methods (complex methods: - while content of chemicals in soils is at acceptable been discharged through drainage to chemical, biological, agrobiological, level, the past contamination still remains a problem watercourses and surface waters; etc.) of crops and pests and diseases - introduced on the all territory of the control and fertilization country;
- feeding capacity has been lost due to over-grazing, - 33% of pastures is degraded; livestock-compaction, lack of phytomelioration, lack - 30% of degraded land is highly degraded; - development of main schema and new of forage, loosening control on use of pastures - landslides are highly introduced in regulations for pastures management Degradation of pastures - lack of rules and regulations in a new agricultural mountains of Fergana valley; - implementation of phytomelioration reform conditions - mudflows are frequent in mountains of - improvement of pasture use practices, - pastures degradation resulted in soil degradation, Tashkent and Kashkadarya oblasts such as pasture rotation mudflows, landslides, floodings - stimulation of feeding crops cultivation in farms
Source: MAWR, 2000 in UNECE, 2001)
109 110 APPENDIX F
Agricultural production hierarchy
…after Reform… District Hokim …before Reform…
AGROPROM Manager (RAIS) Agronomist Economist Land Measurer (zemlemer) FARMER ASS./UNION/MTP KOLKHOZ/SHIRKAT Manager (RAIS) Manager (RAIS) Agronomist Agronomist Economist Economist Land Measurer Land Measurer Engineer Engineer
Fermer F F F F F Brigadier B B
Worker W W W Pudrat P P K K Kolkhoz worker
(Based on ‘Agricultural production hierarchy in ‘The Emerging Actor of ‘Decollectivisation’ in Uzbekistan: Private farming between newly defined political constraints and opportunities’, Trevisani T. (2005)
111 112 Appendix G Questionnaire Fermers and Dehkan Farmers
1. Name:
2. Established in:
3. Leasehold term:
4. Number of hectares:
5. Number of workers:
6. What kinds of crops are cultivated and how much of the land is allocated to each crop?
7. Who decides upon the size of the farm and the size of land allocated to the different crops?
8. What are the reasons for the crops cultivated? Who has decided over the crop mix?
9. Which crops are produced under state procurement quota, what are the exact quota requirements?
10. What are the differences with earlier work (in agriculture: e.g. in shirkat/sovkhoz/kolkhoz?)
11. Does the farmer practice crop rotation?
12. What is produced on the tamorka? What is the size of the tamorka?
13. Who maintains the equipment and the irrigation systems?
14. Where do the seeds come from?
15. Does the farmer work independently, or is the farm part of a cooperation? Is there competition between farmers?
16. Is the farmer engaged in any association?
17. Who is working on the farm?
18. How can the yields be judged? Are the yields high enough to earn a living and how are they in comparison with other farms?
19. What are the yields, and from last years (or from the start)?
20. How is the condition of the farm environment?
21. How is the condition of the soil?
22. What is the (average) bonitation of the land?
23. Who determines the bonitation, and what is the frequency?
24. By what means is the soil ‘fertilized’?
25. Where does the animal manure come from?
113
26. Does the farmer purchase the farm inputs himself?
27. What kinds of fertilizers and pesticides are used for the different crops?
28. What amounts of fertilizers and pesticides are used for the different crops? When?
29. Have the amounts increased over the years?
30. How does the farmer manage if fertilizers and pesticides are not provided on time?
31. How much of the applied fertilizers and pesticides are provided by the state, how much is purchased elsewhere?
32. Is there any registration upon elsewhere/extra bought fertilizers and pesticides?
33. What is the maximum allowed quantity to apply?
34. Who checks/controls the application of fertilizers and pesticides, how often and where?
35. Has the farmer developed any alternatives?
36. Does the farmer have specific agricultural experiences that improve the functioning of the farm and the production and in what way did the farmer acquire it?
37. What kind of machinery does the farmer own/use?
38. What is the relationship/contact with authorities?
39. Does the farmer have an official certificate on which is rights are stated?
40. What happens when the lease period is ended?
41. How did the farmer obtain the land and the registration, what were the requirements for an application?
42. Does the farmer have an official bank account? Is this perceived as positive or negative?
43. Is farming the only source of income?
44. Why has the farmer chosen for this type of farming?
45. Is the farmer able to introduce innovative practices?
46. Did the farmer make any investments in the last years, regarding the future?
47. Does the fermer care more for the land after individualisation? Has this influenced his way of farming, if yes, how?
48. How does the farmer perceive the farm practices with regard to the environment?
49. How does the farmer perceive the degree of freedom in farming?
50. How does the farmer view the future of agriculture?
114 Appendix H Questionnaire shirkats
1. Name:
2. Established in:
3. Historical background:
4. Number of hectares:
5. What kinds of crops are cultivated and how much of the land is allocated to each crop?
6. Who decides upon the size of the farm and the size of land allocated to the different crops?
7. Why are in particular these crops cultivated?
8. Which crops are produced under state procurement quota, what are the exact quotas?
9. How does the shirkat obtain the inputs (fertilizers and pesticides)? What is supplied by the state, what is purchased elsewhere, and how much?
10. By what means is the soil ‘fertilized’?
11. What kinds and amounts of fertilizers and pesticides are used for the different crops? When are they applied?
12. Who determines the quantities and kinds of fertilizers and pesticides?
13. Have the amounts increased over the years?
14. Is there any registration upon elsewhere/extra bought fertilizers and pesticides?
15. What is the maximum allowed quantity to apply?
16. Who checks/controls the application of fertilizers and pesticides, how often and where?
17. Are the standards equal for shirkats and fermers?
18. Where do the seeds come from?
19. How can the yields be judged? How are they in comparison with other shirkats or individual farms?
20. What are the yields, and from last years (or from the start)?
21. What is the size of the shirkat, is all land used for agricultural production?
22. How is the condition of the farm environment?
23. How is the condition of the soil?
24. What is the (average) bonitation of the land?
25. Who determines the bonitation, and what is the frequency?
115 26. Does the staff conduct specific practices to enhance the structure and condition of the soil?
27. What is the role of the authorities, how is contact with local authorities?
28. What is the organisational structure of the shirkat?
29. What kind of workers and staff are employed by the shirkat and what are their tasks?
30. In what way are pudrats selected and appointed? What is the procedure?
31. Do the workers/pudrats practice crop rotation?
32. Is the shirkat able to introduce ‘new/innovative’ practices?
33. Who maintains the equipment and the irrigation systems?
34. How is the payment arranged within the shirkat?
35. How are/were shirkat quota in comparison with state quota?
36. How is the water distribution organised?
37. Are pudrats allowed to grow a second harvest (in case they grow wheat), or other additional crops?
38. Do pudrats participate in decision-making over farm practices; if yes, which?
39. What is going to happen after liquidation of the shirkat, with the machinery, workers, pudrats?
116
Agrarian Reform… the Pathway to Sustainability…? Irna Hofman, April 2007 [email protected] 830110-350-030
Environmental Policy Group Social Science Group Wageningen University
117