Oman: Girding and Guarding the Gulf
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United Arab Emirates (Uae)
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division Country Profile: United Arab Emirates, July 2007 COUNTRY PROFILE: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE) July 2007 COUNTRY اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴّﺔ اﻟﻤﺘّﺤﺪة (Formal Name: United Arab Emirates (Al Imarat al Arabiyah al Muttahidah Dubai , أﺑﻮ ﻇﺒﻲ (The seven emirates, in order of size, are: Abu Dhabi (Abu Zaby .اﻹﻣﺎرات Al ,ﻋﺠﻤﺎن Ajman , أ مّ اﻟﻘﻴﻮﻳﻦ Umm al Qaywayn , اﻟﺸﺎرﻗﺔ (Sharjah (Ash Shariqah ,دﺑﻲّ (Dubayy) .رأس اﻟﺨﻴﻤﺔ and Ras al Khaymah ,اﻟﻔﺠﻴﺮة Fajayrah Short Form: UAE. اﻣﺮاﺗﻰ .(Term for Citizen(s): Emirati(s أﺑﻮ ﻇﺒﻲ .Capital: Abu Dhabi City Major Cities: Al Ayn, capital of the Eastern Region, and Madinat Zayid, capital of the Western Region, are located in Abu Dhabi Emirate, the largest and most populous emirate. Dubai City is located in Dubai Emirate, the second largest emirate. Sharjah City and Khawr Fakkan are the major cities of the third largest emirate—Sharjah. Independence: The United Kingdom announced in 1968 and reaffirmed in 1971 that it would end its treaty relationships with the seven Trucial Coast states, which had been under British protection since 1892. Following the termination of all existing treaties with Britain, on December 2, 1971, six of the seven sheikhdoms formed the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The seventh sheikhdom, Ras al Khaymah, joined the UAE in 1972. Public holidays: Public holidays other than New Year’s Day and UAE National Day are dependent on the Islamic calendar and vary from year to year. For 2007, the holidays are: New Year’s Day (January 1); Muharram, Islamic New Year (January 20); Mouloud, Birth of Muhammad (March 31); Accession of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi—observed only in Abu Dhabi (August 6); Leilat al Meiraj, Ascension of Muhammad (August 10); first day of Ramadan (September 13); Eid al Fitr, end of Ramadan (October 13); UAE National Day (December 2); Eid al Adha, Feast of the Sacrifice (December 20); and Christmas Day (December 25). -
Israeli–Palestinian Peacemaking January 2019 Middle East and North the Role of the Arab States Africa Programme
Briefing Israeli–Palestinian Peacemaking January 2019 Middle East and North The Role of the Arab States Africa Programme Yossi Mekelberg Summary and Greg Shapland • The positions of several Arab states towards Israel have evolved greatly in the past 50 years. Four of these states in particular – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and (to a lesser extent) Jordan – could be influential in shaping the course of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. • In addition to Egypt and Jordan (which have signed peace treaties with Israel), Saudi Arabia and the UAE, among other Gulf states, now have extensive – albeit discreet – dealings with Israel. • This evolution has created a new situation in the region, with these Arab states now having considerable potential influence over the Israelis and Palestinians. It also has implications for US positions and policy. So far, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Jordan have chosen not to test what this influence could achieve. • One reason for the inactivity to date may be disenchantment with the Palestinians and their cause, including the inability of Palestinian leaders to unite to promote it. However, ignoring Palestinian concerns will not bring about a resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which will continue to add to instability in the region. If Arab leaders see regional stability as being in their countries’ interests, they should be trying to shape any eventual peace plan advanced by the administration of US President Donald Trump in such a way that it forms a framework for negotiations that both Israeli and Palestinian leaderships can accept. Israeli–Palestinian Peacemaking: The Role of the Arab States Introduction This briefing forms part of the Chatham House project, ‘Israel–Palestine: Beyond the Stalemate’. -
Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S
Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy Updated May 19, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RS21534 SUMMARY RS21534 Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy May 19, 2021 The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic partner of the United States since 1980, when it became the first Persian Gulf state to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its Kenneth Katzman facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in the region since Specialist in Middle then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter terrorist groups and other regional threats. In Eastern Affairs January 2020, Oman’s longtime leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id Al Said, passed away and was succeeded by Haythim bin Tariq Al Said, a cousin selected by Oman’s royal family immediately upon Qaboos’s death. Sultan Haythim espouses policies similar to those of Qaboos and has not altered U.S.-Oman ties or Oman’s regional policies. During Qaboos’s reign (1970-2020), Oman generally avoided joining other countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates , Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in regional military interventions, instead seeking to mediate their resolution. Oman joined but did not contribute forces to the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, nor did it arm groups fighting Syrian President Bashar Al Asad’s regime. It opposed the June 2017 Saudi/UAE- led isolation of Qatar and had urged resolution of that rift before its resolution in January 2021. -
US “Peace Plan” for the Middle East
AT A GLANCE US 'Peace Plan' for the Middle East On 28 January 2020, United States President Donald Trump released his administration's 'vision for Israeli- Palestinian peace'. The White House Plan, coupled with earlier Trump administration moves, marks a distinct departure from past US policy on the Middle East Peace Process. Key elements are illegal under international law, as they advocate the annexation of occupied territory. Israeli leaders have welcomed the plan, seen as meeting Israel's key demands. The leadership of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas have been united in rejecting the proposal, and the PA has since cut ties with Israel and the USA. The plan is meant to serve as the basis for future direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, to stretch over four years. However, the Israeli government has announced plans to implement parts of it unilaterally in the near future. Key points of the White House plan Palestinian statehood. The 'Peace to Prosperity' plan would see Israel agree to the creation of a future Palestinian state as set out in 'a conceptual map'. However, the establishment of a – demilitarised – Palestinian state within four years is subject to several conditions, which are difficult to meet under current circumstances. They include the Palestinian Authority (PA) taking control in Gaza, the disarming of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other armed groups, a commitment to non-violence and recognition of Israel as 'the nation state of the Jewish people'. The capital of the Palestinian state would comprise a Palestinian town outside the city of Jerusalem and several eastern Jerusalem neighbourhoods (see below). -
So Close, So Far. National Identity and Political Legitimacy in UAE-Oman Border Cities
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Open Research Exeter So Close, So Far. National Identity and Political Legitimacy in UAE-Oman Border Cities Marc VALERI University of Exeter This manuscript is the version revised after peer-review and accepted for publication. This manuscript has been published and is available in Geopolitics: Date of publication: 26 December 2017 DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2017.1410794 Webpage: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14650045.2017.1410794 1 Introduction Oman-United Arab Emirates border, Thursday 5 May 2016 early morning. As it has been the case for years on long weekends and holidays, endless queues of cars from Oman are waiting to cross the border in order to flock to Dubai for Isra’ and Miraj break 1 and enjoy attractions and entertainment that their country does not seem to offer. Major traffic congestions are taking place in the Omani city of al-Buraymi separated from the contiguous United Arab Emirates city of al-Ayn by the international border. Many border cities are contiguous urban areas which have been ‘dependent on the border for [their] existence’ or even ‘came into existence because of the border’. 2 Usually once military outposts (Eilat/Aqaba, on the Israel-Jordan border 3), they developed on either side of a long established border (Niagara Falls cities, on the Canada-USA border) after a border had been drawn (Tornio, on the Sweden-Finland border; 4 cities on the Mexico-USA and China- Russia 5 borders). Furthermore, split-up cities which were partitioned after World War II, including in Central Europe (e.g. -
Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S
Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy Updated May 19, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RS21534 SUMMARY RS21534 Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy May 19, 2021 The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic partner of the United States since 1980, when it became the first Persian Gulf state to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its Kenneth Katzman facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in the region since Specialist in Middle then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter terrorist groups and other regional threats. In Eastern Affairs January 2020, Oman’s long-time leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id Al Said, passed away and was succeeded by Haythim bin Tariq Al Said, a cousin selected by Oman’s royal family immediately upon Qaboos’s death. Sultan Haythim espouses policies similar to those of Qaboos and has not altered U.S.-Oman ties or Oman’s regional policies. During Qaboos’s reign (1970-2020), Oman generally avoided joining other countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in regional military interventions, instead seeking to mediate their resolution. Oman joined but did not contribute forces to the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, nor did it arm groups fighting Syrian President Bashar Al Asad’s regime. It opposed the June 2017 Saudi/UAE- led isolation of Qatar and had urged resolution of that rift before its resolution in January 2021. -
Oman, Zanzibar, Their Relationship – and Our Trip
Oman, Zanzibar, Their Relationship – and Our Trip http://realhistoryww.com/world_history/ancient/Misc/True_Negros/Assorted/Oman_Zanzibar_Sultanate.htm Oman and Zanzibar are separated by 2,400 of the Indian Ocean. Oman is in the Middle East (in Asia); Zanzibar part of Africa. So why is the University of Arizona Center for Middle Eastern Studies’ 2016 Fulbright-Hays Group Project Abroad combining these two regions? Historically, the two areas have been in close contact with each other and provide an interesting case study of cross-regional relations. The curriculum-development program will explore these political, linguistic, and religious ties and will develop ways to integrate the information into elementary and secondary classes. From the 1st century CE, traders from the Arabian peninsula – as well as Persia and India – were in regular contact with Zanzibar and the East African coast; such cultural and trade relations increased by the 11th century. Political ties date from the early 1500s when both Oman and Zanzibar came under Portuguese colonial rule. Nearly 200 years later, Omanis overthrew Portuguese control and took charge of both Oman and Zanzibar. The latter became a center of Arab trade in slaves, spices (particularly cloves), and ivory. Many Arabs moved to the island, bringing with them Ibadi Islam, a very small school of Islamic thought which is the main faith of Oman and an important force in Zanzibar. By the 19th century, Zanzibar had become a center of Islamic scholarship: a contact zone between Ibadi Islam and other variants of the Muslim faith. The height of Arab association with Zanzibar occurred in 1840 when Omani ruler Sayyid Said bin Sultan al-Busaid moved his capital from Muscat, Oman, to Stone Town, Zanzibar. -
Ambassador Richard W. Boehm
The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project AMBASSADOR RICHARD W. BOEHM Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy Initial interview date: June 27, 1994 Copyright 199 ADST TABLE OF CONTENTS Background Born in Queen New York 1926 (amaica High School Army armored division Germany 194,-1946 Adelphi .ollege graduated 19,0 0ngland France 1941-1949 2erits of G.I. Bill Prentice Hall Publishing .ompany 2utual Insurance .ompany Foreign Service 06amination process Appointed to the Foreign Service December 19,4 2otivations to enter the Foreign Service New Division 19,,-19,6 Henry Suydam head Role of Division News-tickers service 8iaison with the bureau of Near 0astern Affairs 9sort of assistant spokesman: Department of State;s relationship with the press .old war issues Foreign Service Institute 19,6 A <100 course .onsular course Schott 2c8eod & Frank Auerbach Naha Okinawa 19,6-19,1 (unior vice-consul Organization people in the consular unit 8iving in Okinawa Report on 9Revisionist sentiment among the Okinawans: Reaction of American military command to report 1 Hamburg West Germany 19,9 Assistant General Service Officer German language school Frankfurt West Berlin West Germany 19,9-1962 0conomic Section 19,9-1960 Driving on the autobahn to West Berlin Khrushchev;s ultimatum 0conomy population government of West Berlin Prohibited manufacture and sales of goods for military use Question of dual use items French position Access to 0ast Berlin No contact with 0ast German authorities A.S. policy on 0ast Germany 0conomic developments in 0ast Germany 9Inter-Bonal Trade: Disparity between 0ast and West German economic situations Possibility of Soviet attack on West Berlin fear of nuclear war Disparity of Soviet attack on West Berlin fear of nuclear war .oncerns about change in A.S. -
University of London Oman and the West
University of London Oman and the West: State Formation in Oman since 1920 A thesis submitted to the London School of Economics and Political Science in candidacy for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Francis Carey Owtram 1999 UMI Number: U126805 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U126805 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 bLOSiL ZZLL d ABSTRACT This thesis analyses the external and internal influences on the process of state formation in Oman since 1920 and places this process in comparative perspective with the other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. It considers the extent to which the concepts of informal empire and collaboration are useful in analysing the relationship between Oman, Britain and the United States. The theoretical framework is the historical materialist paradigm of International Relations. State formation in Oman since 1920 is examined in a historical narrative structured by three themes: (1) the international context of Western involvement, (2) the development of Western strategic interests in Oman and (3) their economic, social and political impact on Oman. -
Country Coding Units
INSTITUTE Country Coding Units v11.1 - March 2021 Copyright © University of Gothenburg, V-Dem Institute All rights reserved Suggested citation: Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, and Lisa Gastaldi. 2021. ”V-Dem Country Coding Units v11.1” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Funders: We are very grateful for our funders’ support over the years, which has made this ven- ture possible. To learn more about our funders, please visit: https://www.v-dem.net/en/about/ funders/ For questions: [email protected] 1 Contents Suggested citation: . .1 1 Notes 7 1.1 ”Country” . .7 2 Africa 9 2.1 Central Africa . .9 2.1.1 Cameroon (108) . .9 2.1.2 Central African Republic (71) . .9 2.1.3 Chad (109) . .9 2.1.4 Democratic Republic of the Congo (111) . .9 2.1.5 Equatorial Guinea (160) . .9 2.1.6 Gabon (116) . .9 2.1.7 Republic of the Congo (112) . 10 2.1.8 Sao Tome and Principe (196) . 10 2.2 East/Horn of Africa . 10 2.2.1 Burundi (69) . 10 2.2.2 Comoros (153) . 10 2.2.3 Djibouti (113) . 10 2.2.4 Eritrea (115) . 10 2.2.5 Ethiopia (38) . 10 2.2.6 Kenya (40) . 11 2.2.7 Malawi (87) . 11 2.2.8 Mauritius (180) . 11 2.2.9 Rwanda (129) . 11 2.2.10 Seychelles (199) . 11 2.2.11 Somalia (130) . 11 2.2.12 Somaliland (139) . 11 2.2.13 South Sudan (32) . 11 2.2.14 Sudan (33) . -
A Study of Ibadi Oman
UCLA Journal of Religion Volume 2 2018 Developing Tolerance and Conservatism: A Study of Ibadi Oman Connor D. Elliott The George Washington University ABSTRACT This thesis analyzes the development of Omani-Ibadi society from pre- Islam to the present day. Oman represents an anomaly in the religious world because its Ibadi theology is conservative in nature while also preaching unwavering tolerance. To properly understand how Oman developed such a unique culture and religion, it is necessary to historically analyze the country by recounting the societal developments that occurred throughout the millennia. By doing so, one begins to understand that Oman did not achieve this peaceful religious theology over the past couple of decades. Oman has an exceptional society that was built out of longtime traditions like a trade-based economy that required foreign interaction, long periods of political sovereignty or autonomy, and a unique theology. The Omani-Ibadi people and their leaders have continuously embraced the ancient roots of their regional and religious traditions to create a contemporary state that espouses a unique society that leads people to live conservative personal lives while exuding outward tolerance. Keywords: Oman, Ibadi, Tolerance, Theology, History, Sociology UCLA Journal of Religion Vol. 2, 2018 Developing Tolerance and Conservatism: A Study of Ibadi Oman By Connor D. Elliott1 The George Washington University INTRODUCTION he Sultanate of Oman is a country which consistently draws acclaim T for its tolerance and openness towards peoples of varying faiths. The sect of Islam most Omanis follow, Ibadiyya, is almost entirely unique to Oman with over 2 million of the 2.5 million Ibadis worldwide found in the sultanate.2 This has led many to see the Omani government as the de facto state-representative of Ibadiyya in contemporary times. -
Nationals of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and U
International Civil Aviation Organization STATUS OF AIRPORTS OPERABILITY AND RESTRICTION INFORMATION - MID REGION Updated on 26 September 2021 Disclaimer This Brief for information purposes only and should not be used as a replacement for airline dispatch and planning tools. All operational stakeholders are requested to consult the most up-to-date AIS publications. The sources of this Brief are the NOTAMs issued by MID States explicitly including COVID-19 related information, States CAA websites and IATA travel center (COVID-19) website. STATE STATUS / RESTRICTION 1. Passengers are not allowed to enter. - This does not apply to: - nationals of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates; - passengers with a residence permit issued by Bahrain; - passengers with an e-visa obtained before departure; - passengers who can obtain a visa on arrival; - military personnel. 2. Passengers are not allowed to enter if in the past 14 days they have been in or transited through Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Georgia, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Philippines, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Viet Nam or Zimbabwe. - This does not apply to: - nationals of Bahrain; - passengers with a residence permit issued by Bahrain. BAHRAIN 3. Passengers must have a negative COVID-19 PCR test taken at most 72 hours before departure. The test result must have a QR code if arriving from Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Georgia, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Philippines, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Viet Nam or Zimbabwe.