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Home , Religious philosophy

Open 2015; 1: 97–106

Research Article Open Access Vladimir K. Shokhin* The Pioneering Appearances of of in Europe: François Para du Phanjas on the Nature of Religion

Abstract: Philosophy is, in some sense, the self-reflection of general culture, and perpetual self-reflection has been a primary occupation of philosophy in the West. Consequently, self-reflection is of great importance for dividing philosophical fields into separate divisions, and is no exception. This paper deals with a thinker who constructed a “philosophy of religion” as a discipline, but was overlooked by historians. The main achievements of François Para du Phanjas (1724-1797), who tried to offer a theory of religion in the theological context, have not lost their significance for today, especially his insights into of religious beliefs, his conception of “certainty” and classification of “religious evidences”, and the shortcomings of his analysis of “natural religion”.

Keywords: François Para du Phanjas, Sigmund von Storchenau, philosophy of religion, natural religion, revealed religion, theology, , apologetics, scholasticism, evidence

DOI 10.2478/opth-2014-0008 Received October 20, 2014; accepted November 24, 2014

It is generally recognized that Philosophy of Religion was introduced into the Western philosophical landscape not earlier than Modernity, though philosophical speculation on the nature and of religion dates much earlier, from the very beginnings of philosophy itself (i.e. from Antiquity). However, there is no consensus as to who introduced it as a philosophical field. Some historians of philosophy, including considerably authoritative, are still sure that Philosophy of Religion was a production of Hume, Kant and Hegel.1 It is true that their contribution into reflection on religion has proved very important and effective in producing philosophical discussions on the subject, but they were not the pathfinders, having predecessors including English and Continental deists, agnostics and their theistic opponents. So, I believe that the bias towards their “pioneering” work is based on the supposition that only the greatest philosophers do everything in philosophy. More attention should be paid to historians of philosophy who correlated the emergence of this philosophical field with the introduction of the very term philosophy of religion. In reality, there is a great difference between Mr. Jourdain (from Le Bourgeois gentilhomme), who doesn’t know that he

1 See, e.g., the notorious book by James Collins, regarded as a classic work by Anglo-American authors, and views of the historian of philosophy of religion of the 20th century Eugene Long or a champion of “comparative philosophy of religion” Paul Griffiths. Among Continental historians of philosophy of religion one can mention, e.g., Timo Koistenen, for whom this branch of philosophy was established through efforts of such philosophers of the Enlightenment, as Locke, Hume, Kant and Hegel, or Jörg Splett who refers in this regard to Kant and Hegel. Before them S. Holm asserted that philosophy of religion had not “the independent existence” before Kantian Religion in the Limits of Reason Alone (1793), and the same view was advocated lately by K. Müller. See: Holm, Religionsphilosophie, 11; Collins, The Emergence of Philosophy of Religion, 1967; Griffiths, “Comparative Philosophy”, 615; Splett, “Religion”; Long, Thewntieth-Century Philosophy of Religion, 1; Koistinen, Philosophy of Religion or Religious Philosophy? 12-13; Müller, “Religion/Religionsphilosophie”.

*Corresponding author: Vladimir K. Shokhin: Institute of Philosophy: Russian Academy of Sciences

© 2015 Vladimir K. Shokhin, licensee De Gruyter Open. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License. 98 V.K. Shokhin speaks in prose, and the same person who is already aware of it. So, Charles Taliaferro’s mention that the first use of “philosophy of religion” in English occurs with the Platonist Ralph Cudworth (1616-1688) is of much interest.2 Nevertheless, the same Mr. Jourdain didn’t manage to use his “discovery” then, and it was only in the Continent one hundred years later that the combination of the words “philosophy of religion” and the corresponding philosophical discipline under this name began to sprout. Chronologically, it is striking that, for the first time in history, two solid works entitled Philosophy of Religion were published within an interval of two years in the 1770s. Both volumes, one in German and the other in French, came from the pens of theologians and philosophers who belonged to the Society of Jesus. Their objective was to provide a detailed response to philosophical opponents of the Christian religion, both deists and atheists, by means of a philosophical argument, and it was not accidental that representatives of the most “proactive” Catholic order decided to undertake this. However, their historical were not the same.

А Disregarded Philosopher

It is true that we know little more about Sigmund von Storchenau than what Heidegger once said about Aristotle: he was born, he lived and he died. Indeed, Storchenau was born 17 August 1731 and died 13 April 1798 near the Austrian town of Klagenfurt, which has been called Kärnten since the mid-20th century. In 1763, he became a professor of philosophy in Vienna, and also held the degree of doctor of theology and philosophy. A member of the Jesuit order, he was, in terms of his “philosophical confession,” like many in the “Age of Reason”, a Wolffian. Unlike many Wolffians at this time, he was, owing to his religious stand, a consistent opponent of French deism, with whose representatives he engaged in lively polemics. All of his works stem from the period of his Viennese professorship. In 1769, he published the Latin works Institutiones logicae and Institutionem metaphysicarum, which were undoubtedly his lecture courses. In 1774, he published in German Grundsätze der Logik (Principles of ) and in 1772, Die Philosophie der Religion (Philosophy of Religion). In 1773-1781, a significantly expanded edition of the latter appeared, but now in seven parts (the edition of 1772 forming the first part),3 and in 1785-1789 he published the five volume Zugaben zur Philosophie der Religion (Additions to the Philosophy of Religion). The main thrust of Storchenau’s study of religion was the apologetic endeavor to differ between two pillars of religion, i.e. natural religion and revealed religion and to substantiate the view that the first one was insufficient for both knowledge of and salvation. All those who wrote on Philosophie der Religion or Religionsphilosophie in Germany were of quite another spirit. However, they (just as philosophical researchers of religion) built on his foundation, and in spite of the fact that responses to his endeavors were scarce and mostly critical,4 his role in establishing a philosophy of religion has been acknowledged by historians who have expounded his teachings in detail.5 In contrast, François Para du Phanjas (1724-1797) is practically a forgotten figure, and no historian of the subject has tried to uncover his heritage. The scant information available to me comes from a 19th century lexicon of Pierre Larousse – an “encyclopedia of forgotten things.” The only thing we know about him is that the second part of his name was a designation of the chateau in Paris in which he was born, that the Jesuit order commissioned him to teach mathematics and philosophy in Grenoble, Marseille and Besançon (where he enjoyed great success), and that after the dissolution of the order in 1774 he returned

2 See: Taliaferro, “Philosophy of Religion”; cf.: Taliaferro, Evidence and , 12 (footnote 6) with reference to: Muirhead, The Platonic Tradition, 28. 3 Jaeschke, “Religionsphilosophie”, 748. 4 E.g., one well known German writer, regular participant of literary polemics and bookseller Christoph Friedrich Nicolai (1733-1811) read Die Philosophie der Religion with much interest but criticized Storchenau for the latter’s attempts to wrap super- natural verities in “wretched philosophical clothes” and capture obedience to reason. Nicolai finished his estimation with an exclamation: “Let God deliver us from such a philosophy of religion!”. See: Jaeschke, Ibid., 748. 5 See: Feiereis, Die Ursprung, 227-241. The author estimates Storchenau’s achievements very highly and even finishes his va- luable book with a chapter dedicated to him as decisive contributor to philosophy of religion’s autonomy (Verselständgung ). The Pioneering Appearances of Philosophy of 99 to Paris. Living there on a pension he received from the Archbishop and the Princess Adélaide (the aunt of the unfortunate Louis XVI), he was able to devote himself entirely to scholarly pursuits. In 1767, Para published his Eléments de métaphysique sacrée et profane, ou Théorie des êtres insensibles [Elements of Sacred and Secular or a Theory of Supersensible Beings], a work which made him respected and was later noted for its “loftiness of thought, its perfect method and clarity of expression.”6 By an irony of fate, however, his four volume Théorie des êtres sensibles, ou, Cours complet de physique, spéculative, expérimentale, systématique et géométrique [Theory of Sensible Things, or a Complete Course of Speculative, Experimental Physics Presented Systematically and Geometrically], published in 1774, proved to have the greatest results among his works.7 But in the same year there appeared the two volume Les Principes de la saine philosophie conciliés avec ceux de la religion, ou la Philosophie de la religion [The Principles of Sound Philosophy Reconciled with those of Religion, or the Philosophy of Religion] which will be the object of our examination. The concept that philosophy is to be “reconciled” with religion continued to occupy him later, as evidenced by his Tableau historique et philosophique de la religion [Historical and Philosophical Picture of Religion] from 1784. Although he was as much a fervent polemicist as another Jesuite, François Nonnotte (a fervent opponent of Voltaire), he enjoyed no attention from the philosophers of his day, and was not referenced by any historian of philosophy of religion. The Principles of Sound Philosophy were conceived as an attempt to compensate the lack of a systematic Christian apologetic and to substantiate the possibility and the need for consensus concerning the “true” philosophy and the “true” religion. That, along with Para’s unjustifiable oblivion, vindicates the following detailed account of his magnum opus.

Philosopher of the Revealed Religion

The work consisted of two unequal parts. The first, entitled, “Philosophical Theory of Religion,” is more than three times the size of the second, “Philosophical and Christian Discourse on Religion.” But they did not have to be equal. Para, in a thorough, “mathematical” presentation, outlines and justifies the structure of his work in the preface, clearly stating that the “oratorical” and polemical essays making up the second part were intended only to emphasize certain points introduced in the fundamental, “theoretical” part.8 The “Philosophique Théorie de la Religion” consists of eight sections, which are further divided into sections. Consistent with his mathematical and scholastic exposition of the material, Para forms the relevant definitions and updates them, at times introducing “axioms,” raising opponents’ objections and consistently replying to them. Section I deals with “credibility” regarding preliminary definitions of different states of certainty and doubt, an epistemological analysis of the subject and object of valid knowledge and its sources, and the sources of our conviction of the religion’s credibility. Section II is devoted to the “objects of religion,” which include the idea of God, the Divine governance of the world, and the idea of the human being, (its psycho- physical structure, freedom and the immortality of the ), and a refutation of atheistic counterclaims. Section III is about the “nature of religion,” with a thorough differentiation of the attributes of natural and revealed religion, the definition of faith, and the Christian evaluation of non-Christian (pagans, Muslims, Jews), Christian heretics, schismatics and “tolerantists.” In Section IV, Para examines the “storehouse of Revelation,” which includes the Scriptures (giving the author occasion to examine Biblical versions in various languages), Tradition and the teachings of the Church. Section V is devoted to the “chronology of the holy books,” with an excursus into “chronology in general:” the astronomical and civil year, the historical epochs beginning with the creation of the world and the “incredible chronologies” of non-Biblical nations. In section VI, Para again returns to the theme of certainty, but now to the “certainty of ,” devoting his main attention to justifying faith in through a refutation of eight

6 Larousse, Grand Dictionnaire, 167. 7 Most likely, this work was preceded by his Principes du Calcul et de la Géometrie [Principles of Calculus and Geometry], which was intended to be a popular mathematics textbook (the date of it is unknown to us). 8 A statement of the structure of the work and the tasks undertaken in both of its parts is presented in: Para du Phanjas, Les Principes de la Saine Philosophie. T. I, xiii-xxviii. 100 V.K. Shokhin types of objections. In the purely polemical section VII, Para presents refutations of a variety of positions of “unbelief” contemporary to the author, including objections against Church dogmas (on the basis that they contradict reason), the certainty of the Scriptural texts (on the grounds that natural religion is sufficient, which was Rousseau’s focus), the necessity of revealed religion; and the Biblical teaching on the unity of the human race. Section VIII deals with “practical religion” where Para examines self-love and passions, human morals and character, virtues (both ethical and Christian), true and false piety, and the “morality of religion.” The second part of The Principles of Sound Philosophy consists of three apologetic discourses. The object of the first is the necessity and existence of a single revealed religion (the first part devoted to “the idea of the one God,” the second to “the idea of religion”), which is substantiated through a critique of “religiomachism” and the deistic conception of the self-sufficiency of natural religion. The second discourse deals with the “divinity of the Catholic religion,”: its sacraments, “practical dogmas,” cult, morality, historical development, its qualitative difference from all other religions, and the necessity to work for its preservation in humanity. Finally, the third discourse, the most pathetic? (“oratorical”), is dedicated to “the wanderings of disbelief,” the unfounded nature of “attacks” on Biblical miracles (and the attempts to contrast them with the “signs” of pagan religions), and the refutation by the testimonies of “the entire Earth and history.” A systematic thinker, Para comments in detail on the title of his work. He pursues a dual task: to reveal the true philosophy applied to the “dogmas and proofs” of religion, as well as religion itself “compared” to the true philosophy. His work intends to be simultaneously a philosophical and a theological treatise, expressing the true agreement between philosophy and religion, and also intends to overthrow all the means that unbelief currently utilizes against religion and to which it will resort to in the future.9 Para provides an extended exposition of the book’s subject and the content of the discipline of knowledge that is systematically laid out.

“The general aim of this philosophy of religion (de cette Philosophie de Religion) is, consequently, to have everyone aware of what is fundamental and essential in religion (de fondamental & d’essentiel dans la Religion), to make known simply and clearly the principles on which religion is based, the objects to which it refers, the properties it distinguishes, the sources from which it emanates, the sacred repository to which it is consigned, the speculative and factual proofs that establish it, the speculative and practical truths that it teaches, the heavenly morality that it preaches.”10

The “philosophy of religion” (la Philosophie de Religion) has every right not to be like that cold and apathetic philosophy which suppresses within itself the sound principles of reason and religion and grows like a seed of in the hearts of all who accept it. The true philosophy is a “love of truth” and of virtue, and therefore also the “love of religion.”11 Para reveals what he understands by a “philosophical theory of religion”. He treats it as a “philosophical examination of the principles that Christianity assumes; of the sources from which it emanates; of the principles on which it is based; of the various sorts of proofs that substantiate it; of the fundamental objections directed against it; and of the traits that characterize it.”12 In Section I, devoted to certainty, Para examines the transition from certainty (certitude) to faith (foi). The foundation of any faith (la foi en général) is the authority serving as the external testimony, impelling us with a definite force to believe in something. Para divides faith into divine faith and human faith, depending on the source of the respective testimony. Divine faith is a mental consent, an acquiescence (un acquiescement) based on testimony from the Deity Itself that appears to us in a manner as a “speculative or factual truth” which can both be comprehended and not comprehended.13 There are four sources of certainty as testimonies: 1) from the inner sense, 2) from ideas, 3) from the understanding and 4) from other people. Divine Revelation (la Révélation divine) is based on (2) – the testimony of ideas

9 Ibid., vii-ix. 10 Ibid., xii. 11 Ibid., xxi-xxii. 12 Ibid., xxxvii. 13 Ibid., 68. The Pioneering Appearances of Philosophy of Religion in Europe 101

(le témoignage des idées). This means we trust everything God has revealed to us, since we know that He is infallible Wisdom and irreproachable Truth.14 Therefore, He can neither be mistaken nor lead us into error. Revelation itself, as His testimony, can be either immediate (as in the case of Moses or the prophets) or through His messengers and servants, who through undeniable proofs do not permit us to doubt the revelation on His behalf.15 All the four types of testimony converge in establishing the certainty of religion itself. The testimony of our inner sense teaches us that we have within ourselves – within the depths of our soul and our heart – a natural inclination to “pure and holy religion.” The testimony of ideas makes us sure that the wonderful order of nature is essentially connected with the existence of the uncreated Being. The testimony of understanding (sens) teaches us that Moses, the prophets, Jesus Christ and the apostles existed, taught and acted in the name of the Eternal One and that their miracles and ministry surpassed normal human capabilities. The testimony of holy people instructs us about all that is “essential and fundamental in religion.”16 In section II, we find the explanation that the objects of religion are God, Who is revealed to humans, and humans, who are brought to God. Para considers it necessary to examine these “objects of religion” before turning to “religion in itself” (la Religion en elle-même)17, referring to its definition and essential characteristics. Section III contains the following definition of religion in the spirit of Lactantius: “religion, looked at in its most general manner (dans sa plus grande généralité), is the sacred communication (un Commerce sacré) between heaven and earth by means of which God unites Himself with humans and humans with God.”18 God communicates with us, revealing to us His existence and His nature, bestowing His graces, and demanding and accepting our worship. We communicate with God through worship and observing His law. Worship and law are “the two fundamental constituents of religion” (les deux constitutifs fondamentaux).19 Religion is either natural or revealed, or both together, and we are obliged to follow religion and practice it. However, next follows a thesis not completely agreeing with the previous one: the only religion to which we must necessarily be obedient and true is revealed religion.20 Para also provides definitions of both varieties of religion:

“Natural religion (la Religion naturelle) is the inner language of nature and reason, by means of which the common prin- ciples of human morality are manifested. It reveals that in nature there exists a Being, superior to all that is visible and perceivable, on Whom our existence, life and happiness depend; Who can protect us or allow our ruin, Who is interested in our innocence and our virtue, Who hates sin and crime, Who values and demands worship and Whose will we must respect, Whose commandments we must observe, Whose kindness we must hope for and Whose wrath we must fear.”21

It is Para’s conviction that this listing contains the foundation of the religion worthy of both God and humanity, but this religion is not enough to bring us to God without Divine Revelation.22 He would not be a classic scholastic if he did not attach an explanation of the given definition and provide further clarification. This religion is called “natural,” for nature and reason, or the natural lights (les lumières naturelles) proclaim it to all people. On God’s part, it is “substantiated” by His love for order (l’Ordre), and it is this very order that is divided into the “essential” and “arbitrary.” The former corresponds to what is contained in the nature of things and is the “natural order.”23 Here, we transition to the concept of law (la loi).

14 Faith in the given case is based on the very ideas of wisdom and truth as perfections. 15 Ibid., 75. 16 Ibid., 83. 17 Ibid., 85. 18 Ibid., 214. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid., 215. 21 Ibid., 214-215. 22 Ibid., 215-216. 23 Here Para cites St. Augustine. 102 V.K. Shokhin

Natural law (la Loi naturelle), which serves as the basis of natural religion, “is etched in our minds and hearts by the hands of nature or, rather, by the Arbitrator, the Author and the Legislator of nature.” It is identical with the “eternal law” (la Loi éternelle), which, “seen from God’s vantage point,” is the immanent action of Divine reason and will, prescribing what a free and rational mortal creature should do and what it should avoid. In this sense, it is also necessary and immutable law.24 The same natural law, “seen from the human being’s vantage point,” is the light emanating from the Creator, Who enlightens us as to what we must follow and what we must avoid in the moral and social order. It is a rule of conduct (une règle de conduite) clearly “stamped” in human reason and the heart, pointing out our fundamental duties and obligations regarding God, fellow human beings, and ourselves. The human powers – religious and secular – can merely add other prescriptions to this natural law, corresponding to our “positive laws” (loix positives), but they cannot take away anything from it.25 Revealed religion (la Religion révelée) is defined as “a body of speculative and practical truths, emanating in a supernatural way from the bosom of the Deity Himself, Who has deigned to manifest Himself to us, to speak with us and to instruct us in another way than by means of the simple lamp of reason,” and these revealed truths are contained in the Scriptures and Tradition.26 Revealed religion replenishes natural religion and contains a body of supernatural truths and laws (de vérités & de loix surnaturelles), which humanity would never grasp, save for the Deity instructing us through supernatural Revelation (la révélation).27 There are two means of communicating revealed truths: through “inspiration” (voie d’inspiration) and through “impulse” (voie d’impulsion). “Inspiration” means that God creates supernatural ideas and images in the human soul, which stamp and reveal secret truths that are naturally hidden from human reason. “Impulse” means that God limits Himself to influencing the soul to announcing (without altering the truth), to enriching the natural knowledge and to presiding over the mouth that speaks and the hand that writes, adding the stamp of certainty and infallibility.28 God enlightened the Prophets by the first of these means, whereas the second directed the pens of the Biblical scribes. Furthermore, Revelation is subdivided into a common revelation (une révélation commune) and a particular revelation (une révélation particulière). The former is intended for those who are charged with instructing others, whereas the second is directed to individuals for their own instruction.29 Apart from 1) “inspiration” and 2) “impulse” there is still another path of revelation; 3) that of special help. This takes place when God enlightens and guides His Church, preventing it from falling into errors by means of special Providential acts. Para especially examines faith (la Foi), which he characterizes as the “supernatural light” that God shines into our that bolsters our firm in Him and in everything He has disclosed to us. Among the truths we can comprehend are that there is one God, that He is just, and that He is the creator and the keeper of the world. Among the truths we cannot comprehend are that one God can be in Three Persons and that He was incarnated for the sake of human salvation30. Thus, all the objects of faith are true, but not all are comprehensible.31 Para was unable to avoid delineating faith along scholastic rubrics: its source is heavenly grace, a supernatural gift from the Father of light; its subject is the soul, striving for “divine things”. The cause is the infallible authority of God Himself, while the object is the universality of the Divine truths and promises. By making faith the theme of his work, the French philosopher raises the burning question of his day (and not only of his day) concerning the fate of those who did not accept or receive the truth of revealed religion. This was one of the questions Rousseau had recently held Christian theologians to account to,

24 Ibid., 218. 25 Ibid., 220. 26 Ibid., 251. 27 Ibid., 252. 28 Ibid., 253. 29 Ibid., 256-257. 30 There is no doubt the French philosopher founded himself on Aquinas’s Summa contra gentiles I. 3: Quaedam namque vera sunt de deo quae omnem facultatem humanae rationis excedunt, ut deum esse trinum et unum. Quadem vero sunt ad quae etiam ratio naturalis pertingere potest, sicut est deum esse unum, et alia huiusmodi. 31 Ibid., 271-272. The Pioneering Appearances of Philosophy of Religion in Europe 103 in no small degree. Para mentions that some theologians believe that, despite the unavailability of the Christian religion to some people, the adherence to natural law was still possibile for them, as well as an “implicit faith” (la Foi implicité) in the Holy and Incarnation. God cannot demand more than such faith from these people, and it is sufficient for their salvation. However, along with , Para believed that an explicit faith (la Foi explicité) was necessary for the reception of the saving truth. However, someone who follows natural law can be enlightened by God before death and in some manner be initiated into the truths necessary for salvation.32 Religiological themes33 recur in the second part of Para du Phanjas’s work, “Philosophical and Christian Discourse on Religion.” This is, above all, in the second part of Discourse I with the self-explanatory title “Necessity and existence of one religion – the religion of revelation.” It is clear from the context that the polemical assertions were addressed to an audience under the influence of deists. One the one hand, we encounter again the assertion that human beings have only two available paths that lead to God: namely, natural religion and revealed religion (see above). On the other hand, Para’s claim that if the first of these is insufficient to lead us to God and be united with Him, it is only the second path that remains. And this religion, which is worthy of God and humanity, cannot be the “monstrous conglomeration” of absurdities, dishonesties, extravagances, and contradictions that idolatry and other “religious phantoms” present to us.34 Natural religion alone is insufficient for the mind and heart. Deprived of the lamp of Divine Revelation, it inevitably leads us astray, away from the path of the religion that “both in theory and in practice” is worthy of God and of the human being.35 Without the light of Revelation, we are left to blindly follow either “an arbitrary religion” (une religion arbitraire) or “a system of religion” (un système de religion).36 In the first case, we are left to accept “a frivolous and fantastic belief” (une créance frivole & fabuleuse), an impure or insufficient worship of God, a perverse or criminal morality, and a religion “consisting of vices and absurdities”. But if we should take the “system of religion” – Para’s euphemism for the “religion of the philosophers” – then it becomes obvious that such religion would be out of the reach of the vast majority of humanity. The “lack of sources of light” as well as agitated passions coupled with the brevity of human life point to this. Further, the bustle of human life excludes for three-quarters of the population from the possibility of using such a religion. Yet, even if there were an absolute minority whose natural talents and circumstances in life allowed them to reflect on morality, on how to worship God and on the Deity itself, they would inevitably go astray with such a “system devoid of enlightenment by the light of Revelation.”37 The past, which can teach the present, proves all this. Para provides sufficiently detailed accounts of the errors of Greek philosophers and their distorted ideas of both God and morality. In order to show that natural religion is incapable of correcting the human heart in the absence of Divine Revelation, Para needs few examples. Nature itself appeals to us, trying to persuade us that there must be “a sacred and inviolable religion” (une religion sacrée et inviolable) which imposes great obligations and demands great sacrifices. However, it does not say what these are. Moreover, it turns out that this arbitrary and “poorly heard” voice of natural religion has generated all the errors of the mind and heart. This voice is responsible for the folly of idolatry, the delirious doctrine of , and the outrageous impiety of magic and

32 Ibid., 277-279. 33 The notion of religiology was introduced in the 1920’s – 1930’s by some German Catholic theologians (as Religiologie) to designate later religious studies which have not empirical, but philosophical, theological and even pastoral methods at their disposal. In reality, we have to do justice to those German Catholics who coined the discipline of Fundamentaltheologie in the 1850’s (which, by the way, was swiftly implanted into the Russian Spiritual Academies), and whose goal was rational apology of authentic religion against its naturalistic “unmasking” (very similar to today’s new in the shape of the cognitive studies of religion etc.). I refer to the three-volume opus magnum by Johannes Nepomukh Ehrlich “Handbook for Lecturing on the Ge- neral Introduction into Theological Science and Theory of Religion and Revelation as the First Part of Fundamental Theology” (1859) based on his lectures in Prague. Among the notorious champions of religiology are Burgault, “Le congrės d’histoire des religions “ and Pummer, “Religionswissenschaft or Religiology?”. In some English papers the term religiology was used still earlier, i.e. in: Kishimoto, “Religiology”, 84-85 and McDermott, “Religion as Academic Discipline”, 17. 34 Para du Phanjas, Les Principes de la Saine Philosophie. T.II, 288. 35 Ibid., 290. 36 Ibid., 291. 37 Ibid., 292-293. 104 V.K. Shokhin superstition. People sensed the ; they considered the soul to be immortal and at the same time “placed” it into the body of an animal and summoned it back with the help of infernal forces. The same “arbitrary and poorly heard voice” of natural religion allowed certain pagans to spill the blood of fellow humans, sacrifice children to idols, allow the ritual of bride burning, and deify all vices and passions in order to serve their . Even though people did sense the presence of the Unknown God,38 it was owing to this “unknown” character that the human heart found Him in everything and everywhere that flattered its tastes and inclinations. Indeed, today natural religion heaps one system on top of another, one error upon another and engenders an entire mob of “unbelievers” who agree with one another only in their general hatred of truth.39 In the end, “wherever natural religion is deprived of the beacon of Revelation, it reveals itself and blossoms into a religion – both speculative and practical – that is worthy neither of God nor of humanity”.40 Para du Phanjas elaborates this thesis, which he conceived long before, but adds essentially nothing new to what he has already said.

Real Failures and Overweighing Merits

It is clear that Para du Phanjas’ efforts to introduce a new philosophical discipline were of undoubtful merit. Whether he knew of the Austrian’s Philosophy of Religion or forged this expression himself independently of Storchenau is an answer he took to the grave. However, there are great affinities between two Jesuit discoverers of the land of Philosophy of Religion, the greatest being the philosophical undertaking to provide a rational apology of Revelation and main theistic claims. The fundamental defect in the religiology of Para du Phanjas is the undisguised contradiction between his two basic points. The existence of two genuine paths to God (“natural religion” and “revealed religion”), contradicts his thesis that the first can by no means be successful. This contradiction, which is already present in the first part of his work, is glaring in the second part. It was likely an inconsistency in his missionary strategy that gave rise to this contradiction. On the one hand, he sought to “acquire” people from outside the church, and on the other he was unable to refrain from denouncing them. Such “acquisition” and denunciation aimed simultaneously are incompatible tasks. Denunciation completely held his attention while writing the second part of his work, while the motivation to “acquire” was primary in the first part. It deprived Para’s second part of objectivity and even common sense by assigning responsibility for almost all the spiritual ills of humanity, from paganism and idolatry to atheism, to natural religion. Besides this, Para’s personal contradiction was shared with Nonnotte, Storchenau and other philosophical theologians of the 18th century who worked on “religion”, and they constructed a theistic religiological edifice on a foundation that was foreign to . However, the “religion of reason” did not need any “supplement” with deists, whereas with theistic apologists it was to be overbuilt with “positive religion”. This meant that in trying to oppose the deists they in some sense shared their original religiological starting point41. They would have been more consistent with traditional theists had they acknowledged that the Divine Sower sowed the seeds of God-knowledge everywhere, but would not produce fuit in every soil. Revelation was a requirement, not only a historical heritage, for both enlightening and purifying the very recipients of sowing.

38 This is a reference to Acts 17:23. 39 Ibid., 301. 40 Ibid., 302. 41 Nevertheless, one must acknowledge that Storchenau’s correlation of the two religions was more consistent than Para’s, in so far as he did not denunciate “ the religion of reason”. Up to the end of a later version of Philosophy of Religion, he emphasizes that Storchenau employs arguments that were directed at the elimination of two extreme trains of thought, not of reason, which in the religious sphere prevents an understanding of the truth. One of these extremes takes place when reason is relied upon too much, and the other is when it is relied upon too little. The first consists in making reason the sole measuring stick of religion; the other consists in excluding it from among our “measuring devices.” Therefore, the “golden mean” must be recommended. Turning to his readers, Storchenau appeals to us to see “both reason and Revelation as two lamps, which, originating from a single source,” are not turned against each other, but together dissipate the darkness of ignorance and misconceptions. See: Storchenau. Die Philosophie der Religion. Th.III, 141-142. The Pioneering Appearances of Philosophy of Religion in Europe 105

Other shortcomings in Para’s undertaking were conditioned by his dependency on the outdated resources. If we take the very form of his polemical arguments, it becomes evident that he used florid rhetoric rather than the strict academic style, which might have been more efficient at times of Voltaire, Rousseau and their followers. Further, in elaboration of the “positive topics”, he was too loyal to scholasticism. For example, his dealings with “the natural law” and “the eternal law” as, “seen from God’s vantage point “ and “seen from the human being’s vantage point” (see above) actually lead to tautologies. Similarly, his division of the topic of faith into its “source”, “subject”, “cause” and “object” could have been regarded as decrepit even in his times. Nevertheless, Para’s achievements outweigh his shortcomings, and, in contrast to them, remain undisputed even today. To begin with, his contributions into the very terminology of the subject are significant. First and foremost are his “philosophical theory of religion”, which in reality justified the introduction of the discipline of philosophy of religion into the body of philosophical subjects, especially considerating he managed define it. He also tried to single out such “constituents of religion” (les deux constitutifs fondamentaux), which could not be reduced to each other. Further, he insisted on the existence of the genus of religion behind its different forms (la religion dans sa plus grande généralité). This point is by no means trivial given that more and more students of religion today, in contradiction to any logic, contend there is no religion besides religions (which is the same, in my view, as to declare that there are only red, blue, yellow, green, etc. colors but not a characteristic that could unite all into the class of colors and not of smells). Certainly, one may allude that Para was not meticulous in his understanding of “philosophy of religion”, but blended philosophical theology and philosophical investigation of the phenomenon of religion together. However, we must be reminded that even today philosophy of religion is conceptualized as the confluence of philosophy-in-religion and philosophy-on-religion. So is it any that this “blending” was not considered about a quarter of millennium ago? Now, although Para’s definition of religion in the “abstract sense” is deducible from the traditional etymologization of “religio” in Lactantius (circa 250 – 325)42, his emphasis that it is a communication between two poles of an intersubjective relation was a remarkable development One cannot help but agree with Para that the conceptual possibility of an “implicit Christianity”43 is illusive. Indeed, religious faith is not something that can be identified as an unconscious state of mind, though semen religionis may be regarded as inborn for humanity.44 Para was also correct in thinking that religious claims which appear to contradict each other when compared (e.g., concerning the ontological status of Jesus Christ), cannot all be equally true. This view can also speak to today’s superficial religious pluralism (which is much more philosophical than religious in attitude), where even basic religious doctrines are seen as only “secondary elements” of religion. Not less persuasive are Para’s insights into the epistemology of religious beliefs. It is obvious at least for many, that religious faith must be viewed in the logical context of general “certainty” and that such faith rests on the “evidence,” needed in an epistemological classification. Such classification works inasmuch as the “evidences” from our inner sense, our idea of the Divine attributes, the arguments of common sense and history are actually irreducible to each other. Further, Para’s classification sounds more reasonable than today’s popular division of arguments for the existence of God into a priori (mostly deductive) and a posteriori (mostly inductive) reasons. It is much richer than the latter division, leading to an understanding of three main sources of the knowledge of God for human reasons; inner vision, arguments of common

42 Lact. Inst. IV.28. 43 When K. Rahner, one of the main ideologists of the Second Vatican Council, introduced the concept of “anonymous Chris- tianity,” he was much less original than it seemed at the time to many enthusiasts of this idea of a “religious compromise.” 44 Cf. Jean Calvin’s Institutio I.3. 106 V.K. Shokhin sense45 and analysis of metaphysical concepts.46 He was also justified in recognizing their interdependence. To give one example, Para was traditional in distinguishing between objects of faith whose veracity is comprehensible and those whose veracity is incomprehensible. As a matter of fact, the unity of God is much easier to understand than the Trinity. This does not mean, however, that the first thesis (God’s unity) is merely the conclusion of a logical deduction. Without faith, it would be only a speculative opinion that would lack what Para called the “evidence of the inner sense”. But speculative opinions, however important some of them may be, could not provide religious consciousness persuasive enough to sustain religious life. Realized clearly by the French Jesuit, one can even imagine that, had François Para du Phanjas lived long enough to witness later German religious controversies, this heir of Catholic scholasticism, who was at the same time righteously sure that religion is located in the depths of the soul and heart, could have sided with Friedrich Jacobi, Jacob Fries47 and other Protestant philosophers in their fight against the Kantians’ one-sided religious rationalism.

References

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45 They are suitable arguments for the existence of God and may be generalized under the modus tolledo ponens, i.t. A˅B, ¬A→ B, where A means, e.g., the naturalistic view that purposeful activity of the nature is directed by “the blind watchmaker” and B the view that it was designed by “the intelligent designer” or A being the proposition that mystic experiences of humanity are to be looked at as a priori iilusory and B that testimonies on them deserve not less attention than any historical evidences. 46 It is most appropriate in defining the attributes of God, such as necessity, incorporeality, unimprovability, eternity, ubiqui- tousness etc. 47 One has to remember that the given philosophers provided concepts such as Ahndung (“presentment”, “divination”), Glau- be (faith as the way of knowledge), Gefühl (inner feeling as a similar way of knowledge), and the idea that truth is self-revelatory and best intuited between individuals and their God etc. could have been very intimate for him.