BETWEEN STAGNATION AND RENOVATION: THE ARAB SYSTEM IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE IRAQ WAR *By Elie Podeh

This article explores the impact of the U.S. occupation of Iraq on the Arab system. It advances three arguments: First, that the system has not yet extricated itself from the political paralysis that characterized it in the pre-war period. Second, that in spite of its political fragmentation the system underwent some modest structural changes that may herald significant developments in the long run. And, finally, that the Arab world is witnessing an expansion of a reformist discourse and the introduction of certain liberal measures that may eventually bring about some political changes. Consequently, it can be fairly assessed that though the Arab world stands between stagnation and renovation, there are some modest signs indicating that renovation of the "Arab house" has already begun.

INTRODUCTION Patrick Seale composed a eulogy for the Arab On March 4, 2003, Muslims celebrated the State system shortly after the war.2 beginning of year 1424, according to the hijri Since the end of the war, a serious Arab calendar. But for Arab Muslims there was no dialogue concerning internal and regional reason to celebrate. Three days earlier, the reforms ensued on the governmental and Arab summit in Cairo failed to prevent -- or societal levels. This dialogue affected the delay -- the U.S.-led attack against Iraq, May 2004 Tunis Arab summit declaration, which began at the end of that month, and led which included references to future reforms. to its occupation by the United States. By the These pledges were reiterated in the March end of 2003, an interim Iraqi council, under 2005 Algiers manifesto, a summit celebrating American supervision, was ruling Iraq. In one the Arab League's sixtieth anniversary. For of his last articles in Arabic, the late Edward some, this dialogue and specific liberalization Said argued that what occurred in Iraq was no measures (such as the elections in Iraq, less than a "major catastrophe" (karitha Palestine and Lebanon, the referendum on the kabira). The collective Arab nation, he change in Egyptian constitution, and the exclaimed, powerlessly and helplessly municipal elections in Saudi Arabia) were confronted the American invasion, which he indications of a profound change in the Arab described as a hamla 1-- a term used to depict world.3 Others downplayed the importance of Napoleon Bonaprte's invasion of Egypt in these changes, which, in their opinion, 1798. In the same vein, veteran journalist occurred mainly in areas under colonial rule (Iraq and Palestine). Shibley Telhami even

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2005) 52 Between Stagnation and Renovation suggested that the war constituted a setback Another four years elapsed before another to Arab reforms.4 Arab statements in favor of summit convened, this time as a response to reforms, therefore, were viewed by some as the outbreak of the Palestinian al-Aqsa mere rhetoric, reminiscent of previous hollow intifada, in October 2000. Institutionally, the Arab decisions, primarily emanating from most important decision then was to hold Western pressure on Arab rulers to initiate regular annual summits to "enhance the joint reforms. Such a view, in essence, perceived Arab endeavor in all fields, particularly the the Arab reaction as a new form of tanzimat - economic."7 Consequently, summits were the reforms taken by the Ottoman Empire in held in Amman (March 2001), Beirut (March the nineteenth century, mainly as a response 2002), Sharm al-Sheikh (March 2003), Tunis to Western pressure to modernize the empire. (May 2004) and Algiers (March 2005). In light of these conflicting assessments, A second problem that divided and this article sets to explore the impact of the weakened the Arab system throughout the Iraq war on the Arab system. 5 It advances 1990s was the Iraqi question. In the aftermath three arguments: First, that the system has not of the 1991 war, Iraq was ostracized from the yet extricated itself from the political League. Being a major player in the Arab paralysis that characterized it in the pre-war system, its absence not only weakened the period. Second, that the system underwent system's overall strength, but also led to its some modest structural changes that may fragmentation. Several states, such as Egypt, herald significant developments in the long Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, benefited run. And, finally, that the Arab world is economically from the sanctions and the witnessing an expansion of a reformist consequent Oil for Food agreement signed discourse and the introduction of certain between the U.N. and Iraq on May 20, 1996.8 liberal measures that may indicate that some Yet, this development did not lead to major winds of change are blowing. changes in the Arab arena. Both Egypt and Jordan were reluctant to endanger their BACKGROUND: THE ARAB SYSTEM amicable relations with their U.S. ally. Egypt IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM also feared that Iraq's return as a full player The Arab system entered the new might threaten its leading role in the system. millennium with a host of problems among Iraq's pariah status also served well the which its institutional breakdown was the interests of the Gulf countries, which most serious one. During the 1990s, only one remained apprehensive of its inspirations in Arab summit was convened since the this area. disastrous Cairo summit of August 1990, The gradual erosion of the Western which revealed the extent to which Iraq's sanctions against Iraq eventually led to its re- invasion and occupation of Kuwait divided admission into the League in October 2000 the Arab world. The 1996 Cairo summit was and its presence at the March 2002 Beirut an unconvincing show of Arab solidarity in summit. The formal pretext for its return was the face of the election of the right-wing the need to display Arab solidarity with the candidate, Benjamin Netanyahu, as Israeli intifada, which broke out in September Prime Minister, following the assassination 2000.9 This step notwithstanding, Iraq's of Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995.6 relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council

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(GCC) countries remained sour. Moreover, and competed. On the one hand, being close most of the GCC states still supported the allies of the United States, they shared similar war against Saddam in 2003. interests in the Arab world. At the same time, The third Arab problem in the pre-war both struggled for leadership of the Arab period was the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. system. This was reflected in their attempts to Outwardly, the Arab countries displayed offer their good offices to the United States in solidarity with the Palestinian struggle during both the Iraqi and Palestinian "files." Thus, the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada. This for example, the Abdallah initiative was solidarity was vividly demonstrated in the published in February 2002, and Saudi final statement of the Arab summit in Cairo Arabia worked assiduously to turn it into an in October.10 In reality, however, the Arab peace plan. It was likely not a destabilizing effect of the Palestinian uprising coincidence that President Mubarak did not threatened to spill over to neighboring Arab attend the Beirut summit, which endorsed a regimes, which naturally became more modified Saudi initiative. Three months later, concerned with their internal security. The in June 2002, when the Israeli-Palestinian explosive nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reached another impasse, Mubarak conflict brought about Egyptian and Saudi hosted a mini-international summit in Sharm mediation attempts. The most significant was al-Sheikh. 12 Undoubtedly, the meeting should Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah's initiative, be seen as an Egyptian attempt to compensate which was made public in February 2002, for its failure in the Beirut summit. Since the and eventually endorsed with modifications Saudis did not want to antagonize the United by the Arab summit in Beirut in March.11 States, they fully cooperated with the However, Palestinian terror attacks in Israel Egyptian move. and the latter's hard-line retaliatory policy Another feature of the inter-Arab pre-war only served to strengthen the Israeli- system was Syria's isolation and its Palestinian impasse. Even the inauguration in consequent declining regional influence. At April 2003 of U.S. President Bush's Road the end of the 1990s, hostility and mistrust Map -- with general Arab and Israeli blessing characterized its relations with Egypt, Jordan, -- did not bring about the expected and the Palestinians. In addition, Syrian- rapprochement. Thus, when U.S. forces Turkish relations were on the verge of entered Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict confrontation and the Israeli- Syrian peace was still festering. Much of Arab public talks reached a deadlock. Only Iran remained opinion viewed Iraq, like the Palestinian a half-hearted regional ally, while Syria's issue, as a modern manifestation of Western economic relations with Iraq -- its formidable colonialism. rival in the Fertile Crescent -- improved as a In terms of regional political dynamics in result of the sanctions imposed on the latter the pre-war period, several features were (see above).13 After almost thirty years in particularly noteworthy in the Arab system. power, President Hafiz al-Asad's death in First, as explained above, Iraq was largely June 2000 further weakened Syria's regional marginalized as a result of the sanctions standing. Though the process of nominating imposed on it -- a development that left his son to presidency went rather smoothly, it Egypt and Saudi Arabia as the only key Arab was clear that the inexperienced young players. These two countries both cooperated Bashar would have to focus on the domestic

54 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2005) Between Stagnation and Renovation scene to consolidate his control and holding the summit there. Undoubtedly legitimacy. Indeed, one of the reflections of attempting to exploit the opportunity, Syria's declining role was the growing Mubarak offered Egypt as a venue. At the autonomy of the Hizballah organization in its same time, the GCC countries, more operations against Israel and the repeated concerned with their immediate threat, calls heard from Lebanon for Syrian decided to send military forces to Kuwait in evacuation. In addition to all these factors, case of an Iraqi aggression against it.16 the fact that Syria remained on the U.S. list of In February 2003, when the Arab foreign states sponsoring terrorism meant that it was ministers convened in Cairo to prepare the also largely ostracized internationally.14 summit, it was not clear whether a summit would be held at all or where it would be ARAB RESPONSE TO THE IRAQI held. Also, the Gulf countries called for a CRISIS firm statement against Iraq, while Syria -- The Iraqi crisis lingered for a long period, backed by Lebanon, Libya, and Yemen -- yet the final countdown to war began in early demanded an explicit statement calling for January 2003. However, for almost three the prevention of war and the prohibition of months, the U.N., European countries, and logistical support to the U.S. forces. Egypt, other interested parties invested massive Saudi Arabia, and Jordan attempted to hold a efforts to prevent what seemed to be an middle path, calling for adherence to U.N. inevitable U.S. decision to launch war against resolutions. Behind the scenes, the issue of Iraq in order to eliminate the "hidden" mass- Saddam's free abdication raised much destruction weapons. However, in contrast to controversy. It seemed at that point that the the active reactions of outside forces, the summit would not be convened at all.17 regional players remained largely passive When war in Iraq seemed imminent, the with regard to the Iraqi crisis. This behavior efforts to convene a summit increased. stemmed from either the perception that their Fearing that a failure to convene the summit ability to actually influence the final outcome would expose Egypt's declining role vis-à-vis was limited, or a tacit desire to see the Iraqi the Arab world and the United States, threat finally eliminated. Still, as war became brought Mubarak to intensify his efforts. imminent, the involvement of the Arab states Also, in light of attempts by international in the crisis proportionally increased. organizations to prevent the war, Arab public The main Arab axis that emerged during opinion criticized Arab elites for their the crisis was, as expected, between Cairo impotence, particularly as the crisis revolved and Riyadh. The two states - jointly and around an Arab country. In the words of the separately - were involved in the inter-Arab editor of the Egyptian daily al-Ahram, "the and U.S.-Arab consultations.15 A main issue Arab nation should have one voice" with in the Arab dialogue was the question of regard to the Iraqi crisis.18 where to hold the next Arab summit. The second round of deliberations by the According to the formula established in 2000, Arab foreign ministers once more confirmed it was to be held in Bahrain. Yet, the crisis in the existence of three camps: one, led by the Gulf and the stationing of U.S. forces Kuwait, supported the coming war; the there raised doubts as to the wisdom of second, led by Syria, wanted to prevent the

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Elie Podeh war and avoid any logistical support to the between the Gulf countries and the League's United States; and in between, stood Egypt chairman. 22 and Saudi Arabia, denouncing the war, but The summit also briefly discussed the attaching full legitimacy to U.N. decisions-- a Saudi initiative for reform of the Arab position that did not rule out the use of force League and the conduct of Arab affairs. In against Iraq. The idea of calling upon January 2003, Crown Prince Abdallah Saddam to abdicate was discussed behind the proposed a new initiative called "Charter to scenes, but only aroused tension and anger.19 Reform the Arab Stand," which was meant to The main fear of the participants was a encourage regional economic development repetition of the fiasco in the 1990 Cairo and greater participation in politics. It calls summit, which paralyzed Arab politics for upon the Arab states to implement an Arab almost a decade.20 Generally, however, all free trade zone by the end of 2005. The Arab Arab states were apprehensive of the states would agree to develop unified tariffs imminent war and its unforeseen and duties within 10 years, which would consequences. Chaos in Iraq or a serve as a basis for the establishment of a democratized Iraq according to U.S. plans Common Arab Market. It also encourages might potentially affect the stability in members to modernize local economies, neighboring Arab states. privatize government-owned industries, and After the one-day summit convened in open economic development to outside Cairo in March 2003, participants, in spite of investment. The charter calls to recognize the their disagreements, formulated a need for internal reform and enhanced communiqué. It called for: a peaceful political participation in the political process. solution that would prevent a war, which It also forbids the use of force in intra-Arab would be seen as a threat to Arab national disputes and calls for a united stand against security; objected to any Arab involvement in any foreign country attacking an Arab a war that aimed at Iraq or any other Arab country by stating their "total rejection of any state; and denounced any foreign interference illegitimate foreign aggression against any in internal Arab affairs. The last resolution Arab country and their commitment to solve was meant to express Arab opposition to all Arab conflicts peacefully."23 The Saudi Western intentions to force a regime change initiative was preceded by three other, less in Iraq.21 The statement reflected the lowest detailed initiatives presented to the League by common denominator, responding to the Qatar, Libya, and Sudan.24 However, in light mood of the "Arab Street." Clearly, the of the severe Iraqi crisis it was decided to decisions stood in sharp contrast to the postpone the discussion of the Saudi interests of the Gulf countries. The main initiative-- or any other for that matter-- to dispute evolved around the initiative of the the next summit in Tunis. United Arab Emirates, that in return for Most Arab observers perceived the Saddam's abdication he would receive summit's results as a failure-- a true reflection political asylum, while the League would of the lamentable Arab situation; the struggle temporarily take over Iraqi affairs. This amongst the Arab states was seen as a initiative, however, was not formally put on modern version of the old Arabian Desert the agenda-- a move that created tension tribes.25 Fawaz Gerges, for example, claimed that the summit was a "dismal failure,"

56 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2005) Between Stagnation and Renovation revealing deep Arab rifts and lack of President Bashar al-Asad addressed a foresight and vision. 26 In terms of the system, procession of thousands of Syrians, there were neither winners nor losers.27 Yet, Lebanese, and Palestinians coming from the taking into account the diverse, and often Ba'abda palace in Beirut to express their conflicting Arab interests, as well as the gratitude for his pan-Arab stance. It was problematic nature of the League's decision claimed that this procession reflected the true making, there was nothing surprising at the "pulse of the Arab Street."31 Whether summit's inability to offer a viable solution to masterminded by the regimes or initiated the crisis. Therefore, its results should be from below, or as is most likely, both-- these measured against its aims and capabilities. If celebrations served to strengthen the regimes the goal was to respond to Arab public in a period of uncertainty and insecurity. opinion, which opposed any Western involvement in Arab affairs, and to produce THE WAR AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS an Arab consensus (ijma'), then the summit The Iraqi Scene succeeded. If, however, the goal was to avert Two days after the beginning of the war, the war, or at least to produce a new on March 23, Arab foreign ministers issued a diplomatic maneuver, then the summit failed. statement that denounced the aggression, Interestingly, a similar statement was issued calling for an immediate withdrawal of the by the Islamic Conferenc e Organization U.S. forces from Iraq. The fact that the war (ICS) in Qatar, on March 5.28 was termed "aggression" ('udwan) reflected Undoubtedly, the position of the Arab the general Arab attitude toward the U.S. "Street" largely affected the results of the move.32 Though annihilating Saddam's Arab and ICO summits. In the absence of regime would serve the interests of several elected democratic regimes and credible Arab states, their leaders preferred not to polls, this amorphous term corresponds to swim against the Arab public stream. Saudi what public opinion is in the West. And and Jordanian leaders, for example, called for though Arab presidents and kings have the an end to the war, reiterating their refusal to ability to influence the Arab Street, it is allow the use of their territory for attacking equally clear that their policies are being Iraq.33 Outspoken in particular was the Syrian affected by it. Thus, for example, on March leader, who expressed full support of Iraq's 5, Cairo saw a procession of more than a struggle against the invaders. In his reference million people demonstrating against the to the U.S. "aggression war" (al-harb al- impending war in Iraq. Apparently, however, 'udwaniyya), Asad made a historical analogy the procession was initiated by the ruling with the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement,34 National- Democratic Party and supported by which in Arab mythology symbolized the the opposition parties.29 Similarly, on March classic example of Western imperialism. 8, Syria celebrated the 40th anniversary of the Even Mubarak, who initially put the blame of Ba'ath revolution. As this holiday celebrates the war squarely on Saddam's shoulders, Syria's national liberation from foreign changed his tone and stated that Egypt would domination, it was clear that the celebrations not take part in a war or military operations were naturally linked to the Western aimed at any Arab state.35 aggression against Iraq.30 The next day, The behavior of the Arab leaders was not

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Elie Podeh only a natural consummation of their policies triangle, Syria continued supporting Iraq. in the pre-war period. In light of the massive This was not only reflected in its media and demonstrations against the war that swept the national celebrations, but there were also Arab capitals, as well as other Muslim and signs of actual collaboration during the war Arab communities in Europe and elsewhere, that led the United States to transmit unveiled any other Arab position seemed threats to Syria. 41 inconceivable at that time. 36 Syria led this To ensure Syria's containment and anti-Western campaign, as the only Arab regional stability, seven countries decided to state which actively supported Iraq (see hold a meeting of the so-called "states below). This behavior cannot be solely neighboring Iraq." On April 18, the foreign explained by Asad's need to strengthen his ministers of Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Saudi tottering legitimacy. It should be noticed that Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Bahrain met in the crisis and subsequent war occurred during Riyadh. Obviously, the meeting included all March and April, the two months in which the main regional actors involved in the Iraqi Syria celebrates its national holidays. conflict. Soon, however, the discussion was Following Revolution Day (March 8), the bogged down over several thorny issues, such regime celebrates Ba'ath Founding Day as the Kurdish problem, the oil fields in (April 7), and Independence Day (April 17). northern Iraq, and the nature of the future All of these holidays celebrate, among other Iraqi regime. Eventually, however, the things, Syria's heroic struggle against the conferees called to end Iraq's occupation, to imperialists. Thus, the coincidence of the war respect Iraq's sovereignty, to create a in Iraq with these holidays was bound to raise transitional government and expressed all these anti-Western historical memories.37 opposition to U.S. threats toward Syria. The On April 9, the Saddam's regime fell. participants discussed the possibility of Nothing illustrated this development more sending Arab troops to Iraq but this than the photos of the demolished statue of suggestion was dropped.42 Saddam in central Baghdad. Kuwait and However, as U.S.-Syrian relations further other Gulf shaykhdoms could not conceal deteriorated due to alleged Syrian assistance their jubilation. 38 Other states expressed a to Iraq, Mubarak -- likely with U.S. more restrained position. 39 First to respond, encouragement-- visited Damascus on April Mubarak called upon Iraqis to run their own 20. He then proceeded to Bahrain, the UAE, affairs. This statement dovetailed with U.S. and Saudi Arabia to discuss the Iraqi hints about Arab promises to support the new situation, the Israeli-Palestinian peace Iraqi regime. In fact, Egypt began a series of process, and the U.S. threats to Syria.43 It diplomatic maneuvers intended to safeguard seems that Egypt and the GCC countries were Iraq's integrity and eliminate any threat to the alarmed by the possible ramifications of a stability of neighboring Arab states. As conceivable confrontation between Syria and expected, Mubarak coordinated his policy the United States, as well as by the prospects with Saudi Arabia and Jordan, which shared of an American administration in Iraq rather the same interests. Publicly, they demanded than an indigenous Iraqi regime.44 the evacuation of all foreign forces and the Several months after the fall of the election of a free Iraqi government.40 Yet, in Saddam regime, the Arab system returned, contrast to the Egyptian-Jordanian-Saudi more or less, to its previous balance. Egypt,

58 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2005) Between Stagnation and Renovation the state leading most of the maneuvers in the or a reflection of popular will-- culminating Arab system, strengthened its position. Syria, in the January 2005 elections and the on the other hand, though gaining wide establishment of a representative Iraqi support in Arab public opinion, became government,49 would potentially undermine politically and economically weaker. Saudi the stability of their own authoritarian Arabia, which led the Arab peace plan in regimes. 2002, seemed to play a second fiddle to Egypt, yet it retained an important position Syria and Libya within the system. No change occurred in the Though hailed by the Arab street, Asad's position of the Arab states, except for Iraq, behavior during and after the war largely which returned to the Arab League in mid- isolated Syria in the regional and September 2003 on the condition that a new, international systems. In particular, the free-elected government would replace the Syrian Accountability Act, issued by the current transitional council.45 United States in May 2003, allowed the The instability of the Iraqi domestic scene, president to impose certain sanctions on which also included frequent terrorist acts, Syria.50 Moreover, the presence of U.S. did not spill over to neighboring states. In a troops in Iraq served as a constant reminder series of meetings, the United States and the that Asad might be the next target. He feared regional states coordinated their policy with that the elimination of Saddam would regard to containing the Iraqi conflict, while become a precedent for the United States to preserving Iraq's territorial integrity. 46 But get rid of what they considered to be realizing in general that their actual impact on recalcitrant leaders. In addition, the U.N. Iraq's future was limited and that the threat of decision to terminate the Oil for Food its division was receding, the Arab states agreement with Iraq in May 2003 meant a confined their activity to declarations in significant financial loss for Syria, which support of its territorial integrity and the well earned some $500 million annually from being of its people. Indeed, the Iraqi "file" Iraqi oil and trade transferred through its was not a major item on the agenda of the territory. 51 Syria was not compensated for Arab summit in Tunis (May 22-23, 2004). Its that loss. Jordan, in contrast, another major final communiqué reiterated the Arab beneficiary of this agreement, was commitment to Iraq's territorial integrity, compensated by the Gulf States.52 urging the U.N. to put an end to the By the end of 2003, realizing that to occupation and to prepare the ground for ensure the regime's survival and stability he transferring power to the Iraqi people.47 The needed to improve his regional standing, Algiers summit (March 22-23, 2005) omitted Asad moved in several directions. First, he altogether any direct reference to this issue.48 reiterated his call to resume negotiations with Thus, the Iraqi "file" has gradually Israel. This time, however, he expressed disappeared from Arab rhetoric and politics. willingness to start from the beginning and This, however, did not mean that Arab not from the point they were terminated. This leaders became indifferent. Rather, they were rather moderate position was meant to concerned that the democratic process in alleviate U.S. pressure and improve the Iraq-- whether imposed by the United States economic predicament, as it was clear that

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Asad did not believe that peace with the nationhood. Though sectarianism (ta'ifiyya) is Sharon government was possible. Moreover, still a major component of the Lebanese his continued support to Damascus-based political system in the post-Ta'if era, in the Palestinian organizations cast a shadow on wake of Syrian withdrawal, lingering his sincerity with regard to his peace memories of the devastating Civil War, could overtures.53 Second, he paid a visit to Turkey- produce a new reality, commencing in May - the first ever by a Syrian president. In spite 2005, with the first independent of Syria's perennial disputes with Turkey parliamentary elections since 1972. Finally, over the Alexandretta region and the since the Syrian decision was made without Euphrates River waters, Asad aimed at prior approval of the Arab League, it further coordinating his Iraqi policy with eroded the importance of this institution, neighboring Turkey.54 Third, he played a which in October 1976, sanctioned the more significant role in the Arab dialogue entrance of Syrian forces, under the guise of that focused on various Arab initiatives to Arab Deterrence Force (ADF), with the aim reform the Arab League, the reaction to the of ending the Civil War. U.S. Greater Middle East plan, and the Though all these maneuvers partially possible amendment of the Saudi peace succeeded in extricating Syria from its initiative.55 regional and international isolation, it still Syria's most significant step, however, remained a pariah state, perceived in the was the decision to fully evacuate its forces West as representing the more radical and from Lebanon in April 2005. Lebanese calls anti-Western voice in the Arab camp. for Syrian withdrawal were initially heard in Libya, another player that had previously the late 1990s, but the eventual momentum belonged to the radical Arab camp, that brought about this decision was underwent a major transformation. In late generated by the assassination of Lebanese December 2003, President Mu'amar al- Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri on February Qadhafi announced his decision to renounce 14, 2005. This incident ignited mass his weapons of mass destruction (WMD). demonstrations in Lebanon and intense This unexpected step was probably a international pressure on Syria to pull out its consummation of a long process. But the fear forces. Thus, it complied with the U.N. of an American attack, the need to remove Resolution 1559 of September 2004 calling U.S. sanctions-- which badly affected Libya's for its complete withdrawal from Lebanon.56 economy-- and the desire to reinvigorate the Syria's end of 29 years of occupation is long-established regime, likely all affected highly significant for several reasons: First, it Qadhafi's thinking. 57 Though peripheral in further diminishes, though does not eliminate, the Arab system (both in terms of geography Syria's influence in Lebanon (particularly and politics), Libya acquired a unique place with regard to Hizballah). As a result, Syria's as a symbol of Arab radicalism along the already weakened position in the Arab Nasserite type, often articulating ideological system is further deteriorating. Second, it hostility toward the West and Israel. The exposes its Lebanese flank to Israeli change was also reflected in the realm of the intrusions. Third, by regaining its full Arab-Israeli conflict, when Libya accepted sovereignty over the land, Lebanon would the Arab peace plan in March 2002 and after now be in a better position to build a viable that expressed a more moderate view of the

60 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2005) Between Stagnation and Renovation conflict. Thus, the change in the Libyan Israeli Prime Minister Sharon, and the position meant that the previous radical Arab Palestinian leader. These meetings were camp (known in the past as the Steadfastness intended to accelerate the peace process, and Rejection Front), consisting of Iraq, based on the U.S. planned Road Map. In Syria, Algeria, Yemen, and the PLO, no terms of regional dynamics, these summits longer existed. Israel, of course, was the main accentuated the existence of an Egyptian- beneficiary of this change, but it was also Saudi axis which-- in contrast to the Beirut significant for the Arab balance of power. summit a year earlier-- was now led by The Israeli-Palestinian Scene Egypt.59 With the fall of the Saddam regime and The absence of any reference to Syria and installation of an American governor in Iraq, Lebanon in the Road Map was meant to the situation there subsided. This helped the marginalize them in the Arab system. Such a relevant parties to re-focus on the Israeli- development would have dovetailed with Palestinian "file." On April 30, 2003, in an U.S. interests, as the United States was keen attempt to capitalize on the successful to punish Asad for his "misbehavior" during military campaign, the Bush Administration the Iraqi crisis. However, keeping his lines of published the "Road Map," a peace plan communication open, Asad met with aimed at serving as a blueprint for solving the Egyptian and Saudi leaders during the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The United States summer of 2003, seeking another Road Map, hoped that both the Iraqi and the Israeli- which would also tackle the Syrian-Lebanese Palestinian scenes were now ripe for a track. 60 But what hampered the U.S. plan was peaceful solution.58 not the Syrian position, but rather the Israeli- The publication of the plan and the initial Palestinian conflict, which continued positive response of the parties involved unabated for the rest of the year, dominated diverted the regional attention away from the by Palestinian terror acts and Israeli targeted Iraqi scene. Like the Arab involvement in killings. Iraq, here too, Egypt and Saudi Arabia In light of the political stalemate and what became the two leading Arab players. The was seen as the failure of the Road Map, Saudi involvement was hardly surprising, as Saudi Arabia led a new initiative to modify Crown Prince Abdallah was the initiator of a the Arab peace plan to meet U.S. and Israeli peace plan that was accepted, with certain reservations. Reportedly presented to the modifications, by the Beirut summit in 2002. State Department in late January 2004 Having been overshadowed by the Saudi following some Arab consultations, the initiative, Egypt attempted to regain the initiative was a major item on the agenda of driver's seat in the Arab caravan. For that the Arab foreign ministers' meetings in purpose, Mubarak hosted a mini-summit in March. 61 However, the Arab states could not Sharm al-Sheikh on June 3, with the find a new consensus other than the modified participation of President Bush, King Saudi initiative, which was endorsed at the Abdallah, Crown Prince Abdallah, the Beirut summit in March 2002. 62 Bahraini Emir, and Palestinian Prime The political impasse in the Israeli- Minister Abu Mazen. The next day, King Palestinian scene meant that Israel's unilateral Abdallah hosted in Aqaba President Bush, disengagement from Gaza and certain

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Elie Podeh settlements in Judea and Samaria was the levels Saudi Arabia stands as Egypt's most only viable political plan. With the death of significant competitor. Thus, in general, the PA Chairman Yasir Arafat in November fact that the Israeli-Palestinian track saw 2004, and his replacement by the more considerable progress since the end of the moderate Mahmud Abbas (Abu-Mazen), Iraq war was more connected to its own some major developments took place: First, dynamics than a result of the repercussions of Abbas and Sharon officially ended the al- the war. Aqsa intifada by reaching a truce. The deal Arab Reforms was struck on February 9, 2005, at the Sharm Voices calling for reforming the structure al-Sheikh summit, with the participation of and charter of the Arab League as well as President Mubarak and Jordan's King defining a new meaning to Arab solidarity Abdallah. Shortly after, Egypt and Jordan were frequently heard in the pre-war period. returned their ambassadors to Tel Aviv.63 In fact, ideas to reform the institutions and Second, the Fatah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad operating mechanisms of the League were signed an agreement in Cairo on March 17, raised since the 1950s, but various rulers and which extended the truce (tahdi'a) in military elites persistently blocked these ideas, which operations until the end of 2005 and promised were considered to encroach upon their certain reforms in the Palestinian political sovereignty. 65 The failure of the League to institutions.64 These two developments play a meaningful role in the 1990-91 Iraqi- reflected the debilitating effects of the Kuwaiti crisis highlighted its weakness and uprising on both Palestinian and Israeli impotence. Upon being elected chairman in societies, as well as the growing realization March 2001, Amru Musa offered some new of the changing reality. ideas to reform the League.66 Later, in Egypt has played a key role in the January 2003, Crown Prince Abdallah came preparatory consultations regarding Israel's out with a new initiative called "Charter to withdrawal from Gaza. In an attempt to Reform the Arab Stand."67 Added to the ensure the safe transfer of land and future Qatari, Libyan, and Sudanese initiatives security, Israel even considered allowing published earlier,68 these initiatives were to Egypt to station a force of 750 soldiers along be discussed at the next summit. However, the border, in breach of the Israeli-Egyptian the war led to a change of venue and agenda. peace treaty. Clearly, Egypt has played a key It was only natural that a lively dialogue role in all these Israeli-Palestinian peace regarding the future of the Arab League and talks. The prominent Egyptian role is a result Arab politics commenced as soon as the of three considerations: First, in view of the situation in Iraq stabilized. Three schools of forthcoming presidential elections thought emerged: One called for dissolving (September 2005), it was a partial response to the Arab League and forming an alternative local voices criticizing Mubarak for his institution, more equip ped to deal with intention to run, unopposed, for a fifth term. reality. Some even thought of replacing the Second, it reflected a desire to play a leading League with a Middle Eastern regional Arab role, one that dovetails with its self- organization. The second called for reforming perception. And, finally, it aims at the League and its charter. The third demonstrating to the United States that it is associated its problems with the personality the most reliable Arab ally. On the last two of its chairman, thereby implying that his

62 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2005) Between Stagnation and Renovation replacement would remove a major King Faruq's abdication. 72 The next day the obstacle. 69 full text of the initiative was published.73 The There was correlation between the ideas fact that Egypt put its prestige behind a plan raised in the initiatives presented before the for Arab reform ensured that other Arab war and the dialogue held in its aftermath. states would consider it seriously. It was One theme was the idea to abolish the system expected that all these ideas would be of ijma', in which a binding resolution is one formally discussed during the next Arab that is accepted unanimously, replacing it summit in Tunis. with a simple majority (or two-thirds) Yet, the idea of reforming the League was decision. Another theme was to allow non- soon interwoven with other ideas circulating governmental organizations to take part in the in the post-war period about reforming Arab League's activity or to allow non-Arab regimes through democratization and the regional states to obtain the status of emancipation of civil society. The dialogue observer. Other themes were reminiscent of on the necessity to introduce domestic the European union: establishing (or rather reforms stemmed from a realization that the reviving) the Arab Common Market, laying weakness of the League essentially reflected the foundations for economic integration; the weakness of the Arab regimes and their establishing an Arab parliament; forming an lack of legitimacy. Therefore, it was argued, Arab deterrence force or an Arab defense it was necessary first to tackle the roots of the council aimed at safeguarding Arab national problem. 74 security; and setting up an Arab court of More significant, however, was the impact justice.70 of Bush's ideas to spread democratic values At the peak of this dialogue, and in in the "Broader Middle East," first spelled out attempt to capitalize on it, Egypt came up on February 2003, on the eve of U.S. with its own initiative. An article by the invasion to Iraq. The U.S. plan was received editor of al-Ahram and a close confidant of with little enthusiasm in the Arab world. It President Mubarak foreshadowed the was viewed as another expression of Egyptian campaign. The article rejected the imperialism and too broad geographically notion that Iraq's occupation demolished the while failing to recognize the particularities Arab League, which was synonymous with of the various states in the area.75 In the post- the term "the House of the Arabs" (bait al- war period, when and where Iraq actually 'Arab). It argued that it was necessary to became a testing ground for U.S. ideas about revive the joint Arab action-- a development democracy, time seemed ripe for revising and dependent on the continuation of Egypt's re-launching the plan. Indeed, the G-8 leading role (al-dawr al-qiadi) in the Arab countries prepared a draft plan, which was system. The first step was to clear Arab leaked to the Arab press in February 2004. atmosphere.71 The fact that this was a Limiting the area to the Greater Middle East preparatory article in a well-orchestrated (the Arab world, Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran, campaign soon became evident, as two days and Israel), and attaching an equal role to the later, on July 26, Mubarak revealed the local actors, the new "partnership " focused on initiative while speaking at Alexandria three goals: promoting democracy and good University during the annual celebration of governance; building a knowledge society;

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Elie Podeh and expanding economic opportunities.76 all spheres, promoting educational reforms, The leaked draft was received with and enhancing research. The declaration also resentment in the Arab world, as another sign called for greater Arab economic of Western imperialism. However, it did cooperation.80 Most of these points were provoke a lively dialogue concerning the reiterated in the Algiers Arab summit of need for internal reforms. An indication of March 2005.81 the new "reformist" discourse was the Arab politicians stressed what they saw as convening of two conferences with the positive aspects of the declaration, which governmental and non-governmental heralded the beginning of a new era of agencies. The first was held in Yemen in changes and reforms. 82 Observers and January 2004, and another was held in Egypt intellectuals tended to see the summit as yet in March 2004. Both dealt with democracy, another failure, producing much rhetoric but civil rights, and other reforms.77 In practice, little substance. 83 Others thought the summit's Arab rulers adopted a "middle-of-the-road success or failure would depend on the position, " claiming that reforms and implementation of its resolutions.84 But democratization should gradually emerge perhaps Shafeeq Ghabra, President of the from within the system and not be imposed American University in Kuwait, expressed by outside powers.78 This nuanced position the most sober view, arguing that "the Arab allowed them to attack the paternalistic way world finds itself at a potentially historic in which Bush's plan was introduced, while turning point confronted by confusion." In his not entirely rejecting some of its ingredients. opinion, the Arab world is living a pre- Intensive Arab consultations were held democratic moment, which "may produce the prior to the Tunis summit in an attempt to momentum needed to push the region toward reach a formula responding to Western change."85 Likewise, Fareed Zakaria assessed pressure, while coinciding with the various that "the wind is behind those who advocate interests of the Arab states. However, the free-market, modern, Western-style inability to find a common formula led to the reforms."86 postponement of the summit from March to The Tunis Declaration was meant to May. 79 facilitate Arab participation in the G-8 Eventually, to reach an Arab consensus, meeting, which was intended to also discuss the Tunis declaration was formulated in a the Greater Middle East partnership program. more diluted version than the views However, the major Arab leaders, such as articulated during the preparatory meetings. Mubarak and Crown Prince Abdallah, Also, the distinc tion between structural decided not attend, though their participation reforms of the joint Arab world and of was initially expected. Mubarak may have individual Arab regimes was blurred. The excused himself because he was expecting a declaration expressed willingness to revise more binding declaration or because he the League's Charter on the basis of existing feared being exposed to further Western Arab initiatives and commitment to the pressure. But according to the official values of human rights. It also pledged to version, his absence was related to Egypt's carry out domestic reforms such as expanding refusal to "dilute" the Arab identity within the political participation, increasing the role of Greater Middle East project.87 This was civil society, widening the role of women in reminiscent of Egypt's opposition to the

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Israeli New Middle East concept, which was 2005 shows that Saudi Arabia held municipal perceived to consolidate Israeli regional elections in February;91 a referendum in hegemony, erode Egypt's leading role, and Egypt in May led to a change in the dismantle the Arab system. 88 constitution, allowing independent candidates In spite of the disappointing Arab to run for the presidency (scheduled for attendance, the G-8 countries issued an September);92 and also in May the first free impressive document, which embraced some elections since Syria's withdrawal were held of the major criticism leveled against in Lebanon. All these developments, added to previous drafts. Thus, it was emphasized that other liberal measures already taken in the partnership would be based on genuine Morocco, Oman, Bahrain, and Jordan, led cooperation with the region's governments, as Saad Eddin Ibrahim to speculate that this well as civil society elements and that trend was irreversible: "Too many people in successful reforms depended on the regional too many places…are defying their countries and should not be imposed from the oppressors and taking risks for freedom. outside. It was emphasized, however, that Across the region the shouts of 'Kifaya!' - regional conflicts (referring particularly to the 'Enough!" have become a rallying cry against Israeli-Palestinian case) "must not be an dictators."93 And while the possibility that obstacle for reforms." The statement also Arab rulers have invented a "theater of welcomed the Arab summit's declaration, "in democratization" based on cosmetic reforms which Arab leaders expressed their should not be dismissed, Amr Hamzawy was determination to firmly establish the basis for also of the opinion that "the Arab world is democracy."89 In this way, the G-8 countries changing, and in a very profound way." In his attempted to bind the Arab countries more view, "a crack has emerged in the strongly to their commitment to reform, a authoritarian pattern of the state-society commitment that had only been vaguely relationship, and there is no way of reversing expressed at the 2004 summit in Tunis. its dynamics."94 Another manifestation of the reformist discourse prevailing in the Arab world was CONCLUSIONS the convening in December 2004 of the "The Arab system has often been Forum for the Future which took place in pronounced dead and this time it may be Morocco. Foreign and finance ministers from indeed true," wrote Patrick Seale soon after about twenty countries in the Middle East and the end of the Iraq war.95 For Seale, an Arab North Africa, as well as representatives of the system meant "a reasonably stable regional G-8 countries attended. Beyo nd the reformist order, seemingly dedicated to Arab interests, rhetoric, the participants pledged to create a managed by sovereign Arab states, accepted regional private enterprise development fund, by many of its citizens and able to keep a Democracy Assistance Dialogue, and a external enemies at bay, if not defeat them."96 Micro-Finance Training Center in Jordan. 90 The theoretical literature on regional Changes, however, were not limited to subsystems, however, suggests other discourse, rhetoric, and conferences; there definitions. Louis Cantori and Steven were also changes at the institutional level. A Spiegel, for example, defined it as "proximate cursory survey of the Arab political scene in and interacting states which have some

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Elie Podeh common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, feeling of Arab togetherness.98 The Iraqi and historical bonds, and whose sense of occupation, just like the 1990-91 crisis, identity is sometimes increased by the actions invigorated-- if temporarily-- the political and attitudes of states external to the system." Arab identity as well, deepening the existing W. R. Thompson added two distinctive gulf between "we" (the Arabs) and "them" attributes: that the actors' pattern of (the West).99 The U.S. expedition to interactions exhibit a particular degree of Mesopotamia, as Fouad Ajami called it,100 regularity and intensity to the extent that a resulted in conquering Iraq, demolishing its change at one point in the subsystem affects regime, and instituting another-- acts other points; and that internal and external reminiscent of twentieth century Western actors recognize the subsystem as a imperialism. Unable to stand to this distinctive "theater of operations."97 challenge, Arab leaders and societies once On the basis of these characteristics it can more felt humiliated by their subjugation. be fairly assessed that an Arab system-- Though most detested Saddam Hussein, though fragmented and divided-- is still Arabs sympathized in general with the Iraqi operating. In the pre- and post-war periods, people (as well as with the Palestinians), thus the Arab system was under a facade of creating a common ground based on a shared solidarity, largely paralyzed as a result of Arab identity. Moreover, the growing divisions among its members. Though it has regional role of Turkey and Iran, as reflected not recuperated as yet from the Iraqi ordeal, during the war and its aftermath, and the the system remained intact, achieving certain strengthening of the Israeli-Turkish alliance, regularity in its interactions through summits posed additional threats to the separate Arab and other traditional channels of identity. Once more, acts of external powers communication. The fact that the Arab increased the self-awareness of the system's system did not initially reach a consensus members. In such a way, the political concerning the war, and that this consensus, repercussions of the war coincided with the when reached, concealed deep divisions, does cultural developments of the 1990s. not ipso facto mean the destruction of the The Iraq war accelerated certain processes system. It still may be recognized as such and initiated some changes in the Arab during periods of conflicts, and not only system. Though far from transformation at during periods of cooperation. present, the war may, in the long run, prove In light of this political fragmentation, to be a turning point in the annals of the Arab Arab identity has been reflected mainly in the system should these processes and changes cultural domain. This phenomenon became deepen. The first issue concerns the unclear even more salient with the expansion of the fate of Iraq. For almost two decades Iraq has use of Arab communications-- TV satellite played a marginal role in Arab politics, as a channels (such as al-Jazeera and al- result of the Iran-Iraq war and the sanctions 'Arabiyya), press (such as al-Hayat and al- imposed on it since 1991. The current U.S. Shraq al-Awsat), and Internet-- among attempts at building a new Iraq ensure its growing numbers of literate Arabs. Though continued marginality in the near future. this communication revolution has not yet Moreover, it is possible that a new Shi'i- brought about political changes, it has controlled Iraq may be less motivated in contributed to the emergence of an undefined playing a pivotal role in the Arab system than

66 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2005) Between Stagnation and Renovation the previous Sunni regime, which was keen roots of this change predate the war, which to compensate for its narrow domestic base only accelerated this process. by defining itself as leader of a largely Sunni In Arab public opinion, the Iraqi and Arab region. In any case, a disarmed Iraq-- Israeli-Palestinian tracks are closely which had been involved in several wars in connected since both are considered the Gulf and the Arab-Israeli arena-- would territories under foreign occupation that be a different player in the Arab system. In should be liberated.102 In reality, however, the the long run, however, taking into account its link is less pronounced. Though the intifada geographical, economic, and demographic ended in the aftermath of the war, this capabilities, Iraq may return to play a development was more related to domestic powerful role in the Arab system, challenging Palestinian affairs (the death of Arafat) and to both Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Its large oil certain other processes within the Israeli and supplies, for example, could be used to Palestinian societies than to the Iraq war. challenge Saudi Arabia's domination of the The war was instrumental in intensifying market. A democratic regime in Iraq may the calls for reforming the Arab League and also lead to domestic pressures on other Arab democratizing Arab regimes. What made states to adopt more liberal measures. On the these calls more serious than before was the other hand, continuation of instability-- and extent of the Arab dialogue, as well as the even the prospects of anarchy-- may spill fact that two leading Arab states-- Egypt and over to neighboring states and adversely Saudi Arabia-- came with initiatives of their affect the whole region. 101 own. 103 If that dialogue and these initiatives In terms of Arab political dynamics, there are a true indication of social undercurrents were no major changes in the Arab coalitions, then the atmosphere in the Arab world seems except for a temporary alliance of Syria with ripe for change.104 Clearly, however, the Iraq during the war, largely as a result of Western pressure in the wake of the Iraq war domestic reasons. The change of regime in contributed to that dialogue. It is hardly Iraq and the Arab and Western pressure on surprising, therefore, that some of the ideas Syria, as well as its deteriorating economic are based on the EU model. Whether these situation due to the closure of the Iraqi changes would actually be implemented is market, put pressure on Asad. But his largely dependent on three factors: the degree enforced withdrawal from Lebanon-- a move of desire and commitment of Arab leaders; precipitated by the war-- undoubtedly the level of pressure coming from Arab inflicted a serious blow to what seems a society; and the level of pressure exerted by tottering regime. All the same, Egypt and the international community. All these Saudi Arabia remained the leading states of dimensions existed in the post-Iraqi crisis the system, with Egypt playing a more period but their affect has so far been partial. prominent role in this crisis. Perhaps Saudi Unless Arab regimes feel more secure and domestic problems and its military inferiority legitimate, the chances of transferring some led it to play second fiddle. A major change responsibilities from the state to the Arab occurred with regard to Libya's place in the League, thus transforming it into a powerful system, as the country disengaged itself from regional organization, are slim. the Arab radical camp. Yet, it seems that the The Arab League has been under attack

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Elie Podeh since its foundation in 1945. Yet, while but whether it would be "a spring wind or a celebrating its sixtieth anniversary this year, sandstorm" depends on how the regimes scholars, instead of announcing its demise accommodate the Islamists.105 Clearly, time and again, should consider what has reforms should primarily emanate from an made the League so durable in spite of the Arab conviction of necessity and not from many setbacks it has suffered. The Iraqi crisis submission to external pressures. Otherwise, gave a partial answer: states and leaders are they would resemble the tanzimat of the still unwilling to relinquish their pan-Arab Ottoman Empire. While the Arab states-- identity, which is reflected in this institution. unlike the empire-- would not collapse, they Moreover, any foreign interference or steps would surely suffer from political and perceived as attempts to replace the existing economic stagnation. In such a scenario, the Arab order-- such as the Greater Middle East impotence that characterized the Arab system project-- are bound to reinvigorate the calls during the last decade-- vividly demonstrated for retaining-- and even reforming-- the in the Iraqi crisis-- would continue. In existing order. The Iraqi crisis demonstrated conclusion, the Arab world stands at a that in spite of the many malfunctions of the crossroads between stagnation and Arab system, news of its demise was renovation. Unless Bait al-'Arab or al-Bait premature. In addition, as long as Egypt sees al-'Arabi undergoes serious renovation, its itself as the most important Arab actor and tenants will continue living in a wrecked the League as an important tool in promoting house.106 But the fact that Arab leaders and that role, it would invest efforts, as it did in intellectuals recognize the need for reforms the recent crisis, to preserve that system and may tell us that the renovation has already that institution. Fear of losing its special commenced. position in a broader system is the main imperative for this Egyptian behavior. General Note: Arab discourse often blurs the distinction I would like to express my gratitude to the between reforms for democratization and Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the reforms of the Arab political order (mainly Advancement of Peace for its financial associated with the activity of the Arab support. League, but also relevant to economic, legal, and cultural issues). But a distinction has to *Professor Elie Podeh is Head of the be made since the introduction of domestic Department of Islam and Middle East Studies democratic reforms, taken within the at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and jurisdiction and territory of a certain regime, editor of Hamizrah Hehadash (the New East), may be easier to implement than reforms on the journal of the Israeli Oriental Society. He the collective Arab level. So far, most of the has published several books and articles on reforms of the individual Arab states were the modern Middle East. He has recently taken at the periphery of the Arab world. The edited (with Onn Winckler), Rethinking populations seem to long for such reforms, Nasserism: Revolution and Historical but autocrat rulers at the core of the Arab Memory in Modern Egypt (2004). system are tenaciously holding onto power. In Saad Eddin Ibrahim's opinion, the Middle NOTES East may catch the third wave of democracy,

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1 Edward Said, "The Condition of the Trading Partners," www.escwa.org (no date Arabs," al-Hayat, May 26, 2003. The term provided). According to this report, during hamla may be translated as a campaign, the years 2000-2002 Egypt was the top Arab attack, occupation, and control. For an trade partner with Iraq and the third largest analysis of the debate surrounding the French trade partner with Iraq after France and hamla, see Shimon Shamir, "Light and Fire: Russia. For Jordan, Iraq is the most important The Debate in Egypt over the Historical export market for Jordanian goods, as Iraq Meaning of Bonaparte's Invasion," Alpayim, accounted for 19 percent of Jordan's total No. 20 (2000), pp. 9-35. [Hebrew] exports in 2002. Similarly, Syria and 2 Patrick Seale, Daily Star, October 6, 2003. Lebanon increased substantially their trade 3 Amr Hamzawy, "Understanding Arab with Iraq during the years 1997-2002. Political Reality: One Lens Is Not Enough," 9 MECS, 2000, pp. 64-65. Carnegie Endowment Policy Outlook, March 10Ibid., pp. 81-83. 2005, p. 1. 11 On the Saudi plan, see Elie Podeh, From 4 Shibley Telhami, NPR.org, March 14, 2005 Fahd to 'Abdallah: The Origins of the Saudi (www.brookings.edu/views/op- Peace Initiatives and Their Impact on the ed/telhami/20050314.htm) Arab System and Israel, Gitelson Peace 5 For several studies that attempted to Publication No. 24 (Jerusalem: The Harry S. analyze the episode shortly after, see Shai Truman Research Institute for the Feldman (ed.), After the War in Iraq: Advancement of Peace, 2003). Defining the New Strategic Balance 12 This was followed by the Aqaba meeting, (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2003); which included Bush, Prime Minister Sharon, and several articles in Shu'un ‘Arabiyya, No. King Abdallah, and Abu Mazen. 115 (Winter 2003); Shu'un al-Awsat, No. 111 13 Eyal Zisser, Assad's Syria at a Crossroads (Summer 2003); and al-Siyassa al-Dawliya, (Tel Aviv: Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Meuhad, 1999), No. 152 (April 2003). See also various pp. 89-110 [Hebrew]. Though Syrian-Iraqi articles in al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi for the relations improved mainly after Hafiz al- years 2003-5. Asad's death in June 2000, the two countries 6 On the Arab summit, see Bruce Maddy- signed, already in 1998, an agreement to Weitzman, "Inter-Arab relations," Middle repair an oil pipeline that has the capacity of East Contemporary Survey (MECS), Vol. 20, 1.4 million barrels per day, which connects 1996 (Boulder: Westview, 1998), pp. 69-80. Kirkuk with Banias and which was not in use 7 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "Inter-Arab since 1982. Syrian-Iraqi trade between 1997- Relations," MECS, Vol. 24, 2000 (Tel Aviv: 2003 is estimated around $5 billion. See "Oil Tel Aviv University, 2002), p. 70. for Food: Impact on Iraq and Its Main Arab 8 The agreement (UNSC Resolution 986) Trading Partners," www.escwa.org, p. 6. allowed Iraq to export oil for food and 14 On Syria in the Arab system following medical equipment in the sum of $2 billion Hafiz al-Asad's death, see MECS, 2000, pp. per half a year. In 2000, the sum increased to 56-59. $5.2 billion. For an excellent overview of this 15 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 15 and 26, program and its beneficiaries, see "Oil for 2003; Ha'aretz, January 30, 2003 Food: Impact on Iraq and Its Main Arab

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16 Ha'aretz, February 10, 2003; New York 28 On the ISO conference and its resolutions, Times, February 21, 2003. see al-Ahram, al-Sharq al-Awsat, al-Hayat, 17 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 17-20, 2003; March 6, 2003. Ha'aretz, February 20-21 and 23, 2003. 29 Headline: "Egypt Says No to War… Yes 18 Ibrahim Nafi', al-Ahram, February 28, to Peace," al-Ahram, March 6, 2003. 2003. 30 Al-Thawra, March 8, 2003. 19 Ibid.; Al-Hayat, February 28, 2003, March 31 Ibid., March 10, 2003. 1, 2003. 32 For the text of the statement, see al-Hayat, 20 See, i.e., Ibrahim Nafi', al-Ahram, March 25, 2003. February 28, 2003; Karim Bakraduni, al- 33 Al-Hayat, March 25-26, 2003. Sharq al-Awsat, March 1, 2003; Fahd Diab, 34 See a well-publicized interview of Asad al-Thawra, March 1, 2003. with the Lebanese daily al-Safir, in al- 21 For the text of the resolutions, see al- Thawra, March 28, 2003. Sharq al-Awsat, March 2, 2003. 35 Al-Ahram, March 28, 2003; compare with 22 For details on the summit, see al-Hayat, Ha'aretz, March 23, 2003. al-Sharq al-Awsat, al-Ahram, Okaz, al- 36 For reports on massive demonstrations, Thawra (Syria), Ha'aretz, March 2-3, 2003. see most of the Arab newspapers during April For more details of the UAE initiative, see 2-5, 2003. See, in particular al-Hayat during Tzvi Bar'el, Ha'aretz, March 4, 2003. these days. Egyptian demonstrators, for 23 For details, see www.itp.net/new; al- example, demanded the closure of the Suez Sharq al-Awsat, January 13, 2003. Canal - which was used by U.S. marine 24 For some details on these initiatives, see forces. Amir Taheri, Jerusalem Post, February 7, 37 See al-Thawra during these days, which 2003. made a connection between the current 25 Da'ud al-Sharian called it the "failed imperialist attack on Iraq and previous Syrian summit," see al-Hayat, March 2, 2003. Nabil and Arab struggles. 'Abd al-Fattah called it "the summit of Arab 38 The Kuwaiti al-Qabas' headline was "Iraq impotence," see al-Ahram al-'Arabi, March [Is] Free," April 10, 2003. 15, 2003. See also Ahmad al-Ruba'i in al- 39 See, i.e., al-Ahram, al-Hayat, al-Sharq al- Sharq al-Awsat, March 2-3, 2003; Mustafa Awsat, Okaz, April 10-11, 2003. al-Fiqi in Ha'aretz, March 2, 2003; Ashraf al- 40 Al-Hayat, April 11, 15, 17, 2003; 'Ashari and Suzi al-Jnidi, al-Ahram al-'Arabi, Ha'aretz, April 15, 2003; al-Ahram, April 15, March 8 , 2003. 2003. 26 Fawaz Gerges, "Rudderless in the Storm: 41 On the deterioration of US-Syrian Arab Politics before and After the Iraq War," relations, see Nathan Gutman, Ha'aretz, April Dissent (Winter 2004), see 14, 2003; al-Hayat, al-Qabas, April 21, 2003. www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/articles/ 42 Al-Hayat, al-Qabas, al-Ahram, April 19, wi04/gerges.htm, p 2. 2003. The editor of al-Ahram succinctly 27 Ashraf al-'Asari, al-Ahram al-'Arabi, summarized the Arab position in the title of March 8, 2003. his column: [the US:] "Get Out of Iraq and Take Off Your Hands of Syria." See Ibrahim Nafi', al-Ahram, April 25, 2003.

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43 On Mubarak's tour, see al-Ahram, April and Its Main Arab Trading Partners," 21-25, 2003; al-Hayat, April 22, 2003. http://www.escwa.org, no date. See also Tzvi 44 A cynical title of an article by Jamil Matar Barel, Ha'aretz, December 10, 2003. captured the problem: "Guy Garner [the US- 52 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 5, 2003. nominated ruler in Iraq]… in the Arab 53 On December 1, 2004, Asad gave an summit." See al-Hayat, April 23, 2003. interview to the New York Times; these views 45 The decision to re-admit Iraq was not an were also transmitted to U.S. Senator, Bill easy one. Initially, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Nelson, who delivered them to Israel. See and other states reportedly objected to the Ha'aretz, January 11-13, 18, 2004. See also admission of the current Iraqi regime. It was his interview with al-Sharq al-Awsat, January reported that the U.S. exerted pressure on 19, 2004. See also Eyal Zisser, "What's member states to admit Iraq. See al-Sharq al- Behind Bashar al-Asad's Peace Offensive," Awsat, August 28, 2003; September 3, 6, 9, Tel Aviv Notes, No. 95, January 11, 2004. 2003; al-Jazeera, September 9, 2003. 54 On the visit to Turkey, see Ha'aretz, 46 See, e.g., the meetings in Sharm al-Shaikh January 14, 2004; Asad's interview with al- on November 22-23, 2004, see Ha'aretz, Sharq al-Awsat, January 19, 2004. November 22, 2004. 55 On a certain document that was signed 47 For the text, see with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, see al-Jazeera, http://www.albawaba.com/news, May 24, al-Hayat, January 18-20, 2004; al-Watan, 2004. January 20, 2004. 48 Al-Hayat, March 25, 2005. See also the 56 For information on the Lebanese events Arab cold attitude toward Iraq during the and the Syrian decision, see in general the deliberations of the Arab foreign ministers in Lebanese press for February-April 2005. For September 2004, early calls In Lebanon for Syrian evacuation, www.weekly.aharam.org.eg/print/2004/708/r see William W. Harris, "Lebanon," MECS, e7.htm Vol. 24, 2000 (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan 49 On Iraqi elections, see Ibrahim al- Center for Middle Eastern and African Marashi, "Boycotts, Coalitions and the Threat Studies, 2002), pp. 382-83. of Violence: The Run-Up to the January 57 Ha'aretz, December 21, 24, 2003; Yehudit 2005, Iraqi Elections," The Middle East Ronen, "Qadhafi's Christmas Gift: What's Review of International Affairs (January Behind Libya's Decision to Renounce 2005); "Iraqi Vote Mirrors Desire for WMD?" Tel Aviv Notes, No. 93, December Democracy in Muslim World," The Pew 24, 2003. On Qadhafi's position in the past, Research Center, February 3, 2005, see Yehudit Ronen, "Libya's Qadhafi and the www.people- Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1969-2002," press.org/commentary/display.php3?Analysis Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40 (2004), pp. ID=107 85-98. 50 For the text of the bill, see 58 For the text of the plan, see New York http://www.theorator.com/bills108, May 1, Times, Ha'aretz, al-Hayat, May 1, 2003. 2003. 59 Al-Ahram, al-Hayat, Ha'aretz, New York 51 For more details on Syrian-Iraqi economic Times, June 3-4, 2003. relations, see "Oil for Food: Impact on Iraq

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60 Al-Ahram, June 8, 2003. See also reports July 30, 2003; Ahmad Hamrush, al-Sharq al- on a Mubarak-Asad meeting on July 7, 2003, Awsat, September 15, 2003; Ahmad al- al-Hayat, July 8, 2003. On meeting with Ruba'i, al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 17, 2003; Saudi officials, see al-Hayat, July 21, 2003; Ahmad Jabir, al-Hayat, April 14, 2004. al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 7, 10, 2003. 70 In addition to the sources mentioned in 61 On this initiative, see Ha'aretz, January 25, previous note, see Abu Talib, "Islah al- 2004; al-Hayat, March 2, 28, 2004. Jami'a," pp. 102-3. The idea of setting up an 62 For the text, see http://albawaba.com, Arab justice court had been raised for the first March 24, 2004. The Tunis Arab summit of time in 1964, see Ahmad, "al-Mutaghayyirat May 2004 followed the same position. al-'Arabiyya," p. 44. Also, an Arab Common 63 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "Patrons, Clients Market was established in 1964 but never and Shepherds: The Sharm al-Shaykh implemented. Summit," Tel Aviv Notes, No. 124, February 71 Ibrahim Nafi`, "Nahwa Ru'ya Mutakamilla 13, 2005; Ha'aretz, February 9, 2005. li-Tatwir al-'Amal al-'Arabi al-Mushtarak," 64 Meir Litvak, "The Palestinian Cairo al-Ahram, July 25, 2003. Agreements: Between Lull and Truce," Tel 72 For the text of the speech, see al-Ahram, Aviv Notes, No. 130, March 27, 2005. July 27, 2003. 65 For some of the previous attempts to 73 Al-Ahram, July 28, 2003. See also reform the League, see Ahmad Yusuf editorial, ibid., July 30, 2003. Ahmad, "Islah Jami'at al-Duwwal al- 74 See, i.e., Abu Talib, "Islah al-Jami'a," p. 'Arabiyya: al-Mutaghayyirat al-'Arabiyya," 98. al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, No. 301 (March 75 For some of the criticism, see Gilbert 2004), pp. 42-65. Achcar, "Greater Middle East: The US Plan," 66 Hasan Abu Talib, "Islah al- Le Monde Diplomatique (April 2004), Jami'a…Mu'dilat Iltizam al-Duwal al- http://mondediplo.com/2004/04/04world 'Arabiyya," al-Siyassa al-Dawliya, No. 153 76 The text of a "working paper," circulated (July 2003), p. 99. by the U.S. in preparation for the G-8 summit 67 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 13, 2003; scheduled for June 2004, was published in www.itp.net/news English and Arabic by al-Hayat, February 13, 68 Amir Taheri, Jerusalem Post, February 7, 2004. This and the following section is 2003. primarily based on Jeremy M. Sharp, "The 69 For some of the interesting contributions, Broader Middle East and North Africa see: Musa's interview, al-Jazeera, May 11, Initiative: An Overview," Congressional 2003; Sameh Rashed, Faysal 'Allush, al- Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Hayat, May 16, 2003; Edward Said, al- February 15, 2005. For a critical view of the Hayat, May 26, 2003; Patrick Seale, al- U.S. role, see Thomas Carothers, "A Better Hayat, May 30, 2003; Muna Makram Ubeyd, Way to Support Middle East Reform," Policy al-Hayat, June 18, 2003; Muhammad al- Brief 33 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Ramihi, al-Hayat, June 25, 2003; Jamil Endowment, 2005). Matar, al-Hayat, July 1, 2003; Patrick Seale, 77 The first, the conference on "Democracy, al-Hayat, July 4, 2003; Ibrahim Nafi', al- Human Rights and the Role of International Ahram, July 25, 2003; Editorial, al-Ahram, Criminal Court," was held in Sana'a; the

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second, entitled "Arab Reform Issues: Vision 90 CRS Report, p. 5. and Implementation," was held in 91 See in this connection, Joshua Teitelbaum, Alexandria. For the resolutions, see CRS "Between the International Hammer and the Report, p. 4; al-Ahram Weekly, No. 683, Local Anvil: Municipal Elections in Saudi March 25-31, 2004. The Egyptian sociologist Arabia," Tel Aviv Notes, No. 129, March 15, Saad Eddin Ibrahim called the Alexandria 2005. Declaration "a sort of Arab Magna Carta." 92 Ha'aretz, May 27, 2005. See "The Sick Man of the World," 93 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Islam Can Vote, If Washington Post, March 28, 2004. See also We Let It," New York Times, May 21, 2005. the importance attached to it in Arab Human 94 Hamzawy, "Understanding Arab Political Development Report 2004 (New York: UN Reality," p. 1. Development Program, 2005). 95 The Daily Star, October 6, 2003. For a 78 Mubarak expressed a typical attitude, see development of this same view, see Asher al-Hayat, March 2, 2004. Susser, "The Decline of the Arabs," Middle 79 For some sources that shed light on these East Quarterly, Vol. 10 (2003), pp. 3-16. For talks, see al-Hayat, March 2-3, 27-28, 2004, an opposite view, see Muna Makram Ubayd, al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 29, 2004. al-Hayat, March 29, 2004. 80 See the text of the Tunis Declaration. 96 Seale, The Daily Star, October 6, 2003. 81 Al-Hayat, March 24, 2005. 97 For the full sources and other references to 82 See the positive note of Musa, al-Ahram, literature on the Arab system, see Elie Podeh, May 26, 2004; and the Saudi response, al- "The Emergence of the Arab State System Hayat, May 25, 2004. Reconsidered," Diplomacy and Statecraft, 83 See, i.e., Ghassan Charbel, al-Hayat, May Vol. 9 (1998), p. 51. 21, 2004; Barry Rubin, Jerusalem Post, May 98 See the various articles in a special issue 23, 2004; Marwan Bishara, International on Arab media and reform, Arab Reform Herald Tribune, May 24, 2004; Editorial, Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 11 (December 2004). Ha'aretz, May 25, 2004; Salama Naamat, al- 99 On the impact of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi crisis, Hayat, May 27, 2004. see As'ad AbuKhalil, "A New Arab 84 See, i.e., Jihad al-Khazen, al-Hayat, May Ideology? The Rejuvenation of Arab 25, 2004. Nationalism," Middle East Journal, Vol. 46 85 The Daily Star, 26 May 2004. (1992), pp. 22-36. 86 Newsweek, May 27, 2004. 100 "Iraq and the Arabs' Future, Foreign 87 See Egypt Foreign Minister's statements, Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1 (2003), p. 2. al-Hayat, May 25, 2004; 101 For possible scenarios, see Ephraim http://www.alarabonline.org, May 27, 2004. Kam, "The War in Iraq: Regional 88 See, for example, Muna Makram Ubayd, Implications," in After the War in Iraq, pp. al-Hayat, March 29, 2004. 101 -114. 89 For the text, see "Partnership for Progress 102 For a comparison between the two cases, and a Common Future with the Region of the see Patrick Seale, "Should the Arabs Fight Broader Middle East and North Africa, June American Imperialism?" al-Hayat, May 30, 9, 2004, 2003. http://www.g8usa.gov/d_060904c.htm

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103 For a similar view, see Muhammad Sa'ad Abu 'Amud, "Nahwa Istrategiyya Gadida lil- 'Amal al-'Arabi al-Mushtaraq," Shu'un 'Arabiyya, No. 115 (Winter 2003), p. 55. 104 For a similar view, see Ahmad al-Ruba'i, al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 17, 2003. 105 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, New York Times, May 21, 2005. 106 This analogy is based on Ahmad al- Ruba'i, al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 2, 2003.

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