DOCSLIB.ORG

Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: Toward a First Amendment Ethnography

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: Toward a First Amendment Ethnography William & Mary Law Review Volume 45 (2003-2004) Issue 5 Article 7 April 2004 Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: owarT d a First Amendment Ethnography Timothy Zick William & Mary Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Social and Cultural Anthropology Commons Repository Citation Timothy Zick, Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: owarT d a First Amendment Ethnography, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2261 (2004), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol45/ iss5/7 Copyright c 2004 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr CROSS BURNING, COCKFIGHTING, AND SYMBOLIC MEANING: TOWARD A FIRST AMENDMENT ETHNOGRAPHY TIMOTHY ZICK* TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .................................... 2263 I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE CULTURE OF SYMBOLIC GESTURES ............................. 2272 A. Early Statements on FirstAmendment Symbolism ... 2272 B. Symbols of Protest ............................ 2274 1. Peaceful Sit-Ins ............................. 2274 2. Symbolic Protests of Hostilities ................. 2276 3. Symbolic Protests of Government Policies ......... 2278 4. The Symbolism of the U.S. Flag ................ 2280 C. Symbolic Eroticism: The Act of DancingNude ...... 2284 D. Paradesand Other Symbolic Gatherings ........... 2287 E. Symbols of Fear,Hate, and Violence .............. 2289 F. Sacred Symbols ............................... 2292 G. Symbolic Membership .......................... 2297 H. Summary: CurrentDoctrine and the Way Forward .. 2299 II. AN ETHNOGRAPHIC MODEL FOR SYMBOLIC GESTURES ... 2301 A. A Semiotic Conception of "Culture". ............... 2303 1. The Cultural and Constitutional Significance of Symbols ....................... 2303 2. "SacredSymbols" ........................... 2308 * Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. B.A., 1989, Indiana University; J.D., 1992, Georgetown University Law Center. I wish to thank Erin Albritton, Paul Kirgis, Rosemary Salamone, Susan Stabile, Brian Tamanaha, Robert Vischer, and Philip Weinberg for their support, and for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this Article. I would also like to thank Meghan Silhan for her diligent research assistance. 2261 2262 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:2261 B. The Mechanics of the Interpretive Perspective ....... 2311 1. Data Gathering-BuildingCultural Context ...... 2312 2. "Thick Description" .......................... 2316 3. On "GoingNative": Emic and Etic Perspectives .... 2321 4. Symbolic Meaning and Interpretation ........... 2324 III. SYMBOLIC GESTURES REVISITED: TOWARD A FIRST AMENDMENT ETHNOGRAPHY ................... 2335 A. Legally Uncontested and Contested Meanings ....... 2336 1. Legally Uncontested Symbolic Meaning .......... 2336 2. Legally Contested Symbolic Meaning ............ 2338 B. Symbols of Violence and Hatred .................. 2340 1. Ritual Cross Burning ......................... 2340 2. The Confederate Flag ......................... 2350 3. Symbols of Nazism ........................... 2354 C. The "Said"of the Striptease ..................... 2355 D. Other Symbolic Expressive Activity ............... 2362 E. The Semiotics of Sacred Symbols ................. 2365 F. The Meaning of Membership ..................... 2375 G. Some Final Thoughts on Interpretationand "Meaning" 2380 1. Semiotic Competence and InterpretiveAuthority ... 2380 2. JudgingMeanings ........................... 2384 IV. CONCLUSION: THE BENEFITS OF AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF GESTURES ........................ 2389 A. Rejecting Indifference-Recalibrating the FirstAmendment Hierarchy .................. 2389 B. ConstitutionalBalancing and Semiotic Precision .... 2394 20041 TOWARD A FIRST AMENDMENT ETHNOGRAPHY 2263 INTRODUCTION We live in a culture of symbols.' We speak not only through our words but through symbolic gestures-our acts, our religious symbols, and our associations. What we do, what we wear, how we worship, and with whom we associate are all deeply symbolic aspects of our cultural life. Despite this rich symbolism, what it is that we say when we act, worship, and join has been a topic treated substantially with indifference by courts and scholars. What does it mean to burn a draft card or a cross, to sleep in the park, or to dance in the nude? What does the display of a menorah, or creche, or the Ten Commandments at the county courthouse signify? What does it mean to join the Jaycees, the Rotary Club, or the Boy Scouts? Although a diverse and complex symbolism inheres in the First Amendment, courts have made little effort to translate or interpret these and other symbolic gestures. Outside the realm of "pure" expression, whose meaning is often self-evident, it seems that judges are loathe to delve too deeply into symbolic meaning. As a result, what we have now is a very thin doctrine of symbolic gestures.2 This does not have to be so. Indeed, one recent exception to the general disengagement from symbolic meaning stands out and deserves particular attention. In Virginia v. Black,' the Supreme Court held that cross burning could be prohibited, categorically, as a "threat" outside the protection of the First Amendment.4 The record facts in Black can be stated briefly. One man, leading a Ku Klux Klan rally, burned a cross on private property some 300 feet from the nearest public road and in view of his neighbors, while two 1. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, They Whisper: Reflections on Flags, Monuments, and State Holidays, and the Construction of Social Meaning in a Multicultural Society, 70 CI.- KENT L. REV. 1079, 1107 (1995) ("Symbols are an important part of the cultural exchange system that, among other things, establishes relationships of hierarchy and domination."). 2. The usual labels-%ymbolic conduct" or "symbolic expression"-are too limited for my project, which includes, in addition to an analysis of symbolic conduct, the symbolism of religion (sacred symbols) and symbolic membership. I use "symbolic gestures" to indicate this more expansive coverage. 3. 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003). 4. Id. at 1547-49. 2264 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:2261 other men, on a separate occasion, attempted to burn a cross in an African American neighbor's yard.5 This conduct was said to violate a Virginia criminal statute regulating cross burning undertaken with the "intent of intimidating any person or group of persons."6 Although the Court concluded that the government could prohibit cross burning as a form of threatening symbolism, it held that the Virginia statute was procedurally flawed.7 The narrow holding is not significant. What is significant, or at least potentially so, is how the Court was able to determine that burning a cross could be interpreted as a constitutionally unpro- tected symbolic threat. In order to educate itself, and the rest of us, with regard to the symbolic meaning of burning a cross, the Court had to go beyond the narrow conception of "the record."' In order to recover the most plausible meaning of cross burning, the Court had to ascertain what potential meanings such an act might have, and then choose the meaning most consistent with, among other things, participant behavior. The conclusion surely seems self-evident, at least for those with even a rudimentary awareness of the historic struggle for civil rights, and of the ideology and operations of the Ku Klux Klan. But where meaning and interpretation are concerned, courts ought not simply pronounce their own sense of the matter. This is as true of interpretation of symbolic gestures as it is of interpretation of constitutional text. Courts must state reasons for their interpretations. Drawing on a wealth of sociological, historical, and anecdotal data, therefore, the Black Court produced a detailed account, a monograph of sorts, of the practice of cross burning, from the origins of the ritual in fourteenth-century Scotland, through the violence and racism of the civil rights struggle, up to the present.9 The Black Court sought to recover the most plausible meaning of cross burning by placing it in cultural context, consulting public sources of meaning, and providing a detailed description of the practice. What resulted was a translation of the gesture of cross 5. Id. at 1542-43. 6. Id. at 1541. 7. Id. at 1541, 1551-52. 8. See id. at 1544-47. 9. See id. 2004] TOWARD A FIRST AMENDMENT ETHNOGRAPHY 2265 burning into recognizable, if not ultimately incontestable, cultural terms. Black demonstrates that interpretation of symbolic gestures can be demanding, and risky, work for judges. Courts have generally avoided interpreting the meaning of symbolic gestures for two reasons. First, they have failed to appreciate the importance of symbolism to cultural expression. Indeed, normative bias against unusual or unconventional forms of speech-symbolic protests and nude dancing, for example-has led over time to a doctrine of interpretive indifference. Second, courts tend to view symbolic meaning as hopelessly indeterminate. They do not believe that, as judges, they are capable of choosing from among the various available meanings for polysemous symbols. Thus, concerns regarding institutional competency have led, with respect to some symbolic gestures, to a doctrine of interpretive avoidance. It is precisely because of the indeterminacy of meaning that Black will have detractors. For if the
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Ku Klux Klan in Nebraska, 1920-1930
    Nebraska History posts materials online for your personal use. Please remember that the contents of Nebraska History are copyrighted by the Nebraska State Historical Society (except for materials credited to other institutions). The NSHS retains its copyrights even to materials it posts on the web. For permission to re-use materials or for photo ordering information, please see: http://www.nebraskahistory.org/magazine/permission.htm Nebraska State Historical Society members receive four issues of Nebraska History and four issues of Nebraska History News annually. For membership information, see: http://nebraskahistory.org/admin/members/index.htm Article Title: The Ku Klux Klan in Nebraska, 1920-1930 Full Citation: Michael W Schuyler, “The Ku Klux Klan in Nebraska, 1920-1930,” Nebraska History 66 (1985): 234-256. URL of article: http://www.nebraskahistory.org/publish/publicat/history/full-text/NH1985Klan.pdf Date: 3/15/2011 Article Summary: Beginning in 1921 the Ku Klux Klan made a major effort to recruit members in Nebraska. At its height the Klan claimed 45,000 members in the state. By the end of the 1920s the group had become known for racism and bigotry, and from then on its influence faded rapidly. Cataloging Information: Names: William J Simmons, Edward Young Clarke, Hiram Wesley Evans, Gail S Carter, J L Beebe, Edward Merrill Brown, James C Dahlman, Agnes Lobeck, Millard Hoffman, William Brown, E P Smith, Samuel Avery, Robert Strehlow, Charles Bryan, William Jennings Bryan, John Briggs, Charles McDonald, J Hyde Sweet Nebraska cities
    [Show full text]
  • Cross Burnings and the Harm-Valuation
    CROSS BURNINGS AND THE HARM- VALUATION ANALYTIC: A TALE OF TWO CASES RONALD TURNER* INTRODUCTION Cross burning is a form of hate speech "inflict[ing] its harm through its meaning as an act which promotes racial inequality through its message and impact, engendering terror and effectuating segregation."' Does the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 2 forbid or permit laws regulating and criminalizing this expression and communication? Consider the following cases: 1. A group of white teenagers, angered at the presence of an African- American family in "their" neighborhood, assembled and burned a cross in the backyard of the black family's residence in St. Paul, Minnesota. One of the cross burners was arrested and charged with violating a city ordinance banning the burning of a cross on public or private property "which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender... ' 3 Arguing that this law violated the First Amendment, he sought dismissal of the charges. 2. Two whites tried to burn a cross at the home of an African-American neighbor; both were charged with and convicted of violating a Virginia statute making it a felony to burn a cross "with the intent of intimidating Alumnae Law Center Professor of Law, The University of Houston Law Center, [email protected]; Visiting Professor of History, Rice University. J.D., The University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. Magna Cum Laude, Wilberforce University. I. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Pornographyas Defamation and Discrimination,71 B.U.
    [Show full text]
  • Memorandum of Law in Support of Changes to Stone Mountain Park
    Memorandum of Law in Support of Changes to Stone Mountain Park To: Whom It May Concern From: Stone Mountain Action Coalition Date: October 15, 2020 During public discourse regarding the legal entanglement between the Confederacy and Stone Mountain Park (the “Park”), some have argued that the Stone Mountain Memorial Association (“SMMA” or the “Board”) is powerless to make changes to the Park, claiming that the Board’s “hands are tied by the law.” To the contrary, the Board has discretion to make changes under current Georgia state law. Indeed, all boards created by law have discretion. Absent discretion, such entities would be powerless to take actions pursuant to their statutory mandates. Here, that discretion is front and center, listed in the code among the three primary purposes of the SMMA: (1) To preserve the natural areas situated within the Stone Mountain Park area; (2) To provide access to Stone Mountain for Georgia's citizens; and (3) To maintain an appropriate and suitable memorial for the Confederacy. See O.C.G.A. § 12-3-192.1 (emphasis added) (the complete “Stone Mountain Memorial Act,” O.C.G.A. § 12-3-190, et seq. is attached as Exhibit “A”). Thus, the General Assembly explicitly granted the Board discretion as to what is an “appropriate and suitable” memorial to the Confederacy. Page 1 of 11 I. THE STONE MOUNTAIN MEMORIAL ASSOCIATION IS PERMITTED UNDER GEORGIA STATE LAW TO MAKE CHANGES TO STONE MOUNTAIN PARK. A. The history of Stone Mountain Park and the SMMA underscores the urgent need to make changes at the Park.
    [Show full text]
  • VIRGINIA V. BLACK Et Al. Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Virginia
    538US2 Unit: $U39 [10-30-04 18:46:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 2002 343 Syllabus VIRGINIA v. BLACK et al. certiorari to the supreme court of virginia No. 01–1107. Argued December 11, 2002—Decided April 7, 2003 Respondents were convicted separately of violating a Virginia statute that makes it a felony “for any person . , with the intent of intimidating any person or group . , to burn ...across on the property of another, a highway or other public place,” and specifies that “[a]ny such burning . shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group.” When respondent Black objected on First Amendment grounds to his trial court’s jury instruction that cross burning by itself is sufficient evidence from which the required “intent to intimidate” could be inferred, the prosecutor responded that the instruction was taken straight out of the Virginia Model Instructions. Respondent O’Mara pleaded guilty to charges of violating the statute, but reserved the right to challenge its constitutionality. At respondent Elliott’s trial, the judge instructed the jury as to what the Commonwealth had to prove, but did not give an instruction on the meaning of the word “in- timidate,” nor on the statute’s prima facie evidence provision. Consol- idating all three cases, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the cross- burning statute is unconstitutional on its face; that it is analytically indistinguishable from the ordinance found unconstitutional in R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377; that it discriminates on the basis of content and viewpoint since it selectively chooses only cross burning because of its distinctive message; and that the prima facie evidence provision ren- ders the statute overbroad because the enhanced probability of prosecu- tion under the statute chills the expression of protected speech.
    [Show full text]
  • O Say, Can You See: Free Expression by the Light of Fiery Crosses Jeannine Bell Indiana University Maurer School of Law, [email protected]
    Maurer School of Law: Indiana University Digital Repository @ Maurer Law Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship 2004 O Say, Can You See: Free Expression by the Light of Fiery Crosses Jeannine Bell Indiana University Maurer School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons Recommended Citation Bell, Jeannine, "O Say, Can You See: Free Expression by the Light of Fiery Crosses" (2004). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 334. http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/334 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 0 Say, Can You See: Free Expression by the Light of Fiery Crosses JeannineBell* Scholarship on cross burning has paid scant attention to the full context of the act of burning a cross. Many FirstAmendment scholars generally ig- nore cross burning's historical underpinnings. Those scholars who do rec- ognize the historical importance of cross burning as a threat to African Ameri- cans do not fully address its place in First Amendment doctrine. Scholars in neither group acknowledge the contemporary use of cross burning by those with anti-integrationistends. This Article presents a comprehensive, context-based theory that both places cross burning in its proper doctrinalframework and recognizes the history of cross burning as one of Ku Klux Klan-inspired terrorism directed at African Americans.
    [Show full text]
  • A Condensed History of the Stone Mountain Carving
    A Condensed History of the Stone Mountain Carving Copyright © 2017 Atlanta Historical Society, Inc. Atlanta History Center 130 West Paces Ferry Road NW Atlanta, Georgia, 30305. www.atlantahistorycenter.com Executive Summary: Condensed History of the Stone Mountain Carving The carving on the side of Stone Mountain has a controversial history that involves strong connections to white supremacy, Confederate Lost Cause mythology, and anti-Civil Rights sentiments. From the beginning of efforts to create the carving in 1914, early proponents of the carving had strong connections to the Ku Klux Klan and openly supported Klan politics. Helen Plane, leader of the United Daughters of the Confederacy and credited with beginning efforts to create the initial carving, openly praised the Klan and even proposed Klansmen be incorporated in the carving. Sam Venable, owner of Stone Mountain, sanctioned Klan meetings on the mountain and remained highly involved with the group for many years. These are just a two of the early carving proponents involved with the white supremacist organization- the carver, Gutzon Borglum, and others were also involved. Given the influence of white supremacists, the Stone Mountain carving effort carried with it Confederate Lost Cause sentiments from its beginning. Efforts at rewriting Confederate history as a moral victory and pining for the supposedly morally superior society of the romanticized Old South were at the center of the motivations behind the carving. Although the carving was not again pursued after the collapse of the initial effort until half a century after it was begun, Lost Cause sentiments remained. Governor Marvin Griffin, an overt supporter of segregation, promised to resume the carving if elected during his campaign for governor.
    [Show full text]
  • Download the Court Opinion
    (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2002 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus VIRGINIA v. BLACK ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA No. 01–1107. Argued December 11, 2002—Decided April 7, 2003 Respondents were convicted separately of violating a Virginia statute that makes it a felony “for any person . , with the intent of intimi- dating any person or group . , to burn . a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place,” and specifies that “[a]ny such burning . shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimi- date a person or group.” When respondent Black objected on First Amendment grounds to his trial court’s jury instruction that cross burning by itself is sufficient evidence from which the required “in- tent to intimidate” could be inferred, the prosecutor responded that the instruction was taken straight out of the Virginia Model Instruc- tions. Respondent O’Mara pleaded guilty to charges of violating the statute, but reserved the right to challenge its constitutionality. At respondent Elliott’s trial, the judge instructed the jury as to what the Commonwealth had to prove, but did not give an instruction on the meaning of the word “intimidate,” nor on the statute’s prima facie evidence provision.
    [Show full text]
  • The Klan's Constitution
    THE KLAN’S CONSTITUTION Jared A. Goldstein* INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 287 I. THE RECONSTRUCTION-ERA KLAN AND THE CONSTITUTION: 1866-1877 ................................................................ 293 A. The Birth of the Ku Klux Klan ..................................................... 293 B. The Klan’s Constitutional Mission .............................................. 299 C. The Deep Roots of the Klan’s Constitutional Vision .................... 304 D. “Forced By Force to Use Force”: The Constitution As Justification for the Klan’s Violence ............................................ 313 E. The Demise of the Klan and the Birth of the Klan Legend............ 317 II. THE SECOND KLAN AND THE CONSTITUTION: 1915-1944 ................... 320 A. The Rise of the Second Klan ........................................................ 321 B. The Second Klan’s Constitutional Mission .................................. 327 C. The Widespread Acceptance of the Klan’s Constitutional Ideology ...................................................................................... 333 D. The Constitution as Justification for the Klan’s Violence ............. 337 E. The Demise of the Second Klan ................................................... 342 III. THE THIRD KLAN AND THE CONSTITUTION: 1944-1971 ...................... 343 A. The Rise of the Third Klan .......................................................... 343 B. The Central Role of the Constitution in the Klan’s
    [Show full text]
  • O Say, Can You See: Free Expression by the Light of Fiery Crosses
    Maurer School of Law: Indiana University Digital Repository @ Maurer Law Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship 2004 O Say, Can You See: Free Expression by the Light of Fiery Crosses Jeannine Bell Indiana University Maurer School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons Recommended Citation Bell, Jeannine, "O Say, Can You See: Free Expression by the Light of Fiery Crosses" (2004). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 334. https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/334 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 0 Say, Can You See: Free Expression by the Light of Fiery Crosses JeannineBell* Scholarship on cross burning has paid scant attention to the full context of the act of burning a cross. Many FirstAmendment scholars generally ig- nore cross burning's historical underpinnings. Those scholars who do rec- ognize the historical importance of cross burning as a threat to African Ameri- cans do not fully address its place in First Amendment doctrine. Scholars in neither group acknowledge the contemporary use of cross burning by those with anti-integrationistends. This Article presents a comprehensive, context-based theory that both places cross burning in its proper doctrinalframework and recognizes the history of cross burning as one of Ku Klux Klan-inspired terrorism directed at African Americans.
    [Show full text]
  • Notes on Writing the History of the Ku Klux Klan
    Notes o Notes on Writing N Writi N g the History of the the h i story of the Ku Klux Kla Ku Klux Klan Orange Grove Texts Plus seeks to redefine publishing in an electronic world. a joint venture of the University Press of Florida and The Orange Grove, Florida’s digital repository, N this collaboration provides faculty, students, and researchers worldwide with the latest scholarship and course materials in a twenty- first-century format that is readily discoverable, easily customizable, and consistently affordable. www.theorangegrove.org C almers h David Chalmers IsBN 978-1-61610-158-9 Notes on Writing the History of the Ku Klux Klan UNIVERSITY PRESS OF FLORIDA Florida A&M University, Tallahassee Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton Florida Gulf Coast University, Ft. Myers Florida International University, Miami Florida State University, Tallahassee New College of Florida, Sarasota University of Central Florida, Orlando University of Florida, Gainesville University of North Florida, Jacksonville University of South Florida, Tampa University of West Florida, Pensacola Orange Grove Texts Plus Also by David Chalmers Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan (1965, 1987) And the Crooked Places Made Straight: The Struggle for Social Change in the 1960s (1991, 2013) Backfire: How the Ku Klux Klan Helped the Civil Rights Movement (2003) Notes on Writing the History of the Ku Klux Klan Victory over Reconstruction in the South; Glory Days in the 1920s; Depression-Era Futility in the 1930s; Post World War II: Fragmented but Dangerous; Challenging the Civil Rights Movement in the Southern Streets in the 1960s; and the Long Wait for Justice in Mississippi David Chalmers Distinguished Service Professor of History, Emeritus University of Florida University Press of Florida Gainesville/Tallahassee/Tampa/Boca Raton Pensacola/Orlando/Miami/Jacksonville/Ft.
    [Show full text]
  • Monumental Discourse: the Narratives on Display at Stone Mountain Park, Georgia
    MONUMENTAL DISCOURSE: THE NARRATIVES ON DISPLAY AT STONE MOUNTAIN PARK, GEORGIA By SEAN V THOMAS Bachelor of Science in Secondary Education Oklahoma State University Stillwater, OK 2011 Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College of the Oklahoma State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE December, 2015 MONUMENTAL DISCOURSE: THE NARRATIVES ON DISPLAY AT STONE MOUNTAIN PARK, GEORGIA Thesis Approved: Dr. Alyson Greiner Thesis Adviser Dr. Brad Bays Dr. Ron McCoy ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The thesis committee — Dr. Brad Bays, Dr. Ron McCoy, and Chairperson Dr. Alyson Greiner — has been exceptional and patient in the achievement of this thesis. Dr. Greiner’s help has been highly appreciated and instrumental in finishing this study. Her rigorous approach and attention to detail provided the major guidance which made the completion of this study possible. I would be remiss if I did not recognize the support of my wonderful wife Melissa Thomas during this period. In addition to moral and financial support, she traveled with me during data collection and even took some pictures that were used in this study. iii Acknowledgements reflect the views of the author and are not endorsed by committee members or Oklahoma State University. Name: SEAN V THOMAS Date of Degree: DECEMBER, 2015 Title of Study: MONUMENTAL DISCOURSE: THE NARRATIVES ON DISPLAY AT STONE MOUNTAIN PARK, GEORGIA Major Field: GEOGRAPHY Abstract: While the desire to memorialize the past is quite common, the motivations behind many memorials are not necessarily self-evident. Often — whether intentional or not — the memorialization of the past is a platform for the creation of collective identity, and frequently these arise out of conflicting identities and sometimes even racism.
    [Show full text]
  • The Incongruous Intersection of the Black Panther Party and the Ku Klux Klan
    The Incongruous Intersection of the Black Panther Party and the Ku Klux Klan Angela A. Allen-Bell CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1157 I. JUXTAPOSITION OF THE KKK & THE BPP ...................................... 1160 A. Formation & Geographical Presence ........................................ 1160 B. Mission & Objectives ................................................................. 1169 C. Group Identity ............................................................................ 1172 D. Fulfillment of Organizational Goals .......................................... 1174 E. Law, the Legal Process & Law Enforcement ............................. 1179 F. Public Appeal ............................................................................ 1188 II. ASSESSMENT................................................................................... 1192 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 1195 INTRODUCTION When, in 2015, a Louisiana prison warden publically likened the Black Panther Party to the Ku Klux Klan, I was stunned.1 The differ- Associate Professor of Legal Writing & Analysis, Southern University Law Center; J.D., Southern University Law Center, 1998. The author is quite honored to have been afforded this forum to ex- plore this topic, which the author believes has the potential to lend to tremendous social and restora- tive justice advances, as well as one that could enhance cultural competency
    [Show full text]