STRATEGIC TRENDS 2014 Key Developments in Global Affairs

Center for Security Studies

Editors: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe

Series Editor: Andreas Wenger Authors: Lisa Watanabe, Jonas Grätz, Michael Haas, Prem Mahadevan, Martin Zapfe

CSS ETH Zurich STRATEGIC TRENDS 2014 is also electronically available at: www.css.ethz.ch/strategictrends

Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2014: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger

Contact: Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland

This publication covers events up to 28 February 2014.

All images © by Reuters (except p. 65, © by US Navy / MC Scott Barnes)

ISSN 1664-0667 ISBN 978-3-905696-43-1 CHAPTER 3 The ‘talibanization’ of insurgency Prem Mahadevan

As Western troops continue their withdrawal from Afghanistan, the stage is being set for the emulation of Taliban insurgent tactics elsewhere. Having tested the limits of Western military power, radical Islamists are encouraged by the proposition that persistent subversion, coupled with steady attrition through direct and indirect combat – the latter primarily involv- ing improvised explosive devices – shall exhaust the West into strategic retreat. Although no insurgent group has the capacity to prevent the entry of Western forces into a combat theatre, denying such forces the tactical ability to operate freely shall grow easier.

A member of the US Army’s 52nd Ordnance Group prepares confiscated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for detonation near Combat Outpost Hutal in Maiwand District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, 21 January 2013

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The withdrawal of International insurgency since 2001 has proven Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that even a non-state actor can pur- troops from Afghanistan will sue the modest goal of area denial have important implications for against vastly superior conventional the military credibility of the armed forces, via asymmetric war- North Atlantic Treaty Organi- fare. Even if Western troops enter an zation, as well as the European insurgency-affected region, they can Union’s political authority in the be deprived of the freedom to operate developing world. As far as radical at will within it. Islamists are concerned, Western power is diminishing. For them and their Although the Taliban model of insur- supporters, proof of this decline can gency has yet to be exactly replicated already be seen in Iraq, where more in other contexts, some aspects can than a decade of counterinsurgency already be noticed elsewhere. Suicide has brought no lasting result. Rather, bombings in Mali, ‘swarming’ assaults Al-Qaida-linked militants have seized in Iraq and the tactical innovativeness control of some of Iraq’s most impor- of jihadist groups in Syria all point to tant cities, such as Fallujah and Rama- battlefield lessons being transmitted di, which were bitterly fought over by along a knowledge chain originating US troops less than a decade ago. in Afghanistan. The operators of this chain might be Al-Qaida or its affili- As Michael Haas notes in the next ates, or even the Taliban themselves. chapter, the development of anti-ac- For over the last decade, the insur- cess/area denial doctrines has reached gents in Afghanistan have developed an unprecedented level of intensity in a distinctly pan-Islamist worldview, many non-Western countries. These partly out of a desire to mobilize re- states are trying to ensure that the sources from the wider Arab and Is- world’s preeminent military power, lamic community against Western the United States, cannot interfere troops in Afghanistan. with their regional agendas. The same applies to non-state actors, which are This chapter will highlight the main now likely to learn from the Afghani- characteristics of ‘talibanized’ insur- stan example. The Taliban could not gency. In so doing, it will provide a prevent US forces from entering Af- checklist of tactics and techniques ghanistan in 2001; they had (and still that Western militaries will have to have) no capability for implementing watch for in the future, when operat- an anti-access strategy. However, their ing overseas against Islamist guerrillas.

50 The ‘Talibaniza tion’ of I nsurgency

Beginning with the strategic develop- retained a surprising degree of stra- ments that allowed the Taliban to re- tegic coherence. Therein lies the first cover from the overthrow of their re- clue to its success: the existence of a gime in 2001, the chapter will examine layered organization that functions as the innovative methods by which the a loose network while preserving the Taliban have enhanced their military, unity of purpose that comes with hi- psychological and economic clout and erarchical structures. Any insurgent illustrate how other groups are copying leader who was co-opted by the West these methods. Finally, the chapter will or the Afghan government was swiftly offer some reflections on what theISAF labelled a renegade and deprived of withdrawal might signify for Western the credibility that would have cre- military interventions elsewhere. ated a split in the insurgent movement. Throughout, the power centre Strategic development of of the insurgency lay in its leadership’s talibanization continuing close ties with Pakistani The Taliban insurgency has been a intelligence, and the strategic advice tactically decentralized affair that has it seems to have received therefrom.

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Western analysts have noted that the During this period, other Taliban Taliban have long had an innate un- forces kept Afghan and ISAF troops derstanding of guerrilla tactics at the preoccupied along the international field level, based on the accumulated boundary with low-level irritants wisdom of three decades of civil war such as rocket fire and shallow pene- in Afghanistan. However, in strategic tration raids. Distracted from the Af- terms the insurgency of 2002 – 14 was ghan interior, and subjected to a pol- markedly different from any kind of icy downgrade back home caused by campaign that the Taliban had ever preoccupation with the war in Iraq, waged before. This has given rise to ISAF units were unable to organize speculation that after 2001 the Tali- for counterinsurgency. ban leadership was following a blue- print for Maoist-style protracted war- Airpower was a powerful tool for both fare, provided by extraneous actors. Its sides, but in very different ways.ISAF own leadership showed no particular used it to great effect while carrying gift of generalship either before or out area dominance missions and de- during the 2001 invasion by US forc- capitation strikes. The Taliban used it es, thus raising the question of how to showcase the ‘foreignness’ of their Taliban leaders could have had the vi- enemy and discredit the country’s pro- sion to organize a long-term resistance Western leadership for not resisting movement. the use of vastly superior force against Afghan civilians. Thus, the operation- Calibrating operations with subversion al contribution of airpower in sup- Evidence of such a capacity for long- port of ISAF offensives was balanced term planning has increasingly come out by the psychological boost that it to light. It is known that the Taliban gave the insurgent recruiting appara- spent the years 2002 – 05 infiltrating tus, largely because the insurgents did large numbers of cadres into Afghani- not have any ability to compete with stan, from safe havens in Pakistan. this instrument. Since they could not These cadres, some crossing the inter- be blamed for civilian lives lost in air- national boundary in groups of 100 or strikes, the Taliban used airpower (or more, avoided carrying out the large- rather, the lack of it) to justify their scale attacks which were well within own resort to terrorist tactics. their means. Instead, they focused on quietly subverting the populations of Fusing terrorism and insurgency remote rural areas, which could serve Talibanized insurgency combines tac- as bases for the coming insurgency. tics of terrorism and guerrilla warfare.

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Thus, insurgents in Afghanistan have Keeping an eye on the prospect of developed an operational model that eventually returning to power, the is resistant to ‘conventional’ counter- Taliban have avoided resorting to insurgent measures such as winning methods which would lose them hearts and minds among local popu- popular support within their already lations. Unless first provided with se- finite, Pashtun-centric power base. curity, few rural communities will be Thus, they have not carried out fre- willing to cooperate against the insur- quent rocket attacks on population gents. Yet blanket security coverage centres, as the Afghan mujahideen cannot be extended throughout the did during the 1980s and the subse- countryside, due to the need to pro- quent civil war. In areas where they tect infrastructural targets, particularly have a strong support infrastructure, in a rugged landscape where connec- they have provided advance warning tivity is poor. to the population before launching attacks on ISAF troops. This allows Counterinsurgent commanders are the locals to escape military retribu- then caught up in the dilemma of how tion and bolsters the Taliban’s image best to use their limited forces effi- as a people-friendly force. However, ciently. Both politically and doctrinal- in areas where the ISAF presence is ly, Western militaries are better suited stronger and popular support for the to short-duration counterterrorism insurgency is not as pronounced, the missions than long-duration counter- insurgents have been happy to carry insurgency, with its attendant task of out provocative attacks. They hope state-building. Force structures differ that by doing so, they can engineer dramatically between the two types a security backlash that would fall of mission. Counterterrorism requires upon the locals, who would then ei- the use of stand-off firing platforms ther support the insurgency or at least and lightly equipped helicopter-mo- suffer for not having done so. bile special operations troops. Coun- terinsurgency requires an extensive Exploiting local tensions on-ground infantry deployment and The Taliban have been especially sustained investment in community shrewd in identifying local faultlines liaison and trust-building through and grievance narratives, which they civic action. It also has a strong civil- can capitalize on for recruitment. In ian component, in the form of both remote villages, they begin the pro- developmental work and political cess of subversion by approaching negotiation. influential community leaders. The

53 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2014 insurgents have a good idea of who assassinated key individuals in order to these individuals are, thanks to cells weaken the constituency that they rep- of ‘spotters’. If the community leaders resent. Thus, the killing of the Pashtun do not respond favourably, the Taliban leader Hamid Karzai’s half-brother in simply go around them and appeal di- 2011 weakened the Karzai clan, while rectly to village youth. Another recruit- that of Burhanuddin Rabbani, a for- ment tool is the insurgents’ shadow jus- mer Afghan president, weakened the tice system. In southern Afghanistan, Jamaat-e-Islami. Both political group- which is the Taliban heartland, they ings could have stood in the way of the have installed non-local judges who ar- Taliban’s ambitions to capture power bitrate on disputes. The rulings handed in the central government once the out are backstopped by the clear threat ISAF withdrawal is complete. of violence for non-compliance. Given the slow pace of the government ju- The Taliban as a proliferator of dicial system, it is unsurprising that tactical innovations many Afghans perceive Taliban courts There is, as yet, no combat theatre as a better alternative. In this way, the where the talibanized style of insur- Taliban can claim that they are already gency has been imported in its entire- governing large parts of the country ty as a composite model. However, and therefore cannot be excluded from elements of this style have surfaced in political office in the event of a negoti- regions across the world where radi- ated settlement to the conflict. cal Islamists are active. Often, there is a direct link with Afghanistan, in In areas where they have neither a sup- the form of transnational jihadist port infrastructure nor scope for arbi- networks forged by Al-Qaida. The trating local disputes, the Taliban use Taliban themselves have contributed assassination as an instrument to shape to the formation of these networks: power dynamics. They kill a govern- Over the past decade, from being a ment official, triggering a war of suc- purely local movement, the insur- cession among various tribes who all gents have evolved into a success story vie to get their own candidate appoint- of the global jihadist community for ed to the vacant post. In the process, having stood firm against Western the Taliban offer their services to one of forces. The Taliban have learnt to ap- the factions, thereby introducing them- preciate the value of Arab support in selves into a political landscape from particular, since it has enhanced their which they had previously been ex- military effectiveness by opening new cluded. On other occasions, they have channels of funding and skill-sharing.

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IEDs begin to fundamentally as little as $ 265 apiece. TheUS gov- influence war costs ernment, in contrast, spent $ 18 bil- The most potent weapon wielded by lion on designing and manufacturing the Taliban has been the improvised bomb-detection equipment. There explosive device (IED). In previous have been further costs, amounting conflicts, IEDs were a means of tac- to $ 45 billion in mine-proof vehicles. tical attrition. With the recent insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, they This double asymmetry skewers the have transformed into instruments cost-benefit ratio of waging counter- of strategic coercion. Their usage is insurgency far from Western borders, characterized by a double asymmetry with all the attendant difficulties of which works in favour of insurgents arranging force logistics overseas. and terrorist groups. First, the time re- Governments are not keen to bear the quired to develop new IED designs is expense of fighting technologically- less than the time required to develop advanced guerrillas. Insurgents on countermeasures. The pace of technol- the other hand have few inhibitions ogy change thus allows insurgents to about projecting their power through dictate the pace of operational activity, foreign training missions: As early as since military commanders are com- 1991, Hizbollah operatives taught pelled to focus on force protection un- Al-Qaida how to assemble large ve- til counter-IED systems become avail- hicle-borne IEDs. Al-Qaida eagerly able. Second, there is an asymmetry absorbed these lessons because it of costs: Afghan IEDs can be built for wanted to emulate Hizbollah’s area

55 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2014 denial success in driving out US and upon. Although the first such bomb- French military forces from Lebanon ing occurred in May 2003, it was in the 1980s – a feat that Osama bin not until 2006 that suicide attacks Laden was determined to surpass in became a regular feature of Tali- his own fight with the West. Likewise, ban operations. The attitudinal shift the Taliban acquired their compe- occurred because Iraqi insurgent tence in IED-manufacturing through trainers, based on their own experi- knowledge transfer from Iraqi jihadist ence of combat against US troops, trainers in 2004 – 05. advised the Taliban that regular use of this tactic would help in eliminating There is little reason to believe that the focal points of Western counter- the insurgents in Afghanistan, having insurgency efforts. benefited from foreign assistance, will not now engage in skill-sharing them- Despite being initially reluctant to selves, and arm jihadist groups else- break the Islamic taboo against sui- where with the technical knowledge cide, Afghan insurgents were even- to mass-produce anti-personnel and tually won over by operational logic. anti-vehicle mines. The Taliban have Assassinations which had previously already demonstrated the capacity to been difficult to carry out became build 8000 IEDs annually, or a little easy; in just one year (2005 – 06), suc- more than 22 per day. This is more cess rates shot up from 40 % to 85 %. than the British army faced in over 30 Initially sourced from among foreign years of insurgency in Northern Ire- militants fighting in Afghanistan, sui- land, where the IED first made its ap- cide bombers were soon coming from pearance as a tool of guerrilla warfare communities who had suffered from in the early 1970s. ISAF counterinsurgency operations. Not content with just this source of Cultural norms no barrier to recruits, the Taliban also abducted adaptation children from remote areas and in- Sceptics may argue that cultural differ- doctrinated them for suicide attacks. ences will limit the widespread emu- Knowing that women and children lation of Taliban-style IED attacks in are less likely to be screened at securi- other theatres. The historical record ty checkpoints, the Taliban have used is not promising in this regard. Tradi- girls as young as eight years as human tionally, Afghan Islam has been more bombs. In a similar vein, they have tribalist than fundamentalist. Suicide pioneered the use of ‘turban bombs’. bombing in particular was frowned Many Afghan men wear turbans and

56 The ‘Talibaniza tion’ of I nsurgency consider it an insult if asked to remove been noticeable as a result of advice these for security screening. Through received from foreign militants. The experimenting with such tactics, the appearance of suicide bombings tar- Taliban have found that breaking so- geted at peacekeeping forces in Mali cietal norms and resorting to under- is an example. hand methods of attack (even by local standards) pays handsome military Strategic communication as part dividends that offset the cost to their of the battlespace public image. Another field in which the insurgents have been surprisingly adept Since 2007, it appears that Chechen is propaganda, or what is known as militants have made the same discov- ‘strategic communication’. Aimed at ery in the South Caucasus. The so- influencing perceptions that are held called ‘Caucasus Emirate’, a network by the adversary as well as neutral ob- of local jihadists with pronounced servers, strategic communication is sympathy for Al-Qaida, has carried a tool used to wear down the adver- out an unrelenting war of attrition sary’s morale and raise doubts about against Russian security forces and ci- the legitimacy of his cause. The war vilians. Unlike the early Chechen sep- in Afghanistan has seen this tool be- aratists of the 1990s, these jihadists do coming ever more potent. For a group not care about international opinion. whose ideological slant once opposed They are not interested in appealing digital entertainment, the Taliban to the out-groups that they are fight- have had few qualms about waging ing, but only in winning the respect digital insurgency. Radio broadcasts of their relatively small in-group. As a and DVDs of the insurgents’ recruit- result, since 2009 they have been car- ers delivering fiery sermons are widely rying out provocative attacks on soft accessible in Afghanistan. The Tali- targets, in part because they are com- ban even operate websites expound- peting alongside regional franchises ing on their vision of an Islamic state. of Al-Qaida to attract fresh funding Knowing that doctrinaire ideas about and volunteers from the global jihad- banning female education would not ist community. Jihadists in Syria and go down well with the populace, the Mali currently have an edge in the insurgents have moderated their rhet- race for resources. Since these are ‘new’ oric. They now claim to have no ob- conflict areas – the jihadist equivalent jection to girls’ schooling, but oppose of emerging markets – improvisation the ‘Westernization’ of school curric- of weaponry and especially IEDs has ula and mixed-gender classes. These

57 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2014 are issues that most Afghans find no The insurgents can plant a story in quarrel with. the Western media within an hour of a newsworthy incident occurring. Most impressive of all has been the in- In contrast, ISAF and Afghan spokes- surgents’ ability to shape perceptions men almost never possess the full facts of the actual conduct of operations on at short notice. This breeds a crisis of the ground, and the results achieved. credibility and confidence as far as Contrary to notions of the group’s larger audiences are concerned, since strong motivation levels, evidence they extrapolate the military situation from the field suggests that violent co- based on the public relations perfor- ercion plays a part in driving Taliban mance of government officials. fighters into battle. Insurgent camp- sites raided by ISAF have yielded signs The Taliban can also provide sub- of drug use, in the form of used syring- versive entertainment, in the form es, while defectors have spoken about of social media duels with NATO fratricidal killings as a result of harsh spokesmen. Though amusing to read, discipline. Analysis of the insurgency’s the exchanges serve to equate the in- micro-politics reveals a fragmented surgents with the Western forces who structure, with considerable autono- are fighting them. Every propaganda my being granted to subordinate com- point made by the latter is swiftly met manders. Yet none of this has dispelled with a riposte from the Taliban, thus the notion that the Taliban are a rigid- weakening the overall impression of ly hierarchical entity with the capabil- progress that is crucial to maintaining ity to significantly influence violence public support for counterinsurgen- levels in Afghanistan. This ability to cy. In this regard, the Somali group appear far more motivated and capa- Al-Shabaab seems to be copying the ble than they really are has been a key Taliban. During its September 2013 component of the insurgents’ psycho- attack on the Westgate Mall in Nai- logical warfare campaign. robi, Al-Shabaab kept up a running commentary via Twitter. Seeking to Several commentators have remarked ridicule the Kenyan government, on the speed with which the Taliban the group was successful in creating contacts the international media and a widespread impression of tactical disseminates its own version of a story, incompetence on the part of Kenyan leaving ISAF and Afghan government security forces. Interestingly, both the forces with the burden of establishing Taliban and Al-Shabaab seem to have the actual facts and issuing a rebuttal. begun using Twitter as an instrument

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Social Media warfare ISAF and Taliban, Afghanistan Al-Shabaab, Kenya/Somalia

of psychological warfare at exactly the Initially the Taliban targeted heavy ve- same time, in September 2011. hicles, hoping that such attacks would cause more casualties. Subsequently Complex ambushes despite Western they shifted to smaller IEDs, which air supremacy were intended only for use against Western militaries are reliant on air- foot patrols. By doing this they nulli- power when operating overseas. This fied the counterinsurgency policy be- is both an asset and a liability. On the ing employed by Western units, that one hand, airpower provides a supply of trying to build good relations with lifeline as well as badly-needed fire Afghan villagers through directly en- support during combat engagements. gaging with them. Anti-infantry IEDs On the other, its importance to the ensured that patrols avoided staying effectiveness of counterinsurgency in any one locality long enough to be makes guerrillas highly adaptive to the ambushed. In the process, villagers threat it poses. This has been seen in understood the larger message: West- Afghanistan, where the Taliban have ern soldiers were worried for their own learnt to live with the limitations that safety, and could not be counted on to hostile airpower usage poses to their provide protection against the insur- operations in a relatively open, arid re- gents for any length of time. Many vil- gion. Other insurgent groups will not lages thus avoided sharing intelligence be far behind in learning that Western with ISAF troops, and some even airpower threats can indeed be cir- prepared to reach an accommodation cumvented, even as attacks on ground with the insurgents, as and when the forces continue unabated. ISAF would eventually leave.

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During this phase (2007 – 09) West- which had often been exploited in the ern forces still maintained a high rate past by Western signals intelligence of operational activity, compelling the capability – was better maintained insurgents to do battle whenever they while on the move. As a precaution were discovered. In one 14-month against bombardment, the insurgents period, 3000 engagements took place learned to water down the ground, between the Taliban and security to prevent dust from being kicked forces in just two provinces of south- whenever a mortar was used and ern Afghanistan, while another 1300 thereby giving away their location. occurred in the east. During these They also showed good fire control, engagements the Taliban would con- launching RPGs in coordinated at- centrate fire onto the enemy’s com- tacks from different directions onto munications equipment and heavy individual targets. Their fields of fire weaponry. The insurgents had learned interlocked, with machine guns being from experience how long it took used to continuously suppress targets ISAF airpower to deploy in support of even as mortar and RPG teams set up ground forces, and tried to ensure that new firing positions.RPG s were used they could break off contact before to disable armoured vehicles rather it arrived. Recently, French troops in than destroy them outright, since the Mali recovered documents suggesting crew members became vulnerable to that the lessons learnt by the Taliban small arms fire in any case when they are being disseminated widely to other attempted to exit the vehicle. Irriga- jihadist groups. The documents cap- tion ditches were a favourite firing tured in Mali included an exhaustive position for Taliban machine gun and list of suggestions for avoiding contact mortar teams, since they provided with Western air forces, and focused effective cover while manoeuvring especially on the risk of drone strikes. away from an essentially road-bound enemy. Given the similarities between The tactical sophistication of Tali- Afghanistan and the tactical topogra- ban operations increased in 2009. phy of Mali – large arid expanses with The guerrillas fought pitched bat- scattered communities – French and tles in which they used mortars to United Nations forces might expect to get foreign troops to take cover, and encounter similar tactics in the future. then hit them with rocket-propelled The fact that jihadists in North Af- grenades (RPGs) and automatic fire. rica openly fight under the Al-Qaida Firing positions were changed often. franchise suggests that if and when Radio discipline – a key weakness Al-Qaida’s core leadership acquires a

60 The ‘Talibaniza tion’ of I nsurgency safe haven in post-ISAF Afghanistan, ‘sleeper’ agents remain dormant for the fallout will not be long in appear- months, learning weapon drills and ing across other conflict zones where winning the trust of their colleagues, Islamist insurgencies are being waged. before carrying out surprise attacks, usually in the form of shooting ram- Tactical deception and pages. ISAF troops have been badly counterintelligence hit by such encounters, which under- Insurgencies are, to a large degree, a standably lead to tensions between game of intelligence and counterin- the Afghan and foreign troops and telligence. The Taliban have shown greatly reduce their ability to operate a strong understanding of Western jointly. Considering that much of the counterintelligence techniques, using Western effort in counterinsurgency this to plan attacks that leave a small campaigns consists of local capacity- logistical footprint. With few leads to building, the risk of insider attacks follow, investigators have difficulty in in other combat threats is only likely identifying the persons behind a terror- to grow. European training missions ist incident in an urban area. The attack in northern and central Africa, if de- methods used by the insurgents are: ployed for any length of time, could cross-networking (deploying cadres be especially vulnerable to such at- from multiple area commands, or tacks unless strict personnel vetting even loaned from other militias) and standards are maintained for recruits suicidal assaults conducted in security to the local police and military. forces uniforms. Organized crime as a funding source The Taliban have been helped by Talibanized insurgency is a lucrative the virtually non-existent capabil- business opportunity for criminal en- ity of Afghan officialdom to regulate trepreneurs. Anecdotal evidence sug- the manufacture and sale of security gests that insurgents in Afghanistan forces uniforms. On numerous occa- cooperate with the private armies of sions, insurgents have used police and drug lords. Besides taxing the drug army uniforms to attack protected lo- trade, in the form of extracting hard cations or otherwise engage in ‘black’ cash and/or material goods such as operations – killing civilians and at- vehicles, the insurgents offer physical tributing responsibility to the security protection for drug convoys. On oc- forces. In yet another ploy, they have casion, they have even been suspected infiltrated sympathizers into the secu- of staging attacks to draw away se- rity forces as bona fide recruits. These curity forces’ attention from border

61 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2014 crossing points where traffickers were happy to do this. Meanwhile, the moving drugs. If these reports are ac- destruction of opium farms in gov- curate, the personnel losses suffered by ernment-controlled territory had the the Taliban would still be worthwhile. unforeseen side-effect of driving up Although authoritative estimates are prices in territory controlled by the impossible to come by, it has been Taliban, thus strengthening the insur- speculated that the Taliban receive gency’s financial base. In recognition about 40 % of their funding from the of their mistake, ISAF commanders Afghan drug trade. thereafter attempted to pursue the traffickers directly. However, almost ISAF and Afghan government efforts all trafficking syndicates had a meas- to curtail the trade have backfired. ure of local government protection, in First, opium eradication was seen as some cases extending to the authori- an assault on the already impoverished ties in Kabul. Afghan peasantry. The Taliban were quick to offer monetary support to Besides drugs, the Taliban also gener- affected farmers, asking in return that ate revenue by extortion. Shopkeep- they assist the insurgency. Many were ers are expected to pay 10 % of their earnings to the insurgents, while trucks plying the national highways have to pay ‘road taxes’. Since Af- ghan security forces also engage in such practices, which are blatantly illegal, the Taliban are not perceived any worse than the police as far as economic predation goes. Rather, the relatively disciplined manner of their cadres generates a favourable impression upon most Afghans.

The criminal dimension makes Tali- ban-style insurgency more resilient to action by security forces. It may also make insurgent factions more volatile and prone to competitive extremes of violence. The January 2013 assault upon a gas field in Algeria was partly

62 The ‘Talibaniza tion’ of I nsurgency caused by a disagreement over the divi- from entering their territory, prevent- sion of proceeds from cigarette smug- ing such an army from operating free- gling. A local commander, upon be- ly is an easier task. Anti-access would ing accused of paying more attention not be a threat to Western force pro- to his personal racketeering business jection efforts in such a scenario, but than to waging jihad, decided to prove area denial very likely would be. his critics wrong by carrying out a major terrorist attack on Western workers Given that Western militaries are be- at the gas field. In a slightly different ing forced to economize, it is safe to vein, drug cartels in Mexico have be- suggest that talibanized insurgency come far more violent as a result of offers a model that other Islamist combat skills introduced by deserters guerrillas would study carefully. There from the Mexican army and police. are already worrying signs in Mali, Lured by salaries that are twelve times where the initial success of French higher than what they could earn in military intervention bears some re- government service, many combat semblance to the immediate after- specialists have joined the drug cartels math of the 2001 Afghanistan inva- as mercenaries, ratcheting up violence sion. Instead of staying to fight, the levels in gang warfare. It is interest- bulk of the Malian rebels have scat- ing to note that certain Mexican drug tered to cross-border sanctuaries in lords have been openly compared to Libya and Chad. If they now build up the Taliban, due to their penchant for a capability for political subversion, mutilating and beheading victims and using the highly organized, Maoist- displaying the severed body parts in like strategy developed by the Tali- public spaces. ban, the Malian rebels could eventually hope to regain much of what they Curtailing Western interventionism have lost. The Taliban are already get- The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan ting close to doing so, despite having has managed to withstand the best fought a numerically much stronger prescriptions of counterinsurgency force than has so far been deployed in theory and practice. Its resilience has North Africa. With the French mili- encouraged other jihadist movements tary component being downsized and elsewhere in the world in the belief United Nations peacekeeping troops that Western military forces can be de- currently functioning at half their feated over time. Although there exist sanctioned strength, the operational no insurgent groups with the capac- environment in Mali is favourable to ity to prevent a modern Western army a Taliban-style insurgency.

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History shows that international ter- decade of unsuccessful efforts to re- rorism received a major boost follow- shape attitudes and societies in re- ing the US withdrawal from Vietnam. gions where Islamist insurgencies are A belief that strong military powers active, Western societies have grown can be humbled through terrorist tac- more preoccupied with domestic af- tics runs through much of Al-Qaida’s fairs and have little appetite for sus- ideological and operational thinking. tained foreign interventions. Know- With the war in Afghanistan now ing this, insurgent leaders are likely close to ending on less than favour- to continue waging regional conflict able terms for the West, it is necessary without concern for Western military to anticipate the fallout that this con- power. In short, the West may leave flict could have upon other regions in Afghanistan, but Afghanistan will the developing world, where Western not leave the West for several years to interests are threatened. Following a come.