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Politics of Talibanization in Pakistan Abasyn Journal of Social Sciences Politics of Talibanization in Pakistan Abasyn Journal of Social Sciences. Vol.3 No.2 Politics of Talibanization in Pakistan Hasan Akbar*† General End of the Cold War proved all the assumptions about the nature of the emerging international system proved wrong. Neither there was a “Clash of Civilization” nor an “End of History”. Sketch drawn by the political analysts about the future of international political system was based on their individual views. A key factor was ignored that henceforth international political system would be shaped by the world’s sole superpower. Thucydides said that power expands in the absence of a countervailing power. As it is the behaviour of every superpower that it wants to perpetuate its grip over the globe and take measures to contain the emergence of any other power. The 9/11 event was not an ordinary one. It inflicted severe damage to the centres of US economic, political and military power. Long and clandestine planning of the attacks forced many to wonder, whether it was an opportunity given by the terrorists or created by US itself to pursue its hegemonic ambitions. The US legitimized its expedition for power under the veil of Global War on Terror (GWOT). Al-Qaeda was formed during Afghan war in 1980s. With the passage of time it expanded its operational capabilities and network throughout the world. The 9/11 attack was not the first attempt by the Al-Qaeda to inflict damage on American interests but indeed it was a successful and vital * Hasan Akbar, MSC, Department of International Relations, National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad. E-mail: [email protected] 243 Politics of Talibanization in Pakistan Abasyn Journal of Social Sciences. Vol.3 No.2 blow. It is unimaginable that such an act of terrorism plotted by Al-Qaeda did not come in the knowledge of CIA. The US with a mammoth military budget which accounts 80% of the world’s total military budget, was unable to dig out the conspiracy. After the declaration of GWOT, US ambitions were miscalculated and misinterpreted by Pakistanis. Afghanistan was not the only abode of Taliban and Al-Qaeda. During the Afghan jihad Pakistan fully supported the Mujahideen. Even after the Afghan jihad these Mujahideen were used by Pakistan as a tool to further its interest in the region. Reportedly Pakistan’s military intelligence had relations with the high profile leadership of Taliban. All these facts were open secret. The only thing which saved Pakistan from the initial anger of US was its nuclear capability and geographical importance. After nine years of war Pakistan’s status is transforming from an ally to a target. Approximately 40 percent of supplies come from Pakistan for coalition forces operating in Afghanistan (“Pakistan reopen supply route for NATO forces,” 2010). It was clear that US cannot overtly extend the GWOT to Pakistan’s borders. GWOT and Challenges to US The GWOT is a manifestation of US hegemonic ambitions in the world. War initiated on the plea that the Taliban government, nurtured by US in the Cold War, is providing safe haven to the Al-Qaeda cadres. Primary objective of the US in this war is to destroy Al-Qaeda and Taliban. 9/11 attacks provoked US as never before. The Bush administration put a lot of pressure on Musharaf regime; as a result Pakistan offered its unequivocal support to US after 9/11 attacks. US took arms against the enemy (Taliban 244 Politics of Talibanization in Pakistan Abasyn Journal of Social Sciences. Vol.3 No.2 and Al-Qaeda) which heretofore it has praised on dismantling Communist Soviet. Trans-border Movement of Mujahideen: Border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is divided by the Durand line. There are Pashtun tribes living on both sides of the border. Movement on this border is unchecked and free. People living on the both sides of the border are tied together with kinship, marital relations and above all with the thread of Pashtun nationalism and concept of Muslim brotherhood. Therefore, territorial division did not affect them much. These Pashtuns resisted the British Army and the Red Army so there is an inherited animosity among them for the Westerners or the so-called “farangi”. The region which is administered by the federal government of Pakistan and is known as Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), provided much of the manpower and training facilities during the Afghan Jihad. When the US invaded Afghanistan it was clear that Taliban would receive support from the insurgents coming from Pakistan. These insurgents could be the veterans of Afghan Jihad concentrated in refugee camps of Pakistan, foreigners living in tribal areas, students of Pakistani madrassahs or the tribal Pashtuns. Pakistan was considered incompetent to stop the movement of these insurgents either due to its administrative weaknesses or for political purposes. Pakistan has the same perception of US presence in Afghanistan as it had of Soviet presence in Afghanistan during Cold War. This situation led to the establishment of new priorities in US strategy, first, to stop all the physical support coming to help the Taliban, from Pakistani side, second, to restrict cross border movement of Taliban and Al-Qaeda cadres and third, to curb Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda must not be allowed to settle in FATA and carryout its terrorist activities. Pressure was 245 Politics of Talibanization in Pakistan Abasyn Journal of Social Sciences. Vol.3 No.2 exerted on Pakistan to stop the movement of the Taliban on Durand line. The US provided video evidences, showing the movement of Taliban from Afghanistan to FATA. It is questionable that drone attacks in FATA are rampantly carried out by US but when it comes to trans-border movement of Taliban, US instead of taking tangible actions to restrain movement, rely on evidence and a consistent demand from Pakistan to do more. Detachment of Pakistan Army: Beside Pakistan’s pledge to provide maximum support in GWOT, it refused to become a part of the Allied military campaign. Since 9/11, it was the top priority of US to crush Al- Qaeda and exterminate Taliban. To eliminate Al-Qaeda and Taliban it was necessary to crush them from both sides i.e. from Afghanistan by NATO forces and from Pakistan’s tribal region by Pakistan Army. A porous border provided the notorious elements to inflict damage on Allies and find safe havens in FATA. Although through tacit consent of Pakistan, US is carrying drone attacks but the results are not much fruitful as it would have been if there was a full fledge military operation (Murphy, 2009). Question was how to involve the Pakistan military in the ongoing GWOT. There were no such movements as Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e- Muhammadi (TNSM) or one carried out by Lal Masjid’s clerics or Pakistani Taliban before 2005. Even when animosity against US was at peak after the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, nothing stirred the mullahs in Pakistan to raise weapons against their own country. But suddenly after 2005, TTP emerged and Pakistan was hit by a wave of suicide blasts and terrorist attacks. Security agencies, especially army and the police, were the main targets of these blasts. Analysts consider the possibility of US intelligence plot behind the creation of TTP to provoke the Pakistan to launch a full scale operation in Waziristan in general and delink its sympathy to Taliban in Afghanistan in particular (Javed, 2010). These 246 Politics of Talibanization in Pakistan Abasyn Journal of Social Sciences. Vol.3 No.2 suspicions about US behaviour are further strengthened by the fact that while Pakistan army was initiating a military operation against militants in South Waziristan in 2009, the US forces vacated eight check posts from the other side of the border. Evacuation allowed Taliban to move into Pakistan from Afghanistan and fight against Pakistan’s Army (Quddsia, 2009). Instead of bolstering the Pakistan’s efforts, US provided a safe passage to the Taliban. Concerns of Pakistani Government: India and Pakistan have competing strategic agendas in Afghanistan over the last seven decades. Pakistan enjoyed cordial relations with the Taliban government and its western border was safe as it was never before in history. After 9/11 Pakistan was forced to take a u-turn on its Afghanistan policy on the face of US ultimatum- Either you are with us or against us. Once US entered into Afghanistan things changed for Pakistan. Indian involvement increased in Afghanistan. In this situation Pakistan had to defend its own interest rather than pursuing that of US. Pakistan sees Afghanistan as part of a threatening Indian movement, to fuel Pashtun separatism inside Pakistan. According to Richard Holbrooke: “Afghanistan is a classic power vacuum; neighbours see it as point of instability to guarantee their own stability or an opportunity to score points.” US Goals 1. Spoiling the Image of Taliban: The Taliban were regarded with great respect after they had successfully established a just society. It was thought at that time that Muslims would lend support to the Taliban because of their religiosity. These sentiments were more pervasive in Pakistani 247 Politics of Talibanization in Pakistan Abasyn Journal of Social Sciences. Vol.3 No.2 society than any other Muslim country. The US objective was to spoil the image of Taliban. The policy of US, in this regard, was to make the Pakistanis think as all the people of the world are thinking about the Taliban. Talibanization in Pakistan will change the public opinion and would legitimize the possible operations from the NATO forces. 2. Demonization of Pakistan: Demonization of a state prior to military operation is an important aspect of psychological warfare.
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