Mencius and the Stoics - tui and oikeiôsis

Both Mencius and the Stoics think that nature, that is, xing or phusis, serves as a norm describing the way one should live, and that nature is closely allied to the concept of life, even that of the life cycle. But this simple statement masks the contours of the thinking involved, and it is the purpose of this paper to take some steps towards articulating the shape of the thought of these two forms of ethics in comparison with one another. The general question this paper approaches is the way in which ethical and natural norms relate to one another – how does the moral life relate to biological life? In each case, moral attitudes, and hence character are inscribed into the living being, and then require development until they achieve universal scope. In one of his most famous fragments, Hierocles suggests the image of concentric circles to describe this process. The image requires careful interpretation in order for it to be compared to the view in Mencius of how extension (tui, ta, chong) occurs.

The way universality is conceived in both schemes is what one may call concrete, rather than abstract. It is not based on universal rules, but on an obligation arising from concrete nature – of each agent; and this universality is affective. This may surprise, for surely the great contrast between the Stoics and Mencius should lie in the contrast between apatheia, impassivity, and bu ren zhi xin, the heart that does not bear the suffering of others (IIA6.1) pity. Yet apatheia was hotly contested within the history of Stoicism, and one can see in Hierocles the move to preserve universality within an affective model. Perception is the king’s way to virtue. And in Mencius the moral feeling and action need to be underwritten if they are to extend reliably to all. And the underwriting is done by the engagement in argument portrayed and propagated in the text, appealing to the natural growth of a heart that does not bear the suffering of others.