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A Revaluation of Tolerance and Toleration A Selective Incorporation of Classical Conceptions of Tolerance by Fritz Theo Knauff Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Magister Artium (Philosophy) in the DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY FACULTY OF HUMANITIES UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA 2016 SUPERVISOR: Professor U. Kistner September 2016 The financial assistance of the National Research Foundation (NRF) towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at, are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the NRF. © University of Pretoria A Revaluation of Tolerance and Toleration A Selective Incorporation of Classical Conceptions of Tolerance by Fritz Theo Knauff ABSTRACT This dissertation aims to revitalise and revalue a currently disregarded conceptual field of tolerance, and explores the prospect of it - and its respective practice (toleration) - satisfying Nietzsche‟s criteria of life-affirmation and flourishing. The project of revaluation undertaken within this dissertation entails an evaluative re- appraisal and a critically selective incorporation of the particular concepts of tolerance and toleration once highly esteemed during the Hellenistic period. This inquiry centres on the axiological, ethical and psychological perspectives on tolerance and toleration, whilst investigating their compatibility within a Nietzschean valuation. Considerations of a few overlapping epistemological perspectives which are apposite to the aforesaid are articulated. Including the effects on the affective and cognitive accompaniments to toleration, possible formulations of tolerance that undermine life-affirmation and flourishing are also considered from a meta-ethical perspective. In order to do so, a critical analysis of the incorporated aspects of tolerance and toleration is conducted in relation to resentment and ressentiment. The primary questions I address are: „what is it to tolerate?‟, „how would tolerance and toleration read within a Nietzschean valuation?‟, „what are the psychological - i.e. affective and cognitive - intricacies of tolerating and how do they feature in its procedure?‟, „what kinds of psychological attachment does one qua human being create in connection with the entities one tolerates?‟ and „are there possible psychological dangers regarding tolerance and toleration that a Nietzschean valuation can help identify?‟ KEY TERMS: Philosophy, Psychology, Nietzsche, Stoicism, Tolerance, Toleration, Perspectivism, Ressentiment, Ethics, Value Theory i © University of Pretoria Acknowledgements Confronted by an overwhelming uncertainty of the future, impotence towards the past, and a ceaseless investigation the ebb and flow of significance within that grand cosmic scheme, all human endeavour - including communal endeavour - seems to take on the character of absurdity. Albert Camus, one of my philosophical inspirations, believes that the only way to deal with such disorienting absurdity is to face it head-on. In other words, to face it head-on we should take heart in the fact that, at least, we are not alone in our revolt against the absurd and our toleration of fate (for „everything is redeemed and affirmed in the whole‟). Without doubt, the somewhat Sisyphusian challenge of completing a philosophical dissertation was made surmountable by the constant care and support I received from family, friends, and colleagues, besides the endurance, patience and tolerance the endeavour itself has taught me. Though the nature of writing does incline one towards solitude, I had the fortune of always being in good company. Although I cannot here mention all who played a part, I would like to extend my sincere thanks to some which have been keystones in the accomplishment of this project. First and foremost thanks must be extended to my loving mother, Ria. Without her constant support I certainly never would have succeeded. Her support of me has kept me going, and her nurturing has been an inestimable boon to my life and career. Secondly, I extend gratitude towards my grandparents, Magda and Nico, whom accommodated me both with their wisdom and lodgings over the course of this dissertation. My deep thanks also go to the person most directly responsible for bringing this project to life; my supervisor Prof. Kistner. Prof. Kistner‟s proclivity for the road less travelled, continuous feedback (often going beyond the call of duty), adventuresome attitude, linguistic adroitness, sage advice and genuine care guided me to the rarefied air of the apex. Her philosophical insight and knowledge is ensconced between the lines of this entire project. You are an indelible influence on me. ii © University of Pretoria I extend my thanks to my friends who have been there for me, as beacons of insight and intimacy. My peers and teachers in life-affirmation and meditation - some who I shall never meet beyond the threshold of paper and imagination - must also be acknowledged. Special thanks also to all my colleagues at the University of Pretoria‟s philosophy department. Your catching enthusiasm has continually kept my philos of sophia aflame. May the footnotes be as inexhaustible as perspectives. Lastly, I would like to extend my thanks to the University of Pretoria, the Faculty of Humanities, and the entire staff of the Department of Philosophy in particular. I could not have asked for an environment more conducive to philosophical enquiry, brimming as it is with sharp minds and kind hearts. iii © University of Pretoria Table of Contents Introduction ............................................................................................. 1 Chapter 1: The Emergence of Tolerance (and Toleration) ...................... 8 I: The unconventional yet undisturbed Cynics. ..................................................... 11 II: Stoical endurance in the face of fate ................................................................. 20 III: Cicero‟s equanimous embrace of tolerantia ..................................................... 29 IV: Recapitulation and Conclusion ........................................................................ 39 Chapter 2: Carving out Tolerance for a Nietzschean Valuation ............. 41 I: Tolerance and Toleration ................................................................................... 43 II: Values, Evaluation and Tolerance .................................................................... 46 III: A critical comparison of Nietzsche and the Stoics. .......................................... 49 IV: From withstanding toleration to em-bracing toleration. Nietzsche‟s Stoic progression and beyond. ...................................................................................... 71 V: Beyond Stoicism: Nietzsche‟s dose of Scepticism. .......................................... 99 VI: Recapitulation and Conclusion ...................................................................... 118 Chapter 3: The Perils of Tolerance and Toleration .............................. 121 I: Resentment ..................................................................................................... 123 II: The analgesic effects of resentful toleration ................................................... 132 III: The ressentiment of the tolerant priest and slave .......................................... 144 iv © University of Pretoria IV: Recapitulation and Conclusion: ..................................................................... 169 Conclusion .......................................................................................... 171 Bibliography ........................................................................................ 178 v © University of Pretoria Introduction Pleas for tolerance have come to the fore in the vocabulary of ethical and political discourses in the 21st century, being espoused and advocated by most normative frameworks including the UN and international conventions (Brown 2006: 12). Conversely, tolerance particularly as political discourse has been severely criticised recently for its tendencies to perpetuate irreconcilable differences in the form of subject identities, establishing the liberal West as moral hegemon, obfuscating bourgeois Protestant norms behind a facade of neutrality and legitimating intolerance of, and resentment and aggression toward non-liberal forms of politics. In acknowledgement of these criticisms, the aims of this dissertation are modest; it explores the possibility of situating tolerance within a Nietzschean valuation. Such a framework shifts the emphasis of tolerance back to the tolerating being - rather than those who ought to be tolerated or the authority advocating tolerance. More details on what this framework entails will be provided below. To conceptually distinguish between tolerance as a procedure and tolerance as theory, purpose (telos), virtue or value, I shall refer to the former as toleration. This split between the practice of toleration and the theory of tolerance is based upon Nietzsche‟s distinction between procedure and purpose1 (2007: II, 12). Nevertheless, tolerance and toleration constantly inform each other and do not necessarily follow upon each other in a linear fashion; e.g. practice as the application of theory, or practice as inspiration for theory. Instead of theory leading to practice or vice versa, taken from Foucault, “practice is a set of relays from one theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay from one practice to another” (1977: 206). That is to say,
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