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Aristotle's Theory of Actuality SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy Author : Bechler, Z

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title : Aristotle's Theory of Actuality SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy author : Bechler, Z. publisher : State University of New York Press isbn10 | asin : 0791422399 print isbn13 : 9780791422397 ebook isbn13 : 9780585046068 language : English subject Aristotle, Philosophy of nature. publication date : 1995 lcc : B491.N3B43 1995eb ddc : 113 subject : Aristotle, Philosophy of nature. cover Aristotle's Theory Of Actuality cover-0 SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy Anthony Preus, Editor cover-1 Aristotle's Theory OF Actuality Zev Bechler State University of New York Press cover-2 Published by State University of New York Press, Albany © 1995 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher. For information, address State University of New York Press, State University Plaza, Albany, N.Y., 12246 Production by Diane Ganeles Marketing by Fran Keneston Composition by Kelby Bowers, Compublishing, Cincinnati, Ohio Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bechler, Z. Aristotle's theory of actuality / Zev Bechler. p. cm.(SUNY series in ancient Greek philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7914-2239-9 (alk. paper).ISBN 0-7914-2240-2 (pbk.: alk. paper) 1. Aristotle. 2. Philosophy of nature. I. Title. II. Series. B491.N3B42 1995 185dc20 94-1045 CIP 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 cover-3 To Niza Dolav For her special friendship cover-4 Contents Acknowledgments xi Introduction: The Idea of Anti-Informationism 1. Tradition: Forms into Forces 1 2. Nonseparability and its Consequences 2 3. A Note on the Translations 4 Chapter One: Aristotle's Explanation of Natural Motion 1.1. The natural motion puzzle and the two potentialities 5 1.1.1. Soul as first actuality 6 1.1.2. The definition of motion and the aspects of the potential 8 1.1.3. The two potentials 11 1.1.4. Genuine potentiality is one with actuality 12 1.1.5. Consistency-potentials are noneffectual and nonreal 18 1.1.6. A role for consistency-potentials: Dispute with the Megarians 21 1.1.7. Plato's Forms and the nature of consistency-potential 23 1.1.8. Aristotle's principle of the priority of the actual 25 1.2. The explanation of natural motion 28 1.2.1. Is everything moved by another in Aristotle's physics? 28 1.2.2. The official interpretation and the energizer theory 30 1.2.3. The natural motion of living creatures is uncaused motion 32 1.2.4. Is "nature" the mover in the natural motion of the elements? 34 1.2.5. How can potentiality be the mover in natural motion? 36 1.2.6. Practical syllogism and the necessity of action 39 1.2.7. Desire and motion 42 cover-5 Page viii 1.2.8. The mover in natural motion is a logical mover 44 1.3. Logical causality and teleology 47 1.3.1. Form and end are logical causes 47 1.3.2. Efficient causes and logical causality 50 1.3.3. Is causal necessity really different from teleological necessity? 52 1.3.4. Hypothetical and categorical necessities are the same 53 1.3.5. Means and ends are strictly convertible 55 1.3.6. Aristotle's teleology "strictly speaking" 56 Chapter Two: Logical Causality and Priority of the Actual: Consequences and Illustrations 2.1. Coincidence, relationality and the ontology of potentiality 59 2.1.1. Coincidentality entails non-causality 59 2.1.2. Why is the coincidental necessarily causeless? 62 2.1.3. The nullity of the coincidental 63 2.1.4. Clustering, instantaneity and the relativity of the coincidental 65 2.1.5. The identity of the relative and the coincidental 68 2.1.6. Lack and the coincidental 69 2.1.7. The potentiality connection 73 2.2. The First Mover fiasco 76 2.2.1. The ontology of Met 12 76 2.2.2. Redundancy: "Why need we seek any further principles?" 77 2.2.3. Contradicting the priority of the actual 79 2.2.4. How is separate form possible? 81 2.3. Substance and causality 84 2.3.1. The unity of substance 84 2.3.2. The unity of causal action 89 2.3.3. The inconsistency of Aristotle's actualism 92 2.3.4. The notion of particular-form: A.C. Lloyd 95 2.4. Logical determinism 102 2.4.1. Plenitude and the necessity of eternal motion 102 2.4.2. The necessity of all states 104 2.4.3. Necessity into contingency 107 2.4.4. The future sea-battle: Physical indeterminism and logical 109 determinism page_viii Page ix 2.5. The continuum 112 2.5.1. The instantaneity of actualization 112 2.5.2. The nature of the infinite 116 2.5.3. Potential infinity and Zeno's Achilles 120 2.5.4. Homogeneous analysis and the impossibility of continuous change 122 2.5.5. Continuous motion and abrupt change 126 Chapter Three: Necessity, Syllogism and Scientific Knowledge 3.1. Two kinds of necessity 129 3.2. Deductive necessity and group inclusion 130 3.3. Propositional necessary truth 132 3.4. Deductive necessity and the circularity of the syllogism 134 3.5. Accepting circularity 1: Syllogistic demonstration 135 3.6. Nominalism and Aristotle's essentialism: Seeing the universal 137 3.7. Aristotle's demon: Potentiality and the scientific syllogism 141 3.8. Accepting circularity 2: Knowing that and what and why 143 3.9. Convertibility and noninformativity 146 3.10. Necessity by construction 148 3.11. Objective identity and noninformativity 151 3.12. Aristotle on noninformative questions 153 3.13. Noninformativity and error 155 3.14. Summary 157 Chapter Four: Inconsistent Potentials: The Philosophy of Mathematics 4.1. Some conditions for a philosophy of mathematics 159 4.2. The potentiality of mathematical objects 160 4.3. The puzzle of the exactness of mathematics 162 4.4. Qua and the relativity of the essence-matter distinction 164 4.5. Construction and absolute potentiality 166 4.6. Objections to a constructionist interpretation: (1) Annas 170 4.7. Objections to a constructionist interpretation: (2) Lear 171 4.8. Objections to a constructionist interpretation: (3) Hussey 175 4.9. Intelligible matter: The triangle is neither a "this," nor a triangle, nor 177 triangular 4.10. The nondenotativity of mathematics according to Aristotle's philosophy: A 179 short review 4.11. The a priority of Aristotle's philosophy of essence and mathematics 181 4.12. The formality and emptiness of mathematics according to Aristotle's 183 philosophy 4.13. The a priority of qua and the nature of mixed science 184 4.14. Aristotle's concept of universal mathematics 186 page_ix Page x Notes 190 Bibliography 231 Index of Passages 259 General Index 267 page_x Page xi Acknowledgments During the ten years in which this work has been in the making, it was continuously rewritten, expanded, and contracted. Its earliest version was read by my colleague and friend, Shabtai Unguru, and criticized in many heated discussions. I thank him for his patience and insistence on proof for everything. Special thanks go to Antony Lloyd who so freely and generously donated his time and deep scholarship to a complete stranger. His detailed criticism of the first half of the book helped me steer clear of many errors, clarify many arguments, and drastically readjust the book's perspective. Niza Dolav, my close friend and assistant during all these years, gathered (sometimes unearthed) the literature I needed, typed the infinite number of my longhand drafts and the whole book several times as it metamorphosed. She created the whole apparatus, gave the book its final look before going to the publisher, and finally proofread both galleys and the page proofs. I wouldn't have completed the book but for her devotion and determination. My wife Nira has been my daily love-support system and no words can express my gratitude to her. page_xi Page 1 Introduction: The Idea Of Anti-Informationism 1. Tradition: Forms into Forces Our traditional perception of Aristotle's philosophy of nature takes it as a kind of dynamics, a theory of forces that cause the motions of the world. This tradition interprets his concept of ''nature" by taking what he calls "beginning" or "principle" or "origin" (arche *) as some kind of a force, and the "internal origin of motion" (arche* kineseos* en auto(i)*, which is Aristotle's formal definition of "nature") as "a power, resident in natural objects" (Ross, 1936: 25). This initial step is next followed by linking the "internal power" with potentiality for motion, and potentiality (dunamis) now becomes a power or force resident in natural objects, causing their natural motions. From such humble beginnings, this traditional reading of Aristotle molds him into a sobered-up Plato, namely, a Plato without a world of Ideas. Aristotle took these, so it is suggested, and transformed them into indwelling entities residing within natural objects. These, in their new role, he renamed "forms," but apart from these two variations he left them intact as he found them in Plato. In particular, Aristotle's forms remain causative as "powers, resident in natural bodies" (Ross, ibid.) acting on these bodies from within as their immediate movers in their natural motions. "Nature or essence" is the indwelling form that is "an internal power of originating movement" as Ross put it (ibid: 24), or as a recent scholar writes, it is the "developmental force which impels it [the body] toward the realization of its form .
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