PROPOSAL : Aristotle’s Physics , A Critical Guide Edited by Mariska Leunissen, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
A. Project description The importance of Aristotle’s Physics : Throughout his life, Aristotle was deeply committed to the study of natural phenomena: about one third of the surviving Corpus Aristotelicum investigates and explains the motions and attributes of things that have a nature, that is, of things that have an internal principle of change and rest. The Physics – an intellectual masterpiece in itself and one of the mostly widely read Aristotelian treatises – forms Aristotle’s most fundamental treatise in his studies of natural philosophy. In this treatise, Aristotle investigates the principles and causes of all natural things in general, and, in the course of doing so, defines a large number of key concepts of his natural philosophy, such as motion and change, space and time, matter and form, causal explanation, luck and spontaneity, teleology and necessity. In addition, Aristotle specifies in the Physics the methodological guidelines for how one should study nature if one wants to gain scientific knowledge of it, which includes the famous but still ill understood recommendation to start from things that are “more known and clearer to us” and to work from there to what is “more known and clearer by nature”. In this way, the Physics lays out Aristotle’s conceptual apparatus and methodological framework for all of his natural philosophy, including his psychology, biology, and other inquiries into the more specific and more complex segments of the natural world preserved in Aristotle’s remaining natural treatises. The Physics is not just relevant for Aristotle’s natural philosophy, however; since the objects of metaphysics do not, for the most part, exist independently of the objects of physics and can thus only be studied through those, the science of metaphysics often has to rely on the same concepts, definitions, and approaches as are presented in the Physics. The purpose of this volume: Because of the foundational role of the Physics for Aristotle’s natural philosophy and metaphysics, interest in the Physics among scholars of Aristotle (and of ancient philosophy more generally) has been consistently high. Somewhat surprisingly, even though the Physics has inspired a rich scholarly literature in the form of both articles and monographs, there exists only one volume of collected papers that focuses exclusively on the Physics : L. Judson (1991), Aristotle’s Physics, A Collection of Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press). However, since the publication of this volume the field of Aristotle studies has changed considerably, both in terms of its understanding of key concepts in Aristotle’s philosophy and in terms of its preferred methods for gaining such understanding. It is time for a reassessment. The papers commissioned for this proposed volume aim to make optimal use of these new insights and approaches, and thereby to push forward the scholarship on Aristotle’s Physics. The fourteen papers on Aristotle’s Physics in this volume are expected to engage with these changed perspectives on Aristotle in at least one of the following three ways:
1 (1) Reassessing the key concepts of Aristotle’s natural philosophy. First, some of the papers will provide a challenge to existing interpretations of some of the key concepts of Aristotle’s Physics (such as nature, cause, art, chance, and motion) and argue for alternative understandings . These papers do not only draw from the latest research in the field, but also exhibit a greater sensitivity towards the richness and complexity of Aristotelian concepts as well as towards the extent to which Aristotle builds on and reshapes his concepts in different explanatory contexts. Instead of just studying the main concepts of Aristotle’s natural philosophy in the immediate context in which they are first introduced in the Physics and trying to provide a unified account of their definitions and roles, the papers presented in this volume also pay attention to some of the (methodologically) later uses to which the concepts are put in other (natural) treatises, provide explanations of why these other uses require conceptual changes, and answer the meta question about why Aristotle needs the specific understandings of, for instance, his concepts of nature and cause for his natural philosophy as a whole. (2) Reconstructing Aristotle’s methods for the study of nature. Second, some of the papers will try to provide a reconstruction of the methods Aristotle uses and/or describes for the study of nature. Scholars working on Aristotle have become increasingly interested in the relationship between Aristotle’s ‘geometric style’ theory of scientific demonstration and investigation as presented in the Posterior Analytics and his practice in the natural treatises, and although much work has been done on the methodological connections between the Posterior Analytics and Aristotle’s biology (i.e., his study of living nature), the connections with his Physics remain largely unexplored territory. The papers in this volume aim to work towards closing this gap in the existing scholarship by offering interpretations of (a) what it means according to Aristotle to investigate things physikôs – i.e., in the manner of a natural scientist; (b) how this method relates to other methods available to a philosopher (such as semantic analysis or dialectic) as well as to the scientific method outlined in the Posterior Analytics ; and (c) how methodological concerns stemming from the Posterior Analytics drive the investigations in the Physics . (3) Determining the boundaries of Aristotle’s natural philosophy. Third, some papers will concern themselves with the boundaries (and the extent to which these boundaries are crossed) between Aristotle’s natural philosophy and his metaphysics. In recent years, there has been a growing awareness among scholars of Aristotle that Aristotle’s full views can rarely be plucked out of single passages, or even single treatises. This has led to modifications in how we believe one should conduct conceptual analysis in Aristotle (e.g., as taking into account the different uses to which concepts are put in different parts of a science, as described under item number 1 above), but it has also highlighted problems concerning Aristotle’s division of the sciences and his requirement that principles that belong properly to one science cannot be used in the generation of knowledge in another science (unless the two sciences are subordinated to each other). For this volume, the issue concerning the relation between the different sciences arises most prominently with regard to Aristotle’s concept of the Unmoved (or Prime) Mover – the origin of all motion in the universe – which he
2 introduces in Physics VIII. Since this Unmoved Mover is a divine being that is pure form and is without matter, it is technically speaking not part of the physical world, but rather belongs to Aristotle’s ‘first philosophy’ or metaphysics. The papers in this volume examine the ways in which Physics VIII divides up the science of nature and his metaphysics, and how his account in the Physics relates to a similar, but also importantly different discussion of unmoved movers in Metaphysics XII. B. Audience The proposed volume aims to bring together cutting edge research papers, written by some of the best scholars currently working on Aristotle’s natural science, and thereby to produce a volume that reflects the recent developments in the field but also opens up new avenues of inquiry. The primary audience for this volume will be scholars and advanced graduate students in ancient philosophy. The volume will be an essential reading and key resource for all those working on Aristotle. However, the volume will appeal more broadly to scholars working in ancient philosophy as well as to those working in the history and philosophy of (natural) science, given the centrality of the notions and methods discussed in Aristotle’s Physics for his entire philosophy and their influence on the development of natural philosophy in later Antiquity (including the Neo platonic period) and in the Early Modern period. C. Timetable The papers commissioned for this volume are all original and have not been published elsewhere. Authors will submit the first complete drafts of their papers to the editor by March 15, 2013, after which they will receive comments. The drafts will be revised during the summer of 2013, and the complete manuscript will be submitted to CUP for review no later than September 1 st , 2013. The manuscript should be ready for the production process sometime during the fall of 2013. D. Information about the editor and the contributing authors Mariska Leunissen, the proposed editor for this volume, is currently assistant professor of philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. From fall 2007 to spring 2011 she was assistant professor at Washington University in St. Louis, and from fall 2010 to spring 2011 she held a residential fellowship at the Harvard University’s Center for Hellenic studies in Washington, D.C. She is the author of Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature (CUP 2010; one of three finalists for the Journal of the History of Philosophy 2011 book prize), co editor of Interpreting Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics in Late Antiquity and Beyond (Brill, Leiden 2010), and has written several articles on Aristotle’s theory of demonstration, natural science, and character.
3 The scholars who have agreed to contribute to this volume were all selected on the basis of their individual expertise in the field of Aristotle’s natural science. All – including the more junior scholars – have published previously on Aristotle’s natural science, either in the form of articles but also of monographs or edited volumes. As a group, they represent the current diversity in Aristotelian scholarship in terms of their distribution in gender, geographical location of their home institution, nationality, and rank. This is the full list of contributors to the volume: James Allen is Professor of Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, U.S.A.
Robert Bolton is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers – The State University of New Jersey, U.S.A
David Charles is Colin Prestige Fellow and Research Professor in Philosophy at Oriel College, Oxford University, U.K.
Ursula Coope is Professor of Ancient Philosophy and Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford University, U.K.
Andrea Falcon is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Concordia University, Canada
Devin Henry is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at The University of Western Ontario, Canada
Sean Kelsey is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, U.S.A.
James G. Lennox is Professor of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, U.S.A.
Jacob Rosen is Junior Researcher in Philosophy (TOPOI Excellence cluster) at the Humboldt University, Berlin.
Diana Quarantotto is Professore Aggregato at the University of Rome, Italy
Margaret Scharle is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Reed College, U.S.A.
Stasinos Stavrianeas is Assistant Professor at the University of Patras, Greece
Charlotte Witt is Professor of Philosophy at the University of New Hampshire, U.S.A.
4 E. Chapter titles and abstracts There will be fourteen chapters, plus an introduction. Each paper, with the exception of the introduction, will be maximally 8500 words long. The complete manuscript will be maximally 125000 words long.
Introduction Author: Mariska Leunissen (The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, U.S.A.) Chapter : The Method of the Natural Scientist Author: James G. Lennox (University of Pittsburgh, U.S.A.) Abstract: This paper discusses what it means, precisely, to carry out a methodos physikôs , i.e. in the manner of a natural scientist. The paper takes off from passages in Physics I 1, On the Soul I 1, and Metaphysics VI 1 that discuss the natural method of inquiry and the way in which the mathematician differs in his method from the student of nature (although both study the same objects, the first studies their attributes as separable from those objects by an effort of abstraction and as unchangeable, whereas the latter studies them as enmattered and as subjected to change). I shall explain what is meant by the ‘teleological integration’ of matter and form of natural objects (building on the introduction of this concept in Lennox 2008), and show what the methodological consequences are of taking such a position towards natural objects for the student of nature. In the next part of the paper, I range around in the various natural treatises to show what such a method looks like in practice.
Chapter 2 The Role of Semantics in Natural Science Author: Diana Quarantotto (University of Rome, Italy) Abstract: In Physics book I Aristotle begins his investigation “about nature” ( peri physeos ) – an investigation whose status and possibility were considered controversial, at least from the perspective of the Eleatic claim that being is one and immovable. The beginning of this investigation is for us particularly difficult to understand. It is unclear how exactly Aristotle understood the problem of becoming and being as presented by his predecessors, and therefore what Aristotle’s own solution amounts to. Moreover, it is unclear what the field and the objects of the investigation themselves are, that is, whether they actually belong to the science of nature, given that Aristotle pays considerable attention to language and makes frequent use of linguistic analysis. On these issues, several interpretations have been proposed: for instance, that Aristotle confuses the realms of language and thought and the realm of reality; or that Aristotle is a realist and thinks that language mirrors reality directly and perfectly; or even that Aristotle is an ante-litteram phenomenologist. This paper tackles this issue heads on by means of an analysis of Physics I 2 3 where this problem is most glaring. I shall argue that Aristotle’s critique of the Eleatic thesis that being is one and unchangeable is carried out from a semantic and propositional point of view: it is through the generation of semantic meaning and the use of propositional structures that Aristotle demonstrates the impossibility for being to be one in the sense proposed by the Eleatics. In
5 addition, I shall offer some considerations of what role semantics plays according to Aristotle in the method of investigation into the science of nature.
Chapter 3 Aristotle’s Account of Substantial Change in Physics I 5 8 Author: Devin Henry (University of Western Ontario, Canada) Abstract: This paper will explore Aristotle’s account of coming to be in Physics I 5 8. Aristotle’s account can be divided into two parts. The first part ( Physics I 5 7) develops the basic theory according to which all coming to be involves three principles, an underlying subject and a pair of contraries (form and privation) which represent the two ‘poles’ of the change. The second part ( Physics I 8) defends this account against the Eleatics, who argued that coming to be is impossible because it requires the existence of non being. In this paper I shall explore two controversial aspects of this theory. First, I will challenge the long standing assumption that Aristotle thinks that all change requires an underlying subject that endures the process and remains as a constituent of the finished product. Specifically, I shall argue that Physics I 7 does not commit Aristotle to the view that substantial generation requires a persistent subject. Second, I shall show how Aristotle’s response to the Eleatics defends the account of non being from Plato’s Sophist using the conceptual machinery developed in the Analytics . This is something that has not been noticed by scholars.
Chapter 4 Aristotle’s Definition of Nature as a Second Level Potentiality Author: Stasinos Stavrianeas (University of Patras, Greece) Abstract: This paper offers a new interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of nature in Physics book II by examining how the claims that precede this definition pave the way for it and by addressing certain concerns relating to the necessity and sufficiency of the criterion proposed in this definition. I argue that Aristotle’s description of the substratum as ‘an ungenerated potentiality’ that is essentially related to what will be the result of the change leads to an understanding of nature not as an efficient cause, but (following an interpretation proposed already by Simplicius) as a second level potentiality responsive to principled processes that constitute complete activities. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, I turn to the analysis of the nature of elemental bodies in order to show that their passive principle of motion qualifies as being a nature. This means that their movement must be conceived as a complete activity, given that the elements are active principles of their mutual transformations and not in need of a further active principle determining their respective motions. I then argue that an analysis of artistic processes – which are incomplete activities – leads necessarily to a separation of the principle of change and of the thing changed. Finally, I turn to living beings and show that such a separation of agent and patient of change does not apply to them. Consequently, both Aristotle’s arguments in the Physics and his account of generation in the Generation of Animals allow living beings to be patients as well as possessors of their own principle of change and rest.
6 Chapter 5 “The Representation of Nature” Author: Sean Kelsey (University of Notre Dame, U.S.A.) Abstract: Elsewhere I consider the content of Aristotle’s definition of nature (first half of Physics II 1); here I propose to consider its function. Why does Aristotle think it important to “define” nature (to say “what” nature “is”)? What mileage does he hope to get from the particular definition he offers? What use does he put it to? These questions arise because when Aristotle appeals to the definition—which he does not often do in Physics II— it is usually to remark that certain things fall outside the purview of natural science (e.g. 198a35 b1). But the definition can hardly function merely to settle the extension of τὰ φύσει ὄντα; on the contrary, it is elicited from this extension (192b8 ff.). Moreover, Aristotle does not appeal to the definition—at least not explicitly—in those contexts in which we would most expect him to do so, namely, when explaining and defending the most characteristic and distinctive aspects of his conception of nature and natural science: e.g. in the second half of Physics II 1 (form and matter are both nature—exceptions are 193a29 30 and b3 4, where it is virtually idle), in Physics II 2 (the science of nature must treat of both form and matter), and in Physics II 8 (nature is a final cause—an exception being a snatch of reasoning at 199b13 25, that does advert to the definition, albeit briefly). In a word, the definition appears less foundational than we expect. This suggests that something is amiss (perhaps with the appearance, perhaps with the expectation); the idea of the paper is to try to get to the bottom of this. Chapter 6 Aristotle’s Conception of Four Causes Author: Robert Bolton (Rutgers University, U.S.A.) Abstract: Much work has been done on Aristotle’s understanding of his theory of four causes, especially regarding their ontological status – that is, whether these causes constitute ‘real causes’ or should rather be considered as mere ‘epistemic reasons why’. This paper examines Aristotle’s theory of the four causes from a more pragmatic perspective, namely: Why does Aristotle need four causes? What conception – or conceptions – of a cause is Aristotle working with and what interrelations among the causes does he introduce in order to make this notion (which at least first seems rather foreign to us) intelligible?
Chapter 7 Chance as a Byproduct of Natural Teleology Author: James Allen (University of Pittsburgh, U.S.A.) Abstract: Chance, which Aristotle sometimes divides into two species, luck ( tyche ), operative in the realm of human agency, and its counterpart in the broader natural world, the automatic or spontaneous, figures prominently in his defense of natural teleology. His own position is something of a balancing act. According to a view widespread at the time, lucky events are the result of divine intervention in the natural order. Tyche or Fortuna was worshiped as a goddess who acts on behalf of her favorites. Though the divine exists and is a cause in Aristotle’s universe, there is no place in it for divine meddling by ‘supernatural’ agents of this kind. Against this view, Aristotle is concerned to show that chance, if there is such a thing, must be part of the natural order and explicable within the framework of the four causes. Of more pressing concern to him, however, are the views of some of his
7 philosophical predecessors, who see the cosmic order and the beneficial arrangements that are everywhere in evidence within it as products of chance, above all members of the biological species, which are organic unities in which mutually dependent functional parts contribute to the good of the whole. These are, of course, precisely the items that can only, according to Aristotle, be understood teleologically, with the aid of final causes. Chance, then, is the alternative to final causal explanation, which Aristotle is determined to reject. This is not, however, because he agrees with others who maintain that nothing occurs by chance because everything has a cause of some sort. Instead, on the interpretation of Aristotle’s own account of chance as a cause by accident defended here, it is an inevitable byproduct of final causation and unintelligible apart from it. If Aristotle is right, chance events are a marginal exception to the teleological rule that prevails in nature, and at the same time a proof of it.
Chapter 8 The Ontology of Artifacts in Aristotle’s Physics Author: Charlotte Witt (University of New Hampshire, U.S.A.) Abstract: In the Physics Aristotle distinguishes artifacts from natural beings, noting that the latter have an internal origin of motion and rest, which artifacts lack. Still, it is striking that artifacts are frequently used as examples in the passages of the Physics that introduce important ideas like matter and form, which suggests that they are ontologically similar to natural substances at least in some respects. However, most commentators agree that artifacts do not count as substances, although there are significant differences in the explanations given. Some argue that artifacts lack the unity of true substances (Kosman), others think that it is an artifacts inability to reproduce that is key (Katayama), and still others think it is the fact that artifacts are not self regulating (Shields). In this paper I focus on the context of Aristotle’s discussion of artifacts in the Physics to show how truly problematic the idea is that artifacts are not substances at all and to try to develop a compromise interpretation. Being a substance comes in degrees, and artifacts are substances to a degree.
Chapter 9 On processes Author: David Charles (Oxford University, U.K.) Abstract : My aim is to set out and engage with the ongoing debate on the nature of processes, considering the views held by Kosman, Broadie, and Coope on one side and Ross, Heinaman, and me on the other. I shall focus on processes as continuants, understood as unfoldings through time, and compare them with other continuants (such as substances and activities). In addition to Physics III 1, I shall also consider parts of Metaphysics Theta.
8 Chapter 0 Infinite divisibility and the topology of change: Physics V–VI
Author: Jacob Rosen (Humboldt University, Berlin) Abstract: In Physics V–VI, Aristotle attempts to provide a theory of continua: both the temporally extended sort (changes) and the spatially extended sort (bodies, lines, etc.). The treatise was historically influential, but its mathematical basis has been superseded by differential calculus and set theory; nowadays it is famous for its testimony about Zeno's paradoxes of motion, but receives little systematic attention in its own right. I try to attain an overview of the treatise from two angles. First, its deductive structure. The text shows ambitions of being a mathematical treatise with definitions, axioms and theorems; but its actual organization is not so neat (for example, several claims are argued for in two different ways in two different chapters) and it is sometimes hard to determine what is supposed to be derived from what. I try to produce some order. Second, its connections with the rest of the corpus. In some ways the treatise makes an isolated impression, offering distinctions and claims which do not evidently serve any larger purpose in Aristotle's philosophy. Yet on the other hand, it promises to provide an important link between mathematical and (meta)physical issues as Aristotle tells us in GC I 2, it makes a great difference to one's theory of generation, perishing, and alteration whether or not one is an atomist, and Physics V–VI is his most sustained argument for, and elaboration of, an anti atomist picture. I consider where the treatise is implicitly or explicitly relied on in other works, as well as looking to see where its results are overlooked or contradicted.
Chapter Aristotle’s Account of Change and Virtues in Physics VII 3 Author: Mariska Leunissen (The University of Chapel Hill, U.S.A.) Abstract: In Physics VII 3, Aristotle argues that qualitative change, which is one of the four standard modes of change he distinguishes, only belongs to things that are affected in and by themselves by perceptible things. Somewhat surprisingly, he also claims that ‘conditions’ – such as the virtues of the body or soul – do not belong to the category of ‘quality’ and do not come to be as a result of qualitative change, but that they are rather ‘some kind of perfections’ ( Ph VII 3, 246a13) that ‘exist in virtue of a particular relation’ ( Ph VII 3, 246b8), thereby seemingly introducing a fifth type of change. In this paper, I will analyze Aristotle’s account of the virtues in the Physics and show how it offers a physiological and naturalistic explanation for his account of habituation in the Nicomachean Ethics. In this treatise, it is argued that, even though human beings are by nature able to receive moral virtues, those virtues do not come to be by nature, but are ‘made perfect’ through habituation ( NE II 1, 1103a23 26), and that the change that takes place during habituation is different from the one involved in the realization of natural capacities (which constitute qualitative changes) as well as from the one involved in learning a skill (which do not require the development of the right motivations, as the acquisition of virtue does; see NE II 1 4). Only in the Physics, however, do we learn what kind of change is involved in moral development.
9 Chapter 2 Aristotle on the Boundary between Physics and Metaphysics Author: Margaret Scharle (Reed College, U.S.A.) Abstract: Posterior Analytics I 28 maintains that a single science is a science of one kind (87a38 40), so the strictness of the boundary between one science and another depends on the strictness of the boundary between one kind and another. Physics VIII argues for the distinction between two kinds of substances—natural substance and immovable substance—that mark off the boundary between physics and metaphysics. Physics II.2 characterizes the distinction between physics and metaphysics by the fact that the former is concerned with composites of matter and form, while the latter concerns separable form(s). Physics II’s distinction rests on grounds analogous to those found in the argument of Physics VIII. I argue that Physics II’s conception of the distinction between composites and separable form(s) depends on the impossibility of something’s being its own nature. That would be tantamount to something’s being in itself primarily, which would require something to be container and contained with respect to the same contents ( Physics IV.3 210b8 23). Likewise, Physics VIII’s distinction between natural and immovable substance rests on the impossibility of something’s being both agent and patient with respect to the same motion. I thereby argue that there is a philosophically rich a priori issue at stake in Aristotle’s distinction between science and metaphysics, and I show how this issue distinguished Aristotle from his foremost predecessors, Plato and Parmenides.
Chapter 3 Aristotle’s Account of Self Motion in Physics VIII Author : Ursula Coope (Oxford University, UK) Abstract: In Physics VIII 5, Aristotle sets himself the question: if a thing moves itself, in what way does it do so? He argues that when a thing moves itself, there is one part of it that is the mover and another part of it that is moved (257a12 13). In my paper, I shall examine, in detail, Aristotle’s arguments for this claim and shall discuss some questions about their larger significance. In particular, shall examine the following three questions: (i) The extent to which Aristotle’s views about self motion depart from or are consistent with Plato’s. (For instance, according to one later, neo platonist view, Aristotle’s arguments depend on the fact that the kind of motion he is considering is the motion of a bodily thing – something that is infinitely divisible – so Aristotle could agree with Plato that a soul might be able to act on itself as a whole.) (ii) Whether Aristotle’s argument for the existence of self motion depends on a particular account of motion or change (and if so, what account it presupposes). And (iii) whether Aristotle’s argument provides any resources for distinguishing between a genuine self mover and a pair of things: an external unmoved mover and the moved thing whose motion it causes.
Chapter 4 A Scientific Study of Eternal Motion in Physics VIII Author: Andrea Falcon (Concordia University, Canada) Abstract: The standard interpretation is that Physics VIII is an argument in two stages from the eternity of motion to the existence of a prime mover which is eternal and unmoved. Interestingly enough, this is not quite what we are told in the opening lines of the De Motu Animalium. There, Aristotle makes contact with Physics VIII. He tells us that the
10 investigation conducted in Physics VIII unfolds in two stages. But the two stages he has in mind are not those presented in the standard interpretation. Rather, they are those outlined at the outset of the second book of the Posterior Analytics . More directly, his investigation begins with the question ei esti (is there eternal motion?). Once it is established that there is eternal motion, this investigation continues with the question ti esti (what is eternal motion?). At this second stage, Aristotle looks for a scientific definition of eternal motion by engaging in search for its causes. And it is in this context that a first principle of motion that is not itself subject to motion is introduced. The latter enters the explanation of eternal motion as the first unmoved mover. That in Physics VIII Aristotle is, at least in principle, committed to the method outlined in the Posterior Analytics is not sufficiently appreciated. Many, if not most, scholars still agree with G.E.L. Owen, who opened his immensely influential article “Tithenai ta Phainomena” (1961) 1 with the following statement: “there seems to be a sharp discrepancy between the method of scientific reasoning recommended in the Analytics and those actually followed in the Physics. ” I propose a close textual study of the argument advanced in Physics VIIII to establish to what extent it reflects the theory of science outlined in the Posterior Analytics.
1 Owen, G.E.L. (1961), ‘Tithenai ta Phainomena’, in: S. Mansion (ed.), Aristote et les problèmes de méthode. Papers of the Second Symposium Aristotelicum . Louvain, 1961, 83 103.
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