Avicenna's Metaphysics in Ṭodros Ṭodrosi's Incomplete Hebrew

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appendix Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Ṭodros Ṭodrosi’s Incomplete Hebrew Translation of Kitāb al-Najāt, iii

1 Introduction

The Metaphysics (al-Ilāhiyyāt) is the third and concluding section of Avicenna’s The Salvation. Avicenna composed The Salvation shortly after completing The Cure, drawing for both on some of his earlier writings. While for the Physics he copied mostly from the al-Majmūʿ; al-Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍīya (The Compilation or Philosophy of ʿArūḍī), and for the psychology he used The State of the Human Soul, in the Metaphysics section, he incorporated passages from al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād (The Provenance and Destination).1 Generally, the difference between physics and metaphysics can be defined as follows: whereas physics is concerned with the existence of a being related to matter that is subject to motion and rest, metaphysics is concerned with the existent of a non-physical being or object that is abstracted from matter. The question of the content of the Metaphysics was an issue of interest for thinkers and commentators on Aristotle. In his autobiography, in one of the most instructive paragraphs describing the intellectual development of philosophers, Avicenna tells the reader about the turning point in his understanding of the purpose of Aristotelian Metaphysics:

Having mastered Logic, Physics and Mathematics, I had now reached Theology [al-ʿilm al-ilāhī]. I read the Metaphysics of Aristotle [mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿah] but did not understand what it contained and was confused about the author’s purpose to the point that I reread it forty times and consequently memorized it. In spite of this I still did not understand it or what was intended by it, and I said, despairing of myself, “There is no way to understand this book!” One afternoon I was at the booksellers’ quarter when a crier came up holding a volume which he was hawking for sale. He offered it to me, but I refused it in vexation, believing that there was no use in this particular science. But he said to me, “Buy it; its owner needs

1 See Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 112–113.

the money and it’s cheap; I’ll sell it to you for three dirhams.” So I bought it and it turned out to be Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī’s book On the Purpose of the Metaphysics. I returned home and hastened to read it, and at once the purposes of that book were disclosed to me because I had learned it by heart. I rejoiced at this and the next day I gave much in alms to the poor in gratitude to God Exalted.2

As Gutas indicated, understanding the purpose of Metaphysics addresses the question of the content of Aristotle’s Metaphysics; al-Fārābī’s precious assis- tance led Avicenna to recognize that theology is not identical to Metaphysics; i.e., the One is not the exclusive subject of the Metaphysics as was the case in other approaches, but only one of its subjects.3 Synthesizing Aristotelian tradition and Islamic principles and beliefs, yet still considering theology the noblest part of metaphysics, Avicenna’s understanding evolved into a comprehensive system that amalgamated various aspects of universal science (metaphysics as the being qua being, and as the science that is the basis of all sciences) and theology (the science of the Divin- ity and the survival of rational thought). This amalgamation receives greater or lesser emphasis in his various works.4 Often independent of the Aristotelian model, Avicenna’s metaphysical the- ory reveals points of conflict with the Aristotelian tradition, such as the inclu- sion of the survival of the rational soul in metaphysics, and the abandoning of the Aristotelian proof of the First Mover by means of motion in favor of the concept of the Necessary Existent (wājibal-wujūd).5 The Necessary Existent in itself (bi-dhātihi) means that God has no cause, is one, simple, eternally actual, and that the very existence of all things is due to Him; every existent other than God is possible (mumkin), i.e., must be necessitated by another cause. The concept of the Necessary Existent (which has its roots in pre-Avicennian thought and which circulated at the time in Islamic theology) is the most important aspect of the Avicennian metaphysical system.6 Although critiqued by al-Ghazālī

2 See the translation of Avicenna’s autobiography in Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 28. The Arabic is from Gohlman, ed., The Life of Ibn Sina, 30–32. 3 Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 243–249. 4 Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 238–254. 5 Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 263–265. 6 Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 261–262; Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context, 219–244.