Marines, Missiles, and the Iron Lady: the Military Leg in Japan’S Ocean Strategy 海兵隊、ミサイル、そして鉄の女 日本の 海洋政策における軍事的選択肢
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Volume 11 | Issue 49 | Number 1 | Article ID 4045 | Dec 08, 2013 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Marines, Missiles, and the Iron Lady: The Military Leg in Japan’s Ocean Strategy 海兵隊、ミサイル、そして鉄の女 日本の 海洋政策における軍事的選択肢 Alex Calvo management strategy. This paper seems to examine these factors, on the understanding that developments in the military sphere are only part of Tokyo’s foreign policy towards The complex situation in East Asia and the East-Asia. wider Pacific-Indian Ocean Region is prompting governments to deploy a full range of tools, Recent amphibious drills offer a glimpse into from economic diplomacy to humanitarian Tokyo's strategy to deter and avoid armed relief operations to declarations of exclusive air conflict with China. The goal is to prevent space, in their search for a balance between giving the impression that limited force could what they consider to be their key national succeed in securing a foothold in contested interests and their shared wish to avert open islands, with Japan either unable (for lack of conflict. Tokyo is one of these actors who feel military capabilities) or unwilling (due to compelled to defend their national interests insufficient domestic support or international while at the same time recognizing that war opposition) to counterstrike. The security would imply harsh costs, to itself and the component in Japanese strategy consists of at region, at many levels, from the human to the least six legs: the development of specialized economic to the political. While many Asian Marine-like units, the holding of regular drills, leaders have expressed the wish to see tensions the deployment of shore-based anti-ship ease and differences settled without recourse missiles, the incorporation of the memory of to violence, all understand the high risk of conflict and look to higher levels of military Margaret Thatcher and the 1982 Falklands War preparedness to enhance their position. Japan into standard political discourse, better and is no exception. Japan is unique, however, in deeper relations with Russia, and a moving to reinforce military capabilities despite strengthening of the alliance with the US and a restrictive legal and constitutionalof wider defense and security agreements with framework. The development of an amphibious other democracies such as India, Australia, and capability by the SDF (Self-Defense Forces), ASEAN member states including Vietnam. This their latest drills featuring among others shore- article will examine the first four factors, while based anti-ship missile deployment, more also referring to the wider Japanese search for frequent joint exercises with the US and a security and defense identity, an image, a appeals to Washington for a firmer position in brand, which leaves behind both Article 9 the Pacific, a push for constitutional change idealism and unbalanced defense treaties while involving the reinterpretation or formalavoiding suspicions from the international amendment to Article 9, and repeated public community in general, and the United States in references to the late Margaret Thatcher, particular. Japan today is a country looking not former British prime minister, illuminate the only for security but also an international military leg in Tokyo’s conflict prevention and identity. 1 11 | 49 | 1 APJ | JF The large-scale amphibious drills in early King's College's Alessio Patalano notes that it November constitute a major step forward in comprises “a surface component more than deterrence strategy, putting on display Japan’s twice the size of Britain’s Royal Navy’s and a ability both to reconquer an island and to submarine force twice that of the French prevent the passage through key straits of Navy”. He concludes that “Japan really is hostile shipping. This follows Prime Minister becoming the Britain of the Far East” since she Abe Shinzo 's repeated references to the “allocates naval means to achieve strategic Falklands in his speeches, an indirect yet ends against an austere economic climate, unequivocal way of warning China that an seeking to maintain a range of capabilities to invasion of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu for effectively defend its own core interests and Beijing, Diaoyutai for Taipei) would be met with wider bilateral and ad hoc partnerships. Like an amphibious counterstrike. This was crowned Britain, Japan endorses a maritime strategy in by his meeting in early October with Falklands which the safeguard of crucial sea lanes sits at veteran the Duke of York. On the political and the heart of national security”.1 The Center for diplomatic side the drills are designed to show Strategic Studies of Catalonia's Pol Molas that Tokyo is not standing alone should war stresses the MSDF's “training (of both sailors occur. Japan has succeeded in getting the and officers), organization (very much focused United States to state that the bilateral security on anti-submarine warfare but at the same time treaty covers the Senkaku Islands in the event balanced, and the quality of its hardware (be it of a Chinese attack. The next step is to show of domestic design or purchased abroad and that Japanese and US forces are interoperable upgraded”.2 In an overview of the most and could work together in such a campaign important navies in the Indo-Pacific, US Naval while developing a Japanese amphibious War College's James R. Holmes ranks the capability. Japan deployed, as part of the drills, MSDF second in terms of “their capacity to anti-ship missiles with which to close the First execute the missions national leaders entrust to Island Chain to Chinese shipping in the event of them” and describes it as “modest in size yet hostilities. The potential of such missiles is well-equipped, sporting Aegis destroyers, light another lesson learned from the South Atlantic, aircraft carriers, and an elite diesel submarine where HMS Glamorgan suffered extensive force”.3 damage at the hands of an improvised shore- launched Exocet missile, in an episode not Japan's goal in beefing up her amphibious forgotten by military officers on either side of forces is to develop a capability to deploy the East China Sea. sufficient force in contested islands in the event of a crisis, and to retake them if necessary. Japan's growing amphibious capability. The Current Japanese policy is not to deploy a creation of specialized amphibious units and permanent land force, or even a permanent facilities is one aspect of Japan's defense civilian presence, in those same islands.4 With reorientation following the end of the Cold War that end in view, Tokyo, mentored by the US and the growing might of the Chinese Navy. Navy and Marine Corps, set out to develop a Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) specialized force,. The force will comprise are significant in size and capabilities.contingents from the Ground, Air, and Maritime Although they may not sport some weapons Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and include systems deemed to be offensive and therefore different units covering a range of capabilities, incompatible with Article 9 as officiallyfrom infantry to maritime transportation, and interpreted, they are still one of Asia's powerful including air support. This specialized force is navies. In an overview of the MSDF's historical seen as necessary, among others, because the origins, rationale, structure and capabilities, disputed territories are not only far from 2 11 | 49 | 1 APJ | JF existing military facilities, but from civilian the other hand, Colonel Grant Newsham, infrastructure able to support operations. 5 USMC liaison officer to the Japanese military, noted that “If the 20th century taught us Until 2012, Japan considered marines to be anything, it is that when democracies are able offensive in nature and thus precluded by and willing to defend themselves, it preserves Article 9 of the constitution. The current peace and stability”, adding that “Most Asian government interpretation of Article 9 is that it countries welcome--even if quietly stated--a allows defensive, but not offensive, weapons, a more capable (Japanese force) that is also distinction not always easy to make in practice. closely allied to U.S. forces”. Kerry Finally, last year the cabinet came to the Gershaneck, from the Pacific Forum-Center for conclusion that Japanese law allowed marines Strategic & International Studies, described units to be created and deployed. The unit Japan’s progress in amphibious warfare as selected to serve as the core of this amphibious “hugely significant” and noted that, given the capability was the Western Army Infantry United States’ treaty commitment to defend Regiment (WAIR), based in Nagasaki. This Japanese territory, “We cannot ask young location facilitates quick embarkation on MSDF American Marines to fight and die doing a job (Maritime Self-Defence Forces) ships atthat Japanese forces cannot, or will not, do”, Nagasaki/Sasebo or on V-22 Ospreys from adding that “The U.S. Marines will help, but nearby air bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki. From they must have a capable partner”.8 this core, Japanese amphibious capabilities are expected to expand. There have also been Despite its name, the WAIR is, broadly reports of discussions on the possible creation speaking, of battalion size. It is made up of at of a further specialized amphibious unit.6 least three infantry companies. Its table of equipment is that of a light infantry unit, with In any case, an important step was Japan’s weapons no heavier than 84mm Carl Gustav participation earlier this year in the Dawn Blitz recoil-less rifles (employed by the Royal 2013 exercise in California, a US-ledMarines against ARA Guerrico in the defense of multinational military drill which also featured South Georgia on 3 April 1982 9) and French troops from New Zealand and Canada.MO-120-RT 120mm towed mortars. Tokyo Described as “historic” by a USMC officer, announced recently that it would be buying up Tokyo’s participation was notable not only to six AAV-7A1 amphibious assault vehicles.