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THE FALKLANDS WAR Raf100schools.Org.Uk LONG RANGE MISSIONS THE FALKLANDS WAR raf100schools.org.uk LONG RANGE MISSIONS – THE FALKLANDS WAR INTRODUCTION The 1982 Falklands War is often taught and discussed from the position of its political rights and wrongs and the wider ramifi cations it had for the British and Argentinian leaderships at the time. In this material, the main focus is on the basic narrative of the military war and, in particular, the RAF Operation Black Buck. BACKGROUND TO THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT The Falkland Islands are a group of islands in the Atlantic Ocean, crossing the Atlantic, but with no 300 miles off the South American coast and 8,000 miles from the UK. formal port. There are two larger islands – East and West Falklands – and lots of In 1820, the new South American smaller ones. country of Argentina (which was The Islands were uninhabited when the Islands, before the French then created from the Spanish colony in European explorers and adventurers landed there in 1701. the region) claimed the Islands for fi rst started landing there in the itself. However, as Argentina was a The French established the fi rst seventeenth and eighteenth new state, still locked in a war with settlement on the Islands in 1764, centuries. Spain was fi rst to claim Spain, its claims were largely but within two years had left. ownership of the Islands, under laws ignored. Argentina did establish a The British separately established issued by the Pope that asserted settlement on the Islands, but the a settlement, Port Egmont, on West Spanish rights to govern South US Navy destroyed it in 1831 over a Falkland in 1765. They abandoned America. However, according to dispute about seal hunting. this in 1774, but left behind a plaque English and French sources from the claiming the Islands as the property In 1833, British sailors created a time, it was an English sailor, of the British king. The uninhabited permanent settlement on the Captain John Strong, who in 1690 Falklands then became an Falklands, forming the basis of the was the fi rst European to land on occasional stopping place for ships current settlements on the Islands, 1 LONG RANGE MISSIONS THE FALKLANDS WAR raf100schools.org.uk and the Falklands are now classified saw German naval vessels destroyed The Argentinians started to make as a British Overseas Territory. by the Royal Navy and deterred from serious claims on the Islands from further activities in the South the 1940s. The timing of the claims The Falkland Islanders are mainly of Atlantic. Argentina was neutral usually coincided with the British descent, and most consider during the First World War. During Argentinian government having themselves British. the Second World War, Britain, the domestic problems – the demands The Argentinian claims to the US and Argentina had for the Falklands acted as a way of Islands are partly historical, based a more complex relationship, distracting the Argentinian on inheriting the areas previously due to Argentinian sympathies population from other issues. under Spanish control in the towards the Axis countries. Overall, After all, the Islands have little nineteenth century, and partly however, Argentina remained strategic value, and their main geographical, outside the conflict. business is sheep farming. as Argentina is the closest country In the post-1945 era, there were However, in recent decades, to the Falklands. The Argentinians talks in British government circles of there have been suggestions of call the Falklands ‘Las Malvinas’, returning or potentially leasing oil or other resources to be found from the eighteenth-century French (similar to renting) the Islands to the off the Falklands coast, so ownership name Îles Malouines. Argentinians. However, official visits of the Islands now has a potential During the First World War, to the Falklands and discussions economic element as well. the Islands became important with the Islanders always resulted in to Britain for supporting a statement saying that the naval activities. The Battle of the Islanders wished to remain British. Falkland Islands in December 1914 FACT BOX Human population of the Falklands Islands: Number of landmines on the beaches: 20,000 to stop 2,932 (2012 census) further invasion. However, they have resulted in keeping the beaches free from intruders, therefore making great Number of sheep on the Islands: approximately 700,000 penguin breeding grounds (the penguins are too light to Number of penguins: approximately 1 million trigger the mines). There are 778 islands in the Falklands group 2 LONG RANGE MISSIONS THE FALKLANDS WAR raf100schools.org.uk APRIL 1982 – INVASION In 1982, the population of the military junta (the military council At the same time as negotiations Islands was under 2,000. In the in charge of the country). As there began, the British government, previous year, the British had was no reason for the Islanders under the leadership of Margaret withdrawn a Royal Navy ice patrol to expect an attack, they were Thatcher, sent a naval task force vessel from the Falklands, which completely unprepared. The 80 Royal of over 100 ships and 28,000 some believe indicated a slow Marines stationed there were vastly servicemen to liberate the Islands. withdrawal from the region. There outnumbered by the Argentinian The naval force and British military had been a number of attempted force of 3,000, and the Islands were response was approved by UK negotiations between the quickly captured. Parliament, including the opposition Argentinian and British governments parties. The naval force included two The next day, the United Nations about ownership of the Islands over aircraft carriers; fleet flagship HMS (UN) demanded the immediate the decades, but this became more Hermes and HMS Invincible, along withdrawal of Argentinian forces, pressing under the new Argentinian with accompanying frigates; three but instead they sent more troops. president General Galtieri. nuclear submarines; amphibious Britain’s ally, the United States, ships; specialist vessels; and 50 ships On 2 April 1982, Argentina invaded wanted to stay out of the conflict requisitioned from the commercial the Falklands. The attack was part due to its own politics with South fleet (non-military), including the QE2 of a show of political strength in America, but appointed their (the passenger liner Queen Elizabeth Argentina in response to unrest ambassador, Alexander Haig, II), Canberra and a converted in the country – General Galtieri as a negotiator to try to resolve hospital ship, Uganda. believed that it would help secure his the conflict. THE PROBLEMS OF A WAR IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC By the 1980s, Britain had become used to seeing itself as a member of NATO and was focused on the Cold War. The Falklands was the first time for many years that Britain had been engaged in a conflict on its own, many miles from home. Cuts to the UK military over the years meant that fighting a war without a military ally was a huge risk. The naval task force had to include non-military vessels; otherwise, there would not have been enough ships to send to the South Atlantic. The UK had once been the world’s the naval task force nearly a month Nonetheless, this war was very leading naval power, but political to reach the Falkland Islands. This much seen as a British affair. priorities such as the Cold War – posed a further problem – would a No one was prepared to send troops along with Britain no longer being military response get to the Islands to help Britain. South American an imperial power, governing a in time to do anything to stop a full politics meant that most of the global empire – had meant that Argentinian occupation? countries of South America initially a massive navy was no longer a Support was shown from Britain’s supported Argentinian actions, necessity. By 1982, Britain’s military allies through political means. although once again vocally rather focus was on fighting land wars and The EEC (forerunner of the EU) than through military support. For short- to medium-range air attacks introduced sanctions against some, this was a battle between a and defence. Argentina for its act of aggression, former colonial power versus the The distance of 8,000 miles between and the EEC also declared their new independent world. However, the UK and the Falklands is a huge support for Britain in the conflict. what it really proved to be was a test distance to travel – to get to the While the US didn’t want to get for the British military and a gamble Falklands would usually mean a long involved, it would eventually share for its politicians. flight to South America and then a pieces of military intelligence with further flight to the Islands. By ship the UK to support British actions. it takes weeks – it would have taken 3 LONG RANGE MISSIONS THE FALKLANDS WAR raf100schools.org.uk THE LAST STEPS TO WAR With the Naval Task Force was on its way but still with some weeks to arrival, the British government declared a 200-mile exclusion zone around the Islands (12 April 1982). This was to try and deter further Argentinian attacks on the Islands while the peace negotiators worked to bring an end to the hostilities. British forces started the invasion to 900 miles from the main The US also then announced its retake the islands on 25 April and Falklands grouping. political support for Britain. succeeded in taking South Georgia, On 29 April the Argentinian Then on 1 May the conflict became an island that then came under the government refused US a full-scale war. Falklands group, though it’s over Ambassador Haig’s peace proposals. FLYING LONG RANGE – FEATS OF ENGINEERING Caption Just as the Naval Task Force had been dispatched while the negations were The challenge was how to fly over happening, an assessment of what else would be needed if talks failed was also 7,800 miles (3,900 miles there and taking place with the RAF.
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