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Marines, Missiles, and the Iron Lady: the Military Leg in Japan’S Ocean Strategy 海兵隊、ミサイル、そして鉄の女 日本の 海洋政策における軍事的選択肢
Volume 11 | Issue 49 | Number 1 | Article ID 4045 | Dec 08, 2013 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Marines, Missiles, and the Iron Lady: The Military Leg in Japan’s Ocean Strategy 海兵隊、ミサイル、そして鉄の女 日本の 海洋政策における軍事的選択肢 Alex Calvo management strategy. This paper seems to examine these factors, on the understanding that developments in the military sphere are only part of Tokyo’s foreign policy towards The complex situation in East Asia and the East-Asia. wider Pacific-Indian Ocean Region is prompting governments to deploy a full range of tools, Recent amphibious drills offer a glimpse into from economic diplomacy to humanitarian Tokyo's strategy to deter and avoid armed relief operations to declarations of exclusive air conflict with China. The goal is to prevent space, in their search for a balance between giving the impression that limited force could what they consider to be their key national succeed in securing a foothold in contested interests and their shared wish to avert open islands, with Japan either unable (for lack of conflict. Tokyo is one of these actors who feel military capabilities) or unwilling (due to compelled to defend their national interests insufficient domestic support or international while at the same time recognizing that war opposition) to counterstrike. The security would imply harsh costs, to itself and the component in Japanese strategy consists of at region, at many levels, from the human to the least six legs: the development of specialized economic to the political. While many Asian Marine-like units, the holding of regular drills, leaders have expressed the wish to see tensions the deployment of shore-based anti-ship ease and differences settled without recourse missiles, the incorporation of the memory of to violence, all understand the high risk of conflict and look to higher levels of military Margaret Thatcher and the 1982 Falklands War preparedness to enhance their position. -
La Guerre Des Malouines
4 La guerre des Malouines IV – 26 mai - 15 juin 1982 : Objectif Port Stanley... Le L 3005 RFA Sir Frédéric Stahl Galahad en feu le 8 juin. (MOD) A San Carlos, la 3.Commando Brigade du brigadier Thomson n’a subi aucune contre-attaque terrestre de la part des Argentins qui restent encore en net état de supériorité numérique même si deux régiments se trouvent maintenant isolés sur la grande île occidentale (isla Gran Malvina). La dernière occasion quasiment nulle). Dans le courant de la matinée, deux Dagger de la patrouille « Pocker », les C 416 et Le mercredi 26 mai, jour où l’ONU va adopter la C-420, couverts par deux Mirage IIIEA de la patrouille résolution 505 sur les Malouines qui réafirme la « Sombra » du Grupo 8 suivent mais ils ne trouvent pas résolution 502 et demande aux parties de coopérer de cible dans le mauvais temps. L’aviation argentine avec le Secrétaire général pour négocier une trêve se montre donc discrète, deux IA-58 Pucara A 509 et de 72 heures, trois Canberra Mk-62 du Grupo 2, les A 533 de la patrouille « Fierro » effectuent un vol de B-104, B-105 et B-108 formant la patrouille « Odin », reconnaissance au nord de Darwin, ce qui permet aux armés chacun de quatre bombes Mk.17, et décollés Britanniques de s’organiser et en particulier d’installer de Rio Gallegos, doivent effectuer un raid sur San des bases avancées pour les hélicoptères afin de Carlos avant la levée du jour mais ils vont faire demi- compenser la perte de l’Atlantic Conveyor qui aurait dû tour à cause des conditions atmosphériques (visibilité être utilisé comme FOB mobile (voir encadré n°1).. -
OPERATION CORPORATE Taken from the PWO's Diary at the Time On
OPERATION CORPORATE Taken from the PWO’s Diary at the time on HMS GLAMORGAN (transcribed by Danny Wort ex RS) 1982 2 April Argentine troops invade Falkland Islands. Garrison of about 80 marines put up a good fight killing and wounding Argies in a fierce gun battle. Marines run out of ammo and told to put down arms by Commander. 1500 Argentine troops against 80 but what a fight. RAS(L) with BLUE ROVER – 158 tons 4 April South Georgia invaded marines from ENDURANCE put ashore, put up a good fight, fired anti-tank rockets at CORVETTE, seriously damaged it and brought down helicopter. We are on our way to the Ascension Islands. Big Task Force underway. RAS(L) TIDESPRING – 200 tons 5 April Britain mustering task force, Hermes and Invincible made ready, Cmdo Brigade and 1st parachute battalion embarked and with others. “Tally Ho! Here we come Argies” 6 April Fearless sails from U.K. We are moving South. RAS(L) TIDESPRING – 228 tons 10 April Arrive Ascension Islands much activity with Hercules bringing stores out from U.K. RAS(L) APPLELEAF – 200 tons 12 April Vertrep stores all day, food, ammo and Beer 13 April More work bringing on stores RAS(L) APPLELEAF – 212 tons 14 April Depart Ascension to R/V with Hermes. The Harriers look very impressive, hope they are good combat aircraft, though they are usually ground attack. 15 April Admiral Woodward to Hermes, flag in Command. Steam back to Ascension. 16 April Prep for war, much activity, stores accounting, black out ship 17 April Heading South with SHEFFIELD, ALACRITY, ARROW, BRILLIANT, GLASGOW and COVENTRY. -
The Communigator
Ge Zs*e{ THE COMMUNIGATOR VOL 18 .No. 5 v T ' D .12 IS RTDIFONIS NTtlI i:,, .:1,r,... rORhI AR D-ACT IN8 TERROR ERECTOR EE E ERROR CORRECTOR and it measures only 6" x 4' x 20 Unlrke conve:tt:-: r::-'--:e:- l=l s':::-s :- s -:.'. one acts fori.,a'l c- . T.e -'c'-:: :- : ;-: s :::--:: 3. an encoder in th: i':-:-: L^: .'.-:- :^e^ ;:-:':::: : stream of pariil'b ts aq-a, :: :-= -':'-:: :- : :s A decoder in the Re:et'e U.,t -s.s l^as:::':. ::!:: detect and correct errors. But, beca,s: 3a:^ Da':. : : > computed from a scanntng of the inforn atro^ sra^3 a ':' : 20-bit length, the s'i stem has the remarkable a3 : ' :: correct'burst'errors of as many as 6-inforn'atlon-brts o us 6 parity-bits, as well as random errors. The TD 12 operates with normal 5-unit code teleprinter or data transmission equipment, synchronous or non-syn- chronous, at a number of speeds. lt is suited to HF and troposcatter radio links, as well as landline or submarine circuits. And because of its forward action it is ideal for one way transmissions such as naval traff ic broadcasts, meteoro- logical broadcasts, and all forms of data transmission. For f urther information please contact the Sales Manager, Communications Division :- REDIFON LIMITED COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION Broomhill Fload, Wandsworth, London, S.W.18. fe: 01-874 7281' A member company of the REDIFFUSION Group A 4 LIG HTWEIG HT the Services newest PROVEN adaptable- BCC 30 "Against intense competition the BCC 30 has been selected to f ill the 414 role for the British Services." The Alzl--BCC 30 is the lightest, smallest, fully transisto- rised, one man high power H F transmitter-receiver station with an output of up to 30 watts. -
Maritime Warfare in a Mature Precision-Strike Regime
MARITIME WARFARE IN A MATURE PRECISION-STRIKE REGIME ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH 2014 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent, non- partisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. © 2014 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Andrew Krepinevich is President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He assumed this position in 1993, following a 21-year career in the U.S. Army. Dr. Krepinevich has served in the Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment, and on the personal staff of three secretaries of defense. He has also served as a member of the National Defense Panel, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Experimentation, the Joint Forces Command Advisory Board, and the Defense Policy Board. He currently serves on the Chief of Naval Operations' (CNO's) Advisory Board and on the Army Special Operations Command's Advisory Board. Dr. Krepinevich frequently contributes to print and broadcast media. He has lectured before a wide range of professional and academic audiences, and has served as a consultant on mil- itary affairs for many senior government officials, including several secretaries of defense, the CIA’s National Intelligence Council, and all four military services. -
The World Cruise the Complete Story of Hms Ajax
THE WORLD CRUISE THE COMPLETE STORY OF H.M.S. AJAX DURING 1975-76 Author believed to be CRS (W) Fox We sailed out of Plymouth Sound on the morning of July the 22nd to the sound of "When will I see you again" by the "Three Degrees" playing on the Jimmy young Show. I suppose that the wife who requested that record for the Eighth Frigate Squadron was not presented with a copy of our 'Longcast'. We thank you for your kind thought. We left in company with H.M.S. Berwick and that afternoon we were hard at work carrying out anti-submarine exercises with the Submarine H.M.S/M Otter and R.A.F. Nimrod. At 0130 the following morning, we rendezvous'd with the remainder of the Deployment Group - H.M.S.'s Glamorgan (Flying the Flag of Flag Officer Second Flotilla), Plymouth, Llandaff, Rothesay and R.F.A.'s Gold Rover, Tarbatness and Tidespring. Immediately the Group were busy working together fighting off 'attacks' by Otter. As we headed South, Admiral Lewin, the then Commander-in-Chief Fleet, sent the following message to the Task Group: "The progress of your circumnavigation will be watched with envy. You carry the reputation of the Fleet with you. I am confident that it is in good hands and that you will remind the people of many countries of the continuing professionalism and courtesy of the Royal Navy. Work hard, have fun, and enjoy the comradship of your impressive Group. Bon Voyage." From the Southwest Approaches we proceeded to Cape Finisterre carrying out inter-ship exercises. -
Battle Atlas of the Falklands War 1982
ACLARACION DE www.radarmalvinas.com.ar El presente escrito en PDF es transcripción de la versión para internet del libro BATTLE ATLAS OF THE FALKLANDS WAR 1982 by Land, Sea, and Air de GORDON SMITH, publicado por Ian Allan en 1989, y revisado en 2006 Usted puede acceder al mismo en el sitio www.naval-history.com Ha sido transcripto a PDF y colocado en el sitio del radar Malvinas al sólo efecto de preservarlo como documento histórico y asegurar su acceso en caso de que su archivo o su sitio no continúen en internet, ya que la información que contiene sobre los desplazamientos de los medios británicos y su cronología resultan sumamente útiles como información británica a confrontar al analizar lo expresado en los diferentes informes argentinos. A efectos de preservar los derechos de edición, se puede bajar y guardar para leerlo en pantalla como si fuera un libro prestado por una biblioteca, pero no se puede copiar, editar o imprimir. Copyright © Penarth: Naval–History.Net, 2006, International Journal of Naval History, 2008 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- BATTLE ATLAS OF THE FALKLANDS WAR 1982 NAVAL-HISTORY.NET GORDON SMITH BATTLE ATLAS of the FALKLANDS WAR 1982 by Land, Sea and Air by Gordon Smith HMS Plymouth, frigate (Courtesy MOD (Navy) PAG Introduction & Original Introduction & Note to 006 Based Notes Internet Page on the Reading notes & abbreviations 008 book People, places, events, forces 012 by Gordon Smith, Argentine 1. Falkland Islands 021 Invasion and British 2. Argentina 022 published by Ian Allan 1989 Response 3. History of Falklands dispute 023 4. South Georgia invasion 025 5. -
Under Fire: the Falklands War and the Revival of Naval Gunfire Support
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Portsmouth University Research Portal (Pure) Steven Paget Published in War in History, 24:2, 2017, pp.217-235. This is the post-print version and must not be copied or cited without permission. Under Fire: The Falklands War and the Revival of Naval Gunfire Support I have always placed a high priority on exercising NGS. All my ships have had the capacity & I made sure we knew how to use it. NGS became a lower priority for the Naval Staff & new construction planned had no gun. Op [Operation] Corporate changed all that thinking. Captain Michael Barrow1 The reputation of naval gunfire support (NGS) has waxed and waned since the initial development of the capability. At times, NGS has been considered to have been of supreme importance. At others, it has been viewed as worthless. By the end of the 1970s, there was burgeoning opinion in some circles that NGS had become obsolete. Operation Corporate – the Falklands War – demonstrated that reports of the demise of NGS had been greatly exaggerated. NGS played a prominent role during Operation Corporate, but it was just one of a multitude of capabilities. As John Ballard put it: ‘The British...integrated nearly every tool in the kit bag to mount their operation rapidly and win at the knife’s edge of culmination.’2 There can be no doubt that the destructive mix of capabilities utilised by British forces was crucial to the success of Operation Corporate. However, due to the inevitable limits of operating so far from home, NGS was often required to redress deficiencies in other fire support capabilities. -
Naval Accidents 1945-1988, Neptune Papers No. 3
-- Neptune Papers -- Neptune Paper No. 3: Naval Accidents 1945 - 1988 by William M. Arkin and Joshua Handler Greenpeace/Institute for Policy Studies Washington, D.C. June 1989 Neptune Paper No. 3: Naval Accidents 1945-1988 Table of Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1 Overview ........................................................................................................................................ 2 Nuclear Weapons Accidents......................................................................................................... 3 Nuclear Reactor Accidents ........................................................................................................... 7 Submarine Accidents .................................................................................................................... 9 Dangers of Routine Naval Operations....................................................................................... 12 Chronology of Naval Accidents: 1945 - 1988........................................................................... 16 Appendix A: Sources and Acknowledgements........................................................................ 73 Appendix B: U.S. Ship Type Abbreviations ............................................................................ 76 Table 1: Number of Ships by Type Involved in Accidents, 1945 - 1988................................ 78 Table 2: Naval Accidents by Type -
THE FALKLANDS WAR Raf100schools.Org.Uk
LONG RANGE MISSIONS THE FALKLANDS WAR raf100schools.org.uk LONG RANGE MISSIONS – THE FALKLANDS WAR INTRODUCTION The 1982 Falklands War is often taught and discussed from the position of its political rights and wrongs and the wider ramifi cations it had for the British and Argentinian leaderships at the time. In this material, the main focus is on the basic narrative of the military war and, in particular, the RAF Operation Black Buck. BACKGROUND TO THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT The Falkland Islands are a group of islands in the Atlantic Ocean, crossing the Atlantic, but with no 300 miles off the South American coast and 8,000 miles from the UK. formal port. There are two larger islands – East and West Falklands – and lots of In 1820, the new South American smaller ones. country of Argentina (which was The Islands were uninhabited when the Islands, before the French then created from the Spanish colony in European explorers and adventurers landed there in 1701. the region) claimed the Islands for fi rst started landing there in the itself. However, as Argentina was a The French established the fi rst seventeenth and eighteenth new state, still locked in a war with settlement on the Islands in 1764, centuries. Spain was fi rst to claim Spain, its claims were largely but within two years had left. ownership of the Islands, under laws ignored. Argentina did establish a The British separately established issued by the Pope that asserted settlement on the Islands, but the a settlement, Port Egmont, on West Spanish rights to govern South US Navy destroyed it in 1831 over a Falkland in 1765. -
The 2014 Newsletter
2014 Judy Barrow and her family with Rear Admiral Hugh Edleston and HMS Glamorgan Standard Bearer Eon Matthews CHAIRMAN’S LETTER It is unprecedented that a Chapel these special circumstances Trustees so pleased that the Chapel means so On Saturday June 15th HMS Hermes Trust Chairman has had to write of Rev. David Cooper and Anthony much to so many. We were pleased too Association gathered together in the the sad passing of two amongst us Hudson describe their thoughts and to be able to carry out the presentation Chapel for a special service to lay during the past year. I refer, of course, memories for you on pages 4 and 5. of more Elizabeth Crosses to Next of their Falklands Memorial Stone at to Captain Michael Barrow CVO Kin discovered by the enduring efforts the Cairn. (page 6). We are so very DSO RN – Founder Trustee and a The Annual Service on 16th June last of the FFA’s Treasurer and bereaved grateful to Reverend Neil Jeffers former Chairman- and Admiral Sir year was clearly another memorable father Ray Poole (page 7). To date, for organising and conducting this John ‘Sandy’ Woodward GBE KCB occasion (pages 2 & 3) although I had 40 families have been able to receive Service together with the Annual – Founder Chairman and latterly our been called away overseas. I remain their medals in the Chapel and many Service and other ‘special’ services President – two great men to whom hugely grateful to my ‘deputies’ Major more by other means through his and throughout the year in addition to his we owe an enormous debt of gratitude. -
Under Fire: the Falklands War and the Revival of Naval Gunfire Support
Steven Paget Published in War in History, 24:2, 2017, pp.217-235. This is the post-print version and must not be copied or cited without permission. Under Fire: The Falklands War and the Revival of Naval Gunfire Support I have always placed a high priority on exercising NGS. All my ships have had the capacity & I made sure we knew how to use it. NGS became a lower priority for the Naval Staff & new construction planned had no gun. Op [Operation] Corporate changed all that thinking. Captain Michael Barrow1 The reputation of naval gunfire support (NGS) has waxed and waned since the initial development of the capability. At times, NGS has been considered to have been of supreme importance. At others, it has been viewed as worthless. By the end of the 1970s, there was burgeoning opinion in some circles that NGS had become obsolete. Operation Corporate – the Falklands War – demonstrated that reports of the demise of NGS had been greatly exaggerated. NGS played a prominent role during Operation Corporate, but it was just one of a multitude of capabilities. As John Ballard put it: ‘The British...integrated nearly every tool in the kit bag to mount their operation rapidly and win at the knife’s edge of culmination.’2 There can be no doubt that the destructive mix of capabilities utilised by British forces was crucial to the success of Operation Corporate. However, due to the inevitable limits of operating so far from home, NGS was often required to redress deficiencies in other fire support capabilities. In the absence of medium and heavy artillery and with the role of aircraft in close air support (CAS) being limited by both competing demands and weather, NGS took on an increasing importance.