Reforming China's Telecommunications Laws

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Reforming China's Telecommunications Laws International Journal of Communications Law and Policy Issue 7, Winter 2002/2003 REFORMING CHINA'S TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAWS LESSONS FROM THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE? by Martyn Taylor* A. The challenge of sustainable Chinese economic development China has achieved a dramatic economic transition under the leadership of successive Presidents Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. From 1978, the traditional Chinese agricultural economy, based on communist command structures, has been transformed into a socialist market economy with a burgeoning industrial and service sector.1 These economic reforms have been reinforced by far-reaching institutional and legal reforms, as is well documented in the literature.2 As a result, China has achieved economic growth rates averaging an astounding 8.9% per annum over the past 15 years.3 China’s economy now ranks as the world’s second largest behind the United States in real terms, suggesting China already ranks as a global economic superpower notwithstanding its developing status. However, as the World Bank has noted, China must overcome daunting internal challenges if it is to sustain its present growth trajectory.4 Such challenges include rising income inequality, declining international competitiveness, regional disparities and rising unemployment.5 These challenges are compounded by the global information revolution, which will force Chinese industry to undergo further rapid restructuring to remain internationally competitive. Relevantly, to address such challenges, the World Bank recommended to the Chinese government in October 2001 that China's existing five year strategic plan should be amended to further promote the development of Chinese telecommunications infrastructure.6 Indeed, while China has the largest telecommunications network in the world (dwarfing that of Australia), the accessibility of that network to the Chinese population remains comparatively low, indicating significant scope for further infrastructure development, as illustrated by the comparison in Table One below. * LLB(Hons), BA(Economics)(Hons), BSc, LLM; PhD candidate; Senior Associate at Mallesons Stephen Jaques specialising in telecommunications law and competition law. Submitted following study at the East China University of Politics & Law, Shanghai, China. The author can be contacted at [email protected]. The views expressed in this article are those of the author. 1 The term “socialist market economy,” refers to a situation in which market forces are relied on to improve efficiency while the government continues to manage many aspects of economic production, including by retaining a high degree of state-ownership. 2 See AES Tay “Introduction : Law and Legal Culture in China” in AES Tay & G Doeker-Mach (eds) Asia-Pacific Handbook - Volume 1: People’s Republic of China (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden- Baden, 1998), pp 39-53. See also B Naughton Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1979-1993 (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1995). 3 See World Bank “Country Economic Review: People’s Republic of China” PRC 2000-09, World Bank, Washington DC, October 2000, adjusted for recent statistics. 4 See CJ Dahlman & JE Aubert “China and the Knowledge Economy: Seizing the 21st Century”, World Bank Development Study (China), World Bank, Washington DC, October 2001. 5 Significant income disparities now exist, for example, between the richer coastal provinces and the poorer hinterland areas where ethnic minorities are heavily concentrated. 6 Chinese economic policy for the development of the telecommunications sector is articulated within China’s Tenth “Five Year Plan” (2001-2005) which sets out various targets for such matters as telephone line penetration and infrastructure investment. 1 International Journal of Communications Law and Policy Issue 7, Winter 2002/2003 Within the context of its rapid economic reform programme, China has already moved swiftly in recent years to reform its telecommunications sector. Such reforms were expedited by China's entry into the WTO in 2001, resulting in significant amendments to Chinese telecommunications regulation.7 However, towards the end of 2001, the Chinese government indicated that it would prioritise and implement yet further telecommunications law and policy reforms.8 Such reforms remain firmly on the Chinese policy agenda for 2003 and are likely to remain central to China’s future economic development strategy, particularly given the World Bank’s October 2001 recommendations.9 Against this background, this paper identifies further reforms that could be made to China's existing telecommunications laws and overall regulatory structure to address critical issues that Australia experienced during its own telecommunications law reforms. In undertaking this analysis, this paper undertakes a comparative analysis of Australia's and China's current telecommunications laws and assesses their effectiveness in meeting their respective policy objectives. This paper concludes with a number of law reform recommendations for the Chinese Government, consistent with the economic development strategy identified by the World Bank in its October 2001 report. Table One: Key comparative statistics between China and Australia10 Statistic China Australia Population 1,273.1 million 19.4 million Land area 9.3 million square km 7.6 million square km GDP (2000 est.) US$4.5 trillion US$445.8 billion GDP per capita (2000 est.) US$3,600 US$23,200 GDP composition 15% agriculture, 50% 3% agriculture, 26% industry, 35% services industry, 71% services Telephones lines in use 185.1 million11 9.6 million Telephone lines per capita (%) 15% 50% Mobile telephones 155.8 million12 10.3 million Mobile phones per capita (%) 12% 53% Internet users 27.5 million 8 million Internet usage per capita (%) 2% 41% 7 See S Nelson “Regulatory Watch: China” (2001) 33(12) Business Asia 9. 8 See “China Moves Ahead with Monopoly Phone Split”, Total Telecom Asia, www.totaltele.com, 11 December 2001. 9 China’s APEC Individual Action Plan for 2001, for example, comments that: (a) during 2002-2005, China will progressively open its telecommunications market after its entry into the WTO; (b) during 2005-2010, China will continue to implement opening policy, strengthen international cooperation and exchanges, and promote further opening of the Chinese telecommunications industry; and (c) during 2010-2020, China will actively create conditions to promote the integration of China's telecommunications industry into the world. See Government of China “Peoples Republic of China: Individual Action Plan 2001”, APEC, Singapore, 2001. 10 Statistics as at March 2002, unless otherwise stated. 11 See “China Mobile Users Hit 155.85 Million Mark in February: China Reports Record Rise in Mobile Phone Users”, Total Telecom Asia, www.totaltel.com, 27 March 2002. 12 See Total Telecom Asia, above n 11. 2 International Journal of Communications Law and Policy Issue 7, Winter 2002/2003 B. Comparative telecommunications sector reforms In order to analyse Australia and China’s current telecommunications laws, it is necessary to understand the historical context to their respective telecommunications reforms. Telecommunications sector reforms were initiated, on an international basis, during the late 1970s and early 1980s in recognition that state ownership was hindering the development of telecommunications infrastructure and the adoption of new services and technologies.13 Such reforms were partly motivated by the rapid evolution of new technologies and the considerable capital investment that would have been required by governments to implement such technologies and meet growth in demand.14 Such reforms were also motivated by an increasing international emphasis on competition policy and market mechanisms as a means to promote economic efficiency and increase social welfare. The primary purpose of such reforms was to provide consumers with a greater quality and diversity of services at a lower overall cost.15 I. Australian historical and policy context Historically, Australian domestic telecommunications services were provided by the Australian Post Office and, later, the Australian Telecommunications Commission (ATC).16 International telecommunications services were provided by the Overseas Telecommunications Commission (OTC).17 The ATC and OTC each comprised statutory commissions operating statutory monopolies in their respective sectors. In 1989, the Australian government corporatised the ATC while enacting the Telecommunications Act 1989 to implement the first stage of Australian telecommunications reforms.18 This legislation permitted limited competition in the provision of certain value-added services, while establishing an independent regulatory agency (AUSTEL) to protect consumers and ensure fair competition.19 In 1991, the Australian government enacted the Telecommunications Act 1991 which facilitated the market entry of Optus Communications Limited (Optus ) by way of competitive tender, and Vodafone Limited (Vodafone ), as large-scale private sector competitors.20 Meanwhile, the OTC and ATC were amalgamated to form Telstra Corporation Limited (Telstra) under 100% government ownership.21 Optus and Vodafone were granted statutory access rights to various Telstra networks and services, supervised by AUSTEL as independent industry regulator.22 Retail competition was increased by encouraging market entry by resellers who resold basic carriage services provided by Telstra. 13 See W Melody (ed) Telecom Reform: Principles, Policies
Recommended publications
  • State of Mobile Networks: Australia (November 2018)
    State of Mobile Networks: Australia (November 2018) Australia's level of 4G access and its mobile broadband speeds continue to climb steadily upwards. In our fourth examination of the country's mobile market, we found a new leader in both our 4G speed and availability metrics. Analyzing more than 425 million measurements, OpenSignal parsed the 3G and 4G metrics of Australia's three biggest operators Optus, Telstra and Vodafone. Report Facts 425,811,023 31,735 Jul 1 - Sep Australia Measurements Test Devices 28, 2018 Report Sample Period Location Highlights Telstra swings into the lead in our download Optus's 4G availability tops 90% speed metrics Optus's 4G availability score increased by 2 percentage points in the A sizable bump in Telstra's 4G download speed results propelled last six months, which allowed it to reach two milestones. It became the the operator to the top of our 4G download speed and overall first Australian operator in our measurements to pass the 90% threshold download speed rankings. Telstra also became the first in LTE availability, and it pulled ahead of Vodafone to become the sole Australian operator to cross the 40 Mbps barrier in our 4G winner of our 4G availability award. download analysis. Vodafone wins our 4G latency award, but Telstra maintains its commanding lead in 4G Optus is hot on its heels upload Vodafone maintained its impressive 4G latency score at 30 While the 4G download speed race is close among the three operators milliseconds for the second report in row, holding onto its award in Australia, there's not much of a contest in 4G upload speed.
    [Show full text]
  • Separation of Telstra: Economic Considerations, International Experience
    WIK-Consult Report Study for the Competitive Carriers‟ Coalition Separation of Telstra: Economic considerations, international experience Authors: J. Scott Marcus Dr. Christian Wernick Kenneth R. Carter WIK-Consult GmbH Rhöndorfer Str. 68 53604 Bad Honnef Germany Bad Honnef, 2 June 2009 Functional Separation of Telstra I Contents 1 Introduction 1 2 Economic and policy background on various forms of separation 4 3 Case studies on different separation regimes 8 3.1 The Establishment of Openreach in the UK 8 3.2 Functional separation in the context of the European Framework for Electronic Communication 12 3.3 Experiences in the U.S. 15 3.3.1 The Computer Inquiries 15 3.3.2 Separate affiliate requirements under Section 272 17 3.3.3 Cellular separation 18 3.3.4 Observations 20 4 Concentration and cross-ownership in the Australian marketplace 21 4.1 Characteristics of the Australian telecommunications market 22 4.2 Cross-ownership of fixed, mobile, and cable television networks 27 4.3 The dominant position of Telstra on the Australian market 28 5 An assessment of Australian market and regulatory characteristics based on Three Criteria Test 32 5.1 High barriers to entry 33 5.2 Likely persistence of those barriers 35 5.3 Inability of other procompetitive instruments to address the likely harm 38 5.4 Conclusion 38 6 The way forward 39 6.1 Regulation or separation? 40 6.2 Structural separation, or functional separation? 42 6.3 What kind of functional separation? 44 6.3.1 Overview of the functional separation 44 6.3.2 What services and assets should be assigned to the separated entity? 47 6.3.3 How should the separation be implemented? 49 Bibliography 52 II Functional Separation of Telstra Recommendations Recommendation 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Telstra Corporation Limited (‘Telstra’) Welcomes the Opportunity to Make a Submission to the USPTO on Prior User Rights
    Introduction Telstra Corporation Limited (‘Telstra’) welcomes the opportunity to make a submission to the USPTO on prior user rights. As Australia’s leading telecommunications and information services company, Telstra provides customers with a truly integrated experience across fixed line, mobiles, broadband, information, transaction, search and pay TV. Telstra BigPond is Australia’s leading Internet Service Provider offering retail internet access nationally, along with a range of online and mobile content and value added services One of our major strengths in providing integrated telecommunications services is our vast geographical coverage through both our fixed and mobile network infrastructure. This network and systems infrastructure underpins the carriage and termination of the majority of Australia's domestic and international voice and data telephony traffic. Telstra has an extensive intellectual property portfolio, including trade mark and patent rights in Australian and overseas. Telstra is also a licensor and a licensee of intellectual property, including a licensee of online and digital content. The prior user exemptions to infringement under Australian and other countries’ (such as Japanese, EU and Canadian) law are important mechanisms that allow companies or individuals to continue activities legitimately undertaken prior to the grant of a third party patent. It’s Telstra’s submission that harmonisation of US laws to recognise and adopt similar prior user provisions would be welcomed to similarly provide certainty for commercial practices and investment. Our response below focuses on those aspects of the study into prior user rights that are of particular interest or concern to Telstra. 1a. Please share your experiences relating to the use of prior user rights in foreign jurisdictions including, but not limited to, members of the European Union and Japan, Canada, and Australia.
    [Show full text]
  • Getting to Know Your Telstra Pre-Paid 3G Wi-Fi Let’S Get This Show on the Road
    GETTING TO KNOW YOUR TELSTRA PRE-PAID 3G WI-FI LET’S GET THIS SHOW ON THE ROAD You must be excited about your brand new Telstra Pre-Paid 3G Wi-Fi. This guide will help you get connected as quickly and as easily as possible. It’ll guide you through installation and run through all the handy extra features that are included. If all goes to plan you’ll be up and running in no time, so you can get connected while you’re on the move. 2 WHAT’S INSIDE 03 Safety first 06 Let’s get started 13 Getting connected 25 Wi-Fi home page 20 Extra features 22 Problem solving 25 Extra bits you should know 2 SAFETY FIRST Please read all the safety notices before using this device. This device is designed to be used at least 20cm from your body. Do not use the device near fuel or chemicals or in any prescribed area such as service stations, refineries, hospitals and aircraft. Obey all warning signs where posted. RADIO FREQUENCY SAFETY INFORMATION The device has an internal antenna. For optimum performance with minimum power consumption do not shield the device or cover with any object. Covering the antenna affects signal quality, may cause the router to operate at a higher power level than needed, and may shorten battery life. RADIO FREQUENCY ENERGY Your wireless device is a low-power radio transmitter and receiver. When switched on it intermittently transmits radio frequency (RF) energy (radio waves). The transmit power level is optimised for best performance and automatically 3 4 reduces when there is good quality reception.
    [Show full text]
  • The State of 5G Trials
    The State of Trials Courtesy of 5G Data Speeds Shows the highest claimed data speeds reached during 5G trials, where disclosed 36 Gb/s Etisalat 35.46 Gb/s Ooredoo 35 Gb/s M1 35 Gb/s StarHub 35 Gb/s Optus 20 Gb/s Telstra 20 Gb/s Vodafone UK 15 Gb/s Telia 14 Gb/s AT&T 12 Gb/s T-Mobile USA 11.29 Gb/s NTT DoCoMo 10 Gb/s Vodafone Turkey 10 Gb/s Verizon 10 Gb/s Orange France 9 Gb/s US Cellular 7 Gb/s SK Telecom 5.7 Gb/s SmartTone 5 Gb/s Vodafone Australia 4.5 Gb/s Sonera 4 Gb/s Sprint 2.3 Gb/s Korea Telecom 2.2 Gb/s C Spire 5G Trial Spectrum Shows the spectrum used by operators during 5G trials, where disclosed Telstra Optus NTTDoCoMo AT&T AT&T AT&T AT&T Verizon Vodafone Korea Vodafone Bell Vodafone StarHub UK Telecom Turkey Canada Turkey Sonera China SmarTone C Spire Verizon Mobile M1 Vodafone Sprint Korea Australia Telecom Optus Telia NTT DoCoMo Sprint Turkcell SK Telecom US Cellular T-Mobile USA Verizon US Cellular Verizon SUB 3 3.5 4.5 SUB 6 15 28 39 64 70 70-80 71-76 73 81-86 60-90 GHTZ Operator 5G Trials Shows the current state of 5G progress attained by operators Announced 5G trials Lab testing 5G Field testing 5G Operators that have announced timings of Operators that have announced Operators that have announced that they trials or publicly disclosed MoUs for trials that they have lab tested 5G have conducted 5G testing in the field Equipment Providers in 5G Trials Shows which equipment providers are involved in 5G trials with operators MTS T-Mobile USA SK Telekom Verizon Batelco Turkcell AT&T Bell Canada Sonera SmarTone Vodafone Orange BT Taiwan Germany Telia Mobile Telstra C Spire Vodafone US Cellular Vodafone Turkey M1 Australia MTS Ooredoo M1 NTT Docomo Optus Orange China StarHub Mobile Korea Telecom 5G trials with all five equipment providers Telefonica Deutsche Telekom Etisalat Telus Vodafone UK Viavi (NASDAQ: VIAV) is a global provider of network test, monitoring and assurance solutions to communications service providers, enterprises and their ecosystems.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 11 ) INTELSAT
    Case 20-32299-KLP Doc 495 Filed 07/09/20 Entered 07/09/20 15:11:39 Desc Main Document Page 1 of 16 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA RICHMOND DIVISION ) In re: ) Chapter 11 ) 1 INTELSAT S.A., et al., ) Case No. 20-32299 (KLP) ) Debtors. ) (Jointly Administered) ) DECLARATION OF DISINTERESTEDNESS OF HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP AS PROPOSED ORDINARY COURSE PROFESSIONAL I, Steven M. Kaufman, declare under penalty of perjury: 1. I am a Partner of Hogan Lovells US LLP, located at Columbia Square, 555 Thirteenth Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 2004 (“HLUS”). 2. Intelsat S.A. and its affiliates, as debtors and debtors in possession (collectively, the “Debtors”), have requested that HLUS continue to provide legal services to the Debtors as an ordinary course professional pursuant to section 327(e) of the Bankruptcy Code in the Debtors’ chapter 11 cases (collectively, the “Chapter 11 Cases”), and HLUS has agreed to provide such services. Such services may be provided by HLUS directly and/or through its affiliated businesses, including Hogan Lovells International LLP (collectively, the “Firm”), through arrangements with HLUS. 3. The Firm may have performed services in the past, may currently perform services, and may perform services in the future in matters unrelated to the Chapter 11 Cases for persons or entities that are parties in interest in the Chapter 11 Cases. See Schedule A attached 1 Due to the large number of Debtors in these Chapter 11 Cases, for which joint administration has been granted, a complete list of the Debtor entities and the last four digits of their federal tax identification numbers is not provided herein.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction to China Telecom Americas' West Coast Data Centers
    About China Telecom Americas China Telecom Americas is the wholly owned North American-based subsidiary of China Telecom Corp. Ltd. (NYSE: CHA) with headquarters in Herndon, Virginia, and offices in Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, St. Louis and San Jose, Introduction to and a subsidiary in Toronto, Canada. We are an international telecom provider of Data, IP and Wholesale Voice services to Multinational enterprises, carriers, ISPs, content providers and companies operating mission critical operations and applications in China/Asia Pacific. China Telecom Americas provides a locally based, one-stop, turn-key solution for everything from China China Telecom Americas’ domestic and international data circuits to IDC services, network management, equipment management, systems integration, and much more. We are licensed to sell domestic China telecommunication services in the Americas. For more information West Coast Data Centers go to www.ctamericas.com or send an email to [email protected]. Find China Telecom Data Centers Worldwide China Telecom’s expansion and investments in support of global enterprises means that IDCs are located in most of the major cities in China and new data centers are constantly being brought online. To find out about data centers in a specific location, contact China Telecom Americas. Santa Clara & Data centers are available in provinces throughout China including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Fujian, Zhejiang, Sichuan, Chongqing, Hunan, Hubei, Guangxi, Yunnan, Tianjin and Shanxi. Los Angeles Other global locations include Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States of America, Canada, the United Kingdom (London), Germany (Frankfurt), France (Paris), Sweden (Stockholm), the United Arab Emirates (Dubai) and in Russia.
    [Show full text]
  • 6. China's Economic Transformation
    6. China’s economic transformation1 Gregory C. Chow Why economic reform started in 1978 Deng Xiaoping took over control of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1978. He was responsible for initiating reform of the planned economy to move towards a more market-oriented economy. In a sense, the change in policy can be interpreted partially as a continuation of the ‘four modernisations’ (of agriculture, industry, defence, and science and technology) announced by premier Zhou Enlai in 1964, but interrupted by the Cultural Revolution. This explanation was suggested to me by a former vice-premier of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On the other hand, a former premier once told me: ‘The Cultural Revolution did great harm to China, but it freed us from certain ideological constraints.’ These statements indicate that the Cultural Revolution did affect the thinking of top party leaders and thus the course of China’s economic development. Taking these statements into account, together with other considerations, I offer the following explanation for the initiation of economic reform. There were four reasons the time was ripe for reform. First, the Cultural Revolution was very unpopular, and the party and the government had to distance themselves from the old regime and make changes to win the support of the people. Second, after years of experience in economic planning, government officials understood the shortcomings of the planned system and the need for change. Third, successful economic development in other parts of Asia—including Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea, known as the ‘Four Tigers’—demonstrated to Chinese government officials and the Chinese people that a market economy works better than a planned one.
    [Show full text]
  • Can the Strategy of Western Development Narrow Down China's
    Can Western Development Narrow Down China’s Regional Disparity? Can the Strategy of Western Development Narrow Down China’s Regional Disparity?* Wei Zhang Abstract Faculty of Oriental Studies The main causes of the faster growth in China’s eastern coastal University of Cambridge Sidgwick Avenue area, and thus for the rise in income disparity between eastern Cambridge CB3 9AD and western regions, are the rapid increases in foreign trade and United Kingdom foreign investment resulting not only from the government’s [email protected] coastal development strategy but also from inherent advantages of the eastern coastal area. Since 1999, the development strategy for western China has focused on the injection of large amounts of capital, but fiscal constraints make this strategy unsustainable. China’s government should allow mobility of the labor force across regions to play a bigger role in solving the income disparity problem. 1. Introduction China embarked upon economic reforms in 1978. Since then, the average annual growth rate of China’s GDP through 2001 has been 8.9 percent.1 The pace of GDP growth in different regions has varied, however. If we di- vide China into three areas based on geographical location and government policy coverage (viz., eastern, central, * I thank Wing Thye Woo, Cyril Lin, Maozu Lu, Guy Liu, and Zhichao Zhang for insightful discussion on this topic. I also beneªted from discussions during the Asian Economic Panel conference on 9–10 October 2003 in Seoul, South Korea. The views expressed in the paper are those of the author and should not be interpreted as reºecting the views of those who have helped with the paper.
    [Show full text]
  • VPN Solutions
    VPN Solutions VPN Solution China Telecom’s VPN services are the ultimate cost-effective solution for business communication needs, offering the same security and reliability as digital private leased line circuits. Running on China Telecom CN2 network, exclusively tailored for high-end users and offering premium VPN services, we adeptly provide any-to- any connectivity, full managed, flexible and secure VPN solutions with unique service quality. China Telecom also provides enhanced value-added services to give businesses security in knowing their networks are permanently in superior condition. Our value-added services include NetCare, equipment procurement and leasing, equipment maintenance outsourcing and system integration. Service Options • Layer 3 MPLS VPN • Layer 2 VPLS VPN 中国电信(欧洲)有限公司 China Telecom (Europe) Ltd. Member of China Telecom Global www.chinatelecomglobal.com China Telecom’s VPN Overseas PoPs Helsinki Stockholm Vancouver Moscow London Seattle Toronto Frankfurt Shenyang Chicago Paris Milan San Jose New York Urumqi Beijing Istanbul Seoul Washington Madrid Tokyo Dallas X i ’a n Nanjing Los Angeles Chengdu Shanghai Cairo Lhasa Wuhan Miami New Delhi Guangzhou Kunming Dubai Hong Kong Hanoi Mumbai Bangkok Ho Chi Minh City Kuala Lumpur Nairobi Singapore Jakarta, Tangerang San Paolo Perth POP Johannesburg POP under construction Sydney Our vast network resources ensure secure data transmission; in particular, for VoIP, Video or ERP applications, we provide 5 levels Quality of Service (QoS) and Services Level Agreement (SLA) to meet all your specific needs and requirements. Service Specifications Class QoS Parameters Service / Application Latency, Jitter, Available to strictly high demand on latency and/or Jitter, such as quality real-time voice Diamond Packet Loss (VoIP), etc.
    [Show full text]
  • China Telecom (Americas) Corporation ) GN Docket No
    Federal Communications Commission FCC 20-177 Before the Federal Communications Commission Washington, D.C. 20554 In the Matter of ) ) China Telecom (Americas) Corporation ) GN Docket No. 20-109; ) ITC-214-20010613-00346; ) ITC-214-20020716-00371; ) ITC-T/C-20070725-00285 ORDER INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS ON REVOCATION AND TERMINATION AND MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Adopted: December 10, 2020 Released: December 14, 2020 By the Commission: Chairman Pai, Commissioners Carr and Starks issuing separate statements. TABLE OF CONTENTS Heading Paragraph # I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 1 II. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................................... 2 III. ORDER INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS .......................................................................................... 15 A. Revocation of Section 214 Authority............................................................................................. 20 1. National Security and Law Enforcement Concerns Related to China Telecom Americas .................................................................................................................................. 22 2. National Security and Law Enforcement Risks Associated with China Telecom Americas’ Retention of Section 214 Authorities ..................................................................... 29 3. China Telecom Americas’ Past
    [Show full text]
  • Resourcing Vocational Education and Training in Australia
    NCVER in Australiavocationaleducation traeininducatig resourcinon trainig ng vocational education and trainingresourcing edtruaincaitionng Australia Resourcing vocational education and training in Australia Tom Dumbrell ©Australian National Training Authority, 2004 This work has been produced by the National Centre for Vocational Education Research (NCVER) with the assistance of funding provided by the Australian National Training Authority (ANTA). It is published by NCVER under licence from ANTA. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of this publication may be reported by any process without the written permission of NCVER Ltd. Requests should be made in writing to NCVER Ltd. The views and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author/project team and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Australian National Training Authority. ISBN 1 920895 25 6 print edition ISBN 1 920895 26 4 web edition TD/TNC 76.10 Published by NCVER ABN 87 007 967 311 Level 11, 33 King William Street, Adelaide SA 5000 PO Box 8288, Station Arcade SA 5000, Australia <http://www.ncver.edu.au> Contents Tables and figures 4 Executive summary 5 The policy environment leading to the ANTA Agreement 7 Background 7 The ANTA Agreement 10 The VET policy environment ten years on 12 The decade of change 12 Changing industry structure during the nineties 14 Changing occupational structure during the nineties 15 Changing social philosophies 15 VET in Schools 18 VET funding 20 Funding and growth in VET and TAFE—1989–90 to 1999 20
    [Show full text]