DOCSLIB.ORG

Can the Strategy of Western Development Narrow Down China's

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Can Western Development Narrow Down China’s Regional Disparity? Can the Strategy of Western Development Narrow Down China’s Regional Disparity?* Wei Zhang Abstract Faculty of Oriental Studies The main causes of the faster growth in China’s eastern coastal University of Cambridge Sidgwick Avenue area, and thus for the rise in income disparity between eastern Cambridge CB3 9AD and western regions, are the rapid increases in foreign trade and United Kingdom foreign investment resulting not only from the government’s [email protected] coastal development strategy but also from inherent advantages of the eastern coastal area. Since 1999, the development strategy for western China has focused on the injection of large amounts of capital, but fiscal constraints make this strategy unsustainable. China’s government should allow mobility of the labor force across regions to play a bigger role in solving the income disparity problem. 1. Introduction China embarked upon economic reforms in 1978. Since then, the average annual growth rate of China’s GDP through 2001 has been 8.9 percent.1 The pace of GDP growth in different regions has varied, however. If we di- vide China into three areas based on geographical location and government policy coverage (viz., eastern, central, * I thank Wing Thye Woo, Cyril Lin, Maozu Lu, Guy Liu, and Zhichao Zhang for insightful discussion on this topic. I also beneªted from discussions during the Asian Economic Panel conference on 9–10 October 2003 in Seoul, South Korea. The views expressed in the paper are those of the author and should not be interpreted as reºecting the views of those who have helped with the paper. I thank Nancy Hearst at the Fairbank Center of the East Asia Institute at Harvard for her help. 1 This calculation for the 1978–2001 period used constant prices based on the price level of 1978. Asian Economic Papers 3:3 © 2005 The Earth Institute at Columbia University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/1535351054825229 by guest on 01 October 2021 Can Western Development Narrow Down China’s Regional Disparity? and western),2 the average growth rates of GDP in these areas during 1978–2001 were 10.2 percent, 9.08 percent, and 8.19 percent, respectively. This means that in- come disparities across the three areas have increased during this time, given that the coastal area was already relatively richer than the central and western areas in 1978. The GDP share of the eastern area in the total national GDP increased from 52 percent to 60 percent; the share of the central area decreased from 31 percent to 27 percent; and the share of the western area decreased from 17 percent to 12 per- cent (see table 1). The widening of regional disparities is also seen in the changes of GDP per capita across regions. During 1978–2001, the ratio of GDP per capita in the eastern area to the average GDP per capita nationwide increased from 1.28 to 1.42, but the corresponding ratio for the central area decreased from 0.86 to 0.75, and that of the western area decreased from 0.72 to 0.57 (see table 2 and ªgure 1). To address this worsening of regional disparity, the Chinese government mapped out a strategy of western development in 1999.3 In general, it should take a long time to implement a regional development policy and even longer to obtain any sustainable results, so it is perhaps premature to evaluate the effectiveness of China’s strategy of western development at present. The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the relevance of, or relationship between, the causes of China’s re- gional disparity and the policies chosen by the government for the development of China’s western area. 2. China’s strategy of western development In June 1999, at a meeting on the reform and development of state-owned enter- prises (SOEs) in Xi’An, Jiang Zemin, then General Secretary of the Central Commit- tee of the Communist Party of China and President of China, formally put forward the concept of the development of the western region.4 The participants of the Cen- tral Economic Working Conference held in November of the same year determined the strategy for the development of the western region. In January 2000, a leading 2 The eastern area is made up of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan; the central area covers Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan; and the western area includes inner Mongolia, Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizho, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. Guangxi is an autonomous region with a seaport, Beihai. It is one of the 11 coastal provincial-level units that has enjoyed the central government’s preferential policies since 1984. It was also listed as one of the western provincial-level units when the central government launched the campaign of western development. For consistency in the data analysis, we categorize Guangxi as a coastal/eastern area. 3 Jiang Zemin, “Talk at the Workshop of State-Owned Enterprises’ Reform in Xian,” People’s Daily, 18 June 1999. 4 Ibid. 2 Asian Economic Papers Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/1535351054825229 by guest on 01 October 2021 Can Western Development Narrow Down China’s Regional Disparity? Table 1. China’s GDP and the percentage share of GDP in total GDP for the three areas (1978–2001) Eastern area Central area Western area National GDP GDP GDP GDP (million yuan) (million yuan) % (million yuan) % (million yuan) % 1978 346,354 181,832 52.5 106,466 30.7 58,056 16.8 1979 394,275 203,873 51.7 123,687 31.4 66,715 16.9 1980 439,596 229,585 52.2 136,908 31.1 73,103 16.6 1981 479,347 250,961 52.4 151,041 31.5 77,345 16.1 1982 533,108 279,868 52.5 166,131 31.2 87,109 16.3 1983 598,085 311,019 52.0 189,495 31.7 97,571 16.3 1984 712,537 373,412 52.4 223,875 31.4 115,250 16.2 1985 862,066 455,246 52.8 267,538 31.0 139,282 16.2 1986 965,648 511,314 53.0 300,087 31.1 154,247 16.0 1987 1,144,177 612,845 53.6 352,365 30.8 178,967 15.6 1988 1,445,266 786,501 54.4 434,060 30.0 224,705 15.5 1989 1,635,691 895,790 54.8 489,251 29.9 250,650 15.3 1990 1,833,023 989,966 54.0 547,920 29.9 295,137 16.1 1991 2,110,312 1,164,293 55.2 605,130 28.7 340,889 16.2 1992 2,584,738 1,459,328 56.5 725,345 28.1 400,065 15.5 1993 3,422,001 1,981,049 57.9 931,780 27.2 509,172 14.9 1994 4,521,683 2,652,547 58.7 1,212,823 26.8 656,313 14.5 1995 5,763,278 3,361,540 58.3 1,586,764 27.5 814,974 14.1 1996 6,730,552 3,970,377 59.0 1,916,757 28.5 843,418 12.5 1997 7,547,520 4,445,350 58.9 2,164,300 28.7 937,870 12.4 1998 8,106,540 4,807,090 59.3 2,287,150 28.2 1,012,300 12.5 1999 8,619,170 5,156,430 59.8 2,397,450 27.8 1,065,290 12.4 2000 9,527,990 5,752,720 60.4 2,625,020 27.6 1,150,250 12.1 2001 10,501,650 6,362,436 60.6 2,867,045 27.3 1,272,169 12.1 Sources: Chinese Statistical Yearbook, 1984 to 2002. Note: GDP per capita is calculated by current price. group for western development was set up, with Premier Zhu Rongji as the leader, Vice-Premier Wen Jiabao as the deputy, and 19 ministerial-level ofªcials from rele- vant ministries and commissions under the State Council as members. This group produced the report Some Policies and Measures Concerning the Launch of the Great Western Development in October 2000. This document has been regarded as the for- mal commencement of the implementation of the strategy of western development. In March 2000, the Leading Group of the Western Development Ofªce under the State Council was established as part of the State Development and Planning Com- mission (Leading Group of the Western Development Ofªce 2000). The basic content of the strategy for western development was later included in the Outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–2005) for National Economic and Social Devel- opment in China (State Development and Planning Commission 2001). The strategy has three main goals: ªrst, to narrow regional disparities in economic development and income distribution; second, to maintain social and political stability in the western area by accelerating western development; and third, in response to the slowing economic growth in China, to create new economic growth by expanding domestic demand. The central government also stressed the following ªve focal points for developing the western region (Wang 2001): 3 Asian Economic Papers Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/1535351054825229 by guest on 01 October 2021 Can Western Development Narrow Down China’s Regional Disparity? Table 2.
Recommended publications
  • Uneven Development and Beyond: Regional Development Theory in Post-Mao China*

    Uneven Development and Beyond: Regional Development Theory in Post-Mao China*

    Uneven Development and Beyond: Regional Development Theory in Post-Mao China* C. CINDY FAN From Maoist redistributive policies1 to Deng’s uneven development model to the current Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996–2000), Chinese regional policy has undergone several decades of trials, adjustments and readjustments. During the first three decades of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), investments were diverted from the more developed coastal areas to the poorer interior, in order to ‘correct’ the inherent uneven regional development, to tap inland raw materials and resources, and for national defense purposes2 (Falkenheim, 1985; Yang, 1990). Post-Mao evaluations of these redistributive policies criticized their neglect of economic efficiency and their failure to accelerate national economic growth. Then, Deng’s rise to power brought about a stark reversal of regional development priorities. Specifically, the coastal region is designated to be developed first, with a host of open zones set aside for foreign investment and rapid economic growth. Deng’s uneven development policy has led to a widening development gap between the coastal areas and the interior, contradicting Mao’s attempt to narrow regional disparities but has indeed contributed to strong national economic growth. Yet the debate on regional development continues. Since the mid-1980s, criticisms of the uneven development policy have become more severe and alarming, culminating in the current Ninth Five-Year Plan, which advocates once again that investments be increased in inland areas. The debates and shifts of Chinese regional policy are a product of politics as well as the prevailing philosophies and theories of development. This paper emphasizes the latter.
  • 6. China's Economic Transformation

    6. China's Economic Transformation

    6. China’s economic transformation1 Gregory C. Chow Why economic reform started in 1978 Deng Xiaoping took over control of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1978. He was responsible for initiating reform of the planned economy to move towards a more market-oriented economy. In a sense, the change in policy can be interpreted partially as a continuation of the ‘four modernisations’ (of agriculture, industry, defence, and science and technology) announced by premier Zhou Enlai in 1964, but interrupted by the Cultural Revolution. This explanation was suggested to me by a former vice-premier of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On the other hand, a former premier once told me: ‘The Cultural Revolution did great harm to China, but it freed us from certain ideological constraints.’ These statements indicate that the Cultural Revolution did affect the thinking of top party leaders and thus the course of China’s economic development. Taking these statements into account, together with other considerations, I offer the following explanation for the initiation of economic reform. There were four reasons the time was ripe for reform. First, the Cultural Revolution was very unpopular, and the party and the government had to distance themselves from the old regime and make changes to win the support of the people. Second, after years of experience in economic planning, government officials understood the shortcomings of the planned system and the need for change. Third, successful economic development in other parts of Asia—including Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea, known as the ‘Four Tigers’—demonstrated to Chinese government officials and the Chinese people that a market economy works better than a planned one.
  • Urban Green Growth in Dynamic Asia: a Conceptual Framework

    Urban Green Growth in Dynamic Asia: a Conceptual Framework

    Urban Green Growth in Dynamic Asia A conceptual framework Photo credit - © Shutterstock URBAN GREEN GROWTH IN DYNAMIC ASIA: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK The development of Asian cities is characterised by rapid and continuous urbanisation on an unprecedented scale, with rapid economic growth led in most places by the manufacturing industry, and rapidly increasing motorisation. The result has been escalating greenhouse gas emissions, sprawling urban development and local environmental impacts, as well as disparities in income, education levels and job opportunities in the urban population. These trends differ sharply from those in most of the OECD area and call for a green growth model that differs from those identified in previous OECD studies and that addresses the specific circumstances of Asian cities. This paper proposes an analytical framework for assessing policies for green growth in rapidly growing cities in the emerging world. It builds on Cities and Green Growth: A Conceptual Framework (Hammer et al., 2011) and is adapted to the urban policy context of dynamic Asia. Its three main elements are: i) identification of the key policy strategies for urban green growth in fast-growing Asian cities, highlighting similarities to and differences from OECD cities; ii) opportunities for green growth; and iii) enabling strategies for implementing urban green growth. The paper was prepared by Tadashi Matsumoto and Loïc Daudey in the Urban Development Programme, under the supervision of William Tompson, in the Regional Development Policy Division directed by Joaquim Oliveira-Martins. It benefitted from valuable comments and inputs from colleagues: Joaquim Oliveira-Martins, Setsuko Saya, Claire Charbit, Isabelle Chatry, Aziza Akhmouch, Oscar Huerta Melchor, Marissa Plouin, Despina Pachnou, Oriana Romano, Nathalie Girouard, Robert Youngman, Xavier Leflaive, Osamu Kawanishi, Jan Corfee-Morlot, Sani Zou, Juan Casado Asensio, Alexis Robert, Stephanie Ockenden, Anna Drutschinin, David Gierten, James Sheppard and Kensuke Tanaka.
  • OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy Synthesis Report

    OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy Synthesis Report

    OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy CHINA Synthesis Report ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT in collaboration with THE MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, CHINA ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT The OECD is a unique forum where the governments of 30 democracies work together to address the economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisation. The OECD is also at the forefront of efforts to understand and to help governments respond to new developments and concerns, such as corporate governance, the information economy and the challenges of an ageing population. The Organisation provides a setting where govern- ments can compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and work to co- ordinate domestic and international policies. The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Commission of the European Communities takes part in the work of the OECD. OECD Publishing disseminates widely the results of the Organisation’s statistics gathering and research on economic, social and environmental issues, as well as the conventions, guidelines and standards agreed by its members. © OECD 2007 No reproduction, copy, transmission or translation of this publication may be made without written permission. Applications should be sent to OECD Publishing: [email protected] 3 Foreword This synthesis report (August 2007 Beijing Conference version) summarises the main findings of the OECD review of the Chinese national innovation system (NIS) and policy.
  • The Shanghai Co-Operation Organisation: China’S Initiative in Regional Institutional Building

    The Shanghai Co-Operation Organisation: China’S Initiative in Regional Institutional Building

    Journal of Contemporary Asia Vol. 41, No. 4, November 2011, pp. 632–656 The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation: China’s Initiative in Regional Institutional Building JOSEPH Y. S. CHENG Contemporary China Research Project, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong ABSTRACT China’s initiative in establishing and promoting the development of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) is an interesting case study of China’s attempt at regional institution building. China’s increasing interest in Central Asia coincided with its gradual acceptance and rising enthusiasm regarding participation in regional organisations. The ‘‘Shang- hai Five’’ mechanism and the SCO were seen as appropriate mechanisms for pursuing China’s multiple interests in the region; their development was also in line with the improvement in Sino-Russian relations. Chinese leaders have skilfully developed the SCO’s institutional frame- work, and they seem intent on getting good value for the resources spent. The leaders have also demonstrated considerable patience when the SCO’s development encountered setbacks. KEY WORDS: Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, regionalism, institution building, Central Asia, Sino-Russian relations, oil, gas, New Silk Road Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, China has engaged in increasingly close co-operation with the five Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). This co-operation has been perceived by the Chinese leadership as essential to maintaining security along its western border, promoting the economic development of western China, diversifying the sources of China’s energy imports and those of other raw materials, and the securing of a peaceful and friendly international environment along its frontiers.
  • TA–$ZK#: Strategy for Liaoning North Yellow Sea Regional Cooperation

    TA–$ZK#: Strategy for Liaoning North Yellow Sea Regional Cooperation

    ADB Project Document TA–1234: Strategy for Liaoning North Yellow Sea Regional Cooperation and Development Technical Report G: Relevant Domestic and International Experience in Designing and Implementing Regional Cooperation Programs December M2NO This report was prepared by David Roland-Holst, under the direction of Ying Qian and Philip Chang. We are grateful to Wang Lin and Zhang Bingnan for implementation support. Special thanks to Edith Joan Nacpil and Zhuang Jian, for comments and insights. Dahlia Peterson, Wang Shan, Wang Zhifeng provided indispensable research assistance. Asian Development Bank 4 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City NGG2 Metro Manila, Philippines www.adb.org © M2NG by Asian Development Bank April M2NG ISSN M3N3-4G3O (Print), M3N3-4GXG (e-ISSN) Publication Stock No. WPSXXXXXX-X The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or its Board of Governors or the governments they represent. ADB does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility for any consequence of their use. By making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area, or by using the term “country” in this document, ADB does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area. Note: In this publication, the symbol “$” refers to US dollars. Printed on recycled paper 2 Contents I. Executive Summary ..................................................................................................
  • China and the SDR Financial Liberalization Through the Back Door

    China and the SDR Financial Liberalization Through the Back Door

    CIGI Papers No. 170 — April 2018 China and the SDR Financial Liberalization through the Back Door Barry Eichengreen and Guangtao Xia CIGI Papers No. 170 — April 2018 China and the SDR: Financial Liberalization through the Back Door Barry Eichengreen and Guangtao Xia CIGI Masthead Executive President Rohinton P. Medhora Deputy Director, International Intellectual Property Law and Innovation Bassem Awad Chief Financial Officer and Director of Operations Shelley Boettger Director of the International Law Research Program Oonagh Fitzgerald Director of the Global Security & Politics Program Fen Osler Hampson Director of Human Resources Susan Hirst Interim Director of the Global Economy Program Paul Jenkins Deputy Director, International Environmental Law Silvia Maciunas Deputy Director, International Economic Law Hugo Perezcano Díaz Director, Evaluation and Partnerships Erica Shaw Managing Director and General Counsel Aaron Shull Director of Communications and Digital Media Spencer Tripp Publications Publisher Carol Bonnett Senior Publications Editor Jennifer Goyder Publications Editor Susan Bubak Publications Editor Patricia Holmes Publications Editor Nicole Langlois Publications Editor Lynn Schellenberg Graphic Designer Melodie Wakefield For publications enquiries, please contact [email protected]. Communications For media enquiries, please contact [email protected]. Copyright © 2018 by the Centre for International Governance Innovation The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Centre for International Governance Innovation or its Board of Directors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution — Non-commercial — No Derivatives License. To view this license, visit (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). For re-use or distribution, please include this copyright notice.
  • Research on the Productivity Effect of Inter-Regional Industry Transfer—Taking Guangdong Province As an Example

    Research on the Productivity Effect of Inter-Regional Industry Transfer—Taking Guangdong Province As an Example

    Modern Economy, 2019, 10, 1872-1896 http://www.scirp.org/journal/me ISSN Online: 2152-7261 ISSN Print: 2152-7245 Research on the Productivity Effect of Inter-Regional Industry Transfer —Taking Guangdong Province as an Example Li Liu Jinan University, Guangzhou, China How to cite this paper: Liu, L. (2019) Abstract Research on the Productivity Effect of Inter-Regional Industry Transfer. Modern This paper empirically tests the influence of the inter-regional industrial Economy, 10, 1872-1896. transfer policy which was promoted by local government in Guangdong https://doi.org/10.4236/me.2019.108121 Province in 2005 on total factor productivity by using the double-difference Received: July 16, 2019 and triple-difference models, based on the panel data of 120 counties in 21 Accepted: August 24, 2019 prefecture-level cities in Guangdong Province from 2001 to 2016. The study Published: August 27, 2019 found that the inter-regional industrial transfer policy of Guangdong Prov- Copyright © 2019 by author(s) and ince has increased the total factor productivity of the area with industry Scientific Research Publishing Inc. transferring out, but has a negative impact on the TFP of the land with in- This work is licensed under the Creative dustry transferring in, and there are differences in the effects of total factor Commons Attribution International productivity in the four regions: the periphery of the Pearl River Delta, East- License (CC BY 4.0). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ern Guangdong, Western Guangdong, and Northern Guangdong. And the Open Access industrial transfer has the greatest negative effect on the eastern Guangdong region, and the least negative effect on the western Guangdong, which has a positive impact on the TFP in northern Guangdong.
  • Geographical and Structural Constraints of Regional Development in Western China: a Study of Gansu Province

    Geographical and Structural Constraints of Regional Development in Western China: a Study of Gansu Province

    Issues & Studies© 42, no. 2 (June 2006): 131-170. Geographical and Structural Constraints of Regional Development in Western China: A Study of Gansu Province YEHUA DENNIS WEI AND CHUANGLIN FANG* There have been heated debates over the extent, causal mechanisms, and consequences of regional inequality in China and the proper policy in- tervention. The central government considers struggling poorer regions and the widening coastal-interior gap as serious threats to China's pros- perity, stability, and unity, and has launched the Great Western Develop- ment Strategy. Given the massive scale of the region and its tremendous diversity, more work is needed on regional development in interior China and on how effective the Chinese government has been in developing its western region. This paper broadens the study of regional inequality in YEHUA DENNIS WEI (魏也華) is Associate Professor in the Department of Geography and Urban Studies Program, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee (UWM). Author of Re- gional Development in China: States, Globalization, and Inequality (2000), and more than forty referred journal articles, he is the recipient of the UWM Excellence in Research Award (2003), the Outstanding Young Investigator Award of the Natural Science Foundation of China (2004), and the Distinguished Scholar Award of the Regional Development and Planning Specialty Group of the Association of American Geographers (2006). He can be reached at <[email protected]>. CHUANGLIN FANG (方創琳) is Professor at the Institute of Geographical Sciences and Nat- ural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing. He can be reached at <[email protected]>. *The authors would like to acknowledge the funding of the Chinese Academy of Sciences K.C.
  • Involuntary Migrants, Political Revolutionaries and Economic Energisers: a History of the Image of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia GORDON C

    Involuntary Migrants, Political Revolutionaries and Economic Energisers: a History of the Image of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia GORDON C

    Journal of Contemporary China (2005), 14(42), February, 55–66 Involuntary Migrants, Political Revolutionaries and Economic Energisers: a history of the image of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia GORDON C. K. CHEUNG* Along the contemporary migration history of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, three distinctive images have been constructed through the interaction between the overseas Chinese and Mainland China. First, the image of involuntary migrant, formulated by their migration activity and the continuous remittance they sent back to their hometowns, closely linked to the political and social-economic disturbances in the early years of the twentieth century. Second, the image of the overseas Chinese as political revolutionary was heavily politicised by the revolutionary policies of Mainland China in the 1950s and 1960s. Third, through the operational means of foreign direct investment, the overseas Chinese image of economic energiser was re-focused and mirror-imaged with the imperative of the economic reform of Mainland China in the 1970s and 1980s. On the one hand, the images of involuntary migrant, political revolutionary and economic energiser of the Southeast Asian overseas Chinese describe their situational status. On the other hand, these images also reflect the contemporary historical development of Mainland China. Whatever the reasons for studying the Overseas Chinese, there is no doubt that they are a bona fide object of research. The diversity of cultures represented by these people, the diversity of settings in which they have found themselves, the wide differences in the histories of specific Chinese ‘colonies’, all of these things make them a fascinating laboratory for social scientists of various disciplinary bents.1 In Southeast Asia the capitalists were the Chinese.
  • Education in China Since Mao

    Education in China Since Mao

    The Canadian Journal of Higher Education, Vol. X-l, 1980 Education in China Since Mao WILLIAM G. SAYWELL* ABSTRACT Policies in Chinese education, particularly higher education, have undergone major shifts since 1949 in response to general swings in Chinese policy, ideological debates and the political fortunes of different leaders and factions. These changes have involved shifts in emphasis between "redness"and "expertness", between education as a party device designed to inculcate and sustain revolutionary values and education as a governmental instrument used to promote modernization. In the most recent period since Mao's death and the "Gang of Four's" ouster in the fall of 1976, there has been a return to pragmatism with the radical policies and stress on political goals of the Cultural Revolution period giving way to a renewed emphasis on developing professional and technical skills. These objectives are being promoted by the reintroduction of earlier moderate policies governing curricula, admission standards and academic administration and by extraordinary measures, including international educational exchanges, designed to overcome the Cultural Revolution's disruptive impact. These new policies have provoked some criticism from those concerned about elitist aspects of the current system and a reduced commitment to socialist values. Since educational policy is highly sensitive to shifting political currents, future changes in this area will serve as a barometer of new political trends. RÉSUMÉ La politique de l'enseignement en Chine, particulièrement l'enseignement supérieur, a subi des changements majeurs depuis 1949 en réponse aux va-et-vient généraux de la politique chinoise, aux débats idéologiques et à la fortune politique des différents leaders et des dissensions.
  • National Computer Policy and Development in China

    National Computer Policy and Development in China

    china Jcase WD klkhd 92494 1 NATIONAL COMPUTER POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA Kenneth L. Kraemer Jason Dedrick Working Paper PAC-060A Center for Research on Information Technology and Organizations Suite 320, Berkeley Place University of California, Irvine Irvine, CA 92717 Tel: 714-856-5246 Fax: 714-856-8091 Internet: [email protected] © 1994, CRITO china Jcase WD klkhd 92494 2 NATIONAL COMPUTER POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA1 I. INTRODUCTION2 Economic reforms of the past fifteen years have transformed China from a centrally- planned socialist economy to a mixed market system. The government has introduced market incentives for farmers, put state enterprises on a more commercial basis, given more authority to enterprise managers and opened the economy to more foreign investment in order to create what it calls a "socialist market" economy. These reforms have already produced high rates of growth in output and exports, especially in the coastal areas which are involved most heavily in export-oriented manufacturing. Economic reform in China has been accompanied by a similar shift in technology policies away from the nationalistic strategy of self-reliance which prevailed until the 1980s. The government has moved to a more pragmatic strategy of importing advanced technology and directing domestic technology development toward commercial purposes. This shift is driven by economic necessity, as China realizes it must upgrade its technology rapidly to compete internationally. It is also made easier by the end of the Cold War and the fall of the 1 The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the following people who participated in interviews and/or reviewed this manuscript: Joseph Lin, Clement Zhang, Saiman Hui, Hsu Kung-Shih, Yang Tian- xing, Wu Jaipei, and Zheng Youjing, Chen Zhaoying.