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04.22.20.+--+Russian+Interference in 2016 Presidential Election

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Hickey, Adam (NSD) From: Hickey, Adam (NSD) Sent: Thursday, September 29, 2016 4:53 PM To: Lan, Iris (ODAG) Subject: FW: Russia Cover Attachments: Russia Cover.pdf; wMassimo_ released.pdf 1-iave not read. From: Laufman, David (NSD) Sent: Thursday, September 29, 2016 4:51 PM To: T oscas, George (NSD); Hickey, Adam (NSD) Subject: FW: Russia Cover fyi From: Calabresi, Massimo - Time U.S. <[email protected]> [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, September 29, 2016 4:43 PM To: Laufman, David (NSD); Raimondi, Marc (OPA) Subject: Russia Cover David, Marc, I'll drop off some copies oft he magazine tomorrow, but in t he meantime, attached are pdfs of t he cover image and the story. I hope you find it interesting. Best, Massimo --Massimo Calabres.i Document ID: 0.7.24125.5327 Document ID: 0.7.24125.5327-000001 r HACKINCampaign 2016 WHAT’S BEHIND RUSSIA’S EFFORT TO INFLUENCE THE U.S. ELECTION BY MASSIMO CALABRESI THE theleadersoftheU.s.government, int igll cn comm unityk nowsa bout th l ctr icity grid, transportation s c tor including th Pr ids ntand h is to p th ira ctiviti wsou ld h pA lm icrans and n y rgn wtorksi sv uln bral national-s curity adv is ,rs fa c an und rstandandr p onds pr ud ntly to an y to fi rst str ik ; soth rssay atta cks on unpr c d ntil ddmma.S inc th p rings, disruptions thatm ightta k plac b w t pnrivat comp ani , stos ck xchang ands U.S .i nt igll cn and la w- nforc m ntnow and th clos of th polls .S iorn th m iad co uld aff ct th conom y. ag cin havs s monunt ing idv cn Ju stic D partm ntoffici als hav argu dS r io n int igll cn fficioals v worrny ofan ac tiv Russ ian in flu c n po ration in favor of call ing ou t th Russ ians, and about Ru ssia xposing U .S.s pionag targ ingt th 2016p r ids intal clt ion. that pos ition has b chon fordc ullfy op rations in r taliation.A nd wh il U.S. It is v yu rnlik y lth Russ ians co uld outsid ofgov rnm bynt lawmak andrs officials hav “high con fid cn ” that sway th actu al vot count ,b caus our form rtop national-s curity officials from Russia is b indh w hat th y d crsib as clt ion infrastr uctur is d c ntraliz dboth pol itical part i . s a ma jor in flu cn po ration, s iorn U.S . and vot ing ma chin ars not a cc ibssl Unfort unat y, lt ’si not that si mpl . officials t TIME,ll th ir idv cn would from th Int rn. tBut th yc an so w Th Pr ids ntand s v ofral his c los stnot y standt upi n co urt. disruption and insta bilityup to, and on , national-s curity advis arrs c onc rn dA ndso wi th fiv w k s to go , th Whit El ction Da y, mor than a do z sn ior n about th dang ofr a confrontat ion H ous is, forno w, l ingtt v unfoldnts.O n U.S. offi cials t llTIME, ndu rmining in th n w and ungov rn worldd of on sid, U.S . law- nforc m agnt cin s faith in th r ults and in d mocracyi ts . lf cyb prsac , and th y arg u that w hil ar cramsblingto uncov rth xt ntofth T h qu iston, d bat dat m ultipl th U.S. has p ow urflo ff insv and Russian op ration,c ount itr and hard n m i ngst at th Whi t Hou s ,i s ho w d f iv ns capa biliti ths ,r an calatsing th countr y’s clt ion i n frastructur .O n aggr issv y lto r ponds to th Russ ian confrontation carr i ssign ificant ri sks. th oth , amr urky n wtork of Ru ssian op ration.Pub licly naming and sham ing National Su crityC ouncilo fficials warn hack rsand th ir asso ciat is st pping th Russ ians and d crsibing w hat th thato ur critical i nfrastr uctur i nc luding up th pac ofl ksa ofstol doncu m nts PHOTOGRAPH BYLANDON NORDEMAN FOR TIME L 31 1 0.60_wmassimo.indd 1 9/28/1 6 6:40 PM TIME LEFT PAGE STORY SLUGS: SEQUENCE: 1 of 6DESIGNER (b) (6) PHOTO(b) (6) wMassimo GUIDE#: 3110 REMARKS: I -- r---,ISSUE DATE: 10/10/16 SECTION:WELL .JIN PAGE Document ID: 0.7.24125.5327-000002 N VOTER 31 1 0.60_wmassimo.indd 2 9/28/1 6 6:40 PM TIME RIGHT PAGE STORY SLUGS: SEQUENCE: 2 of 6DESIGNER (b) (6) PHOTO(b) (6) wMassimo GUIDE#: 3120 REMARKS: ISSUE DATE: 10/10/16 SECTION:WELL - IN PAGE Document ID: 0.7.24125.5327-000002 r designed toffec at pub lic opi nion and On Se p t. 22, the ranking Demo crats on give the impress ion that thection ele is the Senate and Hous e Intell igence Com - vulnerable,i ncluding emails from them ittees ,C alifornia’s Sienator Danne Fein- computers of D theemoc ratic atNional ste in and Re presentative Adam Sc hiff, Committee (DNC). eanMwhile, the FBI released an unus uallyb lunt statement. alerted all 50 states to the dangerinm id- “Based on brie fings w e have ce ireved, August, and the states haveivered del we have conc luded that Ru thessian in - evidence of “si agnific ant” nu mber oftell igence agencies are ki mang aio serus newi ntrusions intothe irele ctions ystems and concertede ffortto influ encethe .S U. thatthe bureau andthe ir colleagues atthe ele ction,” they said.“A t the ,least this - ef Department ofHomeland S“e curity are fort is intendedtoso w doubta boutthese - still yi trng tounderstand ,” a department cu rity ofo urele ction.”O rdersfor Russian official tells TIME. intelligenceagen ciesto conductele ctoral- A ll ofwhic h makes D onald Tr ump’s iunflenceo perations, the y added,c ould repeated insertionofh imself intotheU .S.- come only fromver y seniorlevels ofgov- Russiastor y allthemorestartl ing.T rump ernment. “We callon [Russian]P resident has pra ised Pu tind uring the camp aign, [Vladimir] Putin toimmed iately order and at fitherst p residential debate, a halt toisa c tthivity.” he T statement, on Se p t. 26, he isad it w asn’t clear the tho ugh not endorsed publicl yby the Ad - Russians were beh indthe DNC hack.Bu t m inistration,w as cleared wi th the CIA. theU .S.i ntelligence community has “h igh T o un derstand wh yPu tin wo uld want confidence” that Ru ssian intell igence to under cut the it ilegmacy of the .S. U services were infa ctres ponsible, multiple election,i t helps topb steack from the intelligenceandnat ionalse curity officials longand ugl yp residential cam paignand tell TIME. r uTmpw as informed of thatremem ber wh yw e’re voting in the first assessment udring acent re class ified place.E lections are u theltimate usorce intelligence b riefing, a SU .. official of u athorityi no ur democracy. e Bcause familiar withthemattertells TIME.“I do Republicans and Demo crats have agreed not comment on informat ion I re ceive in for decades that pread sing democracyi s intelligence br iefings, ho wever, no body good for yeverone,A merica has pushed HillaryC linton in particular ofmeddling knows wi th definitive certa inty that iths for free andir elefactions around the in Ru ssia’s pres idential election in 2012. was in c fat Ru ssia,”T rump told TIMEi n world.A ndman y nations have bra emced Hehas pub liclyqu estionedtheval idity of a statement. t“I mayb e, but it may also them:p easants in the Balk ans pu t on pastU .Sp. res identialele ctions, saying, on be Ch ina, another country or individual.” their Su n dayb est to go p toolls, theand June 17, ofthe Electoral College,“Y ouc all burqa-clad women in Afghan istan brave thatdemo cracy?”N ow, experts y,Pu sa tin Russia’s inteRfeRence in the .SU. terroristatta cks to stand inl ine forho urs ise xpandingh isant i-American campaign election is an xtraord e inary es calation to cast their ballots . into cyb erspace.“M ore thanan y attempt of an alreadyw orrying trend.O ver the N ot u rsprisingly, quasi-authoritarian to get coneandidate or another cted ,ele past 2½ ears y, Russia has xecu eted aru lers in the former Sov iet Union, latter- this [Russian influenceo peration]i sa bout westward march ofct eleion meddling cday ommunists in Ch ina and imedeval discrediting the ire ent idea ofa free and through cyberspace, starting inthe states theo crats in the Middle E ast, among fairele ction,” says Dm itriA lperovitch,c o- of the former S oviet Union and imovng many others , see Amer ica’s sometimes fo under and chief c tehnology officer of toward the North Atlant ic.“O n au larreg aggressiveevangel isma boutthe bene fits CrowdS ktrie, the cyb erse curityc ompany basis they tr y to in fluence elections in of ib leral democracy as airec dt threatthat id d the y analsis ofthe DNC hack.
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