View/Open (13.5MB)
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Reporting, and General Mentions Seem to Be in Decline
CYBER THREAT ANALYSIS Return to Normalcy: False Flags and the Decline of International Hacktivism By Insikt Group® CTA-2019-0821 CYBER THREAT ANALYSIS Groups with the trappings of hacktivism have recently dumped Russian and Iranian state security organization records online, although neither have proclaimed themselves to be hacktivists. In addition, hacktivism has taken a back seat in news reporting, and general mentions seem to be in decline. Insikt Group utilized the Recorded FutureⓇ Platform and reports of historical hacktivism events to analyze the shifting targets and players in the hacktivism space. The target audience of this research includes security practitioners whose enterprises may be targets for hacktivism. Executive Summary Hacktivism often brings to mind a loose collective of individuals globally that band together to achieve a common goal. However, Insikt Group research demonstrates that this is a misleading assumption; the hacktivist landscape has consistently included actors reacting to regional events, and has also involved states operating under the guise of hacktivism to achieve geopolitical goals. In the last 10 years, the number of large-scale, international hacking operations most commonly associated with hacktivism has risen astronomically, only to fall off just as dramatically after 2015 and 2016. This constitutes a return to normalcy, in which hacktivist groups are usually small sets of regional actors targeting specific organizations to protest regional events, or nation-state groups operating under the guise of hacktivism. Attack vectors used by hacktivist groups have remained largely consistent from 2010 to 2019, and tooling has assisted actors to conduct larger-scale attacks. However, company defenses have also become significantly better in the last decade, which has likely contributed to the decline in successful hacktivist operations. -
Hacks, Leaks and Disruptions | Russian Cyber Strategies
CHAILLOT PAPER Nº 148 — October 2018 Hacks, leaks and disruptions Russian cyber strategies EDITED BY Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Secrieru WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM Siim Alatalu, Irina Borogan, Elena Chernenko, Sven Herpig, Oscar Jonsson, Xymena Kurowska, Jarno Limnell, Patryk Pawlak, Piret Pernik, Thomas Reinhold, Anatoly Reshetnikov, Andrei Soldatov and Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer Chaillot Papers HACKS, LEAKS AND DISRUPTIONS RUSSIAN CYBER STRATEGIES Edited by Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Secrieru CHAILLOT PAPERS October 2018 148 Disclaimer The views expressed in this Chaillot Paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or of the European Union. European Union Institute for Security Studies Paris Director: Gustav Lindstrom © EU Institute for Security Studies, 2018. Reproduction is authorised, provided prior permission is sought from the Institute and the source is acknowledged, save where otherwise stated. Contents Executive summary 5 Introduction: Russia’s cyber prowess – where, how and what for? 9 Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Secrieru Russia’s cyber posture Russia’s approach to cyber: the best defence is a good offence 15 1 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan Russia’s trolling complex at home and abroad 25 2 Xymena Kurowska and Anatoly Reshetnikov Spotting the bear: credible attribution and Russian 3 operations in cyberspace 33 Sven Herpig and Thomas Reinhold Russia’s cyber diplomacy 43 4 Elena Chernenko Case studies of Russian cyberattacks The early days of cyberattacks: 5 the cases of Estonia, -
Ethical Hacking
Ethical Hacking Alana Maurushat University of Ottawa Press ETHICAL HACKING ETHICAL HACKING Alana Maurushat University of Ottawa Press 2019 The University of Ottawa Press (UOP) is proud to be the oldest of the francophone university presses in Canada and the only bilingual university publisher in North America. Since 1936, UOP has been “enriching intellectual and cultural discourse” by producing peer-reviewed and award-winning books in the humanities and social sciences, in French or in English. Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Title: Ethical hacking / Alana Maurushat. Names: Maurushat, Alana, author. Description: Includes bibliographical references. Identifiers: Canadiana (print) 20190087447 | Canadiana (ebook) 2019008748X | ISBN 9780776627915 (softcover) | ISBN 9780776627922 (PDF) | ISBN 9780776627939 (EPUB) | ISBN 9780776627946 (Kindle) Subjects: LCSH: Hacking—Moral and ethical aspects—Case studies. | LCGFT: Case studies. Classification: LCC HV6773 .M38 2019 | DDC 364.16/8—dc23 Legal Deposit: First Quarter 2019 Library and Archives Canada © Alana Maurushat, 2019, under Creative Commons License Attribution— NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ Printed and bound in Canada by Gauvin Press Copy editing Robbie McCaw Proofreading Robert Ferguson Typesetting CS Cover design Édiscript enr. and Elizabeth Schwaiger Cover image Fragmented Memory by Phillip David Stearns, n.d., Personal Data, Software, Jacquard Woven Cotton. Image © Phillip David Stearns, reproduced with kind permission from the artist. The University of Ottawa Press gratefully acknowledges the support extended to its publishing list by Canadian Heritage through the Canada Book Fund, by the Canada Council for the Arts, by the Ontario Arts Council, by the Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences through the Awards to Scholarly Publications Program, and by the University of Ottawa. -
Belling the BEAR
2016/12/21 Russia Hacks Bellingcat MH17 Investigation | ThreatConnect SEPTEMBER 28, 2016 Belling the BEAR IN BLOG, FEATURED ARTICLE, RESEARCH BY THREATCONNECT RESEARCH TEAM ThreatConnect reviews activity targeting Bellingcat, a key contributor in the MH17 investigation. Read the full series of ThreatConnect posts following the DNC Breach: “Rebooting Watergate: Tapping into the Democratic National Committee [https://www.threatconnect.com/tapping-into-democratic-national-committee/] ”, “Shiny Object? Guccifer 2.0 and the DNC Breach [https://www.threatconnect.com/guccifer-2-0-dnc-breach/] “, “What’s in a Name Server? [https://www.threatconnect.com/whats-in-a-name-server/] “, “Guccifer 2.0: the Man, the Myth, the Legend? [https://www.threatconnect.com/reassesing-guccifer-2-0-recent-claims/] “, “Guccifer 2.0: All Roads Lead to Russia [https://www.threatconnect.com/guccifer-2-all-roads-lead-russia/] “, “FANCY BEAR Has an (IT) Itch that They Can’t Scratch [https://www.threatconnect.com/fancy-bear-it-itch-they-cant-scratch/] “, “Does a BEAR Leak in the Woods? [https://www.threatconnect.com/blog/does-a-bear-leak-in-the-woods/] “, and “Russian Cyber Operations on Steroids [https://www.threatconnect.com/blog/fancy-bear-anti-doping-agency-phishing/] “. [UPDATE] October 7th 2016 [/russia-hacks-bellingcat-mh17-investigation#update] Introduction Since posting about the DNC hack [https://threatconnect.com/blog/tapping-into-democratic-national-committee/] , each time we published a blog post on a BEAR-based topic we thought it was going to be our last. But like the Death Star’s gravitational pull, the story keeps drawing us back in as new information comes to light. -
Date 1.1.2015 1.1.2015 1.1.2015 1.1.2015 1.1.2015 1.1
Date 1.1.2015 1.1.2015 1.1.2015 1.1.2015 1.1.2015 1.1.2015 1.1.2015 2.1.2015 2.1.2015 2.1.2015 2.1.2015 3.1.2015 3.1.2015 4.1.2015 4.1.2015 4.1.2015 5.1.2015 5.1.2015 5.1.2015 6.1.2015 6.1.2015 6.1.2015 7.1.2015 7.1.2015 7.1.2015 7.1.2015 7.1.2015 8.1.2015 9.1.2015 10.1.2015 11.1.2015 11.1.2015 11.1.2015 11.1.2015 11.1.2015 11.1.2015 11.1.2015 12.1.2015 12.1.2015 12.1.2015 12.1.2015 12.1.2015 12.1.2015 14.1.2015 14.1.2015 14.1.2015 14.1.2015 14.1.2015 15.1.2015 15.1.2015 15.1.2015 16.1.2015 16.1.2015 16.1.2015 16.1.2015 16.1.2015 16.1.2015 17.1.2015 17.1.2015 17.1.2015 19.1.2015 19.1.2015 20.1.2015 20.1.2015 20.1.2015 21.1.2015 21.1.2015 22.1.2015 23.1.2015 23.1.2015 24.1.2015 24.1.2015 24.1.2015 25.1.2015 25.1.2015 26.1.2015 27.1.2015 27.1.2015 27.1.2015 27.1.2015 27.1.2015 28.1.2015 28.1.2015 29.1.2015 29.1.2015 29.1.2015 29.1.2015 30.1.2015 30.1.2015 30.1.2015 31.1.2015 1.2.2015 1.2.2015 1.2.2015 1.2.2015 1.2.2015 2.2.2015 2.2.2015 2.2.2015 2.2.2015 2.2.2015 4.2.2015 5.2.2015 5.2.2015 5.2.2015 6.2.2015 6.2.2015 7.2.2015 8.2.2015 8.2.2015 9.2.2015 9.2.2015 10.2.2015 10.2.2015 10.2.2015 10.2.2015 10.2.2015 10.2.2015 10.2.2015 10.2.2015 12.2.2015 12.2.2015 12.2.2015 12.2.2015 12.2.2015 13.2.2015 13.2.2015 14.2.2015 14.2.2015 14.2.2015 14.2.2015 14.2.2015 14.2.2015 14.2.2015 15.2.2015 16.2.2015 16.2.2015 16.2.2015 17.2.2015 17.2.2015 17.2.2015 17.2.2015 17.2.2015 17.2.2015 18.2.2015 18.2.2015 18.2.2015 18.2.2015 19.2.2015 21.2.2015 21.2.2015 22.2.2015 23.2.2015 23.2.2015 23.2.2015 23.2.2015 23.2.2015 23.2.2015 24.2.2015 24.2.2015 24.2.2015 -
Revolution Hacking
Revolution Hacking by Nikolay Koval Chapter 6 in Kenneth Geers (Ed.), Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine, NATO CCD COE Publications, Tallinn 2015 Nikolay Koval, head of Ukraine’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-UA) during the revolution, describes in Chapter 6 how cyber attacks rose in parallel with ongoing political events, in both number and severity. In 2012, hackers ‘defaced’ Ukrainian government websites with politically motivated digital graffiti. In 2013, network defenders discovered new and more menacing forms of malware, such as RedOctober, MiniDuke, and NetTraveler. In 2014, hacktivist groups such as CyberBerkut published stolen Ukrainian Government docu- ments. Koval analyses in detail the most technically advanced attack investigated by CERT-UA: the May 2014 compromise of Ukraine’s Central Election Commission (CEC). He closes by appealing to the Ukrainian Government to allocate greater funds to hire and retain qualified personnel. Disclaimer This publication is a product of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Ex- cellence (the Centre). It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of the Centre or NATO. The Centre may not be held responsible for any loss or harm arising from the use of information contained in this publication and is not responsible for the content of the external sources, including external websites referenced in this publica- tion. Digital or hard copies of this publication may be produced for internal use within NATO and for personal or educational use when for non-profit and non-commercial purpose, provided that copies bear a full citation. Please contact publications@ccdcoe. org with any further queries. -
State-Sponsored Hackers: Hybrid Armies? by Patryk Pawlak and Gergana Petkova
5 2015 SU P ER S TOCK/AP/SIPA State-sponsored hackers: hybrid armies? by Patryk Pawlak and Gergana Petkova Cyber-attacks are rarely disconnected from politi- 2010, the collision of a Chinese fishing boat with cal realities. CyberBerkut – a pro-Russian group a Japanese coast guard vessel and the subsequent of ‘patriot’ hackers – has, for example, hacked detainment of its Chinese captain and crew caused German government websites in retaliation for a flurry of malicious cyber activity. Attacks in lat- the political support offered to Kiev by Berlin. er years were triggered by the 80th anniversary The Syrian Electronic Army – a hacker collective of the 1931 Manchuria incident or the ongoing thought to be linked to Syrian President Bassar controversy over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. al-Assad – regularly targets Western media out- lets, most recently Le Monde. Non-state cyber armies have also been employed in ongoing conflicts. CyberBerkut is but the Due to this blurring of the virtual and most recent example: the group not only man- physical worlds, governments, which aged to hack governmental websites in Germany, are familiar with stateless actors such as Ukraine and Poland, but also successfully took al-Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq and the down three NATO websites, including that of the Levant (ISIL), may now have to learn to deal Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence with equally hostile, amorphous and often in Tallinn. state-sponsored ‘hacktors’. Other Russian political movements, which are or- ganised and partially sponsored by the state, also Using the past but shaping the present have an important role in non-state cyber offensive capabilities. -
Are Cyber Operations Having an Impact on State Electoral Processes?
City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works Dissertations and Theses City College of New York 2018 Are Cyber Operations Having an Impact on State Electoral Processes? Sean Joseph McNicholas CUNY City College How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cc_etds_theses/748 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] Are Cyber Operations Having an Impact on State Electoral Processes? Sean McNicholas May 2018 Master’s Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of International Affairs at the City College of New York COLIN POWELL SCHOOL FOR CIVIC AND GLOBAL LEADERSHIP Advisor: Professor Jean Krasno Second Advisor: Professor Bruce Cronin 1 Table of Contents Abstract: ………………………………………………………………………….. 3 Chapter One: Introduction: ………………………………………………………. 4 Chapter Two: Literature Review: ………………………………………...……… 7 Chapter Three: Overcoming Definitional Fog: ………………………………...... 17 Chapter Four: Types of Cyber Operations: …………………………………….... 29 Chapter Five: Purposes behind the Cyber Operations: ………………………….. 48 Chapter Six: Quantifying the Effects: ………………………………………...…. 62 Chapter Seven: Russia’s International Meddling and Active Measures – An Interview with a Former Eastern European Official: .……………………………………… 75 Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Recommendations: ……………………………. 88 Bibliography: …………………………………………………………………… 100 Annex A: ………………………………………………………………………... 111 Annex B: ………………………………………………………………...……… 121 2 Abstract Cyber-attacks have become common occurrences which have an impact on all aspects of life ranging from business transactions to personal communications. Alarmingly, coordinated cyber-attacks are increasingly targeting politicians and their associates, political campaigns, political organizations and the broader public with political messaging. -
2015 7Th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Architectures in Cyberspace
2015 7th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Architectures in Cyberspace M.Maybaum, A.-M.Osula, L.Lindström (Eds.) 26-29 MAY 2015, TALLINN, ESTONIA 2015 7TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT: ARCHITECTURES IN CYBERSPACE Copyright © 2015 by NATO CCD COE Publications. All rights reserved. IEEE Catalog Number: CFP1526N-PRT ISBN (print): 978-9949-9544-2-1 ISBN (pdf): 978-9949-9544-3-8 CopyriGHT AND Reprint Permissions No part of this publication may be reprinted, reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence ([email protected]). This restriction does not apply to making digital or hard copies of this publication for internal use within NATO, and for personal or educational use when for non-profit or non-commercial purposes, providing that copies bear this notice and a full citation on the first page as follows: [Article author(s)], [full article title] 2015 7th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Architectures in Cyberspace M. Maybaum, A.M. Osula, L. Lindström (Eds.) 2015 © NATO CCD COE Publications PrinteD copies of THIS publication are AVAILABLE from: NATO CCD COE Publications Filtri tee 12, 10132 Tallinn, Estonia Phone: +372 717 6800 Fax: +372 717 6308 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.ccdcoe.org Layout: Jaakko Matsalu LEGAL NOTICE: This publication contains opinions of the respective authors only. They do not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of NATO CCD COE, NATO, or any agency or any government. -
Understanding Russian Subversion Patterns, Threats, and Responses
February 2020 Perspective EXPERT INSIGHTS ON A TIMELY POLICY ISSUE ANDREW RADIN, ALYSSA DEMUS, KRYSTYNA MARCINEK Understanding Russian Subversion Patterns, Threats, and Responses ussia is suspected of having undertaken a wide range of subversive activities against the United States and its partners and allies since 2014—examples include military support for the separatist republics in eastern Ukraine, Ran attempted coup in Montenegro, and influence campaigns in the 2016 U.S. and 2017 French elections. Responding to Russian subversion is difficult, in part because the threat is, by its very nature, not clearly known. In this Perspective, we review past RAND Corporation and other relevant work and synthesize overall insights about why and how Russia undertakes subversion. This review and synthe- sis offer insights about the likely threat of Russian subversion to the United States and its partners and allies. Russia likely finds subversion—which we define as efforts intended to influence the domestic politics of other countries—attractive because it could help achieve multiple Russian foreign policy interests at relatively low cost. The threat of Russian subversion to different countries varies based on the intensity of Russia’s interests and the resources available to undertake subversion. In western Europe and the C O R P O R A T I O N United States, Russian subversive tools appear to be limited political warfare, or sharp power (Cardenal et al., 2017; to information, cyber, and political ones. In neighboring Cohen and Radin, 2019; Robinson et al., 2018). There is former communist countries, Russia uses a wider range substantial debate about these terms—for example, crit- of military and economic tools. -
Hacking the Voter Lessons from a Decade of Russian Military Operations
Hacking the Voter Lessons From a Decade of Russian Military Operations Nate Beach-Westmoreland Agenda • “Why,” not just “how” • Information conflict • Tactics in context • What’s next Who Am I? • Head of Strategic Cyber Threat Intelligence @ Booz Allen Hamilton • Prior experience in elections, diplomacy, & law • CTI by way of social sciences • B.A. History @ Cornell • M.A. International Relations @ Yale Now Just How, but Why? • Why conduct an operation? • Why act at this time? • Why use these tactics? • What was the objective? • How do operations relate to each other? Background Reading • Russia’s Military Doctrine explains the tactics, targets, and timing of GRU cyber operations • TL;DR: the GRU has often done exactly what it said it would do Soviet-Era Election Interference Image Source: Everett Herald Familiar Tactics, but Shifting Responsibilities Image Source: U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee (1985) Information “So, tell me more about how bad life is here! (translation) Confrontation The continuous competition over beliefs, opinions, perceptions, and feelings to enable the furthering of states’ agendas Image Source: Unknown Russian Military Bought Into Information Confrontation • Codified into core military doctrinal documents since 2000 • Addition of new missions like protecting “historical, spiritual, and patriotic traditions” “Information Confrontation – a Strategic Challenge” - National Defense (March 3, 2013) Information Confrontation’s Two Sides “Informational-Psychological” Capabilities “Informational-Technical” ≈ Capabilities -
King's College, London: Department of War Studies
UNIVERSITY OF READING U.S. Strategic Cyber Deterrence Options Doctor of Philosophy in Politics Department of Politics & International Relations Scott Jasper March 2018 1 Contents Abstract......................................................................................................................... 3 List of Abbreviations..................................................................................................... 4 Introduction................................................................................................................... 7 Section One: Thinking about Deterrence Chapter I: Literature Review........................................................................................59 Chapter II: Global Cybered Conflict...........................................................................120 Chapter III: Theoretical Foundations..........................................................................158 Section Two: Contemporary Deterrence Strategies Chapter IV: Deterrence by Retaliation.........................................................................198 Chapter V: Deterrence by Denial................................................................................. 234 Chapter VI: Deterrence by Entanglement.....................................................................269 Section Three: A New Strategic Option Chapter VII: Active Cyber Defense..............................................................................307 Conclusion.....................................................................................................................343