Systémový Model Protidžihádistického Vigilantismu

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Systémový Model Protidžihádistického Vigilantismu MASARYKOVA UNIVERZITA Fakulta sociálních studií Katedra politologie Mgr. Jakub Drmola Kybernetická bezpečnost: systémový model protidžihádistického vigilantismu Disertační práce Školitel: prof. JUDr. PhDr. Miroslav Mareš, Ph.D. Brno 2017 Čestné prohlášení Čestně prohlašuji, že jsem disertační práci s názvem Kybernetická bezpečnost: systémový model protidžihádistického vigilantismu vypracoval samostatně a uvedl veškerou použitou literaturu a prameny. V Brně dne 20. 9. 2017 Jakub Drmola 1 Poděkování Za odborné vedení a pomoc v průběhu celého mého studia si v prvé řadě zaslouží velké poděkování Miroslav Mareš. Za podněty, spolupráci, kritiku, trpělivost a plamenné akademické rozepře na půdě naší fakulty i mimo ni bych chtěl poděkovat především Petře Vejvodové, Janu Hanzelkovi a Vendule Divišové. Vděk si zaslouží také všichni bývalí i současní kolegové z našeho oboru, kteří mě motivovali, rozvíjeli a společně tvořili a stále tvoří plodné prostředí. Pronikání do konceptuálních a metodologických tajů dynamických systémů, jejich modelů a simulací by nepochybně bylo o poznání pomalejší a méně příjemné, kdyby mne při něm neprovázeli Tomáš Hubík, Niels van Rosmalen, Jonas Matheus, Tim Clancy a mnoho dalších mentorů a kolegů z UiB, EMSD a SDS. I jim všem patří můj dík. V neposlední řadě musím poděkovat své rodině a přátelům za neutuchající podporu během studia i mimo něj a za tolik potřebná rozptýlení, bez nichž by průchod doktorským studiem nebyl možný. 2 Anotace Tato disertační práce se zabývá povahou a vlivem protidžihádistického vigilantismu v kyberprostoru na džihádismem motivovaný terorismus, a to zejména z hlediska počtu útoků a množství jejich obětí. K tomuto účelu je sestaven hybridní stochastický model, který stojí na metodách Systémové dynamiky a principech mocninných zákonů. Tento model je validován na historických datech z let 2007-2016 a umožňuje i kupředu hledící simulace. V první části práce jsou představeny hlavní teoretické koncepty, v druhé části je vysvětlen metodologický rámec a třetí část je rozdělena na popis struktury modelu a výsledky provedených simulací. Klíčová slova: kybernetická bezpečnost, terorismus, džihádismus, vigilantismus, systémová dynamika, mocninný zákon Annotation Aim of this dissertation thesis is to explore the character of antijihadist vigilantism in cyberspace and the impact it has on jihadism-motivated terrorism measured by the number of attacks and the number of casualties. For this purpose, a hybrid stochastic model is built using the methods of system dynamics and principles of power laws. This model is then validated on the historical data from the period of 2007-2016 and allows for forward-looking simulations. The first part of the thesis introduces key theoretical concepts, the second part explains the methodology used here and the third part is split into a description of the structure model and the results of the performed simulations. Keywords: cybersecurity, terrorism, jihadism, vigilantism, system dynamics, power law 3 Obsah 1 Úvod ................................................................................................................................. 9 2 Cíle ................................................................................................................................. 12 3 Teorie a konceptualizace ................................................................................................ 14 3.1 Terorismus .............................................................................................................. 14 3.1.1 Radikalizace ..................................................................................................... 15 3.1.2 Typy útoků ....................................................................................................... 17 3.2 Hacktivismus........................................................................................................... 21 3.3 Vigilantismus .......................................................................................................... 23 3.3.1 Metody ............................................................................................................. 26 3.3.2 Aktéři ............................................................................................................... 28 3.4 Role správců digitálního obsahu ............................................................................. 30 4 Metodologie ................................................................................................................... 32 4.1 Systémová dynamika .............................................................................................. 32 4.1.1 Epistemologický kontext ................................................................................. 32 4.1.2 Historie metody ............................................................................................... 35 4.1.3 Kauzalita a vlastnosti dynamických systémů .................................................. 36 4.1.4 Vizualizace a použití systémové dynamiky ..................................................... 41 4.2 Chaos a mocninné zákony ...................................................................................... 55 4.3 Parametry, kompromisy a vymezení modelu.......................................................... 61 5 Související výzkum ........................................................................................................ 64 6 Referenční vzorek teroristických útoků ......................................................................... 66 7 Model protidžihádistického vigilantismu v kyberprostoru ............................................ 72 7.1 Konceptuální a kauzální struktura .......................................................................... 72 4 7.2 Matematická a logická struktura ............................................................................. 79 7.2.1 Demografický segment .................................................................................... 81 7.2.2 Radikalizační segment ..................................................................................... 83 7.2.3 Segment generující teroristické útoky ............................................................. 85 7.2.4 Segment generující oběti teroristických útoků ................................................ 89 7.2.5 Segment generující viditelnost džihádismu ..................................................... 92 7.2.6 Segment soupeření v kyberprostoru ................................................................ 95 7.2.7 Vigilantistický segment ................................................................................... 98 7.2.8 Segment svobody a bezpečnosti v kyberprostoru .......................................... 101 7.3 Výsledky simulací ................................................................................................. 104 7.3.1 Replikace historie .......................................................................................... 104 7.3.2 Bez eskalace řízeného terorismu ................................................................... 106 7.3.3 Bez vigilantismu v kyberprostoru .................................................................. 110 7.3.4 Navázání na historický vývoj ........................................................................ 113 7.3.5 Extrapolace vlivu vigilantismu v kyberprostoru ........................................... 116 7.4 Návrat džihádistů ze zahraničí .............................................................................. 119 8 Závěr............................................................................................................................. 123 8.1 Zhodnocení modelu .............................................................................................. 123 8.2 Zhodnocení výsledků ............................................................................................ 125 8.3 Role vigilantismu .................................................................................................. 129 9 Přílohy .......................................................................................................................... 132 10 Zdroje........................................................................................................................ 140 5 Seznam rovnic Rovnice 1 – růst celkové populace ............................................................................................................. 81 Rovnice 2 – změna množství sympatizantů ................................................................................................ 82 Rovnice 3 – radikalizace inspirací .............................................................................................................. 83 Rovnice 4 – rozsah řízeného teroristického útoku ..................................................................................... 86 Rovnice 5 – velikost inspirovaného teroristického útoku ........................................................................... 87 Rovnice 6 – eliminace inspirovaných teroristů ........................................................................................... 87 Rovnice 7 – kalkulace obětí inspirovaných teroristických útoků ............................................................... 89 Rovnice 8 – změna dopadu džihádismu na veřejnost ................................................................................. 93 Rovnice 9 – změna výskytu džihádismu v kyberprostoru .........................................................................
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