­ Work in Progress – ­ Do Not Cite ­

Draft Paper for ISA Convention 2008 ‘Bridging International Divides’, 26­29 March, San Francisco, USA

Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism

Introduction

Celebrated by fans and critics alike, Fox’s 24 television series, now filming its seventh season and averaging over 15 million viewers a week in the United States, has set a new standard for action­ drama (Chamberlain and Rudin, 2007).1 Lauded for its innovative split­screen presentation and signature ticking­clock that counts down the seconds remaining in the 24­hour day ­ time remaining to ‘save the day’ ­ 24 has nonetheless come under sustained criticism for its depiction of torture and interrogation, most recently and notably by US Army Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan (the Dean of the US Military Academy at West Point) and by former US military interrogator Tony Lagourianis (Mayer, 2007; Miller, 2007; Baunder, 2007). In their defence, 24 producers argue that the fiction of television torture has no influence on reality; that the public can tell the difference between television fantasy and what is acceptable in the ‘real’ world (Mayer, 2007).2 As Jutta Weldes argues, however, popular culture and politics are inseparable (Weldes, 1999b). Popular culture (re)inscribes or (re)presents stories about the nature of reality, often (re)telling tales about the rules governing ‘our’ societies and the consequences of

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the British International Studies Association Conference, December 17­19, 2007, Cambridge, United Kingdom. 2 The complex interplay between fantasy and reality has been recognised on some levels since the 1774 publication of Goethe’s Werther was linked to an increase in suicides across Europe. The effect of popular culture on reality has subsequently been referred to as ‘the Werther Effect’ (Lawrence and Jewett, 2004, 9). The specific claim by 24 creator and producer Joel Surnow that there is no connection between fiction and reality is moreover belied by his collaboration with the Fox Broadcasting Corporation to establish a conservative satirical news show, The Half Hour News Hour (now cancelled), to ‘counter’ Jon Stewart’s The Daily Show, a satirical news programme that often lampoons the Bush administration and which Surnow describes as ‘tipping left’ (Mayer, 2007). Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism transgressing these rules. Like the genre of American ‘law and order’ prime­time television from which 24 has evolved, such as Dragnet (1967­70), Hill Street Blues (1981­87), Miami Vice (1984­89), America’s Most Wanted (1988­Present), Rescue 911 (1989­96), Top Cops (1990­93), Law and Order (1990­Present), NYPD Blue (1993­2005), or CSI: Crime Scene Investigation (2000­Present)3, 24 is saturated with meaning about US society and its response to criminality and violence. However, along with the more traditional police­drama cast of murderers, drug­dealers, gangsters, prostitutes, corrupt officials and greedy businessmen (characters who nonetheless remain central to 24 and other recent spy­dramas like Alias and The Agency), the storylines of 24 focus explicitly on the dangers posed to the US by terrorists. And just as police dramas in the 1980s and 90s began to (re)tell the tales of the US ‘war on drugs’, in the process mirroring the discourse of the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations (Grant, 1992), 24 is fulfilling the same uncritical role with regards to current security policies. As I argue, a critical reading of 24 suggests that the series (re)produces key elements – including the exceptional and pervasive nature of the threat posed by terrorism, and the corresponding need for a militarised and repressive form of counter­terrorism ­ of the Bush administrations discourse of the ‘global war on terrorism’, potentially facilitating its practices. This is accomplished in ways that are no different from the way that popular culture (particularly film and television) and political discourses have traditionally (re)presented crime, conflict and justice. 24 therefore relates more broadly to long­standing US security policy traditions that are a legacy of what Lawrence and Jewett refer to as the American Monomyth (2004), the idea that salvation only comes through extra­legal force. This in turn relies on a Schmittian understanding of politics: that ‘authentic’ politics is a fatal confrontation between friend and enemy, and is consequently beyond legal regulation (Scheuerman, 2006, 116). Though the packaging of 24 may be new and exciting, the underlying messages remain the same – that America is open, innocent and law­abiding but that extralegal force is needed to maintain these qualities when confronted by an existential threat ­ in the process rendering commonsensical the construction of the US global war on terrorism and the way that it is waged.4 In order to make this case, what follows is a discussion in

3 The mixing of these ‘fictional’ and ‘reality’ shows is deliberate. They may be considered distinct genres but, as Grant argues (1992), they work together to constitute a common (mis)understanding of crime and justice in the US. This fiction/reality boundary is therefore misleading: the ‘fictional’ shows draw on elements of ‘reality’ (realities), rearranging them so that their plausibility is accepted to a greater or lesser degree, while the ‘reality’ shows are themselves fictional, firstly, as their mediation through a televisual format means that they are edited, even framed, and a narratives imposed (Grant, 1992). And, secondly, they are fictional due to the nature of reality itself: reality is socially constructed (“there is nothing outside the (con)text” (Derrida, 1974, 158)). Accepting this binary as unproblematic therefore allows ‘reality’ to continue as the privileged signifier making it harder to challenge those who claim special access to this ‘reality’ and ignoring the meaning we derive from other sources of truth. Therefore conceptualising fiction and reality as texts which we treat as part of the same ‘pick­ and­mix’ (or ‘image bank’) for our constitution of meaning in the world may be more useful. This is an important theme and one to which I return later. The recent emergence of ‘the CSI effect’ is an example of this interdependence. Prosecutors and police officers have reported an increased tendency among jurors and victims of crime to expect courts and police to work in accordance with the television show (Thomas, 2006; Toobin, 2007). I am grateful to David Mutimer for this point. 4 Due to length constraints several other important constructions and themes at work in 24 are not discussed here such as the gendered and racial constructions of the terrorists, as well as the troubled relationship with technology in the series. 2 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism three acts (in keeping with the style of 24) first, of the ways in which the threat from terrorism is represented as exceptional and pervasive in both 24 and the discourse of the GWOT; second, of how the only logical response is constructed as a militarised and repressive counterterrorism policy; and finally of how this narrative occludes the rule of law and the role of a legal system as part of countering terrorism, overall maintaining the construction of America as innocent and law­abiding.

Popular Culture, World Politics and Counterterrorism

There is a growing body of literature that explores the linkages between popular culture and world politics, arguing that popular culture while reflecting politics also plays an important role in (re)producing and popularising it (Der Derian, 2000; Weber, 2002; Weldes, 2003; Philpott and Mutimer, 2005).5 As Jutta Weldes explains, popular culture does so by providing “a background of meanings that helps constitute public images of world politics… [It] helps to construct the reality of world politics for elites and the public alike, and to the extent that it reproduces the content and structure of dominant foreign discourses, it helps to produce consent to foreign policy and state actions” (2003, 7). And while Weldes’ discussion centres on foreign policy, the interconnection equally applies to security policy. This is due in large part to intertextuality: that any text, whether a presidential address or a film, “is necessarily read in relationship to others [so that…] a range of textual knowledges is brought to bear upon it” (Fiske, 1987, 108). When experiencing a text, these intertextual knowledges – what Fiske refers to as a culture’s ‘image­bank’ – “‘pre­orient’ readers and allow them to make meanings [to read and therefore respond to texts] … in some ways rather than others” (Weldes, 2001, 649). The repetitive use of elements from the ‘image­bank’ thereby generates a “common symbolic environment that cultivates the most widely shared conceptions of reality” (Gerber, et al., 1986, 18). More specifically, this interconnection can occur in at least three ways: through an established and long­standing relationship between text producers, secondly, intertextually through explicit references from one set of texts to another, and thirdly, intertextually through the common narratives or tropes that are central to the constitution of meaning in the texts (Weldes, 2001). In other words, the interrelated representations produced by these texts interact to constitute a frame of meaning which if repeated often enough can come to be identified as ‘common sense’. By both constituting and drawing on the same (re)presentations of ‘reality’, the intertextuality of popular culture and world politics helps to make the world intelligible. Popular culture therefore can be explored “for insights into the character and functioning of world politics” (Weldes, 2003, 7) as it is relevant for insight into what becomes ‘common sense’. To explore the way in which meaning and particular conceptions of security emerge, I therefore turn firstly to a closer examination of the points of intersection between popular culture and conceptions of security, particularly with reference to terrorism and counterterrorism discourses. As explicitly security­related text producers, the interconnectedness of the U.S. film industry, Pentagon, security services and the White House has been described as particularly deep­rooted (Der Derian, 2000, 787; Valantin, 2005, ix). This has been especially documented with regards to the

5 Like Weldes, I use the term ‘popular culture’ in lieu of ‘mass culture’ which more accurately reflects the relationship between those that produce the type of cultural artefact which 24 represents and those that consume it (Weldes, 1999b; Weldes, 2003). 3 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism connections between the military and producers of popular culture to the extent that, as Der Derian argues, a military­industrial­media­entertainment network (MIME­NET) has been constituted: a feedback loop that “merges the production, representation and execution of war” such that the distinction between military and civilian, state and public, real and simulation, original and new, produced and reproduced becomes too hard to make (2000, 787). This is accomplished not only through a long­standing relationship when it comes to recruiting and the provision of military resources for filming, but also through the sharing of key ideas regarding the importance of national security strategy (Valantin, 2005, xii). This connection is not limited to the military but extends to the security services more broadly, particularly the CIA, FBI and more recently, the Department of Homeland Security. Overall, this had led to the emergence of ‘national security cinema’, a genre most frequently reproduced in the US and characterised by the rescue of the nation from threat through the actions of a heroic military or security service. As Valantin claims, the “originality of American national security cinema resides in its creation of a highly dramatic portrayal of the life of defence and security institutions, even the most secret of them (2005, 110).6 On one level, this interconnectedness is fostered as film and television producers work directly with security services on certain projects: I Led Three Lives (1953­56), The Man from U.N.C.L.E. (1964­1968), and The FBI (1965­1974) were produced with the support and endorsement of J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the FBI (Miller, 2003 106); Alias star Jennifer Garner, who played an undercover CIA operative, was invited by the CIA to make a recruitment video for the agency (Erickson, 2007, 208) as ‘the character Jennifer Garner plays embodies the integrity, patriotism and intelligence the CIA looks for in its officers’ (CIA, 2004); and more recently, Fox Broadcasting Corporation, with the producer Brian Grazer from 24, signed a deal with the ‘real’ FBI to revive the television drama The FBI (Andreeva, 2007). Finally, the influence of Hollywood and its ability and shape popular understanding of security is well established enough that on November 11, 2001 Bush’s political advisor Karl Rove traveled to Hollywood to meet with Jack Valenti, head of the Motion Picture Association of America and the most powerful lobbyist in Hollywood. The meeting which included several prominent television and film executives was held to ensure that ‘the war on terrorism’ was not misrepresented as a clash of civilisations’ (Saunders, 2001). According to Jack Valenti, "This was about contributing Hollywood's creative imagination and their persuasion skills to help in this war effort” (Saunders, 2002). However, even without the deliberate and cultivated connections between policy elites and popular culture producers, security themed films are commonplace with frequent and explicit ‘intertextual moments’ occurring between official and Hollywood texts.7 Instances of officials referencing popular culture are well­known: the ‘Star Wars’ missile programme, the naming of the first NASA shuttle ‘the Enterprise’ after Star Trek, the association of the J. F. Kennedy administration with Camelot, or Hillary Clinton’s campaign advertisement based on The Sopranos. Discussed with less frequency,

6 Moreover, whether depicting international conflicts, internal security or policing issues, national security cinema (like the American Western and its reliance on the idea of American Manifest Destiny) (re)produces what Lawrence and Jewett (2004) describe as the American Monomyth, the recurrent narrative in American popular culture that superheroic redemptive violence is essential for US survival. 7 Instances of official texts explicitly referencing popular culture include. 4 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism however, are the myriad ways in which popular culture draws on official texts. Films frequently refer to ‘real’ agencies and hire consultants to advise on policies or procedures (for example, Chase Brandon, the CIA’s representative in Hollywood, acts as an adviser for 24 scripts (Mayer, 2007)).8 The frequency with which popular cultural texts draw on ‘reality’ to suggest plausibility is an interesting part of the (re)production of discourses of security.9 Specifically, with regards to (re)presentations of terrorism and counterterrorism, though present in other media such as literary fiction, video games and comic books, (re)presentations in film have proved particularly popular. Terrorism and counterterrorism (re)presentations in particular have “become a vital source of narratives, fantasies, and myths that contribute so much to highly entertaining cinema, with its international intrigue, exotic settings, graphic violence, and the putative conflict between good and evil” (Boggs and Pollard, 2007, 335). The “violent high­tech spectacle” that is popular cultural (re)presentations of terrorism (and therefore of corresponding counterterrorism strategies) can be found in dozens of films produced over the years from James Bond films (Dr. No (1962), Thunderball (1965)) of the 1960s; to the films of the 1980s and 90s (Delta Force (1986), Frantic (1988), Die Hard (1988), Navy Seals (1990), Die Hard 2 (1990), Delta Force 3 (1991), American Ninja 4: The Annihilation (1991), Patriot Games (1992), Chain of Command (1993), Speed (1994), True Lies (1994), Under Siege 2: Dark Territory (1995), Die Hard with a Vengeance (1995), The Rock (1995), Executive Decision (1996), The Siege (1998), Air Force One (1997), The Peacemaker (1997), Tomorrow Never Dies (1997), and The World is Not Enough (1999)), most of which are produced by Hollywood and many of which are dominated by encounters with Arab/Muslim militants. This has continued into the present, albeit arguably with a more critical narrative of counterterrorism (Mission Impossible II (2000), Spy Game (2001), Swordfish (2001), The Sum of All Fears (2002), Collateral Damage (2002), United 93 (2006), Munich (2005), Syriana (2005), Casino Royale (2006), Live Free or Die Hard (2007), Rendition (2007), and The Kingdom (2007)). Terrorism and counterterrorism themes are not, however, limited to the big screen but are increasingly (re)presented on television as well. Agents from the CIA, FBI, or military special forces also battle terrorists on the small screen (Scarecrow and Mrs. King (1983­1987), MacGyver (1985­1992), La Femme Nikita (1997­2001), The Agency (2001­2003), Alias (2001­2006), The Grid (2004), Sleeper Cell (2005­2006), The Unit (2006­Present, and Chuck (2007)).10 “Scenes of terrorist and counterterrorist activity have a natural cinematic appeal” (Boggs and Pollard, 2007, 335)

8 For a critique of Hollywood’s lack of ‘reality’ with regards to the CIA see Dujmovic, 2008. 9 This emphasis on ‘the real’ may in part be due to inaccessibility of terrorism/counterterrorism ‘realities’ for the general public to start with. 10 Other genres other than those explicitly identified as ‘spy­dramas’ have also explored the theme of terrorism such as science­fiction (Battlestar Galactica, 2005­Present and Lost (2005­Present)). A more closely related television genres ­ that of vigilante police­dramas and private investigators (PIs) ­ especially popular in the 1980s could also be included, where heroes (usually men) or teams of heroes act on their own initiative to solve and prevent crimes. This includes Magnum PI (1980­88), Knightrider (1982­86), The A­Team (1983­87), Murder She Wrote (1984­96), Airwolf (1984­86), Streethawk (1985), and Counterstrike (1990­93). 5 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism which are increasingly finding their way onto television so that viewers can tune in weekly (or more often) to see the inner workings of the security services. With their big­screen equivalents, these representations therefore become common reference points for understanding terrorism: ‘the spectacle of terrorism’ has become so familiar that events like the destruction of the World Trade Towers in 2001, however shocking, seemed to many like something out of a movie (Valantin, 2003, 90). Thirdly, beyond engaging in intertextual referencing, popular culture and official discourses share common narratives and tropes – structural homologies ­ that help to generate meaning and understanding of what constitutes security (Weldes, 2001, 650). While Cold War narratives dominated cinematic as well as political discourses throughout the 1960s, and the ‘war on drug’ dominated the 1980s, the ‘war on terror’ and international terrorism has come to dominate conceptions of security as reflected in both cinematic and political discourses. With regard to terrorism, Pollard and Boggs therefore suggest that Hollywood (re)produces many of the key elements articulated more broadly: “patriotism, the cult of guns and violence, glorification of technology, the hypermasculine hero, [and] obsession with ‘alien’ threats” (2007, 347). And, secondly, that these narratives also work so that security services such as the CIA and the FBI are rehabilitated and sanitised, while their very role in producing the insecurity and instability is elided (Valantin, 2005). Therefore, as will be argued here, when it comes to the war on terrorism the dominant narrative (re)produced by the Bush administration and within 24 are similarly productive and work together to normalise the existence of a terrorist threat that is exceptional and ubiquitous, legitimising certain counter­terrorist strategies that are militarised, repressive and where heroes do ‘whatever it takes’. So, just as police dramas “present fables about crime and law” within society (Grant, 1990), spy dramas such as 24 present a rationale for a particular conception of security and counter­terrorism policies. Overall, the intertextuality that occurs between official discourses and popular culture therefore means that, with regards to terrorism, it is impossible to distinguish between fiction and reality; for each point of interconnection, the divide that is most often accepted as existing between reality and fiction is bridged and blurred. When actors imitate spies who are themselves inspired by actors playing fictional spies, or when writers create agencies based on actual agencies which are in turn modelled by policy­ makers on the agencies in fiction, the “commingling of illusion and reality calls both into question” (Grant, 1992, 62). Therefore once intertextual moments occur that draw on ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ ­ as opposed to drawing exclusively from one or the other (if this is ever possible) ­ the production of a hyperreality becomes more likely. In other words, a hyperreality emerges where the blurring that occurs between fact and fiction results in the recombinant appearing natural (Baudrillard, 1994).11 With regards to counterterrorism and 24, the hyperreal emerges when the fusion of little realities of counterterrorism forms a fiction of counterterrorism in 24, this in turn interacts with the ‘reality’ of the global war on terrorism as articulated by the Bush administration resulting in an intertext which influences and alters the reality of counterterrorism (most notably the use of torture) – not only does the real influence the fiction, but the fiction influences the real. The result of these interconnections ­ the intertexts – is the production of a hyperreality of counterterrorism in the global war on terrorism, which works to normalise current practices and render

11 For a more obvious and frequently cited example of hyperreality and Baudrillard is that found in The Matrix (1999). The Matrix is a fiction world created based on a reality of life before ‘the machines’ in order to enslave humanity. This fictional world not only camouflages what life is ‘really’ like but can also influence that reality and how it is constituted (Irwin, 2002). 6 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism them more plausible and commonsensical. If left unchallenged, these meaning therefore become hegemonic and articulating an alternate approach (as occurred immediately following 9/11) becomes ‘unsayable’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Therefore problematising the distinction between fact and fiction through an analysis of these intertextual moments of 24 and the global war on terrorism discourse becomes more important for understanding terrorism, counter­terrorism, security policy and more broadly world politics.

24: The Clock is Ticking

As a television show, 24 is successful. Fusing three popular televisual genres ­ law and order, reality television and Hollywood blockbuster ­ 24 fits easily within the genre of national security cinema, appealing to a large American audience and exceeding 10 million viewers a week in the US for five of its six seasons. The show itself depicts, in “real­time”12, the efforts of Jack Bauer (Kiefer Sutherland) and the Los Angeles­based Counter­Terrorism Unit (or CTU) to stop terrorist threats from being realised on American soil. In particular, its novel techniques such as split­screens and ticking clock, makes 24 particularly compelling viewing. However, in addition to its distinct style and format, its producers have also invested heavily in its ‘realism’ by consulting experts in terrorism and counterterrorism when writing their scripts to increase their believability. As writer Michael Loceff explains: We … have an investment in plausibility. We've hired writers who have done heavy research in espionage and anti­terrorism and worked with the government. And we've met with consultants from the intelligence community and other parts of the government, just to help stir up ideas and help us come up with something that seems compelling (Surowiecki, 2006). Moreover, its timing, airing for the first time shortly after September 11, 2001, also means that 24 exists in a “post 9/11 world.” Though the script and the first episodes of Season 1 had been written by the time September 11, 2001 took place, Joel Surnow, the series creator and producer, explains that “the inspiration for seasons two, three, four and five is 9/11” (cited in Dillulo, 2006; Suroweiki, 2006). Based on this success, 24 has run for six seasons and has been renewed for an additional two. There is also the promise of a forthcoming movie, as well as the publication of numerous spin­off books, board and video games (‘Fox orders more '24’', 2007). The show has also won critical acclaim, having been awarded the 2006 Emmy for Outstanding Drama Series, the 2002 Golden Globe for Best Television Series (Drama), and the 2002 Golden Globe for Best Performance by an Actor in a Television Series (Drama) for Kiefer Sutherland (Academy of Television Arts and Sciences, 2007). Based on the popularity and influence of 24 and Jack Bauer, Kiefer Sutherland has also recorded at least four public service advertisements on US television including, rather ironically, advertisements to

12 This device, to have all the action occur in one day, is a return to the classical tradition of the unities as defined by Aristotle in Poetics (V): “for Tragedy endeavours, as far as possible, to confine itself to a single revolution of the sun, or but slightly to exceed this limit” (Aristotle, 1996, 10). Aristotle believed that respecting the unities (action, place and time), increases the intensity of the audience’s experience. 7 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism promote gun safety, to discourage discrimination against Muslim­Americans, and to encourage climate­ change awareness. 24 has even inspired university courses: Georgetown University Law School Professor Walter Sharp (who is also associate deputy general counsel for the US Department of Defense) offers “The Law of ‘24’”, a course providing "a detailed understanding of a very wide range of U.S. domestic and international legal issues ... in the context of the utilitarian and sometimes desperate responses to terrorism raised by the plot of 24" (2007). Individual viewers are also invested in the series, as evidenced by the number of internet fan websites and listservs devoted to the show (and not mention the distinct ring­tone that seems to follow me everywhere which fans have down­loaded to their personal phones). As one viewer describes his own experience of 24: From the outset, I was hooked... In just a couple months, I had watched all seventy­two episodes that had previously aired and were available... I wondered how Jack would have handled real life situations I learned about on the news or whether discussions of national security in the real world pertained to the information gathering techniques utilized on 24. I often wondered if the strategies worked in 24, would they also work in the real world? Would they be of necessity? [sic]… (Keane, 2007, 1­2) In other words, 24 is popular; at the level of the public, Americans “care about it, talk about it, and write about it” (Weldes, 1999b, 133). Its success as a television show is undeniable. 24’s reach, however, extends to elites as well ­ Karl Rove hosted producers of the show at the White House where they also dined with Tony Snow and Lynne Cheney; the Heritage Foundation and Rush Limbaugh have also hosted 24­themed events attended, among others, by Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas and Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff; Chertoff himself has corresponded directly with producer Howard Gordon. In addition to these interconnections, intertextual moments have appeared amongst official texts when John Yoo, former Justice Department lawyer and author of the Bush administration’s ‘torture memo’, used examples from 24 as justification for torture; when Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia suggested that no court in the US would convict Jack Bauer for torturing; when Rush Limbaugh described 24 as ‘pro­America; when even staunch torture­ opponent, Senator and Presidential candidate McCain described himself as “a Jack Bauer kind of guy”; or when Army West Point graduates believe 24 is how counter­terrorism works (Saunders, 2001; Patterson, 2006; Freeze, 2007; Mayer, 2007; Carlson, 2007; Poneiwozik, 2007). Along with members of the public, elites have therefore also been successfully interpellated or hailed into subject positions sympathetic with Jack Bauer and which equate Americanism with 24 and therefore with a particular narrative of terrorism and counter­terrorism. Therefore, as these interconnections suggest, whether at the level of the general public or elite policy­makers, the distinction between reality and fiction starts to break down when it comes to developing an understanding of terrorism and counterterrorism as (re)presented within 24. However, to understand more fully the production of common sense in the war on terror, it is worth examining more closely the manner in which 24 (re)produces key narratives of the global war on terrorism discourse and the way in which this (re)inscribed beliefs surrounding identities. If we accept the connections

8 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism between popular culture and world politics connections as meaningful, the themes that are essential to 24 must be explored, beginning with the representation of terrorism as an exceptional, ubiquitous, and immediate threat to Americans.

“We’re Dealing with Extraordinary Circumstances Here!” The Exceptional Threat of Terrorism

In the world of 24, Los Angeles is a very, very dangerous place to live. It is a world filled with nasty but familiar threats targeted at Americans: car bombs, chemical attacks, hostage takings, presidential assassination attempts, nuclear explosions, train bombings, and radiological attacks, all the result of terrorism and all on a scale that has never been seen before. In Season/Day 4 alone (4), Bauer and the Counter­Terrorism Unit (CTU) must foil plots masterminded by 'Turkish' terrorists and rescue the Secretary of Defence from public execution, stop a stolen fighter from flying into Air Force One, stop hijacked nuclear reactors from exploding across the country, and stop a nuclear missile from being fired into Los Angeles. 13 And, though these scenarios may seem familiar – mostly through popular cultural (re)presentations in police or spy dramas in film or television of the past 40 years – within the series they are constantly articulated as new and exceptional, as well as ubiquitous, immediate and foreign. This works alongside public discourses to construct the risks posed by terrorism in a way that renders it more ‘real’ and commonsensical.14 As a 24 viewer we are often told by characters that these threats spell potential death for 'hundreds of thousands of Americans', are 'bigger than anyone could have imagined’ or 'the worst attack in the history of our country'. This is because, more often than not, the threats involve ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMDs), biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear weapons that we are told have the capacity to kill thousands, if not millions (a claim that remains contested (Mueller, 2006, 14)). This apocalyptic narrative follows a tradition in US popular culture of playing to nuclear anxieties (Herbert, 2007).15 For example, within the first half of Season/Day 2, which aired 2002­03, Jack Bauer and CTU work to find a nuclear bomb that Islamic terrorists are planning to detonate in Los Angeles, a scenario easily pulled from the pages of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) Report: “a new breed of Islamic terrorist has emerged … its strategy is to inflict mass casualties and their aim is to attack no less than the head of Western civilisation” (2003, 421). The threat of this super­terrorism in 24 was simultaneously being articulated by officials such as Powell, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz. Vice–President Cheney in 2003 stated that the next time terrorists strike, they may well be armed with more than just plane tickets and box cutters. The next time they might direct chemical agents or diseases at our

13 Episodes are referenced by indicating the season (e.g. 4 for Season/Day 4, 5 for Season/Day 5) or the specific episode (e.g. 4.5 for episode 5 in Season/Day 4). 14 On the use the term articulate see Weldes, 1999a. 15 Popular cultural (re)presentations of threat in the US tradition often feature an existential threat to a community. A legacy of Protestant millennialism ­ establishment of the American 'city on the hill', preparation for the new millennium and the apocalypse (Lawrence and Jewett, 2004). 9 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism

population, or attempt to detonate a nuclear weapon in one of our cities…no rational person can doubt that terrorists would use such weapons of mass murder the moment they are able to do so… [W]e are dealing with terrorists…who are willing to sacrifice their own lives in order to kills millions of others. Meanwhile, as episodes of 24 aired and fictional officials discussed raising the national threat level, the actual national threat level stood at Code Orange, the second highest alert level, for an unspecified threat (Feeny, 2004) reminding Americans that the United States was ‘really’ in danger. And even less surprising that the ‘fictional’ moments of 24, based as they are on ‘plausible scenarios’, anticipate ‘real life’ – as occurred when debates over the manipulation of intelligence and the lead up to war were simultaneously aired on 24 as Colin Powell appeared before the UN Security Council in the lead up to the Iraq War (Erickson, 2007, 208). These fictional and ‘real’ (re)presentations of catastrophic threat therefore work together through their intertextuality to render this threat understandable. Secondly, the threat from terrorism is presented as ubiquitous – suburban shopping malls are as likely to be targeted by WMDs as Air Force One. Over the first 5 seasons of 24, terrorists release a deadly virus in a populated hotel (3); release nerve gas in a shopping mall (3); attempt to explode nuclear reactors near suburban populations (5); explode ‘suitcase nukes’ killing thousands (6), engage in hostage takings in an airport (5); capture, torture or kill individuals who are out camping (4), at work (4,5), driving down the 'freeway' (4), or investigating a noise outside their house (4). Individuals can also become victims by being unwittingly related, involved, living next­door to or married to a terrorist (1,4), or by being a corrupt official (5) or even a corrupt agent (1,4,5). In the world of 24, targets can be anyone and anywhere: “violent death is possible any time, at any place, from any quarter. Ordinary people are vulnerable as they ride buses, go to work in high­rise buildings, or simply walk along crowded streets” (Boggs and Pollard, 2006, 344). In the same way, following 9/11 the Department of Homeland Security declared that “today’s terrorists can strike at any place, at any time, and with virtually any weapon” (Department of Homeland Security, 2001) and oversaw the identification of over 80,000 sites within the US as likely terrorist targets, including a miniature golf business (Mueller, 2006, 1). The suggestion, like in 24 is that ‘we’ are all at risk anywhere, including in our homes: terrorism seeks to disrupt ‘our way of life’ (Bush, 2001), to transform a peaceful and innocent society into a fearful one through indiscriminate killing. In this sense, “24 communicates to its viewers the very sense that American politicians and particularly the Bush administration, have been insisting upon repeatedly since 9/12: ‘9/11 changed everything’” (Caldwell and Chambers, 2007, 97) providing the space for the raft of new measures implemented in the name of national security. The history of the United States, however, is replete with identifications of existential threat and 'exceptional' events threatening all of 'America': the American Civil War, Pearl Harbor and the declaration of unlimited emergency in 1941, the Great Depression, the Cold War and now latterly terrorism and 'WMDs' (Caldwell and Chambers, 2007, 100). This construction of exceptional threats, as Agamben argues, is “a voluntary creation of a permanent state of emergency” that since WWII “has become one of the essential practices of contemporary states” (2005, 2) such that the distinction between war and peace is no longer possible. The ubiquity of the threat along with its exceptional

10 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism nature means that show after show “24 offers viewers the exception incessantly” so that “the exception has become the norm” (Caldwell and Chambers, 2007, 99). The events of 24, like to global war on terrorism discourse, are therefore paradoxically represented as both constant and exceptional. Thirdly, the threat from terrorism is articulated as immediate. Throughout every moment of the series, there are ticking clocks, both the overlaying one omnipresent throughout the series with its signature sound­effect, and those embedded within the story itself ­ either as a prop or through the constant reminders from characters ­ counting down the minutes left until the execution, until the reactors explode or until the missile hits LA. The ticking clocks, the very premise for the series (Suroweiki, 2006) ­ and therefore based on a common (mis)understanding of the ‘reality’ of counterterrorism ­ provide 24 with one of its most distinctive features, cleverly imbuing the series with its sense of urgency and suspense. The ‘ticking­time bomb’ scenarios of each Season/Day, render the extraordinary measures of 24 commonsensical and 'real', for example, from the start of Season/Day 2, the initial scenes feature a source confessing under torture to the existence of a nuclear bomb set to explode in Los Angeles that day, evidence, we are told, that is ‘highly credible’.16 The initial shots prepare the viewer for an imminent, and catastrophic threat, removing any uncertainty that may lead the viewer to question, first, the method of obtaining the information, and, secondly, the information itself. In the same way the Bush administration uses the ticking time bomb scenario to caution US citizens that they are in imminent danger from terrorism: Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning…tens of thousands of trained terrorists are still at large… A terrorist underworld…operates in remote jungles and deserts, and hides in the centers of large cities…time is not on our side (Bush, 2002a). It is not enough for the threats to be all around; they must be pressing and immediate, so that the action taken seems persuasive. This construction of terrorism more importantly leaves little discursive space for reflection or critique within the series or the ‘war on terror’. The ‘ticking time bomb’ scenario engenders a sense of immediacy, intensity and urgency about the threat, limiting the possibility to challenge the claim that a threat exists as constructed. Finally, terrorism is constructed through the representation of the terrorists themselves. Within 24, as with the wider discourse of the ‘war on terrorism’, terrorists are most often constructed as ruthless, devious, resourceful, cunning, dangerous and evil (Jackson, 2005, 108). They do not hesitate to kill randomly (1­6), they torture (2,4,6), and have violent families lives (4), characteristics which are highlighted, even exploited, by CTU. Moreover, their willingness to engage in super­terrorism involving WMDs means that terrorists cease being ‘normal biopolitical bodies’ that can be deterred by conventional means, becoming instead an exceptional threat (Hannah, 2006, 629). Indeed, the construction of terrorists within 24 as willing to engage in extremes of violence make them ideal characters to embody Schmitt’s conception of the Partisan – the “real” or “absolute” enemy who is

16 This scene is set in South Korea rather than the US with the impression given that the torturers are themselves South Korean, though the torture is observed by US government agents (2.1). At the time that this episode was aired little was made of this allusion to the extraordinary rendition programme. 11 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism willing to go to all lengths to defend their interests and therefore requires a response in kind (Scheuerman, 2006, 109). As terrorists, “they show no qualms about the “real possibility of killing”” and cannot be “opposed by legal, moral or economic devices.” Furthermore, terrorists generally originate ‘over there’: Serbian (1), Saudi (2), Turkish (4), Russian (5) and Lebanese (6) terrorists all provide the main threat for a significant portion of each Season/Day. This reliance on foreign or ‘alien’ terrorists, as they are commonly referred to in the 'war on terrorism’ discourse, as opposed to ‘home grown ones’, is common within ‘national security cinema’. In particular, since the 1980s, Middle Eastern terrorists have served as a main terrorist threat, a powerful construction due to its interplay with existing cultural stereotypes of Arabs (Shaheen, 2001) and is wholly consistent with the American tradition of representing threat as originating outside and on an apocalyptic scale, whether in popular culture or political rhetoric (Lawrence and Jewett, 2004).17 24 capitalises on these stereotypes, and through careful casting, lighting and musical themes ­ for example those associated with the character Habib Marwan (played by Arnold Vosloo) who leads the terrorist cell in Season/Day 4 ­ makes it impossible to view terrorism as anything other than fanatical: as Marwan moves through the scenes, he is accompanied by discordant ‘exotic’ sounding music (often in counterpoint to Bauer’s heroic theme), with his face often in shadows, he threatens and kills civilians and co­conspirators alike without emotion, and, in one scene, flees through the sewers to evade capture. The general impression of terrorists is therefore that they are willing to commit random violent acts that target ‘civilians’ as well as political leaders without restraint. Grievances with US policies and actions that might motivate them are alluded to by never explored. Therefore, in the same manner that police­dramas often set up criminals as ‘ideological straw men’ (Grant, 1990, 59) who represent “agreed upon criminal types”, 24 relies on these terrorists to embody the terrorist threat. The repetition of these images, and their consistencies with the image of terrorist presented in the discourse of the Bush administration officials, reinforces the image of the terrorist, making it easier to see racial profiling as common sense, for example. Overall, 24 is very successful at telling a story about terrorism, of representing the threat of terrorism to the US as exceptional, ubiquitous, and immediate, as well as foreign. Though terrorism as a threat is not new to national security cinema, 24 is successful in (re)producing the elements familiar from the Bush administrations discourse of the war on terrorism. This interplay between the ‘reality’ of terrorism and its simulation/fiction helps to render the threat more commonsensical, and therefore legitimises a particular form of counterterrorism – leading to what some have come to refer to as ‘torture porn’ (Surowiecki, 2006).

“We don't have time for your rule book!”: The War­Fighting Model of Counter­ Terrorism

17 This construction of terrorists as ‘outside’ therefore also facilitates the understanding of terrorists as ‘real enemies’ in the Schmittian sense as their presence outside means that they are existentially distinct from ‘us’ and ‘our friends’. In other words, the distinction between friend and enemy is clearer and more understandable when it is tied to geography and space. 12 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism

On May 1, 2003 the US Terrorist Threat Integration Centre (TTIC) was created, bringing together 16 agencies involved in counterterrorism operations as “the nerve centre of the US­led global war on terror” (Gardner, 2006; National Counterterrorism Center, 2007). Eight months later, in December 2004 the TTIC became the National Counterterrorism Centre (NCTC) authorised under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. The new facilities, located in a non­descript Washington suburb were developed with the help of Hollywood “imagineers” and include large plasma screens which “rise up like something out of a James Bond film” (Gardner, 2006). Interestingly, when images of the site were released to the public, comments by online bloggers were made as to how closely the centre resembled the set of CTU Los Angeles in 24. Meanwhile, in the world of 24, counterterrorism is carried out by the Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU): an elite branch of the CIA18 with local divisions situated in major American cities, the Los Angeles unit in which the action of 24 is based is one of them. CTU has therefore been compared in many ways to the CIA’s own elite unit, the Counter Terrorism Centre (CTC) (DiLullo, 2006). As these examples suggest, the construction of a counterterrorist discourse means that it is impossible to escape the interconnections between counterterrorist fact and fiction. The longstanding relationship between Hollywood and the security services, whether directly or intertextually, has generated a common ‘image­bank’ from which meaning and understanding about security is derived. Therefore, just as terrorism has been articulated as an exceptional threat within 24 ­ working with existing official discourses to tell us what terrorism looks like ­ counterterrorism has also been constructed through both fiction and reality. These work together to render counterterrorism practices commonsensical, in particular its reliance on the use of ‘exceptional measures’ – whether militarised, using extralegal violence (including extraordinary rendition, indefinite detention without charge and torture), and/or the emphasis placed on heroic sacrifice in the name of safeguarding ‘our way of life’, freedom and the homeland.

‘The Last Line of Defense’ Firstly, counterterrorism involves the maximum use of force. Force is required to overcome an enemy that, as constructed, cannot be contained or restrained any other way. Most often, this requirement for overwhelming force for counterterrorism means that high­tech weaponry and military tactics are required, even and up to including involving the military directly.19 As Crelinstein argues, a militarization of counterterrorism occurs in response to this construction, particularly when the threat is constructed as a war, as was the case with the ‘war on drugs’ (1998) and now the ‘global war on terrorism’. Consequently a military model of counterterrorism is increasingly common and found in many Western European, North American and Israeli security services and police forces. And, where, to respond to the needs of these ‘wars’ maximal as opposed to minimal use of force is seen as necessary

18 A detail specified only in the spin­off books. 19 The use of the military for counterterrorism is especially interesting in light of the Posse Comitatus (1878) and Insurrection Acts (1807), which historically have limited the authority of the federal government to use US military forces for carrying out law enforcement activities on US soil. For the first 6 seasons of 24 these Acts were in place though did not prevent the ‘fictional’ world from using the military. However, since 2006, these acts are among those that have been altered in the wake of 9/11. The US President is now authorised to use the military for law enforcement in the event of a ‘major public emergency’. 13 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism and most effectively delivered with a war­model of counterterrorism. This means that excessive use of force becomes more likely. Excessive use of force has been the primary problem within the war model of counter­ terrorism, particularly in the case of political killings whereby a suspect is shot rather than arrested, as in cases of alleged shoot­to­kill policies. This often arises when elite commandos, who may be either police personnel with special training or military personnel, are used to capture suspected terrorists (Crelinstein, 1998). 24 captures the elements of this model nicely, but more importantly, renders it commonsensical. Towards the start of each Season/Day we are offered a view of CTU Los Angeles in operation. Its highly­skilled, hard­working professionals monitor suspicious activity, prepared to respond. However, as soon as ‘action’ is required, the real heroes ­ the field agents and tactical units (with the support of analysts) ­ are ready to respond with force to eliminate the exceptional threat ‘in the nick of time’ and as ‘the last line of defense’ (3). CTU, with its hierarchies, military grade communications, command and control systems as well as weaponry and tactics are articulated as de facto military organisations which have the capability in ­ indeed the responsibility ­ to use maximum force to ‘save the day’.20 This often results in what could otherwise be described as summary executions. By the end of each Season/Day, Jack Bauer alone has killed 10 (1), 30 (2), 14 (3), 45 (4), 38 (5), and 49 (6) ‘terrorists’ in a 24­hour period. In many cases this includes the summary execution of the terrorist leaders (1, 3, 4, 5, 6) (VanLandschoot, 2007), though drivers and security details are equally dispensable. Meanwhile, as this occurs we are told how this is the only option and brought about by the terrorists themselves. The first lesson of counterterrorism is therefore that force is often the only way of eliminating the threat, and means that it is militarised war­model of counterterrorism that prevails, involving the excess use of force and culminating in a pattern of summary executions. As a consequence, in 24, but (re)produced in the global war on terrorism narrative, traditional police methods developed for crime (often represented by the LAPD or the FBI) are articulated as insufficient (even ineffective or corrupt) to meet the needs of the new war. The criminal justice model which relies on police, courts and corrections for detection, apprehension, detention, prosecution and/or rehabilitation of accused persons to address conflict (Bernard & Engels, 2001) and in theory includes operating within the law, using minimal force, careful surveillance and detailed investigations (Crelinstein, 1998) prove to be too burdensome, even an obstacle.21 Therefore, the reality of counterterrorism – its detailed research, lengthy surveillance operations, “people debating in a conference room and filling out forms in triplicate (Mike Baker, 14­year CIA veteran as cited in Silver, 2006; Vice Admiral Scott Redd, Head of the National Counter Terrorism Centre, as cited in Gardner 2006) is overlooked by producers of 24 who have been captivated by the image of a glamorous and adrenaline­fuelled work, focusing on the ‘pursue’ element rather than the ‘prevent’, further perpetuating

20 In an interesting case of the interconnection between Hollywood and the Pentagon, where fiction meets reality, real­life marine units and helicopters were loaned to the production for the purposes of ‘taking down the terrorists’ (4.6). When one of the soldiers who participated in the filming was later killed in Iraq, 24 paid tribute to his heroism following the show (‘24’ Pays Tribute to Fallen Marine’, 2005). 21 This model itself is not unproblematic as ongoing problems in the American criminal justice system attest to (Neocleous, 2004). 14 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism the myth.

‘Whatever it Takes’ Secondly, while exceptional measures seem to justify the use of maximum force as part of a militarised approach to counterterrorism, going rogue is presented as the only option when confronted with an exceptional threat and therefore an essential element of the strategy for effectively protecting Americans. As Vice President Cheney explained in 2001: we also have to work sort of the dark side, if you will. We’re going to spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussions, using sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies if we’re going to be successful. That’s the world these folks operate in. And so it’s going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our objective…It is a mean, nasty, dangerous, dirty business out there, and we have to operate in that arena. I’m convinced we can do it… As part of constructing a narrative that relies on the ticking­time bomb scenario and an exceptional threat, agents such as Bauer are presented as having no option but act, and act such that they step outside the boundaries established either by law in the global war on terrorism discourse or within the 24­world ­ whether disobeying direct orders or breaking the law. In this world where there is no time for discussion or debate, only action, Bauer has no choice but to constantly shift from operating within the law to operating beyond it. As Bauer explains, “We don't have a choice. We're out of time here” (4.24). As time presses ever onwards and there are no other leads, 'going rogue' to get the job done makes sense. We are told there is never any other choice when legal or authoritative obstructions are in the way: whether a suspect with connections is kidnapped from the sanctuary of an embassy (4) or medical assistance is denied (4); whether legal authorities are superseded, disregarded or even incapacitated (1, 2, 3, 4, 5); or whether a court injunction (4) or a presidential immunity deal (5) to stop an interrogation ignored. With regards to the war on terrorism, there is ‘no choice’: “win we must ­­ we have no choice” (Bush as cited in Jackson, 2005, 139). More importantly, Bauer's 'going rogue', and stepping outside the boundaries of the law is never punished. He may be pursued by the authorities, only to be reinstated as an agent shortly after, when he is again needed. Through Bauer, Schmitt’s vision of politics is therefore enacted. In response to the exceptional threat that “real enemies” such as terrorists pose, ‘we’ are required to ‘whatever it takes’: At CTU, exceptional actions not only become regularised, but also are continually made to appear legitimate: the agents pursue leads that routinely turn out to be true. And the agents always appear to be working for the good of the country, to stop an indisputably imminent threat (Caldwell and Chambers, 2007, 104, emphasis added). Other agents within CTU are also continually stepping outside boundaries 'to get the job done': holding secret conferences, accessing data from other agencies illegally or countermanding orders from higher ups, all of which are constructed as the logical thing to do to save the day. Even Presidents (Palmer (2, 3) and Logan (4, 5) in 24 are continuously stepping outside accepted parameters for governance, rarely consulting with executive members, congress or legal experts in their decision­ 15 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism making; incarcerating journalists (2), even conspiring with terrorists as there is no choice when confronted with terrorism. These actions outside the legal and established framework of counter­terrorism as constructed within the world of 24 ­ never a rare occurrence – mirror the justifications provided by the Bush administration in the global war on terrorism. They are what Judith Butler would describe as actions by 'petty sovereigns' where unaccountable and decentralised decision­making becomes the acceptable norm as long as it is carried out by the 'right people' (Butler, 2004, 65). Together through their intertextuality, 24 and the global war on terrorism constitute therefore this hyperreal world where counterterrorism is equated with this type of decision­making. To avoid “the dynamic of perpetual competition and perpetual discussion” (Schmitt, 1998, 72), decision­making when the stakes are high must be made in a “fundamentally norm­less realm … in which the executive posses full discretionary authority” (Scheuerman, 2006, 118) and attempts to tame such conflicts by juridical means are destined to fail (116). Laws, democracy, transparency and accountability are constraints in the fight against terrorism. In particular, when decision­making is limited under the pressure of a ticking clock, time limits increase the acceptability of the use of violence, especially extralegal violence ­ euphemistically referred to by Cheney (2001) as ‘working the dark side’, ‘in the shadows’, and a ‘dirty business’ or in 24 as ‘getting your hands dirty’ (2.1).22 This includes the use of torture to extract information from suspected terrorists or their affiliates, which of all the elements of 24 or the global war on terrorism discourse has attracted the most attention.23 24 in particular is renowned for its frequent and graphic torture sequences.24 Torture is a key component of the show, despite the claim to the contrary by producer Loceff who suggests that they often hold back (Surowiecki, 2007), to the extent that fans specifically expect it and monitor it, particularly through the website Jack Bauer Torture Report (2007). These tortures are often carried out by Bauer, though not always, and all are justified within the narrative and through careful filming and editing by the ticking clock. Credible evidence that a suspect has knowledge of or is affiliated with terrorism is not needed as there is never any doubt that the heroes are torturing, if not always the right person, for the right reason. If an innocent is tortured, they are ultimately either revealed as complicit with the terrorists, or forgive the torturers. In other words, when laws become an obstacle to security in the war on terrorism, as they do in 24, a “trade off” between civil liberties and security becomes necessary. The world of successful counterterrorism requires these sacrifices in order to respond to the new and fast­paced requirements which are too much for ‘ordinary’ police methods. In the Schmittian sense, exceptional threats require

22 These metaphors are themselves interesting, with their references to light/dark, good/evil, and clean/dirty associations, and are common in the GWOT discourse generally, working together (along with creating other intertextual moments with texts such as Star Wars and ‘the dark side’) to render the argument commonsensical. 23 24 is not the only show to depict torture as necessary. As Human Rights First reports, primetime depictions of torture have increased from 55 (1995­2000) to 679 (2001­2005) (Human Rights First, 2007), and appear in counterterrorism shows such as Alias (2001), in police dramas like CSI Miami (2002), or science fiction such as Heroes (2006) where ‘good guys’ torture. 24 For a discussion of torture in 24, see Howard, Douglas L. (2007). ‘‘You’re Going to Tell Me Everything you Know’: Torture and Morality in Fox’s 24’ in S. Peacock, (Ed.) Reading 24: TV Against the Clock. New York: I.B. Tauris, pp. 133­148. 16 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism exceptional actions. This argument is not only made in 24, but has also been used to justify interrogation techniques used at Joint Task Force Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib prison by General Miller, the American US Army Major General tasked with overseeing detention in Guantánamo in 2003 and later Abu Ghraib. And, as Scheuerman points out, this “eerily corroborates Schmitt’s expectation that the dynamism of modern warfare potentially clashes with any attempt to develop a firm legal framework for the rules of war” (Scheuerman, 2006, 121). Whether with in 24 or the global war on terrorism, the ‘common sense’ has become that torture is justified because the clock is ticking; executive discretion or authoritarian decision­making is necessary as legal means are not adequate to address the threat. Within 24, however, actions that could be interpreted as morally questionable are always constructed as outside legal boundaries, as “going rogue”. This camouflages the reality that the White House and the Pentagon routinely make decisions that involve ‘permissible’ violence ­ whether it is NSA authorisation to listen to domestic phone conversations without a warrant, the use of torture (or ‘harsh interrogation techniques’) as sanctioned by the Bush administration (including Abu Ghraib) in contravention of accepted international laws, indefinite detention without charge (Guantánamo Bay, Bagram’s Pul­i­Charki), or extraordinary renditions – as these are exceptional times and these actions save American lives. The Bush administration has therefore created new legislation and interpreted existing ones in new ways in order to make this approach more acceptable. In this respect, the need for CTU agents in 24 to “go rogue” is farcical as the legal, if not the moral, authority exists already through the extension of executive privilege by the Bush administration. Maintaining this construction of ‘going rogue’, however, does preserve the illusion that ‘America’ is an innocent and morally upstanding entity (Philpott and Mutimer, 2005, 341).

‘Jack's country needs him. Dead.’: Heroic Sacrifice and Counterterrorism Thirdly, the capacity to step outside these boundaries is an essential part of the representation of the hero. Heroes, according to counterterrorist discourse, are the only characters capable of making this ‘sacrifice’ and therefore deserve our respect and admiration: we must be “inspired by the heroic sacrifices of our fire­fighters, rescue and law enforcement personnel, military service members, and other citizens” (Bush, 4 September 2002). Within 24 and as Audrey Raimes, the show's moral compass in Seasons/Days 4 and 5, expresses: “thank god there are people like you [Jack Bauer] who can deal with that world” (4.24). As heroes, they are the lone authority figure who is able to make difficult decisions, use force and sacrifice themselves in a selfless manner for a ‘higher purpose’. Individuals who do not abide by that strict code ­ for example seeking compensation for being tortured without grounds (4.13) ­ are expelled or given an opportunity to later redeem themselves by, for example, completing a suicide mission to stop the terrorists (2.1, 3.19). Heroes however are also however positioned apart as a group and cannot be ‘held back’ by laws or ‘morality’ (similar to the way that cowboys were constructed in the American ‘Western’ genre) (Wright, 1977). Ordinary members of the community who do abide by the rules and defer to authority to provide security are not capable of heroic action. Like the scared villagers of Westerns, members of the community in 24 are never brave or resourceful enough to rescue themselves and must be provided with guns and encouragement in order to fight back (4.13); led to safety and rescued (4.17); or are 17 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism helpless victims without any agency, too afraid of 'the terrorists' to act (4,5). When individuals do become heroes, it is most often because they ‘get their hands dirty’ and carry out actions that involve sacrificing their own morals and/or welfare. This willingness to ‘go rogue’ and sacrifice themselves sets the heroes of CTU ­ despite their simultaneous construction as ‘everyman’ ­ apart from the ordinary members of the community. Their presence as a ‘superempowered’ individual operating without boundaries is, as Lawrence and Jewett argue, part of the superhero myth unique to America, whereby heroes endowed with the powers to save ordinary citizens are themselves incapable of abiding by the laws of citizenship, maintaining political relationships or responding to the preferences of the majority (Lawrence and Jewett, 2002, 46). Heroes are therefore represented as lonely and singular souls (a very masculine representation), who are able to make these difficult and self­less sacrifices needed to rescue the impotent and terrorised community. For these reasons, fans of 24 buy “Bauer Power” T­shirts and suggest that they are “a Jack Bauer kind of guy”. They accept these heroes as representative of the way the world should be, what values they should have, what actions to take, as well as what attitudes bring success, and therefore look to them for inspiration (Wright, 2001, 2). Finally, this construction of the hero is therefore also connected to the rehabilitation of security agencies themselves. As Valantin argues, national security cinema has a key role to play in ‘rehabilitating’ agencies like the CIA (2003, 110), eliding the role these agencies have in constituting the threat in the first place. It is in part through what is not shown in this discourse, that security agencies maintain their heroic standing. Overall, one of the central messages of the discourse of the global war on terrorism and 24 is that a security environment involving exceptional threat demands new security measures, a militarised war­model approach to counterterrorism, This includes new ways of operating that may have previously been considered unacceptable ­ in an anarchic world, laws and rules interfere with the safety and security of America and exceptional situations require exceptional measures. Television shows such as 24 help to rationalise these extraordinary actions, including torture, as necessary to preserve US national security. The intertextuality at work allows the superheroic myth to be (re)produced not only in popular culture, but also in the global war on terrorism, and US security policy, allowing 24 to resonate with viewers as its selfless hero, operating in an anarchic system permeated with threats, fights terrorism using force without limits and always ‘saves the day’.

Conclusion

This reading suggests that intricate links do exist between popular culture and world politics, in this case between the discourse of the global war on terrorism and the popular representation of counter­terrorism as depicted on 24 ­ from its (re)presentations of threat to the actions that are required in order to stop terrorism. The intense ‘liveness’ or real­time character of the show which enhances the drama and suspense, making it a critical and popular success, however also helps to sustain the illusion that what is presented are the ‘facts’ of counter­terrorism, especially the usefulness of torture as an information­gathering tool (Peacock, 2007; Human Rights First, 2007).

18 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism

While we can enjoy these shows and similar ones like La Femme Nikita, Alias, or The Unit, we must ask ourselves why these shows are so popular and inquire as to how they might influence our perceptions and understandings of security and world politics. Popular television shows and ‘national security cinema’ that depict intelligence operations “in bright and unmottled hues” (Saunders, 2001) can have a profound influence on our understanding of counter­terrorism in the same way that popular culture has “profoundly influenced popular understandings of the Vietnam war” (Philpott and Mutimer, 2005, 337). And, as much as government rhetoric or news media, these popular television shows are vehicles for communicating and (re)presenting fundamental ideas about how the world works, re­ inscribing key myths surrounding security and world politics and therefore must be interrogated.

[9,112]

References

‘‘24’ heads back into action with new twists’ (2007). Associated Press, 11 January 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com [accessed 31 April 2007]. ‘‘24’ Pays Tribute to Fallen Marine’ (2005). Chicago Tribune, 8 January 2005, http://www.chicagotribune.com [accessed 02 May 2007]. Andreeva, Nellie (2007). ‘FBI, Fox on the Case With Drama Series’, Reuters. 8 August 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/televisionNews/idUSN0826274420070809?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0 [accessed 22 November 2007]. Aristotle (1996). Poetics. (ed. and trans. Malcolm Heath), London: Penguin Classics. Baker, Peter (2005). ‘President Acknowledges Approving Secretive Eavesdropping’ Washington Post, 18 December 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com [accessed 20 April 2007]. Bauder, David (2007). ‘TV Torture Influencing Real Life’, Associated Press, Washington Post, 11 February 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com [accessed 15 February 2007]. Baudrillard, Jean (1994). Simulacra and Simulation (trans. Sheila Glaser). Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press. Bellamy, Alex J. (2006). ‘“No Pain, No Gain?” Torture and Ethics in The War On Terror’ International Affairs 82, pp. 121­148. Bernard, Thomas, Engel, Robin Shepard (2001). 'Conceptualizing criminal justice theory', Justice Quarterly, 18:1, pp. 1­30. Bignell, Jonathan (ed.) (2004). An Introduction to Television Studies, London: Routledge. Buncombe, Andrew (2007). ‘US Military Tells Jack Bauer: Cut Out The Torture Scenes ... Or Else!’, The Independent, 13 February 2007. Bush, George (2002a). State of the Union. The White House. 29 January 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov [accessed 20 April 07]. ­ (2002b). Securing the Nation, Strengthening the Homeland. http://www.bioterrorism.slu.edu [accessed 17 May 2007]. ­ (4 September 2002). “Patriot Day, 2002: By the President of the United States of America, A Proclamation.” http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020904­10.html [accessed 17 May 2007]. 19 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism

Butler, Judith (2004). Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. London: Verso. Caldwell, Anne and Samuel A. Chambers (2007). ‘24 After 9/11: The American State of Exception’ in S. Peacock (Ed.) Reading 24: TV Against the Clock. New York: I.B. Tauris, pp. 97­108. Carlson, Peter (2007). ‘Jack Bauer of '24,' The Interrogator's Marquee de Sade?’, Washington Post, February 20, 2007. Chamberlain, Daniel and Scott Rudin (2007). ‘24 and Twenty­first Century Quality Television’ in S. Peacock (Ed.) Reading 24: TV Against the Clock. New York: I.B. Tauris, pp. 13­24. Cheney, Richard (2001). ‘The Vice President appears on Meet the Press with Tim Russert’. The White House. 16 September 2001. http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news­speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html [accessed 5 December 2007]. ­ (2003). ‘Vice President Cheney Salutes Troops’. The White House. 9 April 2003 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030409­4.html [accessed 5 December 2007]. Crelinsten, Ronald D. (1998). The Discourse and Practice of Counter­Terrorism in Liberal Democracies, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 44:1, pp. 389­413. Department of Homeland Security (2002). http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/toc.html, [accessed 17 May 2007]. Der Derian, James (2000). ‘Virtuous War/Virtual Theory’. International Affairs, 76:4, 771–788. Derrida, Jacques (1974). On Grammatology (trans. Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak). Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. DiLullo, Tara (2006). 24: The Official Companion Season 1 and 2. London: Titan Books Ltd. Dujmovic, Nicholas (2008). Hollywood, Don’t You Go Disrepectin’ My Culture: The Good Shepherd Versus Real CIA History’, Intelligence and National Security, 23:1, 25­41. Erickson, Christian W. (2007). ‘Counter­Terror Culture: Ambiguity, Subversion, or Legitimization?’, Security Dialogue, 38:2, 197­214. Feeney, Matt (2004). ‘Torture Chamber: Fox's 24 terrifies viewers into believing its bizarre and convoluted plot twists’. Slate, 6 January 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2093269/, [accessed 21 November 2007]. Fiske, John (1987). Television Culture. London: Routledge. ‘Fox orders more '24’: Emmy winner extended through '08­'09 season’, Variety, 15 May 2007, http://www.variety.com [accessed 16 May 2007]. Freeze, Colin (2007). ‘What Would Jack Bauer Do?’ The Globe and Mail, June 16, 2007. Gardner, Frank (2006). ‘The US counter­terror nerve centre’, BBC News Online, 5 December 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/6210090.stm [accessed 28 November 2007]. Gerber, George; Morgan, Michael & Signorielli, Nancy (1986). "Living With Television: The Dynamics of the Cultivation Process," in Bryant and Zilmann, (eds.), Perspectives On Media Effects. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc Inc, 17­40. Georgetown Law (2007). ‘The Law of “24”’. Georgetown University. [http://www.law.georgetown.edu/curriculum/tab_courses.cfm?Status=Course&Detail=1534 accessed 05 December 2007] Goldman, Michael (2001). ‘A New Role for Hollywood?’ Penton Media, Inc., 1 December 2001, http://digitalcontentproducer.com [accessed 12 February 2007]. Grant, Judith (1992). ‘Prime Time Crime: Television Portrayals of Law Enforcement. Journal of American Culture. 15:1, pp. 57­68. Hannah, Matthew (2006). ‘Torture and the Ticking Bomb: The War on Terrorism as a Geographical Imagination of Power/Knowledge’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 96:3, pp. 622–640. 20 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism

Hark, I. R. (2004). “Today is the longest day of my life”: ‘24’ as mirror narrative of 9/11. In W. W. Dixon (Ed.), Film and television after 9/11. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Herbert, Daniel (2007). ‘Days and Hours of the Apocalypse: 24 and the Nuclear Narrative’ in S. Peacock, (Ed.) Reading 24: TV Against the Clock. New York: I.B. Tauris, pp. 85­96. Howard, Douglas L. (2007). ‘‘You’re Going to Tell Me Everything you Know’: Torture and Morality in Fox’s 24’ in S. Peacock, (Ed.) Reading 24: TV Against the Clock. New York: I.B. Tauris, pp. 133­148. Human Rights First ‘Torture on TV Rising and Copied in the Field, Primetime TV Torture Project, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/primetime/ [accessed 16 May 2007]. Irwin, W. (2002). The Matrix and Philosophy: Welcome to the Desert of the Real. Chicago: Open Court. Jackson, Richard (2005). Writing the War on Terrorism. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Johnson, Richard (2002). ‘Defending Ways of Life: The (Anti­) Terrorist Rhetorics of Bush and Blair’, Theory, Culture & Society, 19:4, pp. 211­231. Keane, Stephen (2007). ‘America Exceptionalism in Television Spy Dramas: Mainstreaming America With "I Spy," "Sleeper Cell," and "24"?’ Aladin Research Commons, http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/handle/1961/4115 [accessed 5 December 2007]. Kim, Richard (2005). ‘Pop Torture’, The Nation, 9 December 2005, http://www.agenceglobal.com [accessed 20 April 2007]. Laclau, Ernest & Mouffe, Chantal (1985). Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, London: Verso Lawrence, John Shelton and Jewett, Robert (2004). The Myth of American Superhero. Cambridge: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing. Lewis, C.W. (2005). ‘The Clash between Security and Liberty in the U.S. Response to Terror’, Public Administration Review, 65:1, pp. 18­30. Macmaster, Neil (2004). ‘Torture: from Algiers to Abu Ghraib’, Race and Class, Vol. 46:2, pp. 1–21. Mayer, Jane (2007). ‘Whatever it Takes: The Politics of the Man Behind ‘24’’. The New Yorker, 19 February 2007. Miller, Martin (2007). ‘'24' Gets A Lesson In Torture From The Experts.’ Los Angeles Times, 13 February 2007. Monaco, James (2000). How to Read a Film: The World of Movies, Media and Multimedia: Language, History, Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press (3rd ed.). Mueller, John (2006). Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Treats, and Why We Believe Them. New York: Free Press. National Counterterrorism Center (2007). About the National Counterterrorism Center, 5 August 2007, http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/about_nctc.html, [accessed 28 November 2007]. Neocleous, Mark (2004). Fabricating Social Order: A Critical History of Police Power. London: Pluto Press. Patterson, Troy (2006). ‘Senator, We're Ready for Your Cameo: What was John McCain doing on 24?’. Slate, 7 February 2006. Paur, Jasbir K. and Rai, Amit S. (2002). ‘Monster, Terrorist, Fag: The War on Terrorism and the Production of Docile Patriots.’ Social Text 72, 20:3, pp. 117­148. Peacock, Steven (2007). ’24: Status and Style’ in S. Peacock (Ed.) Reading TV: TV Against the Clock. New York: I.B. Tauris, pp. 25­34. Phipott, Simon and David Mutimer (2005). ‘Inscribing the American Body Politic: Martin Sheen and Two American Decades.’ Geopolitics, 10, pp. 335­355. Poneiwozik, James (2007). ‘The Evolution of Jack Bauer’. Time, January 14, 2007.

21 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism

Priest D., and R. Wright (2005). ‘Cheney fights for detainee policy.’ Washington Post. 07 November 2005. http://www.washingtonpost.com [accessed 20 April 07]. Risen, James and Lichtblau, Eric (2005). ‘Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts’, New York Times, 16 December 2005, http://www.nytimes.com [accessed 12 May 2007]. Saunders, Doug (2001). ‘Hollywood, D.C.’, The Globe and Mail, 17 November 2001, http://www.theglobeandmail.com [accessed 20 April 07]. Scheingold, Stuart A. (1984). The Politics of Law and Order: Street Crime and Public Policy. New York: Longman. Scheuerman, William E. (2006). ‘Carl Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib’. Constellations, 13:1, 108­124. Schmitt, Carl (1998). The Concept of the Political (trans. George Schwab). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Shaheen, Jack G. (2003). Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 588, 171­193. Sturken, Marita & Cartwright, Lisa (2001). Practices of Looking: An Introduction to Visual Culture, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Surowiecki, J. (2006). ‘The Worst Day Ever: A 24 Writer Talks About Torture, Terrorism, and Fudging "Real Time”’. Slate, http://www.slate.com/id/2134395/ [accessed 23 November 2007]. Thomas, Andrew P. (2006). ‘The CSI Effect: Fact or Fiction’, Yale Law Journal Pocket Part, 115, 70­72, http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/02/thomas.html [accessed 15 March 2008]. Toobin, Jeffrey (2007). ‘The CSI Effect: The Truth About Forensic Science’, The New Yorker. May 7, 2007. Valantin, Jean­Michel (2005). Hollywood,t he Pentagon and Washington: The Movies and National Security from World War II to the Present. London: Anthem, Press. Vandlandshoot, Wesley (2007). ‘Jack Bauer – Kill Count’. http://www.bauercount.com, [accessed 30 November 2007]. Weber, Cynthia (2002). ‘Flying Planes Can be Dangerous’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 31:1, 129­147. Weldes, Jutta (Ed.) (2003). To Seek Out New Worlds: Exploring Links Between Science Fiction and World Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. ­ (1999a). Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. ­ (1999b). Going Cultural: Star Trek, State Action, and Popular Culture’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 28:1, pp. 117­134. Wright, Will (2001). The Wild West: The Mythical Cowboy and Social Theory. London: Sage Publications Ltd. ­ (1977). Sixguns and Society: A Structural Study of the Western. Berkeley: University of California Press. Zizek, Slavoj (2006). ‘TV's '24' Sheds Light on Real Ethical Drama: How Expendable Is Human Life, Spirit?’ The San Francisco Chronicle, 12 February 2006.

Internet Academy of Television Arts and Sciences, ‘Awards’, http://www.emmys.org/awards Almeida is God fansite, http://www.almeidaisgod.com Fox Broadcasting Corporation, ‘24’, http://www.fox.com/24 Jack Bauer Torture Report, http://www.jackbauertorturereport.com Human Rights First, Primetime Torture Project, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/primetime/safe.asp 22 Interrogating 24: Making Sense of U.S. Counterterrorism in the Global War on Terrorism

Innocent Bystander: 24, http://innocentbystander.typepad.com/innocent_bystander/24/index.html

23