A Review of Reconciliation Efforts in Afghanistan
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AUGUST 2009 . VOL 2 . ISSUE 8 A Review of Reconciliation and political system, and a focus on than 30 supporters in the lower house strengthening broader governance (of 249 seats). Many other “former” Efforts in Afghanistan activities to cut off potential community members of Hizb-i-Islami, a grouping support for the insurgency rather than always dominated by professionals By Joanna Nathan rewards for violent actors. and technocrats, took powerful positions in the administration. These to achieve stability in Afghanistan, The Early Years: Lack of Coherence examples highlight the complex web there is a growing emphasis on political In 2001, the treatment of individuals of overlapping identities and shifting solutions with insurgents. The reality, associated with the Taliban regime allegiances that has characterized the however, is that such efforts so far have proved remarkably arbitrary. In many post-2001 government. been fragmented and often contradictory. cases, the use of airpower or arbitrary There remains no agreement within the detentions was the result of information Amidst a highly personalized, patronage- Afghan government and international provided to U.S. forces by new allies based system, the administration community, or between them, on what seeking to settle old scores, the very has jealously guarded its primacy in the concept is, who it is aimed at, and randomness (and/or inaccuracy) of “reconciliation” efforts, but has failed to most importantly its place within action contributing to early alienation.2 provide a serious strategic approach to wider stabilization strategies. Amidst Taliban camp cooks were reported to more equitable and responsive systems. an increasingly violent insurgency, be on trial while a former international Instead, there has been continued public the temptation has been to attempt spokesman went to Yale.3 Some former rhetoric offering succor to the Taliban’s local or grand bargains with insurgent Taliban leaders were detained at top leadership and attempts at opaque leaders. Even if desirable, this strategy Guantanamo Bay, while others worked behind-the-scenes deal-making with is unrealistic because amorphous anti- for the government with no transparent individuals. The disjointed programs— government elements show no desire criteria for such decisions. such as the Allegiance Program and for such deals. It further dangerously “Takhim e-Solh”—often seem largely distracts from enduring political There was never a legal bar on regime aimed at capturing donor funding or solutions—aimed at the Afghan people members taking public roles. For entrenching favored networks rather rather than at insurgents—of ensuring example, a former Taliban deputy than strengthening government better governance and more equitable minister and a former envoy of institutions and tackling sources of representation. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (a former Taliban alienation.5 rival whose faction of Hizb-i-Islami has This article offers a short summary joined the insurgency in a loose alliance) Members of the international community of post-2001 “reconciliation” and were appointed to the Senate. In the have also not acted cohesively. They “outreach” efforts. It examines how 2005 National Assembly elections, have undertaken a series of unilateral, since 2001 the international community at least two former regime members bilateral and multilateral efforts despite and Afghan government have failed were elected to the lower house.4 Soon the theoretical lead of the United Nations to pursue a coherent policy even in afterward, a group of Hizb-i-Islami Assistance Mission in Afghanistan deciding which strata of the Taliban claiming to have split with Hekmatyar (UNAMA). The latter holds a specific should be targeted, isolated or engaged. registered as a political party (Hizb- mandate to Furthermore, reconciliation efforts i-Islami Afghanistan), boasting more have for the most part been narrowly provide good offices to support, premised on a paradigm of amnesty 2 International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan: The Prob- if requested by the Afghan and surrender rather than true peace- lem of Pashtun Alienation,” August 5, 2003; Martine government, the implementation of building. Moreover, operating distinctly Van Bijlert, “Unruly Commanders and Violent Power Afghan-led reconciliation programs, from wider nation-building programs, Struggles: Taliban Networks in Uruzgan,” in Antonio within the framework of the Afghan they have failed to tackle underlying Giustozzi, De-Coding the New Taliban: Insights from the Constitution with full respect for dynamics.1 Given that the insurgents are Afghan Field (London: Hurst and Co., forthcoming). Van the implementation of measures widely perceived to have the strategic Bijlert provides a detailed account of one province— introduced by the Security Council momentum, having a demobilization 6 Uruzgan—and how such events helped drive some com- in its resolution 1267 (1999). program for fighters as a centerpiece manders (back) into the arms of militants. of such efforts is redundant at best. 3 “Guantanamo Prisoner says Taliban Forced him to be Political solutions must not be treated a Cook,” Associated Press, August 11, 2005; Chip Brown, 5 For more on the current political set-up, see Martine as a quick exit strategy when the aim is “The Freshman,” New York Times, February 26, 2006. In Van Bijlert, “Between Discipline and Discretion: Policies ongoing stability. Success will require a this case, the suspect was apparently accused before the Surrounding Senior Subnational Appointments,” Af- far greater commitment to coordination U.S. military tribunal of being an assistant cook. ghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), May by all players, a nuanced understanding 4 The winners were Zabul commander Mullah Salam 2009; Antonio Giustozzi and Dominique Orsini, “Cen- of the complex nature of the insurgency Rocketi and the former Taliban Bamiyan governor Mo- tre-Periphery Relations in Afghanistan: Badakhshan be- hammad Islam Mohammadi (later murdered). Among tween Patrimonialism and Institution Building,” Central 1 Regional issues will not be included in this article for those who stood but lost out were former Taliban foreign Asian Survey, March 2009. For an account of how com- reasons of space and focus. Indeed, while realigning ex- minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, former deputy inte- munity exclusion can feed directly into the conflict, see ternal equations is essential to long-term stability, this rior minister Mullah Khaksar (also later murdered) and Graeme Smith, “Inspiring Tale of Triumph over Taliban has too often been used as an excuse to distract from nec- head of the Taliban vice and virtue department, Maw- Not All it Seems,” Globe and Mail, September 23, 2006. essary internal measures. lawi Qalamuddin. 6 See UN Security Council Resolution 1868 (2009). AUGUST 2009 . VOL 2 . ISSUE 8 In fact, Resolution 1267,7 which The 2005 Allegiance Program and Program quickly backtracked, President Karzai institutes a travel ban, asset freeze and Takhim e-Solh has publicly repeated such offers.16 arms embargo on listed members of An early specific Taliban “reconciliation” the Taliban, has remained cut off from effort by the U.S. military was the In practice, however, the main focus of efforts on the ground. Originally created Allegiance program launched in 2005. both programs was grassroots fighters in response to al-Qa`ida-directed One of the few open source references and the release of detainees, with PTS bombings in Africa and the Taliban’s by then chief of staff of Combined claiming some 4,599 “reconciled” refusal to hand over the suspects, it is Forces Command-Afghanistan, Colonel individuals by September 2007.17 Since now unclear whether it is supposed to David Lamm, stated that after briefing monthly individual “reconciliations” are be a fixed list of past regime members the ambassador and gaining Afghan the main yardstick of progress, there has under continuing sanction or, as the government approval, been a strict focus on the short-term; a current 1267 committee chair wants, “a dynamic list that addresses the the command rapidly developed a “Both the Allegiance and evolution of the threat posed by Al- reconciliation program for former Qaida and Taliban.”8 Taliban, and began a release PTS programs suffered an program of 80 former Taliban absence of monitoring and Currently it is neither, with many each month from U.S. detention member states not ensuring enforcement facilities, again involving the follow-through.” nor aiding its update. Hekmatyar was Afghan government in a central listed in 2003, but there has been role.12 only minimal change to the Taliban entries. Of the major powers, only A contemporaneous newspaper report small-scale UN survey apparently found Russia has demonstrated a definite quoted Lamm as saying that he expected that 50% of “reconcilees” were not policy—blocking the removal of any most of the Taliban’s rank and file, genuine fighters.18 This supports tales names, even the dead. Today, the list whom he estimated to number a few from the southern and eastern insurgent of 142 individuals associated with the thousand, to take up the amnesty offer heartlands of returning refugees and Taliban is disconnected from both the by summer.13 others being induced or threatened to current fight and the current political sign up to boost numbers.19 framework.9 Abdul Hakim Monib, who Its Afghan government successor, acted as Uruzgan governor in 2006- launched the same year in close Indeed, PTS’