IMMIGVANHEUGTEN.NL POSTS 2009

NEW OBAMA STRATEGY (March 27, 2009) ...... 6 CONFERENCE THE HAGUE (MARCH 31, 2009) ...... 8 THE NEW US STRATEGY FOR AF-PAK (April 1, 2009) ...... 9 SWAT VALLEY (April 1, 2009) ...... 17 TERROR SECRETARIAT (April 4, 2009) ...... 19 MEDIA DEBATES SWAT DEAL (April 14, 2009) ...... 22 V. TALIBAN (posted APRIL 19, 2009) ...... 28 BACKGROUNDER: MILITANCY UNFOLDING RAPIDLY IN PAKISTAN (APRIL 22, 2009) ... 32 PAKISTAN SENDS TROOPS TO NORTHWEST (APRIL 24, 2009) ...... 35 WORRYING ABOUT PAKISTAN‘S FUTURE (28 APRIL, 2009) ...... 37 U.S. TAKES DUTCH MILITARY AS ROLE MODEL (APRIL 30, 2009) ...... 40 PAKISTAN‘S ISLAMIC SCHOOLS (MAY 4, 2009) ...... 42 THREE-WAY TALKS IN WASHINGTON (MAY 6, 2009) ...... 46 TALIBANISATION AND PAKISTAN‘S IDENTITY CRISIS (MAY 11, 2009) ...... 49 PAKISTAN‘S ETHNIC FAULT LINE (MAY 11, 2009) ...... 52 PAKISTAN CONFLICT MAP (MAY 13, 2009) ...... 55 SWAT - A REPORT FROM THE FRONTLINE (MAY 16, 2009) ...... 62 U.S. ARMS IN TALIBAN HANDS (MAY 19, 2009) ...... 65 RUSSIAN THINKING ON AMERICA‘S ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN (MAY 20, 2009) ...... 69 PAK, INDIA, U.S. BEGIN SHARING INTELLIGENCE (MAY 21, 2009) ...... 72 UN SEEKS $543 MILLION FOR PAKISTAN WAR REFUGEES (MAY 22, 2009) ...... 74 TEHRAN SUMMIT (MAY 24, 2009) ...... 76 FALLOUT OF SWAT MILITARY OPERATION (MAY 27, 2009) ...... 78 SWAT OFFENSIVE ‗TO END IN TWO-THREE DAYS‘ (MAY 31, 2009) ...... 81 EXTRA US TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN BY MID-JULY (JUNE 1, 2009) ...... 83 BANKING ON PASHTUN REVENGE CULTURE (JUNE 4, 2009) ...... 85 MORE BY LUCK THAN JUDGMENT (JUNE 8, 2009) ...... 87 MASSIVE TRUCK BOMB EXPLOSION IN PESHAWAR ON JUNE 9, 2009 ...... 90 COMMANDER MAPS NEW COURSE IN AFGHAN WAR (JUNE 12, 2009) ...... 93 1

AFGHAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES PREPARE TO CAMPAIGN (JUNE 16, 2009) ...... 96 THE BATTLE FOR PAKISTAN (JUNE 16, 2009) ...... 98 HEADING FOR THE TALIBAN OF WAZIRISTAN (JUNE 18, 2009) ...... 101 PAKISTAN‘S POLITICAL LANDSCAPE (JUNE 19, 2009) ...... 105 DEOBAND ULEMA TERM ALL TALIBAN ACTIONS UN-ISLAMIC (JUNE 20, 2009) ...... 110 FANTASY OF US-MEHSUD NEXUS (JUNE 23, 2009) ...... 112 ZAINUDDIN‘S ASSASSINATION EXPOSES TALIBAN RIFTS (JUNE 25, 2009) ...... 115 BACKGROUNDER: USEFUL REPORTS (JUNE 30, 2009) ...... 117 KYRGYZ OPERATION REVEALS GROWING TERRORIST THREAT (JULY 1, 2009) ...... 124 MAJOR MILITARY OPERATION UNDERWAY IN HELMAND (JULY 2, 2009) ...... 131 PAKISTAN - A DECISIVE SHIFT (JULY 7, 2009) ...... 134 MILITARY GO AFTER FORMER PROXY FORCES: ZARDARI (JULY 7, 2009) ...... 137 MILITARY GO AFTER FORMER PROXY FORCES: ZARDARI (JULY 7, 2009) ...... 139 WHY PAKISTAN BALKS AT THE U.S. AFGHANISTAN OFFENSIVE (JULY 28, 2009) ...... 146 STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF PAK‘S KHYBER AGENCY (AUGUST 6, 2009) ...... 149 U.S. DRONE KILLS CHIEF OF TALIBAN IN PAKISTAN (AUGUST 8, 2009) ...... 151 TTP LEADER DEAD IN SUCCESSION FIGHT? (AUGUST 9, 2009) ...... 154 ANALYSTS EXPECT LONG-TERM, COSTLY U.S. CAMPAIGN (AUGUST 9, 2009) ...... 156 KARZAI OFFERS RIVAL TOP CABINET POST IN EFFORT TO AVOID ELECTION DEFEAT (AUGUST 11, 2009) ...... 159 AFGHANISTAN ENLISTS TRIBAL MILITIA FORCES (AUGUST 12, 2009) ...... 161 DISCOVERY OF MASS GRAVES IN SWAT (AUGUST 13, 2009) ...... 164 PEACE TALKS WITH TALIBAN TOP ISSUE IN AFGHAN VOTE (AUGUST 17, 2009) ...... 166 MAULVI OMAR CAPTURED, SAYS BAITULLAH IS DEAD (AUGUST 18, 2009) ...... 169 BACKGROUNDER: AFGHANISTAN‘S NEXT PRESIDENT (AUGUST 18, 2009) ...... 171 BACKGROUNDER: DE VOLGENDE PRESIDENT VAN AFGHANISTAN (AUGUST 18, 2009) ...... 187 AFGHANISTAN ELECTION SECURITY MAP (AUGUST 19, 2009) ...... 201 THE DEATH OF MEHSUD - A VIEW FROM AFGHANISTAN (AUGUST 20, 2009) ...... 202 VOTES COUNTED AS WEST HAILS AFGHAN ELECTION (AUGUST 21, 2009) ...... 204 CONFUSION REIGNS AS KARZAI, ABDULLAH CLAIM WIN (AUGUST 21, 2009) ...... 206 BEYOND ELECTIONS, FIXING THE AFGHAN STATE (AUGUST 21, 2009) ...... 208 MASS RIGGING IN AFGHAN VOTE - ABDULLAH (AUGUST 24, 2009) ...... 212 KARZAI APPEARS TO BE WINNING (AUGUST 27, 2009) ...... 214 US ENVOY ‗IN ANGRY KARZAI TALKS‘ (AUGUST 27, 2009) ...... 215 2

TALIBAN AND THE BOGEY OF TERRORISM (AUGUST 29, 2009) ...... 217 PAKISTAN - FROM A TROIKA TO A QUARTET (AUGUST 29, 2009) ...... 220 US COMMANDER CALLS FOR FRESH STRATEGY (SEPTEMBER 1, 2009) ...... 223 $600 FOR A KALASHNIKOV - A SIGN OF BLOODSHED TO COME (SEPTEMBER 3, 2009) 224 ADVISERS TO OBAMA DIVIDED ON SIZE OF AFGHAN FORCE (SEPTEMBER 3, 2009) .... 226 ANALYSIS - DEEPENING CRISIS IN AFGHANISTAN (SEPTEMBER 4, 2009) ...... 229 FAKE AFGHAN POLL SITES FAVORED KARZAI, OFFICIALS ASSERT (SEPTEMBER 6, 2009) ...... 232 AFGHAN TALIBAN DECLINE SWAT MILITANTS‘ REQUEST FOR HELP (SEPTEMBER 7, 2009)...... 235 POST-BAITULLAH TTP (SEPTEMBER 9, 2009) ...... 237 US IN DELICATE SPOT OVER AFGHAN VOTE FRAUD CLAIMS: NYT (SEPTEMBER 9, 2009) ...... 239 PAKISTAN ARRESTS TALIBAN SPOKESMAN IN SWAT (SEPTEMBER 11, 2009) ...... 240 US COULD SHIFT WAR ON TERROR FOCUS TO PAK-AFHANISTAN BORDER (SEPTEMBER 14, 2009) ...... 242 DOCUMENT: MCCRYSTAL‘S AFGHANISTAN ASSESSMENT REDACTED (SEPTEMBER 21, 2009)...... 258 MCCRYSTAL - MORE FORCES OR ‗MISSION FAILURE‘ (SEPTEMBER 21, 2009) ...... 259 AFGHANISTAN ASSESSMENT, A CATALYST FOR OBAMA (SEPTEMBER 22, 2009) ...... 264 PLAN TO BOOST AFGHAN FORCES SPLITS OBAMA ADVISERS (SEPTEMBER 26, 2009) . 265 US THREATENS AIR STRIKES ON QUETTA (SEPTEMBER 28, 2009) ...... 268 WHITE HOUSE STARTS REVIEW OF AFGHAN STRATEGY ...... 270 ENVOY SAYS HIS REMOVAL SENDS OUT BAD SIGNAL (OCTOBER 1, 2009)...... 272 HOW CAN 40.000 TROOPS FIX CHRONIC CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN? (OCTOBER 1, 2009)...... 274 US PULLOUT FROM AFGHANISTAN WOULD BE ‗DISASTROUS‘: MUSHARRAF (OCTOBER 5, 2009)...... 276 NATO BATTLES FOR TALIBAN ‗JEWEL‘ (OCTOBER 7, 2009) ...... 278 U.N. DATA SHOW DISCREPANCIES IN AFGHAN VOTE (OCTOBER 7, 2009) ...... 280 EMERGING GOAL FOR AFGHANISTAN - WEAKEN, NOT VANQUISH, TALIBAN (OCTOBER 9, 2009)...... 283 GUNMEN, BOMBS HIT 5 SITES IN PAKISTAN, 39 DIE (OCTOBER 15, 2009) ...... 290 PAKISTAN IN FREE FALL (OCTOBER 15, 2009) ...... 293 AFGHANISTAN - OBAMA‘S NIGHTMARE (OCTOBER 16, 2009) ...... 296 PAKISTAN ATTACKS SHOW TIGHTENING OF MILITANT LINKS (OCTOBER 16, 2009) ... 298

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PAK ARMY KICK STARTS OFFENSIVE AGAINST TALIBAN IN SOUTH WAZIRISTAN (OCTOBER 17, 2009) ...... 302 NOVEMBER 7 RUNOFF ORDERED IN AFGHAN ELECTION (OCTOBER 20, 2009) ...... 304 U.S. SIGNALS AFGHAN COALITION GOVERNMENT IS POSSIBLE (OCTOBER 22, 2009) .. 307 U.S. OFFERING MASSIVE ASSISTANCE TO PAK IN SOUTH WAZIRISTAN OFFENSIVE (OCTOBER 23, 2009) ...... 310 WAZIRISTAN OR BUST (OCTOBER 26, 2009) ...... 312 U.S. TESTED 2 AFGHAN SCENARIOS IN WAR GAME (OCTOBER 26, 2009) ...... 314 U.S. PLANS TO WOO TALIBAN FIGHTERS (OCTOBER 28, 2009) ...... 317 U.S. PLANS TO WOO TALIBAN FIGHTERS (OCTOBER 28, 2009)...... 319 KARZAI OPPONENT SET TO BOYCOTT RE-RUN (OCTOBER 31, 2009) ...... 321 PULLS OUT OF POLLS (NOVEMBER 1, 2009) ...... 322 KARZAI DECLARED AFGHAN PRESIDENT, RUN-OFF SCRAPPED (NOVEMBER 2, 2009) 324 AFGHANISTAN LEADER TOLD TO STEP UP ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES (NOVEMBER 16, 2009) ...... 364 TALIBAN OPEN NORTHERN FRONT IN AFGHANISTAN (NOVEMBER 26, 2009) ...... 397 REPORT CLAIMS BIN LADEN SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN 2001 (NOVEMBER 29, 2009) ...... 400 OBAMA’S SPEECH ON AFGHANISTAN TO ENVISION EXIT (NOVEMBER 29, 2009) ...... 401 OBAMA OFFERS NEW ROLE FOR PAKISTAN (NOVEMBER 30, 2009) ...... 404 OBAMA’S AFGHAN POLICY SPEECH AT WEST POINT (DECEMBER 1, 2009) ...... 407 OBAMA ANNOUNCES AFGHAN SURGE AND EXIT STRATEGY (DECEMBER 2, 2009) ...... 417 AFGHANS REACT TO OBAMA TROOP PLAN (DECEMBER 2, 2009) ...... 420 MCCHRYSTAL - STRENGHTENING AFGHAN FORCES MOST IMPORTANT THING WE DO (DECEMBER 2, 2009)...... 423 MISSING TOOLS FOR THE AFGHAN JOB (DECEMBER 2, 2009) ...... 425 OBAMA’S AF-PAK POLICY - SEEDS OF FAILURE (DECEMBER 2, 2009) ...... 427 PAKISTAN TOLD TO RATCHET UP TALIBAN FIGHT (DECEMBER 7, 2009) ...... 429 FROM CLINTON, PLAIN TALK ON AFGHANISTAN (DECEMBER 8, 2009) ...... 432 THE DRONE DILEMMA (DECEMBER 12, 2009) ...... 434 NEW U.S. STRATEGY AND PAKISTAN’S RESPONSE (DECEMBER 14, 2009) ...... 435 U.N. OFFICIALS SAY AMERICAN OFFERED PLAN TO REPLACE KARZAI (DECEMBER 16, 2009) ...... 438 INSURGENTS HACK U.S. DRONES (DECEMBER 17, 2009) ...... 441 PRESIDENT ZARDARI UNDER PRESSURE AFTER NRO RULING (DECEMBER 17, 2009) ...... 444 AFGHAN PRESIDENT SAYS NEW CABINET TO BE ACCOUNTABLE (DECEMBER 21, 2009) ...... 446 HOW SLIPPED FROM OUR GRASP (DECEMBER 22, 2009) ...... 447

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A SHORT-TERM APPROACH TO AFGHANISTAN (DECEMBER 22, 2009) ...... 457 JIHADI CULTURE ON THE RISE IN PAKISTAN (DECEMBER 24, 2009) ...... 459 MILITANTS IN PAKISTAN STRIKE SHIITES AGAIN, PROMPTING FEARS OF SECTARIAN VIOLENCE (DECEMBER 28, 2009) ...... 462 AFGHAN DELEGATION INVESTIGATING CIVILIAN DEATHS (DECEMBER 29, 2009) ...... 464 TALIBAN COURTS MORE POPULAR (DECEMBER 30, 2009) ...... 466 SUICIDE ATTACK ON U.S. BASE AN INSIDER’S JOB (DECEMBER 31, 2009) ...... 467

5

NEW OBAMA STRATEGY (March 27, 2009)

Written by admin on Sunday, March 29th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten:

Obama strategy links Pakistan with Afghanistan SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Friday, March 27, 2009

President Barack Obama announced the outcome of his administration‘s Afghanistan-Pakistan policy review Friday, calling for increased aid to both countries and a need for more civilian and international support. ―Security demands a new sense of shared responsibility,‖ Obama said in an address from the Eisenhower Executive Office Building here. ―Together, we must enhance intelligence sharing and military cooperation along the [Afghan-Pakistan] border, while addressing issues of common concern like trade, energy and economic development.‖

Obama said the future of Afghanistan is ―inextricably‖ linked to the future of Pakistan, as al-Qaida and other extremists have moved freely across the two countries‘ shared border since 9/11, planning attacks and training. He called the border region ―the most dangerous place in the world‖ for the American people, but added that the issue is ―an international security challenge of the highest order.‖

―The safety of people around the world is at stake,‖ the president said, noting that terrorist attacks in London, Bali, Islamabad and Algeria over the past two decades were all tied to al-Qaida elements and safe havens in Pakistan.

―It is important for the American people to understand that Pakistan needs our help in going after al- Qaida,‖ he continued. ―[Pakistan‘s] ability to destroy these safe havens is tied to its own strength and security.‖

The weakness of Pakistan‘s central government and waning economy is indirectly responsible for al- Qaida‘s ability to harbor and operate safe havens along the border region. The review calls for Congress to authorize $1.5 billion in support for the Pakistan people annually over a five-year course to build schools, roads and hospitals to strengthen the country‘s democracy, Obama said.

Also, the review calls for Congress to pass a bill that creates ―opportunity zones‖ in the border regions ―to develop the economy and bring hope to places plagued by violence,‖ he added. ―A campaign against extremism will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone.

―I do not ask for this support lightly,‖ he continued. ―These are challenging times, and resources are stretched, but the American people must understand that this is a down payment on our own future.‖

On Afghanistan‘s side of the border, Obama said the and partner nations must prevent the country from becoming the safe haven it was prior to 9/11. The gains of the resurgent Taliban over the past year must be reversed. Allied forces must ―promote a more capable and accountable Afghan government,‖ he said.

Ground commanders in Afghanistan have expressed the need for additional resources for more than three years, and with the drawdown of forces in Iraq, those resources are now available. The

6 additional 17,000 U.S. soldiers and Marines he authorized for Afghanistan last month will impact greatly, Obama said.

Those resources, according to the new strategy, will support an emphasized shift in the Afghanistan mission to focus efforts on increasing the size and capacity of the Afghan army and police with training, he said. Although, more U.S. resources and troops are available for the Afghan mission now, Obama stressed the importance of the Afghan security forces eventually taking the lead in their own country.

―That is how we will prepare the Afghans to take responsibility for their security, and how we will ultimately be able to bring our troops home,‖ he said.

The president said that in late spring, after the first wave of U.S. reinforcements hit the ground, the effort to train Afghan police and army units will be fully resourced for the first time since combat operations began there in 2001. He said every American unit will be partnered with an Afghan army or police unit, and that additional support has been requested for NATO trainers.

Obama said he hopes those efforts will grow the Afghan army from 82,000 to 134,000 as well as increase the size of the police to 82,000 by 2011. These increases may very well be needed, he added, as the United States and NATO work on plans to turn over security responsibilities to the Afghans.

The increase in troops and military resources must be accompanied by civilian efforts, too, including State Department personnel and the U.S. Agency for International Development as well as their NATO and international counterparts. Afghanistan‘s government is democratically elected but plagued by corruption, while the economy remains undercut by narcotics trade, he said.

Obama called for agricultural specialists, educators, engineers and lawyers to come forward to help the Afghan government serve its people and develop its economy. His fiscal 2010 budget request includes ―indispensible‖ investments in the State Department and foreign assistance programs. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton will lead this effort, he said.

―Make no mistake. Our efforts will fail in Afghanistan and Pakistan if we don‘t invest in their future,‖ he said. ―[Civilian experts] contribute directly to security. They make the American people safer, and they save us an enormous amount of money in the long run.‖

Obama said the new strategy and policy will set clear goals to measure progress to maintain accountability. His administration will ―consistently‖ assess training and fighting efforts, he said, adding that he will pay close attention to the changes in Afghanistan‘s economy.

―We will review whether we are using the right tools and tactics to make progress towards accomplishing our goals,‖ he said.

The road to success and an end to the insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan will be long and difficult. But a lasting partnership with the two countries ―serves the promise of a new day for their people,‖ he said.

―None of the steps I have outlined will be easy, and none should be taken by America alone,‖ he said. ―We have a shared responsibility to act. What‘s at stake now is not just our own security — it is the very idea that free nations can come together on behalf or our common security.‖

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AFGHANISTAN CONFERENCE THE HAGUE (MARCH 31, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, March 31st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Afghanistan conference concludes with offer to Taliban SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Tuesday March 31, 2009

The one-day Afghanistan conference in The Hague has drawn to a close.

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and world Foreign Ministers promised Afghanistan their support, offering help in the creation of economic development and strengthened security in Afghanistan, as well as greater cooperation in the region.

Afghan President said in his speech that assistance from neighbouring countries was essential in combating terrorism.

Neighbouring Iran said it was willing to cooperate on development and reconstruction in Afghanistan. Its representative pledged help in tackling the huge opium trade, but stressed it remained opposed to US and other foreign troops there.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged the international community to provide more security and development aid to Afghanistan. Ms Clinton urged countries not to let their economic troubles at home lead to a drop in support in Afghanistan, warning the growing instability in Afghanistan has international implications.

Importantly, to move along local peace efforts, she offered Taliban fighters who renounce violence in Afghanistan an ―honourable form of reconciliation.‖ Ms Clinton said: ―We must support efforts by the government of Afghanistan to separate the extremists of Al Qaeda and the Taliban from those who have joined their ranks not out of conviction, but out of desperation. They should be offered an honourable form of reconciliation and reintegration into a peaceful society, if they are willing to abandon violence, break with Al Qaeda, and support the constitution.‖

Later in the day, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Mehdi Akhoundzadeh and United States Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke met for informal talks. The brief, unplanned meeting was described as cordial, with Mr Holbrooke and Mr Mehdi Akhoundzadeh agreeing to more discussions.

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THE NEW US STRATEGY FOR AF-PAK (April 1, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, April 1st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Security and development in the region: the new US strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan SOURCE: Aryana Institute for Regional Research & Advocacy - A I R R A AIRRA Special Edition April 1, 2009

I- Salient features of Obama’s speech.

The US president, Barak Obama, delineated the main features of his administration‘s strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan in his speech on March 27 2009. The salient features are as follows:

1- Border region of Pakistan and Afghanistan has become the most dangerous place in the world. It is an international security challenge of the highest order.

2- A clear and focused goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.

3- To enhance the military, governance, and economic capacity of Afghanistan and Pakistan, we (the US) have to marshal international support….and integrate our civilian and military efforts.

4- And after years of mixed results, we (the US) will not provide a blank check. Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders.

5- We (the US) must pursue constructive diplomacy with both India and Pakistan.

6- To avoid the mistakes of the past, we (the US) must make clear that our relationship with Pakistan is grounded in support for Pakistan‘s democratic institutions and the Pakistani people. And to demonstrate through deeds as well as words a commitment that is enduring, we must stand for lasting opportunity.

7- I (the US president) am calling upon Congress to pass a bipartisan bill co-sponsored by John Kerry and Richard Lugar that authorizes $1.5 billion in direct support to the Pakistani people every year over the next five years - resources that will build schools, roads, and hospitals, and strengthen Pakistan‘s democracy. I‘m also calling on Congress to pass a bipartisan bill co-sponsored by Maria Cantwell, Chris Van Hollen and Peter Hoekstra that creates opportunity zones in the border region to develop the economy and bring hope to places plagued by violence. And we will ask our friends and allies to do their part - including at the donors conference in Tokyo next month.

8- That is why we (the US) will launch a standing, trilateral dialogue among the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan. To succeed, we and our friends and allies must reverse the Taliban‘s gains, and promote a more capable and accountable Afghan government.

9- Afghanistan has been denied the resources that it demands because of the war in Iraq .At the same time; we will shift the emphasis of our mission to training and increasing the size of Afghan Security Forces…. The additional troops that we deployed have already increased our training capacity. Later this spring we will deploy approximately 4,000 U.S. troops to train Afghan Security Forces…. We will 9 accelerate our efforts to build an Afghan Army of 134,000 and a police force of 82,000 so that we can meet these goals by 2011 - and increases in Afghan forces may very well be needed as our plans to turn over security responsibility to the Afghans go forward….

10-Afghanistan has an elected government, but it is undermined by corruption and has difficulty delivering basic services to its people. The economy is undercut by a booming narcotics trade that encourages criminality and funds the insurgency. We need agricultural specialists and educators; engineers and lawyers. That is how we can help the Afghan government serve its people, and develop an economy that isn‘t dominated by illicit drugs. That is why I am ordering a substantial increase in our civilians on the ground….

11-There will also be no peace without reconciliation among former enemies. I have no illusions that this will be easy. In Iraq, we had success in reaching out to former adversaries to isolate and target al Qaeda. We must pursue a similar process in Afghanistan ,

12-There is an uncompromising core of the Taliban. They must be met with force, and they must be defeated. But there are also those who have taken up arms because of coercion, or simply for a price. These Afghans must have the option to choose a different course. That is why we will work with local leaders, the Afghan government, and international partners to have a reconciliation process.

13-None of the steps that I have outlined will be easy, and none should be taken by America alone…. That was the founding cause of NATO six decades ago. That must be our common purpose today…. For the United Nations, we seek greater progress for its mandate to coordinate international action and assistance, and to strengthen Afghan institutions. And finally, together with the United Nations, we will forge a new Contact Group for Afghanistan and Pakistan that brings together all who should have a stake in the security of the region - our NATO allies and other partners, but also the Central Asian states, the Gulf nations and Iran; Russia, India and China.1[1]

II-Afghanistan’s reaction

Afghan president Karzai, while welcoming the Obama administration‘s review of the Afghanistan Pakistan strategy, says that ―It is exactly what the Afghan people were hoping for, and we‘re seeking…Therefore, it has our full support and backing… and we‘ll be working very, very closely with the US government to prepare for and to work on implementing all that was laid out in this strategy‖2[2].

The Afghan government‘s unconditional support to the strategy is understandable keeping in view the needs and requirements of the Afghan government and the Afghan people. The Afghan government needs economic, political and strategic support to win legitimacy within Afghanistan. There are provisions in the strategy which fulfill the requirements of that legitimacy. Firstly, the Afghan government will be supported to identify, lure and facilitate the process of mainstreaming of the non-ideological elements within the ranks of the Taliban. Secondly, the Afghan security apparatus will be strengthened and boosted to replace the ISAF forces in maintaining the rule of law. Thirdly, the US will give a long-lasting commitment to establish state institutions for smooth participatory governance in Afghanistan. Moreover, the ―diplomatic, informational, military and economic‖3[3] aspects covered by the strategy may provide a favorable politico-economic and strategic environment around Afghanistan in which she may emerge as a stable democracy on the junction of South Asia and Central Asia.

1[1]President Obama‘s Afghanistan Speech, by: Chris Bowers Fri Mar 27, 2009, http://www.openleft.com/showDiary.do?diaryId=12515 2[2] Afghan leader welcomes US review. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7969636.stm 3[3] World Security Network reporting from Washington DC, March 29, 2009 10

The provision of the strategy to take regional powers like China, Iran and Russia on board is another positive sign for the establishment of a durable state structure in Afghanistan. And hence this explains president Karzai‘s excitement when he says, ―This is better than we were expecting, as a matter of fact‖4[4]. According to analysts the Afghan government might also be delighted by Obama‘s announcement that the Pakistan side of the Durand line was the most dangerous place in the world and that terrorism emanates from this region.

The Taliban in Afghanistan seem to have articulated their reaction to Obama‘s new policy for Afghanistan on the basis of Obama‘s announcement in the increase of troops. They are of the opinion that increase in the troops will increase the complexity of issues on ground. The Taliban in Afghanistan had initially welcomed the election victory of President Bark Obama, saying that, ―The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan reminds the newly-elected leadership of USA that the presence of thousands of NATO and US forces in Afghanistan and the policy of intransigence and bellicose neither had any achievement nor brought about security and peace to the people of Afghanistan. With the people of Afghanistan having now been fused into one against the foreign invading forces and determined to force their withdrawal from the country, such belligerent policies will never spell expected results, despite the arrival of more contingents. Nor will they achieve results better than Bush‘s and his cronies. The ground realities in Afghanistan and the expectations of the people of America expressed through their votes demand that Obama should shun all policies followed by Bush once and for all. He should respect the rights of the people to independence and observe the norms of human rights. In short, he should set out on a policy that will have a message of peace for the war- stricken world which has been victimized by the arrogance and tyranny of USA.5[5]‖

The civil society organizations have raised a few points regarding the new policy. First, they are of the opinion that sources of terrorism have to be identified and that a mechanism for dialogue has to be devised along with the parameters and conditions for dialogue with those who are ‗moderate‘ among the Taliban.

III- Pakistan‟s reaction

A day after the speech, the Pakistan‘s President‘s spokesman, Farhatullah Babar, expressed his concerns on the ‗blank cheques‘ issue.6[6] This was the disapproving sign from any Pakistani official regarding the New Afghan Policy by President Barak Obama. Previously the president, prime minister and other officials were cautious enough to send any unwelcome gesture. The government as well as the recently became independent media in Pakistan apparently welcomed the policy and president Zardari has even gone to the extent of admitting his prior consent to the policy. The Pakistan foreign ministry and security establishment are of the opinion that additional forces and drone attacks might increase the influx of militants across the border, may increase vulnerability of the NATO supply route through Khyber Agency, more refugee influx, and a spree of violence as vengeance by the

4[4] Afghan leader welcomes US review. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7969636.stm 5[5] Taliban reaction to Obama victory. See www.nefafoundation.org 6[6] Islamabad not happy with Obama strategy, By Baqir Sajjad Syed, Sunday, 29 Mar, 2009 http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/Dawn%20Content%20Library/dawn/news/pakistan/ islamabad-not-happy-with-obama-strategy–bi

11 militants7[7]. What perception this strategy created in Pakistan and how will it affect the war against terrorism in the subsequent days besides analysis of the policy from the perspective of people in the Pashtun belt is discussed in the following lines.

Three issues in the new strategy might have alarmed the security establishment of Pakistan and the rightists who have been quite irritated with the new Af-Pak policy by Obama administration. The right wingers since then have been busy lambasting the policy under age- old assumptions8[8]. Firstly, according to the right wing Pakistani writers, anchors and right wing analysts, there is nothing new in the new policy and that the strategy is in fact a continuation of the Bush administration‘s aggressive policy with respect to Pakistan9[9]. According to this assumption, the US intervention in Afghanistan and her drone attacks across the border have actually caused a full-fledged insurgency inside Pakistan. This line of argument seems to have been taken in response to the US official‘s statements regarding the Pakistan security agencies‘ engagement with some Taliban insurgent groups10[10]. Most of the Pakistani analysts including some of the retired army men still consider Taliban as a liberation army, and favors a change in the apparent pro-US policy lines of the government which would ultimately end in disengaging Pakistan from the coalition in the war against terror.

What the rightists in Pakistan tend to forget is the fact that religious militancy in Pakistan‘s tribal regions and other parts had started spreading its tentacles long before the US intervened in Afghanistan in 2001 to dislodge the Taliban government11[11]. Jaish-i-Mohammad was established in 2000 and Tahreek-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Mohammadi was formed in 1989. These and other organizations in Southern Punjab, FATA and North West Frontier Province (NWFP) were working when the US was busy in Balkans and in the Middle east after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 and after the fall of Dr. Najib‘s government in Afghanistan in 1992. Secondly, the security establishment of Pakistan finds it a bitter pill to swallow that the US would provide funds through the Kerry-Lugar Bill on the condition of performance. The Pakistan‘s government‘s perpetual stance that it has the will but little capability to counter insurgency that has started spreading to the heartland of Pakistan seems to be asking for financial support without any pre-condition. The government and political parties of Pakistan have gradually started realizing the fact that it is increasingly becoming difficult for the security apparatus of Pakistan to counter assaults from the tribal regions as well as from Southern Punjab12[12]. The military of Pakistan has already ceded Waziristan in FATA and the provincial government has surrendered Swat in the NWFP to Taliban as a last option after the military could not achieve those targets which the democratic government desperately desired. In the wake of alliances by different factions of the Taliban, the waves emanating from the tribal belt of Pakistan have not only posed threat to the regional and international states but also to Pakistan and Afghanistan13[13]. The violent extremist movement has started

7[7] Concerns in Pakistan over US plan, says Lodhi. Dawn, April 2 2009 8[8] Press conference by on April 1, 2009 in Lahore telecast by Geo News. 9[9] Shireen Mazari. A Pakistani centric understanding of militancy. The News. April 1, 2009. 10[10] Afghan strikes by Taliban get Pakistan help. The News York Times. March 26 2009. 11[11] Taliban influence to spread in Pakistan. Dawn, Nov 17 1998. 12[12] Pakistan militants strengthen in heartland. Associated Press, March 24 2009 13[13] Shaukat Khattak and Irfan Ashraf. New Afghan policy and Fata politics. Dawn, March 31 2009 12 not only revitalizing their strategic and operational links in FATA, NWFP, Southern and Eastern Afghanistan but has also opened several fronts in the recent past that shows that the insurgents are quite aware of the emphasis on cooperation among the regional states, and hence they have started isolating the regional states from one another14[14].

IV - Analysis

According to New York Times, three factors contributed to the New Afghan Policy. First, Obama seems to have brought about a compromise between his political and military advisors. While the military official favored a considerable increase in troops, the political advisor was reluctant to convince a ―skeptical Congress‖. Mr. Obama, who was in favour of doubling the number of military personnel to Afghanistan, finally decided to send additional 4,000 troops other than the 17000 he had already promised. Second, there was a realization in the White House to set some ―benchmarks‖ for increasing aid to Pakistan in fighting against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Part of the consultative process included Hillary Rodham Clinton and Richard C. Holbrooke ‗s efforts for eradicating corruption in Afghanistan and Admiral Mullen‘s 13 recommendations like expanding the counter narcotics efforts and increasing ―the ability of Pakistan‘s military to carry out counterinsurgency operations.‖ Third, there was an insight from Vice President Biden‘s visit and his personal observations regarding narrowing the American goals in Afghanistan. 15[15]

The US newly announced strategy seems to have taken a holistic approach to counter insurgency in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is, therefore, of utmost importance in this regard that the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan take up holistic approaches to effectively tackle the issues of security and development not only within their states but also adopt an approach that fosters regional understanding of the issues. The denial line taken by the rightists and the security establishment of Pakistan may be harmful in the long run for two reasons. First, no body around the world as well as no body in the high conflict zones in FATA and NWFP may take the denial story any more. Second, religious militancy is fast spreading into the heartland of Pakistan. Until the government and the security establishment of Pakistan develop a comprehensive strategy to tackle the issues of security and development in the country and stop looking for regional scapegoats, the issues will get more complicated with the passage of time. Moreover, the age-old assumption under which the Pakistani establishment preferred sate security over human security has to be revisited because the approach has actually brought Pakistan to the verge of a virtual disaster.

A sincere democratic effort on the part of Pakistan to reverse the ideological discourse of religious militancy both on state and societal level should be started without any delay. The process of Islamization started by the former President of Pakistan General Zia ul Haq has virtually made Pakistan vulnerable to this discourse. What Musharaf did in his tenure was to dupe the international community by presenting himself as Zia in reverse by apparently undoing the process of the so-called Islamization. Huge funds were swallowed in the name of Madrassa Reforms, action against the militant organizations, the so-called basic democracy, changing the curriculum, police reforms and legislation, etc. Back in 1990‘s, historian like

14[14] Syed Saleem Shahzad. The rise and rise of neo-taliban. Asia Times, April 4 2009 15[15] White House Debate Led to Plan to Widen Afghan Effort, By HELENE COOPER and ERIC SCHMITT, March 27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/28/us/politics/28prexy.html?_r=1&ref=politics

13

K.K.Aziz 16[16]had pinpointed the loopholes in the education system but his recommendations were not taken seriously by the successive controlled democracies and military governments. Similarly, the electronic media revolution in Pakistan did not break the so-many stereotypes of its predecessors like PTV and Radio Pakistan. What Musharaf left as legacy to the democratic government is myriads of institutional disharmonies which resulted in a lack of trust on any secular leadership. The recent alliance of the religious and the secular in the Lawyer‘s Movement is testimony to the fact how the religious discourse tries to seek popular support.

Another aspect which feeds this discourse is the structural imbalances within the state. The strong centralist approach towards the state is imbedded in an ideology that can be traced back to the partition of India. The initial idea of building a nation on the concept of a true federation was set aside and a religious identity (hate-Hindus) was put in place which best suited the concept of a garrison state. This concept served well the interests of one nation (Punjab) at the expense of other nations like Pashtuns, Sindhis and Baluchis. While those demanding a federation remained secular at large till this day, the centralist political forces use religion to further their political ends. The ideological discourse can be reversed if the state structure is revisited on the basis of autonomous federating units. There seems to be a realization on the part of the federal government and the security establishment that the centralist approach works no more. Whether it is a twist or a genuine desire by the establishment is yet to be seen.

One is tempted to point out a few missing links in the newly announced US policy for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Though religious militancy in Pakistan is a threat to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Europe and the US, those who bear the major brunt of this insurgency are the people living in FATA, NWFP and Northern Baluchistan besides Southern and Eastern Afghanistan. The newly announced US strategy is silent on the issue of how much these people can help make the new strategy succeed or fail. There is no provision in the new strategy or any other strategy developed by Pakistan and Afghanistan to take these people into confidence. The provincial government of NWFP, the cultural organizations in the Pashtun belt and the civil society within the Pashtun belt have to be engaged in a ‗strategic communication system‘ and in the regional consultations on the implementation of the newly announced policy.

The problems in Pashtun areas are the cumulative effect of the politics by different powers in the Central-South Asian region since early 19th Century. Example of this can be found in the imperial politics of the ‗Great Game‘ between Britain and Czarist Russia, which resulted in the political division of the Pashtuns in Federally Administered Area (FATA), Provincially Administered Area (PATA) of Pakistan, NWFP, Pashtun part of Baluchistan, and Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. The bipolar and ideological conflict of the ‗Cold War‘ further disturbed the power-balance between nationalities in Pakistan strengthening some nationalities while undermining others. The making of one unit of West and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and the inability of Pakistan to evolve into a genuine federal democracy that would represent the interests and political aspirations of all nationalities are the consequences of the cold war politics. This process left huge vacuum in the state structure of Pakistan both on vertical and horizontal levels.

16[16], K.K.Aziz, The Murder of History. Vanguar Lahore, 2004. 14

Afghan War which started in 1979, in reality was a war between Western capitalism and Russian communism, had adverse impact on Pashtuns. It was during this time that the genuine political forces of the Pashtuns were marginalized and their society and values were manipulated in an extreme way to create conditions for a protracted war with Russia. This war served the interests of the Pakistani power-elite, which predominantly comes from the province of Punjab, to counter Pashtun nationalist sentiments with Pan-Islamic ideology and Wahabi doctrine of Islam. It was also during this period that the overgrowth of the power of Punjab in Pakistan to the detriment of others. After the collapse of former Soviet Union (Russia), Pakistani elite, in pursuance of their ‗strategic depth‘ doctrine, created the proxy force of Taliban and imposed it on Afghans/Pashtuns. This had a further negative impact on the society and politics of Pashtuns. The Taliban, networking later with the pan-Wahabi Islamist Al-Qaeda, disrupted the social fabric, cultural values and behavioral system of the Pashtuns leaving their identity, history, culture and existence at the mercy of Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants. The militants under a well-thought out strategy isolate the Pashtun community taking the help of vacuums in state structure and then control the whole society through the perpetuation of fear (see the writ of religious radicals in the Pashtun belt—factors and implications ( see http://www.airra.org/presentations.htm and http://www.airra.org/Papers/AbstractTerrorism%20in%20the%20Pashtun%20belt.pdf ) All this has resulted in the disempowerment of the Pashtuns. The current ‗War on Terror‘ has further marginalized the Pashtuns because this war does not address the real causes of the present problem rooted in the ideological foundations and direction, and state structure of Pakistan but aggravates the situation by destroying the economic, social, and other infrastructures of the Pashtun society. Pashtuns are of the view that until ideological, strategic, military, and logistical support basis of Jihad in Pakistani state structures are neutralized and Pashtuns are empowered, this problem cannot be solved.

V-Conclusion

The governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan have to take a holistic approach to the issues of militancy, security and development in the region. The approach must be able to address ideological, developmental, military, and diplomatic paradigms into consideration. For this to happen, the government and security establishment of Pakistan have to 1) revisit the worn-out security paradigm that necessitates the use of ethnic Pashtuns for ‗strategic depth‘ into Central Asia through Afghanistan on the one hand and cure the India-phobia on the other hand, 2) develop a comprehensive long term counter insurgency strategy that incorporates ideological, economic, diplomatic and strategic aspects, 3) The governments of Pakistan, India, Iran, Afghanistan, Russia and China have to join hands to counter threats emanating from extremism and terrorism in the region to their states (it is a well-thought strategy of the terrorist organizations to keep the regional states isolated which gives them a leverage to strike at each one of them separately), 4) both Pakistan and Afghanistan have to work towards strengthening their civilian institutions of governance and security apparatus working under the civilian authority, 5) lastly and most importantly, the people in the Pashtun belt on both sides of the Durand Line are to be taken into confidence, and hence to develop an institutional structure for the perpetuation of effective dialogue process on a log term basis.

We ask President Obama‘s administration, NATO allies, the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the international community and regional nations that they should help Pashtuns and other people in the region reverse the extremist tendencies and transform its real support basis for the greater benefit of all while implementing new Af-Pak policy framework. We

15 urge all the stake holders for regional cooperation and mutual trust to defeat terrorism with all its root causes mentioned above. In this regard, democratic institutions and political parties must be strengthened and the need for institutionalization must be emphasized. Secondly, the use of coercive means to curb terrorism must be targeted, answerable to the civilian elected governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan and the NWFP government and accountable to elected parliamentary committees. Thirdly, the security forces working under the civilian administration, such as police and Frontier Constabulary, must be equipped and trained on an emergency basis.

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SWAT VALLEY (April 1, 2009)

Written by admin on Sunday, April 5th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten:

Swat deal an unlikely model for reconciliation with Taliban Afghanistan Sun Wednesday, April 1, 2009 (IANS)

Pakistan‘s government stopped 16 months of fighting and brought relative calm to Swat - a scenic valley just an hour north of Islamabad - by cutting a truce with Taliban militants, a development it promotes as a model to deal with the Islamic insurgency in the entire region.

However, the price paid for peace may be too high and likely to discourage Western governments from making similar deals in Afghanistan.

Pakistan‘s North West Frontier Province‘s regional government ceded authority to the Taliban under the peace deal, giving them almost a free hand to impose their puritan Islamic rule on the around 600,000 people of Swat and its seven neighbouring districts.

The 17-point peace accord signed with a pro-Taliban cleric Maulana Sufi Mohammad includes measures to establish Islamic courts, a ban on music, expulsion of prostitutes and pimps from the area, closure of businesses during prayer times, and a campaign against what they call obscenity.

But it does not stop militants, armed with assault rifles and grenade launchers, from patrolling Mingora, the main town in Swat district, military troops being confined to their barracks.

Few policemen can be seen maintaining law and order in the city, which is completely under Taliban control.

Mohammad is a reformed pro-Taliban cleric who led thousands of fighters to Afghanistan following the 2001 invasion of US-led international forces. Most of his comrades died, but he escaped and was imprisoned in Pakistan, only to be released early last year.

Mohammad convinced his son-in-law, Maulana Fazlullah, to abandon his armed campaign that has turned Swat, often compared to Switzerland for its stunning landscape of mountains and meadows, into a war zone since late 2007.

Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani recently defended the agreement, saying it is part of government‘s ‗three D‘ strategy of dialogue, development and deterrence.

Some cabinet members have proposed it should be a model for the new US policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, which stresses the need for ‗reconciliation with the reconcilable elements in Taliban‘.

The militants have stopped executing their opponents in public, bombing girls‘ schools and targeting security forces - with few exceptions here and there - but Swat remains a no-go area for foreigners and even Pakistani tourists.

Hundreds of Al Qaeda-linked militants, mainly from Central Asian states, continue to recruit and train fighters for the war in Afghanistan.

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‗How could it be a model for reconciliation with moderate Taliban if all it produces is a Taliban rule,‘ asks analyst and retired general Talat Masood.

‗If that is how you want to resolve problems in Afghanistan, and for that matter, in Pakistan, just hand over the government to Taliban and they will have no reason for the insurgency.‘

Kabul, which believes the similar peace deals allowed militants to set up mini-states and sanctuaries in Pakistan‘s tribal region from where they launch cross-border attacks on international forces in Afghanistan, also expressed concerns.

‗The Swat peace agreement is Pakistan‘s internal affair, but if this agreement makes enemies of peace stronger, Afghanistan cannot stay quiet,‘ Afghan President Hamid Karzai told DPA in a recent interview.

‗We hope Pakistan will take care of our interests,‘ he added.

According to Masood, any arrangement with the Taliban is successful only if it ensures the writ of the government and consolidation of its authority, which doesn‘t seem happening in Swat.

He said a realistic model for eliminating militancy in the region could be found in Bajaur tribal district, where Pakistani troops brought the Taliban down to their knees by daring ground and aerial strikes.

A major tribe that supported the militants and provided shelter to Al Qaeda terrorists agreed to surrender some key Taliban leaders and stop their activities in Bajaur following a seven-month offensive that left more than 1,500 rebels and dozens of soldiers dead.

Under the 28-point agreement signed March 9, the Mamoond tribe would also ensure that Taliban fighters lay down their arms and promise to live peacefully.

There are indications that the US may be more inclined towards this route in its new Afghan-Pakistan policy.

US President Barack Obama has not ruled out talks with Taliban ready for peace, but at the same time his government plans to send 17,000 additional troops to Afghanistan, expanding its military presence to around 70,000.

The New York Times said in an earlier report that the White House was considering to expand pilotless drone attacks beyond Pakistan‘s tribal areas on the Afghan border to include the south- western Balochistan province, where many Taliban leaders, including Mullah Omar, are believed to be hiding.

A Pakistani official, who participated in last month‘s trilateral consultations on policy review between Islamabad, Kabul and Washington, said that ‗the US would like to talk to them (the Taliban) from a point of strength‘.

‗Under the proposed reviewed policy, an intensive force will be used against Taliban in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan for at least one year. When the Taliban are weakened to some extent, they would be approached for reconciliation,‘ he added.

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TERROR SECRETARIAT (April 4, 2009)

Written by admin on Sunday, April 5th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Target: terror secretariat The News International Saturday, April 04, 2009 By Farhat Taj

The Taliban are a diverse mix of different groups, each led by its own leader, which support each other in militancy. Still, it is not uncommon to see two Taliban groups at cross-purposes with each other, and fighting. At that point, something happens and the groups give up hostilities and once again become ―brothers in faith and comrades. Most certainly, somewhere there is an infrastructure in place that makes this happen, such as a particular terror ―secretariat‖ in Waziristan.

FATA / NWFP

Some people in FATA who have had the opportunity to see the terror secretariat from inside shared with me what they observed. According to them,

The secretariat consists of three complexes owned by Jalaluddin Haqqani and run by his son . The first complex is located right in front of the Frontier Constabulary, FC Fort in main Miranshah bazaar in North Waziristan. Apparently there is a computer institute in this complex but the complex also contains compounds which are well-guarded and no-go area. The second complex is located in Sirai Darpakhel just behind Miranshah Bazaar. This complex consists of seven compounds and is believed to be the headquarters of the Taliban, who move back and forth between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The complex is believed to be commanded by diehard Taliban Bakhta Jan Afghani. The third complex, at a distance of not more than a kilometre from the Pakistan army camp in North Waziristan, is situated in Dandi Darpakhel on the road to Afghanistan.

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The secretariat is a huge and spacious structure spread over an area of a 100 kanals. There is a madressah in the complex in Sirai Darpakhel. All the three complexes have large open grounds, big guest houses and no-go areas. Taliban and Al-Qaida terrorists active in various parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan are believed to stay in the guesthouses. The no-go areas are believed to contain a large quantity of weapons and ammunition. Also, the large grounds are quite possibly used for training terrorists. Jalaluddin Haqqani‘s extended family resides in the Dandi Darpakhel complex.

The people who went to the compound said that they talked to many students and teachers at the madrasa and observed them. It may well be that the teachers were teaching more than basic education to the students and that they were being trained to become suicide bombers. Qari Hussain, who is believed universally to be a master trainer of suicide bombers, is also resident in the area. There were many Pakhtuns, especially Mehsud and Wazir, as well as Punjabis, Arabs and Tajiks, Uzbeks, Afghans and Africans.

Jalaluddin Haqqani, an Afghan, is a former Mujaheedin leader. Due to his old age he has left the management of the complex to his son Sirajuddin. The senior Haqqani is widely respected among the Taliban and he uses his position to make peace among warring Taliban groups. When two Taliban groups anywhere in Pakistan or Afghanistan get at each other‘s throats and kill each other, Jalaluddin asks his son to invite the two to one of his guest houses in the terror secretariat. He ultimately convinces them to stop fighting each other, by giving money to some and weapons to others. Jalaluddin is also a key link between the Taliban of Swat and Baitullah Mehsud. Some time back he managed to make peace between Maulvi Nazir, who leads a strong group of Taliban in North Waziristan, and Baituallah Mehsud. The dispute was over the presence of Uzbeks in the area. Maullvi Nazir wanted them kicked out of Waziristan because they were not interested in fighting in Afghanistan.

In case of any action against the complex, the government will have to consider its close proximity to the FC fort in the area. It is quite possible that in case of an attack on the terror secretariat, the terrorists would try and take control of the fort and kidnap the FC soldiers deployed there. Also, the complex is not far from the main Miranshah bazaar, so any error in the operation may bring about significant collateral damage. The terrorists use women and children as human shields.

An attack on these terrorists needs to be considered, because of the major impact it could have on the coordination and networking of Taliban groups in FATA.

The writer is a research fellow at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Gender Research, University of Oslo, and a member of Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy. Email: [email protected]

Comments

By Sikander Hayat on April 5th, 2009 at 5:29 pm

Another day, another bomb, another atrocity committed in the name of Islam by those who believe that apart from them all other Muslims are ―kafirs‖as today‖s attack was perpetrated on a religious place for Shia community. Once again it will be agonising to listen to right wing Mullahs and their following in general public who still think that this is the reaction for America‖s war in Afghanistan. Please wake up from your deep slumber and at least say that this is bad. If Pakistan needs something today very badly, that is the consensus on what we are faced with. This consensus has eluded us so far but with any luck there will come a point where the ―thakedars‖ of Islam will take notice of the mounting piles of dead and say that what is happening to our country is wrong. I believe that this is the main problem with the Pakistani counter terror activities that many of the own countrymen believe that this is not our war. I know that India‘s RAW is paying these so called Jihadists to wreak havoc in Pakistan and to support such people who are in the payroll of our enemies is a crime in itself. I would like to ask the readers of this site to comment on this issue today. When will the general public and some of our politician say that this is our war and we have to fight it?

20 http://real-politique.blogspot.com

By Sikander Hayat

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PAKISTAN MEDIA DEBATES SWAT DEAL (April 14, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, April 14th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten:

Pakistan media debates Swat deal with Taliban SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Tuesday, April 14, 2009 (IANS)

By agreeing to impose Sharia laws in part of its restive northeast, Pakistan had ceded control of the area to a ‗band of militants‘, an editorial in a leading English daily said Tuesday.

However, another newspaper lauded parliament‘s ‗collective wisdom‘ in agreeing to a controversial peace deal with the Taliban by imposing Sharia laws in the Swat Valley and six other districts of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) in return for the militants laying down their arms.

‗It effectively cedes judicial control of a part of Pakistan to a band of militants who have been waging a savage war against the state,‘ Dawn said in an editorial.

‗The collective wisdom of the country‘s prime public representative body - the National Assembly of Pakistan - has put its weight behind the Swat peace deal to save the people of the valley from ruthless killing and complete lawlessness, which has been the hallmark of this once the enchanting tourist resort of Pakistan,‘ The News said in a commentary.

President Asif Ali Zardari ratified the peace deal late Monday after parliament had passed it after a day-long debate that saw the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) walking out in protest.

In doing so, Zardari took the easy way out by tossing the issue into parliament‘s court in the face of growing international pressure against the deal.

Zardari had given his nod to the Feb 16 deal between the NWFP government and Taliban-linked radical cleric Sufi Mohammad but balked at ratifying it after many Western nations, including the US, termed it a ‗retrograde‘ step.

He then, very conveniently, put the onus on parliament so that he could turn around and show to the world that Pakistan‘s elected representatives supported the pact.

‗This was not the kind of politics the country needed,‘ Dawn said.

Conceding that the constitution gives the president the authority to make ‗regulations for the peace and good government of a Provincially Administered Tribal Area‘, it added that what had been agreed to in Swat ‗is no ordinary change‘.

Dawn also noted that the debate in parliament ‗was yet another missed opportunity‘.

‗The bigger point is that the politicians still need to reach a consensus on how to counter militancy. When force is used some segments in the political spectrum erupt in anger and indignation.

22

‗When peace deals are pursued, other segments denounce them as appeasement. Yet, no one seems serious about devising a credible strategy to fight militancy,‘ the editorial maintained.

According to The News, Pakistan‘s parliamentarians ‗have definitely played their role of being public representatives and thus should be encouraged and praised‘.

‗Going well beyond their personal philosophies, ideologies and political thinking, these members of the Parliament supported the peace deal, which in normal circumstances would not have been acceptable to most of them.

‗Their priority was to secure the people of Swat from being pushed back to the pre-Feb 16 situation when innocent people were beheaded, butchered, looted, harassed and even flogged at the whims of a group of armed individuals,‘ The News maintained.

It also noted that it was ‗no secret‘ that parliament has been involved in the exercise ‗only to tell the foreign powers particularly Washington, which has its reservations about the Swat peace deal, that the imposition of Islamic justice system is the will of the people of Pakistan.

‗No doubt, a smart move from President Zardari, who, for a change has started taking decisions that surprise many,‘ The News said.

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THE PAKISTANI PEACE DEAL (April 14, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, April 14th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten:

Pakistani Peace Deal Gives New Clout to Taliban Rebels SOURCE: Wall Street Journal April 14, 2009 By Zahid Hussain & Matthew Rosenberg

MINGORA, Pakistan — Thousands of Islamist militants are pouring into Pakistan‘s Swat Valley and setting up training camps here, quickly making it one of the main bases for Taliban fighters and raising their threat to the government in the wake of a controversial peace deal.

President Asif Ali Zardari effectively ratified the government‘s deal with the Taliban Monday by signing a bill that imposes Islamic law in Swat, a key plank of the accord, hours after legislators overwhelmingly approved a resolution urging it. Pakistani officials have touted the deal, reached in February, as a way to restore peaceful order in the bloodied region — which lies just a few hours‘ drive from the capital — and halt the Taliban‘s advance.

Yet a visit to the Taliban-controlled valley here found mounting evidence that the deal already is strengthening the militants as a base for war. U.S. officials contend the pact has given the Taliban and its allies in al Qaeda and other Islamist groups an advantage in their long-running battle against Pakistan‘s military.

The number of militants in the valley swelled in the months before the deal with the Taliban was struck, and they continue to move in, say Pakistani and U.S. officials. They now estimate there are between 6,000 and 8,000 fighters in Swat, nearly double the number at the end of last year.

Taliban leaders here make no secret of their ultimate aim. ―Our objective is to drive out Americans and their lackeys‖ from Pakistan and Afghanistan, said Muslim Khan, a spokesman for the group, in an interview here. ―They are not Muslims and we have to throw them out.‖

Militant training camps are springing up across the valley‘s thickly forested mountainsides. ―Young men with no prospect of employment and lack of education facilities are joining the militants,‖ said Abdur Rehman, a schoolteacher in Swat.

Until the fighting began nearly two years ago in the valley, it was a popular weekend getaway for well-heeled Pakistanis, known for its alpine ridges, fruit orchards and trout-filled streams. With the Taliban now imposing its harsh version of Islamic law, floggings and even executions are fast becoming commonplace. Residents said many young men are joining the militants to ensure the safety of their families, who they hope will be left in peace if one of their own is fighting the government. 24

―We are all frightened by this brutality. No one can dare to challenge them,‖ said Fazle Rabbi, who owns a cloth shop in Mingora, Swat‘s main town. The shop sits on a square that has become known among residents as ―Slaughter Square‖ because the Taliban have begun using it to dump bodies after executions.

Since the new peace deal was made, the militants are beginning to push into neighboring areas. Last week they overpowered a village militia in the adjacent Buner district. The attack was a violation of the peace accord. But the Taliban faction that controls Swat says it has no intention of withdrawing. ―We want Islamic sharia [law] also to be enforced in Buner,‖ said Mr. Khan. ―No one can force us out from any part of the province.‖

Many of the longer-term jihadist fighters are loyal to groups with ties to al Qaeda, such as Jaish-e-Mohammed. They have been hardened on battlefields in neighboring Afghanistan and the Kashmir region claimed by India and Pakistan — underlining the growing confluence between the various Islamist groups fighting on either side of the Afghan-Pakistani border, the officials say.

The Taliban and al Qaeda were once largely confined to a mountainous ribbon that runs along the Afghan border and has long existed in a semiautonomous limbo, technically part of Pakistan but never fully under the control of its government.

In the past two years, however, the Taliban and its allies have pushed into areas where Pakistan‘s state had held sway, such as Swat, about 100 miles from Islamabad.

Striking peace deals with some Taliban factions is part of Pakistan‘s broader strategy to counter the militants. The government‘s logic is that such accords can exploit the groups‘ fractious nature; one enemy can be neutralized with a peace deal while another is defeated on the battlefield. The deals also have been struck when the army has struggled to overcome militants. In Swat, about 3,000 militants pushed four times as many soldiers out of the valley in 18 months of fighting, leaving some 1,500 people dead.

Nearly all the peace accords reached in the past few years in areas near the Afghan border, where the Taliban are strongest, have collapsed. Often they have left the militants more

25 powerful. A similar deal in Swat fell apart last year after the Taliban renewed attacks on Pakistani forces.

The Taliban‘s actions since the new peace deal was unveiled have alarmed Washington, where officials fear that Swat will become an effective launching pad for expansion into Pakistan‘s more densely populated plains. ―This is a rest stop for the Taliban, it‘s nothing more,‖ said a U.S. official in Washington.

Swat now offers a glimpse of the Taliban‘s vision for Pakistan. They have taken control of the local government and the police, who have been ordered to shed their uniforms in favor of the traditional Shalwar Kameez, an outfit comprising a long shirt and loose trousers. They also have seized Swat‘s emerald mines, which extract millions of dollars a year in gemstones.

At barbershops, notices warn men not to shave their beards. Women are no longer allowed to leave their homes without their husbands or male blood relatives. Girls‘ schools have been reopened after initially being closed but the students must be covered from head to toe, and Taliban officials routinely inspect classrooms for violators.

―We used to have lots of cultural and extracurricular activities in the school, but all that has been stopped,‖ said Ziaullah Yousaf Zai, a principal of a private girls‘ school in Mingora. ―We do not want to give any pretext to the Taliban to shut the school again.‖

Mr. Khan, the Taliban spokesman, predicted there would soon be more executions, showing off a list of people whom the Taliban want to try in Islamic courts for what he called their ―anti-Islamic‖ ways. The list includes senior government officials, a woman whose husband is in the U.S. military, and others. Many of them have fled or are in areas outside Taliban control

―These kinds of people should not live,‖ said Mr. Khan, who also is a commander in the Tehrik-e-Taliban, a broader Taliban alliance focused on battling the Pakistani government.

Islamic courts haven‘t yet been set up in Swat because Pakistani President Zardari had delayed signing the bill to impose sharia, as the peace deal stipulates. Until Monday, he had maintained there first must be complete peace in the valley, though he didn‘t explain how he would determine that, nor did he address it Monday.

Mr. Zardari‘s delay was widely viewed as an attempt to save face with opponents of the deal in his own government and Washington. He relented after the Parliament vote established support from almost every national political party, said a senior official close to the president. One party walked out in opposition.

Mr. Khan had warned of more bloodshed if Islamic law was not formally imposed. ―It does not matter to us whether the peace deal stays or not. No one can stop us from setting up our own courts,‖ he said.

The Taliban were already imposing their own version of sharia, which has been interpreted with wide variations by Islamic scholars for centuries. Pakistani television stations recently broadcast a video of a woman being flogged by black-turbaned Taliban in Swat. Most official accounts say she was alleged to have left her house without a male blood relative.

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While Mr. Khan insisted the video was a fake, he acknowledged that such an incident did happen. ―As a Muslim, we cannot allow a woman to violate Islamic values,‖ he said.

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TALIBAN V. TALIBAN (posted APRIL 19, 2009)

Written by admin on Sunday, April 19th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Taliban v. Taliban SOURCE: London Review of Books vol 31, no 7 (April 2009) By Graham Usher

Pakistan and India have been at war since 1948. There have been occasional flare-ups, pitched battles between the two armies, but mostly the war has taken the form of a guerrilla battle between the Indian army and Pakistani surrogates in Kashmir. In 2004 the two countries began a cautious peace process, but rather than ending, the war has since migrated to Afghanistan and the Pakistani tribal areas on the Afghan border. ‗Safe havens‘ for a reinvigorated Afghan Taliban and al-Qaida, the tribal areas are seen by the West as the ‗greatest threat‘ to its security, as well as being the main cause of Western frustration with Pakistan. The reason is simple: the Pakistan army‘s counterinsurgency strategy is not principally directed at the Taliban or even al-Qaida: the main enemy is India.

In the Bajaur tribal area, for example, the army is fighting an insurgency led by Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of one of Pakistan‘s three Taliban factions, but it‘s not because he is a friend of al-Qaida. What makes him a threat, in the eyes of Pakistan‘s army, is that he is believed to be responsible for scores of suicide attacks inside Pakistan (including the assassination of ). He is also thought to have recruited hundreds of Afghan fighters, among them ‗agents‘ from the Afghan and Indian intelligence services – ‗Pakistan‘s enemies‘, in the words of a senior officer.

An enemy in Bajaur, the Taliban is a friend of Pakistan in North and South Waziristan. Like Mehsud, the guerrilla commander Jalaluddin Haqqani, who directs the Afghan Taliban‘s ‗central front‘ from bases in Pashtun villages in Pakistan, has ties to al-Qaida. Unlike Mehsud, he‘s not attacking Pakistan, and his fight against the US and Nato enjoys the support of the army and of broad sections of the Pakistani public. The same courtesy has been extended to Mullah Omar, whose headquarters are in Quetta, where he‘s reportedly sheltered by the ISI. ‗They are our people; they‘re not our enemies,‘ one ISI officer says. So what does it mean to be ‗anti-Pakistan‘? The short answer is pro-India, in practice if not intent. Insurgents in the tribal areas are deemed anti-Pakistani if their actions advance the perceived goals of India in Afghanistan. They are pro-Pakistani as long as they don‘t attack the Pakistani state or army, even if they launch attacks against Nato forces in Afghanistan, Islamabad‘s supposed allies in the ‗war on terror‘. Indeed, the Afghan Taliban is considered an ‗asset‘, a hedge against the day when the US and Nato leave, but also a counter to India‘s expanding influence in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has been worried by India‘s increasing interest in Afghanistan since the Bonn conference in November 2001 at which Afghan factional leaders and UN officials met to discuss the formation of a post-Taliban government. At that conference it became clear that the pro-Pakistani Afghan Taliban would be purged from the new Afghanistan under Karzai and replaced by forces dominated by commanders from the (NA), which

28 had opposed the Taliban regime before 9/11 and fought with US troops to overthrow it. India, Iran and Russia were the NA‘s main supporters while Islamabad was backing the Taliban. Neither Pakistan nor the Taliban was invited to Bonn – this was ‗the original sin‘, according to Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN representative.

India is one of Karzai‘s few remaining champions. Delhi sees the new Afghanistan as a part of its sphere of influence. It has four consulates in Afghanistan and has given its government $1.2 billion in aid: a remarkable sum for it to donate to a country that is 99 per cent Muslim and with which it has no common border. Delhi has also put up the new parliament building and chancery, and has helped to train the army. India‘s most ambitious – and, for Pakistan, most alarming – Afghan project is a new highway that will provide a route to the Iranian port of Chabahar. Not only will Afghanistan no longer need to use Pakistani ports, the road‘s destination is a clear indication of India‘s intention to consolidate an alliance with Iran in western Afghanistan in order to counter Pakistan‘s influence in eastern Afghanistan. The road network, as they see it, is a new way to fight an old war. It‘s precisely in order to resist the India-Iran bloc – as well as the emerging axis between Delhi and Washington – that the ISI has aligned itself with the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani.

Washington has tilted towards Delhi since 2004, lured by the size of India‘s markets and its potential as strategic counterweight to China, Pakistan‘s closest regional ally. Last year the US signed an agreement that allows India to buy civilian atomic technology, including nuclear fuel, from American firms, even though it is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Pakistan, by contrast, has been criticised for developing a nuclear weapon, and of course for the activities of its former top nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan.

Since 9/11 Washington has tended to use Islamabad as a gun for hire: the army was given around $1 billion a year on condition that it secured supplies to US and Nato forces in Afghanistan and fought against the Taliban and al-Qaida in the tribal areas. In agreeing this condition Pakistan had expected that its interests would be taken into account following the Anglo-American invasion. But unlike India or Iran, and despite its services to Washington, Islamabad was given no say in the formation of the Afghan government. This confirmed Pakistanis in their view that Musharraf and his army were no better than mercenaries fighting ‗America‘s war‘, and as a result of this humiliation, the Pakistani army has interpreted its commitments selectively, opposing ‗safe havens‘ that might be used to launch attacks against other countries, but supporting the Afghan . Washington is exasperated by Pakistan‘s refusal to fight the Taliban, but it‘s been given little incentive to do so.

Fear of India‘s influence was heightened by Bush‘s decree last July allowing US Special Forces in Afghanistan to pursue al-Qaida and Taliban fugitives into Pakistan‘s territory without the approval of its government. There has been one US ground assault and more than 30 drone attacks since then, overwhelmingly in North and South Waziristan. Washington claims to have a tacit agreement about the drone strikes with the Pakistan government. The government denies this. Army officers admit that the strikes may have killed scores of al- Qaida fighters, and that the ISI may have supplied intelligence for the operations, but the missiles have also killed civilians, including pro-government tribal elders.

The Pakistan army believes India is responsible for the CIA‘s new belligerence. Some even believe India wants to create such turmoil in the tribal areas that Nato forces and the new Afghan army are compelled to invade, destroy the ‗terrorist havens‘, and wrest back Pashtun lands claimed by Kabul. Others think that India wants to dismember Pakistan because of the

29

‗danger‘ it poses as the world‘s only Muslim nuclear state. According to another source in the army, ‗the Americans have decided India will be the regional power. And India thinks a fragmented Pakistan would reduce the threat level.‘ It‘s true that Washington‘s nightmare is Pakistan‘s nuclear materials falling into the hands of al-Qaida militants. Indeed war games have been staged in the Pentagon to work out what kind of military intervention would be needed to rescue them. The ISI‘s charge that there is Indian involvement in the unrest in the tribal areas is unconvincing, and the evidence scant, but it‘s safe to assume that India is keeping a close eye on what‘s going on there.

After the Mumbai attacks in November a senior Indian military officer told journalists in Delhi that the US-led fight on the Pakistan-Afghan border was ‗also our war‘. And a former Indian envoy to Pakistan, G. Parthasarathy, told India Today magazine in January that India ‗should not shy away from political destabilisation and inflicting economic damage on Pakistan. The time has come for us to say that Pakistan‘s border with Afghanistan is disputed.‘ It does not bode well. ‗The more I talk to the military establishment, the more I‘m convinced fear and hatred of India is growing,‘ a Pakistan security analyst told me.

America has just unveiled a strategic review of its policy towards Afghanistan, Pakistan and the tribal areas. While civilian aid to the Pakistan government will increase, Obama will continue with certain policies from the Bush era. One is the use of military force. There will be more drone attacks in the tribal areas (at least 80 people have been killed by US missiles since January) and perhaps in Balochistan, and a ‗surge‘ of 21,000 US troops in Afghanistan, mostly along the border with Pakistan. Obama has also promised that US policy towards India – and Kashmir in particular – will be ‗dehyphenated‘ from policy towards Pakistan and Afghanistan.

One consequence is that three feuding Taliban factions have now joined forces against ‗Obama, Zardari and Karzai‘ in an agreement brokered by Mullah Omar. One of the factions is led by Baitullah Mehsud. The other two are pro-Afghan Taliban factions based in South and North Waziristan, which had largely refrained from attacking the Pakistan state and army but may not do so any longer. The army is also worried that the surge could cause a further flight of Afghan Taliban and other militants into the tribal areas. If the army acts against them, retaliatory strikes may follow across Pakistan. If it doesn‘t, US and Afghan soldiers might chase them inside Pakistan – as they did last September, killing 20 tribesmen ‗by mistake‘. Any such incursion would unite the Pashtun tribes behind the Taliban, deepen anti- American sentiment in the army and stretch US-Afghan-Pakistani co-operation to breaking point.

The removal of India and Kashmir from the strategic review makes clear Delhi‘s growing influence in Washington. During his campaign Obama argued that Pakistan would be more likely to stay focused not on India but on the militants on the Pakistan-Afghan border if there was a concerted effort to resolve the Kashmir crisis. In a lobbying push of near Israeli proportions, however, Obama was told that Richard Holbrooke, his special envoy, would be shunned in Delhi if any link were made between Kashmir, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and by January it was announced that Kashmir would not be part of Holbrooke‘s portfolio.

The announcement was met with scorn in Islamabad, but many Pakistani analysts (and military officers) agree that Kashmir is better handled bilaterally. They also agree that the four-year-old Pakistan-India peace process suffered a near mortal blow with the discovery that Pakistanis were behind the attacks in Mumbai. This is particularly troubling because the

30 process had achieved not only quiet but progress, including on Kashmir: an outline for a deal based on demilitarisation, open borders and a form of self-government or autonomy that would unite the divided territory. The Pakistani army attempted to defuse tensions along the Line of Control, closing militant training camps and co-ordinating security with the Indian army.

The process collapsed partly because of the political crisis that engulfed Musharraf after he sacked Pakistan‘s chief justice in 2007. But it also fell apart because India did not reciprocate: military rule in Indian-occupied Kashmir remained as entrenched as ever. ‗The army‘s recent experience with India is very bitter,‘ a Pakistani analyst told me. ‗After 2004 the army scaled down militant intrusions into Kashmir by 95 per cent. And India‘s response was to refuse to talk about Kashmir. The army thinks it would be the same in Afghanistan if it abandoned the Afghan Taliban.‘ In the last year Indian Kashmir has seen increased penetration by Pakistani militants and skirmishes between the Pakistani and Indian armies. The spike seems to have less to do with Kashmir, where violence is at its lowest ebb in 20 years, than with the proxy war in Afghanistan. And it would suggest that – far more than on strategic reviews – peace in Afghanistan rests on peace between India and Pakistan. The road out of Kabul goes through Kashmir.

Graham Usher, a former Palestine correspondent for the Economist, is now based in Islamabad. He is the author of Dispatches from Palestine: The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process.

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BACKGROUNDER: MILITANCY UNFOLDING RAPIDLY IN PAKISTAN (APRIL 22, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, April 22nd, 2009

OLIVIER IMMIG & JAN VAN HEUGTEN: Militancy unfolding rapidly in Pakistan. Escalation unavoidable

As Spring matures, militancy rapidly unfolds in Pakistan. Slumbering but major differences between the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) led by Baitullah Mehsud and the Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) led by Sufi Muhammad and his son in law Fazlullah are finally emerging. As it becomes clearer with the day that militancy is spreading seemingly unstoppable all over North West Pakistan, an increasing number of leading politicians (Altaf Hussain, , Fazlur Rehman) are raising their voices against the presidentially and parliamentary approved Swat deal. Too little, too late. Reading today’s South Asian press will not fail to bring you a few hours of chilling actual horror.

Fazlur Rehman (chairman of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), the smallest party in the national coalition government of Pakistan) informs us that ‘whatever TNSM chief Sufi Muhammad has been saying about the Constitution, democracy and Islamic ideology were his personal views’. Also, he criticised the way Sharia is being implemented in Swat: “The process of enforcing Sharia in Swat is incorrect. It must be implemented on the basis of recommendations of the Council of Islamic Ideology”. (Dawn, 21 April) Altaf Hussain (leader in exile of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), adds another twist: “Why are the champions of the independence of the judiciary and those who resorted to the long march for that purpose still silent against Sufi Muhammad?”(Daily Times, April 22). An obviously worried Nawaz Sharif (leader of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, (PML-N), the second largest political party of Pakistan) finally spoke out in public as well: ”They (the Taliban) are now threatening to get out of Swat and take other areas. We’ve got to avoid that situation”. (interview with US Today, and reprinted in Pakistan by Dawn, 21 April and the Daily Times, April 22). Yes, Mr. Sharif, a huge majority of Pakistanis agrees with you, but still…Consider the following.

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FATA/NWFP

In Upper Dir, a district bordering on Swat, the top government official was declared missing. (New York Times, April 22). Buner District, bordering on Swat and Malakand, has been infiltrated by Taliban coming from Swat. According to reporter Abdur Rehman Abid, the Buner district has fallen into the hands of Swat Taliban. (Dawn, 22 April). The militants are led by Fateh Mohammed, and actively recruit local youngsters in their campaign to enforce Sharia. In Swat itself, the well-armed Taliban expand their operations; they are setting up checkposts on Malakand’s border. Policemen have stopped attending their duties in the district; Islamic courts have been set up which are deciding cases. (Daily Times, April 22, The News International, April 22).

Muslim Khan, a highly prolific spokesman for the TTP these days, declared: “The NWFP government had signed the deal (on Swat) with TNSM, and not with the Taliban”. Probably unintended, Mr. Khan thus makes clear the difference between a locally operating militant group like the TNSM and a nationwide oriented organization like the TTP. To add more fuel to the fire, Muslim Khan also stated that “Osama Bin Laden was welcome in Swat. Yes, we will help them and protect

33 them” (Associated Press interview, reported in Daily Times, April 22). The US Government was not amused: “Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar should not be welcome in Swat”. (Daily Times, April 22). On May 6 and 7, Afghan president Karzai and Pakistan’s president Zardari will travel to Washington to meet with Obama. Their cooperation is considered to be ‘crucial’ in combating militancy (The Washington Post, April 22).

Skilfully exploiting the international press limelight, Muslim Khan at the same time denounced any Pakistanis who disagreed with his interpretation of Islam, calling them “non- Muslims”. Sufi Muhammad, in an apparent attempt to close ranks, now has started to demand an Islamic justice system to be introduced in the entire country: “God’s Nizam should be enforced on the land of God”(Dawn, April 19). Both the TNSM and the TTP have banned political parties in Bajaur Agency, another area where militancy threatens to reign supreme (The Times of India, 22 April). Yes, this is what many commentators expected would occur; after Swat and Malakand the rest of the country will have to follow suit. (The News International, April 22).

That was not all. Advocate General Ziaur Rehman Khan stated that the superior courts would continue to exercise jurisdiction in the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). The benches of the Supreme Court and Peshawar High Court would be available in Malakand but would be called as Darul Darul Qaza and Darul Qaza, respectively.(Dawn, 22 April 22). Needless to say, this senseless formalism will not have any practical impact on local militant operations.

In Khyber Agency, the militants have succeeded in forcing US supplies destined for Afghanistan to be severely disrupted. Forced to come up with an alternative supply route, the US and NATO have negotiated a new supply route through the Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan) and Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan). (Tamerlan Vahabov, Atlantic Council, April 17). To this end, the US signed a deal with the Tajik government (Daily Times, April 22). This only serves to underline the increasing combined strength of the militants in both countries. To be continued…

Comments

By Gerald on April 23rd, 2009 at 1:47 pm

Very disturbing indeed! Thank you for focussing on these developments

By SergeyNikolaev on July 30th, 2009 at 10:23 am

This is an excellent review.

By Sdanektir on August 6th, 2009 at 3:38 pm

Great post! Just wanted to let you know you have a new subscriber- me!

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PAKISTAN SENDS TROOPS TO NORTHWEST (APRIL 24, 2009)

Written by admin on Friday, April 24th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Pakistan sends troops to northwest SOURCE: Al Jazeera and agencies April 24, 2009

Pakistan has deployed paramilitary troops to northwestern districts infiltrated by the local Taliban, after US officials expressed concern over the developments. The move on Thursday coincided with reports that Taliban fighters were patrolling the streets of Buner, a district about 100km outside the capital, Islamabad. They were warning residents not to engage in ―un-Islamic‖ activity and barring women from public places. ―We have decided to deploy eight platoons,‖ Zafarullah Khan, commandant of the Frontier Constabulary, told the AFP news agency. There are roughly 40-45 soldiers per platoon.

In Buner, one policeman was killed and another wounded when unidentified men opened fire on their vehicle, which was being escorted by paramilitary forces, Syed Azhar, a police officer, told AFP on Thursday. Several Taliban fighters occupied a police post and vacated it after some time, taking a police inspector with them, Rashid Khan, another police officer, said. A meeting between tribal elders and the Taliban in Daggar, Buner‘s main town, ended without any indication that the Taliban would withdraw. Daggar‘s bazaar as well as the road into the district were almost deserted, according to an AP Television News reporter who visited the area and witnessed part of the meeting.

Some fighters have also moved into Shangla, a district adjoining Buner, Fazal Ullah, a local politician, told AFP. Elsewhere in the region, troops reportedly killed 11 fighters and destroyed 11 hideouts in the tribal district of Orakzai where the Taliban is active. In a separate incident, fighters attacked a depot for Nato fuel tankers in Peshawar, capital of North West Frontier Province, and fled after destroying six of the vehicles, police said.

Taliban fighters have moved into Buner from the neighbouring Swat valley, where Asif Ali Zardari, the Pakistani president, signed a deal into law in April allowing the implementation of strict Islamic law in a bid to end an armed revolt. Pervez Musharraf, the former Pakistani president, said on Al Jazeera‘s Frost Over The World programme that he believes it was wrong for Pakistan‘s current government to introduce sharia in Swat. ―There is a legal system functioning in Pakistan. Whatever you do in Swat must be within that legal system,‖ Musharraf said. ―If the same people are demanding things beyond that … and they start adopting measures punishing people for things that a moderate person would not think is tolerable, that becomes challenging to the weight of the government.‖

The pact has also caused alarm in Washington, where , the defence secretary, said Pakistani leaders must take the necessary actions to stop the threat posed by Taliban.

―It is important they not only recognise it (the threat) but take the appropriate actions to deal with it,‖ he said on Thursday. ―The stability and longevity of democratic government in Pakistan is central to the efforts of the coalition in Afghanistan and it is also central to our

35 future partnership with the government in Islamabad.‖ ―We want to support them. We want to help them in any way we can. But it is important that they recognise the real threats to their country.‖

Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state, earlier said the Taliban advances posed an ―existential threat‖ to the survival of Pakistan. ―I think the Pakistani government is basically abdicating to the Taliban and the extremists,‖ she told congress members in a hearing in Washington on Wednesday.

But on Thursday she said she thought Pakistan was beginning to recognise the severity of the threat posed by the group. Clinton told a House of Representatives Appropriations subcommittee that the Obama administration is working to convince the Pakistani government that its traditional focus on India as a threat has to shift to Muslim fighters. ―Changing paradigms and mindsets is not easy, but I do believe there is an increasing awareness of not just the Pakistani government but the Pakistani people that this insurgency coming closer and closer to major cities does pose such a threat,‖ she said.

Tariq Fatemi, Pakistan‘s former ambassador to the US, told Al Jazeera the Swat deal has been ―deeply disappointing‖ to a large number of people in Pakistan as well. ―Most of us, including myself, see the manner in which this particular deal has taken place as an abandonment of government responsibility [and] as a surrender to a group of individuals who virtually had their guns on the temples of the government leadership,‖ he said.

Separately, Richard Holbrooke, the US special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan, called Zardari to discuss the situation in the region, Zardari‘s office said without specifying if Buner was mentioned.The call came as Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, was in Pakistan for talks with officials. Seeking to allay US concerns, Yusuf Raza Gilani, Pakistan‘s prime minister, said that the Swat peace deal was aimed at promoting peace in the region. ―Agreements are made so that both sides are bound by it. We have a minimum understanding that needs to be adhered to,‖ he said.‖Our agreement was that there will be peace in Swat and in return we would give them speedy justice. We have said we will take part in political dialogue with those who put down their weapons and the writ of the government. But if those agreements are broken, then we reserve the right for other options as well.‖

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WORRYING ABOUT PAKISTAN‟S FUTURE (28 APRIL, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, April 28th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Battle for hearts and minds SOURCE: Dawn Tuesday, 28 April, 2009 By Shahid Javed Burki

The Washington Post headlined a recent story on the latest developments in Pakistan ‗Extremist tide rises in Pakistan‘. The story ran on the front page; its subtitle was even more revealing about the worry that is now consuming many in America and the West about Pakistan‘s future. ‗After reaching deal in north, Islamists aim to install religious law nationwide‘ read the story‘s subhead. The story was built around the statement of Sufi Mohammad, the Swat cleric who had campaigned for decades to bring the Sharia to his part of the world. The newspaper reported that he was now determined to extend his campaign beyond Swat.

The threat was carried out a few days later. On April 22, the western press reported that the Taliban had walked into the district of Buner, south of Swat and nearer Islamabad than the Swat valley. Alarm bells began to ring loudly in Washington. On the same day that the Taliban were reported to have advanced into Buner, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton appeared before the House Foreign Relations Committee whose chairman, Howard L. Berman, had prepared a bill that would allow highly conditional economic and military aid to Pakistan.

Ms Clinton called the Taliban advances an existential threat to Pakistan and called upon its people to put pressure on the government not to continue to cede territory to the insurgents. The government‘s lack of resolve was hurting not only Pakistan but could have dire consequences for the rest of the world. She said that Pakistan was becoming a ‗mortal threat to the security and safety of our country and the world‘.

Earlier in the week, The New York Times put on its front page a picture showing a large crowd gathered to hear Maulana Abdul Aziz who was chief cleric at the Lal Masjid in Islamabad before the military action in July 2007. The commando attack killed the cleric‘s brother and scores of others. The cleric managed to escape by wearing a burka. The picture showed a bullet- riddled car parked in the middle of the congregation as a symbol for those who had come to listen to the cleric.

His attendance at the mosque was made possible by the Supreme Court‘s decision to grant him bail. The car was meant to remind the prayer congregation that the struggle to bring Islam to Pakistan would not be easy and that it would be resisted by the state that still had a near- monopoly on power to impose its will. But the state‘s will to resist seems to be weakening.

Western newspapers are not the only ones worrying about Pakistan‘s future. Policymakers in most western capitals have reached three conclusions. One, that even judged by the standards set by a very violent world that is shaping up in the early years of the 21st century, Pakistan is the most dangerous place on earth.

Two, several influential policymakers are worried that Pakistan‘s defences have been lowered to the point where the rest of the country may be overcome by radical Islam. A few days ago 37

Richard Holbrooke, the US envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, told a TV audience that Pakistanis need to worry about the government‘s decision to compromise with the clerics in Swat. ‗That ought to be a wake-up call to everybody in Pakistan that you can‘t deal with these people by giving away territory as they creep closer and closer to the populated centres of the Punjab and Islamabad.‘

Three, that if Pakistan crumbles it will create a tsunami that will hit many distant shores. It is in this context that the statement by President Asif Ali Zardari at Tokyo where he led the Pakistani side at the Friends of Pakistan meeting resonated well in western capitals. The president told his audience that if Pakistan fails the world fails. All this is a preamble to a simple question: why have the people of Pakistan allowed this to happen? ‗This‘ refers to the allowance that has been given to some clerics to openly defy the state, to reject the rule of established law, to show great contempt for most social norms accepted by the vast majority in society.

They are doing this in an attempt to establish a social and political order that conforms only to their liking. Why is it that a small group of people believe that they have the licence to impose their will on the country when it has been shown in election after election that a vast majority of the citizenry does not support the point of view these people hold and want to force down millions of reluctant throats? The answer is as simple as the question. This has happened because the extremists have not met resistance from less radical and saner elements in the country — elements who believe in democracy, the rule of law and personal rights, in particular the rights of women.

Pakistani society can be divided into three parts: the top five per cent or so in terms of income distribution, the middle 50 per cent and the bottom 45 per cent. What has happened in the last couple of decades, as the state failed to provide appropriate services to the citizenry, is that the first class of people have bought insurance for themselves by essentially sealing themselves off from the rest of society. They have their own system of security, their own power supply, their own educational system and their own health services.

The Middle East offers them escape from the country; they go to Dubai to shop and take a vacation. A significant proportion of the middle class, numbering about 85 million, has placed its faith in a democratic system of government. Almost 70 per cent of them voted for the mainstream parties. It was this class that provided the lawyers‘ movement the support it needed to battle the state.

There was a moment of extraordinary euphoria after March 16 when this class of citizenry won the restoration of the judiciary. Why is it now showing ambivalence towards the spread of extremism that challenges the social norms to which it subscribes? There are two answers to this question. This class is waiting for leadership to emerge that will mobilise and organise them. But there is also a section in this class that has swung in the direction of extremism.

Those who have done so have taken the plunge either because of conviction or because of the failure of the state to provide them with their basic needs. They need to be brought back to the fold.

Then there are the poor, 75 million in all. For them life is a struggle and the state an indifferent and increasingly irrelevant presence. The battle for Pakistan will be fought with the aim to keep the middle class convinced that their best option is to continue to put their

38 faith in the Pakistani state. How can they be persuaded to stay on board is the question for next week.

39

U.S. TAKES DUTCH MILITARY AS ROLE MODEL (APRIL 30, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, April 30th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

U.S. Takes Dutch Military as Role Model in Afghan Operation SOURCE: Wall Street Journal Thursday April 30, 2009 By JAY SOLOMON

STROE, the Netherlands — The Obama administration, which wants to send hundreds of additional civilian personnel into Afghanistan, is looking at the Dutch military‘s operations there for lessons on how to combat the Taliban. The civilian deployment is part of a U.S. focus on economic development meant to weaken support for the Taliban and dry up finances it derives from the opium trade. The civilians will complement the deployment in the coming months of 21,000 new troops, many of whom will be posted to southern provinces where the Taliban are thriving. The Obama administration, however, is having trouble finding civilian experts at the State Department to send to Afghanistan. Pentagon officials said they may need military reservists to fill any shortfall in the 500 to 600 civilians Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is seeking for Afghanistan.

The Netherlands, with nearly 2,000 personnel in southern Uruzgan province, has better integrated the efforts of its military and civilian personnel than the U.S., senior U.S. officials say. Dutch soldiers preparing here for deployment to Afghanistan say they are ingrained with the concept that economic development will be their primary mission, rather than solely pursuing extremists and Taliban fighters. Diplomats from the Netherlands‘ foreign ministry help to command the Dutch team in Uruzgan, home to 350,000 Afghans, and aid workers are embedded in the Dutch effort.

―Over time, there‘s been a focus on pure development‖ in the Dutch forces, said Col. Gert-Jan Kooij, chief of operations for the Royal Netherlands Army‘s 13th Mechanized Brigade, which is deployed in Uruzgan. ―We need to provide defense, but the priority is on development and diplomacy.‖ Soldiers training in a wooded area 90 minutes outside The Hague describe their command largely as a protection force. They hope they can provide Dutch diplomats and aid workers enough security to build the roads and agricultural projects needed to dry up local support for the Taliban and other militant groups. The soldiers say that approach has contained violence. Nineteen Dutch personnel have died in Afghanistan since the Netherlands deployed in March 2006, according to iCasualties.org.

―Dutch soldiers and civilians have done excellent work,‖ Mrs. Clinton said last week after meeting her Dutch counterpart, Maxime Verhagen, in Washington. ―In fact, the Dutch ‗3D‘

40 approach — defense, diplomacy, and development pursued simultaneously … is a model for our own efforts and the future efforts in Afghanistan.‖ The U.S. praise for the Dutch mission, say Obama administration officials, reflects Washington‘s growing recognition of the need for political and economic tools to subdue Afghanistan‘s insurgency. U.S. military personnel still dominate American reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, though President Barack Obama has signaled his intent to change this dynamic.

The aid workers whom the U.S. State Department is seeking to deploy will work on building local economies based on agriculture and small business that don‘t rely on the opium crop. Experts will also seek to better establish rule of law and local police forces, U.S. officials said. There are 10 U.S. military personnel to every one U.S. civilian working for the U.S. government in Afghanistan, say State Department officials. Mrs. Clinton is seeking to provide incentives to American diplomats and aid workers to join provincial reconstruction teams. ―We want to get more people out there working with the Afghan ministries on the ground,‖ said a senior U.S. official who traveled to Afghanistan recently to plan for the civilian effort.

Some officials working on Afghanistan note that the Dutch contingent has a somewhat easier time in Uruzgan because the province hasn‘t been a Taliban stronghold like Helmand and Kandahar provinces, and doesn‘t have as large an opium crop. Still, many agree Dutch forces have been effective in understanding that the civilian components of a counterinsurgency strategy need to be intertwined with the military.

—Yochi J. Dreazen contributed to this article. Write to Jay Solomon at [email protected] Printed in The Wall Street Journal, page A8

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PAKISTAN‟S ISLAMIC SCHOOLS (MAY 4, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, May 6th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Pakistan’s Islamic Schools Fill Void, but Fuel Militancy SOURCE: New York Times Monday May 4, 2009 By WAQAR GILLANI

MOHRI PUR, Pakistan— The elementary school in this poor village is easy to mistake for a barn. It has a dirt floor and no lights, and crows swoop through its glassless windows. Class size recently hit 140, spilling students into the courtyard. But if the state has forgotten the children here, the mullahs have not. With public education in a shambles, Pakistan‘s poorest families have turned to madrasas, or Islamic schools, that feed and house the children while pushing a more militant brand of Islam than was traditional here.

The concentration of madrasas here in southern Punjab has become an urgent concern in the face of Pakistan‘s expanding insurgency. The schools offer almost no instruction beyond the memorizing of the Koran, creating a widening pool of young minds that are sympathetic to militancy. In an analysis of the profiles of suicide bombers who have struck in Punjab, the Punjab police said more than two-thirds had attended madrasas. ―We are at the beginning of a great storm that is about to sweep the country,‖ said Ibn Abduh Rehman, who directs the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, an independent organization. ―It‘s red alert for Pakistan.‖

President Obama said in a news conference last week that he was ―gravely concerned‖ about the situation in Pakistan, not least because the government did not ―seem to have the capacity to deliver basic services: schools, health care, rule of law, a judicial system that works for the majority of the people.‖ He has asked Congress to more than triple assistance to Pakistan for nonmilitary purposes, including education. Since the Sept. 11 attacks, the United States has given Pakistan a total of $680 million in nonmilitary aid, according to the State Department, far lower than the $1 billion a year for the military.

But education has never been a priority here, and even Pakistan‘s current plan to double education spending next year might collapse as have past efforts, which were thwarted by sluggish bureaucracies, unstable governments and a lack of commitment by Pakistan‘s governing elite to the poor. ―This is a state that never took education seriously,‖ said Stephen P. Cohen, a Pakistan expert at the Brookings Institution. ―I‘m very pessimistic about whether the educational system can or will be reformed.‖

Pakistani families have long turned to madrasas, and the religious schools make up a relatively small minority. But even for the majority who attend public school, learning has an Islamic bent. The national curriculum was Islamized during the 1980s under Gen. Mohammad

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Zia ul-Haq, a military ruler who promoted Pakistan‘s Islamic identity as a way to bind its patchwork of tribes, ethnicities and languages. Literacy in Pakistan has grown from barely 20 percent at independence 61 years ago, and the government recently improved the curriculum and reduced its emphasis on Islam.

Failures in Education

But even today, only about half of Pakistanis can read and write, far below the proportion in countries with similar per-capita income, like Vietnam. One in three school-age Pakistani children does not attend school, and of those who do, a third drop out by fifth grade, according to Unesco. Girls‘ enrollment is among the lowest in the world, lagging behind Ethiopia and Yemen. ―Education in Pakistan was left to the dogs,‖ said Pervez Hoodbhoy, a physics professor at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad who is an outspoken critic of the government‘s failure to stand up to spreading Islamic militancy.

This impoverished expanse of rural southern Punjab, where the Taliban have begun making inroads with the help of local militant groups, has one of the highest concentrations of madrasas in the country. Of the more than 12,000 madrasas registered in Pakistan, about half are in Punjab. Experts estimate the numbers are higher: when the state tried to count them in 2005, a fifth of the areas in this province refused to register. Though madrasas make up only about 7 percent of primary schools in Pakistan, their influence is amplified by the inadequacy of public education and the innate religiosity of the countryside, where two-thirds of people live.

The public elementary school for boys in this village is the very picture of the generations of neglect that have left many poor Pakistanis feeling abandoned by their government. Shaukat Ali, 40, a tall man with an earnest manner who teaches fifth grade, said he had asked everyone for help with financing, including government officials and army officers. A television channel even did a report. ―The result,‖ he said, ―was zero.‖ A government official responsible for monitoring schools in the area, Muhamed Aijaz Anjum, said he was familiar with the school‘s plight. But he has no car or office, and his annual travel allowance is less than $200; he said he was helpless to do anything about it.

With few avenues for advancement in what remains a feudal society, many poor Pakistanis do not believe education will improve their lives. The dropout rate reflects that. One of Mr. Ali‘s best students, Muhamed Arshad Ali, was offered a state scholarship to continue after the fifth grade. His parents would not let him accept. He quit and took up work ironing pants for about 200 rupees a day, or $2.50. ―Many poor people think salaried jobs are only for rich people,‖ Mr. Ali said. ―They don‘t believe in the end result of education.‖

Safety Net From Despair

In Punjab, the country‘s most populous province, the despair and neglect have opened a space that religious schools have filled. ―Madrasas have been mushrooming,‖ said Zobaida Jalal, a member of Parliament and former education minister.

The phenomenon began in the 1980s, when General Zia gave madrasas money and land in an American-supported policy to help Islamic fighters against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The Islamic schools are also seen as employment opportunities. ―When someone doesn‘t see a way ahead for himself, he builds a mosque and sits in it,‖ said Jan Sher, whose village in

43 southwestern Punjab, Shadan Lund, has become a militant stronghold, with madrasas now outnumbering public schools. Poverty has also helped expand enrollment in madrasas, which serve as a safety net by housing and feeding poor children. ―How can someone who earns 200 rupees a day afford expenses for five children?‖ asked Hafeezur Rehman, a caretaker in the Jamia Sadiqqia Taleemul Koran madrasa in Multan, the main city in south Punjab. The school houses and feeds 73 boys from poor villages.

Former President Pervez Musharraf tried to regulate the madrasas, offering financial incentives if they would add general subjects. But after taking the money, many refused to allow monitoring. ―The madrasa reform project failed,‖ said Javed Ashraf Qazi, a retired general who served as education minister at the time.

Shahbaz Sharif, the chief minister of Punjab, says he is acutely aware of the problem and is trying a different approach, recently setting aside $75 million to build free model schools in 80 locations close to large madrasas, a tactic General Qazi had also proposed. In the district that includes Mohri Pur, a mud-walled village of about 6,000 where farmers drive on dirt roads in tractors and donkey carts piled high with sticks and grasses, there are an estimated 200 madrasas, one-third the number of public schools, said Mr. Anjum, the education official.

Nonreligious private schools have also sprouted since the 1990s. They have better student- teacher ratios, but only the most exclusive — out of reach of most middle-class Pakistanis — offer a rigorous, modern education. Mr. Ali, the fifth-grade teacher, says the madrasas have changed Mohri Pur. They are Deobandi, adherents of an ultra-Orthodox Sunni school of thought that opposes music and festivals, which are central aspects of Sufism, a tolerant form of Islam that is traditional here.

There were no madrasas in Mohri Pur in the late 1980s, when Mr. Ali began teaching. Now there are at least five. Most are affiliated with a branch in the neighboring town of Kabirwala of Darul Uloom, a powerful Deobandi seminary founded in 1952, and whose leaders in other parts of Pakistan have links to the Taliban.

Fear and Respect

Several local residents said they believed the Kabirwala seminary was dangerous. Some of its members were involved in sectarian violence against Shiites in the 1990s, they said. Even if the madrasas do not make militants, they create a worldview that makes militancy possible. ―The mindset wants to stop music, girls‘ schools and festivals,‖ said Salman Abid, a social researcher in southern Punjab. ―Their message is that this is not real life. Real life comes later‖ — after death. On a recent Thursday, the Kabirwala seminary was buzzing with activity. Officials showed rooms of boys crouched over Korans, reading and rocking. A full kitchen had an industrial- size bread oven. Flowers adorned walkways. The foundation for a new dormitory had been broken.

There was also a girls‘ section, with its own entrance, where hundreds of young women chanted in unison after directions from a male voice that came from behind a curtain. ―We have a passion for this work,‖ said Seraj ul-Haq, a computer teacher who is part of the family that founded the seminary. Teachers preach restrictions. February‘s newsletter set out a list of taboos: Valentine‘s Day. Music. Urban women ―wearing imported perfume.‖ Talking about

44 women‘s rights. Suicide bombings were neither encouraged nor condemned.

The ideology may be rigid, but it offers the promise of respect, a powerful draw for lower- class young men. Abed Omar, 24, had little religious education before he was inspired by a sermon at the seminary last year. Better educated than most, he began to work in his family‘s sweets shop. Restless and unfulfilled, he joined a conservative Islamic group, paying about $625 to travel with them around the country for four months on a preaching tour. The group, Tablighi Jamaat, taught him that Islam forbids music and speaking with women. (He would speak to this reporter only through a male colleague.) American officials suspect that the group is a steppingstone to the Taliban. Pakistani officials say it is peaceful.

Now, when Mr. Omar visits his friends, ―they turn off their tape players and give me their seat,‖ he said, a smile lifting his face, which, in the practice of some conservative Islamists, has a bushy beard but no mustache. He is frustrated by a lack of opportunity and at how much of Pakistan‘s bureaucracy requires political connections, which he does not have. ―There is no merit,‖ he said. His faith gives him hope. ―I want to make everyone a preacher of Islam,‖ Mr. Omar said brightly, eating honey-soaked fritters in his family‘s shop. He knows about 100 people in his town who have done a four-month tour like his. As for those who sign up for less, he said ―they are countless.‖

Waqar Gillani contributed reporting from Mohri Pur and Lahore, Pakistan.

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THREE-WAY TALKS IN WASHINGTON (MAY 6, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, May 7th, 2009

Whitehouse: President Obama – remarks after meeting with Pakistan & Afghanistan‘s Presidents Zardari and Karzai, May 6, 2009 (8‘11‖)

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Emphasis on Al Qaeda at Three-Way Talks SOURCE: New York Times Wednesday May 6, 2009 By HELENE COOPER

WASHINGTON — Confronting a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, President Obama said Wednesday that the United States was deeply committed to helping the two countries defeat Al Qaeda and its extremist partners, and in helping democracy endure and flourish.

―No matter what happens, we will not be deterred,‖ Mr. Obama said during an appearance in the White House grand foyer after meeting with President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan and President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan. ―Every day we see evidence of the future that Al Qaeda and its allies offer. It‘s a future filled with violence and despair.‖ Mr. Obama‘s remarks came as the deaths of dozens of Afghan civilians in western Afghanistan, from what Afghan officials and villagers said were American airstrikes, served as a reminder that deep problems in the region extended beyond Pakistan, the most recent American focus.

The three-way meeting with Mr. Zardari and Mr. Karzai was intended by the White House, in part, to press both men to do more to crack down on the rising threat from the Taliban and Al Qaeda in both countries. ―We meet today as three sovereign nations joined by a common goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda and its extremist allies in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their ability to operate in either country in the future,‖ Mr. Obama said.

The two visiting leaders were in talks all day with administration officials, including Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Gen. James L. Jones, the national security adviser; and Richard C. Holbrooke, Mr. Obama‘s special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan. American officials want Mr. Zardari and the Pakistani Army to move troops, including the country‘s 11th Infantry Division, from Lahore and the eastern part of the country, where the army has been preoccupied with India, toward the western border, where the government is battling Taliban insurgents.

Pakistani officials told their American counterparts this week that they were moving large numbers of troops toward the border with Afghanistan, which American officials described as

46 encouraging. But it remains a question whether these troop movements are real or token, and some of Mr. Obama‘s senior aides caution that Pakistan‘s military is ill suited to carry out the kind of counterinsurgency operations needed to end the Taliban fighters‘ control of Swat, in the North-West Frontier Province, and to keep them from infiltrating again or shifting to another region. ―They‘re fundamentally not organized, trained or equipped for what they‘ve been asked to do,‖ said a senior administration official who is closely following the Pakistani military operations in Swat, and who spoke on condition of anonymity to avoid offending the visiting Pakistani leaders. ―They will displace the Taliban for a while. But there will also be a lot of displaced persons and a lot of collateral damage. And they won‘t be able to sustain those effects or extend the gains geographically.‖

None of this was said publicly on Wednesday, as American officials, from Mr. Obama on down, sought to strike an optimistic tone in the presence of Mr. Zardari and Mr. Karzai. The focus, the American officials told reporters, was on ways that Afghanistan and Pakistan, both unstable and strategically vital, could work with each other and with the United States to fight the militants who plague both countries. ―Our strategy reflects a fundamental truth,‖ Mr. Obama said. ―The security of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States are linked.‖

Mrs. Clinton made much the same point at an earlier briefing, suggesting that it would not be incorrect to think of Pakistan and Afghanistan as ―conjoined twins‖ as the United States tries to help each tame the forces that spawn terrorism and violence. ―The confidence-building that is necessary for this relationship to turn into tangible cooperation is moving forward,‖ Mrs. Clinton said. ―And I think today‘s series of meetings is another step along that road.‖

Mr. Obama and Mrs. Clinton described the three-way talks as focusing not just on military and diplomatic moves, but also on attempts to shore up the pillars of society in Afghanistan and Pakistan — by ―developing alternatives to the drug trade‖ in Afghanistan, as Mr. Obama put it in alluding to the traditional poppy-and-opium trade, and by fostering grass-roots democracy in both countries. They also announced that Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed Wednesday to conclude by the end of the year a trade pact that has been under discussion for more than four decades, one meant to increase commerce between the countries, which have long regarded each other with mutual suspicion.

Mrs. Clinton and Mr. Holbrooke held an unscheduled meeting early Wednesday with Mr. Zardari, huddling for an hour with him at his hotel, the Willard. Pakistani officials said they discussed steps that the administration wanted the government to take in dealing with the Taliban insurgency. Appearing late in the White House briefing room, Mrs. Clinton told reporters that the Willard visit had also been ―personal,‖ saying that she got to meet Mr. Zardari‘s son, Bilal Bhutto Zardari, who is 20, for the first time in 10 years. The elder Mr. Zardari, for his part, alluded several times during his visit to the assassination of his wife, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who was shot and killed after a rally in Rawalpindi in 2007. ―Democracy will avenge the death of my wife and the thousands of Pakistani citizens around the world,‖ he said during an appearance at the State Department.

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Mr. Zardari still has work to do to convince Congress of his government‘s ability to beat back the Taliban insurgency. A 90-minute meeting with the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday did not help his cause: members said they were confused and disappointed by Mr. Zardari‘s presentation. ―He did not present a coherent strategy for the defeat of the insurgency,‖ said Representative Howard L. Berman, a California Democrat who is the committee‘s chairman. ―I had a sense of what they are doing today. I did not have a sense of what they plan to do tomorrow.‖ The lack of detail, Mr. Berman said, underscores why Congress needs to attach tough conditions in authorizing any further military aid to Pakistan. Mr. Zardari made a forceful plea for assistance, Mr. Berman said, at one point referring to the government bailout of American International Group. ―I pointed out that the conditions on A.I.G. are a lot stronger than the conditionality in our bill,‖ he said.

Eric Schmitt and Mark Landler contributed reporting.

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TALIBANISATION AND PAKISTAN‟S IDENTITY CRISIS (MAY 11, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, May 11th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Talibanisation and identity crisis SOURCE: Dawn Monday, May 11, 2009 By Huma Yusuf

SINCE the Nizam-i-Adl Regulation, the status of which has now been rendered uncertain, Pakistani citizens have been trying to organise against the Talibanisation of the tribal and northern areas.

There has been a flurry of meetings, lectures, candlelit vigils, protest marches and letter- writing campaigns in all major cities. And yet, read through the discussions on local blogs or peruse letters to the editor in various newspapers, and the sense that Pakistanis are doing nothing about the crisis prevails.

When comparisons are drawn between civil society‘s emphatic response to the deposition of Pakistan‘s chief justice in 2007, its reaction to the virtual colonisation of part of the country by militants seems apathetic. In many quarters, the silence of Pakistanis is being perceived as complicity. As an open conflict between the military and militants rages in the Frontier province, it is worth deconstructing why civil society has not been able to articulate a united stance towards the Taliban.

What becomes apparent is that the Pakistani public is faced with a hydra-headed monster, and it is unable to agree on which is the greatest of all evils. Do we, the people, react to the lack of governance at the centre and the occupation of our territories by an ideological group? Do we, as a Muslim majority, protest the perversion of Islam at the hands of violent, suicide-bombing militants? Do we, as feminists, decry the violation of women‘s rights? Or do we, as humanists, focus on the plight of hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people who for too long have been written off as collateral damage? Indeed, understanding the paralysis of civil society in the face of the Taliban onslaught lies at the heart of the identity crisis that Pakistan has faced since its inception.

Many Pakistanis direct their outrage at the government. Brought to power in a memorable election, the government was tasked by the electorate with strengthening Pakistan‘s democratic credentials. Instead, we have seen shabby power plays as the PPP and PML-N have wrestled like incorrigible schoolboys over the past year. These political intrigues have distracted the government from what should be its major concerns at the present: reviving the Pakistan economy and dealing a decisive blow to what was a militant threat in February 2008, but is now a full-scale invasion. For this reason, some citizens are arguing that the first step in addressing Pakistan‘s problems is calling for mid-term elections and asking President Asif Zardari to step down.

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But this is not the rallying cry of the people at large. For many, the government and the army‘s lack of vision in dealing with the Taliban has been the top complaint. They criticise erratic policies that have the government and militants negotiating one day, and warring the next. This crowd is calling for a consistent strategy against the militants, with no clear consensus on whether that should be martial or diplomatic. As such, it remains unclear if public protest is directed against the government or the army (or do Pakistanis still treat those entities as if they are the same thing?). Meanwhile, there is a subset that is opposed to the Nizam-i-Adl for it threatens the integrity of the state. ‗One constitution for one country‘ is their rallying cry.

On the other hand, in some civic circles, the major concern is that the government and army have failed to protect basic human rights. There is outrage at the blowing up of girls‘ schools and CD shops in Swat, the flogging of women, and the displacement of thousands of people from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Malakand. Skipping over the essential existential crisis posed by Taliban dominance in the northern and tribal areas, many citizens are simply demanding that the government and/or army provide adequate protection and compensation to IDPs, ensure development in the form of schools, roads and hospitals, and bring peace (at whatever cost) to conflict-ridden areas.

In some quarters, the human rights argument has been spun as a women‘s issue. Many public protests were launched in response to the infamous flogging video. Posters and graffiti in urban centres decry the victimisation of women and their abuse in the name of Islam. In this construction, women parliamentarians who did not oppose the controversial Nizam-i-Adl are the ultimate nemesis and the call is for safeguarding women‘s rights, not suppressing the Taliban.

That said, there are many Pakistanis who openly describe themselves as anti-Taliban. But what exactly does that mean? Opposition to Talibanisation has been interpreted in myriad ways: anti-violence, pro-education, pro-nationalism, anti-sectarianism, pro-democracy and more.

Reframe the question in a religious context and the debate is endless. Some Pakistanis are outraged at extremist interpretations of Islam. Others are advocating that democracy be upheld and a separation of church, rather, mosque and state be enshrined in the constitution once and for all.

Still others are protesting the revival of sectarianism, arguing that Pakistan should define itself as a country where Sunni and Shia, Sufi and Salafi, Deobandi and Barelvi can all live together in peace.

Then there‘s the camp that is championing that most nebulous notion, ‗moderate‘ Islam. Worryingly, there are also those civil groups who are reluctant to have religious overtones cloud their anti-Taliban protests. But can you speak out against the Taliban without, at some level, speaking about religion?

If complaints against the government, military and Taliban weren‘t enough, many Pakistanis are also organising around the America factor. Cooperation with the US in the war against terror has long been framed as a test of Pakistani sovereignty. As a result, Pakistanis are torn about what level of intervention they‘re willing to live with. Some want to protest the drone attacks, others want to ensure greater transparency in the distribution of American aid. At a

50 recent meeting of concerned citizens, I heard one hapless woman ask her friend, ‗is it alright if I‘m both anti-Taliban and against the drone attacks?‘

To this mix, add the voices that are less heard: Swatis who demand efficient justice systems, but do not want to live at the edge of the Taliban sword; Bajauris who want to keep their women in purdah, but send their sons to secular schools; religious minorities, including Sikhs and Christians, who want the government to protect their right to worship.

It is this lack of consensus as to what‘s at stake that makes a unified civic response impossible. Pakistanis are able to mobilise when they knew what they are asking for, e.g. the restoration of the chief justice. But they‘re in disarray when it comes to pinpointing why they object to Talibanisation.

In any other circumstance, I would celebrate Pakistan‘s political and ideological diversity, pointing out that it is what distinguishes Pakistan from Iran or Saudi Arabia. But in the face of the Taliban, our plurality is proving to be our Achilles‘ heel. The fact is, in organising against the Taliban, Pakistan is going to be forced to tackle its longstanding identity crisis. The first step to overcoming militancy is knowing ourselves. So before we can take to the streets with a single, articulate demand, we‘re going to have to answer the question that we‘ve been avoiding for over 60 years: who are we?

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PAKISTAN‟S ETHNIC FAULT LINE (MAY 11, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, May 11th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Pakistan’s Ethnic Fault Line SOURCE: The Washington Post Monday, May 11, 2009 By Selig S. Harrison

To American eyes the struggle raging in Pakistan with the Taliban is about religious fanaticism. But in Pakistan it is about an explosive fusion of Islamist zeal and simmering ethnic tensions that have been exacerbated by U.S. pressures for military action against the Taliban and its al-Qaeda allies. Understanding the ethnic dimension of the conflict is the key to a successful strategy for separating the Taliban from al-Qaeda and stabilizing multiethnic Pakistan politically.

The Pakistani army is composed mostly of Punjabis. The Taliban is entirely Pashtun. For centuries, Pashtuns living in the mountainous borderlands of Pakistan and Afghanistan have fought to keep out invading Punjabi plainsmen. So sending Punjabi soldiers into Pashtun territory to fight jihadists pushes the country ever closer to an ethnically defined civil war, strengthening Pashtun sentiment for an independent ―Pashtunistan‖ that would embrace 41 million people in big chunks of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

This is one of the main reasons the army initially favored a peace deal with a Taliban offshoot in the Swat Valley and has resisted U.S. pressure to go all out against jihadist advances into neighboring districts. While army leaders fear the long-term dangers of a Taliban link-up with Islamist forces in the heartland of Pakistan, they are more worried about what they see as the looming danger of Pashtun separatism.

Historically, the Pashtuns were politically unified before the British Raj. The Pashtun kings who founded Afghanistan ruled over 40,000 square miles of what is now Pakistan, an area containing more than half of the Pashtun population, until British forces defeated them in 1847, pushed up to the Khyber Pass and imposed a disputed boundary, the Durand Line, that Afghanistan has never accepted. Over Pashtun nationalist protests, the British gave these conquered areas to the new, Punjabi-dominated government of Pakistan created in the 1947 partition of India.

At various times since, Afghan governments have challenged Pakistan‘s right to rule over its Pashtun areas, alternatively pushing for an autonomous state to be created within Pakistan, an independent ―Pashtunistan‖ or a ―Greater Afghanistan‖ that would directly annex the lost territories. Fears of Pashtunistan led Pakistan to support jihadist surrogates in the Afghan resistance during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s and, later, to build up the Taliban. Ironically, during its rule in Kabul the Taliban refused to endorse the Durand Line despite pressure from

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Islamabad. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has also resisted, calling it ―a line of hatred that raised a wall between the two brothers.‖

The British got the most rebellious Pashtun tribes to acquiesce to their rule only by giving them formal autonomous status in their own ―Federally Administered Tribal Areas‖ (FATA). This autonomy was respected by successive Pakistani governments until the Bush administration pressured former president Pervez Musharraf into sending his army into those areas in 2002, displacing 50,000 people. Since then, Predator strikes have killed more than 700 Pashtun civilians.

So how should the Obama administration proceed? Militarily, the United States should lower its profile by ending airstrikes. By arousing a Pashtun sense of victimization at the hands of outside forces, the conduct of the ―war on terror‖ in FATA, where al-Qaeda is based, has strengthened the jihadist groups the U.S. seeks to defeat. Politically, U.S. policy should be revised to demonstrate that America supports the Pashtun desire for a stronger position in relation to the Punjabi-dominated government in Islamabad.

The Pashtuns in FATA treasure their long-standing autonomy and do not like to be ruled by Islamabad. As a March 13 International Crisis Group report recognized, what they want is integration into the Pashtun Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP).

The United States should support Pashtun demands to merge the NWFP and FATA, followed by the consolidation of those areas and Pashtun enclaves in Baluchistan and the Punjab into a single unified ―Pashtunkhwa‖ province that enjoys the autonomy envisaged in the inoperative 1973 Pakistan constitution.

In the meantime, instead of permitting Islamabad to administer the huge sums of U.S. aid going into FATA, the Obama administration should condition the aid‘s continuance on most of it being dispensed in conjunction with the NWFP provincial government.

Al-Qaeda and its ―foreign fighters,‖ who are mostly Arab, depend on local support from the Taliban for their FATA sanctuary. Unlike al-Qaeda, with its global terrorist agenda, most of the Taliban factions focus on local objectives in Afghanistan and FATA; they do not pose a direct threat to the United States. U.S. policy should therefore welcome any new peace initiatives by the secular Pashtun leaders of the Awami National Party, now ruling the NWFP, designed to separate Taliban and Taliban-allied Islamist factions from al-Qaeda. As in Swat, military force should be a last resort.

In the conventional wisdom, either Islamist or Pashtun identity will eventually triumph, but it is equally plausible that the result could be what Pakistani ambassador to Washington Husain Haqqani has called an ―Islamic Pashtunistan.‖ On March 1, 2007, Haqqani‘s Pashtun predecessor as ambassador, the retired Maj. Gen. Mahmud Ali Durrani, said at a seminar at the Pakistan Embassy, ―I hope the Taliban and Pashtun nationalism don‘t merge. If that happens, we‘ve had it, and we‘re on the verge of that.‖

Selig S. Harrison is the author of the report “Pakistan: The State of the Union,” based on a six-month study of ethnic tensions in Pakistan issued last week by the Center for International Policy. A former Post bureau chief in South Asia, he has written five books on the region.

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54

PAKISTAN CONFLICT MAP (MAY 13, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, May 13th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Pakistan Conflict Map SOURCE: BBC NEWS South Asia Wednesday, May 13, 2009

BAJAUR (Taleban controlled)

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Bajaur is one of those tribal areas where the Taleban established themselves early on. Analysts have long suspected the region to be the hiding place of Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other top al-Qaeda leaders. It is an area where suspected US drones launched their earliest missile strikes.Maulvi Faqir Mohammad is the chief commander of the Taleban in Bajaur and is said to lead a force of nearly 10,000 armed militants. A year-long military operation ended in Bajaur early this year but a peace agreement has broken down and the Taleban are back in control in most areas outside the regional capital, Khar. Maulvi Omar, spokesman for the militant alliance Tehrik Taleban Pakistan (TTP), comes from Bajaur. Taleban camps are reported at various places in Bajaur, such as Salarzai and Dasht.

BANNU (Taleban presence)

Bannu is a so-called ―settled‖ (rather than ―tribal‖) area in North West Frontier Province, which borders troubled Waziristan. The district has witnessed a number of attacks on security forces. Civilians have also been killed. But locals do not have strong tribal affiliations with the Taleban, and the local Taleban have not been successful in building support for their activies in Bannu.

BUNER (Taleban controlled)

Buner is only 100km (65 miles) from the capital, Islamabad. The military launched an operation against the militants in April after the so-called Swat Taleban seized control of Buner. The district is popular with Pashtuns visiting the tomb of a Sufi saint, but traditional religious freedoms have been eroded. Militants from Swat tried to enter Buner in 2008 but were thwarted by locals. An armed clash between the two sides at Shilabandi left six Taleban dead, and the Taleban retreated to their bases in Swat. Local resistance did not go unpunished, however, as nearly 50 people were later killed by the militants.After Sharia law was introduced in Swat, the Taleban again decided to target Buner as part of efforts to expand their area of influence. After negotiations with locals, the Taleban were permitted to operate in the district. Since then all barber shops and music stores have closed down.

D.I. KHAN (Taleban presence)

Traditionally famous for its flowers and sweets, Dera Ismail Khan (or D.I. Khan) has not escaped the increase in Taleban activity seen elsewhere in North West Frontier Province.Two groups of militants are active in D.I. Khan, one of them involved in sectarian attacks, the other in attacks on security forces. Taleban active in neighbouring Waziristan have claimed responsibility for almost all the attacks on security personnel.After troops stepped up an anti-Taleban drive in Waziristan in 2008, large numbers of tribal families settled in D.I. Khan. Some government officials fear that militants might also have left Waziristan and settled in D.I. Khan.Local police say 84 people, many of them security personnel, were killed and more than 100 injured in various violent incidents during 2008.Most analysts agree there will be no end to violence in D.I. Khan until peace is restored in neighbouring tribal areas and concerted action is taken to stop the sectarian attacks.

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HANGU (Taleban presence)

Hangu, neighbouring Orakzai, is believed to be under the control of Hakimullah Mehsud, the right- hand man of Pakistan Taleban leader Baitullah Mehsud. Those parts of Hangu that border Orakzai are dominated by the Taleban.The district also shares borders with two other Taleban strongholds, Kurram and Waziristan. Most analysts argue that if government fails to take steps to check the increasing influence of the Taleban in Hangu, the radical elements now confined to its border areas could soon expand their activities to other areas of district.Sectarian tension between Shias and Sunnis is yet another fault line, which deepened after a 2006 suicide attack on a Shia procession in Hangu.

KHYBER (Taleban presence)

Of the tribal areas of the North West Frontier, Khyber agency is the only one where different religious organisations operate. There are three known religious groups - Lashkar-i-Islam (Army of Islam) headed by Mangal Bagh, Ansar-i-Islam (Companions of Islam) headed by Qazi Mehboobul Haq and Amar Bil Maroof (Organisation for Virtues) headed by Niaz Gul. The Taleban presence in Khyber is fairly recent and most analysts link it to Nato‘s use of the main road through the Khyber pass to Afghanistan. The Taleban are believed to have moved into the area to attack convoys carrying supplies for Nato forces in Afghanistan. There has been a spate of such attacks. The Taleban are now in almost total control of two of the three sub-divisions of Khyber agency, including Jamrod and Bara.

KOHAT (Taleban presence)

Kohat is only a stone‘s throw from the semi tribal district of Adamkhel.The Taleban claim to have carried out attacks targeting security forces in the district. In a recent operation security forces say 35 militants were killed. As in Mardan and other districts in North West Frontier Province, the Taleban in Kohat have mostly confined their activities to opposing music and barber shops.

KURRAM (Taleban presence)

Kurram agency, like neighbouring North Waziristan, is also divided into three administrative areas or sub-divisions - Upper, Central and Lower Kurram.The Taleban (who are Sunni Muslims) do not have a significant presence in Upper Kurram as the local population are Shias. Shias are also found in one town in Lower Kurram, Alizai. Otherwise, the Taleban are present almost everywhere else in Kurram where the Sunni population dominates.Foreign Taleban fighters are believed to have moved into Kurram and adjoining Orakzai agencies since 2008 when missile attacks by suspected US military drones became more frequent in north-west Pakistan.

LAKKI MARWAT (Taleban presence)

Lakki Marwat is a district near North Waziristan where local tribes are very strong. There have been a number of clashes between militants and security forces in the area. 57

LOWER DIR (Taleban controlled)

There have been reports since late 2007 that the Taleban have found many hideouts in Lower Dir. This was confirmed in April when the army acknowledged that the Taleban had dug themselves in on the mountain tops. The area known as Maidan, which is also the home town of radical cleric Sufi Mohammad who brokered the now-defunct Swat ―peace deal‖, has become a Taleban hotspot in the district.The army has twice claimed to have pushed the Taleban out of Lower Dir and taken control. But many people fear the militants may use Lower Dir to expand into nearby Upper Dir.

MALAKAND (Taleban presence)

Malakand is essentially a mountain pass between Mardan and Swat. Historically the district is known for a number of battles between local tribes and British soldiers in the last years of the 19th Century. Before extremism began surfacing in Swat, the local administration had been facing law and order problems in Malakand. At the time it mostly concerned criminal activities including kidnap for ransom. In January 2009 members of an international charity were taken hostage. But the biggest Taleban attack in Malakand was carried out apparently to avenge a US missile strike at Damadola. Forty paramilitary recruits were killed in the attack on a training centre at Dargai.Despite the fact that the Taleban have not maintained a dominant presence in Malakand, the district seems susceptible to their influence and analysts argue that if they so choose the Taleban could move into thearea in a big way.

MARDAN (Taleban presence)

Mardan, about 60km (37 miles) north-east of Peshawar, is one of the most densely populated districts of North West Frontier Province and a thriving centre for trade.In the past year the Taleban have boosted their presence in Mardan and reports of skirmishes with paramilitary security forces have become more frequent. Although there are not many of them in Mardan, the Taleban have proved able to disrupt the day-to-day administration of the district.Early signs of extremism in Mardan can be traced back to attacks on music shops, and more recently, shops providing cable services for different TV channels have been targeted. In another incident an NGO office was also attacked. Responsibility for most of these attacks was reportedly accepted by a militant who claimed to be the local head of the Tehrik Taleban Pakistan alliance. Mardan also made headlines in the international media when Abu Faraj al-Libbi, a high profile al-Qaeda suspect was arrested there in 2005.

MOHMAND (Taleban presence)

The Taleban are widely reported to be present in all three sub-divisions of Mohmand agency. The militants here are under the command of Omar Khalid who belongs to the Safi tribe of Pashtuns. He and about 5,000 militants have been resisting attempts by the security forces to clear them from the southern and south-eastern parts of Mohmand in order to reduce pressure on Peshawar and elsewhere. Taleban fighters of Arab and Uzbek origin are also reported to be present in Mohmand.

NORTH WAZIRISTAN (Taleban controlled) 58

North Waziristan, home to the Wazir and Dawar tribes, is administratively divided into three sub- divisions called Miranshah, Mir Ali and Razmak. The Wazirs make up 75% of the local population, while the remainder belong to the Dawar tribe.The Taleban are in control of all three sub-divisions of North Waziristan. They mount regular daily patrols of town centres and hold informal summary courts, adjudicate in disputes and deliver verdicts from offices established in almost every part of the agency. North Waziristan is controlled by Taleban commander Gul Bahadur, but Baitullah Mehsud is also reported to be in command of at least three Taleban camps. Two of these are located in Miranshah while the third is in Razmak. As in South Waziristan, there is a considerable proportion of Taleban in North Waziristan who are referred to as ―Punjabi Taleban‖.

ORAKZAI (Taleban controlled)

Orakzai agency is divided into two administrative districts.The Taleban do not have a significant presence in Lower Orakzai as most locals belong to an anti-Taleban Shia sect. But, mountainous Upper Orakzai is dominated by Sunnis and has many Taleban and sympathisers.Most Taleban in Orakzai belong to the Mamuzai, Alikhel, Akhel and Ferozkhel tribes. The local population seems supportive of the Taleban more for sectarian reasons than because of the militants‘ activities.The Taleban appointed Hakimullah Mehsud as commander for Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber agencies. He is a cousin of Qari Hussain, the mastermind behind the training of the suicide bombers used by the Taleban.

PESHAWAR (Taleban presence)

The capital of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Peshawar has become the front line city in the so-called ―war on terror‖ in Pakistan. Bombings and suicide attacks coupled with kidnap for ransom have become commonplace. The city is surrounded by militants on three sides. Mardan and Charsadda to the north, Mohmand and Khyber agencies to the west and Darra Adamkhel to the south have all become battle grounds.Disrupting Nato plans in Afghanistan has been the key Taleban target in Peshawar - at least 400 vehicles carrying supplies for Nato forces have been destroyed. The Taleban say they will keep on attacking trucks destined for Nato forces until US stops drone attacks in the region.

SHANGLA (Taleban controlled)

Shangla is said to be under the partial control of the Taleban. Recent reports speak of militants taking control of emerald mines here and it is rumoured that an army operation will soon be launched. The Taleban captured Shangla Top, a strategic point, about 18 months ago and since then have taken control of police stations in the district. Policemen had no option but to run for their lives. Other government buildings in Shangla have since been in and out of Taleban control - and some analysts believe the militants could retake them if they want.

SOUTH WAZIRISTAN (Taleban controlled)

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South Waziristan is the largest tribal district or agency - two big Pashtun tribes, the Mehsud and the Wazir, dominate. The Wazirs are historically settled on either side of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, while the Mehsuds are confined to South Waziristan. It is widely believed the Pakistani government has lost control of almost all of South Waziristan - for some time the army has been restricted to Zerinoor camp in the agency‘s main town, Wana.The army had to evacuate the Mehsud-dominated area of South Waziristan in 2008 when around 300 troops were taken hostage. The army is understood to lack a secure supply line that could guarantee a smoother flow of men and ammunition into this area.Parts of South Waziristan under the direct influence of top Pakistan Taleban militant leader Baitullah Mehsud are reported to contain as many as seven camps where suicide bombers are trained. These camps or training centres are believed to have been established at Makeen, Shaktoi, Kanigaram, Dela, Kot Kai, Shawwal and Badar.In addition, another Taleban leader Mullah Nazir is also believed to be running two separate training centres in South Waziristan at Shikai and Baghar. Some of his followers are also known to be based in Balochistan province, which almost borders Wana.

SWABI (Taleban presence)

Swabi is considered to be the heartland of the secular Pashtun political party, the Awami National Party (ANP). Mainly for this reason, people in Swabi have not welcomed the Taleban. But there have been recent incidents of graffiti in Swabi boasting local support for the Taleban‘s drive for their version of Sharia law and Islamic ―virtues‖.Swabi was in the news in the early 1990s when an operative of Pakistan‘s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency emerged as a key link between the army and the Taleban.

SWAT (Taleban controlled)

Known as the Switzerland of Pakistan, the former princely state of Swat had been popular with tourists for decades. It is now under almost total Taleban control.The militants have targeted the security forces, the police, secular politicians and government-run schools.By early April 2009, Sharia law had been imposed as part of a deal between the authorities and the local Taleban. However, the militants failed to disarm completely in line with the accord and their fighters spread to neighbouring districts, prompting international concern. An army offensive was launched in Swat in early May.The local Taleban, under their leader Maulana Fuzlullah, have extended their control throughout Swat, especially in areas of policing and its judicial system.Maulana Fazlullah is the son-in-law of radical cleric Sufi Mohammad who led an insurgency in the 1990s. Sufi Mohammad brokered the failed peace deal in Swat.There are a number of pockets in and around Swat where the Taleban are known to have hidden when in danger or as a tactic when pushed back by the military. Such safe havens could prove useful to them if political pressure mounts against them in Swat. The militants could melt away into the north of the district where they are in even fuller control.

TANK (Taleban presence)

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Baitullah Mehsud‘s Taleban fighters from South Waziristan first started making incursions into the nearby city of Tank in 2005. Music stores, barbers‘ shops and police stations were their primary targets. That situation still remains, with a slight difference. Taleban groups composed of Bhittani tribesmen have been confronting Mehsud loyalists in the region. The Bhittani is the native tribe of Tank district and its largest, but is in a minority in the city of Tank, the administrative centre, where the Mehsuds dominate. It is thought the Bhittani Taleban are supported by the government. Nevertheless, the writ of the government runs thin in Tank, where fully armed members of rival groups roam the streets freely and run offices in different parts of the city. The police initially offered resistance, but have now downgraded their mandate to one of self-preservation. They stay inside heavily-barricaded police stations. The civil administration is almost completely paralysed.

UPPER DIR (Taleban presence)

Recent reports suggest Upper Dir has started showing some signs of increasing religious radicalisation, but local extremists claim to have no link with the Taleban and do not call themselves Taleban. Instead they are known to be involved in criminal activities, which does not fit with typical Taleban activity. One notable incident of militancy in Upper Dir in February saw a paramilitary post captured. Militants refused to abandon it despite repeated requests from a local jirga (tribal council). In April five policemen were killed by unknown attackers. It is thought however the Taleban could gather support from Upper Dir if they wanted. Radical cleric Sufi Mohammad‘s TNSM organisation has established offices in Upper Dir and some locals sympathise with the movement

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SWAT - A REPORT FROM THE FRONTLINE (MAY 16, 2009)

Written by admin on Saturday, May 16th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Swat - a report from the frontline SOURCE: The News International Saturday, May 16, 2009 By Farhat Taj

Recently an AIRRA (Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy – an Islamabad- based research organisation) investigation team went to some parts of Swat that had been under army attacks. The team observed whether the attacks were targeted at the Taliban and their installations. It observed two villages — Ladikas and Watkai in Mingora — and Khwazakhela, a tehsil in Swat. The team with its access to the people of the area could manage to take Besham route from Islamabad to reach Mingora via Khwazakhela. Though continuous curfew and alternate threats from the military posts and the Taliban posts badly hampered the journey of the team but somehow some of the members could manage to reach Mingora via Khwazakhela and Charbagh with the exodus of the people from different parts of Swat valley. The team was able to access and interview several dozens of those families who were still stuck up in the valley.

The team observed that the security forces have successfully destroyed the installations of the Taliban and have disrupted their chain of command in that area. They have killed many Taliban there with very little collateral damage, albeit with the destruction of civilian infrastructure. The best example is the Taliban headquarter in Khwazakhela. The headquarters was located on a mountain. It housed the Taliban operational command led by commander Yamin, the intelligence department led by commander Rashid and the department of logistics and supplies. The aerial bombardment of the Pakistan army reduced all that to rubble. The entire side of the mountain housing the headquarters has been exploded and razed.

The Taliban terrorists had established the headquarters with great efforts. They had cleansed a huge portion of the forest on the mountain to make free space for the building. They recruited the youth on a large scale, strengthened their command and control structure, established their hierarchical structure, planted mines on the main roads, dug bunkers and occupied the strategic passes in only two and a half months. And they did all this after the peace deal agreed with the NWFP government in February of this year.

The team interacted with the people in the area. Most of those killed were confirmed Taliban. There had been almost no serious collateral damage. Nearby buildings collapsed due to the force of explosions. Some people got injuries when hit by the collapsing debris.

Moreover, the army has cordoned off several narrow alleys of Mingora to prevent the Taliban from escaping. The military has cordoned off Swat from the northeast (the Shangla side), the

62 southeast (the Buner side) and the southwest (the Dir side). In Mingora city itself, the Taliban are reported to be lying dead in the streets and local people confirm that some of them are well-known Taliban leaders.

There are still stranded people in Swat. The people are facing enormous difficulties due to power failure and water reservoirs in their homes which have dried up. Food commodities have become scarce and fuel stations have more or less stopped functioning. Soldiers of the Pakistan army and the FC are sharing their limited food rations with the stranded people. This goodwill gesture has earned respect of the stranded people for the security forces.

It is suggested to the army to issue the photos or video clips of the killed Taliban to the media and of the destroyed Taliban installations. Local people and the IDPs often know the Taliban and location of their installations. They would confirm that the dead were indeed the Taliban and the installations shown as destroyed indeed belonged to the Taliban. This is important because it will ensure transparency and reassure people of the success being achieved in the war.

It is highly commendable that the security forces are conducting targeted operations that have considerably damaged the Taliban in Swat. I would once again request the army high command to destroy the Taliban networks, installations, headquarters everywhere in Pakistan, including FATA and south Punjab. Taliban leaders in each and every city or town of Pakistan have to be neutralised. There is a strong connection between the Taliban in Waziristan, Orakzai, Swat, South Punjab, Khost and Kunar in terms of supply of manpower, weapons and chain of command. This connection is the Al Qaeda-linked Jalaluddin Haqqani and his terror secretariat in North Waziristan. This connection has to be broken, which means that Haqqani‘s ‘secretariat‘ must be destroyed. Other than the military front, the war against militancy also needs to be fought on the ideological battleground — Talibanisation needs to be denied ideological space in the country‘s security and state apparatus and this can be done by targeting elements in state structures and institutions deemed as being sympathetic to the militants.

The army must carry the war against the Taliban to its logical end. The army owes it to the Pakhtun and by extension to Pakistan, because the Pakhtun are citizens of the country and hence deserve the same protection by the state as accorded to those in the other provinces. The Pakhtun have always taken pride in giving their best sons to the army. It is now the turn of the army to reciprocate in such a manner that truly honours the Pakhtun martyrs of the army. This means complete elimination of the Taliban so that the Pakhtun live their lives free of the jihadi fear and intimidation. If done successfully, this will bind the Pakhtun even more closely with the state and the army. In that context, the army must convert this war into an opportunity that will substantially contribute towards making Pakistan a successfully functioning multi-ethnic state.

While the army is rising itself to the occasion, the performance of the politicians is dismal. The soldiers are giving their blood to save us from the Taliban. They are sharing their limited food ration with the stranded people. The army has given a share of their salary to support the relief work for the IDPs. Where are political leaders? What is President Zardari doing abroad? He should be visiting the IDPs rather than foreign lands. What is Asfandyar Wali doing in London? Why is Afrasiab Khattak in Dubai? The IDPs constantly complain that the ministers, MPAs and MNAs only come when the media is there and leave soon afterwards, without tending to their (the IDPs) problems.

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All MNAs and MPAs, especially those elected by the people of Swat, Dir and Buner, should stay with the IDPs of their respective constituencies as long as possible because these are after all the people who voted them into public office.

The writer is a research fellow at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Gender Research, University of Oslo, and a member of Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy

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U.S. ARMS IN TALIBAN HANDS (MAY 19, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, May 19th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Arms Sent by U.S. May Be Falling Into Taliban Hands SOURCE: New York Times Tuesday, May 19, 2009 By C. J. CHIVERS

KABUL — Insurgents in Afghanistan, fighting from some of the poorest and most remote regions on earth, have managed for years to maintain an intensive guerrilla war against materially superior American and Afghan forces.

Arms and ordnance collected from dead insurgents hint at one possible reason: Of 30 rifle magazines recently taken from insurgents‘ corpses, at least 17 contained cartridges, or rounds, identical to ammunition the United States had provided to Afghan government forces, according to an examination of ammunition markings by The New York Times and interviews with American officers and arms dealers. The presence of this ammunition among the dead in the Korangal Valley, an area of often fierce fighting near Afghanistan‘s border with Pakistan, strongly suggests that munitions procured by the Pentagon have leaked from Afghan forces for use against American troops. The scope of that diversion remains unknown, and the 30 magazines represented a single sampling of fewer than 1,000 cartridges. But military officials, arms analysts and dealers say it points to a worrisome possibility: With only spotty American and Afghan controls on the vast inventory of weapons and ammunition sent into Afghanistan during an eight-year conflict, poor discipline and outright corruption among Afghan forces may have helped insurgents stay supplied.

The United States has been criticized, as recently as February by the federal Government Accountability Office, for failing to account for thousands of rifles issued to Afghan security forces. Some of these weapons have been documented in insurgents‘ hands, including weapons in a battle last year in which nine Americans died. In response, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, the American-led unit tasked with training and supplying Afghan forces, said it had made accountability of all Afghan police and military property a top priority, and taken steps to locate and log rifles issued even years ago. The Pentagon has created a database of small arms issued to Afghan units.

No similarly thorough accountability system exists for ammunition, which is harder to trace and more liquid than firearms, readily changing hands through corruption, illegal sales, theft, battlefield loss and other forms of diversion. American forces do not examine all captured arms and munitions to trace how insurgents obtained them, or to determine whether the Afghan government, directly or indirectly, is a significant Taliban supplier, military officers said.

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The reasons include limited resources and institutional memory of issued arms, as well as an absence of collaboration between field units that collect equipment and the investigators and supervisors in Kabul who could trace it. In this case, the rifle magazines were captured last month by a platoon in Company B, First Battalion, 26th Infantry, which killed at least 13 insurgents in a nighttime ambush in eastern Afghanistan. The soldiers searched the insurgents‘ remains and collected 10 rifles, a rocket- propelled-grenade launcher, 30 magazines and other equipment.

Access to Taliban equipment is unusual. But after the ambush, the company allowed the items to be examined by this reporter. Photographs were taken of the weapons‘ serial numbers and markings on the bottoms of the cartridge casings, known as headstamps, which can reveal where and when ammunition was manufactured. The headstamps were then compared with ammunition in government circulation, and with this reporter‘s records of ammunition sampled in Afghan magazines and bunkers in multiple provinces in recent years. The type of ammunition in question, 7.62×39 millimeter, colloquially known as ―7.62 short,‖ is one of the world‘s most abundant classes of military small-arms cartridges, and can come from dozens of potential suppliers. It is used in Kalashnikov rifles and their knockoffs, and has been made in many countries, including Russia, China, Ukraine, North Korea, Cuba, India, Pakistan, the United States, the former Warsaw Pact nations and several countries in Africa. Several countries have multiple factories, each associated with distinct markings. The examination of the Taliban‘s cartridges found telling signs of diversion: 17 of the magazines contained ammunition bearing either of two stamps: the word ―WOLF‖ in uppercase letters, or the lowercase arrangement ―bxn.‖

―WOLF‖ stamps mark ammunition from Wolf Performance Ammunition, a company in California that sells Russian-made cartridges to American gun owners. The company has also provided cartridges for Afghan soldiers and police officers, typically through middlemen. Its munitions can be found in Afghan government bunkers. The ―bxn‖ marking was formerly used at a Czech factory during the cold war. Since 2004, the Czech government has donated surplus ammunition and equipment to Afghanistan. A.E.Y. Inc., a former Pentagon supplier, also shipped surplus Czech ammunition to Afghanistan, according to the United States Army, including cartridges bearing ―bxn‖ stamps. Most of the Wolf and Czech ammunition in the Taliban magazines was in good condition and showed little weathering, denting, corrosion or soiling, suggesting it had been removed from packaging recently. There is no evidence that Wolf, the Czech government or A.E.Y. knowingly shipped ammunition to Afghan insurgents. A.E.Y. was banned last year from doing business with the Pentagon, but its legal troubles stemmed from unrelated allegations of fraud.

Given the number of potential sources, the probability that the Taliban and the Pentagon were sharing identical supply sources was small. Rather, the concentration of Taliban ammunition identical in markings and condition to that used by Afghan units indicated that the munitions had most likely slipped from state custody, said James Bevan, a researcher specializing in ammunition for the Small Arms Survey, an independent research group in Geneva. Mr. Bevan, who has documented ammunition diversion in Kenya, Uganda and Sudan, said one likely explanation was that interpreters, soldiers or police officers had sold ammunition

66 for profit or passed it along for other reasons, including support for the insurgency. ―Same story, different location,‖ he said.

The majority of cartridges in the remaining 13 Taliban magazines bore headstamps indicating they were made in Russia in the Soviet period. Several rounds had Chinese stamps and dates indicating manufacture in the 1960s and ‘70s. A smaller number were Hungarian. Much of this other ammunition was in poor condition. Hungarian and Chinese ammunition had also been provided to the Afghan government by A.E.Y., making it possible that several of the remaining magazines included American- procured rounds. The American military did not dispute the possibility that theft or corruption could have steered Wolf and Czech ammunition to insurgents.

Capt. James C. Howell, who commands the company that captured the ammunition, said illicit diversion would be consistent with an enduring reputation of corruption in Afghan units, especially the police. ―It‘s not surprising,‖ he said. But he added that in his experience this form of corruption was not the norm. Rather than deliberate diversion, he said, the more likely causes would be poor discipline and oversight in the Afghan national security forces, or A.N.S.F. ―I think most A.N.S.F. don‘t want their own stuff coming back at them,‖ he said. Captured Taliban rifles provide a glimpse at arms diversion as well.

After the battle in the eastern village of Wanat last year, in which 9 Americans died and more than 20 were wounded, investigators found a large cache of AMD-65 assault rifles in the village‘s police post, which was implicated in the attack, according to American officers. In all, the post had more than 70 assault rifles, but only 20 officers on its roster. Three AMD-65s were recovered near the battle as well. The AMD-65, a distinctive Hungarian rifle, was rarely seen in Afghanistan until the United States issued it by the thousands to the Afghan police. They can now be found in Pakistani arms bazaars. In the American ambush last month, all of the 10 captured rifles had factory stamps from China or Izhevsk, Russia. Those with date stamps had been manufactured in the 1960s and ‘70s. Photographs of the weapons and serial numbers were provided to Brig. Gen. Anthony R. Ierardi, the deputy commander of the transition command. Upon checking the Pentagon‘s new database, the general said one of the Chinese rifles had been issued to an Afghan auxiliary police officer in 2007. How Taliban insurgents had acquired the rifle was not clear. The auxiliary police, which augmented the Afghan Interior Ministry, were riddled with corruption and incompetence. They were disbanded last year.

Speaking about the captured Taliban ammunition, General Ierardi cautioned that the range of headstamps could indicate that insurgent use of American-procured munitions was not widespread. He noted that the captured ammunition sampling was small and that munitions might have leaked through less nefarious means. ―The mixed ammo could suggest battlefield losses; it could suggest captured ammo,‖ he said. He added, however, that he did not want to appear defensive and that accountability of Afghan arms and munitions was of ―highest priority.‖ ―The emphasis from our perspective is on accountability of all logistics property,‖ he said. Leakage of Pentagon-supplied armaments to insurgents is an ―absolutely worst-case scenario,‖ he said, adding, ―We want to guard against the exact scenario you laid out.‖

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RUSSIAN THINKING ON AMERICA‟S ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN (MAY 20, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, May 20th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Russian thinking on America’s role in Afghanistan SOURCE: Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst May 20, 2009 By Dmitry Shlapentokh

Russian officials have recently sent contradictory messages in regard to American policies in Afghanistan. On the one hand, Moscow signaled that it is quite concerned with the possibility of a U.S. debacle and wishes the Americans to win the war. On the other hand, the very fact that the U.S. publicly entertained the idea of finding a friendly Taliban leader ready for compromise was displeasing. Russia also pushed the Kyrgyz government to close the Manas base, regardless of its importance to the NATO forces. These mutually exclusive messages are due to contradictory drives in Russia, implying that Russia‘s policy regarding Afghanistan and the Middle East could change in any direction and could preclude the continuation of a coalition policy in dealing with Afghanistan.

BACKGROUND: The U.S. landed in Central Asia in the wake of September 11, 2001. Russia acquiesced to this development for a variety of reasons. One was that a U.S. presence, notwithstanding all its potential problems, would counter the Taliban who were seen by Moscow as a much more serious threat than the U.S.. Still, other theories frequently presented in Russia view the relationship between the U.S. and radical Islamists from quite a different perspective. These build on the assumption that radical Islamists are not antagonists, but rather allies, of the U.S., and that they are quite similar to each other in spite of allegedly superficial differences. Alexander Dugin, a prominent proponent of Eurasianism/Neo-Eurasianism and a popular philosopher and political commentator, has propagated this theory with much passion. Dugin asserted that the U.S., the major representative of ―Atlanticism,‖ is rejecting the cultural multiplicities of the people of Eurasia and is trying to homogenize them. The same could be seen among the Jihadist/Wahhabis; for this reason, the Americans and Wahhabis actually gravitate to each other, despite their differences. This assumption, however outlandish to Western ears, has been quite widespread among Russian pundits. This approach is also incorporated in a broader theory, which sees the West and the East as forces equally hostile to Russia. It is assumed in the context of this approach that these forces could even work together at Russia‘s expense. In this case, the anti-Asian streak in Russian nationalism supplements the lingering suspicion and hostility toward America. The proponents of this approach argue that the U.S. created Al Qaeda, and that September 11 was arranged by American elites to justify its ―imperial policy‖. The Chechen resistance— both nationalists and jihadists—is seen in this context as being manipulated and used by the U.S. to weaken Russia. These views seem to penetrate to the very top; it is not accidental that in the wake of the Beslan terrorist attack on a school on North Ossetia in 2004, then president Vladimir Putin stated that the terrorists could well be just tools in the hands of forces who

69 want to snatch the Northern Caucasus from Russia, a statement that was widely assumed to target America. The idea that the U.S. could reach an agreement with the Taliban to simply redirect them against Central Asia and Russia was fueled by the potential abrupt changes in U.S. foreign policy. The end of George W. Bush‘s presidency was marked by grand economic and geopolitical debacles. The implications could be manifold, ranging from a rapid U.S. geopolitical retreat – quite similar to what one saw in the collapsing USSR and later in Yeltsin‘s Russia, to a radical rearrangement of the country‘s geopolitical priorities. One of them is a possible rapprochement with the Muslim world, including the radicals, even if this would upset and marginalize Israel. A new trend was pointed out by a Russian Muslim Internet publication. It claimed, with satisfaction, that resentment against Israel and the Jewish lobby is rising in the U.S.. The publication also alleged that Obama advisor is critical of the Jewish lobby, which in his mind is alleged to be sympathetic toward the ―neocons.‖ Brzezinski, according to the site, had openly warned Israel that it would not always be able to use America for its own goals.

IMPLICATIONS: While these perceptions of U.S. policies that combine the U.S. geopolitical retreat from the Islamic world and an attempt to strike a new alliance with at least some Islamic countries or movements were made not only in the beginning of the Obama presidency, this approach has grown in popularity since his election. For example, Shamil Sultanov, an influential analyst of Islamic affairs and until recently a member of the Russian Duma, noted in one TV interview that Obama understands that the U.S. could hardly subdue Iran or do anything in Afghanistan. Consequently, he concluded that the administration had already decided both to extend a hand to Iran and to abandon Afghanistan. The idea that the U.S. could both decrease its ―imperial‖ presence in Asia and at the same time turn its ―historical‖ enemies into friends could also be found in official and semi-official Russian media. Izvestia, for example, wrote that Obama has already decided to meet with Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the near future. The authors of other articles noted that Iran also took steps toward the U.S. at the possible expense of Russia. In a broader context, this implied that the U.S. would be contemplating significant concessions to the Muslim world. In Afghanistan, a possible agreement between the U.S. and the Taliban could be similar to the abortive concessions of the Pakistani government in the Swat valley, where the Taliban became largely institutionalized and were allowed free hands in Afghanistan. Russian pundits are afraid that the U.S. could do the same in Afghanistan. Such an arrangement would imply that U.S. interests would not be harmed, and at the same time the Taliban, or even al- Qaida, would be allowed to act in Central Asia, Russia‘s soft underbelly, and in the future, in Russia proper. Consequently, while Russian Muslims see the possibility of a Muslim-U.S. rapprochement as positive, Russian pundits observe with apprehension as they entertain the idea that the U.S. would use Muslims to bring Russia harm.

CONCLUSIONS: Russian fears about the possibility of a deal between the U.S. and the Taliban, and in relation to this a sharp turn in U.S. foreign policy, indicate a continuous fear of instability both in Central Asia and Russia proper, as well as an understanding of the limited span of Ramzan Kadyrov‘s ―Chechenization‖ of the previously rebellious republic, despite announcements that the war in Chechnya is over. It also indicates an increasing sense of a dead-end scenario for NATO forces in Afghanistan, where additional contingents transferred from Iraq would still make NATO forces much smaller than the Soviet forces were. Since in the last war Russia was unable to subdue the insurgency, Russian analysts see no reason to believe that NATO would be more successful. The Russian elite entertains a lingering fear that a U.S. debacle could also lead to a new realignment in the Middle East

70 from Iran to Afghanistan where any solutions would come at Russia‘s expense. And these feelings have led to an increasingly muddled Russian policy toward Afghanistan and the U.S. presence in the country. On the one hand, there are concerns over possible attempts to find compromises with the Taliban. On the other hand, Russia itself entertains the idea of building a buffer zone in the North of the country, mostly populated by Uzbeks and Tajiks. Such a buffer zone would provide a cushion in case of an American failure, as well as a Russian stronghold in case of a U.S.-Taliban rapprochement. Russia seems ready to provide free passage for NATO supplies to Afghanistan, seeing the war as a danger to both Russia and the East. Yet, Russia‘s persuasion of Kyrgyzstan to close Manas created additional problems for the U.S. All of this indicates that cooperation between the U.S. and Russia in Afghanistan will be complicated, at least in the foreseeable future. The Taliban definitely stand to benefit from this discord.

AUTHOR‘S BIO: Dmitry Shlapentokh is Associate Professor of History, Indiana University South Bend.

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PAK, INDIA, U.S. BEGIN SHARING INTELLIGENCE (MAY 21, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, May 21st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Pakistan, India and U.S. begin sharing intelligence SOURCE: Wall Street Journal Thursday, May 21, 2009 By JAY SOLOMON & SIOBHAN GORMAN

WASHINGTON — Pakistan and India have begun sharing intelligence on Islamic extremists, with the prodding of the U.S., in an arrangement that represents unprecedented cooperation between the two nuclear-armed South Asian nations.

Washington hopes the cooperation will get a lift from last week‘s Indian elections, in which the incumbent Congress Party won by a wide margin over a Hindu nationalist party traditionally more hostile to Pakistan.

The Central Intelligence Agency arranged for Pakistan and India to share information on Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group widely blamed for last November‘s terrorist attack on Mumbai, as well as on Taliban commanders who are leading the insurgency against Pakistan‘s government, said U.S. officials.

The U.S. is stressing to Indian and Pakistani leaders that they face a common threat in Pakistan-based militant groups. Washington hopes that when India sees the intelligence and evidence that Islamabad is seriously fighting the militants in some areas, it will ease its deployments against Pakistan — which in turn would prompt Islamabad to put even more focus on the battle at home.

―We have to satisfy the Mumbai question, and show India that the threat is abating,‖ said a U.S. official involved in developing Washington‘s South Asia strategy.

India and Pakistan traded military threats across their border in the wake of the Mumbai attacks, in which terrorists left more than 170 people dead. The CIA and U.S. diplomats tried to ease the tension, urging Pakistan to crack down on the sources of the attack. Pakistan banned Lashkar and detained six people in connection with the attack, partially mollifying Indian outrage.

Intelligence sharing on Mumbai has led to a somewhat more frequent exchange of information, U.S. and Pakistani officials said. India and Pakistan have shared ―a lot‖ of information with each other about the Mumbai attack, said an official at Pakistan‘s Inter- Services Intelligence spy agency. He said the CIA was initially used as a conduit but the two countries now work directly with each other, while keeping the CIA in the loop.

Trading Information

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India and Pakistan are sharing intelligence on Islamic militants, with U.S. help.

 India gets: Information on groups that threaten it, including the one that carried out the Mumbai attacks.  Pakistan gets: More trust from India that it is serious about taking on militants.  U.S. gets: Sharper Pakistani focus on the battle against the Taliban and al Qaeda.

The official cautioned, ―We‘re not going to tell them everything we know and they‘re not going to tell us everything they know. Nobody expects that to happen. … But we‘re talking about [the attack]. We weren‘t doing that in December.‖

A U.S. official said Washington isn‘t ―under any illusions‖ about the difficulty of erasing decades-old suspicions between India and Pakistan, but sees some progress. U.S. officials hope that a calming of tensions can allow India‘s Congress Party government, strengthened by its election victory, to resume peace talks with Pakistan over the disputed Himalayan region of Kashmir. Some U.S. officials believe Lashkar-e-Taiba orchestrated the assault specifically to undermine the peace process.

The Obama administration has been concerned that Lashkar could carry out a second strike on India in a bid to stoke a war. President Barack Obama came into office pledging to craft a regional solution to the instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The CIA and other intelligence agencies are stepping up efforts in the Pakistani tribal areas, tapping and tracking the location of the cellphones of Taliban commanders as well as taking pictures and collecting information in their training camps, according to a person familiar with the efforts. The U.S. shares this information with Pakistan, and sometimes with India, to reinforce the U.S. argument that the Taliban threat to Pakistan is greater than the Indian threat.

A policeman walks past a line of internally displaced people, who are fleeing military operations in the Swat Valley, as they stand in line Thursday to receive rice at an United Nations High Commission for Refugees camp in Swabi district.

The U.S. also sometimes brings intelligence on Pakistan‘s efforts to combat militants to India‘s attention, with Pakistan‘s consent, this person said. Examples include showing Indian officials evidence of progress against militants in the Pakistani regions of Bajaur, Swat, and Buner.

U.S. intelligence officers have been able to track the whereabouts of key Pakistani Taliban leaders, such as Baitullah Mehsud, accused of orchestrating the murder of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, said this person. Sufi Muhammad and Maulana Qazi Fazlullah, leaders of a militant group aligned with Mr. Mehsud, are also tracked, according to the person familiar with the efforts. Mr. Muhammad brokered the now-defunct deal between the Pakistani government and the Taliban to enforce Islamic Sharia law in the Swat region in Pakistan.

The government of Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari is hoping that Congress‘s victory can also provide the Indian government with the political cover to move one or two divisions away from the Pakistan border in coming months, according to an official briefed on the diplomacy.

But Indian officials say they aren‘t ready to do so. An Indian government official said New Delhi has documented an escalation of cross-border infiltrations by Pakistani militants into Kashmir.

—Matthew Rosenberg in Islamabad and Paul Beckett in New Delhi contributed to this article

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UN SEEKS $543 MILLION FOR PAKISTAN WAR REFUGEES (MAY 22, 2009)

Written by admin on Friday, May 22nd, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

UN seeks $543 million for Pakistan war refugees SOURCE: The Washington Post Friday, May 22, 2009 By CHRIS BRUMMITT

KHWAZAKHELA, Pakistan — Troops are encircling Taliban militants in their mountain base as well as the main town in the Swat Valley, a Pakistani general said Friday, as the U.N. appealed for $543 million to ease the suffering of nearly 2 million refugees from the fighting.

With skepticism growing about the progress of the month-old army offensive in the northwestern region, the army flew a handful of reporters from foreign news organizations into Swat on Friday. An Associated Press reporter aboard the helicopter saw no cars and few people in the town of Mingora or on roads further up the valley, a former tourist haven just 60 miles (100 kilometers) from the capital, Islamabad.

From the air, there was little evidence of the fierce fighting and airstrikes that the military claims have already killed more than 1,000 militants as well as some 60 soldiers. But a senior commander insisted the army was trapping militants in Mingora and Piochar, a side-valley further north that is the stronghold of Swat Taliban leader Maulana Fazlullah. ―The noose is tightening around them. Their routes of escape have been cut off,‖ Maj. Gen. Sajad Ghani said. ―It‘s just a question of time before (Taliban leaders) are eliminated.‖

Pakistan launched an offensive last month to halt a Taliban advance from Swat toward the capital, Islamabad, that prompted U.S. warnings about the stability of the nuclear-armed country. While the U.S. has praised the military operation, it is also contributing to a gathering effort to shield the government from the political fallout from the humanitarian crisis. Officials say 1.9 million people have fled the fighting. More than 160,000 are staying in sweltering camps just south of the battle zone. The rest have been taken in by relatives.

The United Nations said its appeal would help provide food, schooling and health care to the multitude displaced from the Swat area and by fighting in other border regions last year. ―The scale of this displacement is extraordinary in terms of size and speed and has caused incredible suffering,‖ said Martin Mogwanja, the acting U.N. humanitarian coordinator in Pakistan. ―We are calling for generous support from the international community.‖

The U.N. said the figure included some $88 million from the United States, which this week pledged total assistance of $110 million in emergency aid.

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TEHRAN SUMMIT (MAY 24, 2009)

Written by admin on Sunday, May 24th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Iran hosts summit on fighting Taliban and drugs SOURCE: The Times of India Sunday, May 24, 2009 REUTERS

TEHRAN: The presidents of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan began talks in Tehran on Sunday on ways to combat terrorism, drug trafficking and other regional security problems.

The one-day summit, part of efforts to boost cooperation between the three neighbours, coincides with an offensive launched by Pakistani security forces this month to stop the spread of a Taliban insurgency in the country‘s northwest.

Afghanistan, where violence has grown dramatically in the past two years despite the deployment of more US and other foreign troops, is also battling Taliban militants.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad hosted his Pakistani and Afghan counterparts, Asif Ali Zardari and Hamid Karzai, at the meeting in northern Tehran.

―The presidents of the three countries will discuss security issues and the reconstruction of Afghanistan,‖ Iranian state broadcaster IRIB said. Iran‘s Press TV said they would also talk about the opium trade, which helps fund the Taliban.

In Kabul last month, their foreign ministers agreed to meet once a month as part of efforts to fight terrorism and stabilise Afghanistan.

The United States has said it wants to increase its engagement with both Iran and Pakistan as part of a more regional approach to tackling the growing strength of Taliban militants across the south and east of Afghanistan.

Mistrust

Despite three decades of mutual mistrust, analysts say Iran and the United States share an interest in securing regional stability. Iran says Washington is failing in Afghanistan, but that Tehran is ready to help its eastern neighbour.

At a UN meeting in The Hague in March, Iran offered to help Afghanistan combat the drugs trade, in a gesture that US secretary of state Hillary Clinton called promising.

The United States is pouring thousands of troops into Afghanistan this year to try to reverse gains by a resurgent Taliban, particularly in its southern heartland.

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In Pakistan on Saturday, the military said street fighting erupted in the main town of the Swat valley as security forces mounted a new phase of their offensive against the militants.

The United States, which sees Pakistan as vital to its plan to defeat al-Qaida and bring stability in Afghanistan, has applauded Pakistani resolve to fight what some US leaders have called an ―existential threat‖ to the country.

The United Nations launched an appeal on Friday for $543 million for more than 2 million people displaced by fighting in northwest Pakistan, where officials said villagers were turning against the Taliban.

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FALLOUT OF SWAT MILITARY OPERATION (MAY 27, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, May 27th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Fallout of Swat military operation SOURCE: The News International Wednesday, May 27, 2009 By Rahimullah Yusufzai

The huge military operation launched in Malakand region in late April was meant to decisively defeat the Taliban militants and restore the writ of the state in Swat, Buner and Lower Dir districts. One doesn‘t know how long the army action will continue in view of the fact that the federal and provincial ministers and the military authorities have been giving conflicting timelines for its completion. There is also no guarantee that militancy will be defeated once and for all as a result of this unprecedented undertaking by Pakistan‘s armed forces within the country.

There is no doubt that the militants forced the hand of the government and the military to take action against them due to their unreasonable actions and strong-arm tactics. The militants‘ strength has certainly been diminished following the military operation and it will take them a while and another period of government non-performance, inaction and mistakes to recoup and regroup. Despite the government‘s claim that the Malakand military operation was initiated under strategic planning, there is little to suggest that it was ready for it.

Something that is far more obvious is the emergence of new problems and challenges for our already beleaguered nation. One is the issue of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) that is threatening to overshadow all other priorities of the state. The massive displacement of people caused by the military action wasn‘t properly foreseen by those who planned, executed and backed the operation. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that all of them are now finding it difficult to cope with the situation. This is a man-made disaster that will require divine intervention because our governments have a poor record of helping people in need. Every uprooted family has suffered so much for no fault of its own that it will be impossible to compensate it for its loss, whether it is physical or emotional. Unknowingly, or rather callously, a humanitarian crisis has been created without having the foresight to realise its magnitude and understand its consequences.

The military operation and the large-scale dislocation of hitherto well-knit rural communities have also raised valid questions about the concept of nationhood and the federation of Pakistan. Already, two province-wide strikes called by rival groups of the ultra-Sindhi nationalists Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM) have been held against the arrival of IDPs in Sindh. The JSQM and other Sindhi and Urdu-speaking nationalists may have strong reasons to oppose the influx of ethnic Pakhtuns in Sindh but the timing of their protest and the targeting of Pakhtun transport and other businesses during the strike carried a disturbing message that cannot augur well for the future of relations between the ethnic entities that

78 make of Pakistan. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), which despite the change of its name still operates as the Mohajir Qaumi Movement, enthusiastically backed the first call for strike and withdrew its support for the second one on the request of its ruling coalition partner, the PPP. This also helps explain as to why the first strike on account of MQM‘s active support on May 23 was more widespread and violent with two people, including a 50- year old woman who was burnt alive, getting killed and a lot more vehicles owned by Pakhtuns being torched.

By backing the recent anti-IDPs strike, a powerful MQM-linked segment of the PPP-led Sindh government became involved in the unconstitutional act of denying entry to genuine Pakistanis, that too uprooted and suffering households coming all the way from unliveable places like Swat, Buner and Dir, into a province with a substantial Pakhtun population. No thought was given to the repercussions of such an ethnic-based approach to the problem of displaced people in NWFP, from where they came, and also in Balochistan, home to a considerable number of Pashtuns. Also, there was no appreciation of the fact that the Karachi- bound IDPs weren‘t going to be a burden on the Sindh government. They were heading to Karachi to live with their Pakhtun relatives and friends and seek means of livelihood in a city that is the obvious destination for most jobless and shelterless Pakistanis.

This is not to say that the PPP leadership, which we all know is dominated by the Sindhis, wasn‘t supportive of the move to keep the IDPs out of Sindh. President Asif Ali Zardari, who is still the PPP co-chairman, and some of his party colleagues have been for quite some time advocating registering and controlling the IDPs coming to Karachi and the rest of Sindh. The MQM on its own could not have forced the Sindh government to take this decision. It needed sympathisers in the PPP to make the move and support the call for strike that was basically against its own government‘s inaction for not stopping the IDPs from entering Sindh. The ruling PPP cannot absolve itself of the blame for blocking the trucks and buses bringing the IDPs to Sindh at the border town of Kashmore and for insisting that they go back to their native NWFP or stay in not-yet-ready tented camps there in the middle of nowhere. It was an insensitive act that added insult to injury and contributed to the pain suffered by the IDPs and felt by all Pakhtuns. More pain was inflicted on the Pakhtun psyche by certain PPP leaders, including its blundering spokesperson Fauzia Wahab, when the IDPs were equated to the Afghan refugees. If this isn‘t a slip of tongue, then it obviously means that many politicians and also other likeminded people from different walks of life in Punjab and Sindh have come to believe that the Afghan refugees too are primarily Pakhtuns and all of them need to be kept out of Pakistan‘s two biggest provinces to avoid harm.

The PML-N despite its praiseworthy relief work in support of the IDPs also damaged its growing reputation as a party sympathetic to the cause of smaller provinces by hesitating to allow setting up of IDPs camps in Punjab. Nawaz Sharif too backed the military operation in Malakand division after having pleaded earlier for a peaceful political solution of the issue of militancy and he cannot absolve his party now from the responsibility of the army action‘s consequences. In fact, it was the PML-N‘s backing for the military solution of the Swat issue that changed the course of the debate on the pros and cons of using the armed forces to solve a problem that emerged due to the unresponsive system of justice and governance and deteriorated when politicians failed to tackle it politically.

The apathy of some of the Sindh- and Punjab-based political forces to the woes of the IDPs looks all the more glaring when one compares it to the unparalleled generosity shown by the common people all over the country. In particular, the way the people opened their hearts and

79 homes to the IDPs in NWFP was heart-warming to say the least. Nowhere was this magnanimity more visible than in Mardan and Swabi, the two districts that have received most of the displaced persons coming from neighbouring Swat, Buner and Dir. Villagers with little means have accommodated IDPs in their homes and hujras and those with a room or house to spare are still busy registering their names to show their willingness to take in the displaced families. Every village in Mardan and Swabi has become a camp for the IDPs. Little or no relief supplies have gone to these unknown IDPs‘ village camps because most of the goods are going to the designated camps. In fact, almost 80 per cent of the IDPs are living outside the relief camps with relatives, acquaintances and even with strangers.

If ordinary Pakhtun villagers with few resources could do this on such a massive scale and lessen the burden of the government, is it asking too much from politicians who are in and out of power and are supposed to show the way to the nation to be sensitive to the plight of the IDPs instead of rubbing salt on their wounds? Or according to their interpretation the IDP issue should be a matter of concern for NWFP and the Pakhtuns only? If that is the case, then one should be worried about the damage this attitude is causing to the concept of nationhood in the federation of Pakistan.

Rahimullah Yusufzai is resident editor of The News in Peshawar.

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SWAT OFFENSIVE „TO END IN TWO- THREE DAYS‟ (MAY 31, 2009)

Written by admin on Sunday, May 31st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Pakistan battles Taliban; Swat offensive ‘to end in two-three days’ SOURCE: The Times of India Sunday 31 May 2009 REUTERS

ISLAMABAD: Pakistani forces battled militants in South Waziristan on the Afghan border on Sunday as a government official said an offensive in the Swat valley could be over in two or three days.

Pakistani forces have undertaken their most concerted offensive against an expanding Taliban insurgency that has raised fears for the nuclear-armed US ally‘s stability and the safety of its nuclear arsenal.

The focus of the fighting has been the former tourist destination of Swat, 120 km (80 miles) northwest of Islamabad, which the Taliban virtually took as the government alternated between inconclusive military action and peace pacts.

But tension has also been rising in South Waziristan, an al-Qaida and Taliban stronghold, with military officials saying an offensive was likely there after Swat is secured.

The United States and the Afghan government have long been pressing Pakistan to root militants out of South Waziristan and other enclaves on the Afghan border, from where the Taliban direct their Afghan war.

Militants attacked a paramilitary force camp in Jandola, 80 km (50 miles) east of Wana, the main town in South Waziristan, late on Saturday, security officials said. ―Militants came in force and attacked a paramilitary camp and fighting lasted for eight hours. At least 40 militants were killed while four soldiers died,‖ said an intelligence official in the region who declined to be identified.

A military spokesman said the militants had been pushed back after a heavy exchange of fire. Up to 15 militants and three soldiers were killed, he said. There was no independent confirmation of the casualty estimates.

Militant violence in Pakistan has surged since mid-2007, with attacks on the security forces, as well as on government and Western targets.

There have been eight bomb attacks in various towns and cities since the offensive in Swat and neighbouring districts began in late April and the Taliban have threatened more.

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EXODUS

The offensive in Swat has sparked an exodus of about 2.4 million people, according to government figures, and the country faces a long-term humanitarian crisis.

Bomb attacks in cities and the plight of the displaced could undermine public support for the offensive but for now, analysts say, the authorities are determined to defeat the Taliban in Swat.

The army said on Saturday it had regained full control of Mingora, the main town in Swat, and a top defence ministry official said on Sunday the military operation could be over in a two or three days.

―Only five to 10% of the job is remaining and hopefully within two to three days, the pockets of resistance will be cleared,‖ Syed Athar Ali, secretary of defence for Pakistan, said at a regional defence meeting in Singapore. Military spokesman have been cautious about predicting how long the offensive would last, saying there was still resistance in the valley.

―It‘s very difficult to give a timeline,‖ said chief military spokesman Major-General Athar Abbas. ―It‘s a very big area so nobody‘s in a position to give any timeline for the operation.‖

On Sunday, the military urged civilians to leave the town of Charbagh, about 15 km (10 miles) north of Mingora, and lifted a curfew there and in Mingora to allow people to get out.

Pakistan is vital for U.S. plans to defeat al-Qaida and cut support for the Afghan Taliban.

The United States, which is sending thousands of reinforcements into Afghanistan, has been heartened by the offensive in Swat.

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EXTRA US TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN BY MID-JULY (JUNE 1, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, June 1st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Extra US troops in Afghanistan by mid-July SOURCE: The Frontier Post [National daily published from Peshawar and Quetta] Monday June 1, 2009

KABUL (Agencies): The majority of the 17,000 extra U.S. troops being sent to fight a growing Taliban-led insurgency in southern and western Afghanistan should be on the ground by mid-July, the U.S. military said on Sunday. A further 4,000 troops are arriving to train Afghan security forces and they will be deployed by August.

Washington pledged to send 21,000 additional troops to Afghanistan to reinforce security ahead of presidential elections scheduled for August 20 and to support NATO-led troops which have struggled to fight an escalating insurgency there. ―10,000 Marines are beginning to arrive now and will continue to arrive for the next month and a half or so and they will be principally located in Helmand but also in Farah,‖ said Colonel Greg Julian, spokesman for U.S. forces.

Helmand province, in southern Afghanistan and Farah in the west are among the areas that have seen the fiercest fighting as insurgents gathered strength in recent years, despite the presence of a growing number of foreign troops. ―Everyday we are faced with suicide bombers, an increased number of improvised explosive devices,‖ said General Zaher Azimy, spokesman for the Ministry of Defense. ―If the violence wasn‘t increasing there would be no need for the presence of foreign forces and Afghan forces themselves could handle this issue.‖

Some 7,000 U.S. army troops are also being deployed to southern . ―3,500 are already on the ground in Kandahar with additional helicopters. Following that an additional 3,500 army troops will arrive in Kandahar and will be located in rural areas of that province,‖ Julian told a news conference.

All 21,000 troops will be deployed by August, another U.S. military spokesman said, but declined to comment further. The 4,000 training troops will be sent mainly to south and west Afghanistan and more than half will train and mentor Afghan police, who are a younger force than the Afghan army and have suffered from poor training, illiteracy and corruption.

The Afghan National Army (ANA) has also expanded its forces to 90,0000 troops from about 83,000, and will boost numbers further for the August poll, Azimy said. ―Currently we have 90,000 ANA forces and we expect to increase this number during the elections to 95,000 forces as well as the additional forces of the Afghan National Police and the international forces,‖ he told journalists.

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The Afghan army, described by U.S. military officials as a success story, now leads more than twice as many military operations per week in Afghanistan, compared with this time last year, a spokesman for NATO-led forces said.

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BANKING ON PASHTUN REVENGE CULTURE (JUNE 4, 2009)

Written by admin on Friday, June 5th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Pak cops banking on Pashtun revenge culture to keep Taliban at bay in Swat SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Thursday 4th June, 2009 (ANI)

Mingora (Pakistan), Jun.4 : The military offensive in Pakistan‘s Swat Valley may be nearing its end, with the Army claiming that it has forced the Taliban and other extremists to leave the region, besides sanitizing scores of militants.

However, after the troops pull out from the different regions of the region, the biggest task of the local administration would be to prevent the extremists from resurfacing, and starting their reign of terror once again.

Security officials believe that the government should encourage the traditional Pashtun sentiment of vengeance against the Taliban to fortify the region against extremism, and prevent it from falling into their hands once again.

―The Taliban humiliated a lot of respected community leaders. These people will take any chance they get to take revenge against the Taliban. This is what the Pashtun revenge culture is,‖ a senior police officer said.

He said the Taliban is already planning to hit back, and would wreak havoc in Swat if the government failed to initiate a community-based policing system in the region.

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―The dispersed Taliban are likely already planning on bringing back disorder and killing to Swat once the operation is over,‖ The Daily Times quoted him, as saying.

He added that after the civil administration in the region is restored, an armed civil force would be needed to check regrouping of the extremists.

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MORE BY LUCK THAN JUDGMENT (JUNE 8, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, June 8th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

More by luck than judgment - Zardari took an awful risk in backing Sufi Muhammad’s inner voice. SOURCE: Dawn Monday 8th June, 2009 By ASAD HASHIM

Asif Ali Zardari may just be a genius. It is, however, unlikely. What is more likely is that Pakistan just got very, very lucky (appearances to the contrary notwithstanding).

With the army claiming successes in the ongoing military operation in Swat, it is worth looking back at how a military operation became an option: it was due to the breakdown of the agreement between the Pakistani government and the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat Mohammadi (TNSM).

Make no mistake, the Nizam-i-Adl Regulation was a bad idea on the part of the NWFP government, insomuch as attempting to use it as a bandage to stop the massive bleeding in the province. The rationale at the time appeared to be to try and stop the violence first, and deal with the militants later, or, perhaps, not at all. This was not, strictly speaking, wise.

But the TNSM‘s main source of support in Swat for the implementation of the Sharia included the people of the valley themselves. They were accustomed to it having been governed under a form of Islamic law under the wali until it was absorbed in Pakistan in 1969. The TNSM had been lobbying for a return to the Sharia since the early 1990s. The support of Swat‘s citizens hinged on the demand for a quick and efficient judicial system. Whatever one may say about the Pakistani judicial system, it is neither quick nor efficient.

So, in principle, the citizens‘ (and hence the TNSM‘s) demands for a new system of justice were justified. As I argued at the time the Regulation was signed, the issue with the agreement was not what it was, it was how it would be implemented. By granting the TNSM and the Swat Taliban Sharia in the valley, the government had effectively robbed them of their raison d‘être, particularly when it came to employing violent means. The key now was for the government to ensure that it was the one enforcing the new rules, and that it was its qazis in the courts and its police making the arrests. This did not happen.

At the time, however, the government still appeared satisfied with allowing events to continue, even as Sufi Muhammad and Maulana Fazlullah made it clear that the government‘s interventions in the implementation of the Sharia were unwelcome. At least, it appears they thought, things aren‘t exploding any longer. And so Swat was lost, for a time. And it could have continued to be, were it not for the jihadi in Sufi Muhammad, who made two key errors that led ultimately to the current military intervention in the valley.

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The first was made during a speech to the masses, delivered in a grassy field in Mingora, flanked by smug government functionaries who were pleased with the apparent culmination of their efforts when they released Sufi Muhammad back in April 2008. The cleric, however, refused to stick to the script, and proceeded to damn everything from the Pakistani state to the media. Releasing his inner voice, he declared democracy, freedom of the media and the state of Pakistan — for good measure — ‗un-Islamic‘. Not quite according to plan.

The second mistake the TNSM/Swat Taliban made was to begin a process of expansion soon after having signed the Regulation. It appears that for them the document was less of a pledge by the government to enforce the Sharia in Malakand division, and more a deed. Having taken the keys to the house, they saw no reason not to go about landscaping the land around them.

Matters reached an untenable position when the Swat Taliban moved into Buner, and then claimed to have retreated, leaving just a few ‗local Taliban members‘ in the area. That there were virtually no Taliban members in Buner before the expansion was a fact that did not escape the Pakistani government‘s attention, and ultimately, the current military operation became the only viable option.

Having been directly attacked, the media, which so far had largely backed the TNSM‘s position in Swat, fell right into line with the government. The tide in the battle for public opinion began to turn, and the Pakistani public, which, at the best of times, is ambivalent towards the Taliban, began to realise that surrendering the writ of state, even if ostensibly to ‗Islamic‘ clerics, may not be the best idea.

Mr Zardari, of course, now wants us to believe that this was the plan all along. The truth is that we got very, very lucky. Had Sufi Muhammad merely stuck to the party line during that (and subsequent) speeches, while subtly continuing his machinations in Swat, consolidating control and moving into neighbouring areas slowly, things would be much, much worse, and, moreover, the US nightmare of the Taliban in Afghanistan having another sanctuary in Pakistan would have become reality.

Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan‘s ambassador to the US, recently stated that during the president‘s visit to Washington, he confided to US President Barack Obama that he had known all along that the agreement would collapse, and that this was all one big ploy to rid the Taliban and TNSM of any legitimacy in Swat. That it has achieved the latter is unquestionable, but even if this was the plan, Mr Zardari took an awful risk in backing Sufi Muhammad‘s inner voice.

So is he without sense or a genius? Well, it‘s difficult to tell, as ever. Consider the series of peace deals that were struck with militants across Fata shortly after the PPP government came into power. At the time, the peace deals were decried by security analysts and the US, citing the precedent of previous deals which had merely allowed the militants time to rearm and regroup before launching fresh attacks on the state. And the peace deals duly collapsed, one by one, forcing the government to launch a series of military operations across the area and forming lashkars amongst local tribesmen to root out ‗foreigners‘ and Taliban militants.

What one must realise is, however, that this series of peace deals was crucial as they lent legitimacy to the military action which followed them. If the Pakistan Army had simply marched into Khyber or if it had sent Apache helicopter gunships into Bajaur, the public, and particularly the people of these agencies, would have accused it of unnecessary heavy- handedness.

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Instead, the government chose to speak softly, and then swing the big stick it had been fidgeting with. The fact is that even if the peace deals did allow the militants in these areas to regroup, it was worth it for the political capital gained. The argument may seem academic, but democracy is a messy business, and this process was important for Pakistan‘s fledgling government.

What should happen next is clear, but certainly not inevitable. Pakistan‘s defence secretary, Syed Athar Ali, has claimed that the operation in Malakand division ‗is 90 per cent complete‘, which is a foolish boast, one feels, because all it implies is that militants have been pushed out of settled areas into their hideouts in the mountains. The military is going to have to pursue them there, on their home turf, and attempt to dislodge them permanently. Or else all this: the deaths of over 4,500 militants and soldiers (if Mr Ali is to be believed), the destruction of Mingora and other cities, and, above all, the suffering of the internally displaced people across Pakistan will have been for nothing.

And then? Well, Waziristan. Here‘s hoping that our man Zardari has a ‗plan‘ for that one, too. [email protected]

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MASSIVE TRUCK BOMB EXPLOSION IN PESHAWAR ON JUNE 9, 2009

Written by admin on Wednesday, June 10th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Video Pearl Continental Hotel Attack in Peshawar Pakistan SOURCE: Sky News Wednesday June 10, 2009

Truck bomb kills 11, injures dozens at Pakistani hotel SOURCE: Washington Post Wednesday June 10, 2009 By GRIFF WITTE

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, June 9 — A massive truck bomb exploded outside a luxury hotel in northwestern Pakistan‘s provincial capital Tuesday night, killing 11 people and injuring at least 50, officials said. The attack marked the latest salvo by insurgents who have vowed to avenge an army offensive in the nearby Swat Valley, and it underscored their ability to strike at some of the country‘s most heavily fortified targets.

Peshawar‘s Pearl Continental Hotel had been considered an oasis of relative security in a city that has become a front line in the battle between the Pakistani government and radical Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The hotel, a local landmark, had been popular among foreigners, including aid workers who have been using it in recent weeks as a base for their efforts to assist the more than 2 million Pakistanis displaced from their homes by the fighting in Swat.

The bomb, hidden beneath kitchen supplies and estimated to contain more than 1,000 pounds of explosives, caused one section of the hotel to collapse and destroyed more than 30 vehicles, said Shafqatullah Malik, an assistant police chief.

The dead included at least two foreigners, according to law enforcement and hospital sources. One was Aleksandar Vorkapic, an official with the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, a U.N. spokesman said. Vorkapic, from Belgrade, Serbia, had been part of a group of U.N. staff members who had been working to assist the displaced families.

The spokesman said U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon condemned the attack ―in the strongest possible terms.‖

U.S. Embassy spokesman Lou Fintor said there was no indication that any Americans had been injured or killed. U.S. government personnel had been prohibited from the hotel because of security concerns. Just last week, the embassy issued a warning to Americans to avoid Peshawar altogether. The city has come under increasing strain as the Pakistani Taliban has strengthened, and bombings there have become a regular occurrence.

The Pearl Continental, part of a chain of five-star Pakistani hotels, is one of the few hotels in Peshawar that cater to foreign visitors and well-to-do Pakistanis. It is located in one of the most heavily fortified areas of the city, set near a cluster of government buildings, including a courthouse, the provincial chief minister‘s house and a major military base.

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The State Department has been negotiating to buy the hotel and convert it into a consular building in Peshawar, which is the capital of North-West Frontier Province and the largest city in the region. That deal has not been completed.

Pakistani television networks broadcast images of dazed hotel guests and workers evacuating the building, many covered in dust and some with bloodied faces. The blast demolished the hotel‘s kitchen, and security guards and kitchen workers appeared to have constituted a large share of the injured, according to hospital officials.

Police and an intelligence official at the scene reported that two vehicles were involved in the attack. First, a Toyota Corolla was driven up, distracting the guards. Then a mini-truck followed. The truck‘s passengers opened fire on the guards at the gate as the truck sped toward the building. Moments later, the blast shook the hotel and reverberated across the city. At least 50 rooms were damaged, and 10 were destroyed.

President Asif Ali Zardari condemned the attack, saying, ―Such incidents will not deter the government from its resolve to eliminate this scourge from the country.‖

The explosion sent a shaft of light into the night sky, but afterward, emergency workers were forced to hunt through the debris in darkness because the blast knocked out electricity.

Two hotel security guards were taken into custody for questioning, police officials said. An intelligence officer investigating the site said three to five assailants had been involved. The attack conjured memories of a blast at the luxury Marriott Hotel in Islamabad last September, which killed more than 50 people.

Insurgents have launched a string of attacks in Pakistan in recent weeks that Taliban spokesmen have said are revenge for the army‘s offensive in Swat. The deadliest attack, against a police headquarters and an office of Pakistan‘s Inter-Services Intelligence agency, killed 30 people in the eastern city of Lahore. Peshawar markets and a movie theater have also been targeted.

The army claims to have retaken nearly all of Swat, just over a month after it began its offensive with the declared goal of rooting out Taliban forces who had overrun the scenic valley.

Government officials have indicated that an operation in the Taliban haven of South Waziristan is next, and on Tuesday the army shelled targets near that mountainous tribal region.

Staff writer Colum Lynch at the United Nations and special correspondents Haq Nawaz Khan and Shaiq Hussain in Pakistan contributed to this report.

Bombed hotel may have to be rebuilt SOURCE: The News International Wednesday June 10, 2009 By RAHIMULLAH YUSUFZAI

PESHAWAR: Another landmark of Peshawar was bombed on Tuesday, and it is difficult to say when the Pearl Continental Hotel would become functional again.

Earlier, the mausoleum of the great Pashto poet Rahman Baba located on the outskirts of Peshawar suffered bombing. The beautiful, white marble building, a landmark of Peshawar, had to be demolished as it could have collapsed at any moment. It is now being rebuilt.

It seems the Pearl Continental Hotel, or PC as it is commonly known, would also have to be rebuilt. Parts of the lone five-star hotel in Peshawar were destroyed by the devastating blast

91 and the structure still standing may be declared dangerous. The final decision, however, would be made by engineers.

The blast in Peshawar‘s most secure area once again exposed the security lapses. The Khyber Road where the hotel is located is in the Peshawar Cantonment area, housing the Army garrison and offices and residences of the most important military and civil officers and ruling politicians. The Pearl Continental is next to the residence of the corps commander Peshawar, the Golf Club, Peshawar High Court, NWFP Assembly and other heavily protected buildings.

The hotel also had its own private security arrangements. In fact, the security had been upgraded in the wake of the blast at the Marriott Hotel, Islamabad. Barricades had been put up at the hotel gate, which is at some distance from the main building, and only one road was being used for gaining entry and exiting the hotel premises.

The other road, the one used for exiting the hotel, had been closed. Barricades erected at the front portion of the hotel may have saved the building from collapsing as it forced the car- bomber to attempt collision with the hotel structure from the left side toward the rear.

Peshawar had already become a virtually ―no-go‖ place for foreigners, particularly those from Western countries. The bombing of the Pearl Continental Hotel would prompt not only foreigners but also many Pakistanis to avoid coming to Peshawar. Tourism is already dead in Peshawar and rest of the NWFP. The Frontier economy, already depressed, has thus suffered another deadly blow.

Sadly enough, most of foreigners caught in the hotel blast on Tuesday were the ones working in the UN agencies and other organisations providing relief to the internally displaced persons (IDPs). The bombing could scare away the relief and aid workers and make it difficult for the UN agencies and others to continue serving the IDPs.

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COMMANDER MAPS NEW COURSE IN AFGHAN WAR (JUNE 12, 2009)

Written by admin on Friday, June 12th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Commander maps new course in Afghan war SOURCE: Wall Street Journal Friday June 12, 2009 By PETER SPIEGEL

WASHINGTON — Gen. Stanley McChrystal, in his first interview since being named the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said his front-row seat for the wars there and in Iraq has altered the view of combat he has held since training as a Green Beret to kill enemies quickly and stealthily.

After watching the U.S. try and fail for years to put down insurgencies in both countries, Gen. McChrystal said he believes that to win in Afghanistan, ―You‘re going to have to convince people, not kill them. ―Since 9/11, I have watched as America tried to first put out this fire with a hammer, and it doesn‘t work,‖ he said last week at his home at Fort McNair in Washington. ―Decapitation strategies don‘t work.‖

In the interview, Gen. McChrystal noted he‘s unsure whether the planned troop levels for the job he envisions will be adequate — despite the Obama administration‘s commitment to raise the U.S. presence to 68,000 by year‘s end, to go along with 35,000 allied forces. Iraq surge commanders had more than 170,000 U.S. forces.

―I know that I want it to be an effective traditional or classic counterinsurgency campaign by getting people down in among the population,‖ the general said. ―I know that‘s easier said than done with a limited-sized force.‖

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has given his new commander 60 days to come up with a campaign plan. Gen. McChrystal has indicated it will closely resemble the strategy used in Iraq by Gen. David Petraeus, now his boss as head of all U.S. troops in the region. Gen. McChrystal said he will push soldiers farther out of their bases and among residents, to bring a sense of stability to the people and to better develop nationwide intelligence.

Gen. McChrystal, who was confirmed unanimously by the Senate on Wednesday, comes into the job amid concerns in some corners that his background doesn‘t suit him to the task. Asked whether his years commanding forces trained as elite raiders could complicate his ability to run the culturally sensitive campaign plan he envisions, he said: ―I don‘t think so, but it‘s a fair question.‖

The general is the latest U.S. military leader to have his career-long views challenged by Iraq and Afghanistan. Gen. Ray Odierno, the current Iraq commander and a West Point classmate

93 of Gen. McChrystal, rose through the army‘s ranks as an artillery officer with little counterinsurgency experience.

―Over time, there‘s been a sorting out,‖ said Kalev Sepp, a retired Green Beret who until January helped oversee special-operations forces at the Pentagon. ―There were general officers who were very uncomfortable with counterinsurgency, never quite got it. But others rose up.‖

Gen. McChrystal said his background is more rounded than some skeptics give him credit for. In addition to spending several years commanding infantry outside special operations — twice succeeding Gen. Petraeus in leadership posts at conventional airborne units — he did yearlong stints at Harvard University and the Council on Foreign Relations that he says helped expand his world view.

The son and grandson of army officers, he first applied to join the Green Berets as a young lieutenant shortly after graduating from West Point in 1976. Gen. McChrystal recalled many instances when friends and mentors advised him to return to ―general purpose‖ forces, where the more important command posts are to this day seen as central to advancement in the Army.

―I had some very close friends and respected people who said: ‗You‘ve already been in the Rangers, you‘ve commanded a battalion already, go on and grow up,‘‖ he recalled.But at almost every turn, Gen. McChrystal chose to return to special operations, drawn, he says, by the ethos of the military‘s secretive raiders. Because of that choice, however, much of his recent career is classified.

During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, he was a senior officer at the headquarters that ran ―black ops‖ during the conflict. Other than confirming he was in Saudi Arabia during the war, Gen. McChrystal said he was unable to discuss missions.

Similarly, his five years commanding the same ―black ops‖ unit from 2003 to 2008 means most of his work in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars also remains out of public view.

Some familiar with that time said that while his focus was on targeting individuals such as Saddam Hussein and insurgent leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, both of whom were hunted down by his units, Gen. McChrystal also worked to limit civilian casualties. That tactical decision, he felt, helped win over locals.

―This was not smash-and-grab,‖ Mr. Sepp said. ―He had the sense that if they were going to build intelligence networks, which are essential in counterinsurgency, you needed to be very careful and very discreet about the kind of operations you conducted.‖

―Since 9/11, I have watched as America tried to first put out this fire with a hammer, and it doesn‘t work. Decapitation strategies don‘t work.‖ Gen. McChrystal said Saturday at his home at Fort McNair in Washington.

Gen. McChrystal said in Afghanistan he will emphasize intelligence gathering to try to ensure that military operations and development projects alike help win the support of Afghans. ―The thing I believe in most is understanding what you‘re trying to do, and the effects of what you do,‖ he said. 94

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AFGHAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES PREPARE TO CAMPAIGN (JUNE 16, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, June 16th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Afghan presidential candidates prepare to campaign SOURCE: Hindustan Times Tuesday June 16, 2009 By Associated Press

President Hamid Karzai and 40 other candidates begin their official campaigns for Afghanistan‘s top post on Tuesday, an election that will decide who will lead the country through a spike in violence and a surge in U.S. troops to combat it.

Karzai has led Afghanistan since soon after U.S.-backed troops invaded in 2001 to oust the hard-line Islamist Taliban regime that was sheltering Osama bin Laden. He is the clear front- runner to win a second term, though his standing with Afghans and the international community has weakened in recent years. The campaign period officially begins Tuesday and will close Aug. 18, two days before the vote.

Chief among his challengers are former Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani and former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah. There are 41 candidates running for the five-year term, but few are considered serious contenders.

Abdul Ghafoor Zuri, one of the dozens of unknown candidates, said he has no money for a ―fancy campaign.‖ ―The first words I want to tell the people are: security all over the country, social justice, rule of law, and education for the people of Afghanistan,‖ said Zuri, a 60-year- old from the western city of Herat who has worked in the commerce and finance ministries.

The Taliban have urged the country‘s 30 million people not to vote and have launched minor and scattered attacks on voting registration centers. But Taliban leaders have not said whether they will attempt a large-scale disruption of the election. The Afghan government, the U.N. and the U.S. and NATO militaries are working to provide enough security so Afghans from the snowcapped mountains in the north to the unending deserts in the south may cast votes.

Thousands of new troops are pouring in to help protect the balloting. Kai Eide, the top U.N. official in Afghanistan, said Monday that ―intimidation, inflammatory language and violence of any sort‖ have no place in the campaign. ―I look forward to an election campaign where each candidate presents a vision for Afghanistan‘s future. More than ever, the Afghan people need a debate focused on the key political challenges facing the country and how to take Afghanistan forward,‖ Eide said in a statement.

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The vote will be Afghanistan‘s second democratic presidential election. It comes against a backdrop of rising violence blamed on militants who have gained in power in recent years and as public anger reverberates against U.S. troops for accidental civilian killings.

President Barack Obama has made the war in Afghanistan one of his top priorities and has ordered 21,000 additional U.S. troops to join the fight. The first contingent began fanning out last month across Afghanistan‘s dangerous south.

In addition to accusations that it is corrupt and ineffective, Karzai‘s government has been blamed within the country for the war‘s rising civilian death toll and he has been condemned as little more than a puppet of Western powers.

But Karzai has consolidated support from all of Afghanistan‘s major ethnic groups in recent weeks. He even named as one of his two vice presidential nominees a former warlord accused of rights abuses _ Mohammad Qasim Fahim. A former commander in the Northern Alliance, Fahim is expected to help deliver ethnic Tajik votes from Afghanistan‘s north, but he has already drawn heavy criticism from rights groups and a top U.N. official. Leaders in the ethnic Uzbek and Hazara communities have also publicly backed Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun.

Azizullah Lodin, the head of Afghanistan‘s election commission, announced the final list of candidates Saturday. He said he believed many of them were not qualified but that he had no power to remove them from the ballot.

A council of top Afghan tribal and political leaders appointed the U.S.-backed Karzai as Afghanistan‘s interim president in June 2002, months after the ouster of the Taliban regime. He then swept presidential elections in October 2004. In that election, 18 candidates ran for president. Karzai won in the first round with 55 percent of the vote, while the second placed finisher, Yunus Qanooni, the current speaker of the lower house of parliament, took 16 percent. Qanooni is not running this year.

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THE BATTLE FOR PAKISTAN (JUNE 16, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, June 16th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

The Battle for Pakistan SOURCE: The New York Times Tuesday June 16, 2009 By ISMAIL KHAN & ERIC SCHMITT

The area, South Waziristan, presents the toughest challenge for Pakistan in its fight to curb its growing insurgency. It is home to Baitullah Mehsud, Pakistan‘s enemy No. 1, who leads the Taliban here and has engineered dozens of suicide bombings in recent years.

Mr. Mehsud now has thousands of fighters entrenched in mountain terrain that is nearly impossible for conventional armies to navigate, and past efforts to capture him, most recently last year, have failed. What is more, Pakistan is fighting the Taliban in several areas already and has committed 22,000 troops to its campaign in the valley, called Swat. While military officials say troop strength is not a problem, more forces will be needed to hold newly taken areas, which have gone unpatrolled for years.

―South Waziristan will be a very hard nut to crack,‖ said Talat Masood, a military analyst and retired Pakistani general. ―It is the mother of all problems.‖ ―It‘s here that the real battle for the soul of Pakistan will be fought,‖ he said. Mr. Mehsud has often hidden in plain sight — even holding well-attended news conferences — fueling suspicions that the government has not been serious about killing or capturing him.

But this time is different, analysts and officials say. The military is buoyed by a level of public support and political consensus that it never had before. In the Swat Valley last year, timidity, half measures and limited patrols left the military bogged down in more than a year of fighting. It finally agreed to cede the area to the Taliban in February. After the Taliban took yet another district, the military finally fought back last month, displacing millions of civilians, but also putting the Taliban on the defensive.

In Waziristan, the challenge is similar, if much harder. A succession of peace deals over the years have allowed Mr. Mehsud and his supporters to dig themselves securely into some of the most rugged terrain in the country. Virtually the only pressure on Mr. Mehsud and his supporters and allies, which include elements of Al Qaeda, has been applied by missile strikes by remotely piloted American drones. But in recent weeks, Pakistan has started quietly applying pressure, bombing suspected hide-outs in three areas, strikes that a United States Defense Department official called the beginning of the next phase of the campaign against the Taliban.

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FATA-NWFP (source: Khyber.org)

On Monday, Pakistan‘s army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, flew over the region and said Mr. Mehsud ―must be eliminated.‖ The army has choked off roads. A heavy equipment dealer from the area said his company had not been able to buy diesel for three weeks. ―We‘re shaping the environment,‖ said a senior Pakistani military official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to give details about operations. ―Choking the routes. Control of exit and entrance. Regulating the movement. Checking.‖ On Sunday, a local official announced that the government had given the go-ahead for an offensive, but a military spokesman on Monday declined to provide details.

Another, more fundamental shift may also be afoot. Mr. Mehsud killed many tribal elders to amass power in his domain, and officials say he has alienated so many people that some are now turning against him.

The military has begun trying to exploit a rift within the Taliban itself to further isolate him, analysts said. ―If someone skinned Baitullah Mehsud alive, no one would cry in this country,‖ said an official based in Peshawar, the regional capital, who helps oversee the area. ―The environment that made Baitullah is no more.‖

One such faction is led by two of Mr. Mehsud‘s former allies: Qari Zainuddin and Turkestan Bhaitani. Residents in the towns where they are strong say the group has killed as many as 30 people loyal to Mr. Mehsud. In a sign of their strength, and of Mr. Mehsud‘s waning influence in their area, the group met with several hundred tribesmen near Mr. Mehsud‘s area last week. ―Last year that would have been impossible,‖ said a local journalist who covered the meeting.

The military denies giving any support to the group, but a spokesman for the group said in a telephone interview on Sunday that it received modest financing from the government, through a religious donations fund, Zakat. He said the group had about 2,000 members. Although it opposes Mr. Mehsud, the spokesman said, it supports the Taliban‘s war against

99 the Americans in Afghanistan. ―We are against Baitullah Mehsud and we want to finish him,‖ said the spokesman, who identified himself as Tufan Mehsud.

Fighters loyal to Baitullah Mehsud have been moving into the area from elsewhere in Pakistan to fortify it. Commanders are dividing responsibilities, designating fighters for bomb making and remote detonation, said a fighter who spoke by telephone from the area. ―There‘s a high level of preparation going on in all of South Waziristan,‖ he said. Even in Wana, a town outside Mr. Mehsud‘s area, the roads were so heavily mined that many preferred to walk. The fighters said the Taliban recently shut down courts they operated in the area, telling those who needed disputes resolved to come back in two months, because those who staffed them were now focused on fighting.

An associate of Mr. Mehsud said that the Taliban had the advantage of geography. ―We are up,‖ he said, chopping the air above his head with the side of his hand, ―and they are down.‖ Even if the military prevails, that will be only the beginning. The area is one of the country‘s poorest, a condition that has made it ripe for militancy. A more lasting solution would require economic opportunity and government support, including an adequate police force.

In Bajaur, part of the tribal areas, the military cleared out militants last year, at great cost to civilians, but the militants have reasserted control. The reason, said Mr. Masood, the military analyst, is that a local government was never properly established. That held a lesson. ―Militancy is like a monster,‖ said Habibullah Khan, a top bureaucrat for the tribal areas. ―Even if only the tail is left, it will grow again from there.‖

Ismail Khan contributed reporting from Peshawar, and Eric Schmitt from Washington.

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HEADING FOR THE TALIBAN OF WAZIRISTAN (JUNE 18, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, June 18th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Pakistani Government Offensive in Swat Heading for the Taliban of Waziristan SOURCE: Terrorism Monitor volume 7, issue 17 (June 18, 2009) By: MUKHTAR A. KHAN

After the Swat military offensive, Pakistan‘s military has completed preparations for marching into Waziristan to fight a tough but decisive battle against the hardcore Taliban militia in the rugged mountains. The military offensive on this new front, dubbed ―Operation Rah-e-Nijat‖ (Path of Salvation), is the extension and next phase of ―Operation Rah-e-Rast‖ (Straight Path), regarded as Pakistan‘s first major military operation since the War on Terrorism began. Huge losses were inflicted on Taliban militants during this operation. The Taliban are under immense pressure and their top leadership is on the run towards safer places. Some of them are believed to have moved into the bigger cities of Pakistan while the majority of them are penetrating deep into the South Waziristan tribal agency bordering Afghanistan. The government of Pakistan has vowed to chase the militants inside Waziristan, where Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief Baitullah Mahsud has strong bases. Already the militants have reacted to the Swat offensive by bombing luxury hotels and targeting police and military convoys. Recently, Peshawar and other nearby cities have been their main target for terrorist attacks, but they are also active in far away cities like Lahore, where they killed senior cleric Mufti Sarfaraz Naeemi in a suicide blast for his anti-Taliban ideology. The Taliban are making last ditch efforts to unnerve the government through their attacks, but the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Owais Ahmad Ghani has vowed to track the militants until their terrorist network is dismantled (Dawn [Karachi], June 15).

Battle for Waziristan

Pakistan‘s army has formally announced the launching of its military operation into South Waziristan – the stronghold of Baitullah Mahsud and the TTP network. This is considered to be potentially the toughest battle Pakistan‘s military has fought against the Taliban. All the pro-Taliban, banned jihadi outfits like Sipah-e-Sahaba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e- Jhangvi and other militant organizations from South Punjab are expected to join this battle in the interests of their own survival. There are reports that Taliban militants from Swat, Bajaur, Mohmand, Kurram and Darra Adam Khel have entered into South Waziristan. Pakistan‘s military spokesman Major General Athar Abbas has said they have carried out all the preparations and groundwork to challenge Baitullah‘s 10,000-strong militia. The government has already moved heavy weaponry into areas adjoining Waziristan. Fearing a bloody battle between the military and Taliban in the area, families have started vacating the Mahsud region of the South Waziristan (Daily Times [Lahore], June 17; The News [Islamabad], June 11).

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The targeted killings of religious clerics and suicide bombings in mosques and marketplaces have turned the popular tide against Baitullah Mahsud. There has been a significant shift in public opinion against him and his TTP network. Now even his one-time sympathizers want the elimination of his terror network.

Recently, there emerged a strong alliance against Baitullah, formed by Turkistan Bhittani and Qari Zainuddin Mahsud. The group has the tacit support of the government. Turkistan Bhittani and Qari Zainuddin have openly challenged Baitullah Mahsud, calling him an enemy of Islam and Pakistan. Speaking to local jirgas, they have vowed to take revenge against Baitullah for the killing of innocent Pakistani civilians and security forces (Khabrain [Lahore], June 14).

Turkistan Bhittani, 40, once a friend of Baitullah Mahsud who fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan, is now his biggest enemy. Turkistan also served in the Frontier Corps (FC) until his retirement in 1998. He developed differences with Baitullah and parted ways with him when Baitullah slaughtered some FC officials and began using suicide bombing as a tool to terrorize his opponents inside Pakistan.

Qari Zainuddin Mahsud, in his mid 20‘s, leads the group formerly belonging to Abdullah Mahsud, a former detainee of Guantanamo who was killed by Pakistani military action in Baluchistan in July 2006. Belonging to the same tribe as Baitullah Mahsud, Qari Zainuddin poses a tough challenge for the TTP commander. The alliance of Turkistan and Qari Zainuddin has made it difficult for Baitullah to move around in the strategically important areas of Tank and Dera Ismail Khan (Dawn, June 16).

Even within the TTP, some rifts are expected to become more visible in the coming days. Mullah Nazir in South Waziristan and Haji Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan have shown some preference towards the government in the event of military operations in the area, declaring they do not wish to fight against Pakistani security forces.

All these developments indicate the isolation of Baitullah Mahsud. But he still enjoys the undisputed leadership of the TTP, which has a presence in all seven tribal agencies, along with some districts of the NWFP. He has a trained militia of over 10,000 men, including several hundred suicide bombers who have demonstrated their ability to strike anywhere in Pakistan.

Fallout of Military Operations

The apparent success of Operation Rah-i-Raast has come at a great cost. It has displaced over 2.5 million people from the war zones of the greater Swat Valley. Richard Holbrooke, President Obama‘s Special Envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan, admitted during his recent trip to Pakistani refugee camps that the issue of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) is a major crisis, describing it as the biggest mass exodus in Pakistan since its creation in 1947 (Daily Times [Lahore], June 11; Radio Buraq, June 4). The government was clearly not prepared to place and feed the IDP influx into Mardan, Swabi and other parts of the country.

The use of heavy artillery and aircraft against the militants in Swat was another factor that contributed to the misery of the people trapped in the valley, resulting in civilian casualties. Unable to counter the Army‘s operations against the militants, the majority of the top TTP leadership escaped to the adjoining tribal areas and other safe hideouts in Malakand Division.

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Successful operations against the insurgents have been conducted through surgical strikes involving Special Commando Forces and local police (The News, May 28). It is believed that the majority of militants from the Swat Valley have left for South Waziristan, where they are planning to strike back against the government and other anti-Taliban elements. The recent suicide bombing at Peshawar‘s only five-star hotel, the Pearl Continental, was a message from the Taliban to the opposition in response to ongoing military operations. The hotel is significant for its use by foreign dignitaries, including the officials of relief agencies dealing with the IDPs, and is located close to the provincial parliament, the High Court and residences of the Governor, Chief Minister and Corps Commander (provincial military chief). This attack was soon followed by other suicide attacks on police officials and mosques in various parts of the NWFP, including those in Nowshera and Dera Ismail Khan. However, it was the June 12 killing of Mufti Sarfaraz Naeemi in Lahore by the Taliban that provoked countrywide condemnation and violent protests against the TTP. Mufti Naeemi, 61, was a respected Sunni- Barelvi cleric who had spoken out against the Taliban and declared suicide bombing un- Islamic (Dawn, June 14). Despite this, the Taliban have issued warnings they will kill more high profile clerics in Pakistan (Daily Times, June 17).

The IDP Crisis

The lack of sufficient funds, infrastructure, and services has disappointed the majority of the IDPs in tented camps. About 90 percent of these IDPs prefer to live in school buildings, mosques and with host-families where the relief agencies find it difficult to track them down for the proper distribution of aid and services. The government has not yet chalked out any short or long-term policies for the placement and rehabilitation of the massive influx of refugees from Malakand Division and those now arriving from South Waziristan as well. The majority of the IDPs from Waziristan prefer to go to Karachi instead of Peshawar. The reason is that Mahsud and Wazir have businesses and family relations in Karachi. However, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) has already protested against the settlement of these IDPs in Karachi, saying this will spread in Karachi (The News, May 28).

In the face of these crises, the IDPs have suffered most from the ongoing military operation. However, so far they have supported the government in its offensive. The lack of assistance from the government and aid agencies and the spoiling of ready-to-harvest crops back home have created an urgency in the IDPs to return home as soon as possible. In Dhog Darra of Dir district in Malakand, some 2,500 villagers who do not want to become IDPs have raised armed lashkars (ad-hoc militias) against the Taliban and have successfully flushed the TTP from some villages with initial support from the military. Now the lashkars need more military support to completely eliminate the militants‘ network from the area, but they complain of not getting backup from the military (Dawn, June 17).

Conclusion

In the Swat military offensive, the government claimed to have killed more than 1,400 militants, among them the Taliban‘s second and third-tier leadership. However the fact is that the top Taliban leadership is still at large, which is worrisome for the IDPs who fled the region. They fear the Taliban‘s comeback if they are not brought to justice.

The extensive and ongoing military operation against the Taliban cannot be fully successful unless there are proper arrangements for the IDPs. If the IDPs lose hope in the government, their makeshift camps can turn into breeding grounds for Talibanization. At the same time,

103 these IDPs are a great opportunity for both Pakistan and the United States. In this hour of misery and need, their hearts and minds can be won by only a small effort to feed, place and rehabilitate them. They need to be visited and be listened to in their camps by dignitaries, as in the example set by former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President Obama‘s Special Envoy to Pakistan-Afghanistan, Richard Holbrooke. This is the first time during the last eight years that a significant majority of Pakistanis are standing together against the militants. If this opportunity is lost, another one may not be available in the near future.

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PAKISTAN‟S POLITICAL LANDSCAPE (JUNE 19, 2009)

Written by admin on Friday, June 19th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Pakistan’s political landscape SOURCE: The News International Friday, June 19, 2009 By DR MUZAFFAR IQBAL

It can be said with enough justification that all of Pakistan‘s current troubles stem from the failure of its political leadership. Had there been visionary politicians, Pakistan would not have taken the course it did. It is customary to exclude Mr Jinnah from any criticism of the subsequent failures of the political leadership at the time of Pakistan‘s establishment (giving him the margin of doubt and considering the short time he had after the establishment of Pakistan), but certainly something was rotten in the very make up of the All India Muslim League that began the political rot on the eve of Pakistan‘s coming into existence. Had there been a political party rooted in solid principles, had there been a process of training the newcomers, and had there been a sincere attachment to the land and its people, we could have avoided most of the turmoil that began in 1948 and that continues to define the political landscape of Pakistan.

What has been done cannot be undone, but the real question is what is to be done now to ensure the emergence of a new class of politicians who can take charge of the country and take it out of its present state? The answer, of course, is the emergence of a mature political leadership which is deeply entrenched in a certain vision and is personally above all reproach. At the same time, the army and politicians must stop their rotational musical chairs which have so far defined the pattern of rule in Pakistan. There must now emerge a new political landscape. But how?

The two main political parties are hopelessly person-centred. They exist because of the person at the top. After the demise of BB, the future of the Pakistan Peoples Party remains uncertain, but it was more or less a Bhutto party. Nawaz League is just what it is called: Nawaz League. All other political parties are, likewise, person-centred. This includes the Tahrik-e-Insaf, the ANP and of course the MQM. The only exception is Jamaat-e-Islami. It can be said that this gravitation to a person is in the very psyche of our people. Unable to fathom the abstract, they find attachment with the concrete image of a person. At a certain level, it is true of all eastern people. Political landscape of most of the eastern world is defined by persons, rather than principles, institutions, and political parties. This is true of India, Bangladesh, and most of the Arab world.

While it is not possible to change this psychological makeup which has existed for centuries, it is still possible to rearrange the political landscape in order to focus on policies and issues, rather than persons. In order for this to happen, one needs to have a clear understanding of the principles which can govern a polity without relying on persons. Hence, the need to first

105 define, understand, and have a mass-appeal to certain principles. In the case of Pakistan, a new political landscape can only emerge if a major shift is made in making these principles the mainstay of political parties. Because of the myopic leadership, it is not reasonable to expect this to happen in the case of the main political parties, although both the Jamaat-e- Islami and the Tahrik-e-Insaf have the potential to register a significant change in this process of transference of focus from persons to principles.

For a new political landscape to emerge, we need a new generation of Pakistanis to be trained as politicians — people who have the intellectual resources to analyse the current political order of their country and the world and develop critical tools to affect a major change. Politics need not be a constant show of sorts; it need not be mere deception, greed and blind gravitation towards power; it can be a sincere commitment to a cause. The cause here being the well-being of the country and those who live in this land full of resources.

This new perspective cannot emerge without conscious efforts and training of a new class of politicians. Back in the late 1960s, Z A Bhutto had started such a process of political training of PPP workers on the Chinese model, but he abandoned it as soon as he came to power. The Jamaat-e-Islami has the process of training of its workers as an ongoing effort, but it has not been able to develop a larger base and it does not have a sustained and effective mechanism of involving those who are not already within its fold.

Assuming that the military will not take over once again during the next decade, one can think of a ten-year sustained programme of training which will produce a new breed of politicians. For this to happen there must be a national effort. Since such an effort is not in the self- interest of most politicians now on Pakistan‘s political landscape, they will not like this effort. But are there not enough individuals in Pakistan to understand the need for a fundamental change in Pakistan‘s political landscape to start this effort?

The writer is a freelance columnist. Email: [email protected]

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TRIBESMEN ON THEIR OWN (JUNE 19, 2009) Written by admin on Friday, June 19th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Tribesmen on their own SOURCE: Dawn Friday, June 19, 2009 By SYED IRFAN ASHRAF

Wednesday, June 17, 2009. Over 2,500 villagers are up in arms against 200 dreaded Taliban militants in the inaccessible mountain terrain of Dhog Dara, 25 kilometres northwest of Dir in Upper Dir.

Local tribesmen have encircled the Taliban militants for the last fortnight or so, and are locked in fierce fighting to which there appears to be no end in sight — unless the state steps in to overpower or flush out the militants. The confrontation started on June 5 when a suicide bomber struck a mosque in Hayagai Sharqi in Upper Dir killing over 40 tribesmen. After attending the burial rites, more than 700 enraged locals from Hayagai Sharqi and the nearby villages marched on the thickly forested Dhog Dara valley — where there is a cluster of 25 villages — to settle scores with the Taliban. Initially 13 Taliban were killed, including two commanders, and the homes of their supporters demolished. Hemmed in, the Taliban found themselves restricted to the strategic hilltop in Ghazigai village at the western edge of Dhog Dara. Since then, they have been corralled by a swelling lashkar, composed of people from most of the villages of Dhog Dara.

However, the drop scene is yet to take place. The tribesmen fear that the fortified bunkers equipped with arms, ammunition and food will give the militants the edge allowing them to drag on the battle and test the nerve of the tribesmen.

Strategically, Dhog Dara links Taliban hideouts, through its snowy mountains, with Swat in the southeast, Chitral in the north and far beyond into Afghanistan in the northwest. The militants cannot ignore such an important location. The local people say that the Afghan Taliban arrived in the valley three years ago and were later joined by their comrades from Mardan and Swat. They lived mostly in isolation; however, soon they were offering hefty amounts as rent for shabby mud houses and offering support to locals against their rivals. The absence of the government‘s writ gave the Taliban a free hand in entrenching themselves. In 2007, the Taliban began to make their agenda clear by launching an FM radio station in Dhog Dara to preach jihad to the local community. They won the support of five villages. But, according to Abul Kalam, a resident in the area, people became aware of the real face of the militants when a journalist-cum-NGO worker, Akhtar Kohistani, escaped from the militants, who had abducted him for ransom, in January 2009 and sought the tribesmen‘s help.

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The people of Shringal village cut off the main supply route to adjoining Dhog Dara and asked the villagers to evict the Taliban. This led to a confrontation amongst the villagers with the Taliban playing on their differences.

Fortunately, a temporary solution came in the form of a lashkar from adjoining villages that outnumbered the Taliban. According to Kalam, ‗Many Taliban left for Afghanistan. Some stayed back and destroyed the mosque in a suicide attack to tame the villagers into submission.‘ The confrontation had simmered for months while the civil administration in Dir and the political leadership in Peshawar and Islamabad looked the other way. Although the district coordination officer of Upper Dir claims that contacts were made with the local tribesmen for handling the Taliban problem, the tribesmen say that official help in the form of arms was too little and too late in coming.

Three days after the mosque blast, helicopter gunships targeted Taliban hideouts in Ghazigai village. The lashkar members, entrenched in the surrounding mountains, kept on calling their Islamabad-based MNA to request the military not to shell the surrounding villages and target only the Taliban bunkers. But apparently, their call was not heeded and over 500 families were forced to leave. As a tribal elder pointed out, before shifting his family to safety, ‗The more people get displaced, the more the militants will be strengthened.‘

This saga is indicative of the fact that an indifferent official response only bolsters rogue elements. After the US invasion of Afghanistan, it took militants almost seven years to establish their network in Pakistan‘s northwest. Almost every militant commander launched his own FM radio station in order to carve out his terror fiefdom. However, such developments went unnoticed by the powers that be.

It is not a good idea to be convinced by ISPR images of destroyed tunnels and militants‘ bunkers in the Peuchar valley and other areas. It took almost a decade for the militants to build their infrastructure under the very nose of the state, and it will take the state a similar number of years to eradicate this. This can be attributed both to the massive intelligence failure on the part of the state as well as the superior managerial skills of the Taliban leadership, who supervised their terror industry from unfriendly locations in faraway Waziristan and Afghanistan.

In fact, it was much before Mullah Fazlullah made his mark that the ragtag militants organised their terror network in early 2003 in Swat. They hired a piece of land from a respectable family in the remote but strategic Gutpeuchar valley bordering Lower Dir. At that time, it was not too difficult to run training camps in the remoteness of the mountains as many such camps had enjoyed state patronage in the past. However, by 2003 the militants stepped up hostilities, launching rocket attacks against the office of an intelligence agency in Balogram, Swat.

In one such attack two officials were killed. Strangely enough, intelligence agencies threatened journalists not to publish the news. ‗I was harassed when I dared published it. The intelligence tried to turn my colleagues against me for working against the interests of Swat,‘ said a journalist, who later left the area, and even his profession temporarily.

The tribesmen of Dhog Dara are not alone in their worries. Almost everyone in the settled districts is passing through the same agony. It is the duty of the government to take the rogue elements to task. However, a flawed security apparatus and a listless political leadership

108 cannot support the public whose anger could have formed the basis for a major rebellion against the Taliban in Malakand division and the province. [email protected]

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DEOBAND ULEMA TERM ALL TALIBAN ACTIONS UN-ISLAMIC (JUNE 20, 2009)

Written by admin on Saturday, June 20th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Deoband ulema term all Taliban actions un-Islamic SOURCE: Dawn Saturday, June 20, 2009

KARACHI: Senior clerics of India‘s top seminary whose version of Islam the Taliban claim to follow have denounced the actions of the hardline militia, saying the group does not qualify to enjoy affiliations with the historic madressah.

In an interview with a correspondent of the BBC Urdu Service, the rector and the head of faculty of Darul Uloom (Waqf) Deoband said attacks by ‗vigilantes‘ in which innocent people died was not jihad but ‗individual zulm (oppression)‘.

Seen in this light, attacks on shrines, barber shops and educational institutions were all un- Islamic. Maulana Saalim Qasimi went to the extent of characterising the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which was ousted by the US forces in 2001, as ‗un-Islamic‘.

He said the Taliban did not comprehend fully the tenets of Islam even though much was made of their ‗Islamic government‘.

He said Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman, who supported the Afghan regime, was not a religious scholar. ‗He is more of a politician than a scholar.‘ ‗However, his father, Mufti Mehmood, was a scholar,‘ he said.

Maulana Aslam Qasimi, great grandson of Qasim Nanotvi, the founder of the madressah, said the recent statement by Sufi Mohammad that judiciary in Pakistan was un-Islamic was based on misconceptions and ignorance.

He said that Islam embraced concepts like democracy. ‗The spirit of democracy is very much there in Islam, though concepts like democracy have been taking new shapes and forms.‘

Comments

By Madhavan on June 22nd, 2009 at 8:45 pm

Clerics of Deoband, what made you wait for more than a decade to give fatwa on rule of Taliban in Afghanistan? Who is responsible for innocent Muslims joining Taliban movement, thinking it to be Islamic? if delayed fatwa was deliberate then blood of all Muslims killed in violence is on deobandi heads. Even now these deobandi heads are quiet on bombing worship places. 110

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FANTASY OF US-MEHSUD NEXUS (JUNE 23, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, June 23rd, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Fantasy of the US-Mehsud nexus SOURCE: The News International Tuesday, June 23, 2009 By SADIQ SALEEM

Whenever the Pakistani nation is on the brink of consensus against the excesses of the Jihadi networks, some weavers of conspiracy theories invoke anti-Americanism to confuse the nation and destroy the consensus. The latest example of this trend is the fantastic story about Baitullah Mehsud, a man now clearly identified as a threat to the Pakistani state, as operating at the behest of the United States. Blaming the Americans absolves of any responsibility our own establishment and the grand Jihadi enterprise (which some call Jihad Inc.) that has existed since the days of the CIA and ISI-backed Jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. It is much easier to shift blame to an outside power than to acknowledge that internal forces, nurtured for regional influence, have gone out of control and are threatening the fabric of society and the integrity of the state. This is not to say that the Taliban do not receive support from outsiders. But the outsiders that must be blamed - the al-Qaeda network, with roots in different parts of the Muslim world - and not the US must be seen as the source of this threat to Pakistani sovereignty.

Soon after the assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan‘s intelligence services produced a taped conversation ostensibly proving Baitullah Mehsud‘s connection to this reprehensible murder. But within a couple of days of the assassination, the pro-Taliban elements in the Pakistani media reported extensively that the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan had nothing to do with Ms Bhutto‘s murder and in fact saw it as a conspiracy against Pakistan.

In reports published in newspapers under the title ‗Baitullah denies hand in Benazir‘s assassination,‘ published on December 30, 2007, it was highlighted that Mehsud rejected the allegations of involvement in Benazir Bhutto assassination as ―baseless‖. According to a report, ―We are equally grieved by the tragic death of Benazir Bhutto and extend our sympathies to her family and party workers in this hour of grief,‖ said Maulvi Omar, a Spokesman for Baitullah Mehsud and his Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, a conglomerate of all the militant organisations operating in tribal areas as well as the settled districts of the NWFP.

The report further said, ―Baitullah Mehsud, Ameer or central leader of the recently-formed Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, was accused by the Interior Ministry Spokesman Brig (R) Javed Iqbal Cheema of sending the suicide bomber who blew himself up near the vehicle of Benazir Bhutto outside the Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi.‖

It explained, ―Maulvi Omar, who made a call to the newspaper from an undisclosed location, on Saturday said Baitullah Mehsud, while sensing the gravity of the allegations levelled

112 against him, convened an emergency meeting of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Shura comprising senior militant commanders at a secret place somewhere between South and North Waziristan tribal region to clarify his position. ‗Why on earth would we kill her? We had no enmity with her and more importantly she had done no wrong to us,‘ Maulvi Omar said while quoting Baitullah Mehsud as telling the Shura meeting. He said that it was against the teachings of Islam and Shariah as well as the centuries old rich traditions of the tribal people to harm a woman and added that the government allegations against the militant commander were part of face-saving moves it had resorted to ever since the incident took place.‖

According to the December 30 news report, Maulvi Omar argued, ―By blaming us for the murder of an important political leader like Benazir Bhutto, the government is in fact misguiding the world. Planning such actions is simply beyond our imagination. We want to assure the Pakistan People‘s Party leaders and its workers that we can‘t even think of killing their leader. We are with them in this hour of grief and sorrow.‖ He alleged that the government was attempting to portray the tribal areas as centres of terrorists so as to earn dollars from, what he termed as, Western masters. ―This is why they keep the tribal belt in continuous grip of violence.‖

The Tehrik-e-Taliban turned around and accused ―the secret agencies for the crime,‖ claiming that ―the modus operandi and precision of the strike revealed that the gruesome act was committed by professional hands.‖ It is interesting that the same media persons who are today propounding the theory that Baitullah Mehsud is not only responsible for Ms Bhutto‘s murder but that he is connected to US intelligence were in the forefront of defending Mehsud in the immediate aftermath of the Bhutto assassination.

On March 1, 2008 Baitullah Mehsud was declared a ―proclaimed offender‖ with a warrant of arrest issued for him by an anti-terrorist court in Rawalpindi for masterminding the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in that city on December 27, 2007. At that time, Pakistan‘s media described him as ―an unrelenting foe to the Pakistani military in the hard battleground of South Waziristan‖ and as someone who was ―leading his Pakistani Taliban to aid the Afghan Taliban under Jalaluddin Haqqani and his sons in neighbouring Afghanistan during various forays against US-Nato forces.‖

Long before some anti-American media militants started espousing the ―Baitullah works for US intelligence‖ theory, an April 2008 report posited in alternative theory. It said, ―It increasingly appears that Baitullah may have been more of a scapegoat rather than a perpetrator in the assassination of Bhutto. In the shadowy world of the many Islamist groups, renegade elements of [Pakistani intelligence] and rival politicians who have hated Benazir Bhutto, Baitullah registered more clearly in the public eye. The proscribed Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (Army of Jhangvi) could very well be the real culprit. But in the tradition of blaming all terrorist acts on Osama bin Laden, Pakistan‘s military and the US government have found it convenient to lay the blame squarely on Baitullah, especially since he has become such a public figure in the global war on terrorism. The elimination of Baitullah would now meet with greater public approval.‖

On December 1, 2008 reports and articles in newspapers say, ―Army official calls Baitullah Mehsud, Fazlullah ‗patriots.‘‖

An article in a newpaper says: ―All main militant groups fighting in Fata, from South Waziristan to Bajaur and from Mohmand to the Khyber Agency, have contacted the

113 government through different sources after the Mumbai bombings and have offered a ceasefire if the Pakistan Army also stops its operations. And as a positive sign that this ceasefire offer may be accepted, the Pakistan Army has, as a first step, declared before the media some notorious militant commanders, including Baitullah Mehsud and Maulvi Fazlullah, as ―patriotic‖ Pakistanis.‖

It further says, ―These two militant commanders [Baitullah Mehsud and Fazlullah] are fighting the Army for the last four years and have invariably been accused of terrorism against Pakistan but the aftermath of the Mumbai carnage has suddenly turned terrorists into patriots. A top security official told a group of senior journalists on Saturday: ‗We have no big issues with the militants in Fata. We have only some misunderstandings with Baitullah Mehsud and Fazlullah. These misunderstandings could be removed through dialogue.‘‖

It says, ―The Indian allegations against Pakistan have suddenly forced the military establishment in Pakistan to finally accept that they [the Taliban leaders] are not fighting an American war inside the Pakistani territory.‖

Other reports quoted Muslim Khan, a Spokesman for the Tehrik-e-Taliban Swat, as saying in the aftermath of the Mumbai crisis, ―Whatever our differences are with the government, there is no second opinion on the sovereignty and defence of the country. We offer our unconditional support to the government at this hour of need.‖ The spokesman described Taliban leaders Baitullah Mehsud and Maulvi Fazlullah as ―patriotic‖ Pakistanis. ―They have no differences with Pakistan but with the government and the army,‖ suggested Khan. ―We offer the government to hand over the western borders to us and deploy the army on eastern borders to defend any Indian invasion. We assure them that we are fully capable of defending the western borders, and India knows that very well.‖

So, how are we to understand the more recent reports that suggest that Baitullah is an American agent and that all ills besetting Pakistan - from Benazir Bhutto‘s assassination to the Talibanization of Swat —were somehow US-inspired projects? The explanation can be found in the inability of our establishment and leaders to come clean and reveal all facts about the past before making a new beginning.

The nation wants the Taliban to be confronted, fought and removed as a threat to the nation‘s tranquillity. But those who have presented the concept of endless Jihad as a national security project for three decades, and the support industry comprising pro-Jihadi commentators, cannot accept this sudden loss of livelihoods. Having presented the Taliban as well-meaning Mujahids who simply resented US domination of Afghanistan and the region, these commentators now have the difficult task of changing their story at a time when popular sentiment in Pakistan has turned against the Taliban. What can be better than to twist the story and suggest that the Taliban‘s offensive actions including the murder of Pakistan‘s most popular politician were somehow connected to the United States. Hating America is easy so if the nation now hates Baitullah Mehsud, let him be linked to the Americans too. Why bother about facts when we have conspiracy theories?

Sadiq Saleem is a businessman and part-time analyst based in Toronto, Canada. [email protected]

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ZAINUDDIN‟S ASSASSINATION EXPOSES TALIBAN RIFTS (JUNE 25, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, June 25th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Zainuddin’s assassination exposes Taliban rifts SOURCE: Daily Times Thursday, June 25, 2009 AP

South Waziristan residents adopting a wait-and-see approach Neither Taliban commander ready to send fighters to Mehsud’s aid for fear of drone strikes

PESHAWAR: The assassination of Qari Zainuddin, the leader of the renegade Taliban faction, by one of his own men underscores a growing rift in the ranks of the Taliban as they brace for an impending army assault.

Zainuddin‘s killing on Tuesday sets back government hopes of exploiting these internal divisions in South Waziristan, where the army has been pounding strongholds of Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud in apparent preparation for a major offensive.

Although Zainuddin was never seen as a serious challenger to Mehsud, the government had clearly hoped his outspoken criticism of the Taliban leader would foster others to defect and help the army with tips on where to find him.

Mahmood Shah, a former top security official, said the slaying sends a message to the government that only a major operation would have a chance of defeating Mehsud.

―Baitullah Mehsud has overcome all tribal dynamics. He has resources, funding and a fighting force to strike anywhere in Pakistan,‖ Shah said, calling him a front man for Al Qaeda and his home base of South Waziristan the ―epicentre in the war on terror‖.

The strength of the mutineers - led by Zainuddin, Turkestan Baitni and Commander Amir Thesil - is dwarfed by Mehsud‘s army, said a tribal leader from South Waziristan who asked not to be identified because he feared either Mehsud or Mehsud‘s enemies would kill him. He estimated Mehsud‘s strength at upwards of 12,000 fighters, including Pakistanis, Afghans, Arabs, Uzbeks, Burmese, Chinese and even some Americans and Australians.

―They have control of the whole Mehsud area,‖ the tribal leader said, referring to a 4,000- kilometre swath of land in the remote, mountainous tribal zone. ―He will be difficult to eliminate. The Pakistani forces will face a tough fight.‖

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―Any further defections from Baitullah‘s group might not take place,‖ Shah said, adding that Zainuddin‘s value to the government was that of a potential informant who ―could tell where the hideouts would have been.‖

Army spokesman Gen Athar Abbas said that the military has not helped any of the anti- Mehsud Taliban forces, which he said have not demonstrated an ability to protect themselves.

―The government may be engaging with them and may be doing whatever at a political level,‖ said Abbas, but the military isn‘t ready to partner with any insurgents who ―might end up being a future problem for us‖.

Zainuddin, who broke with Mehsud in 2007, was estimated to have about 3,000 armed followers in the towns of Dera Ismail Khan and nearby Tank.

Although Zainuddin too had a ruthless past, he denounced Mehsud this month for recent attacks on mosques that killed clerics and civilians, bombings apparently in retaliation for the army offensive in the Swat valley.

Residents of South Waziristan are adopting a wait-and-see approach to the Pakistani military operation, reluctant to show outright support for an army they worry will not complete the job.

―You have to know that among the tribes we will follow whoever is the strongest,‖ said the tribal leader. A shura, or council of elders, for the Mehsud tribe was held on June 16, but the tribal leaders, who had previously endorsed Mehsud, broke up without any decision except to meet again.

In an agreement four months ago, Baitullah had closed ranks with powerful Taliban leaders - Maulvi Naseer in South Waziristan and Gul Bahadar in North Waziristan. Both men have battle-hardened troops, in contrast to the weaker mutineers, and could prove a more difficult opponent for the Pakistan Army.

While the agreement is holding, there are reports that neither Naseer nor Bahadar is ready to send his fighters to Mehsud‘s aid for fear that they might be hit by US drones patrolling the tribal regions.

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BACKGROUNDER: USEFUL REPORTS (JUNE 30, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, June 30th, 2009

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OLIVIER IMMIG & JAN VAN HEUGTEN: A selection of reports on Afghanistan and Pakistan (and beyond)

Since 11 September 2001 the Taliban, Al Qaeda and religiously based terrorist activities in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India have gained the international limelight. This has resulted in a huge increase in government policy papers, institutional research reports, international conferences and what have you. In our times, these countries have seldom been given closer international scrutiny; reading and analysing it all, next to ‘digesting’ other relevant publications, is practically impossible. As a public service, but also in an attempt to create a helpful broad overview and to provide some sort of scientific data base, we provide a list of as many research reports as we have been and are able to trace. We have experienced that regular institutional libraries (universities, ministries, research institutes, think tanks) are usually not able to provide all the source materials one is searching for. Of course, there are some limitations here as well. Since the large majority of all reports worldwide have been written in English, we only enlist works in that language. This is not to say that reports written in other languages are qualitatively inferior; it merely indicates that they are often less accessible and known. Another limitation is the date of publication; we focus on recent materials, published since 2001. Thirdly, making them all available on-line would require a major administrative operation, no doubt including a lot of haggling about rights and rules. Therefore, we merely provide all titles and authors if mentioned, origin, date and place of publication. Lastly, we have sorted all materials chronologically, starting in 2009.

Reports

2009

FATA - A Most Dangerous Place. Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, January 2009. Author: Shuja Nawaz

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Focus and Exit: An Alternative Strategy for the Afghan War. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, January 2009. Author: Gilles Dorronsoro

The Future of Afghanistan. United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Washington, January 2009. Editor: J Alexander Thier. Contributors: J Alexander Thier, Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, Haseeb Humayoon, Ali A. Jalali, Grant Kippen, Jolyon Leslie, William Maley, Nader Nadery, Barnett R. Rubin, Amin Tarzi, Marvin G. Weinbaum

India in Central Asia. The Road Ahead. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS Special Report 63), New Delhi, January 2009. Author: Raghav Sharma

Mainstreaming Pakistan’s Tribal Belt: A Human Rights and Security Imperative. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Discussion Paper 09-01, Cambridge, MA, January 2009. Author: Zaid Haider

President Obama’s Policy Options in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (IPSU), Clinton TWP, Michigan, January 26, 2009. Author: Hassan Abbas

Swat. A Critical Analysis. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS Research Paper 18), New Delhi, January 2009. Author: Sultan-i-Rome

Afghanistan & Pakistan on the Brink. Framing U.S. Policy Options. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, February 2009. Authors: Frederick Barton, Karin von Hippel, with Mark Irvine, Thomas Patterson, Mehlaqa Samdani

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Rand Corporation. Testimony presented before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 26, 2009, Washington, February 2009. Author: James Dobbins

Failed States and Foreign Military Intervention. The Afghanistan Imbroglio. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS Special Report 67), New Delhi, February 2009. Author: Sonali Huria

Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue-2008. A Review. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS Special Report 65), New Delhi, February 2009. Author: Samarjit Ghosh

Needed: A Comprehensive U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan. The Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington, February 2009. Co-Chairs: Senator Chuck Hagel, Senator John Kerry

Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure. International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 162, February 2009, Dushanbe/Brussels

The Crisis in Afghanistan. Statement before House Armed Services Committee. Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), Washington, February 12, 2009. Author: Anthony A. Cordesman

Emerging Scenario of Talibanization in the region: is there to be a Spring Offensive? Aryana Institute for Regional Research & Advocacy (AIRRA Special Edition/Analytical Report), Islamabad, March 2009. Authors: Khadim Hussain, Mohammad Arif

Reforming the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan’s Transitional Democracy. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, March 2009. Author: Frédéric Grare

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Sustainable Security in Afghanistan. Creating an Effective Responsible Strategy for the Forgotten Front. Center for American Progress, Washington, March 2009. Authors: Lawrence Korb, Caroline Wadhams, Colin Cookman, Sean Duggan

Swat. A Chronology Since 2006. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS Special Report 68), New Delhi, March 2009. Author: Urvashi J Kumar

Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge. International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 164, 13 March 2009, Islamabad/Brussels

Pakistan. The State of the Union. Center for International Policy (CIP), Special Report. Washington, April 2009. Author: Selig S. Harrison

Reconciling With The Taliban? Toward an Alternative Grand Strategy in Afghanistan. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, April 2009. Author: Ashley J. Tellis

Governance, Growth and Development in Afghanistan. Remarks by His Excellency Hamid Karzai, President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The Brookings Institution, Washington, May 5, 2009. Speaker: Hamid Karzai. Moderator: Bruce Riedel

Meeting the Challenges in Pakistan. Trip Report and recommendations for U.S. policy. Center for American Progress, Washington, May 2009. Authors: Lawrence J. Korb, Brian Katulis, Colin Cookman

Pakistan Can Defy the Odds. How to Rescue a failing State. Institute for Policy and Understanding (IPSU), Clinton TWP, Michigan, May 2009. Author: Hassan Abbas

Pakistan. Politics, Religion & Extremism. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS Research paper 21), New Delhi, May 2009. Author: Arshi Saleem Hashmi

Afghanistan’s Election Challenges. International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 171, 24 June 2009, Kabul/Brussels.

Triage: The Next Twelve Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Center for a New American Security (CNAS), Washington, June 2009. Authors: Andrew M. Exum, Nathaniel C. Fick, Ahmed A. Humayun, David J. Kilcullen

2008

The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya. Congressional Research Service (CRS Report for Congress, Code RS 21695), Washington, January 24, 2008. Author: Christopher M. Blanchard

Pakistan and the War on Terror. Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance. Carbegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, January 2008. Author: Ashley J. Tellis

Afghanistan: The Need for International Resolve. International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 145, 6 February 2008, Kabul/Brussels

Anatomy of a Fallacy: The Senlis Council and Narcotics in Afghanistan. The Centre for International Governance Innovation (Working paper No. 34), Waterloo, Ontario, February 2008. Author: Frédéric Grare

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A New Course for Pakistan. Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), Washington, May 2008. Authors: Frederick Barton, Mehlaqa Samdani, Karin von Hippel

Pakistan – U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service (CRS Code RL33498), Washington, Updated May 30, 2008. Author: K. Alan Kronstadt

Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy. Congressional Research Service (CRS Report, Code RL 30588), Washington, July 11, 2008 (Updated). Author: Kenneth Katzman

Kashmir’s Politics of Hate. South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) Volume 7, No. 1, Delhi, July 14, 2008. Author: Praveen Swami

Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words? International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 158, 24 July 2008, Kabul/Brussels

Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR Special Report No. 36), New York, August 2008. Author: Daniel Markey

The U.S. – India Nuclear Deal. Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, September 8, 2008. Authors: Jayshree Bajoria, Esther Pan

Reforming the judiciary in Pakistan. International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 160, 16 October 2008, Islamabad/Brussels.

Stabilizing Afghanistan: Threats and Challenges. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, October 2008. Author: William Maley

Partnership for Progress. Advancing a New Strategy for prosperity and Stability in Pakistan and the Region. Center for American Progress, Washington, November 2008. Authors: Caroline Wadhams, Brian Katulis, Lawrence Korb, Colin Cookman

From Great Game to Grand Bargain. Article in: Foreign Affairs (Council on Foreign Relations), New York, November/December 2008. Authors: Barnett R. Rubin, Ahmed Rashid

2007

Countering the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Losing Friends and making Enemies. SenlisAfghanistan, London, February 2007

Pakistan: Karachi’s Madrasas and Violent Extremism. International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 130, 29 March 2007, Islamabad/Brussels

Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas. International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 131, 2 April 2007, Islamabad/Brussels

Sufism in Central Asia. A Force for Moderation or a Cause for Politicization? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Carnegie Papers), Washington, May 2007. Author: Martha Brill Olcott

Threats to Afghanistan’s Transition. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, May 8, 2007. Participants: Teresita Schaffer, William Maley, Marvin Weinbaum. Moderator: Frédéric Grare 120

Poppy for Medicine. Licensing poppy for the production of essential medicines: an integrated counter-narcotics, development, and counter-insurgency model for Afghanistan. The Senlis Council, London, June 2007

Elections, Democracy and Stability in Pakistan. International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 137, Islamabad/Brussels, 31 July 2007

Pakistani Politics After Lal Masjid. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, August 9, 2007. Author: Tariq Fatemi (Pakistani Ambassador), moderator: Ashley Tellis

A Perilous Course. U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, August 2007. Author: Craig Cohen. Codirectors: Frederick Barton, Karin von Hippel

Rethinking Western Strategies Toward Pakistan. An Action Agenda for the United States and Europe. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, Autumn 2007. Author: Frédéric Grare

Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan. International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing No. 69, 22 October 2007, Islamabad/Brussels

Stumbling Into Chaos: Afghanistan on the Brink. SenlisAfghanistan, London, November 2007

Winding Back Martial Law in Pakistan. International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing No. 70, Islamabad/Brussels, 12 November 2007

Assessing the Afghan – Pakistani Conflict. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, December 3, 2007. Author: Anthony H. Cordesman

2006

Afghanistan National Development Strategy. An Interim Strategy For Security, Governance, Economic Growth & Poverty Reduction. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Summary report, Kabul 2006

The Afghanistan Compact. Building on success. The London Conference on Afghanistan, London, 31 January-1 February 2006

Afghanistan Research Newsletter, Number 8. The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), Kabul, January 2006. Authors: Brandy Bauer, Royce Wiles, Faraidoon Shariq

Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Carnegie papers 65), Washington, January 2006. Author: Frédéric Grare

Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition From Turmoil to Normalcy. Council on Foreign Relations (The Center for Preventive Action), CSR No. 12, New York, March 2006. Author: Barnett R. Rubin

Afghanistan Insurgency Assessment. Insurgency in the Provinces of helmand, Kandahar and Nangarhar. The Signs of an Escalating Crisis. The Senlis Council, London, April 2006

Afghanistan Five Years Later: The Return of the Taliban. SenlisAfghanistan, London, Spring/Summer 2006

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Islam, Militarism, and the 2007-2008 Elections in Pakistan. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Carnegie Papers 70), Washington, August 2006. Author: Frédéric Grare

China – Pakistan Economic Relations. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS Special Report 30), New Delhi, September 2006. Author: Atul Kumar

Comment les ont repris l’offensive (version longue). (How the Taliban retook the offensive). Le Monde Diplomatique, Septembre 2006. Available in English version. Author: Syed Saleem Shahzad

Balochistan. A Backgrounder. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS Special Report 32), New Delhi, October 2006. Author: Priyashree Andley

Pakistan – Afghanistan Relations in the Post-9/11 Era. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Carnegie Papers 72), Washington, October 2006. Author: Frédéric Grare

Balochis of Pakistan: On the Margins of History. The Foreign Policy Centre, London, November 2006

Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes. International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 123, Kabul/Brussels, 2 November 2006

Nederland in Afghanistan (Netherlands in Afghanistan). Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken/Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Den Haag/The Hague, December 2006. Auteur/Author: Karolien Bais

2005

Current Trends in Islamist Ideology. Hudson Institute, Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World, Washington, March 21, 2005. Editors: Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani, Eric Brown

Afghanistan 2005 and Beyond. Prospects for Improved Stability Reference Document. Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, The Hague, April 2005. Authors: Barnett R. Rubin, Humayun Hamidzada, Abby Stoddard

In the Balance. Measuring Progress in Afghanistan. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, July 2005. Author: M. Courtney. Co-authors: H. Riddell, J. Ewers. R. Linder, C. Cohen

Violence in Andijan. 13 May 2005: An Independent Assessment. Central Asia – Caucasus Institute (CACI), Washington/Uppsala, Silk Road Paper, July 2005. Author: Shirin Akiner

A Guide to Parliamentary Elections in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), Kabul, August 2005. Authors: A. Reynolds, Lucy Jones, Andrew Wilder

2004

Road to Ruin: Afghanistan’s Booming Opium Industry. Center for American Progress, New York, October 7, 2004. Author: Barnett R. Rubin

India – U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service (CRS Code IB93097), Library of Congress, Washington, November 4, 2004 (Updated). Author: K. Alan Kronstadt

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Terrorism in Afghanistan and Central Asia. South Asia Analysis Group(Paper No. 1172), New Delhi, 24 November 2004. Author: B. Raman

2003

Re-building the Afghan army. Crisis States programme, Development Research Centre, April 2003. Author: Antonio Giustozzi

2002

The Pashtun Tribal System. Concept Publishers, New Delhi, 2002. Author: Bernt Glatzer

123

KYRGYZ OPERATION REVEALS GROWING TERRORIST THREAT (JULY 1, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, July 1st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Kyrgyz operation against IMU reveals growing terrorist threat SOURCE: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst July 1, 2009 By ROMAN MUZALEVSKY

On June 23, the Kyrgyz State Committee on National Security (GKNB) conducted a special operation against members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a regional terrorist group. The event parallels numerous similar actions that have recently taken place in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The developments point to an increasing threat of local terrorist groups being driven from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas and actively pursuing their agenda in Central Asia following the intensified attacks by the ISAF in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The GKNB reported that 5 terrorists, believed to be affiliated with the IMU, were killed in the operation that took place in the Ferghana Valley in the southern city of Jalalabad. The skirmish resulted in the death of one member of the Special Forces. Weapons, instructions for making explosives, and black masks and uniforms were discovered in the one-story house which the terrorists used as a safe haven. The operation will allegedly be subjected to a special investigation by the Kyrgyz Parliament. Rashid Tagaev, a member of Parliament, underlined that the terrorists were citizens of neighboring countries. He also confirmed the KGNB‘s information that the terrorists were previously trained in Pakistan. According to Kyrgyz law enforcement officials, one of the killed terrorists had a relative who had been involved in a number of terrorist acts in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the ―24kg‖ information agency reported.

Originating in Central Asia, the IMU seeks to overthrow the secular regime in Uzbekistan and establish a caliphate. Aligned with the Arab-led Al Qaeda, it enhances Al Qaeda‘s potential to recruit regional Turkic people to support global jihad against the West and ‗apostate‘ regimes of the Middle East. While the IMU emphasizes the struggle against the ‗near enemies‘ in Central Asia, its activities threaten EU and U.S. security interests and undermine Transatlantic and EU relations with Central Asia. It is also in the position to capitalize on narcotics trafficking in the region to fund growing operations in Europe, Central Asia, and Pakistan/Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Deputy Head of the Tajik GKNB, General Abdullo Nazarov, believes that Tahir Yuldashev, the IMU‘s leader who had allegedly been killed during a U.S. drone attack, is still alive.

Back in May, Uzbek authorities witnessed terrorist attacks on a checkpoint and on the Ministry of Internal Affairs and National Security Service in Khanabad city, once home to the

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American airbase. The attacks were attributed to the IMU. In another case, six people sentenced on charges of membership in the regional extremist group Hizb ut-Tahrir were imprisoned in Uzbekistan. And on June 23, the Tajik national security services detained more than 40 Islamic fundamentalists in a Dushanbe mosque. The arrested, many of whom had studied in Islamic schools in Pakistan, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, are suspected of inciting religious strife and being adherents of the illegal Salafiyya movement.

The number of cases involving terrorism and fundamentalism illustrates both the failure of the regional states to address local political and economic grievances and, ironically, a slim success of the ISAF in Pakistan and Afghanistan that pushes more and more IMU members back to its traditional playground. Despite the demonstrated vigilance, the regional security services are not adequately prepared to meet the growing threat. The former Secretary of the Security Council of Kyrgyzstan, Miroslav Niyazov, stressed the vulnerability of Kyrgyz national security: ―We are not ready to fight off external and internal threats. Frankly speaking, there is no nation-wide level system of security [in Kyrgyzstan].‖ In light of the recent upsurge in regional terrorist activity, MP Tagaev underlined the importance of the US- Kyrgyzstan agreement on the continuing presence of the US base in the country.

Jakypbek Azizov, the head of the Public Security Administration of the Kyrgyz Ministry of Internal Affairs, stressed that deployment of internal security forces to the country‘s south is a response to the situation in Afghanistan and to the infiltration of militants under the disguise of businessmen and civilian experts. The terrorists apparently seek to destabilize the country during the Presidential elections scheduled for July 23.

The conducted arrests are not enough to adequately address the growing threat of terrorism and fundamentalism in the region. Economic development and democratization of the Central Asian states, reconstruction of Afghanistan and solidification of Pakistan as stable and legitimate states are required. The regional sates should also actively pursue coordinated intelligence, immigration, and anti-narcotics trafficking policies. Crucial and most challenging in the overall efforts will be tilting the balance between the need for democratization of the authoritarian regimes and willingness of these states to promote regional security in favor of the former without undermining the latter.

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MOST PAKISTANIS SAY TALIBAN CRITICAL THREAT (JULY 1, 2009) Written by admin on Wednesday, July 1st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Most Pakistanis say Taliban, Qaeda critical threat to country SOURCE: Dawn Wednesday, July 1, 2009 By MASOOD HAIDER

NEW YORK: Most Pakistanis now see the Pakistani Taliban as well as al Qaeda as a critical threat to the country—a major shift from 18 months ago—and support the government and army in their fight in the Swat Valley against the Pakistani Taliban , according to the findings of new public opinion survey released Wednesday. The survey also reveals that the leader of Pakistan Muslim League (N) Nawaz Sharif is the most popular leader in Pakistan and President Asif Zardari the least popular politician. But Mr Zardari‘s poor ratings have not affected Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani who continues to enjoy favourable ratings, as does the Chief Justice of Pakistan‘s supreme court Iftikhar Chaudhry.

‗A sea change has occurred in Pakistani public opinion. The tactics and undemocratic bent of militant groups—in tribal areas as well as Swat—have brought widespread revulsion and turned Pakistanis against them,‘ comments Clay Ramsay, research director at WorldPublicOpinion.org. However, he adds: ‗It‘s crucial to understand that the US is resented just as much as before, despite the US having a new president.‘ An overwhelming majority think that Taliban groups who seek to overthrow the Afghan government should not be allowed to have bases in Pakistan.

Caveat

However, this does not bring with it a shift in attitudes toward the US. A large majority continue to have an unfavourable view of the US government. Almost two-thirds say they do not have confidence in Obama. An overwhelming majority opposes US drone attacks in Pakistan. These are some of the results of a new WorldPublicOpinion.org poll conducted May 17-28, 2009. The nationwide random sample included 1000 Pakistani adults, selected using multi- stage probability sampling, who responded in face-to-face interviews. The margin of error is +/- 3.2 per cent. There has been a huge increase in those who think the ‗activities of Islamist militants and local Taliban‘ are a critical threat to Pakistan—a 47 point rise to 81 per cent, up from 34 per cent in late 2007. If the Pakistani Taliban were to gain control of the country, 75 per cent say this would be bad (very bad, 67 per cent)—though only 33 per cent think this outcome is likely.

Seventy per cent say their sympathies are more with the government than with the Pakistani Taliban in the struggle over Swat. Large majorities express confidence in the government (69

126 per cent) and the military (72 per cent) to handle the situation. Retrospectively, the public leans (by 45 per cent to 40 per cent) towards thinking the government was right to try to make an agreement in which the Pakistani Taliban would shut down its camps and turn in its heavy weapons in return for a shari‘a court system in Swat. But now 67 per cent think the Pakistani Taliban violated the agreement when it sent its forces into more areas, and 63 per cent think the people of Swat disapprove of the agreement.

On the Afghan Taliban, an overwhelming 87 per cent think that groups fighting to overthrow the Afghan government should not be allowed to have bases in Pakistan. Most (77per cent) do not believe the Afghan Taliban has bases in Pakistan. However, if Pakistan‘s government were to identify such bases in the country, three in four (78per cent) think it should close the bases even if it requires using military force. Public attitudes toward al Qaeda training camps follow the same pattern. Those saying the ‗activities of al Qaeda‘ are a critical threat to Pakistan are up 41 points to 82 per cent. Almost all (88 per cent) think al Qaeda should not be allowed to operate training camps in Pakistan. Though 76 per cent do not believe there are such camps, if the Pakistani government were to identify them, 74 per cent say the government should close them, with force if necessary.

This striking new public willingness to see the government directly oppose Taliban groups and al Qaeda owes little or nothing to an ‗Obama effect.‘ A 62 per cent majority expresses low confidence in President Obama to do the right thing in world affairs (none at all, 41 per cent). Only one in three (32 per cent) think his policies will be better for Pakistan; 62 per cent think they will be about the same (26 per cent) or worse (36 per cent).

Views of the US remain overwhelmingly negative. Sixty-nine per cent have an unfavourable view of the current US government (58 per cent very unfavourable)—essentially the same as in 2008. Eighty-eight per cent think it is a US goal to weaken and divide the Islamic world (78 per cent definitely a goal). The US Predator drone attacks aimed at militant camps within the Pakistani border are rejected by 82 per cent as unjustified. On the war in Afghanistan, 72 per cent disapprove of the NATO mission and 79 per cent want it ended now; 86 per cent think most Afghans want the mission ended as well.

Pakistani leaders survey

Asked about the nation‘s leaders, a large majority—68 per cent—views President Zardari unfavourably (very, 50 per cent), but—unlike the recent past—there are multiple national leaders whom most do view favourably. Prime Minister Gilani is seems untarred by negative views of Zardari and gets favourable ratings from 80 per cent of Pakistanis. The restored Chief Justice Chaudhry is very popular (82 per cent), and opposition leader Nawaz Sharif is extremely popular (87per cent). The leader most associated with the Pakistani Taliban, Maulana Sufi Mohammad, is viewed positively by only 18 per cent of Pakistanis.

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PAKISTAN & EU‟S SOFT POWER (JULY 1, 2009) Written by admin on Wednesday, July 1st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Pakistan & EU’s soft power SOURCE: The News International Wednesday, July 1, 2009 By M SAEED KHALID

The first EU-Pakistan summit held in Brussels on June 17 was the clearest sign yet of our partnership with Europe having come of age. The acceptance by 27 members of the European Union to upgrade the dialogue with Pakistan to the level of their rotating presidency represents Europe‘s collective will to treat this country as a worthy member of the international community.

Facing Mr Zardari and his delegation at the conference table was President Vaclav Klaus representing the Czech Presidency, flanked by Jose Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, and Javier Solana, the best known face of the EU. Their four-hour encounter, including a working lunch, was primarily aimed at better understanding each other‘s perception of the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and its disastrous spill-over into Pakistan. The Europeans were keen to measure Pakistan‘s commitment to fighting terrorism and eradicating militancy. And given the gravity of the situation, it was also important for the leaders to give their final approval to the roadmap identifying ways the EU could help Pakistan out of a perilous situation. The snag was that Pakistan wanted a bold expression of solidarity on market access at the summit, and the EU is bound by its own rules-based system, which does not encourage major announcements unless issues have run through the Brussels bureaucracy and decisions approved by all 27 EU member-states.

Those looking for quick pickings at EU Headquarters should realise that the EU‘s soft power today is the result of a painstaking process of integration begun after World War II. A well- knit union of 27 members, with a population of 500 million that accounts for one fifth of the global GDP and represents the world‘s largest trading bloc, the EU has established its credentials as a proactive supporter of democracy, human rights and environmental protection. The European Parliament has assumed the role of a watchdog in these matters. In contrast to Washington, where world leaders flock to listen mostly to America‘s straight talk, the EU represents a combination of economic power, diplomatic finesse and a standards- based culture. Breakthroughs in Brussels are few and far between and virtue lies in maintaining the dialogue.

At this juncture, the EU is prepared to listen to Pakistan with greater sympathy for a variety of reasons. To begin, this was the first encounter with a popularly elected government since Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif‘s visit to Brussels in 1997 for concluding the Third Generation Cooperation Agreement between Pakistan and the Union. The military takeover of 1999 set back its ratification process by many years, which came back on track only after the EU recognised Pakistan‘s pivotal role in the success of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan.

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Secondly, but no less important, is the EU‘s perception that Pakistan is seriously fighting the extremist challenge to the state and there is a wave of sympathy for assisting the displaced populations. Thirdly, Brussels realises that Pakistan‘s battered economy needs support by way of financial aid and enhanced market access in the Union.

Pakistan‘s priority at the summit was to give a clear message to the EU about the pressing need for a level playing field in market access. The European Commission‘s traditional argument that Pakistan enjoys tariff concessions under the GSP scheme had to be countered effectively with the help of statistics to prove how some competitors had dramatically increased their share of EU‘s textile market because of zero tariff under the GSP plus scheme. The ongoing EU-India negotiations on a free trade agreement have further aggravated Pakistan‘s position in terms of future investments in the textile sector. The EU could demonstrate an even-handed approach by expressing its willingness at the summit to initiate talks aimed at an EU-Pakistan FTA.

The war on terror has rendered Pakistan‘s vulnerable economy more fragile. The European Union and the European Parliament have focused a great deal on women‘s and minorities‘ rights in Pakistan, conduct of fair and free elections, curbing terrorist outfits and matters related to nuclear non-proliferation. But at present, the EU is also looking at the pressing humanitarian and development needs of the world‘s sixth-most populous country, facing violence and instability in a highly charged atmosphere. European economic assistance to Pakistan is still channelled mostly through bilateral programmes of countries like the UK, Germany and France. Trade is the crucial area where policy as well as rules and regulations are framed by the Union. Therefore, the Brussels meeting offered a unique opportunity to break new ground.

The Union‘s echo to Mr Zardari‘s slogan of ―trade not aid‖ was: take some aid while we talk about trade. A new package of 72 million euros in humanitarian and economic assistance was announced to supplement the 485 million euros pledged in long-term development aid over the next five years. The joint statement issued at the conclusion of the summit promised a sustained EU-Pakistan dialogue on trade, raising clearly the possibilities of a free trade agreement and concessions in a revamped GSP plus scheme. The EU would not go beyond accepting the possibilities because both prospects need to be worked out by the experts. Pakistan too needs to do its homework to determine the cost benefit comparison of a free trade agreement or unilateral concessions from the EU.

Several other areas were identified for future cooperation. Significant among these is the initiation of cooperation aimed at improving Pakistan‘s counter-terrorism capabilities, notably in the field of law enforcement and criminal justice particularly supporting the police forces. The EU-Pakistan ―strategic dialogue‖ will cover a wide range of subjects related to security, development, human rights, democracy, energy, environment, non-proliferation, disarmament, education, and science and technology. We can see the contours of a framework where Pakistan is expected to relentlessly pursue its action against militancy and the EU fulfils its commitment of more aid and an active dialogue as well as measures to help Pakistan‘s performance in trade. The EU also expects Pakistan to help in strengthening security and stability in the region and create conditions conducive to resume the composite dialogue with India. Read this as a reminder to prosecute those named by India for masterminding the Mumbai killings. Gentle reminders on transit trade to Afghanistan and beyond or on implementing SAFTA figure in the joint statement.

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The EU may not ask Islamabad to give up its ―misplaced‖ threat perception about India. But the Europeans never hesitate in recommending that the way forward in South Asia is the one that leads to integration through peaceful cooperation, as achieved in Europe through the EU. In their best-case scenario, the Europeans might even think of the Kashmir dispute being subsumed in a process of economic integration on the lines of the European Communities created after World War II, before they matured into a full-fledged European Union.

Pakistan, for its part, can suggest to the EU leaders that they too can help by persuading India to treat the composite dialogue process as a strategic choice rather than a tactical competition in which India asks for time out after a terrorist strike, giving benefit to those very forces who are trying to derail the dialogue. Indeed, the professed support by the west to Pakistan should also include an element of dissuading India from fuelling the unrest in our troubled areas. And if India, for its own reasons, decides to relegate the peace process with Pakistan to the backburner, then the Europeans should also lower their expectations, however noble, of regional economic integration in South Asia.

The writer is Pakistan‘s former ambassador to the EU. E-mail: saeed.saeedk@ gmail.com

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MAJOR MILITARY OPERATION UNDERWAY IN HELMAND (JULY 2, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, July 2nd, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Major military operation underway in Helmand SOURCE: Dawn Thursday, July 2, 2009 By AP

NAWA, Afghanistan: Thousands of US Marines and hundreds of Afghan troops poured into Taliban-infested villages of southern Afghanistan with armour and helicopters Thursday in the first major operation under President Barack Obama‘s strategy to stabilise the country. The offensive was launched shortly after 01:00 a.m. Thursday local time in Helmand province, a Taliban stronghold and the world‘s largest opium poppy producing area.

The stated goal is to clear insurgents from the region before the nation‘s August 20 presidential election. Officials described the operation, dubbed Khanjar, or ‗Strike of the Sword,‘ as the largest and fastest-moving of the war‘s new phase, involving nearly 4,000 of the newly arrived Marines and 650 Afghan forces. British forces last week led similar, but smaller, missions to clear out insurgents in Helmand and neighbouring Kandahar provinces. ‗Where we go we will stay, and where we stay, we will hold, build and work toward transition of all security responsibilities to Afghan forces,‘ Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson said in a statement. Transport helicopters carried hundreds of Marines into the village of Nawa, some 20 miles south of the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah, in a region where no US or other Nato troops have operated in large numbers. Daybreak brought the sporadic crackle of gunfire, but no heavy fighting immediately broke out. Medical helicopters circled overhead and landed, indicating possible early casualties among the Marines. A roadside bomb early in the mission wounded one Marine, but he was able to continue, spokesman Capt. Bill Pelletier said. Southern Afghanistan is a Taliban stronghold but also a region where Afghan President Hamid Karzai is seeking votes from fellow Pashtun tribesmen.

The Pentagon is deploying 21,000 additional troops to Afghanistan in time for the elections and expects the total number of US forces there to reach 68,000 by year‘s end. That is double the number of troops in Afghanistan in 2008, but still half of much as are now in Iraq. The Taliban, who took control of Afghanistan in 1996 and were ousted from power following a US-led invasion in 2001, have made a violent comeback, wreaking havoc in much of the country‘s south and east, forcing the United States to pour in the new troops.

Pelletier said troops in Thursday‘s operation were sent in by a mixture of aircraft and ground transport under the cover of darkness. The operation aims to show ‗the Afghan people that when we come in we are going to stay long enough to set up their own institutions,‘ Pelletier

131 said. Once on the ground, the troops will meet with local leaders, hear their needs, and act on them, Pelletier said. ‗We do not want people of Helmand province to see us as an enemy, we want to protect them from the enemy,‘ Pelletier said. ‗We are kind of forging new ground here. We are going to a place nobody has been before,‘ said Capt. Drew Schoenmaker, 31, from Greene, New York, who commands Bravo Company of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment.

Reversing the insurgency‘s momentum has been a key component of the new US strategy, and thousands of additional troops allow commanders to push and stay into areas where international and Afghan troops had no permanent presence before. While Marine troops were the bulk of the force, recently arrived US Army helicopters were also taking part in the operation in Helmand province.

Afghanistan: provinces

In March, Obama unveiled his strategy for Afghanistan, seeking to defeat al-Qaeda terrorists there and in Pakistan with a bigger force and a new commander. Taliban and other extremists, including those allied with al-Qaeda, routinely cross the two nations‘ border in Afghanistan‘s remote south.

The governor of Helmand province predicted the operation would be ‗very effective.‘ ‗The security forces will build bases to provide security for the local people so that they can carry out every activity with this favourable background, and take their lives forward in peace,‘ Gov. Gulab Mangal said in a Pentagon news release. Obama aims to boost the Afghan army from 80,000 to 134,000 troops by 2011 — and greatly increase training by US troops accompanying them — so the Afghan military can take control of the war. The White House also is pushing forces to set clear goals for a war gone awry, provide more resources and make a better case for international support. There is no timetable for withdrawal, and the White House has not estimated how many billions of dollars its plan will cost. PAK-AFGHAN HOSTILITY IMPEDING US TROOPS (JULY 5, 2009) Written by admin on Sunday, July 5th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten 132

Pak-Afghan hostility impeding US troops operations in the region SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Sunday 5th July, 2009 ANI

Washington, July 5 : The United States is hoping to get support from the Pakistan Army in its offensive in Afghanistan, but the hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan is not allowing the US-led allied forces to carry out an all out offensive in the region and is impeding their success, The Washington Post reports.

The U.S. troops are struggling to overcome decades of enmity between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the rough terrains of the border area, the report said. Top US and Pakistan military officials have increased efforts to claim back the troubled region from the insurgents, but all such efforts have failed on the ground, it added. ―It‘s a strange relationship, considering we‘re supposed to be allies,‖ a top US military commander, who is in-charge of the region, Lieutenant Gabe Lamois said.

The US officials are of the view that Pakistani troops present in the area should assist them against the militants, rather than opposing the Afghan Army‘s move. ―I am not sure why the Pakistanis are even here, except to stick a thumb in the eye of the Afghans,‖ said Major Jason Dempsey, who is the No. 3 officer in the U.S. battalion on the Pakistan-Afghan border.

Pakistani has long been opposing the Afghans for building a fort on the ridgeline between the two countries. Islamabad believes that Afghanistan wants to grab the Pashtun tribal lands on its side of the border, the report went on to add.

U.S. officials said that they must have the support of ‗deeply suspicious‘ Pakistani forces to stop the flow of Taliban fighters across the 90-mile stretch of border. They said that a border coordination center on the Afghan side where commanders from all three countries could plan operations should be operationalised in order to counter and address the real threat. ―Our goal is to get everyone focused on the common enemy,‖ Dempsey said.

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PAKISTAN - A DECISIVE SHIFT (JULY 7, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, July 7th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Analysis: A decisive shift SOURCE: Daily Times Tuesday, July 07, 2009 By RASUL BAKHSH RAIS

Many people in Pakistan and outside the country believe that the Taliban are a worse enemy than any other internal or external adversary that we have ever faced

We are not sure if the Pakistani Taliban and their brand of justice and political violence ever had grassroots public support. There is only one objective measurement of public support, and that is the percentage of the popular votes a party or group wins at the elections. The Taliban and their public defenders, their numbers on a constant decline, don‘t have trust in the common man or seek power through popular legitimacy. Their route to power is through tribal-type conquest and absolute subjugation of the people.

But then the Taliban are a very kind of people: they don‘t accept democracy, the constitution, fundamental human rights, equality among citizens or the sovereignty of parliament. Nor do they represent Islam, as it is understood and interpreted by great classical or modern day Muslim scholars and jurists.

The Taliban, those who have taken up arms against the people, society and state of Pakistan, have neither learnt the ethical, philosophical and cultural content of Islam nor have they any respect for religious pluralism within the broader understanding of Islam as is practiced by different streams of religious thought in different countries.

How did they emerge as a religious and militant force?

The political and ideological roots of the Pakistani Taliban are in the Taliban movement of Afghanistan and its successful overthrow of the fragmented Mujahideen government. Two other factors need to be mentioned regarding their rise. First is the Pashtun ethnicity and the philosophy of tribal jihadism to redress wrong, seek justice, punish wrong doers, and realistically establish their control and political domination.

The second is our alliance with the Taliban as a formidable demographic and military force against other ethnic groups in Afghanistan, which were supported by our rival regional powers — Iran, India and Russia. Many political leaders in Pakistan and in other countries thought that the Taliban were a good force as long as they could end violence and warlordism, establish peace and security and de-weaponise Afghan society.

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Since the Mujahideen war against the Soviet Union, private Pakistani religious groups along with our government and Western powers became deeply involved in Afghanistan. It was a strange mix of powers with different post-Soviet outlooks for the region, rooted in different ideological traditions but with an immediate common goal: defeat of the Soviet Union and the Afghan communists.

Our Taliban tradition — armed struggle by mainly religious groups to establish an Islamic regime — is based on history, factional beliefs and political ethos linked to the Afghan Taliban.

The closet Taliban in the media, the religious and political parties, and some political commentators created a benign myth about the Taliban as an Islamic force willing to sacrifice anything to defeat western imperialism and its surrogate elites in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A wide array of other Muslim groups from the Middle East have similar agendas and have trans- national linkages through Al Qaeda and other organisations to fund and promote this mindset.

The Taliban mindset further flourished during the Musharraf regime with what was virtually the political front of the militant Taliban running governments in two critical provinces — Balochistan and the NWFP, both bordering Afghanistan, where a Taliban insurgency was underway. It was really during the tenure of General Musharraf that the Pakistani Taliban in Swat, Malakand and FATA became organised and started taking control of territory through the use of violence.

The anti-American sentiment in the context of Afghanistan was carefully cultivated by Taliban sympathisers in Pakistan, which further nurtured the image of the Taliban as an ‗anti- imperialist force‘ and some kind of liberators. Some leaders, mostly from the religious parties, justified crossing of the Pak-Afghan border by the Pakistani Taliban much like the Mujahideen that fought against the former Soviet Union.

The supporters of the Taliban, now silenced by the majority view, still don‘t see them as a threat to society and the state. It doesn‘t really matter to these Taliban supporters if people are humiliated, whipped or slaughtered publicly and on camera.

But finally, the people of Pakistan, the silent majority, have woken up to the threat that the Taliban and their supporters in different political formations pose to society and, in a broader context, to the image of Muslims and Islamic civilisation. The Taliban actually further the same caricatured view of Islam and Muslims societies as intolerant, primitive and hostile to modernity and human liberty as the one held by some orientalists.

Pakistan‘s standing as an Islamic society suffered a great deal during the Musharraf regime as it was caught between the Taliban and him with no respect for the constitution, the people‘s mandate or democratic principles.

As the fake democracy and political manipulations of the Musharraf regime and his political associates and their corruption have become exposed, so has the brutality and violent face of the Taliban. As the Taliban ordered suicide bombing of civilians, killed security personnel, targeted locally influentials and engaged in criminal activities to sustain their war against the Pakistani state and society, the people of Pakistan realised who the real enemy was.

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The people in Swat and FATA have been held hostage and have suffered the cruelty and totalitarianism of the Taliban for too long. Neither successive Pakistani governments nor the rest of society came to their rescue, while the Taliban‘s supporters continued to praise them as patriotic, just and selfless warriors.

A big shift in the image of the Taliban and their supporters has occurred, not accidentally but after a careful analysis of what Pakistan and its society would become if the Taliban and other religious zealots were allowed to capture power. Life in Pakistan under the Taliban or forces like them would fare no better than the Hobbesian state of nature — brutish, nasty and short.

We believe the support for the Taliban was exaggerated and their image hyped up unrealistically. Actually, those praising the Taliban should have migrated to live under their brutal rule with the daily drill of public executions, mass murders and dehumanisation of women.

The strong sentiment against the Taliban that has emerged is comparable to the patriotic sentiment during our wars with India. Many people in Pakistan and outside the country believe that the Taliban are a worse enemy that any other internal or external adversary that we have ever faced.

This realisation, though late in the day, is going to help the security forces and the nation marginalise and effectively counter the Taliban threat. Pakistan has already secured a big victory against the Taliban by creating a national consensus against them. The Taliban and their supporters that scared us for so long have suffered a big blow and may not able to socially and politically recover. But this also offers us a respite and opportunity to address the domestic and foreign policy issues that created the Taliban monster in the first place.

Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at [email protected]

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MILITARY GO AFTER FORMER PROXY FORCES: ZARDARI (JULY 7, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, July 7th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Military to go after former proxy forces: Zardari SOURCE: The News International Tuesday, July 07, 2009

RAWALPINDI: President Asif Ali Zardari has broken with decades of strategic policy of Pakistan by declaring that military will turn its guns on extremist groups it formerly supported as proxy forces in its battles with India, reports a London-based English daily.

Zardari said in an interview with The Daily Telegraph that operations would in the future target the figures who were the military‘s ―strategic assets‖.―I don‘t think anybody in the establishment supports them any more,‖ he said. ―I think everybody has become wiser than this,‖ he added.

―Military operations are all across the board against any insurgent, whether in Karachi, Lahore or whether he is in any part of Pakistan,‖ said Zardari. ―My problem is terror. I have focused myself on terror. The PPP has focused itself against the extremist mindset. Terror is a regional problem, it cuts across borders. ―I would love to be remembered for creating a Pakistan where militancy — I know it can‘t totally be diminished — is defeated.‖

A day earlier, Zardari gained important support when Army chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani said the ―immediate internal threat‖ of the Taliban militancy was greater than any ―external threat‖ — a code for India. Diplomats took comfort that Zardari appeared to speak for the most important power brokers in Pakistan.

Gestures of goodwill towards India allied to a campaign to end militants‘ influence have attracted criticism, but for the moment, his opponents are at bay. ―It rankles the small mind,‖ he said.

―It does not rankle the Army, because after India and Pakistan became nuclear powers, that position of being able to take over another state is nullified,‖ he added.―Karzai and myself are friends,‖ he said. ―Our military chiefs have met, our intelligence chiefs have met,‖ he added.

So serious is Pakistan‘s internal struggles that Zardari disclaimed much interest in America‘s role in Afghanistan. ―What the US does in Afghanistan is its own business. It is a sovereign state,‖ he said.

Zardari was once accused of corruption and high living. He bridled at being reminded that he was known as Mr 10 per cent. ―It was a cliche created by the opposition and they tried me for

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11 and a half years (the time he served in jail without being sentenced). I think a man should be judged by the fact he has walked the fire and come out without a spot.‖

He reiterated a call for the US to sell aerial drones to the Pakistani military in place of mounting cross-border attacks. ―My position is that I have always asked for possession of the drone; I want the Pakistani flag on it.‖

The legacy for which he aims is wrapped up in the continuing impact of Benazir Bhutto‘s assassination. On that day, he said, he had saved Pakistan. ―The people in the street were calling for blood and we went for a democratic offensive.‖

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MILITARY GO AFTER FORMER PROXY FORCES: ZARDARI (JULY 7, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, July 7th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Military to go after former proxy forces: Zardari SOURCE: The News International Tuesday, July 07, 2009

RAWALPINDI: President Asif Ali Zardari has broken with decades of strategic policy of Pakistan by declaring that military will turn its guns on extremist groups it formerly supported as proxy forces in its battles with India, reports a London-based English daily.

Zardari said in an interview with The Daily Telegraph that operations would in the future target the figures who were the military‘s ―strategic assets‖.―I don‘t think anybody in the establishment supports them any more,‖ he said. ―I think everybody has become wiser than this,‖ he added.

―Military operations are all across the board against any insurgent, whether in Karachi, Lahore or whether he is in any part of Pakistan,‖ said Zardari. ―My problem is terror. I have focused myself on terror. The PPP has focused itself against the extremist mindset. Terror is a regional problem, it cuts across borders. ―I would love to be remembered for creating a Pakistan where militancy — I know it can‘t totally be diminished — is defeated.‖

A day earlier, Zardari gained important support when Army chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani said the ―immediate internal threat‖ of the Taliban militancy was greater than any ―external threat‖ — a code for India. Diplomats took comfort that Zardari appeared to speak for the most important power brokers in Pakistan.

Gestures of goodwill towards India allied to a campaign to end militants‘ influence have attracted criticism, but for the moment, his opponents are at bay. ―It rankles the small mind,‖ he said.

―It does not rankle the Army, because after India and Pakistan became nuclear powers, that position of being able to take over another state is nullified,‖ he added.―Karzai and myself are friends,‖ he said. ―Our military chiefs have met, our intelligence chiefs have met,‖ he added.

So serious is Pakistan‘s internal struggles that Zardari disclaimed much interest in America‘s role in Afghanistan. ―What the US does in Afghanistan is its own business. It is a sovereign state,‖ he said.

Zardari was once accused of corruption and high living. He bridled at being reminded that he was known as Mr 10 per cent. ―It was a cliche created by the opposition and they tried me for

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11 and a half years (the time he served in jail without being sentenced). I think a man should be judged by the fact he has walked the fire and come out without a spot.‖

He reiterated a call for the US to sell aerial drones to the Pakistani military in place of mounting cross-border attacks. ―My position is that I have always asked for possession of the drone; I want the Pakistani flag on it.‖

The legacy for which he aims is wrapped up in the continuing impact of Benazir Bhutto‘s assassination. On that day, he said, he had saved Pakistan. ―The people in the street were calling for blood and we went for a democratic offensive.‖

SWAT VALLEY ROADS TO BE RE- OPENED (JULY 12, 2009) Written by admin on Sunday, July 12th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Swat Valley roads to be re-opened for returning residents SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Sunday 12th July, 2009

The conflict-hit Swat valley in Pakistan is due to be linked again by road to its neighbouring regions.

The move by the government is desired to encourage people back to their homes after they were scared away by the Taliban.

Any people returning will have to stay in temporary accommodation due to severe damage to the region‘s infrastructure.

Power and water supplies have been destroyed and it is believed reconstruction could take many months.

Two million people have already returned to the area and are living in temporary camps with cash support from the government.

There is now a substantial military presence in the Swat, Malakand and Buner regions after Taliban militants were dislodged.

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KARZAI‟S ELECTION PROSPECTS IN DOUBT (JULY 13, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, July 13th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Karzai’s election prospects in doubt SOURCE: The Financial Times July 13, 2009 By PAMELA CONSTABLE in Kabul

KABUL. His portrait adorns giant billboards in every corner of the capital: hugging a child, making a speech and smiling serenely atop comforting platitudes about progress and peace. But the real Hamid Karzai, president of the Islamic republic of Afghanistan and candidate for reelection Aug. 20, is nowhere to be seen.

Since the official campaign began last month, his aides said, more than 50 rallies have been organized by supporters across the country, but he has not yet attended one. Television stations have proposed debates among Karzai and his major rivals, but he has demurred, saying certain conditions need to be established first.

‖The president is not afraid to debate anyone, but we have concerns that the other candidates do not know the principles of conversation. A debate should not be a battlefield,‖ Ahmad Omar, a spokesman for Karzai‘s campaign, said at a news conference last week. Omar also said Karzai would appear at some campaign rallies soon.

Thus far, however, the president has been relying on his relationships with tribal elders, business leaders and an array of former militia commanders to secure victory.

Meanwhile, UN officials and human rights groups have charged that government officials across the country are improperly using their offices and influence to bolster his campaign.

Until very recently, the conventional wisdom among pollsters, pundits and the public was that Karzai would easily garner the 50.01 percent of votes he needs to win in the first round of polling, despite his declining popularity at home and increasingly testy relations with allies abroad. But in the past several weeks, that presumption has begun to change.

Although none of Karzai‘s major challengers is expected to defeat him outright Aug. 20, several election observers said they may do well enough as a group to force a second round of polling, partly because of recent blunders by Karzai and partly because many Afghans are looking for alternative leadership at a time of sustained insurgent violence, economic stagnation and political drift.

‖If Karzai loses the first round, his spell will be broken,‖ said one businessman who follows the political winds closely. ‖Even his own advisers are worried that the campaign is not going well and that his top opponents are gaining momentum.‖

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Karzai‘s chief rivals are two ex-aides, former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah and former finance minister Ashraf Ghani.

According to private accounts of a recent meeting among Karzai‘s senior aides and backers, many expressed concern over the slow and disorganized campaign, the recent defection of a crucial governor to Abdullah‘s camp, and a series of high-profile meetings between the US ambassador and several opposition candidates, which Karzai denounced in public.

To a large extent, the president has been relying on the weaknesses and divisions within the opposition, which proved unable to field a strong consensus candidate. Now 40 people are vying to oust Karzai, who has been in power for more than seven years, but none is especially charismatic. Ghani, the only candidate who has articulated a detailed vision for the country, is a technocrat with little patience for politicking.

The president, a charming schmoozer and master political juggler, has also cemented his ties with a variety of powerful Afghans, reportedly promising cabinet posts, governorships and even newly created provinces in exchange for their support.

Local business leaders said Karzai‘s administration has ‖facilitated‖ their success by keeping taxes low and offering other incentives.

‖All the people you see here have a lot of money they didn‘t have seven or eight years ago,‖ said construction magnate Shuja Dawalah while attending a recent campaign reception organized by the Afghan Chamber of Commerce.

He said Karzai had done much to develop the economy and possessed ‖more qualifications‖ than others to lead the country.

But lately, Karzai has been shooting himself in the foot. His repeated anti-American outbursts have raised eyebrows, as did his pardon of several convicted drug traffickers from an influential tribe, based on what his spokesman said was ‖respect for their families.‖

His electoral alliances with militia leaders from the past have disappointed a fast-growing younger generation of educated voters hoping for change.

There have also been complaints of local government officials using their resources to assist Karzai‘s campaign and their muscle to intimidate opponents, despite a presidential decree prohibiting such behavior.

In a joint report last week, the UN advisory mission and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission said they had received numerous reports of state interference in the election process. ‖The president may not be directly aware of these incidents, but many local authorities are eager to win his favour,‖ said Ahmad Nader Nadery, an official with the commission.

He cited a case last week in which district officials in Baghlan province complained of being instructed by the governor, a Karzai appointee, to bring 100 people each to a rally for the president – and to tell each of those 100 to bring 15 others.

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At the same time, Karzai appears to have alienated a key governor. Mohammed Atta, a former militia leader who has done much to modernize northern Balkh province in the past several years, recently announced that he was switching his support to Abdullah, dealing a blow to Karzai‘s campaign in a crucial region.

Meanwhile, much of the south, Karzai‘s home base and the core of his Pashtun ethnic constituency, is in the grip of Taliban terror. Many candidates for regional office have been threatened, and despite plans to deploy tens of thousands of soldiers and police to provide election-day security, there are predictions that voters in southern population centers such as Kandahar will stay home for fear of attacks.

The president still enjoys pockets of genuine support across the country, especially in rural areas that have felt the benefits of foreign aid and improved governance on his watch. Moreover, several of his powerful allies are expected to deliver hundreds of thousands of votes each, especially among minorities such as ethnic Hazaras and Uzbeks.

But with more and more Afghans tuned into independent TV and radio, going to school and learning what it means to have individual rights, the benefits of incumbency, patronage, name recognition and powerful friends may no longer be enough to guarantee Karzai the easy victory he once seemed assured of.

‖I voted for Mr. Karzai last time, but I haven‘t made up my mind yet this time,‖ said Ghulam Fareed, 30, a security guard who rides his bicycle to work each morning past the gleaming mansions of Kabul‘s nouveau riche. ‖The people are suffering, and we are still looking for someone who will speak for us.‖

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LACK OF COOPERATION FROM PAKISTAN HAMPERING U.S. OPERATIONS (JULY 20, 2009) Written by admin on Monday, July 20th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Lack of cooperation from Pakistan hampering US operations against Taliban SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Monday 20th July, 2009 (ANI)

Islamabad, July 20 : Top US commander in Afghanistan has said that they are facing difficulties in their latest military campaign against the Taliban due to lack of ―insufficient cooperation‖ from Pakistan.

General Stanley McChrystal, the commander of the International Security Assistance Force and US Forces in Afghanistan, is believed to have pursued this line in his secret visit to Islamabad over the weekend during which he met President Asif Ali Zardari and Army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.

The US general, accompanied by the American Ambassador to Afghanistan Lt-Gen Karl Eikenberry, discussed with his interlocutors operational matters about the stepped up military campaign in Afghanistan. He flew back on Sunday morning.

―Operational issues relating to the military campaign in Afghanistan and matters on our side of the border came under discussion,‖ the Dawn quoted sources, as saying.

The meetings, described as part of ongoing military-to-military operational engagement, were hurriedly arranged.

The visit came at a time when the US military after meeting little initial resistance in their offensive in Helmand province of Afghanistan is confronting a resurgent Taliban not afraid to take on their mighty adversary.

The US commander is currently taking stock of troop requirements in Afghanistan. After completion of the assessment, he is to make recommendations to Pentagon.

With the death of 48 soldiers, July has already been the deadliest month for the international forces in Afghanistan since the offensive began in 2001.

US strategists presume that the Taliban network based in Quetta directs much of the Taliban activity in the bordering Afghanistan provinces of Kandhar and Helmand.

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In an interview with New York Times, published a couple of days before his Islamabad visit, General McChrystal hinted at ―inaction‖ by the Pakistani Army and the government against the Quetta-based Taliban.

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WHY PAKISTAN BALKS AT THE U.S. AFGHANISTAN OFFENSIVE (JULY 28, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, July 28th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Why Pakistan Balks at the U.S. Afghanistan Offensive SOURCE:Time Tuesday, July 28, 2009 By OMAR WARAICH

Islamabad. Pakistan is not betting on a U.S. victory in Afghanistan, nor is it going out of its way to help achieve one. Instead, say analysts and former top officials in Islamabad, Pakistan views the conflict in Afghanistan through the lens of its own national interests and its conflict with India — and it will act accordingly, prioritizing securing its own interests in Afghanistan‘s future. And that could be bad news for a U.S.-led military campaign that depends on Pakistan‘s help for thwarting the Afghan insurgency.

Pakistan officials expressed anxiety two weeks ago when 4,000 U.S. Marines were sent into Helmand province in the first major offensive under the command of President Barack Obama‘s new Afghanistan commander, General Stanley McChrystal. McChrystal was forced to visit Pakistan on July 26 to allay its security chiefs‘ fears that a squeeze on Taliban militants in Helmand could push them across the border and further destabilize Pakistan. (Read ―A New General, and a New War, in Afghanistan.‖)

Helmand shares a porous border with Baluchistan, the vast and restive southwestern province of Pakistan where for years the military has been battling — under a thick media blackout — Baluch separatists in the mountains. Having committed troops to fighting the Pakistani Taliban in the tribal areas of the northwest and insisting on maintaining a heavy troop concentration along the Indian border in the east, Pakistan complains that it lacks the troops to rebuff a Taliban spillover from Helmand.

―What the Pakistanis are asking the Americans to do is encircle [the Taliban militants] within Afghanistan instead,‖ to prevent them from crossing the border, says a senior Western diplomat familiar with the discussions. Washington, for its part, has been urging both India and Pakistan to agree to a reciprocal reduction of troop levels along their mutual border, in order to free up more Pakistani forces to tackle the Taliban. But that may be missing the point: one of the reasons for the divergent strategic priorities between Washington and Islamabad is that Pakistan sees Afghanistan as another theater of its conflict with India.

―There is a genuine concern that when there‘s a military operation across the border, there is a spillover,‖ says Ayesha Siddiqa, an independent Pakistani military analyst. But of equal concern may be the prospect that a weakened Taliban may actually diminish Pakistan‘s influence in Afghanistan. ―Is it,‖ says Siddiqa, ―less to do with the actual movement of

146 militants into Pakistan, and more with the fact that greater U.S. military pressure in Afghanistan may lead to a situation where Pakistan is left with no space in the country?‖ (See pictures from the front lines of the battle in Afghanistan.)

Pakistan has certainly been ambivalent about the U.S. invasion that took down the Taliban regime at the end of 2001. Rustam Shah Mohmand, a former Pakistani ambassador to Afghanistan, says that Islamabad was ―party to the dismantling of the Taliban regime and creating the conditions for the emergence of Hamid Karzai as Afghan President.‖ But it is widely suspected that Pakistan has never really relinquished the Afghan Taliban as a proxy for pursuing its own long-term interests in Afghanistan, since it regards Karzai as an ally of its enemy India. Thus Pakistan‘s own campaign against the Taliban on its soil has focused on those groups directly attacking the Pakistani state, while largely turning a blind eye to militant groups that simply use its soil as a base from which to wage war on Western forces in Afghanistan.

Western intelligence agencies suspect that Mullah Omar, leader of the Afghan Taliban, is hunkered down in a sanctuary near the city of Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan, with other key members of the Taliban leadership.

Pakistani authorities vehemently deny that the Afghan Taliban‘s key leadership structure is based in Quetta. And it stresses that limited resources force it to prioritize dealing with the Pakistani Taliban‘s domestic insurgency. ―The situation is that Pakistan cannot fight all kinds of Taliban militants at once,‖ says Hasan Askari-Rizvi, a political and military analyst. ―Those Taliban who are challenging the Pakistani state‘s authority, they will be dealt with first.‖ But critics believe that elements within the military establishment continue to discreetly support insurgent groups operating across the border in order to maintain Pakistan‘s strategic leverage in Afghanistan.

Pakistan‘s security establishment has never embraced the Karzai government, which it sees as dominated by the predominantly ethnic Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara forces of the India-backed Northern Alliance. And it fears that India is expanding its influence there through massive development projects and by using Afghanistan as a base from which to destabilize Pakistan. (Read ―Can Afghanistan Support a Beefed Up Military?‖)

Although Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari has broken with his predecessor, General Pervez Musharraf, in embracing Karzai as an ally, his government continues to regard Afghanistan skeptically. Last week Interior Minister Rehman Malik accused the Karzai government of colluding with India to secretly back the Baluch insurgency inside Pakistan.

The Taliban regime had given Pakistan what local military strategists termed ―strategic depth.‖ A friendly regime in Kabul helped Islamabad counter New Delhi‘s clout in the region and helped relieve a sense of being encircled by India and its allies. Pakistani officials fear that as Pashtun political power has receded in Afghanistan, New Delhi‘s influence has grown at Islamabad‘s expense. It is widely alleged by Pakistani officials that India is using its four consulates along Pakistan‘s western border to foment the Baluch insurgency. Recent local propaganda has gone further, alleging that even the Taliban in Swat enjoys Indian backing — rumors that have helped rally public support against the militants. (See pictures of Pakistan‘s vulnerable frontier with Afghanistan.)

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The deeper Pakistani fear about the U.S. offensive is that the more it succeeds, the less chance Pakistan will have of influencing events in Afghanistan after the Americans and their allies leave. ―Pakistan will find itself in a fix,‖ says analyst Siddiqa. ―What Pakistan doesn‘t want is a U.S. military victory in the short-term without securing its own long-term strategic interests.‖ It is for this reason, many suspect, that Pakistan has not broken with the Afghan Taliban and other Pakistan-based militant groups fighting in Afghanistan.

Mohmand says the best outcome for the U.S. in Afghanistan is to negotiate an exit. ―Fundamentally, the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is unsustainable,‖ says the former Pakistan ambassador to Afghanistan. ―At some point, they will have to be driven to the negotiations table. Pakistan will have to be included in the overall architecture of those talks. This can happen if basic objectives are met: there is some sort of functioning democracy, there is no space for al-Qaeda and it is a stabilized and peaceful country. If those benchmarks can be negotiated by regional powers, then the U.S. could begin to leave.‖

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STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF PAK‟S KHYBER AGENCY (AUGUST 6, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, August 6th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Local Militants Struggle with Taliban Government for Control of Pakistan’s Khyber Agency SOURCE: Terrorism Monitor Volume 7, Issue 24 (Thursday, August 6, 2009) By: MUKHTAR A. KHAN

Pakistani security forces have not yet established their writ in parts of the volatile Khyber tribal agency. Despite a drawn out military operation dubbed Sirat-e-Mustaqeem (Straight Path), the wary Islamist militants are still at large. Some call it a friendly game of hide-and- seek, others call it a staged drama, yet over 600 people have been killed in the fighting. Several thousand more have been displaced due to the exchange of fire between the Taliban and Pakistani security forces.

Last year, the government claimed to have killed or seriously injured Mangal Bagh – the leader of Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI)—described as a Robin Hood-like character who has gathered several thousand disaffected people around him. Mangal Bagh is still alive and dwelling in the Tirah Valley, where he controls most parts of the agency. Mangal Bagh does not allow his organization to be aligned with the Baitullah Mahsud-led Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), but has imposed the same strict Shari‘a rules in those parts of the Khyber agency under his control. Anybody who is not wearing a head covering has to pay a fine of 100 rupees. He has also imposed a jazia (also called a jizya, or protection tax) for the non-Muslim communities living in Khyber. Each non-Muslim individual has to pay him 1000 rupees annually, with exceptions for women, children and the handicapped (Daily Mashriq [Peshawar], June 2).

In the government‘s fresh offensive against Mangal Bagh‘s LeI, Pakistani gunship helicopters pounded their positions in the Tirah Valley (35 km southwest of Landi Kotal, the main town in the Khyber region) and claimed to have killed over 20 Taliban as well as destroyed four LeI ―hideouts.‖ These included a mosque near Bara and a camp allegedly used to train suicide bombers (Daily Times [Lahore], July 28; Dawn [Karachi], July 27). However, very few people believe the latter claim to be true, as Lashkar-e-Islam does not support suicide bombings. The LeI is considered to be a pro-government militant organization that asks its fighters not to attack military convoys and government installations.

Control of the Khyber Agency is important for both the Taliban and the government. The main land route to Afghanistan and the Central Asian states is via the Khyber Pass, now a vital supply route to U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan. The TTP have sought control of this route to gain political and economic leverage. Several times, TTP leaders have tried to align their movement with Mangal Bagh‘s LeI, but each time Mangal Bagh has refused to approve a merger with the TTP. Despite their internal rivalries and fierce clashes, the three main militant groups in the Khyber Agency, Lashkar-e-Islam, Ansar-ul-Islam and Amr bil Ma‘ruf wa Nahi Anil Munkar (Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice), have all kept

149 their distance from the mainstream TTP. Local people say the Pakistani establishment has been guiding, supporting and fueling differences among the Khyber‘s militants to use them as a buffer against TTP operations targeting the Khyber Pass supply route.

Since late 2005, Lashkar-e-Islam and Ansar-ul-Islam have used pirate FM channels to wage a fierce war of words, but the government has remained a silent spectator unless the broadcasts have resulted in a full-fledged battle on the ground. The LeI preached a Sunni Wahhabi version of Islam, while Ansar-ul-Islam propagated Sufi Islam. The Amr bil Maruf wa Nahi Anil Munkar group has maintained its own identity, though it has the same ideology as Bagh‘s LeI and the TTP. Its founder and leader, Haji Namdar, was assassinated last year in Bara by a young man allegedly sent by Baitullah Mahsud‘s group to eliminate him (The Nation [Islamabad], August 14, 2008). Baitullah‘s deputy, Hakimullah Mahsud, based in the neighboring Kurram tribal agency, took responsibility for Namdar‘s assassination. The main reason for their rivalry was Haji Namdar‘s refusal to allow the TTP access to the strategically important Khyber region.

Despite the efforts of the so-called pro-government and anti-Baitullah militant groups, the TTP has made inroads and extended influence in the Khyber agency through an Afghan national, Commander Rahmanullah, who took the position in late 2008 after his predecessor Mohammad Yahya Hijrat (a.k.a. Kamran Mustafa Hijrat) was arrested in Peshawar by Pakistani security forces (The News, December 10, 2008). Yahya Hijrat, also an Afghan national, was a deputy to Hakimullah Mahsud and was assigned responsibility for attacking trucks loaded with supplies for U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Last December, his men attacked and burnt to ashes more than 300 vehicles destined for NATO troops in Afghanistan while they were parked in a terminal in Peshawar (see Terrorism Focus, January 21). The attacks continue; on July 17 an oil tanker was destroyed in the Jamrud district of the Khyber Pass, with the resulting fire destroying 20 shops and killing a fruit vendor (Daily Times, July 18). A second tanker was damaged by a bomb the same day near Landi Kotal (BBC, July 17).

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U.S. DRONE KILLS CHIEF OF TALIBAN IN PAKISTAN (AUGUST 8, 2009)

Written by admin on Saturday, August 8th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

U.S. Drone Kills Chief of Taliban in Pakistan SOURCE: The Wall Street Journal Saturday, August 8, 2009 By MATTHEW ROSENBERG, ZAHID HUSSAIN and SIOBHAN GORMAN

The apparent death of the chief of Pakistan‘s Taliban, reportedly struck by a U.S. missile as he lay tethered to an intravenous drip, is a major victory for Pakistan and the U.S. in their battle against Islamist militants.

Baitullah Mehsud, who was in his mid-30s, was Pakistan‘s most wanted man, responsible for a spate of suicide bombings in Pakistani cities in recent years, according to Pakistani and U.S. officials.

They include the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 and the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad last September, which killed 54 people. He carried a $5 million U.S. bounty on his head for his support of the insurgency in neighboring Afghanistan, where the Afghan Taliban have been battling U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops.

After two days of rumor and uncertainty, Pakistani officials said Friday that Mr. Mehsud, who was undergoing treatment for a kidney ailment, was killed early Wednesday with his second wife on the roof of his father-in-law‘s compound in Pakistan‘s mountainous northwest by a missile fired from a pilotless U.S. drone aircraft. The campaign of drone attacks, run by the Central Intelligence Agency, has targeted al Qaeda and Taliban leaders along the Pakistan- Afghanistan border.

Pakistan has secretly cooperated with the campaign. In private, Pakistani officials urged the U.S. to focus more on Mr. Mehsud and other Pakistan Taliban leaders than on Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda leaders. In public, the Pakistani government criticized the campaign, calling it a violation of Pakistan‘s sovereignty.

The strike on Mr. Mehsud was the first such attack not immediately condemned by Pakistani officials. Pakistan‘s foreign minister and the head of its Interior Ministry both said the killing was a significant success in the battle against militants.

―If the Pakistanis see us helping them get public enemy No. 1 off the streets,‖ said a U.S. counterterrorism official, they may work more closely with the U.S. on counterterrorism and intelligence operations.

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Senior Pakistani officials said they were certain Mr. Mehsud was dead, although false reports of his death have circulated in the past. He was reported dead from kidney failure in September, only to show up feasting on roast lamb at a party marking his marriage to his second wife.

Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Pakistan‘s foreign minister, told reporters that intelligence showed Mr. Mehsud had been killed. Pakistani officials are working to gain access to the attack site to try to confirm his death through DNA evidence, a senior Pakistani official said.

Members of Mr. Mehsud‘s Taliban faction also said he was dead. A U.S. counterterrorism official said there are ―strong indications‖ that Mr. Mehsud was killed, and that U.S. officials are working to verify that.

Mr. Mehsud‘s death may prove to be only a temporary setback, not a decisive blow, to the Pakistan Taliban‘s insurgency, analysts said.

On Friday, members of his Taliban faction were meeting to elect a new leader, according to Pakistani intelligence officials and militants. These people say there are two main contenders: Waliur Rehman, a relative of Mr. Mehsud‘s, and Azmatullah Mehsud, a low-profile commander from Mr. Mehsud‘s sub-tribe. Another Taliban commander, Hakimullah Mehsud, is also a contender, they say.

Mr. Mehsud‘s death could allow the Afghan Taliban, led by Mullah , to gain more help from the Pakistan Taliban. Although Mr. Mehsud was accused of aiding insurgents across the border, much of his focus was on seizing Pakistani territory and bombing the nation‘s urban centers. He had resisted pressure from the Afghan Taliban, its allied Afghan militant groups and al Qaeda to turn his efforts toward Afghanistan.

The long-term impact of his death may hinge largely on how Pakistan‘s military responds. The army has been battling the Taliban in the Swat Valley north of Islamabad, and the air force has been pounding South Waziristan, the mountainous tribal region where Mr. Mehsud was killed, in preparation for a major offensive. If Pakistan‘s military holds off that offensive to see how the Taliban‘s new leaders behave — something U.S. officials say is a concern — it could give the Taliban time to regroup.

―The Taliban movement survived the death of its leaders in the past, so it is too early to say that it is a decisive blow,‖ says Maleeha Lodhi, a former Pakistani ambassador to the U.S. and now a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington.

The Pakistan Taliban grew out of the Afghan Taliban in the early years of the decade. Many of the Pakistan Taliban‘s commanders fought for the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s and fled the country with their fellow militants, including Osama bin Laden and the remains of his al Qaeda network, after the U.S. invasion. The tribal borderlands became their primary haven.

In late 2007, Mr. Mehsud grouped together more than a dozen factions and declared himself the leader of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, which means Student Movement of Pakistan. His followers called him Emir Sahib, or revered follower. He was said to be deeply pious and modeled himself on Mullah Omar, although he had no formal religious training. He avoided being photographed and never slept in the same place for long.

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Under his leadership, Pakistan‘s lawless northwestern region became a safe haven for Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. The insurgents crossed the border to attack NATO troops in Afghanistan. But the main target of his thousands of followers was Pakistan. They increased attacks in major cities such as Islamabad and Lahore and targeted police in the densely populated lowlands.

As the militancy threatened to destabilize nuclear-armed Pakistan, the CIA stepped up its drone campaign, under special authority from then-President George W. Bush. President Barack Obama decided to intensify the program.

Mr. Mehsud is the most senior Taliban target believed to have been killed by a U.S. drone. Pakistani security officials said he narrowly escaped a U.S. missile strike on the funeral of a senior Taliban commander in June. Mr. Mehsud had left the place a few minutes earlier.

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TTP LEADER DEAD IN SUCCESSION FIGHT? (AUGUST 9, 2009)

Written by admin on Sunday, August 9th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

TTP leader dead in succession fight? SOURCE: Dawn Sunday, August 9, 2009 By PAZIR GUL

MIRAMSHAH, Aug 8: A key Taliban commander was killed in a struggle over succession to Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan chief Baitullah Mehsud at a shura meeting in South Waziristan, government and security officials said on Saturday.

Baitullah was killed, along with his wife, in a US Predator strike on Wednesday.

Interior Minister Rehman Malik confirmed reports of a shootout at the shura meeting and said that one of the commanders had been killed.

According to sources, commanders Hakeemullah Mehsud and Waliur Rehman, the two leading contenders for the chief slot, exchanged hot words at the shura meeting in Sara Rogha over the choosing of a successor to Baitullah. A shootout followed, leading to the death of Hakeemullah while causing life-threatening injuries to Waliur Rehman.

However, a government official in Peshawar said that both Hakeemullah and Waliur Rehman had been killed in the clash.

The names of Hakeemullah, Waliur Rehman and 50-year-old Azmatullah Mehsud were shortlisted at a meeting of senior Taliban leaders from the Mehsud tribe, but a decision was put off following differences over who would succeed the slain leader.

There was no independent confirmation of the reported shooting. A Taliban commander denied that any clash had taken place.

―There is a serious power struggle going on,‖ the government official said.

Hakeemullah had replaced Waliur Rehman as commander in Kurram. He belonged to a rival group led by Qari Hussain, widely known as the Ustad-i-Fidayeen (teacher of suicide bombers).

―I think the Haqqanis will now intervene to resolve the leadership dispute,‖ the official said, referring to Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of veteran Taliban leader Jalaluddin Haqqani and Mullah Omar‘s point man for North and South Waziristan.

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Former interior minister Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao agreed with the assessment. He told a private TV channel that the Haqqanis had been mediating in the past to resolve leadership issues in tribal areas and it was likely that they would intervene again to help throw up a consensus candidate.

Mehsud‘s death: A Taliban spokesman and a deputy to Baitullah Mehsud claimed on Saturday that the chief of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan was not dead, contradicting another aide who had confirmed Mehsud‘s death a day earlier.

Mehsud‘s deputy, Hakimullah, and Taliban spokesman Maulvi Umar each called two separate Associated Press reporters on Saturday to say that Mehsud was alive. They pledged evidence of his continued existence would be brought forth in the coming days.

The reports of his death ―are just to discourage and destroy the morale of the Taliban‖, Umar said.

He said Mehsud was with his fighters ―sound and fit‖ and not even injured. He said Mehsud would not be provoked into coming out into the open so soon because that would make him a target.

Hakimullah described reports of Mehsud‘s death as ―ridiculous‖ and said it was ―the handiwork of the intelligence agencies‖. Asked if Mehsud could call AP, he said it was not possible at the moment.

And asked why he did not refute the reports of Mehsud‘s death earlier, the militant did not answer.

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ANALYSTS EXPECT LONG-TERM, COSTLY U.S. CAMPAIGN (AUGUST 9, 2009)

Written by admin on Sunday, August 9th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Analysts Expect Long-Term, Costly U.S. Campaign in Afghanistan SOURCE: The Washington Post Sunday, August 9, 2009 By WALTER PINCUS

As the Obama administration expands U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, military experts are warning that the United States is taking on security and political commitments that will last at least a decade and a cost that will probably eclipse that of the Iraq war.

Since the invasion of Afghanistan eight years ago, the United States has spent $223 billion on war-related funding for that country, according to the Congressional Research Service. Aid expenditures, excluding the cost of combat operations, have grown exponentially, from $982 million in 2003 to $9.3 billion last year.

The costs are almost certain to keep growing. The Obama administration is in the process of overhauling the U.S. approach to Afghanistan, putting its focus on long-term security, economic sustainability and development. That approach is also likely to require deployment of more American military personnel, at the very least to train additional Afghan security forces.

Later this month, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, is expected to present his analysis of the situation in the country. The analysis could prompt an increase in U.S. troop levels to help implement President Obama‘s new strategy.

Military experts insist that the additional resources are necessary. But many, including some advising McChrystal, say they fear the public has not been made aware of the significant commitments that come with Washington‘s new policies.

―We will need a large combat presence for many years to come, and we will probably need a large financial commitment longer than that,‖ said Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the ―strategic assessment‖ team advising McChrystal. The expansion of the Afghan security force that the general will recommend to secure the country ―will inevitably cost much more than any imaginable Afghan government is going to be able to afford on its own,‖ Biddle added.

―Afghan forces will need $4 billion a year for another decade, with a like sum for development,‖ said Bing West, a former assistant secretary of defense and combat Marine who has chronicled the Iraq and Afghan wars. Bing said the danger is that Congress is ―so

156 generous in support of our own forces today, it may not support the aid needed for progress in Afghanistan tomorrow.‖

Some members of Congress are worried. The House Appropriations Committee said in its report on the fiscal 2010 defense appropriations bill that its members are ―concerned about the prospects for an open-ended U.S. commitment to bring stability to a country that has a decades-long history of successfully rebuffing foreign military intervention and attempts to influence internal politics.‖

The Afghan government has made some political and military progress since 2001, but the Taliban insurgency has been reinvigorated.

Anthony H. Cordesman, another member of McChrystal‘s advisory group and a national security expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told reporters recently that even with military gains in the next 12 to 18 months, it would take years to reduce sharply the threat from the Taliban and other insurgent forces.

The task that the United States has taken on in Afghanistan is in many ways more difficult than the one it has encountered in Iraq, where the U.S. government has spent $684 billion in war-related funding.

In a 2008 study that ranked the weakest states in the developing world, the Brookings Institution rated Afghanistan second only to Somalia. Afghanistan‘s gross domestic product in 2008 was $23 billion, with about $3 billion coming from opium production, according to the CIA‘s World Factbook. Oil-producing Iraq had a GDP of $113 billion.

Afghanistan‘s central government takes in roughly $890 million in annual revenue, according to the World Factbook. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has pointed out that Afghanistan‘s national budget cannot support the $2 billion needed today for the country‘s army and police force.

Dutch Army Brig. Gen. Tom Middendorp, commander of the coalition task force in Afghanistan‘s southern Uruzgan province, described the region as virtually prehistoric.

―It‘s the poorest province of one of the poorest countries in the world. And if you walk through that province, it‘s like walking through the Old Testament,‖ Middendorp told reporters recently. ―There is enormous illiteracy in the province. More than 90 percent cannot write or read. So it‘s very basic, what you do there. And they have had 30 years of conflict.‖

Unlike in Iraq, where Obama has established a timeline for U.S. involvement, the president has not said when he would like to see troops withdrawn from Afghanistan.

White House officials emphasize that the burden is not that of the United States alone. The NATO-led force in the country has 61,000 troops from 42 countries; about 29,000 of those troops are American.

Still, military experts say the United States will not be able to shed its commitment easily.

The government has issued billions of dollars in contracts in recent years, underscoring the vast extent of work that U.S. officials are commissioning. 157

Among other purposes, contractors have been sought this summer to build a $25 million provincial Afghan National Police headquarters; maintain anti-personnel mine systems; design and build multimillion-dollar sections of roads; deliver by sea and air billions of dollars worth of military bulk cargo; and supervise a drug-eradication program.

One solicitation, issued by the Army Corps of Engineers, is aimed at finding a contractor to bring together Afghan economic, social, legal and political groups to help build the country‘s infrastructure. The contractor would work with Afghan government officials as well as representatives from private and nongovernmental organizations to establish a way to allocate resources for new projects.

―We are looking at two decades of supplying a few billion a year to Afghanistan,‖ said Michael E. O‘Hanlon, a senior fellow and military expert at the Brookings Institution, adding: ―It‘s a reasonable guess that for 20 years, we essentially will have to fund half the Afghan budget.‖ He described the price as reasonable, given that it may cost the United States $100 billion this year to continue fighting.

―We are creating a [long-term military aid] situation similar to the ones we have with Israel, Egypt and Jordan,‖ he said.

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KARZAI OFFERS RIVAL TOP CABINET POST IN EFFORT TO AVOID ELECTION DEFEAT (AUGUST 11, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, August 11th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Karzai offers rival top Cabinet post in effort to avoid election defeat SOURCE: The Times Tuesday, August 11, 2009 By TOM COGHLAN and JEREMY PAGE in Kabul

One of the three main contenders in Afghanistan‘s presidential election admitted yesterday that he had been offered a power-sharing deal by President Karzai in an apparent attempt to sideline the other leading candidate and avoid a second-round vote.

Ashraf Ghani, a former academic and World Bank executive, told The Times that a ―weakening‖ Mr Karzai had attempted to persuade him to abandon his campaign in exchange for the position of prime minister in a new Karzai administration.

Mr Ghani, who was Finance Minister in Mr Karzai‘s first Cabinet, said that he was ―listening‖ to the approaches from Mr Karzai‘s intermediaries but was not giving up his campaign for the election on August 20. ―An offer was made. It was for a position as ‗chief executive‘ [in the Cabinet],‖ he said. ―The details were not worked out. I am not discontinuing my election campaign.‖

The proposed deal could seriously undermine the campaign of the other major contender in the election, Abdullah Abdullah, who is widely regarded as the main threat to Mr Karzai‘s continued grip on power.

Wahid Omer, a spokesman for Mr Karzai, confirmed that there had been talks with Mr Ghani, but denied there had been an offer of a specific post. ―Our talks are going towards Ashraf Ghani joining with Karzai. Ghani‘s team has also contacted us … It‘s not just us contacting them.‖

The alleged offer appears to suggest that the President is no longer confident of winning an outright majority in the first round, and may even fear losing in a second round run-off with Dr Abdullah.

It has also prompted speculation that the international community supports the idea as a way of stunting Mr Karzai‘s power and bringing on board a skilled technocrat, while retaining an administration led by ethnic Pashtuns. Both Mr Karzai and Mr Ghani are Pashtuns, the country‘s majority ethnicity and the one from which the Taleban draws it strength.

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Dr Abdullah, a former Foreign Minister in Mr Karzai‘s first Government, is of mixed Tajik and Pashtun ethnicity but has longstanding links to the Tajik north, which is his main support base. Some diplomats fear that if he won it would further exacerbate the sense of alienation among the Pashtun southern tribes and fuel greater violence.

Sources close to the Ghani campaign denied that the United States was driving the deal, but confirmed that US diplomats had offered assurances that the Karzai offer was ―genuine‖.

Dr Abdullah, however, said he doubted that the US supported the proposed power-sharing arrangement. ―Afghanistan has not benefited from these deals,‖ he told The Times. ―A dream team? Or a nightmare team? I don‘t know. What I do know is that people want change.‖

Public mood is notoriously difficult to judge in Afghanistan, but opinion polls do suggest a narrowing lead for the President and an increasing likelihood of a second round.

Mr Ghani said that President Karzai‘s strategy of brokering deals with regional strongmen had failed. ―Karzai‘s support is weakening in every place you look,‖ he said.

―His strategy is to seek out ethnic entrepreneurs on the assumption that they have vote banks that can deliver blocs of votes. They can‘t. I am peeling away a major portion of his support. Abdullah is succeeding in peeling another major portion of it.‖

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AFGHANISTAN ENLISTS TRIBAL MILITIA FORCES (AUGUST 12, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, August 12th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Afghanistan Enlists Tribal Militia Forces SOURCE: The Wall Street Journal Wednesday, August 12, 2009 By ANAND GOPAL and YOCHI J. DREAZEN

KABUL — The Afghan and U.S. governments have launched a new effort to enlist tribal fighters from many of the country‘s most violent provinces in the war against the Taliban, hoping that a tactic first used in Iraq can help turn the tide here as well.

Thousands of armed tribal fighters from 18 Afghan provinces will initially be hired to provide security for elections on Aug. 20, officials from both countries said. If the security is effective, Afghan officials say they will try to give the tribesmen permanent jobs protecting their villages and neighborhoods.

The tribal initiative is being run by a new branch of the Afghan government called the Independent Directorate for the Protection of Highways and Public Property. In coming days, officials from the agency will ask tribal shuras, or councils, in participating provinces to organize armed militias to guard polling places, roads and public gathering spaces.

Officials hope that the militias will provide an additional layer of security to support the new American strategy of trying to better protect Afghan civilians from Taliban violence.

Members of the militias will be allowed to use their own AK-47s and other weapons, but they won‘t receive arms, ammunition or uniforms from the government.

Afghan officials said the effort is an attempt to import a successful tactic from Iraq, where Sunni tribal fighters in Anbar Province helped drive al Qaeda in Iraq out of the area. The so- called Awakening fighters are widely thought to have played a significant role in taming Iraq‘s once-unrelenting violence.

―We are trying to recreate the Awakening of Iraq here in Afghanistan,‖ said Arif Noorzai, the director of the initiative. The militias are supposed to work in coordination with the Afghan National Army and Police, but their most important role might be in areas where the Afghan security forces aren‘t present, Mr. Noorzai said.

U.S. and Afghan officials are concerned that the Taliban will launch large-scale attacks to dissuade Afghans from voting and sap public confidence in the broader Afghan political process. Last week, Taliban fighters fired at least nine rockets into central Kabul.

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On Monday, eight Taliban insurgents raided Pul-i-Alam, a provincial capital south of Kabul, firing rockets at government buildings and sparking a gun battle that left at least 11 people dead, including the attackers.

In restive Paktika province, Gov. Abdul Quoom Katwazi said there had been a sharp uptick in insurgent infiltration from neighboring Pakistan. ―Many of our enemies are trying to cross into Afghanistan to disrupt the election,‖ he said in an interview. ―There may be bad days ahead.‖

Mr. Katwazi said he was trying to improve security in his province by hiring roughly 1,500 local tribal fighters. The so-called arbakai fighters — the pashtu name for the militia forces — will be paid $150 each for the month, and the governor said he hopes to keep them on his payrolls long-term. ―We are going to test this system,‖ he said. ―If it works, we will continue it.‖

The new program is part of a broad American and Afghan push to forge closer ties with Afghanistan‘s tribes, which U.S. military strategists see as powerful potential allies in the fight against the Taliban.

A senior American military official in Kabul said the U.S. was working to develop detailed intelligence about local tribal power structures to better identify which groups and leaders to seek to engage.

The official said the U.S. is also trying to steer development money and reconstruction projects to smaller, less powerful tribes as a way of counteracting the Taliban‘s proven success in recruiting supporters from marginalized sectors of Afghan society.

The new initiative doesn‘t mark the first time U.S. and Afghan officials have tried to enlist the country‘s tribes in the fight against the Taliban.

In a few instances, tribal militias were formed in specific parts of the country but were disbanded after they were deemed ineffective. In some cases, the militias turned to criminal activity or took part in tribal feuds.

The most recent attempt was last year, when Afghan officials created a local-militia effort in parts of eastern Afghanistan‘s Wardak province. U.S. officials said at the time they hoped eventually to replicate the so-called Afghan Public Protection Program, or AP3, elsewhere in Afghanistan.

Nearly 10 months later, the program remains confined to Wardak. U.S. and Afghan officials there have struggled to recruit fighters from the majority Pashtun community, and the program is disproportionately made up of minority Hazaras. The imbalance has sparked tensions between the two groups and prevented American officials from increasing the program‘s size and reach.

―Nobody wants to join this force and be seen as working for the government,‖ said Roshanak Wardak, a parliamentarian from Wardak province.

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Senior U.S. officials said the tribal militias will have to be closely monitored and carefully controlled to prevent them from challenging the central government or falling under the sway of regional warlords.

―This is an area where warlords and militias got a very, very bad name, so we don‘t want to create anything that makes the Afghan people think we‘re going the wrong direction,‖ Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander here, said in a recent interview. ―They‘ll say, ‗we don‘t want any more armed groups around here.‘‖

Officials from both countries also warn that tribal allegiances can be fleeting. Two years ago, international forces withdrew from the southern town of Musa Qala, leaving it in the hands of a local tribe. The tribe then allowed the Taliban to gain control of the town, forcing Western troops to invade and recapture the area the following year.

Still, tribal leaders have had some successes. Earlier this summer, tribal elders in a district of northwestern Afghanistan‘s Baghdis province helped broker a cease-fire in which the Taliban pledged to not attack polling centers during the presidential elections and the government agreed to remove its forces from the area. Afghan officials see it as a possible template for other peace deals.

On a recent afternoon, Gen. Dawlat Khan Zadran, the police chief for Paktika, a large, rural province of more than 1 million people, signed individual contracts for 1,500 arbakai fighters. The one-page documents said the fighters would take orders from local police and army commanders and pledge not to interfere with the balloting. ―I don‘t have enough police to protect the people,‖ he said. ―It‘s a gamble, but I hope the arbakai can help.‖

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DISCOVERY OF MASS GRAVES IN SWAT (AUGUST 13, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, August 13th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Discovery of mass graves in Swat SOURCE: Dawn Thursday, 13 Aug, 2009

LAHORE: A fact-finding mission of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan to Swat has documented accounts of extrajudicial killings by the security forces, discovery of mass graves in the conflict-hit region and the unabated suffering of the civilian population.

The report of the three-day mission says a number of Swat residents have reported having seen mass graves in the area, including at least one at Kookarai village in Babozai tehsil and another in an area between Dewlai and Shah Dheri in Kabal tehsil.

The witnesses to mass burials said at least in some cases the bodies appeared to be those of Taliban militants, it added.

The mission expressed grave concern over the ‗worrying development‘ and also over credible reports of numerous extrajudicial killings and reprisals carried out by the security forces.

The mission said: ‗It is vital for the success of the military operation against terrorists that the security forces‘ actions are distinguishable from the atrocities committed by the Taliban. ‗Taliban justice‘ has been rightly condemned for its brutal and arbitrary nature and was crucial in helping turn the public opinion against the extremists. Treatment of individuals by government must aspire to a higher standard.

‗The human rights violations by security forces can only be discouraged if the State puts in place a transparent mechanism to monitor violations both during and post-conflict and fulfill its obligation of providing justice through due process.‘

The HRCP mission also noted serious difficulties faced by the local population and internally displaced persons (IDPs) returning to Swat.

‗The IDPs have returned to find a number of houses in the area damaged in the military operation. Shops in most areas are yet to reopen and the ones that are open have scarce supplies. The local people demand that the government ensure the supply of essentials to the returning population, including subsidised edibles for the families that cannot afford to buy them on account of financial losses. Restoration of the devastated infrastructure and provision of safe drinking water must be given top priority to prevent the spread of disease.‘

While a massive security operation in Swat seems to have dented the Taliban network in the area for now, the threat still exists. A lack of safety and security remains for the people being sent back to the valley from IDP camps, the mission reported. 164

‗That the law and order situation is still not completely under control is testified by the continued curfew in the area. Even military officials in the area acknowledge that parts of Swat are yet to be purged of the militants. The beheading of a police official in Sangota (Mingora) on July 28 triggered fear among local residents who had returned to their homes after being assured that the militants have been flushed out of the area.‘

It said none of the national and provincial assembly members or district or tehsil nazims had so far returned to the conflict-hit area. Their absence itself is a reflection of the apprehension of lack of security in the region. The government should provide the elected representatives of the area appropriate security to encourage their return, which would also boost public morale. The mission urged a campaign to apprehend local-level Taliban operatives and other terrorists.

The return from the IDP camps must be voluntary and the people should be given accurate assessment of the situation on ground to enable them to make an informed decision.

The HRCP emphasised that security of the displaced population must be the guiding principles in any decision on repatriation.

‗The shifting of IDPs from camps in the NWFP cities to safe places in Swat, and not hurried repatriation or closure of camps for the IDPs, must be the main consideration for the government,‘ the mission said.

It further said the government must not send the returning IDPs to areas yet to be cleared of Taliban and should instead move the IDP camps to those areas of Swat that have been secured and are accessible to national and international humanitarian aid agencies.

It would make the displaced population feel more at home in a climate they are accustomed to, the mission said.

It said the IDPs should be expeditiously compensated for the damage caused to their houses and other property during the military operation to allow them to rebuild their lives at the earliest.

The civil society must also come forward to assist the traumatised population as well as demand provision of justice through due process and an end to human rights violations in security operations, the HRCP said.

165

PEACE TALKS WITH TALIBAN TOP ISSUE IN AFGHAN VOTE (AUGUST 17, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, August 17th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Peace Talks With Taliban Top Issue in Afghan Vote SOURCE: The New York Times Monday August 17, 2009 By CARLOTTA GALL

KABUL, Afghanistan - Whether and how to negotiate peace with the Taliban has become the one issue that no candidate in the Afghan presidential election can avoid taking a stand on. There is broad agreement that the war must end, but debate swirls around whether the government of President Hamid Karzai is moving effectively toward persuading the Taliban to end their insurgency.

Although Mr. Karzai has often talked about negotiating with the Taliban, little concrete has happened. The government‘s reconciliation program for Taliban fighters is barely functioning. A Saudi mediation effort has stalled. Last-minute efforts to engage the Taliban in order to allow elections to take place remain untested. Meanwhile the Obama administration has just sent thousands more troops here in an attempt to push back Taliban gains.

Mr. Karzai, who polls indicate is still the front-runner, is the most vocal candidate in calling for negotiations, pledging that if he is re-elected he will hold a traditional tribal gathering and invite members of the Taliban and , another opposition leader, to make peace.

And just in the past few weeks, his government has started several initiatives to approach local Taliban commanders through tribal elders. The government also has started work to win over the tribes by hiring thousands of their young men to be part of a local protection force, primarily to ensure security for elections. But each of Mr. Karzai‘s three main opponents is critical of his record in following through on such promises.

Abdullah Abdullah, Ashraf Ghani and Ramazan Bashardost all oppose the Taliban, but they also promise if elected to do better and to make peace a priority. The candidates differ on how to pursue a settlement: by negotiating a comprehensive peace with the Taliban leadership; or by trying to draw away midlevel Taliban commanders and foot soldiers, an approach that has been tried with little success over the past seven years as the ranks of fighters have swelled.

Mr. Abdullah, the candidate for the largest opposition bloc, the National Front, and Mr. Ghani, a former finance minister, say the first step must be a grass-roots approach through community and tribal councils to address the grievances of people who have taken up arms

166 against the government. ―If you lose the people, you lose the war,‖ Mr. Abdullah said in an interview.

Mr. Ghani advocates a cease-fire as the next step, with political negotiations only later. ―It‘s not going to be easy,‖ he told journalists at a briefing. ―It is going to be quite complex and quite tough, but we need to create the conditions of confidence.‖

Among those urging a wide-reaching political solution is the head of the United Nations mission in Afghanistan, Kai Eide. A peace process, or reconciliation as he prefers to call it, has to be a top priority of any new government, as does improving relations with Pakistan, which has long backed the Taliban, he said.

The groundwork for that process needs to be laid through the winter, he says, in order to forestall another season of fighting next spring. He also says that the effort has to be broader than the reconciliation and reintegration of local commanders envisaged by the United States military.

―You have different views - those who believe you can do it locally, from province to province, district to district,‖ he said. ―I don‘t think that is the case, I think you have to have a wider process.‖

But the United States and NATO want to negotiate from a position of strength, diplomats and military officials said. ―Reconciliation is important, but not now,‖ said one Western diplomat in Kabul, speaking on the condition of anonymity. ―It‘s not going to happen until the insurgency is weaker and the government is stronger.‖

Thomas Ruttig, co-director of Afghanistan Analysts Network, an independent policy research group, proposed in a recent report multilayered contacts or talks with different elements of the insurgency. He also advocated a long-term reconciliation process across the country to address the alienation from the government of many groups who are tempted to join the Taliban, and to heal the wounds of 30 years of war.

The Obama administration has done little publicly to push the issue forward, offering to talk to moderate members of the Taliban but drawing the line at those linked to Al Qaeda.

―We and our Afghan allies stand ready to welcome anyone supporting the Taliban who renounces Al Qaeda, lays down their arms, and is willing to participate in the free and open society that is enshrined in the Afghan Constitution,‖ Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said in a speech last month.

Yet critics say that essentially demanding that the Taliban surrender will not produce results.

The few senior members of the Taliban who have come over to the government warn that there is so much distrust of the government and foreign forces that it is deterring even low- level members of the Taliban. They have watched the poor treatment of tribal leaders and elders by the government and foreign forces.

Abdul Wahid Baghrani, an important tribal leader from Helmand Province who went over to the government in 2005 under its reconciliation program, negotiated the surrender of the

167

Taliban in 2001 with Mr. Karzai. Now he lives in a house in western Kabul but is largely ignored by the government, despite the enormous influence he could exercise.

Three months ago his eldest son, Zia ul-Haq, 32, was killed, along with his wife and driver, when British helicopters swooped in on their car as they were traveling in Helmand. Two Western officials confirmed the shooting but said it was a mistake. The forces were trying to apprehend a high-level Taliban target, they said.

―My son was not an armed Talib, he was a religious Talib,‖ he said. The word Talib means religious student. ―From any legal standpoint it is not permitted to fire on a civilian car.

―This is not just about my son,‖ he said. ―Every day we are losing hundreds of people, and I care about them as much as I care for my son.‖

Despite the deaths, he has remained in Kabul and still advocates peace negotiations.

He said it was wrong to consider the Taliban leadership, or the leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, as irreconcilable. ―It is not the opinion of people who know him and work with him,‖ he said.

―Of course it is possible to make peace with the Taliban - they are Afghans,‖ he said. ―The reason they are fighting is because they are not getting the opportunity to make peace.‖

Ruhullah Khapalwak contributed reporting.

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MAULVI OMAR CAPTURED, SAYS BAITULLAH IS DEAD (AUGUST 18, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, August 18th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Maulvi Omar captured, says Baitullah is dead SOURCE: Dawn Tuesday, 18 Aug, 2009

ISLAMABAD: Security forces captured Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan‘s top spokesman, and he acknowledged the death of the group‘s leader in a recent US missile strike, officials said on Tuesday.

‗Everybody knows that Maulvi Omar has been arrested. He was a spokesman for the Taliban,‘ said Mian Iftikhar Hussain, information minister for the North West Frontier Province.

‗We will catch them all. All Taliban will have to face the same fate,‘ he told AFP, adding that Omar had been moved to the provincial capital Peshawar.

‗Intelligence agencies have given me information that Maulvi Omar has confirmed the death of Baitullah during interrogation,‘ he added.

US and Pakistani officials have said they were almost certain that the chief, Baitullah Mehsud, had been killed in the August 5 strike, but at least three Taliban operatives, including the detainee, Maulvi Omar, had called media organisations following the attack to say he was still alive.

Omar‘s comments - relayed by an intelligence official who took part in the questioning - would be the first admission by the Taliban that Mehsud was dead.

The spokesman‘s capture was the second arrest of a prominent Taliban figure in 24 hours.

As the official spokesman for Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Omar frequently called journalists to claim responsibility for terrorist attacks in Pakistan.

As well as being the movement‘s mouthpiece, Omar was an influential aide to Mehsud and ranking member of the Taliban.

Omar initially operated relatively openly - a reflection of the former government‘s reluctance to tackle the group.

Reporters had his home and cell phone numbers. Omar would occasionally summon reporters stationed in Khar, the main city in Bajaur tribal region, for news conferences at his headquarters in nearby Mohmand town. 169

But after the army began an offensive in April, Omar changed phone numbers frequently. He never appeared in public, but still continued to telephone the media with messages from the Taliban leadership.

He was captured along with two associates in a village in the Mohmand tribal region Monday night while he was travelling in a car to South Waziristan, a Taliban stronghold, said Javed Khan, a local government administrator.

‗Maulvi Omar is in our custody, and he is being questioned,‘ Khan told The Associated Press without giving any further details.

Earlier, three intelligence officials said local tribal elders assisted troops in locating Omar in the village of Khawazeo.

Omar‘s capture came a day after police arrested militant commander Qair Saifullah, another close Mehsud aide, as he was being treated in a private hospital in Islamabad, the capital.

Saifullah, who is reportedly linked to al-Qaida, told police he had been wounded in an American missile strike in South Waziristan, said two police officials. It was unclear if it was the same strike believed to have killed Mehsud.

Saifullah appeared on Tuesday before a special anti-terrorism court along with Zaid Ikram, an aide arrested along with him. Both were ordered held for four days for investigation, prosecutor Raja Yaseen said, but he would not elaborate on what charges they would face.

The two men were being questioned for possible roles in attacks on US and allied forces in Afghanistan as well as terrorist attacks in Pakistan, said Islamabad police operations chief Tahir Alam Khan.

Saifullah is affiliated to Harkat Jihad-e-Islami, an al-Qaida-linked group that recruits militants to fight foreign forces in Afghanistan, Khan said. Ikram - who is Saifullah‘s younger brother - played a major role in a bomb attack on Islamabad‘s Marriott hotel in 2004, in which one guard was killed in the parking lot, he said.

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BACKGROUNDER: AFGHANISTAN‟S NEXT PRESIDENT (AUGUST 18, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, August 18th, 2009

Click here for PDF-file

Afghanistan’s next president Written by OLIVIER IMMIG, Editor JAN VAN HEUGTEN

The presidential election in Afghanistan originally were planned to be held in April 2009, but as general security in the country has decreased dramatically over the last few years it was decided to await the announced arrival of 21.000 fresh US troops. The first batch of US marines arrived in May; the presidential and provincial council elections will now be held on August 20.[i]

Every candidate for the presidency is required to fulfil five conditions: possess Afghan citizenship, be a Muslim, be at least 40 years of age, hand over a list to the Independent Election Commission (IEC) with 10.000 signatures endorsing the candidacy, and make a deposit of 1.000 US dollars. Initially, 44 contenders for probably one of the most difficult jobs in the world applied, including two women. In the presidential election of 2004 18 candidates participated.

After the registration-office closed on May 8, for a period of two weeks every Afghan had the opportunity to protest against certain candidates taking part. Those accused then got the opportunity to defend themselves; after that, the Electoral Complaints Commission announced on June 9 which candidates were refused, and on what grounds.[ii] This long- winded procedure serves to guarantee the elections will be as ‗clean‘ as possible; quite a number of local militia-leaders and former warlords with dubious pasts nowadays are members of parliament.

On June 16 campaigning has started, to be ended on August 18, two day before the actual polling takes place. Next to formal demands, it mostly is informal conditions and backgrounds that determine a candidates‘ success; what are these? Another big question mark is, how many of Afghanistan‘s 16 million eligible voters will cast their vote; after nearly eight years in power, outgoing president and main contender Karzai and his nation are still faced 171 with numerous grim issues. What future circumstances will the newly elected president have to face?

Bonn: a new dawn?

At the end of 2001, the conservative-Islamic Taliban regime and its notorious ally Osama bin Laden and his Arabic warriors were ousted by fighters of the so-called ‗Northern Alliance‘, with the crucial support of American logistics and bombardments. A moderate Pasthun tribal leader, Hamid Karzai, was installed as interim-president of Afghanistan.

At an almost euphoric UN-Conference in Bonn, held in December 2001, a number of political agreements were laid down in a tight schedule.[iii] First, a national meeting (‘Loyah Jirgah‘) was to be called together to develop and approve a new constitution. Thereafter, presidential and parliamentarian elections would be held. A limited contingent of foreign troops, the International Security Assistance Force or ISAF, was to be stationed in Afghanistan, mainly in and near the cities of Kabul and Kandahar. The main task of these troops, mostly British and American but also originating from other NATO-countries, would be to maintain peace.

In order to support the interim-administration in its reconstruction-effort of a largely devastated country Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT‘s) were established. They had to assist in the repair of irrigational systems (of crucial importance in a largely agrarian country), road-construction, the building of schools and hospitals. Unfortunately, quite a number of projects were carried out badly, or not even finished at all. Considerable amounts of money leaked away to the bank-accounts of private companies and NGO‘s, without any work being done or much help offered in return. Practises like these attributed to undermining the fragile authority of the government. Time and again the Karzai-administration turned out to be fully dependent on foreign support.

Elections and ethnicity

At the first free and largely fair presidential election in October 2004 of Afghanistan conciliatory-minded Hamid Karzai obtained over 55 percent of all votes.[iv] On December 7, 2004 Karzai was solemnly installed as president and the leader of government. During his first tenure he was seconded by vice-presidents Ahmed Zia Massud, a Tajik and brother of the legendary military leader of the Northern Alliance Ahmed Shah Massud (who got murdered on September 9), 2001, and Abdul Karim Khalili, the most prominent leader of the Hezaras. Thus, two out of three of the largest ethnic minorities of Afghanistan were represented on the highest level of government. The Uzbek leader Rashid Dostum became vice-chief of Staff.

Representation and active participation in the national political process by the Tajik population, but also from Hezaras and Uzbeks, is of major importance. Tajiks under the leadership of Ahmed Shah Massud for years have been the main force within the Northern Alliance; it was the only adversary left for the Taliban inside the country. Their role in removing the Taliban-regime can hardly be overstated.

In December 2005 parliamentary elections were held, a new parliament got installed in Kabul. These elections were remarkably successful, owing to an unexpectedly large voter attendance. The Afghan ‗Wolesi Jirgah‘ or House of the People (Lower House or House of Representatives) is made up of 249 members. The ‗Meshrano Jirgah‘ or House of Elders counts 102 seats. After both presidential and parliamentarian elections had delivered the much

172 hoped-for results the Bush-administration apparently assumed that some sort of ‗democratic process‘ had begun to take root in Afghanistan. In many Western capitals the eventual defeat of the Taliban-movement and the warlords of the country were taken for granted. As President Bush stated on July 4, 2002: ―In Afghanistan, we have defeated the Taliban‖.

Nothing could have been farther from the truth. Nor the leadership of Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and his ‗Arabs‘ neither the leadership of the Taliban, mullah Omar and his entourage, had been eliminated. In spite of several large-scale military operations against them in the Tora Bora border area, they succeeded in escaping to neighbouring Pakistan, largely unharmed. Both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were chased out of Afghanistan, but they were not eradicated.

Soon after the rapid demise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Bush-administration put its main focus on the destruction of the regime of Saddam Hussain in Iraq. Although Hussain militarily was equally easy defeated, resistance in Iraq would continue for a number of years to come. This required the US to invest huge military and financial means to at least ‗pacify‘ Iraq - resulting in a loss of interest and means concerning Afghanistan. As 2002 progressed, the Bush-government intensified its ‗War on Terror‘, seeking to destroy Al-Qaeda as well. This silent, unannounced redirection of American priorities concerning its main foreign policy aims had far-reaching consequences for Afghanistan and, indeed, the whole of South Asia.[v] Interim-president Karzai was faced with a factual decline of support from his main alley, the United States.

Obstacles: the Pakistan-connection

In the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan inhabited by numerous Pashtun tribes, part of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) directly bordering on Afghanistan, the Pakistani government never succeeded in establishing its writ.[vi] Here, with their ethnic brethren, the fleeing Pashtun of the Taliban-movement and their Arabic companions found shelter.[vii] As the efforts of the American government were increasingly aimed at bringing Iraq under control, both the Taliban-movement and Al-Qaeda started to regroup and rebuild.

Many of the thousands of madrassas (religious schools) in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area served, and still serve, as recruiting centres and training camps for the Taliban. Strong financial support from Arab countries, Saudi Arabia being the main contributor, enabled the Taliban to re-arm. They received military instruction and training from members of the Pakistani Secret Service (Inter Service Intelligence or ISI). Inside ISI, the Taliban could count on a number of staunch allies who, for a variety of reasons, readily supported militant Islamic groupings like the Taliban. Already in the eighties the number of madrassas and mosques in the border area has been increasing rapidly. Through this expanding network militancy, training facilities and arms were spread.[viii]

Another extremely important development that enabled the Afghan Taliban to regroup and regain strength was the instalment of a conservative-Islamic provincial government in the NWFP in 2002. Being based on a coalition of conservative Islamic Pakistani parties, and being narrowly associated with many of its Afghan counterparts, it openly provided sympathy and support for the Taliban. Increasingly, groups of Taliban fighters crossed the border into Afghanistan to carry out attacks on Afghan government officials and buildings, overwhelmingly in the eastern and southern provinces of the country. The limited Western

173 military contingent could do little; when militants were hotly pursued they could simply run back to safe haven Pakistan, rendering ISAF largely powerless since its troops were not allowed to cross the border.

The wished-for future political system in Afghanistan had been put down in detailed writing in Bonn, 2001. A top down democratic political structure should be developed, starting with an elected president. The president appoints ministers and provincial governors. This enabled Karzai to develop an ethnically balanced administration, an absolute precondition for arriving at a unified country as well as for a balanced national government. On the other hand these almost unlimited presidential powers may easily provoke political opposition, especially when a president rules too heavy-handed. Another disadvantage of this ‗presidential‘ system is that provincial governors are answerable to the president, instead of the electorate in the provinces.

As a consequence, presidential prerogatives like these led to the repeated appointment of potential political alleys and friends as governor, among them a number of former, notorious warlords. Quite a number of provincial governors would never have been elected in direct provincial elections. To the august goal of developing democracy this strongly centralised system created numerous obstacles; but it certainly did fit in with the Afghan political traditions. Here, some seeds of future conflicts between Western wishes and Afghan practise were sown.

Formerly, when a strong Pashtun ruler led the country, the interests of the ethnic minorities were seldom acknowledged, let alone taken into account. The desired development of a Pashtun dominated central authority in Western capitals and the UN headquarters will hardly motivate the other ethnic groupings of the country to wholeheartedly participate in the process of political modernisation and democratisation.

Apart from a political timetable an equally ambitious plan has been designed at the UN- Conference in Bonn for the creation of a wholly new political system, a new judiciary system, the building of an effective new Afghan army and the creation of a strong Afghan police force. The instalment of a huge administrative system of civil servants, practically absent in Afghanistan for years, was another wished for requirement. Unfortunately, all of this demanded steady streams of international financial means which, in spite of repeated promises at regularly held international donor-conferences, were simply not at hand. One consequence turned out to be that local courts of justice, if they were established at all, were hardly able to pay the salaries of their employees. Training programs were entirely out of the question. Since few local courts were established, local communities increasingly came to rely on the rudimentary versions of Sharia law and order as provided by the Taliban.

A high level of corruption is another obstacle on the road to stability and democracy. Ministers, governors and district officials were able to obtain all kinds of privileges for their political allies, family members and ethnic relatives. Whether it was about the smuggling of luxury goods, the building of a road, a hospital or a private bungalow, or turning a blind eye to drugs deals and smuggling, it left a major part of the population out in the cold. Not surprisingly, they felt little affinity with the new government in Kabul. Repeatedly Karzai was forced to sack corrupt or stubborn governors. Even some members of his own family are reportedly involved in the drugs trade, his brother Ahmad Wali campaigning in the southern provinces for him, for instance.

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Candidates: Karzai[ix]

Afghanistan, since its inception as an autonomous state in 1747, has always been inhabited by a rich variety of peoples and tribes. The Pashtun tribes which mainly live in the southern and eastern parts of the country, today make up about 42 % of Afghanistan‘s population of 33 million.[x] The Tajiks, mainly living in the Northern provinces, are the second largest group. They constitute about 27 % of all Afghans. The Shiite Hezaras (practically all other Afghans are Sunnites) constitute approximately 9 % of the entire population, just like the Uzbeks. Taken together, all minorities outnumber the majority Pashtun population.

Ethnic numbers and strength have always determined the influence and positions of all groups within the central government. Traditionally, the Pashtun provide national leadership, whether through a king or a president. The Taliban-movement, which was in power in Kabul between 1999 and 2001, also is basically Pashtun made. As such, it fitted in with a century‘s old tradition of alternating periods of strong and weak leadership. The ethnic minorities seldom succeeded in making themselves an influence within the national government. The mere fact that this, to a certain extent, did happen in the early years of the first Karzai-administration was owed to the non-Pashtun troops of the Northern Alliance that took Kabul in December 2001.

Clearly, President Karzai will not be supported by all members of his own ethnic community. However, being a major Pashtun leader he will certainly be preferred to non-Pashtun presidential candidates. At the previous presidential election in 2004 Karzai succeeded in obtaining about 90% of all votes from provinces like Logar, Paktia, Khost, Paktika, Zabul Kandahar, Helmand and Nimruz. These provinces are largely inhabited by Pashtun. The same ethnic principle by and large applies to other candidates, although in October 2004 a substantial amount of Tajik and Uzbek votes was cast for Karzai.

On August 20, a considerable part of all Hezaras is expected to support Karzai; their main leader, Khalili, presently is one of Karzai‘s vice-presidents, and is running as such again. Another well-known Hezara leader, Muhammad Mohaqiq, campaigns for Karzai as well. Also, a number of Uzbek and Hezara prominents have publicly declared their support for Karzai.[xi] At the end of July four candidates have withdrawn; three of them spoke out for Karzai. The expectation is that more candidates will follow their example.[xii] Karzai‘s main contender, Tajik leader Abdullah Abdullah, recently received a boost as well; a considerable number of followers of the Uzbek Jumbesh-e-Milli Party led by one of Karzai‘s traditional allies, Abdul Rashid Dostum, declared their support for Abdullah.[xiii] On the other hand, at a late hour, former warlord and actual strongman Ismael Khan in Herat province, which borders Iran, decided to back Karzai.[xiv]

All in all, Karzai still is the front runner, in spite of all unresolved issues and problems that still trouble the country. In an attempt to gain the Uzbek‘s vote Karzai reinstalled the controversial former warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum as his Chief of Staff of the Afghan army. Dostum, living in Turkey, on the eve of the elections has returned to northern Afghanistan, if only to discipline his political party Jumbesh-e-Milli. Talks about future cooperation have also been conducted between the former US ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad and Hamid Karzai. Both men have known each other for many years. Although Khalilzad, an American citizen of Pashtun origin (he was born in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif), did not register as a presidential candidate (in which case he would have had to abandon his American citizenship), he may occupy an important post in the next Karzai-administration. It

175 is rumoured that he may be appointed as prime minister, at present a non-existent function. The appointment of Khalilzad will likely increase direct US influence on the Afghan government. A number of Karzai‘s ministers have already voiced their opposition against this.[xv]

Karzai will have little space for extensive political manoeuvring. Delegating political powers to provincial officials or non-Pashtun ethnic groups will immediately backfire; the major Pashtun tribes would not accept this. How many Pashtun tribes support the Taliban movement cannot be readily determined. It is clear, however, that a considerable majority of all Afghan Pashtun still does not wish to identify with the main political aims of the Taliban-movement. Therefore, the repeated summonses of Taliban leader mullah Omar not to vote may meet with little success; equally little results are to be expected from Karzai‘s repeated summonses to the Taliban to take part in the election.[xvi]

Owing to the ethnic variety of Afghanistan, its neighbouring countries have traditionally succeeded in exercising considerable influence on its national affairs. The Pashtuns have for long received substantial Pakistani support. Tajiks are supported by Tajikistan, Uzbeks receive considerable support from Uzbekistan and Turkey. Uzbeks and Tajiks generally do not get on well, both outside and inside Afghanistan. The minority of Shiite Hezaras are helped by Iran. More distant countries like Saudi-Arabia, India and the United States heavily involve themselves in the political, economic and religious affairs of Afghanistan as well.[xvii] These unilateral interferences have repeatedly led to huge public protests, especially when American ‗drones‘ (unmanned but armed aircrafts) or rocket launchings by the Taliban and their foreign supporters caused numerous civilian casualties. This did not just do damage to the popular support for continued Western military presence in the country but also discredits the Karzai-government, since ‗collateral damage‘ like this is not seen to contribute to the enhancement of national security.

Civilian casualties, the increasing strength and presence of the Taliban, plus the continued dependence of a weak Karzai-government on foreign military and financial support, have raised serious doubts in Afghan minds about supporting the presence of increasingly large numbers of Western military in their country. Nevertheless, one important recent poll result shows that a majority of all Afghans, Pashtun included, still prefer continued Western military presence to a return to power of the Taliban.[xviii]

This may well result in another large voter turnout, provided the Afghan army and the western military succeed in securing a safe voting process. Taliban commanders have repeatedly announced that they will ‗disturb‘ the elections. On August 10 six Taliban fighters attacked the governor‘s compound in Logar province; it houses the office of the Independent Election Commission as well. The province is located next to Kabul. Reportedly, 200 suicide bombers will be attacking polling stations on Election Day.[xix]

Under these circumstances, a large turnout of voters may well be considered as a renewed rejection of Taliban rule. As the Taliban continued to gain strength and established themselves in many parts of the country, practically occupying the entire eastern and southern parts of the country, at least since 2006 the overall security in Afghanistan has diminished considerably. At the same time, by now over 100.000 Western soldiers are already stationed in Afghanistan (two-third are Americans), making ISAF and NATO a formidable military force. They only started to arrive in 2007, after numerous previous, fruitless summonses to that end by an increasingly desperate president Karzai.

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Karzai‟s rivals

Another major contender in the presidential election is the partly Tajik, partly Pashtun Abdullah Abdullah. He was educated as an eye surgeon. Of all candidates, Abdullah is one of the few of them who are considered to have ‗clean hands‘, which gives him a clean, respectful image. Unlike Karzai, Abdullah does not receive any meaningful support from former warlords; he did not seek for it either. Former Tajik president Burhanuddin Rabbani does not qualify as such, after all.

Like one of Karzai‘s candidates for the vice-presidency, Tajik Mohammed Qasim Fahim, Abdullah for many years has been a close associate of Ahmed Shah Massud, the legendary, still immensely popular military leader of the Northern Alliance (which was re-baptised as the United front). Both men were befriended. Abdullah fully exploits this former friendship in his election campaign. In Karzai‘s interim government (2002-2004) Abdullah was Minister of Foreign Affairs. Differences of opinion with Karzai and the Bush-government about the future course of Afghan politics and developments in 2006 led to Abdullah‘s forced premature departure.

Abdullah, a moderate, was fully involved in the UN-Conference in Bonn as well. He was one of the major participatories in drafting the final agreement, and had suggested Karzai to be installed as interim-president. Being the main Tajik contender he will receive most Tajik votes. If he succeeds in acquiring substantial support from within other ethnic groups, Abdullah may well be a serious threat to Karzai‘s assumed first-round victory. The provinces where Abdullah is likely to obtain most of the votes are Ghor, Samangan, Baghlan, Parwan, Kapisa, Pansher and Badakshan, mainly Tajik inhabited in the northeast of the country. The most important swing provinces probably are Balkh, Kunduz, Takhar and possibly Ghazni.

Of course, Karzai seeks to get as many Tajiks on his side as he possibly can. Mincing little words, Abdullah describes the present Karzai-government as a failure, which actually caused the loss of a lot of popular support for both the government and democracy. In the ensuing power vacuum the Taliban found an opportunity to stage a comeback, leading to the present instability and insecurity in the country. Abdullah opines that the Afghans who join the Taliban do not do so because they want to destroy their country, but because they see it as the only way to fight corruption.[xx] Unfortunately, destroying their country is precisely what they are doing.

A third candidate who may attract a solid amount of votes is Ashraf Ghani, a Pashtun of the large Ahmedzai tribe.[xxi] Until recently, Ghani lived in the United States, pursuing a career at the World Bank. Ghani was narrowly involved in the UN-Conference in Bonn as well; he also helped to prepare the gathering of the ‗Loyah Jirgah ‗. In the interim-government of 2002-2004 he functioned as Treasury Minister. Ghani wants to lure foreign investments to Afghanistan, rather then keep on depending on foreign support and charity. These days he heads the Institute for State Effectivity. Ghani promises to strongly promote ‗peace and security, national sovereignty‘ and to strengthen national unity. He will combat corruption and raise the tax income of the central government. He has declared himself willing to cooperate with other contenders like Abdullah and Hezara leader Khalili, at present one of Karzai‘s two vice-presidents. If these candidates manage to combine their forces they may well be a viable alternative for Karzai. Following Karzai‘s bid, Abdullah has recently offered him the post of prime minister in his future government.

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Apparently Karzai takes this political threat seriously, considering that he has offered Ghani an important post in his next cabinet, on the condition that he would halt his campaign. Although Ghani did not accept the offer, it serves to show that the Karzai team is not overly confident that it will win, at least not in the first round. Cooperation between Karzai and Ghani would undoubtedly strengthen the future government. The American government, not willing to be seen choosing sides, has also cautiously shown its endorsement.[xxii] Washington‘s trust in Karzai has waned considerably over the years. Besides, Ashraf Ghani, being regarded as a ‗technocrat‘, enjoys a solid reputation of being capable and competent.[xxiii]

Ghani has declared to be willing to join the next Karzai-government, on condition that he will be able to implement his political and economic programs. However, it is highly unlikely that Ghani will even get close to a cabinet-post; on his website, he has branded the Karzai-family as a mafia family, ‗Karzai Incorporated‘, and in all likeliyhood will severely clash with Karzai‘s coterie of unsrupulous warlords.

Some more unlikely contenders have come up. The very first person to register as a candidate was Shahnawaz Tania, a Pashtun, and a former general and minister in the communist government (1978-1992). In 1990 Tanai attempted to overthrow his political boss, Najibullah, but failed. These days, Tanai heads the ‗Afghan Peace Movement‘. Another noticeable contender for the post of Afghan president is Abdul Salam, alias Rocketi, a former member of the Taliban-regime that dominated the country from 1996 to 2001. Salam owns his alias ‗Rocketi‘ to his special ability to extremely accurately fire missiles from his shoulder, demolishing quite a number of Soviet troops and vehicles. After the demise of the Taliban regime Abdul Salam has spent two years in jail. Apparently an enlightened man, he has decided to turn away from the Taliban; in 2005 he was chosen as a member of parliament.

Bullet-proof elections

As Election Day approaches, the much-hoped for ‗bullet-proof‘ elections turn out to be illusionary. A campaign leader of Abdullah Abdullah got killed when his car was attacked. In the Northern Province Kunduz vehicles in vice-presidential candidate Mohammad Qasim Fahim‘s vehicles were fired at with machineguns and RPG‘s (Rocket Propelled Grenades). Kunduz though, ethnically at least, belongs to Fahim‘s home base.

The attack was ascribed to the Taliban, as usual, but might well have been carried out by Tajik rivals of Fahim, trying to settle old scores. Other possible attackers may have been members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), who have recently fled from Pakistan. In the northern provinces of Afghanistan relatively few Taliban commanders are operating, but there is no shortage of local warlords and criminal organisations. A few weeks before, a member of the IEC (Election Commission) was killed. In the third week of July the German troops that are stationed in Kunduz initiated a military operation against all militant groups in the province. Apparently, it has not been very successful. On August 13, former president and actual Member of Parliament Burhanuddin Rabbani narrowly survived a grenade attack in Kunduz. Two days later NATO military headquarters in Kabul was severely damaged by a suicide car bomb; the target was the U.S. Embassy. Seven people were killed, dozens got injured. On August 18 the presidential palace and police headquarters were targeted by rockets; although nobody was injured, attacks like these have been rare in recent years. On the same day, a suicide bomber rammed his vehicle into an international military convoy, killing six people and wounding 44.[xxiv]

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In Western eyes, Afghan election campaigning is a highly traditional affair. Candidates should extensively travel the country just in order to show themselves, giving as many potential supporters as possible an opportunity to touch him, advise him, and lecture him. Political meetings often go on for hours. Considering the widespread illiteracy in Afghanistan (at least 72 % of the population is illiterate), this way of campaigning is the most effective one. Besides, neither Internet (accessible for only about 3 percent of all Afghans in 2009) nor televised debates are of major influence. In spite of the immense increase of private TV- stations in recent years only a minority of Afghans is able to watch and listen to televised debates. Most of the 37 candidates are not even invited to the studios.

Streets and squares of the villages and cities are papered over with campaign posters. Every candidate makes sure his image is to be seen everywhere; some candidates are happily accompanied by political friends. Usually each one of them is depicted with his or her specific election symbol. All contenders have their own symbol; Karzai, for instance, is shown with his pair of Scales. Abdullah regularly has Ahmed Shah Massud watching him approvingly from a corner of his posters. In many places outright ‗poster‘ wars are being fought; posting teams put the posters of their candidate squarely over the other ones. As Election Day comes near less joyous Taliban posters increasingly appear, threatening reprisals to those who will vote in Thursday‘s presidential and provincial polls.[xxv]

The threat of the Taliban issued in mosques, through radio announcements and leaflets (distributed by the ‗Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan‘) to disrupt the elections makes it practically impossible for all candidates to conduct an effective nation-wide campaign. But ethnically hostile areas should also be avoided; vice-president Khalili, for instance, will carefully avoid to campaign in the east and south of the country, where the Pashtun tribes live. Karzai and his election team have decided not to campaign in Helmand.

According to the head of the Independent Election Commission, Ahmed Nader Nadrey, eleven electoral districts in the south of the country are fully dominated by the Taliban. The Afghan Ministry of Defence, however, claims that their number has been reduced to nine, owing to the large American and British offensive in Helmand Province.[xxvi] Another 124 electoral districts (totalling 390) are threatened by Taliban presence.[xxvii] Obviously, under these circumstances it will be well-nigh impossible to conduct ‗free and fair‘ elections, or even ‗credible‘ ones. A considerable part of all approximately 16 million voters may decide not to show up in one of the 7000 polling stations after all.

To improve security, in a number of provinces the Afghan government attempts to recruit the services of local tribes and their fighters. In exchange for 150 US dollar a month per fighter, these tribal militias should safeguard polling stations and security in general, in order to guarantee an election-result as credible as possible. Militias like these are supposed to closely cooperate with both the Afghan army and the Afghan police. They are allowed to use their own weapons, but will not receive them from the government.[xxviii] Of course it is hoped that initiatives like these, when proven successful, will result in a permanent improvement of general security. Unfortunately, so far the effort has yielded few results.

The new president and the future

Whoever steps bravely forward after September 17 (the day the final results are expected to be announced) to be inaugurated as Afghanistan‘s next president will be immediately confronted with numerous severe problems. Almost eight years after the Taliban regime was

179 ousted the ongoing struggle in Afghanistan is bloodier then ever before. In July, 2009 75 Western soldiers got killed, the highest number in one month since December 2001. Spokesman Qari Muhammad Yusuf of the Taliban recently issued a stern warning to president Karzai that he will be subjected to the same fate as previous ‗collaborators‘, since he is an agent of the United States.[xxix] Former Afghan president Najibullah (1986-1992), for instance, was dragged out of the UN building in Kabul by Taliban fighters in September 1996, castrated and hung from a streetlamp in the heart of Kabul, together with his brother. It may be readily assumed that the Taliban have this appalling fate in mind for any other new president.

In his upcoming report to the Obama-government, to be presented to it only after the outcome of the Afghan presidential election is known, American commander of the forces in Afghanistan General McChrystal will assess and announce what the future military requirements for Afghanistan are. Since the end of 2001, the United States has poured 223 billion dollar into Afghan warfare; more money will be asked for.[xxx] In the same period, another 38 billion has been spend on reconstruction.[xxxi] At present, the country is controlled for one-third by the Taliban, for one-third by the government and international military forces, and for one-third is heavily disputed between both parties. One European think-tank has even stated as early as at the end of 2007 that the Taliban controlled over 70 % of the entire country.[xxxii] It is obvious that the Taliban are controlling large parts of the country, especially the areas outside the small number of Afghan cities. McChrystal recently declared that the Taliban ‗have the momentum‘. To be able to turn the tide McChrystal will at least need another 10.000 American troops after 2009, on top of the 68.000 mark that the number of US soldiers will have reached at the end of this year.

In Helmand province in the south of the country most of Afghanistan‘s poppies are grown. From this province alone, 45 % of all Afghan poppies originate. Since 2006, when the Taliban started to focus on occupying Helmand, the number of violent attempts and kidnappings has risen considerably. Using the profits they make by selling drugs, possibly hundreds of millions of dollars, the Taliban are capable of financing many of their activities. Although President Karzai on the eve of his election in 2004 had vowed to conduct a ‗jihad‘ against the growing and selling of drugs, poppy harvests have been increasing ever since. It contributed to the increased strength of the Taliban, as well as to a rise in crime.

It is of crucial importance that the large-scale offensive which has begun on July 2 by American and British troops will be successful. By pushing back the Taliban, it is hoped that the local Pashtun population will cast its vote on August 20. This directly increases Karzai‘s support base. In 2004, Karzai won a substantial amount of all votes in the southern provinces. If local security is seen to be lastingly improved, many voters may well be tempted to cast their vote for him once more, considerably enhancing the prospect of his re-election.

In the longer term, the growth of poppies and the drugs trade related to it (trade in opium and heroine) may receive a blow, thereby diminishing the financial means of the Taliban, as well. Another consequence of lasting improvement of the general security will be that the local population is able to concentrate on the growth of different crops, pomegranates or saffron, for instance. A limited but successful Dutch agricultural project in Uruzgan aims at growing and exporting saffron, like poppies a crop with high yields.[xxxiii]

To enable projects like these to succeed, a long term presence of foreign and Afghan troops is an absolute necessity. This, in its turn, requires the continuous build-up of both a strong and

180 efficiently operating Afghan army and police force. In spite of all means and efforts spent, both these organisations, especially the police force, are still negligible factors in the maintenance of security and peace.

After having come to power, the effective authority of the Karzai-government still is not established in the larger part of the country. In order to survive it needs the continuous presence of many thousands of Western soldiers and huge amounts of international financial support. Quite a number of Western countries, faced with an international economic and financial crisis themselves, are tired of the seemingly endless struggle in Afghanistan. At the end of July 2009, a poll held in Great-Britain revealed that 58 % of all Britons think that the war in Afghanistan cannot be won; 52 % of those interviewed wants all British troops (9.000, the largest contingent after the American one) withdrawn immediately.[xxxiv] On August 15, two more British soldiers got killed in Helmand province.[xxxv] Only one day later three more British soldiers died when they were blown apart by a road-side device; 204 British soldiers now have lost their lives in Afghanistan, forcing prime minister Gordon Brown to once more publicly defend the cotinued presence of British troops in Afghanistan.

Public opinion in many Western countries do exercise influence on the decisions of national governments, especially in European countries. Several countries have announced that they will withdraw their troops from Afghanistan in 2010, the Netherlands and Canada among them. Whether the Obama-administration, hesitant to commit extra means and forces anyway, will decide to send American troops to replace them is still unclear. What is clear, however, is that the build-up of the Afghan army progresses but slowly, and devours enormous amounts of money. Moreover, serious doubts are raised about the enduring loyalty of many freshly recruited soldiers.

During the next ten years, the United States is expected to spend at least 80 billion dollar on the build-up of an effective national Afghan army.[xxxvi] This approach is fully endorsed by Supreme Commander David Petraeus, who in the end is responsible for the success or failure of his armed forces. Petraeus has also declared that to his best knowledge ‗moderate‘ Taliban do not exist; negotiating with the Taliban would merely result in undermining all efforts made by Western military.[xxxvii] (It would be quite interesting to finally learn whom president Obama, SC Petraeus and other key political and military leaders are specifically referring to when they think and talk aloud about ‗moderate Taliban‘.) This point of view is confirmed by the marginal success of the armistice the Afghan government has managed to conclude with Taliban commanders in the North Western Province of Badghis. Although it was readily promoted as a ‗role model‘ for future armistices, it must be noted that there are but few Taliban in Badghis. Those Taliban that are active there immediately took the opportunity to ambush a number of local police officers.

An equally little promising announcement was made by Ahmad Wali Karzai on August 14, a younger half-brother of the President who is campaigning on his behalf in the southern provinces. Ahmad Wali claimed that, on his urging, community elders had spoken with Taliban commanders, who had promised not to disturb the upcoming election process. The agreements were with those Taliban who were ‗not a part of al-Qaeda‘.[xxxviii] Taliban spokesman Yousuf Ahmadi immediately denied that any such conversations had taken place at all. Once more, the diffuse nature of the Taliban movement, as well as that of ‗allies‘ of the government, is shown.

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Another huge problem will continue to be formed by the sheer presence of the neighbouring state of Taliban-infested Pakistan. The unguarded, open border with that country has enabled Afghan fighters to flee Afghanistan whenever they were cornered. In recent years, the internal political situation in Pakistan has considerably changed. The Pakistani Taliban has managed to significantly strengthen their positions, especially in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the province of Balochistan, both of which border Afghanistan. Afghan leaders of the Taliban are known to be present in the Balochi city of Quetta, supreme leader mullah Omar among them. Here, they are able to roam about practically unhindered. For obvious reasons, this is being vehemently denied by the Pakistani government.

The weakened position of both the Pakistani government and the army towards militant Taliban groupings in their own country have resulted in altering balances of military and political strength in entire South-Asia. Previously, the Bush-government (2001-2009) counted on its main ally, the Pakistani army of general and president Musharraf (1999-2008) to contain the spread of the Taliban. The Obama-government has to deal with an elected but weak coalition-government in Islamabad; its weakness is mainly due to a bewildering variety of crises hitting the country since the civil government took over. After having quit as supreme commander in November 2007, Musharraf was forced to step down as president in August 2008 as well. His successor as Supreme Commander, General Kayani, prefers to cooperate and negotiate with the elected government, keeping the armed forces in its barracks. One of his first orders was to forbid continuous contacts between army personnel and politicians.[xxxix]

A new president, a new strategy

All this has led to a thorough review of American strategy towards South-Asia by the Obama- government. No longer is military support alone given to Afghanistan and Islamabad individually, as used to be the preferred approach of the Bush-government. Equally important is finding ways and means to economically support and develop both countries.[xl] Therefore, instead of providing mainly national support, a region-wide secure environment must enhance security and further economic growth.[xli] Besides, Washington‘s politicians led by President Obama specifically seek to open a dialogue with the ‗moderate‘ Taliban, as far as they are around.

To some extent, this initiative was based on the remarkable meeting the Saudi-Arabian King had successfully organised in September 2008 (in Mecca) between president Karzai‘s brother Abdul Qayyum, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Taliban Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, former spokesman of mullah Omar Mohammad Tayeb Agha and former Afghan ambassador to Islamabad mullah . This remarkable meeting could occur owing to the mediation of Pakistani opposition leader Nawaz Sharif, who has been living in exile in Saudi- Arabia for seven years.

In the new ‗AfPak‘ strategy of the United States, strong military action should go hand in hand with equally strong diplomatic activity and national development.[xlii] President Karzai welcomed the new American approach; being the experienced politician that he is, Karzai also repeatedly stated his willingness to arrive at talks and reconciliation with the Taliban, on the condition that they would accept the authority of his government. Abdullah favours a similar approach. Karzai‘s conciliatory attitude is in marked contrast with the solid anti- Taliban position taken by his vice-president, Fahim. Concrete measures and procedures to this

182 end, entitled the governments‘s reconciliation program, are still non-existent. So far, the Taliban response to this ‗conciliatory‘ approach has been to repeat familiar points of view.

This should not be surprising. The Karzai-government is broadly characterised as ‗weak‘ and ‗corrupt‘, and able to survive only because of continuous large-scale international support. Taliban fighters who, for whichever reason, are willing to cease their activities against the government still cannot be adequately accommodated. There are no safe houses or financial support made available for them; no alternative means of living are offered to them (often, Taliban fighters are living on payments by their commanders). The few Taliban commanders who may consider surrendering their weapons, and those who have actually done so, are immediately threatened to be killed. A number of them are. The same morbid principle applies to elders of villages (maliks) who choose to cooperate with government officials.

In the end, success or failure of the new American strategy will be determined by the active support of a huge majority of the Afghan population. The ultimate goal, a peaceful and stabile Afghanistan, is neatly fitting in with the most important wishes of a suspicious population; to be able to live in peace and security. All contenders for the presidency are eagerly promising to further these goals. The one candidate who offers the most inspired, best prospects to arrive at that broadly longed-for future stands the best chance of being elected.

Olivier Immig, Amsterdam, August 2009

[i] The elections for the 34 provincial councils are entirely overshadowed by the presidential election. In all, 3196 candidates including 328 women, are competing for 420 seats. ‗Taliban kill Afghan vote candidate‘, in: Dawn, August 18, 2009

[ii] ‗Electoral Complaints Commission starts its work for the polls‘: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), May 13, 2009. Candidates that have been convicted, especially if on having committed crimes against humanity, are locked out. Three contenders have been denied participation

[iii] ‗Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions‘, UN-Conference Document, Bonn, December 5, 2001

[iv] In the first round. The candidate who manages to acquire at least 50% of all votes wins. One big fear concerning the upcoming election on August 20 is that a second round of voting will be needed. Considering the huge increase of strength of the Taliban-movement and its repeated vow to disturb the voting process, as well as its opposition against ‗democracy‘, that would double the risk of major attempts on candidates‘ lives. This possible runoff will be held on October 1.

[v] On this: Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos. How the war against Islamic extremism is being lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Allen Lane, London 2008, p. 133

[vi] In 2009, approximately 14 million Pashtun people are living in Afghanistan; in Pakistan there are as many as 27 million.

[vii] The present international borderline between Afghanistan and Pakistan was drawn by the Durand-Commission, back in 1893. Ever since, it has never been recognized as such by 183

Afghan kings and governments. Since the border happened to run straight through Pashtun- inhabited areas, serving mainly British colonial interests, this is understandable. Its sheer length (2500 kilometres) as well as its rough features (desert areas and high mountain areas) have always prevented its full closure, enabling guerrilla-fighters to easily straddle the border

[viii] In 1972 there were 893 madrassas in Pakistan; in 2002 their number had reached the 10.000 mark. Of those, over 7.000 belonged to the Deobandi denomination, harbouring many future Taliban students and leaders. See: Charles Allen, God‘s Terrorists. The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad. Da Capo Press, Cambridge 2006, p. 274. Since 2002 the number of madrassas has continued to increase.

[ix] For a detailed description of all candidates: ‗Afghanistan‘s Presidential Election: Power to the People, or the Powerful?‘ The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS), London, March 2009

[x] Most recent data on the Afghan population: ‗CIA - The World Fact Book‘, Afghanistan. Latest update; April 29, 2009

[xi] ‗Afghan Presidential Campaigns Begin‘, in: The Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2009

[xii] As of August 18, eleven of the original 41 candidates have withdrawn. ‗Taliban kill Afghan vote candidate‘, in: Dawn, August 18, 2009

[xiii] Ahmad Kawush, ‗Karzai suffers an election blow‘, in: Asia Times Online (Atol), August 14, 2009

[xiv] Derek Henry Flood, ‗Chopping it up with Karzai‘s challenger‘, in: Asia Times Online, August 17, 2009

[xv] Helene Cooper, ‗Ex-U.S. Envoy Considers Key Role in Afghan Government‘, in: The New York Times, May 19, 2009

[xvi] ‗Taliban urged to join Afghan polls‘, in: Al Jazeera, May 3, 2009

[xvii] Remarkably, since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 Russia has stayed aloof. The Western attempts to ‗export democracy‘ are considered futile. Rather, Russia should stimulate the ‗export of economic development‘. Yury Krupnov, ‗A Marshall Plan for Afghanistan‘, in: The Moscow Times, May 14, 2009

[xviii] Opinion poll by ABC News in February 2009, quoted in in: Anthony H. Cordesman, ‗The Afghan-Pakistan Conflict: US Strategic Options in Afghanistan‘. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, March 16, 2009, p.7-8

[xix] Carlotta Gall and Ruhullah Khapalwak, ‗As Afghan Vote Nears, Taliban Step Up Intimidation Campaign‘, in: The New York Times, August 13, 2009

[xx] Derek Henry Flood, ‗Chopping it up with Karzai‘s challenger‘, in: Asia Times Online, August 17, 2009

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[xxi] For his political program, see: Ashraf Ghani, ‗A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan‘. Executing the Obama Plan…And Beyond. A Report by The Atlantic Council of the United States, April 2009

[xxii] Tom Coghlan en Jeremy Page, ‗Karzai offers rival top Cabinet post in effort to avoid election defeat‘, in: The Times, August 11, 2009

[xxiii] Joshua Partlow, ‗U.S. Officials Looking at Karzai Rival for Key New Post‘, in: The Washington Post, August 11, 2009

[xxiv] ‗Six killed, 44 wounded in Kabul suicide attack‘, in: Afghanistan Sun, August 18, 2009

[xxv] Fingers stained with ink, the sign of having cast a vote, will be hacked off. Logic Taliban-style: ―If anyone is harmed in and around election centres, they will be responsible because we have informed them in advance‖, says spokesman Qari Yousuf Ahmadi. ‗Taliban threaten Afghan voters‘: Al Jazeera, August 16, 2009

[xxvi] ‗Government: 9 Afghan districts still out of control‘; Xinhua Press Agency, as quoted in Afghanistan Online Press, July 29, 2009. According to spokesman General Zaher Azimi over 300.000 Afghan and International soldiers will safeguard the election process

[xxvii] Raghav Sharma, ‗Mapping the Afghan Elections‘, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS, India), Article No. 2918, 25 July 2009

[xxviii] Anand Gopal en Yochi J. Dreazen, ‗Afghanistan Enlists Tribal Militia Forces‘, in: The Wall Street Journal, August 11, 2009

[xxix] ‗Taliban Spokesman Warns Hamid Karzai Must Expect Same Fate As Najibullah‘, in: Sada al-Jihad, as quoted in: TerrorismMonitor, Vol. VII, Issue 22, July 27, 2009

[xxx] Walter Pincus, ‗Analysts Expect Long-Term, Costly U.S. Campaign in Afghanistan‘, in: The Washington Post, August 9, 2009

[xxxi] M.K. Bhadrakumar, ‗A fog swirls in the Hindu Kush‘, in: Asia Times Online, August 17, 2009

[xxxii] „Stumbling Into Chaos: Afghanistan on the Brink.‘ SenlisAfghanistan, London, November 2007

[xxxiii] Lex Kassenberg, ‗Frustraties van een optimist‘, (Frustrations of an Optimist), in: Zem Zem, (Dutch) Magazine on the Middle East, North Africa and Islam, August 2009, Nr.2, p. 55. Kassenberg has been working in Afghanistan since 2006

[xxxiv] Taimoor Shah and Alan Cowell, ‗Bomb Kills 8 Afghans Escorting NATO Convoy‘, in: The New York Times, July 29, 2009.

[xxxv] ‗New death takes UK Afghan toll to 201′, in: The Times of India, August 16, 2009

[xxxvi] Steve Hynd, ‗British Conservatives Back Away from Afghanistan‘. Published on Atlantic Council, Created July 29, 2009 185

[xxxvii] Arnaud de Borchgrave, ‗Afghanistan Exit Scenario?‘ Atlantic Council, created July 28, 2009

[xxxviii] ‗Karzai‘s brother reveals vote deal with Taliban‘, in: Afghanistan Online Press, August 14, 2009

[xxxix] Syed Saleem Shahzad, ‗Musharraf misses his day in court‘, in: Asia Times Online, July 30, 2009

[xl] A point in case is Mr. Holbrooke‘s recent assurance to Pakistan that the US will ‗extend full help and cooperation‘ to Pakistan to resolve its energy crisis. ‗Energy crisis tops Pak-US agenda‘, in: The News International, August 17, 2009

[xli] ‗An Integrated Approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan‘. First public discussion by Mr. Holbrooke and his team of the United States‘ ―AfPak‖ strategy. Center for American Progress, August 13, 2009

[xlii] To this end US Minister of Defence Gates has appointed a new commander for Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal. McChrystal is a reputed ‗counterinsurgency‘ expert; he made a name for himself in effectively combating insurgencies in Iraq. Ann Scott Tyson, ‗Top U.S. Commander in Afghanistan Is Fired‘, in: The Washington Post, May 12, 2009

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BACKGROUNDER: DE VOLGENDE PRESIDENT VAN AFGHANISTAN (AUGUST 18, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, August 18th, 2009

Click here for PDF-file

De volgende president van Afghanistan Geschreven door OLIVIER IMMIG, redactie JAN VAN HEUGTEN

Op 8 mei 2009 lieten de laatste kandidaten voor het Afghaanse presidentsschap zich registreren. Aanvankelijk zou de verkiezing in april plaatsvinden maar de algehele veiligheidssituatie in het land is in de afgelopen jaren dermate verslechterd dat men eerst de komst van 21.000 extra Amerikaanse militairen afwachtte. De eerste extra Amerikaanse troepen arriveerden in mei; de verkiezing wordt nu op 20 augustus aanstaande gehouden.

Kandidaten dienen het Afghaans staatsburgerschap te bezitten, moslim en veertig jaar of ouder te zijn. Elke kandidaat diende 1000 Amerikaanse dollars te betalen en een lijst met tenminste 10.000 handtekeningen ter aanbeveling in te leveren bij de onafhankelijke Afghaanse kiescommissie in Kaboel. Er hebben zich maar liefst 44 liefhebbers gemeld voor wat ongetwijfeld behoort tot één van de moeilijkste banen ter wereld, onder hen twee vrouwelijke kandidaten. In 2004 deden er 18 kandidaten mee.

Na sluiting van de registratie heeft elke stemgerechtigde in Afghanistan gedurende twee weken het recht en de gelegenheid iemands kandidatuur te betwisten; de kandidaat tegen wie bij de electorale klachtencommissie een aanklacht is ingediend krijgt vervolgens de tijd om zich te verdedigen. Op 9 juni maakte de verkiezingscommissie definitief bekend wie is uitgesloten van deelname, en op welke gronden.[1] Dit is geen overbodige procedure in een land waar tal van groeperingen elkaar vaak al jarenlang op leven en dood bestreden hebben, en waar een aantal lokale militieleiders (‘krijgsheren‘) met nogal wat bloed aan hun handen in het nationale parlement zit.

Op 16 juni is de verkiezingscampagne voor het presidentsschap van start gegaan. Op 18 augustus, twee dagen voordat de stembureaus opengaan, worden de campagnes gestaakt. De speciaal afgezant van de VN voor Afghanistan Kai Eide verwacht van elke kandidaat een 187 duidelijk politiek programma, waarin de te volgen toekomstige koers van het land uiteen wordt gezet.

Aan welke voorwaarden naast de formele moeten Afghaanse presidentskandidaten voldoen, willen zij een reële kans maken op het bekleden van ‗het hoogste ambt‘ van het land? Zijn de Afghanen, na de eerste presidentsverkiezing in 2004 en ruim zeven jaar Hamid Karzai aan de macht, bereid om opnieuw naar de stembureaus te komen? Wat zijn de vooruitzichten voor de nieuwe president, en voor het land?

De belofte van Bonn

Kort nadat eind 2001 het radicale Taliban-bewind en hun roemruchte gast Osama bin Laden en diens Arabische strijders door troepen van de Noordelijke Alliantie, met doorslaggevende steun van Amerikaanse logistiek en bombardementen, waren verjaagd, werd de gematigde Pasjtoense stamleider Hamid Karzai aangesteld als tijdelijk president van Afghanistan.

Op de bijna euforische internationale VN-conferentie in Bonn in december 2001 werden politieke afspraken vastgelegd in een concreet tijdspad.[2] Er zou een grote nationale vergadering (Loyah Jirgah) bijeen geroepen worden die een nieuwe grondwet moest goedkeuren, er zou een presidentsverkiezing komen, daarna moest er een nieuw parlement worden gekozen. Een naar verhouding bescheiden internationale troepenmacht, de ‗International Security Assistance Force‘ of ISAF, werd in Afghanistan gestationeerd, voornamelijk in en om de steden Kaboel en Kandahar. Deze militairen, afkomstig uit Groot- Brittannië, de Verenigde Staten en een aantal andere NAVO-landen, kregen als voornaamste taak het handhaven van de vrede.

Om het jarenlang door oorlogsgeweld geteisterde land te steunen bij de wederopbouw werden ‗provinciale reconstructie teams‘ ofwel PRT‘s opgezet. Zij moesten assisteren bij het herstellen van irrigatiesystemen, de aanleg van wegen, het bouwen van scholen en ziekenhuizen. Helaas werden nogal wat projecten kwalitatief slecht uitgevoerd of domweg niet voltooid; veel geld verdween naar de bankrekeningen van particuliere bedrijven en NGO‘s zonder dat daar tegenprestaties voor geleverd werden. Dergelijke praktijken ondermijnden het gezag van de nationale regering. Het werd in de loop der jaren voor de bevolking steeds duidelijker hoe afhankelijk de regering-Karzai was van buitenlandse hulp.

Bij de eerste vrije Afghaanse presidentsverkiezingen, in oktober 2004, verwierf de verzoeningsgezinde Karzai ruim 55 procent van de stemmen.[3] Op 7 december werd hij in Kaboel plechtig geïnstalleerd als president èn regeringsleider. Karzai werd in zijn eerste ambtstermijn geflankeerd door eerste vice-president Ahmed Zia Massoed, een broer van de op 9 september 2001 vermoordde Tadzjiekse leider Ahmed Shah Massoed, en door tweede vice- president Abdoel Karim Khalili, leider van de Hezara‘s. Daarmee waren twee van de drie grootste etnische minderheden op het hoogste regeringsniveau vertegenwoordigd. De Oezbeekse leider Rashid Dostum werd onderminister van Defensie in de nationale regering.

Vooral actieve steun voor en deelname aan het politieke proces vanuit de Tadzjiekse bevolking, naast die van de Oezbeken en Hezara‘s, is van groot belang. De Tadzjieken vormden onder hun fameuze leider Ahmed Shah Massoed jarenlang de ruggengraat van de Noordelijke Alliantie, de enig overgebleven binnenlandse tegenstander van de Taliban, en vervulden een cruciale rol in het verjagen van het Taliban-bewind.

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Na opmerkelijk succesvolle parlementsverkiezingen in december 2005 trad er daadwerkelijk een gekozen nationaal parlement aan in Kaboel. De Afghaanse Tweede Kamer, ‗Wolesi Jirgah‘, bestaat uit 249 leden; de Eerste Kamer, ‗Meshrano Jirgah‘ ofwel het Huis van de Ouden, telt 102 zetels. Toen zowel de president als het parlement eenmaal waren gekozen verwachtte de regering-Bush blijkbaar dat er in Afghanistan zoiets als een ‗democratisch bestuur‘ tot ontwikkeling zou komen. Er werd in tal van Westerse hoofdsteden vanuit gegaan dat de strijd in Afghanistan tegen de Taliban en lokale krijgsheren wel was gestreden; daarmee was ook de veilige haven voor Al Qaida geëlimineerd. De noodzaak om Afghanistan omvangrijke steun te verlenen leek te zijn verminderd. President Bush had al op 4 juli 2002 verkondigd, dat ‗in Afghanistan we de Taliban hebben verslagen‘.

Niets bleek minder waar. Zo waren noch de belangrijkste Al-Qaida leiders noch Talibanleider mollah Omar en diens entourage uitgeschakeld. Zij slaagden erin, ondanks enkele grootschalige militaire operaties in het Afghaans-Pakistaanse grensgebied tegen hen, naar laatstgenoemd land te ontkomen. De Taliban en Al Qaida waren weliswaar uit Afghanistan verdreven, maar niet uitgeschakeld.

Al in de loop van 2002 zag Karzai zich geconfronteerd met het feitelijke verlies van steun van zijn voornaamste bondgenoot, de Verenigde Staten. De regering-Bush richtte zich met de ‗War on Terror‘ op de bestrijding van Al Qaida, en gaf er al kort na de snelle nederlaag van de Taliban politiek en militair de voorkeur aan Iraq te ontdoen van het regime van dictator Saddam Hussein. Dat na diens eveneens snelle militaire nederlaag de kwestie Iraq nog jarenlang omvangrijke Amerikaanse ingrepen en middelen vereiste was een lelijke streep door de rekening. Voor Afghanistan gold dat zelfs letterlijk, de zeer ongelijke verdeling van Amerikaanse en internationale middelen tussen Afghanistan en Iraq, ten nadele van Afghanistan, in ogenschouw genomen.[4] Die - onuitgesproken - keuze van Washington kende vergaande gevolgen, niet alleen voor Afghanistan maar voor heel Zuid-Azie.

Obstakels: de Pakistaanse connectie

In de Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), het aan Afghanistan grenzende stammengebied van de North West Frontier Province (NWFP) bewoond door Pasjtoense stammen, heeft de Pakistaanse overheid nooit veel in de melk te brokkelen gehad.[5] Hier, bij hun bloedverwanten, vonden de vluchtende Talibanstrijders uit Afghanistan en Bin Laden en zijn Arabische volgelingen een veilig heenkomen.[6] Naarmate het zwaartepunt van de door de regering-Bush uitgeroepen ‗War on Terror‘ naar Iraq verschoof kregen zij weer meer gelegenheid zich te hergroeperen, daarbij opnieuw geholpen door Al Qaida.

Veel van de duizenden madrassas (religieuze scholen) in het Pakistaanse grensgebied leverden rekruten en fungeerden als trainingskampen voor de Taliban. Krachtige financiële steun vanuit vooral de Arabische wereld, Saoedi-Arabië voorop, stelde de Taliban-beweging in staat zich te herbewapenen. Hun militaire scholing kregen zij ondermeer van leden van de Pakistaanse geheime dienst ISI (Inter Service Intelligence), waarbinnen de nodige sympathie bestond voor radicaal islamitische groeperingen en bewegingen als de Taliban. Via een sinds de jaren tachtig gestaag uitdijend netwerk van madrassas en moskeeën in de Pakistaans- Afghaanse grensstreek werden een militante ideologie, trainingen en bewapening verspreid.[7]

Van cruciale betekenis was tevens dat er van 2002 tot 2008 een conservatief- religieuze provinciale regering in de NWFP aan de macht was die openlijk sympathiseerde met de

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Taliban-beweging. Steeds vaker trokken groepen Taliban strijders vanuit het veilige Pakistan ongehinderd Afghanistan in om aanslagen uit te voeren op Afghaanse overheids- en veiligheidsfunctionarissen en instellingen. De beperkte Westerse militaire troepenmacht in Afghanistan zag zich in toenemende mate geconfronteerd met aanvallen door groepen Taliban, vooral in het oosten en zuiden van het land. Zij stonden vrijwel machteloos; waar in het nauw gedreven en achtervolgde infiltranten het land eenvoudig konden ontvluchten was het de Westerse troepen uitdrukkelijk niet toegestaan de grens met Pakistan over te steken.

De gewenste politieke toekomst van Afghanistan was in Bonn in 2001 nauwkeurig vastgelegd; het ging vooral om de ontwikkeling van een moderne democratische staat van boven af. De president stelt ministers en de 34 provinciale gouverneurs aan. Daarmee kon Karzai er op toezien dat de etnische krachtsverhoudingen in het land werden weerspiegeld in de personele bezetting van de regering, absoluut noodzakelijk voor de instandhouding van zowel zijn regering als enigerlei vorm van nationale Afghaanse eenheid. De schaduwzijde van deze presidentiele almacht is, dat een toekomstige president die ervoor kiest met harde hand te regeren zich onmiddellijk conflicten met de andere etnische groeperingen in het land op de hals haalt. Een ander nadeel is dat gouverneurs aan de president, en niet aan het electoraat in provincies, verantwoording schuldig zijn.

Voor het bestuur van de provincies betekende deze presidentiele bevoegdheid dat door Karzai herhaaldelijk gouverneurs werden aangesteld die golden als zijn politieke vrienden, of van politici die hij vooral te vriend moest houden. Onder hen bevonden zich een aantal voormalige, beruchte krijgsheren. Nogal wat provinciale gezagsdragers zouden kansloos zijn geweest in directe provinciale verkiezingen. Voor de verheven doelstelling van het ontwikkelen van democratie werkte de creatie van een sterk centraal gezag averechts, maar dit sloot wel aan bij een aloude Afghaanse traditie. In tijden waarin er een krachtig centraal Pasjtoens gezag functioneerde in Afghanistan werden de wensen en verlangens van etnisch afwijkende provinciale bevolkingen nauwelijks gehoord, laat staan serieus genomen. De beoogde opbouw van een nieuw Pasjtoens centraal gezag nodigt de overige etnische groepen van het land niet direct uit om gemotiveerd deel te gaan nemen aan het door de Verenigde Staten, Westerse landen en Verenigde Naties gewenste proces van politieke modernisering en democratisering.

Tegelijkertijd met het politieke tijdspad is er op de VN-conferentie in Bonn in 2001 een ambitieus plan opgesteld om te komen tot de vorming van een nieuw Afghaans politiek systeem, een rechtspraaksysteem, de opbouw van een krachtig Afghaans regeringsleger en een Afghaans politiekorps. De opbouw van een ambtenarenapparaat stond eveneens hoog op de verlanglijst. Helaas waren de enorme financiële middelen die voor dit alles vereist waren niet voorhanden. Eén gevolg is dat gerechtshoven in het land, waar zij al werden opgericht, nauwelijks gekwalificeerd personeel konden betalen, of tenminste opleiden. Bij afwezigheid van enigerlei vorm van rechtsspraak was de bevolking aangewezen op de snelle maar grove gerechtigheid die de Taliban, op grond van door hen zelf beleden sharia interpretaties, belijden.

Een ander probleem in Afghanistan is de enorme corruptie. Ministers, gouverneurs en districtsfunctionarissen konden allerlei voordelen verwerven voor hun politieke vrienden, familieleden en etnische verwanten, of dat nou bijvoorbeeld ging om de aankoop van of smokkelhandel in luxe goederen, de aanleg van een weg, ziekenhuis of privé bungalow, of het tolereren van drugs- en wapenhandel. Ook al omdat de salarissen voor overheidsfunctionarissen laag waren, tot en met dat van soldaten en politieagenten aan toe,

190 bewerkstelligden financiële extra‘s soms wonderen. Onvermijdelijk kwamen in een dergelijk systeem steeds meer arme mensen die ook niet beschikten over de juiste persoonlijke contacten buitenspel te staan. Zij voelden weinig affiniteit met de nieuwe regering in Kaboel. Meerdere malen zag Karzai zich gedwongen corrupte of eigengereide gouverneurs te ontslaan. Zelfs leden van zijn eigen familie worden verdacht van betrokkenheid bij de omvangrijke handel in drugs, zijn broer Ahmed Wali, bijvoorbeeld.

Kandidaten[8]: Karzai

Afghanistan wordt sinds het als onafhankelijk land bestaat (1747) bewoond door een rijke verscheidenheid aan volken en stammen. De Pasjtoense stammen, voornamelijk woonachtig in het zuiden en oosten van het land, vormen ongeveer 42 procent van de Afghaanse bevolking van 33 miljoen.[9] De Tadzjieken, overwegend te vinden in het noorden van het land, vormen met zo‘n 27 procent de tweede etnische groep. De sji‘itische Hezaras (9 %) en de Oezbeken, eveneens rond 9 %, vormen omvangrijke etnische minderheden.

De etnische krachtsverhoudingen hebben altijd de plaats en positie van alle groeperingen ten opzichte van elkaar binnen het landsbestuur bepaald. De dominante Pasjtoenen leveren de nationale leider, of dat nou een koning of een president is. De conservatief-islamitische Taliban-beweging, in Afghanistan aan de macht van 1996 tot november 2001, bestaat eveneens voornamelijk uit Pasjtoenen. Dit heeft geleid tot een traditie van beurtelings sterk en zwak centraal leiderschap, waarbij de minderheden zelden de gelegenheid kregen zich in het nationale bestuur te laten gelden. Dat dit in de regering onder leiding van Karzai wèl gebeurt komt direct voort uit het feit dat Kaboel eind 2001 werd ingenomen door de niet-Pasjtoense soldaten van de Noordelijke Alliantie; het waren de Pasjtoense Taliban die verjaagd werden.

President Karzai kan niet op onvoorwaardelijke steun vanuit zijn eigen etnische groep rekenen maar kreeg, en krijgt, als Pasjtoense leider de voorkeur boven niet-Pasjtoense presidentskandidaten. Bij de vorige presidentsverkiezing in oktober 2004 kreeg Karzai in overwegend door Pasjtoenen bewoonde provincies als Logar, Paktia, Khost, Paktika, Zabul, Kandahar, Helmand en Nimroz rond 90% van alle stemmen. Hetzelfde gaat op voor Tadzjiekse en andere etnische politieke leiders, hoewel in oktober 2004 vanuit de Tadzjiekse en Oezbeekse groeperingen de nodige stemmen naar Karzai zijn gegaan. Een aanzienlijk deel van de Hezara‘s zou eveneens van plan zijn op de zittende president te stemmen; hun vertegenwoordiger Khalili is een van de twee vice-presidenten, en steunt Karzai ook in de huidige campagne. Meerdere leiders van de Oezbeken en Hezaras hebben zich inmiddels in het openbaar voor Karzai uitgesproken.[10] Eind juli hebben vier kandidaten zich teruggetrokken en hun steun uitgesproken voor de belangrijkste mededingers, drie van hen voor Karzai. De verwachting is dat er nog meer zullen volgen.

Op grond hiervan is Karzai, ondanks alle problemen die Afghanistan nog altijd teisteren, opnieuw favoriet bij de komende verkiezing. In een poging ook Oezbeekse stemmen te trekken heeft Karzai de omstreden Oezbeekse krijgsheer Dostum opnieuw benoemd tot stafchef van de nationale strijdkrachten. Voorts heeft voormalig ambassadeur van de Verenigde Staten in Afghanistan, de Pasjtoen Zalmay Khalilzad, concrete gesprekken gevoerd met Karzai over een te vormen samenwerkingsverband. Zij kennen elkaar al jaren. Hoewel Khalilzad, een Amerikaanse staatsburger van Afghaanse origine (hij is afkomstig uit de noordelijke stad Mazar-i-Sharif), zich niet verkiesbaar wilde stellen (in dat geval zou hij zijn Amerikaanse nationaliteit hebben moeten opgeven), zou hij een hoge regeringspost in de nieuwe Afghaanse regering moeten krijgen. Zijn mogelijke benoeming, bijvoorbeeld op de nu

191 nog niet bestaande post van premier, zou de directe Amerikaanse invloed op de ontwikkelingen in Afghanistan vergroten; collega-kabinetsleden van Karzai hebben hier al hun ongenoegen over geuit.[11]

De praktische politieke speelruimte voor Karzai c.s. is al met al zeer beperkt. Het delegeren van politieke macht naar provinciale bestuurders of andere etnische groeperingen, bijvoorbeeld, zal hem direct steun kosten van de grotere Pasjtoense stammen, gezien hun langdurige politieke dominantie over het land. Anderzijds zou het hem de nodige sympathie opleveren in de niet-Pasjtoense gebieden. Hoeveel Pasjtoense stammen de Taliban steunen is niet eenvoudig vast te stellen. Wèl is inmiddels duidelijk dat een aanzienlijke meerderheid van de Afghaanse Pasjtoenen zich nog altijd niet kan verenigen met de politiek-bestuurlijke doelstellingen van de Taliban-beweging. Het valt dan ook nog te bezien hoe effectief de herhaalde oproep van Talibanleider mollah Mohammad Omar zal zijn om de verkiezingen te boycotten. Al net zo weinig viel te verwachten van Karzai‘s herhaalde oproepen aan de Taliban om mee te doen aan de verkiezingen.[12]

Vanwege de etnisch gevarieerde samenstelling van de Afghaanse bevolking hebben de verschillende buurlanden vanouds grote invloed uit weten te oefenen op de binnenlandse ontwikkelingen. De Pasjtoenen kregen, en krijgen, veel steun vanuit Pakistan; Tadzjieken en Oezbeken worden gesteund vanuit Tadzjikistan en Oezbekistan; de sji‘itische Hezara‘s door Iran. Ook landen als Saoedi-Arabië, India en de VS mengen zich nadrukkelijk in de politieke, militaire, economische maar ook religieuze aangelegenheden van Afghanistan.[13] Dat leidt regelmatig tot excessen, bijvoorbeeld als bombardementen of raketbeschietingen van al dan niet vermeende Al Qaida of Taliban posities door onbemande Amerikaanse vliegtuigen (‘drones‘) burgerslachtoffers eisen. Dit brengt niet alleen de Amerikaanse militaire aanwezigheid maar ook het Karzai-bewind ernstig in diskrediet. Het is bovendien allerminst bevorderlijk voor de zo gewenste ‗veiligheid‘ van de Afghaanse bevolking[14]

Dit, naast de toenemende militaire kracht van de Taliban, en gevoegd bij de krachteloosheid en blijvende afhankelijkheid van de regering-Karzai, heeft veel Afghanen huiverig gemaakt voor het blijvend steunen van de aanwezigheid van Westerse troepen. Desondanks luidt één belangrijke conclusie: nog altijd steunt een - weliswaar slinkende - meerderheid van de bevolking, de Pasjtoenen incluis, liever de Westerse militaire aanwezigheid dan de eventuele terugkeer van een Taliban-bewind.[15] Dat betekent dat er waarschijnlijk weer op een hoge opkomst kan worden gerekend, als men er tenminste in slaagt de stembureaus afdoende tegen wapengeweld van de Taliban te beveiligen. Herhaaldelijk hebben Taliban-commandanten beloofd de verkiezingen te zullen verstoren. Op 10 augustus vielen zes Talibanstrijders het huis van de gouverneur, waar ook het kantoor van de Onafhankelijke Verkiezings Commissie is gevestigd, en een stembureau in de provincie Logar, direct grenzend aan Kaboel, aan. Een goede opkomst zou, ongeacht de uitslag, op zich al een succes zijn.

In vergelijking met 2004 is de algehele veiligheid in het land aanzienlijk verslechterd, mèt de toegenomen kracht en verbreiding van de Taliban over vrijwel het hele zuiden en oosten van Afghanistan. Tegelijkertijd zijn er momenteel al meer dan 100.000 Westerse soldaten, voor bijna tweederde deel Amerikanen, in Afghanistan actief. Zij zijn eerst vanaf 2007 gekomen, na jarenlange vergeefse oproepen van president Karzai daartoe. Tot die tijd moesten een paar duizend International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) militairen Kaboel en Kandahar zien te beveiligen.

Karzai‟s rivalen

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Een tweede kansrijke kandidaat na Karzai voor het Afghaanse presidentsschap is de deels Tadzjiekse, deels Pasjtoense Abdullah Abdullah. Hij is een van de weinige kandidaten met schone handen en mede daardoor een alom bekend en gerespecteerd politicus. Evenals de door Karzai als vice-presidentskandidaat verkozen Tadzjiek Mohammad Qasim Fahim was hij jarenlang een naaste medewerker, maar tevens een goede vriend, van de legendarische, nog altijd immens populaire verzetsleider Ahmed Shah Massoed, een gegeven waar Abdullah optimaal gebruik van maakt in zijn campagne. In de interim-regering (van 2002 tot 2004) en in de eerste regering-Karzai (2004-2009) was hij enige tijd minister van buitenlandse zaken. Onenigheid met Karzai en de Bush-regering over de te volgen politieke koers leidde tot een scheiding der wegen.

De gematigde Abdullah was in 2001 net als Karzai aanwezig en volop betrokken bij de gesprekken op de VN-conferentie in Bonn. Als voornaamste Tadzjiekse kandidaat krijgt hij ongetwijfeld het gros van de stemmen van de Tadzjiekse bevolking. Afhankelijk van de steun die Abdullah weet te verwerven binnen andere etnische groepen, de Pasjtoense daarbij inbegrepen, vormt hij een reële bedreiging voor Karzai. Omgekeerd tracht Karzai een deel van het Tadzjiekse electoraat voor zich te winnen. Abdullah karakteriseert de huidige regering-Karzai onomwonden als een mislukking, waardoor een groot deel van de eerdere steun vanuit de bevolking verloren is gegaan, niet alleen voor de president zelf maar ook voor het tot ontwikkeling brengen van het democratisch-politieke systeem. Het daardoor ontstane machtsvacuüm bood de Taliban de gelegenheid zich opnieuw als overheersende beweging te manifesteren en heeft geleid tot de huidige instabiele situatie in het land.

Een derde kandidaat die veel stemmen kan trekken is de Pasjtoen Ashraf Ghani; hij woonde tot voor kort in de Verenigde Staten. Ook Ghani was nauw betrokken bij het opstellen van de akkoorden van de conferentie van Bonn. In de overgangsregering van 2002 - 2004 was hij minister van financiën. Hij is een warm voorstander van het aantrekken van buitenlandse investeerders, liever dan te rekenen op internationale liefdadigheid. Tegenwoordig is hij voorzitter van het ‗Instituut voor Staats Effectiviteit‘ (ISE). Ghani zal zich naar verluid inzetten voor ‗vrede en veiligheid, nationale soevereiniteit en het versterken van de nationale eenheid‘. Ghani is bereid tot samenwerking met andere kandidaten als Abdullah en de Hezaraleider Karim Khalili, een van de twee huidige vice-presidenten. Mocht het daar van komen, dan ontstaat er een reëel alternatief voor Karzai.

Dat het gewicht van Ghani serieus wordt genomen blijkt uit het feit dat Karzai trachtte Ghani over te halen zijn campagne te staken, in ruil voor de post van premier in de nieuw te vormen regering. Hoewel Ghani hier niet op in wenst te gaan geeft deze manoeuvre aan dat Karzai c.s. niet erg vertrouwen op een overwinning in de eerste verkiezingsronde. Overigens zou samenwerking tussen Karzai en Ghani, beiden Pasjtoenen, de basis van de toekomstige regering versterken; ook de Amerikaanse regering staat niet onwelgevallig tegenover een dergelijk verbond.[16] Niet alleen heeft men in Washington weinig vertrouwen in Karzai, ook staat ‗technocraat‘ Ashraf Ghani te boek als competent en betrouwbaar.[17] Ghani heeft zich wel bereid verklaard in een volgende regering zitting te nemen, op voorwaarde dat hij zijn programma‘s in de praktijk kan brengen.

Er zijn onwaarschijnlijker kandidaten. De eerste die zich als kandidaat liet registreren was de Pasjtoen Shahnawaz Tanai, ooit generaal en minister van Defensie binnen de communistische regering. In 1990 trachtte hij middels een coup het toenmalige communistische bewind van Nadjibullah omver te werpen, tevergeefs. Tegenwoordig is Tanai leider van de ‗Afghaanse Vredesbeweging‘. Een andere opvallende mededinger voor het presidentsschap is Abdoel

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Salam Rocketi, een voormalig lid van het Taliban-regime in de periode 1996-2001. Hij dankt zijn bijnaam ‗Rocketi‘ aan zijn opmerkelijke vermogen Sovjettroepen op grote afstand vol te raken met van zijn schouder afgevuurde raketten. Na de teloorgang van het Taliban-regime bracht Rocketi twee jaar in het gevang door. Blijkbaar tot inkeer gekomen, keerde hij na zijn vrijlating de Taliban de rug toe, en werd in 2005 als parlementslid gekozen.

Kogelvrije verkiezingen

Dat ‗kogelvrije verkiezingen‘ een illusie zijn wordt in de aanloop ernaartoe herhaaldelijk bevestigd. Een campagneleider van Abdullah Abdullah raakte eind juli zwaar gewond bij een aanval op zijn auto. In de noordelijke provincie Kunduz werden voertuigen van Mohammed Qasim Fahim, een van de twee van Karzai‘s beoogde vice-presidenten, beschoten met machinegeweren en RPG‘s (rocket-propelled Grenades). Kunduz is onderdeel van de thuisbasis van de Tadzjiekse vice-president.

De aanval wordt gewoontegetrouw aan de Taliban toegeschreven, maar zou eveneens gepleegd kunnen zijn door zijn Tadzjiekse rivalen die nog oude rekeningen met ‗krijgsheer‘ Fahim te vereffenen hebben. Als andere mogelijke daders worden leden van de Islamitische Beweging van Oezbekistan (IMU) genoemd, die recent uit Pakistan zouden zijn gevlucht. In het noorden van Afghanistan zijn weinig Taliban, maar des te meer lokale krijgsheren en criminelen. Enkele weken eerder werd in Kunduz een lid van de Onafhankelijke Verkiezingscommissie (IEC) doodgeschoten. In de derde week van juli 2009 begonnen de Duitse troepen die zijn gestationeerd in Kunduz een omvangrijk offensief tegen alle militante groeperingen in de provincie.

Verkiezingscampagnes worden in Afghanistan op in Westerse ogen traditionele wijze gevoerd. De kandidaten dienen zoveel mogelijk door het land te reizen om zichzelf optimaal te laten horen, zien en aanraken; politieke bijeenkomsten nemen vaak vele uren in beslag, waarbij lokale aanhangers de gelegenheid hebben hun favoriet toe te zingen, spreken of instrueren. Gezien ondermeer de lage geletterdheid van de Afghaanse bevolking is een dergelijke campagnestijl het meest efficiënt. Bovendien spelen noch internet (ongeveer drie procent van alle Afghanen heeft daar midden 2009 toegang toe) noch televisiedebatten een grote rol. Ondanks de forse toename van particuliere tv en radiozenders in de afgelopen jaren hebben lang niet alle Afghanen, zeker niet buiten de steden, de mogelijkheid debatten op televisie te volgen. Bovendien worden lang niet alle van de overgebleven 37 kandidaten in de studio‘s uitgenodigd.

De straten en pleinen van de grotere dorpen èn steden daarentegen hangen vol met posters waarop de kandidaat, soms met zijn politieke verwanten en vrienden, en individuele verkiezingssymbool staat afgebeeld (Karzai bijvoorbeeld heeft als symbool een weegschaal; Abdullah Abdullah wordt gadegeslagen door Ahmed Shah Massoed). Op veel plaatsen woedt zelfs een regelrechte pamflettenoorlog, waarbij plakploegen elkaars kandidaten wegplakken. Veel regio‘s en steden zijn voor de meeste kandidaten ontoegankelijk. Niet alleen vormen de Taliban in grote delen van het land een constante bedreiging; ook etnische scheidslijnen belemmeren veel kandidaten in het voeren van hun campagne. Vice-presidentskandidaat Khalili bijvoorbeeld, een Hezara, doet er verstandig aan in elk geval het Pasjtoense zuiden en oosten van het land te mijden.

Volgens het hoofd van de Onafhankelijke Verkiezingscommissie (IEC, Independent Election Commission), Ahmed Nader Nadrey, worden elf kiesdistricten in het zuiden van het land

194 volledig overheerst door de Taliban. Inmiddels is volgens het Afghaanse Ministerie van Defensie dat aantal, dankzij het Amerikaanse en Britse offensief in de provincie Helmand, teruggebracht tot negen.[18] Nog eens 124 van de in totaal 390 kiesdistricten worden door hun aanwezigheid bedreigd.[19] Het is onder deze omstandigheden vrijwel onmogelijk om ‗vrije en eerlijke‘, of geloofwaardige, verkiezingen te houden. Een flink deel van de circa 16 miljoen stemgerechtigden zal zich naar verwachting niet in een van de ruim 7000 stemlokalen vertonen. Wil men daadwerkelijk een zinvolle vrije en onafhankelijke presidentsverkiezing organiseren, dan zal in elk geval vóór 20 augustus de nationale veiligheid ingrijpend moeten worden verbeterd.

In een aantal provincies is de Afghaanse regering overgegaan tot het rekruteren van strijders van lokale stammen. Zij moeten milities vormen die tegen betaling van 150 dollar per maand de algemene veiligheid garanderen en de stembureaus bewaken, om zo de komende verkiezingen tot een succes te maken. Deze milities, die nauw samen moeten werken met het Afghaanse regeringsleger en de politie, mogen hun eigen wapens gebruiken, maar zullen die niet van de regering krijgen.[20] Uiteraard hoopt men dat dit initiatief meer zal opleveren dan een kortstondige beveiliging van het verkiezingsproces; indien succesvol wordt deze aanpak een permanente zodat dorpen en wegen worden gevrijwaard van oorlogsgeweld.

De nieuwe president en de toekomst

Wie er op na de verkiezingen ook aantreedt als nieuwe president, de toekomst belooft voor Afghanistan nog niet veel goeds. Bijna acht jaar na de omverwerping van het Talibanbewind is de strijd in Afghanistan bloediger dan ooit. Alleen al in juli jl. kwamen 75 Westerse militairen om, het hoogste aantal in een maand sinds december 2001. Woordvoerder Qari Muhammad Yusuf van de Taliban waarschuwde onlangs in een interview president Karzai dat hij als ‗agent‘ van de Verenigde Staten hetzelfde lot zal ondergaan als andere collaborateurs voor hem, voormalig president Nadjibullah bijvoorbeeld. Die werd in september 1996 in Kaboel door Talibanstrijders uit het VN-gebouw gesleurd, gecastreerd, en samen met zijn broer aan een lantaarnpaal opgehangen.[21] Aannemelijk is dat dit akelige lot ook een andere nieuwe president dan Karzai wordt toebedacht.[22]

In zijn evaluatierapport, dat na de installatie van de Afghaanse president overhandigd wordt aan de Obama-regering, zal de Amerikaanse commandant van de strijdkrachten McChrystal ondermeer uiteenzetten wat er aan nieuwe troepen nodig is, en welke. Het land wordt voor eenderde door de Taliban gecontroleerd, voor eenderde door de regering en internationale troepen, het resterende deel wordt door beide partijen betwist. Eén Europese ‗denktank‘ stelde eind 2007 dat de Taliban zelfs meer dan 70% van het hele land controleerden - toen al.[23] Duidelijk is dat de Taliban inmiddels grote delen van het land beheersen, vooral buiten de steden. Om het tij te kunnen keren verwacht generaal McChrystal na 2009 nog tenminste 10.000 extra Amerikaanse troepen nodig te hebben, bovenop de 68.000 manschappen die de VS eind gestationeerd zullen hebben.

De provincie Helmand in het zuiden van het land vormt het hart van de Afghaanse opiumcultuur. Er komt tenminste 45 % van de gehele Afghaanse papaveroogst vandaan. Nadat de Taliban vanaf 2006 hun aandacht verlegden naar Helmand, nam het aantal aanslagen en ontvoeringen toe. Met de opbrengsten van de drugsverkoop, mogelijk honderden miljoenen dollars, financieren de Taliban een aanzienlijk deel van hun activiteiten. Hoewel Karzai al voor zijn inauguratie in december 2004 had aangekondigd een ‗jihad‘ tegen de drugscultuur te gaan voeren, zijn sindsdien de papaveroogsten alleen maar omvangrijker

195 geworden. Daarmee nam de kracht van de Taliban toe, evenals de met de drugshandel gepaard gaande criminaliteit.

Het is essentieel dat het grootscheepse offensief dat op 2 juli jl. in Helmand is gestart door Amerikaanse en Britse troepen succesvol zal zijn. Men hoopt dat het terugdringen van de Taliban in het zuiden de Pasjtoense bevolking zal bewegen op 20 augustus naar de stembus te gaan. Hiermee verbeteren de kansen van Karzai om opnieuw tot president te worden gekozen aanzienlijk. In de zuidelijke provincies won Karzai eerder in 2004; als de veiligheidssituatie een massale gang naar de stembus mogelijk maakt is hij opnieuw de grootste kanshebber.

Op langere termijn wordt de teelt van papavers en de handel in de drugs die eruit worden vervaardigd (opium, heroïne) een stevige slag toegebracht. Daarmee zouden de Taliban ook een flink deel van hun inkomsten kwijtraken. Een ander beoogd effect van het offensief is dat de regionale veiligheid duurzaam wordt verbeterd, waardoor de lokale bevolking in staat is zich op de verbouw van andere gewassen te richten. Een succesvol Nederlands landbouwproject in Uruzgan richt zich op de teelt en verwerking van saffraan, een gewas dat eveneens een hoge opbrengst kent.[24] Wil men dergelijke ontwikkelingen een reële kans geven, dan is een lange termijn aanwezigheid van buitenlandse en Afghaanse troepen onvermijdelijk. Daar hangt weer mee nauw samen dat de opbouw van zowel een betrouwbare Afghaanse politiemacht als een efficiënt Afghaans nationaal leger onverminderd wordt voortgezet, organisaties die momenteel nog in de kinderschoenen staan, in het bijzonder de politie.

Voorlopig reikt het effectieve gezag van de regering-Karzai na zeven jaar nog altijd niet erg ver, en is voor zijn politieke (en letterlijke) overleven afhankelijk van tienduizenden Westerse troepen en omvangrijke internationale financiële steun. Veel Westerse landen zijn inmiddels de schijnbaar uitzichtloze strijd in Afghanistan moe; een eind juli 2009 gehouden onderzoek onder de Britse bevolking geeft aan dat 58 procent van hen van mening is dat de Afghaanse oorlog niet te winnen valt. 52 % wil dat de 9.000 Britse soldaten die zijn gelegerd in Afghanistan, de grootste buitenlandse troepenmacht na die van de Verenigde Staten, direct terug wordt getrokken.[25]

Publieke opinies in veel Westerse landen, zeker Europese, zijn van grote invloed op de besluitvorming van nationale regeringen. Meerdere landen, waaronder Nederland en Canada, hebben aangekondigd dat ze hun troepen in 2010 terugtrekken. Of tegen die tijd ter vervanging nog meer Amerikaanse militairen door een eveneens terughoudende Obama- regering zullen worden gestuurd is onduidelijk. De opbouw van het nieuwe Afghaanse regeringsleger verloopt moeizaam, en is een kostbare aangelegenheid. Aan de blijvende loyaliteit van veel rekruten wordt bovendien getwijfeld.

In de komende tien jaar zullen de VS naar verwachting tenminste 80 miljard dollar besteden aan de vorming van een krachtig nationaal leger.[26] Deze aanpak wordt naar verluidt volledig gesteund door de opperbevelhebber van het Amerikaanse leger David Petraeus, eindverantwoordelijke voor de militaire operatie in Afghanistan. Petraeus is overigens van mening dat er geen gematigde Taliban bestaan; onderhandelen met de Taliban zou alle inspanningen van de Westerse militairen slechts ondermijnen.[27] Zijn standpunt wordt bevestigd door het geringe succes van de wapenstilstand die de regering wist te sluiten met de lokale Taliban commandanten in de noordwestelijke provincie Badghis. Hoewel direct gepropageerd als een ‗rolmodel‘ voor meer toekomstige wapenstilstand akkoorden, moet

196 aangetekend worden dat er weinig Taliban in Badghis zijn. De weinige die er wèl zijn gebruikten de wapenstilstand om een aantal politieagenten in een hinderlaag te lokken.

Een ander immens probleem ligt in de verhouding met buurland Pakistan. De zeer bergachtige, relatief open grens met dat land heeft Afghaanse strijders decennia lang in staat gesteld het strijdtoneel in eigen land te ontvluchten. Maar inmiddels is de binnenlandse situatie in Pakistan drastisch veranderd. De Pakistaanse Taliban hebben hun positie in de afgelopen jaren aanzienlijk weten te versterken, op de eerste plaats in de aan Afghanistan grenzende provincies NWFP en Balochistan. Afghaanse Talibanleiders, onder hen mollah Omar, bevinden zich al jaren in de Pakistaanse stad Quetta en omgeving, waar zij zich vrijwel ongehinderd kunnen bewegen. Dit wordt overigens consequent tegengesproken door de Pakistaanse regering.

De verzwakte positie van regering en leger in Pakistan ten opzichte van militante Taliban- aanhangers in eigen land hebben de krachtsverhouding in de gehele regio gewijzigd. Waar voorheen de regering-Bush (2001-2009) voor het indammen van de Taliban voornamelijk vertrouwde op de inzet van het leger door voormalig Pakistaans legerleider en president Musharraf (1999-2008), ziet de regering-Obama zich geconfronteerd met een weliswaar gekozen maar zwakke burgerregering in Islamabad. Musharraf moest in augustus 2008 het veld ruimen als president. Zijn opvolger als opperbevelhebber in november 2007, Kayani, kiest voor overleg en samenwerking met de coalitieregering. Hij stuurde het leger terug naar de barakken. Eén van zijn eerste orders was, dat legerpersoneel voortaan geen contacten meer mocht hebben met politici.[28]

Dialoog?

Dit alles heeft geleid tot een herziening van de Amerikaanse strategie door de regering- Obama. Niet langer wordt er voornamelijk militaire hulp aan Islamabad gegeven, zoals lange tijd gebeurde onder de regeringen-Bush; nadrukkelijk zoekt men ook naar wegen om zowel Afghanistan als Pakistan economisch te steunen en ontwikkelen. Tevens wordt door Washington tegenwoordig nadrukkelijk de dialoog met ‗gematigde Taliban‘ gezocht, voor zover die althans te vinden zijn.

Dat streven werd flink aangewakkerd door de geheime ontmoeting die de Saoedi-Arabische koning in september 2008 in Mekka had weten te organiseren tussen president Karzai‘s broer Abdul Qayyum, voormalig Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken van het Talibanbewind Wakil Ahmed Mutawakil, de voormalig woordvoerder van mollah Omar Mohammed Tayeb Agha en voormalig Afghaans ambassadeur in Islamabad mollah Abdul Salam Zaeef.[29] Deze bijzondere bijeenkomst kon tot stand komen dankzij de bemiddeling van Pakistaans oppositieleider Nawaz Sharif, die zeven jaar lang in ballingschap in Saoedi-Arabië verbleef.

In de nieuwe ‗AfPak‘ strategie moet krachtig militair optreden hand in hand gaan met nationale ontwikkeling en diplomatie.[30] Ook president Karzai, doorgewinterd politicus als hij is, laat regelmatig weten dat hij tot een verzoening en onderhandelingen met die Taliban wil komen die het gezag van zijn regering accepteren. Maar daadwerkelijke, praktische maatregelen daartoe ontbreken.

De respons is tot op heden dan ook vrijwel nihil. De Karzai-regering wordt allerwegen gezien als zwak en corrupt, in het zadel gehouden dankzij grootschalige Westerse steun. Voor Talibanstrijders die zich om welke reden dan ook bereid verklaren hun activiteiten tegen de

197 regering te staken zijn nog altijd geen concrete tegenprestaties (veilige verblijfplaatsen, financiële steun) of voorzieningen (werk, onderdak) geregeld. De weinige Talibancommandanten die overwegen om de wapenen neer te leggen, of dat in een enkel geval ook gedaan hebben, worden direct met de dood bedreigd. Hetzelfde geldt voor dorpsoudsten (maliks) die met regeringsvertegenwoordigers samenwerken.

Uiteindelijk valt of staat het succes van de nieuwe Amerikaanse benadering met de actieve steun van de grote meerderheid van de Afghanen voor het ultieme doel, een vreedzaam, stabiel Afghanistan. De grote meerderheid van de Afghaanse bevolking wil op de eerste plaats in vrede en veiligheid kunnen leven. Vrijwel alle presidentskandidaten beloven om het hardst zich daar optimaal voor in te zullen spannen; de kandidaat die erin slaagt daar het beste uitzicht op te bieden maakt op 20 augustus a.s. de grootste kans.

Olivier Immig, Amsterdam, augustus 2009

[1] ‗Electoral Complaints Commission starts its work for the polls‘: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 13 May 2009. Drie kandidaten werd deelname geweigerd

[2] ‗Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions‘, Bonn, 5 december 2001

[3] In de eerste verkiezingsronde. De kandidaat die tenminste 51 % van de stemmen behaalt wint. Eén grote vrees voor de presidentsverkiezing van 20 augustus 2009 is dat er een tweede stemronde nodig zal zijn, wat gezien de toegenomen kracht en het verzet van de Taliban tegen ‗democratie‘ en de huidige regering van het land een riskante onderneming is

[4] Zie hiervoor: Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos, Londen 2008, p. 133

[5] In Afghanistan wonen anno 2009 naar schatting 14 miljoen Pasjtoenen, in buurland Pakistan circa 27 miljoen

[6] De huidige grens tussen Afghanistan en Pakistan, in 1893 getrokken door de Britse Durand-commissie, werd nooit als internationale grens erkend door de Afghaanse koningen en regeringen. Begrijpelijk, aangezien die grens het woongebied van de tientallen Pasjtoense stammen in tweeën deelde. De loop ervan werd op de eerste plaats bepaald door Britskoloniale veiligheidsbelangen. Zowel de lengte van de grens (2500 kilometer) als het natuurlijke karakter ervan (woestijngebieden en hooggebergtes) bieden aan guerrillastrijders uitgelezen mogelijkheden vrijelijk tussen Afghanistan en Pakistan heen en weer te trekken

[7] In 1972 waren er 893 madrassas in Pakistan; in 2002 al ca. 10.000. De meeste, ruim 7.000, werden geleid door Deobandi-geestelijken; er verbleven 1,7 miljoen studenten, waaronder vele aktieve Taliban-aanhangers. Het aantal madrassas is sindsdien alleen maar toegenomen. Zie: Charles Allen, God‘s Terrorists. The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad, Da Capo Press, Cambridge 2006, p. 274

[8] Voor een gedetailleerde beschrijving van alle potentiele kandidaten zie: ‗Afghanistan‘s Presidential Election: Power to the People, or the Powerful?‘ The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS), Londen, maart 2009

198

[9] Meest recente bevolkingsgegevens, afkomstig uit: ‗CIA - The World Factbook‘, Afghanistan. Bijgewerkt tot en met 29 april 2009

[10] ‗Afghan Presidential Campaigns Begin‘, in: The Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2009

[11] Helene Cooper, ‗Ex-U.S. Envoy Considers Key Role in Afghan Government‘, in: The New York Times, 19 mei 2009

[12] ‗Taliban urged to join Afghan polls‘, in: Al Jazeera, 3 mei 2009

[13] Rusland daarentegen houdt zich relatief afzijdig, hoewel Afghanistan toch ‗de zachte onderbuik‘ van Rusland vormt. De Westerse ‗export van democratie‘ wordt in Moskou als onhaalbaar betiteld; Rusland zou zich primair moeten richten op de ‗export van ontwikkeling‘. Yury Krupnov, ‗A Marshall Plan for Afghanistan‘, in: The Moscow Times, 14 mei 2009

[14] Minister van buitenlandse Zaken M. Verhagen, ‗Toespraak bij de Afghanistan Conferentie 2009′, Den Haag 31 maart 2009. Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: www.buza.nl

[15] Opinieonderzoek door ABC News in februari 2009, geciteerd in: Anthony H. Cordesman, ‗The Afghan-Pakistan Conflict: US Strategic Options in Afghanistan‘. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 16 maart 2009, p.7-8

[16] Tom Coghlan en Jeremy Page, ‗Karzai offers rival top Cabinet post in effort to avoid election defeat‘, in: The Times, 11 augustus 2009

[17] Joshua Partlow, ‗U.S. Officials Looking at Karzai Rival for Key New Post‘, in: The Washington Post, 11 augustus 2009

[18] ‗Government: 9 Afghan districts still out of control‘; Xinhua Press Agency, as quoted in Afghanistan Online Press, July 29, 2009. Volgens woordvoerder generaal Zaher Azimi zullen zo‘n 300.000 Afghaanse en internationale militairen de verkiezing beveiligen

[19] Raghav Sharma, ‗Mapping the Afghan Elections‘, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), Article No. 2918, 25 July 2009

[20] Anand Gopal en Yochi J. Dreazen, ‗Afghanistan Enlists Tribal Militia Forces‘, in: The Wall Street Journal, 11 augustus 2009

[21] ‗Taliban Spokesman Warns Hamid Karzai Must Expect Same Fate As Najibullah‘, in: Sada al-Jihad, als geciteerd in: TerrorismMonitor, Vol. VII, Issue 22, 27 juli 2009

[22] Karzai daarentegen spreekt verzoenende woorden: ―Als ik de verkiezing win zal ik een nationale Loyah Jirgah bijeenroepen, en ook uitnodigingen daarvoor sturen aan onze Taliban en Hezb-i-Islami broeders teneinde wegen te vinden om tot vrede en veiligheid te komen en een einde te maken aan buitenlandse invloeden‖. ‗Taliban attacks Afghan poll office‘, in: Al Jazeera, 11 augustus, 2009

199

[23] „Stumbling Into Chaos: Afghanistan on the Brink.‘ SenlisAfghanistan, London, November 2007

[24] Lex Kassenberg, ‗Frustraties van een optimist‘, in: Zem Zem, Tijdschrift over het Midden-Oosten, Noord-Afrika en islam, Nr. 2, Augustus 2009, p. 55

[25] Taimoor Shah and Alan Cowell, ‗Bomb Kills 8 Afghans Escorting NATO Convoy‘, in: The New York Times, July 29, 2009

[26] Steve Hynd, ‗British Conservatives Back Away from Afghanistan‘. Published on Atlantic Council, Created July 29, 2009

[27] Arnaud de Borchgrave, ‗Afghanistan Exit Scenario?‘ Atlantic Council, created July 28, 2009

[28] Syed Saleem Shahzad, ‗Musharraf misses his day in court‘, in: Asia Times Online, July 30, 2009

[29] Ibid., noot 20

[30] Minister van Defensie Gates heeft, in het kader van de nieuwe strategie, een nieuwe Amerikaanse bevelhebber voor Afghanistan aangesteld; Generaal McChrystal staat bekend als expert op het gebied van ‗counterinsurgency‘. McChrystal heeft naam gemaakt als effectief bestrijder van opstanden in Iraq. Ann Scott Tyson, ‗Top U.S. Commander in Afghanistan Is Fired‘, in: The Washington Post, 12 mei 2009

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AFGHANISTAN ELECTION SECURITY MAP (AUGUST 19, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, August 19th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Afghanistan Election Security Map SOURCE: Afghanistan Interior Ministry / Reuters Wednesday, August 19, 2009

Afghanistan Election Security Map (August 2009)

201

THE DEATH OF MEHSUD - A VIEW FROM AFGHANISTAN (AUGUST 20, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, August 20th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

The Death of Baitullah Mahsud: A View from Afghanistan SOURCE: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 26 Thursday, August 20, 2009 By: WAHIDULLAH MOHAMMAD

Officials in Afghanistan see the killing of Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mahsud as a great victory for his opponents and say his death may result in the breakup of the Tehrik-e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP) organization. The loss of the TTP leader comes as Pakistani jet fighters and helicopter gunships continue to pound Taliban positions in South Waziristan in preparation for an expected ground offensive.

Baitullah Mahsud was killed in a U.S. drone missile attack on his father-in-law‘s house in South Waziristan. Although officials in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States have stood behind reports of the death of the insurgent leader, the Taliban in Pakistan still insist their leader is alive, an increasingly unsustainable position. The Taliban in Afghanistan have refused comment on this issue.

Hamed Elmi, deputy spokesperson to Afghan president Hamid Karzai, feels certain that Baitullah is dead, but the government is still waiting for more credible evidence of the insurgent leader‘s death from the Pakistani government [1] Elmi says that Baitullah and his group are linked to al-Qaeda, but his death does not lead the government to expect a decrease in Taliban attacks within Afghanistan. ―This is one hundred percent true that the Pakistani Taliban leader is killed… We can see that after he was killed there was a big clash between his two top commanders, Wali-ur-Rahman and Hakimullah Mahsud over who would replace him.‖ Elmi says that the Afghan government wants the Pakistani government to close all those religious madrassas (religious schools) where thousands of Taliban have been trained as terrorist insurgents. ―There are hundreds of madrassas on the Pakistan side that are training young boys as terrorists. We want these madrassas to be closed and to be changed into modern schools. Their curriculums should be under government control. We have always insisted the Pakistani government should have control over the religious madrassas. The centers for terrorist training should be destroyed. We also have religious madrassas in different cities of Afghanistan but none of them [are] used for terrorist activities because we have full control over our madrassas.‖

202

Elmi said the Defense Ministry was happy with the killing of the Taliban leader. ―His death is a big success for the killers and can have a big positive impact not only on the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan. His death is good for the region and even for the world.‖

Kabul-based political analyst Fazal Raman Orya says that killing the TTP leader will have a short term positive impact on the security situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the region. [2] According to Orya, Mahsud was a main player for Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence and was killed at the ISI‘s suggestion. ―He was very powerful; he had more than 30,000 armed people but sometimes he was not listening to the ISI and was out of their control - that is why they decided to kill him.‖

Orya says the ISI will now look for a good replacement and will reorganize the TTP structure. ―The truth is that ISI wants to replace him with a new person. The new person will be more powerful than Mahsud but he will always be listening to ISI. Once Baitullah is replaced by the new person I think the situation will become much worse in Afghanistan.‖

Afghan Taliban spokesperson Qari Yusuf Ahmadi refused to speak on the repercussions of the TTP leader‘s fate, saying that the movement will have comments once Baitullah Mahsud‘s death is confirmed by the Pakistani Taliban. ―We do not want to give any comments on the death of Baitullah Mahsud. His friends have not confirmed his death yet.‖ [3]

General Mohammad Zaher Azimi, spokesperson for Afghanistan‘s defense ministry, said the ministry is still collecting information regarding Baitullah‘s death, but says if his elimination is confirmed, it will have a direct positive impact on the security situation in the region and in Afghanistan in particular. General Azimi maintains there was a very close connection between the Taliban, al-Qaeda and Baitullah Mahsud, especially his connection with the in Miramshah. ―They were working together to plan suicide attacks in Afghanistan, training and sending suicide bombers into Afghanistan.‖ [4]

General Azimi is confident that the death of Baitullah Mahsud will gradually improve the security situation in Afghanistan. ―It won‘t have a high-speed, positive impact on [the] security situation in Afghanistan and the region very soon, but in the coming few months its positive impact will be seen.‖

Notes:

1. Hamed Elmi deputy spokesperson to the President Hamed karzai was interviewed on August 12, 2009. 2. Fazal Rahman Orya political analyst was interviewed on August 13, 2009. 3. Taliban Spokesperson Qari Yusuf Ahmadi was contacted on August 12, 2009. 4. General Zahir Azimi spokesperson for the Afghanistan defense ministry was interviewed on August 13 2009. For the Haqqani network, see Terrorism Monitor, March 24, 2008; Terrorism Focus, July 1, 2008.

203

VOTES COUNTED AS WEST HAILS AFGHAN ELECTION (AUGUST 21, 2009)

Written by admin on Friday, August 21st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Votes counted as West hails Afghan election SOURCE: The Hindustan Times Friday, August 21, 2009

Kabul, August 21, 2009 Votes were counted in Afghanistan on Friday after the presidential election was hailed as a success by the international community despite low turnout, Taliban violence and allegations of irregularities.

President Hamid Karzai — bidding for another five years in office — praised the war-weary Afghan people for defying threats of violence and described the polls as a ―day of pride and glory‖ for the country.

US President Barack Obama, NATO and many other Western backers of Karzai‘s government also welcomed Thursday‘s election, which although subject to sporadic attacks was spared a feared full-scale Taliban onslaught.

The United Nations representative in Afghanistan, Kai Eide, said the most positive aspect of the polls was the lower than expected level of violence and he urged the country‘s leaders to pull together.

―The Afghan people as well as the international community expect that the political establishment will get together and unite behind a common agenda. The Afghan people don‘t need more fragmentation and division,‖ he said.

Initial results are expected at the weekend with pre-vote opinion polls suggesting Karzai will likely be forced into a second round run-off in six weeks time with former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah.

There are concerns that dissatisfaction with the outcome of the election could spark protests and Abdullah‘s office has detailed 40 complaints so far, most of them alleging that officials were commanding people to vote for Karzai.

The election authority said it was investigating complaints from candidates, although Western officials played down prospects for entirely free and fair elections given reports of vote- buying and Karzai‘s reliance on warlords.

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Officials said it would be some days before they could determine how many of the 17 million registered voters had cast their ballots, but Interior Minister Hanif Atmar said the government was ‘satisfied‘ with turnout levels.

However, international observers said turnout was likely to be lower than the roughly 50 per cent reached in the 2005 parliamentary polls and much lower than the 70 per cent figure during the 2004 presidential election.

They said the numbers could be particularly low in the south, where the Taliban insurgency is at its bloodiest despite a US and NATO campaign to pacify the lawless nation.

One diplomat described turnout in Kandahar, Afghanistan‘s second city and the capital of the 1996-2001 Taliban regime, as ‖ very, very low‖ while another diplomat estimated turnout in parts of the south as below 10 per cent.

Afghans were electing a president and 420 councillors in 34 provinces across the country.

The Taliban had threatened to target polling stations on election day and to cut off the fingers of voters, and scattered incidents of Taliban violence were reported around the country.

Notable election-day clashes included a multi-pronged assault by Taliban militants in the northern town of Baghlan which officials said left 30 militants dead, and a shootout in Kabul that killed two militants.

Officials also said 26 civilians were killed in nationwide unrest.

The polls, only Afghanistan‘s second direct presidential election, were seen as a crucial test of a system installed after the Taliban were ejected from power in late 2001, following the .

Despite billions of dollars of Western aid and over the presence of more than 100,000 foreign troops helping to provide security, most Afghans still lack electricity, roads are bad, jobs are scarce and graft widespread.

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CONFUSION REIGNS AS KARZAI, ABDULLAH CLAIM WIN (AUGUST 21, 2009)

Written by admin on Friday, August 21st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Confusion reigns as Karzai, Abdullah claim win SOURCE: Dawn Friday, August 21, 2009 AFP

KABUL: Both the incumbent and his main rival have claimed victory in the hotly contested Afghan elections, as elections officials confirm ballot counting is over and results will be released next week.

‗From what we have obtained so far, we can claim that there is no need for a run-off and we can claim that we‘re in the lead,‘ Karzai‘s campaign chief Din Mohammmad told AFP.

‗We have got this figure from our observers at the (voting) sites,‘ he added.

However, Abdullah Abdullah‘s campaign spokesman also claimed that his side had won based on partial figures.

‗The results that we have received from our observers from the sites tells us, as we speak, we have 63 per cent, Hamid Karzai has 31 per cent,‘ Sayed Aqa Fazil Sancharaki told AFP by telephone.

‗This is not a final result. We are still receiving more results from our people on the ground. We might be done by tomorrow,‘ he added.

Experts believe that an energetic campaign during the past few days by ex-foreign minister Abdullah, who has a northern powerbase, boosted the chance of a run-off, which would take place in around six weeks time.

Counting over

Ballot counting in Afghanistan‘s presidential election is over with results to be released next week and turnout expected at 40 to 50 per cent, the election authority said Friday.

Afghans voted on Thursday to elect a new president and for 420 councillors in 34 provincial councils.

‗The counting is finished for the presidential race,‘ Independent Election Commission official Zekria Barakzai told AFP.

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‗The turnout was different from south to the north and central parts of Afghanistan but still it is satisfactory and I expect that turnout will be from 40 to 50 per cent,‘ he said.

Pre-election opinion polls put Abdullah on track for around 26 per cent of the vote.- AFP

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BEYOND ELECTIONS, FIXING THE AFGHAN STATE (AUGUST 21, 2009)

Written by admin on Friday, August 21st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Beyond Elections, Fixing the Afghan State SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations Friday, August 21, 2009 Interviewee: Elizabeth Rubin, Edward R. Murrow Fellow, CFR Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, CFR.org

Elizabeth Rubin, a journalist who has written extensively on Afghanistan, says whoever emerges as winner in presidential elections should face steady U.S. scrutiny for how they govern-from financial transactions to security. Rubin says official corruption and other governance problems, and inattention from Washington on this front, has played a role in stunting the country‘s development. Incumbent Hamid Karzai, she says, has engaged in some questionable power-sharing deals with warlords and it‘s not clear how his main contender, former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah would govern. ―I think that given how much money we are spending in Afghanistan and how many lives we are putting at risk there, we have the right to demand that the Afghan government show how they spend every single penny,‖ she says. ―And we have a right to demand certain kinds of justice, so that Afghan people feel there is some hope and justice in their lives. Right now there is none.‖

The first round of the Afghan presidential elections has just ended. There is extensive vote counting going on now, with President Hamid Karzai, widely seen as the favorite, and his former foreign minister, Abdullah Abdullah, as the leading contender. Does it matter who wins?

It does matter who wins. If Karzai wins, as we know from many reports, he has made a lot of deals with many unsavory characters and has promised a lot of cabinet positions to these people. He‘s also promised a lot of governorships. There are rumors that he has offered so many governorships that he will have to create new provinces. That is not a joke. That is a real possibility. So if he is to rule more effectively, he will have to disappoint these people and face the consequences or he is going to have to try to somehow turn them into legitimate players. Some U.S. officials think there is a way that old warlords can turn new tricks and become responsible members of society. Others in Afghanistan say that is impossible. They say that in Afghanistan, they rule by intimidation and by the gun and people are too afraid to stand up to them. That‘s what we can expect from Karzai.

Abdullah was Karzai‘s foreign minister until Karzai removed him. We don‘t know how he would rule. He‘s of a jihadi generation. He himself may not have been a warlord, but he is certainly connected to the same people Karzai is. So whoever wins, one of the things that the United States is going to have to do is make sure that the Afghan government is held responsible for every penny that it spends, something that it was not before.

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Do you think there is a good chance there will be a runoff.

Yes.

It would probably be Abdullah versus Karzai. That‟s a long time between elections, almost two months. What will happen in the country in the two months?

It depends on two things: On how much the people think there was ballot box stuffing and how much the candidates and their allies stir up the people to riot. A lot will depend on the message given out by Abdullah and Karzai and their people. It‘s possible there will be a lot of turmoil but it is also possible both sides will be reasonable and say ―it is too close to call and we need a runoff. Let‘s maintain stability until that time.‖

I got the impression from your New York Times Magazine article that the United States government officials would prefer that Karzai not be reelected. Is that a misreading?

I know [Former Finance Minister Ashraf] Ghani is popular with Western officials. There was an attempt to dispel the rumor that the United States was backing Karzai. This rumor was very powerful in May and June because the United States had given the green light to Karzai to stay in power through August even though his mandate ended in May as a way to maintain stability in the country. So he and his people used that to say the Americans are backing Karzai; don‘t you want to back the winner? But as soon as the new U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry began meeting with the other candidates they started being seen as possible choices for the Americans and that evened the playing field a little bit.

Everyone writes, including you, that this has been a very corrupt country. Could you give an example?

When the minister of the interior was Zahar Ahmad Muqbil, who was removed last year, [the ministry's] chief administrator was selling police chief positions for $100,000. The reason why it was so lucrative to be a police chief was because of the kickbacks you could get in the provinces, and mostly from the drug trade. Any trucks that came through the highway in your province had to pay extortion. And there were other kinds of extortion, such as in land sales, in settling disputes, in releasing prisoners, etc. So being a police chief was a lucrative position. Another example is in the south, where people talk about Karzai‘s half brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai who runs the south like a Mafia don. In the early years, he was appointing his tribal allies as district governors and police chiefs. The reason was to ensure that power stayed in the family and because the drugs were being grown down south and moved through the south and therefore he was ensuring that his allies got a cut as it was moved along his roads and also that they got kickbacks for him.

Whoever wins, one of the things the United States is going to have to do is make sure that the Afghan government is held responsible for every penny that it spends.

In addition, their enemies, tribal rivals–anybody that was deemed as not cooperating–faced having information given to the coalition that they were Taliban or al-Qaeda and in the early years, it meant a lot of people being sent to prison, or roughed up by coalition troops, mostly American at that time. And that meant slowly but surely these people went to the other side. A lot of these tribes were completely alienated from the government and the Americans, and began cooperating with the Taliban.

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The Obama administration says it wants to do something different from the Bush administration on drug enforcement.

The Bush administration talked big about eradication but when it came to actually going after real smugglers, they had a spotty record. The Obama administration is now saying that the cause of the war in the south is about drugs so we are going to put [U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration] agents in with United States troops and we are also going to go after drug growers who are as much an enemy as the Taliban and labs, which are as much an enemy as the Taliban. They have sent sixty agents to the south, some with drug enforcement experience.

Karzai said in a debate recently he would favor some arrangement with the Taliban. Is that a real possibility?

The Taliban is a big umbrella for a lot of disparate groups. In the northeast, there are Gulbuddin Hekmatyar‘s people, Hezb-i-Islami; they are a different brand of insurgents. Hekmatyar had written a letter to Karzai. He and Hekmatyar were friends in the past. In the south you have Mullah Omar and his shura, which is a small council. They are a little more intransigent to some extent. Their condition has always been the removal of U.S. troops. Former Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, who also ran against Karzai, had an interesting plan– a cease-fire, followed by negotiations, followed by removal of foreign troops. He felt certain Taliban units you would be able to bring in and some you wouldn‘t.

President Obama made the statement the other day that the Afghan war was a “war of necessity.” This has become something of a theological argument, whether the war is one of “choice” or “necessity.” How important do you think the Afghan war is?

The United States has a moral responsibility to Afghanistan. We have been involved there for decades. In the 1980s we supplied thousands if not hundreds of thousands of tons of military equipment to the country. We gave millions and millions of dollars to Islamist extremists and killers. We did not support education, or people trying to build up the country and then we walked away and let the country devolve into civil war. A realist school of international relations would say we need to stay in Afghanistan to prevent another attack on the United States. I don‘t know if that is really true. I imagine with satellite imagery and Special Forces we could probably ensure that there is not a training camp on Afghan soil. It is more of a moral responsibility, which also has to do with international responsibility and relations. I don‘t know if that means we need to have 70,000 U.S. troops there. I am not sure they can accomplish that much. Everyone talks about this ―clear and hold and build‖ policy of counter- insurgency. U.S. troops can‘t hold terrain because they can‘t be in the villages at night to ensure the Taliban doesn‘t come back; they can‘t live with the population. They can‘t assure them of anything. If anything, their presence encourages the Taliban to come in. It is a Catch 22 situation. I am not a military specialist, but I don‘t think a military solution is the best solution.

As Americans, we tend to be so reluctant to dominate a country, to be seen as occupiers. But given how much money we are spending in Afghanistan and how many lives we are putting at risk there, we have the right to demand that the Afghan government show how they spend every single penny. And we have a right to demand certain kinds of justice, so that Afghan people feel there is some hope and justice in their lives. Right now there is none. These things require a different kind of attention from the past. As I heard it, Bush didn‘t feel you should

210 be involved in the day-to-day affairs of a country. We should learn how the country collects taxes, how it organizes its police. If we don‘t do that, nothing is going to change in that country.

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MASS RIGGING IN AFGHAN VOTE - ABDULLAH (AUGUST 24, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, August 24th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Mass rigging in Afghan vote: Abdullah SOURCE: The News International Monday, August 24, 2009

KABUL: Abdullah Abdullah, the main challenger to Afghan President Hamid Karzai in the last week‘s elections, said on Sunday that he had evidence the ballot had been widely rigged.

With counting underway following the Thursday‘s vote, the country is on tenterhooks ahead of an official result - although the start of the Ramazan and a relative lull in violence has helped calm tensions.

An election result respected by the candidates and their supporters is crucial for the country and US President Barack Obama, who has made stabilising Afghanistan his top foreign policy priority.

On Sunday, former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah, who was given a fighting chance of pushing the election to a second round, said he had evidence of widespread rigging. ―The initial reports we are receiving are alarming,‖ he said. ―There might have been thousands of violations throughout the country, no doubt about that.‖

He said his team received ―constant reports‖ that the turnout, which observers said was the lowest for an election since the 2001 US-led invasion, was in some areas inflated by four times the real figure, with all the votes for Karzai.

―Since this is a sign of widespread rigging, I thought the people of Afghanistan deserve to know what is going on and the international community deserves to know about our concerns,‖ he said.

Abdullah said the allegations of rigging had been directed to Afghanistan‘s independent Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) for investigation. In a separate news briefing, Afghanistan‘s election watchdog said it was dealing with scores of complaints, but there was no sign that they would directly affect the result.

Meanwhile, the ECC said it received 225 complaints of which 35 had been labelled a priority. ―The allegations contained in the complaints we have received so far range from voter intimidation, violence, ballot box tampering (to) interference by some IEC (Independent Election Commission) officials,‖ Grant Kippen told a news conference.

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Kippen said the ECC was aware of ―significant complaints‖ of vote irregularities, but that there were no specific charges against individual candidates such as Karzai. Millions of Afghans braved threats of the Taliban violence to vote in what was only the country‘s second presidential election.

With the outcome still unpublished and both sides claiming victory, Washington‘s envoy to the region, Richard Holbrooke, said both Karzai and Abdullah had promised to respect the result. ―So the United States‘ position, and that of all our Nato allies, is unanimous: we all will respect the decision of the Independent Election Commission,‖ he said on a visit to the Herat province on Sunday.

Western and Afghan officials have breathed a sigh of relief that violence did not wreck the election altogether after Taliban militants vowed to disrupt it and launched sporadic attacks across the country on the morning of the poll.

Attacks and threats did scare many people away, however, especially in the Taliban‘s southern heartland. Since voters in the south were expected to back Karzai, a poor turnout there increased the chance of a run-off. There has been a relative lull in violence since the vote, coinciding with Ramazan, which began here on Friday night.

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KARZAI APPEARS TO BE WINNING (AUGUST 27, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, August 27th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Karzai appears to be winning in Afghan election SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Thursday, August 27, 2009

Afghanistan‘s President Hamid Karzai has seen his slender lead in the presidential election widen over his main rival, former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah.

Over 18 percent of all returns are now in with Karzai having a lead of 90,000 votes over Mr Abdullah.

The president will need a simple majority of more than 50 percent to avoid a run-off election against Mr Abdullah.

The outcome of the election is bound to be tainted by widespread voter fraud allegations and Abdullah has warned against predicting the election‘s outcome.

He has said all allegations and claims and complaints will need to be addressed by the Election Complaints Commission.

The Election Complaints Commission already has more than 750 complaints of fraud to examine, and at least 70 are considered especially serious.

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US ENVOY „IN ANGRY KARZAI TALKS‟ (AUGUST 27, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, August 27th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

US envoy ‘in angry Karzai talks’ SOURCE: BBC News, Kabul Thursday, August 27, 2009 By IAN PANNELL

The US special envoy to Afghanistan has held an ―explosive‖ meeting with Afghan President Hamid Karzai over the country‘s election, the BBC has learnt.

Richard Holbrooke raised concerns about ballot-stuffing and fraud, by a number of candidates‘ teams, sources say.

The US envoy also said a second-round run-off could make the election process more credible, the sources said.

Concerns have already been raised about Afghanistan‘s election, although final results are not due until September.

A number of senior sources have confirmed the details of a meeting between Mr Holbrooke and Mr Karzai held on 21 August, one day after the election.

The meeting was described as ―explosive‖ and ―a dramatic bust-up‖.

Mr Holbrooke is said to have twice raised the idea of holding a second round run-off because of concerns about the voting process.

He is believed to have complained about the use of fraud and ballot stuffing by some members of the president‘s campaign team, as well as other candidates.

Mr Karzai reacted very angrily and the meeting ended shortly afterwards, the sources said.

However, a spokeswoman for the US embassy in Kabul denied there had been any shouting or that Mr Holbrooke had stormed out.

She refused to discuss the details of the meeting.

A spokesman for the presidential palace denied the account of the conversation.

There have been many doubts raised about the Afghan presidential election, about the turnout and irregularities.

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But this is the first time that a leading Western official has apparently expressed it quite so openly.

It will raise more questions about the credibility of the whole process and could well make the plan to establish a meaningful government in a stable country all the harder to achieve.

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TALIBAN AND THE BOGEY OF TERRORISM (AUGUST 29, 2009)

Written by admin on Saturday, August 29th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Taliban and the bogey of terrorism SOURCE: The News International Saturday, August 29, 2009 By CHARLES FERNDALE

On Newsnight (Aug 20) while being interviewed by Gaven Esler, the US general incharge of the Afghan war, David Petraeus, said that the war was ―not a war of choice‖. He was echoing President Obama, Gordon Brown, British military officials and others. We in Britain are told constantly that NATO forces have to be there to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a training ground for terrorist attacks on our own soil. The implication is that we are killing Afghans (in their tens of thousands) to stop Britons at home from being killed (in their tens, or, at worst, in their hundreds). The claim that we are in Afghanistan to keep terrorists off our streets is false; our presence there increases the threat of terrorism here. But its falsity is not news; no thoughtful person believes that the NATO forces are there for that reason. But what no one in the NATO countries asks publically is the question they should ask: even if the claim that we are in Afghanistan to prevent terrorism on our soil were true, would such a policy be justifiable on any coherent moral grounds? Is it right to kill thousands of people in their own homes to stave off a threat to just a fraction of that number in our own homes? Even if it worked, would it be a morally justifiable policy? We the British don‘t ask this question, but I am quite sure Afghans do.

Afghanistan has not been an important planning area for any attacks on western countries and the Taliban have shown no inclination to conduct war against NATO countries outside Afghanistan (so far, but we seem to be doing our best to change their practices). They are freedom-fighters who want us out of their country. Would we be killing them if there were no oil and gas around the Caspian sea?

General Petraeus said that the attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001 were planned in Afghanistan. This remark is disingenuous. Osama bin Laden may have been in Afghanistan at the time of the attacks, but had he been in Washington, New York, London, Paris or Hamburg, his whereabouts would have made no difference to the outcome. The perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks resided in Germany, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and were trained (in part) in flying schools set up (some allege, for this very purpose) by the CIA in Florida, US.

Gordon Brown said two days ago that 75 per cent of the terrorist attacks planned against Britain so far have been planned in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Another dishonest statement. Mr Brown has no idea what terrorist attacks on Britain have been planned so he cannot know what percentage were planned in Afghanistan or Pakistan. The most he can ever claim to know is what percent of the terrorist attacks planned, and known to our intelligence services, originated from one of those two countries. How many such plans does he know about? Is it

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75 per cent of one, two, three, or four plans? How many were there? We are not told and we don‘t ask. Why are our journalists so lazy as to allow these fraudulent justifications for the war in Afghanistan to go unchallenged?

And what about the convenient disjunction in the claims of our officials — that the terrorist plots were planned in Afghanistan or in Pakistan? Well, which country was it? Does Brown think we don‘t care? If none were planned in Afghanistan, then what relevance have those plans to our presence there? For the existence of any such plans to afford us grounds for killing thousands of Afghans in their own country, it would have to be shown (minimally) that such plots could never be hatched elsewhere. Clearly that cannot be shown. So, even if such plans might have exited, or might occur in future, their existence, or possible existence, offer no grounds for our belligerent presence in Afghanistan; any more than their known past occurrence in Britain, France, Germany, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and America would justify the mass killing of the nationals of those countries by anyone‘s armed forces. Would the Taliban be justified in bombing London just because our politicians are aggressive, dishonest, opportunists?

Over the last few days, two honest British journalists have at last mentioned that during the eight years of our presence in Afghanistan, there has been no improvement whatever in the appalling conditions under which most Afghans live. Perhaps that was news to them, but it is not news to any Afghan, nor to anyone who knows the region well. Despite the billions of dollars that have poured into Afghanistan since 2001 (which has promptly poured straight out again), no help has been given to the poor there. Actually the condition of the poor has got much worse since 2001, which is why, contrary to yet more dishonest statements by our officials, a great many Afghans support the Taliban. The only reliable experience Afghans have had of most NATO powers is that they break their promises (under Mullah Omar, the Taliban did not break their promises). So why should the NATO powers ever be trusted? And the plight of poor Afghan women (outside of the privileged families located mainly in Kabul) has also got worse since the Taliban were overthrown (hard as this may be for us liberals to believe). But did we not invade to liberate them? John Simpson, two days ago, was honest enough to say that had the money spent on the Afghan war been spent on the poor, there would be no war there. At last we see a glimmer of truth in the self-serving, meticulously disseminated, ‗fog‘ of war. The fog exists in Europe and America, not in Afghanistan. The Afghans have a perfectly clear, close-up, view of what we are up to: and what they see is not pretty. They must think foreigners are all fools or liars.

When challenged on the failure of the NATO powers to do anything to help ordinary Afghans, the usual response from officials in the NATO countries is that the Taliban always prevent developmental projects from being implemented. They call it ‗the security situation‘. But the claim is another lie. There are huge areas of Afghanistan suffering the agonies, deformities, diseases and deaths caused by poverty, but those areas are untroubled by the Taliban. Nevertheless, they have not seen a dime since 2001. These areas are free from the troublesome Taliban, so anyone could visit them safely and confirm the truth of what I have just said, and so prove that what British and American officials are saying is false; but few do.

Western officials talk little of the fact that when the Taliban were in power from 1996 to 2001 opium production in Helmand was eliminated completely. Newspapers allege, repeatedly, that the Taliban are financing themselves with sales of heroin. The western media‘s favourite estimate of the profit made by the Taliban from heroin sales is $100 million a year. First question: how do they know? Second question: which Taliban make this money? The so-

218 called Taliban no longer have a unified command (we saw to that). There are at least fourteen different groups being called ‗Taliban‘. Is the dope trade run like a welfare state, with fair shares for all? NATO officials are probably the source of most claims about the drug trade in Afghanistan. Can they be trusted? I don‘t think so. Simultaneously with claims that the drug trade is run by the ‗Taliban‘, we are told that it is run by Karzai‘s ‗war lords‘. But Karzai is America‘s man. So could it be that the drug trade is financing America‘s men (as it did during the Vietnam war and during the illegal, American-run, Contra war against the elected Sandanista government of Nicaragua)? In any case, can these commentators have it both ways? Is the drug trade financing both sides? Maybe, maybe not. None of these obvious and reasonable questions is ever asked in public in Britain. Why not? Is the British public content to be told highly improbable stories?

Oh, how tiresome it is to be misinformed routinely by the country‘s supposed leaders and by lazy journalists. And what hope is there for countries in which the electorate tolerate, as their leaders, people who only ever seem to lie.

The writer has degrees from the Royal College of Art, Oxford University, and the Institute of Psychiatry, University of London. He divides his time between the UK and Pakistan. Email: charlesferndale@ yahoo.co.uk

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PAKISTAN - FROM A TROIKA TO A QUARTET (AUGUST 29, 2009)

Written by admin on Saturday, August 29th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

From a Troika to a Quartet SOURCE: The News International Saturday, August 29, 2009 By SHAHEEN SEHBAI

WASHINGTON: Pakistan has entered into a make-or-break, decisive phase for the political system and the next few weeks have become so critical that any slip by any of the main institutional players could cause a major catastrophe and land the country into deep trouble.

The three pillars of the so-called troika, namely the president, the prime minister and the Army chief, have now been joined by another major pillar, the chief justice of the Supreme Court and the troika is practically now a quartet.

Each of these four players appear to have their hands full with matters they have to dispose of and some of these issues impact directly on the other two or three members of the quartet, a matter of life or death for some.

Behind the scene matters appear to be moving in such mysterious ways and at such a dangerous pace that no political or official spokesperson has been able to explain why and how of the developments. No one knows what was the urgent need for diverting the presidential aircraft to Islamabad while flying from China to the UK just days ago and why President Asif Zardari stayed on the tarmac at Chaklala to meet the prime minister and the Army chief and then immediately took off for Dubai and London. These happenings are not normal by any given standard.

What the next few weeks hold in store for the country can be put simply in this brief form:

* The president has to decide, and decide quickly, whether he is going to give up his powers under the 17th Amendment, which has become a basic factor of the continuing political instability in the country. This lack of stability has not only damaged the prospects and potential of a democratic set up but has given rise to unnecessary and frivolous controversies over dead and buried issues. Politicians squabbling and fighting like kids on non-issues do not inspire confidence or raise hopes while the teeming millions get crushed by ever-increasing burden of day to day survival.

* The president has to decide whether he would continue with his style of running the system like the US/French model with presidential cronies surrounding him or will he allow a set-up that has built-in systems of checks and balances and keeps every institution within its prescribed constitutional limits.

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* The prime minister has to make up his mind whether he wants to say all the right things at all the right forums but is unable to deliver and lose credibility with each statement he makes. His pathetic plight is so pitiable that the nation starts cheering him up if he sacks a petty corporate official.

* The limits of patience which opposition political parties have shown towards the PM are about to end if Gilani keeps waiting forever for real power to fall automatically in his lap. That may not happen any time soon.

* The Army Chief has his own compulsions as he has his real wars and battles to fight on hot military fronts but he must be the most disturbed person looking at the political landscape from his Pindi seat of power. He must be feeling desperate because the political stability that he needed to fight these wars, without caving in totally to outrageous demands of the foreign powers involved, is not being provided by the politicians.

* The Army chief would also be worried because his own retirement is just about a year from now and it would be giving him sleepless nights when wondering whether he would leave the national scene in the hands of the current players with their incompetence. His options to bring about improvements are limited but he has shown the willingness to intervene, when pushed really against the wall and the nation saw two such almost positive interventions in recent months, once on the night of March 15-16 when the chief justice was restored and another when the July 31 judgment of the Supreme Court was about to be announced.

* The latest member of the quartet, the Chief Justice of Pakistan, has the most crucial decisions to make as cases involving all the other members of the previous troika come before him for judgment. His words and decisions may bring down the entire system, if not carried out in a proper, well rehearsed and balanced way. But as one top lawyer recently in Washington put it, the restored judiciary has to prove that the people were not wrong in fighting for their cause so they will take all the decisions that need to be taken, without fear or favour.

* The chief justice also has to do a balancing act when matters pertaining to the conduct of the Army generals and the politicians come before it. Thus a hasty decision against Musharraf or a sweeping reversal of NRO related benefits could further increase tensions and the instability that may deepen may cause a collapse of the system. Yet the CJ has to act within the next few weeks.

With these critical matters in the air, what options do the four players of the quartet have. The most frightening scenario is that either of these four pillars may take some precipitate action in panic which may cause a domino effect.

For instance, it has been in the air for some time that the presidency was keeping its fingers very close to the panic buttons. All the loud talk of Minus-1 formulas and NRO bashing may have triggered this panic and President Zardari‘s sudden, unexplained dashes abroad have not helped create the sense of confidence and calm that should otherwise be the hallmark of an elected and popular president.

There have also been whispers that President Zardari would not give in to political or physical threats and would fight all the way, even if that created an October 12, 1999-like situation. It would be better if nothing more is said about these options.

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In Pindi, there is a general agreement that no one would like to see the system collapse but some corrections are due and should be quickly made. These include the end of the crony control and taking away a few unelected and unpopular associates of the president may satisfy Pindi.

The PM side may be happy if President Zardari moved fast on the 17th Amendment but any impression or attempt of stalling things and gaining time may backfire, again causing someone to push the panic button. The political parties sitting on the fence including Mian Nawaz Sharif may also find their patience exhausted if things linger on indefinitely. The smear campaign launched recently resurrecting the Midnight Jackals can adversely hit the system. But the Supreme Court holds most of the cards and in the new power equation with four instead of three troika players, there could be a tie with two sides aligned against each other.

The bottom line is that the courts enjoy the support of the people, at least until now, and Pindi holds the real physical power so in any such eventuality, the losers may be the two big houses on the hill in Islamabad. But the country may be the biggest loser if all the players do not realise their grave responsibilities and act sensibly, and now.

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US COMMANDER CALLS FOR FRESH STRATEGY (SEPTEMBER 1, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, September 1st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

US commander in Afghanistan calls for fresh strategy to deal with Taliban SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Tuesday, September 1, 2009 (ANI)

Kabul/Washington, Sep.1 : The commander of American forces in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, has called for a revised military strategy, suggesting the current one is failing. In a strategic assessment, General McChrystal said while the Afghan situation was serious, success was still achievable. The report has not yet been published, but sources say General McChrystal sees protecting the Afghan people against the Taliban as an issue of top priority.

According to the BBC, the report does not carry a direct call for increasing troop numbers, but says the situation in Afghanistan is serious. Copies of the document have been sent to NATO Secretary General and US Defence Secretary Robert Gates. Gates has said that he is yet to see the report he expected it to show that there were ―challenges that remain before us… and areas where we can do better‖ in Afghanistan.

The report came as further results from last week‘s presidential election were released, with ballots now counted from almost 48 percent of polling stations. President Hamid Karzai is leading so far, with 45.8 percent of the votes counted and key rival and former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah retaining over 33 percent of the vote.

Gen McChrystal‘s blunt assessment will say that the Afghan people are undergoing a crisis of confidence because the war against the Taliban has not made their lives better. The general says the aim should be for Afghan forces to take the lead. He will also warn that villages have to be taken from the Taliban and held, not merely taken. General McChrystal also wants more engagement with the Taliban fighters and believes that 60 percent of the problem would go away if they could be found jobs.

The latest Washington Post-ABC news poll suggests that only 49 percent of Americans now think the fight in Afghanistan is worth it. The Obama administration is presently projecting that the problem in Afghanistan is the creation of the previous George W. Bush administration and blames it for fighting the wrong war (Iraq) rather than concentrating its efforts on Afghanistan.

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$600 FOR A KALASHNIKOV - A SIGN OF BLOODSHED TO COME (SEPTEMBER 3, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, September 3rd, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

$600 for a Kalashnikov - a sign of bloodshed to come in Afghanistan SOURCE: Tehran Times Thursday, September 3, 2009 By KIM SENGUPTA

KABUL (The Independent) — The price of Kalashnikovs has doubled in Afghanistan. For a country awash with arms, the fact that the weapons are now fetching $600 apiece is a cause of some surprise, but a surge of demand is to blame for the increase, with a steady stream of weapons said to be heading for the north.

This is the Tajik constituency of Abdullah Abdullah, the presidential candidate who claims the election is being stolen by the incumbent Western-backed President, Hamid Karzai.

The arms shipments are a source of alarm in a country where political stand-offs have often been settled at the point of a gun. Few Western diplomats claim there is an immediate danger of civil war but tensions are mounting after polls which have been mired in bitterness and recrimination.

In the next few days, Mr. Karzai is expected to pass the 50 per cent of the votes he needs to avoid a second round of polling and to retain the presidency.

The demographic factors all point towards this. Mr. Karzai has 46 per cent of the votes, counted predominantly from the north and west which should be the stronghold of Dr Abdullah, the former foreign minister who trails with 33 per cent.

The ballots yet to be tallied will be from the Pashtun south and east, in which the President is the overwhelming favorite to win.

Mr. Karzai‘s opponents are putting their faith in more than 2,500 complaints of voting irregularities - 691 of them described as serious charges - that the complaints commission has received. Most of them emanate from the south - The Independent witnessed what appeared to be flagrant fraud at Nad-e-Ali in Helmand, with ballot stuffing on behalf of the President.

Investigators say many of the complaints will be difficult to prove and even if officials are found guilty of malpractice, the penalty would be fines and disbarment from taking part in future elections rather than the wholesale discounting of votes.

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Analysts point out that even if the commission decided that votes from some polling stations in the Pashtun belt were invalid, Mr. Karzai would be the overwhelming beneficiary of the ones still considered valid.

Western powers, whose soldiers are fighting and dying in Afghanistan, supposedly so democracy takes root, are embarrassed by the apparent fraud.

The Obama administration, which has taken a noticeably harder stance against Mr. Karzai than the Bush White House, is said to prefer a second-round run-off between Mr. Karzai and Dr Abdullah to at least maintain the appearance of probity. During Mr. Karzai‘s tempestuous 19-minute meeting last week with Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the American diplomat is said to have stated: ―Too many votes have been stolen by your side, there has to be a second round‖ prompting Mr. Karzai to storm out. Mr. Holbrooke‘s officials maintain that the talks were amicable.

Yet, according to some analysts, a second round would be seen as having been engineered by the Americans and would lead to deep Pashtun resentment. ―The Americans are fighting in the south, killing Pashtuns, they are pressing for a second round to prevent a Pashtun, Hamid Karzai, from being President as long as possible. This may be simplistic but it is how a lot of Pashtuns will look at this,‖ said one analyst, Waheed Mujhda.

―It will look like interference by the West, especially by the Americans. It will not be good for the country.‖

Fellow analyst Zalmai Afzhali said: ―Some people in America have their views about Mr. Karzai. But he is an Afghan and the fact is that we are having these elections which have mainly gone off peacefully, with him in charge.‖

One reason that Mr. Karzai appears to have done well in the north is because of block votes secured for him by allies Mohammed Fahim and Abdul Rashid Dostum, ex-warlords and power-brokers in the region.

But Mr. Mujhda said that consensus may fall apart if there was a second round. ―Then the voting would be Pashtun versus Tajik, south versus north, and there is definitely a fear that this may spread into violence.‖

In the Panjshir Valley, the heartland of the Northern Alliance where Dr Abdullah fought beside Ahmed Shah Masoud, the legendary commander murdered by al-Qa‘ida at the behest of the Taliban, a former Mujaheddin fighter said the Tajiks would not tolerate being deprived by a fraudulent poll.

At his home, as he unwrapped an oiled cloth to show off a Kalashnikov and a Glock pistol, the former Mujahedeen commander Gul Shah Mohammed declared: ―We know how to use these weapons, we haven‘t forgotten how to fight.‖

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ADVISERS TO OBAMA DIVIDED ON SIZE OF AFGHAN FORCE (SEPTEMBER 3, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, September 3rd, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Advisers to Obama Divided on Size of Afghan Force SOURCE: The New York Times Thursday, September 3, 2009 By PETER BAKER and ELISABETH BUMILLER

WASHINGTON - The military‘s anticipated request for more troops to combat the insurgency in Afghanistan has divided senior advisers to President Obama as they try to determine the proper size and mission of the American effort there, officials said Thursday.

Even before the top commander in Afghanistan submits his proposal for additional forces, administration officials have begun what one called a ―healthy debate‖ about what the priorities should be and whether more American soldiers and Marines would help achieve them.

Leading those with doubts is Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr., who has expressed deep reservations about an expanded presence in Afghanistan on the grounds that it may distract from what he considers the more urgent goal of stabilizing Pakistan, officials said. Among those on the other side are Richard C. Holbrooke, the special representative to the region, who shares the concern about Pakistan but sees more troops as vital to protecting Afghan civilians and undermining the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has been vocal in favor of more troops, and while some officials said she had not shown her hand during the current deliberations, they expected her to be an advocate for a more robust force.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has voiced concern that putting so many troops in Afghanistan would make the United States look like an occupier, but during a news conference on Thursday he sounded more supportive of the prospect.

―There is a unanimity of opinion about what our objective is, and the objective is to disable and destroy Al Qaeda and remove that threat to our national security,‖ said David Axelrod, the president‘s senior adviser. ―Obviously, there are a variety of opinions about how best to achieve that objective, and it‘s valuable and important to hear those views.‖

The emerging debate follows the delivery Monday of a new strategic assessment by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, who took over all American and NATO forces in Afghanistan in June. Mr. Gates has now forwarded the general‘s report of about 25 pages to Mr. Obama.

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Although General McChrystal included no specific force proposals in his review, officials expect him to send a separate request in the coming weeks. Military strategists, including one who has advised General McChrystal, said he might offer three options. The smallest proposed reinforcement, from 10,000 to 15,000 troops, would be described as the high-risk option. A medium-risk option would involve sending about 25,000 more troops, and a low- risk option would call for sending about 45,000 troops.

Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary, cautioned that talk about troop levels was speculation. ―Anyone who tells you that they know how many troops the commander is going to ask for and the options he may or may not present doesn‘t know what he‘s talking about, because that has not been determined yet,‖ Mr. Morrell said. He said that Mr. Gates had not made up his mind about what he would recommend to the president.

Mr. Gates could be the key adviser on this decision, and some military analysts predicted that he might recommend what Pentagon officials call the ―Goldilocks option‖ - the medium-risk one in the middle. Because he was first appointed by President George W. Bush, Mr. Gates could provide political cover for Mr. Obama should the president reject the biggest possible buildup.

Mr. Gates has long been worried that a large number of American forces would alienate the Afghan population. But at a news conference with Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Gates said Thursday that his concerns about the American ―footprint‖ had been mitigated by General McChrystal, who has indicated that the size of the force is less important than what it does.

―Where foreign forces have had a large footprint and failed, in no small part it has been because the Afghans concluded they were there for their own imperial interests and not there for the interests of the Afghan people,‖ Mr. Gates said. But he said that General McChrystal‘s emphasis on reducing civilian casualties and interacting more with Afghans ―has given us a greater margin of error in that respect.‖

Mr. Obama has already ordered 21,000 additional troops to Afghanistan this year for a total American force of 68,000, on top of 40,000 NATO troops. Mrs. Clinton and Mr. Holbrooke pushed for those reinforcements, while Mr. Biden resisted. ―It is true that Hillary was very forceful; I had some disagreement in degree with her,‖ Mr. Biden later told USA Today. ―The president ended up landing on a spot that was where she was.‖

Mr. Biden has argued that a sizable increase in resources for Afghanistan invariably means less for Pakistan, a concern born out of his frustration as a senator during the Bush administration pushing for more aid to Islamabad. In some ways, he has told colleagues, Pakistan is more important than Afghanistan because extremism is on the rise there, Al Qaeda has operating room and the government of Pakistan, a nuclear-armed nation, remains vulnerable.

Other American officials said they worried that General McChrystal simply did not have enough forces to turn around Afghanistan. Mr. Holbrooke just returned from Afghanistan, where he heard from military officers who said they needed more help to execute General McChrystal‘s strategy of protecting the population from the Taliban, rather than just hunting militants.

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As the president‘s senior uniformed adviser, Admiral Mullen has said he worries about the impact of a buildup on the nation‘s already stretched armed forces. In July, Mr. Gates announced a temporary increase of 22,000 troops in the size of the Army.

Mediating the debate will be Gen. James L. Jones, the national security adviser. ―My job is to make sure the process works the way the president wants and everybody is at the table,‖ he said. ―I try to be open-minded and not prejudice anything.‖

He said he would ensure that dissidents got to voice their views to Mr. Obama. ―He encourages vigorous debate,‖ General Jones said. ―The thing not to do in a meeting with the president is to sit on your hands and hope you don‘t get called on, because that‘s a guarantee that you‘re going to get called on.‖

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ANALYSIS - DEEPENING CRISIS IN AFGHANISTAN (SEPTEMBER 4, 2009)

Written by admin on Friday, September 4th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

ANALYSIS: Deepening Crisis in Afghanistan SOURCE: Daily Times Friday, September 04, 2009 By NAJMUDDIN A SHAIKH

The fact that Abdullah Abdullah got an endorsement from an important tribe of a Kandahar district was a singular exception to the rule that votes are cast in Afghanistan on tribal and ethnic lines

In my column last week, I had expressed the fear that the allegations of election fraud would further divide Afghanistan rather than give added legitimacy to a re-elected President Karzai. Developments over the last week have only strengthened the basis for this apprehension.

Abdullah Abdullah has been able to bring to Kabul a group of leaders from the Bariz tribe from the Shorabak District of Kandahar province to make the allegation that even while not a polling station opened in the district and not a single vote was cast, the ballot boxes had been stuffed by officials working under the direction of the president‘s brother Ahmad Wali Karzai. The results communicated to the Election Commission showed that 23,900 votes had been cast in the district in favour of Karzai with not one vote going to his opponent Abdullah Abdullah, who ten days earlier had received an endorsement from the Bariz tribe - the principal inhabitants of Shorabak District.

These claims may be an exaggeration. Even Karzai‘s brother must have known that such results could only be regarded as fraudulent but the large grain of truth that the allegation undoubtedly contains gives a fair indication of how Karzai‘s supporters and officials have sought to ―make assurance double sure‖.

This has also made largely irrelevant the complaints that the Karzai campaign has made about vote rigging and ballot stuffing in Panjshir and other northern districts by Abdullah supporters even thought there is no doubt that this too has happened albeit in a smaller area and with far less effectiveness. The charges against Abdullah are important, however, because they show that Marshal Qasim Fahim, Karzai‘s vice-presidential candidate was not able to prevent vote rigging in favour of Abdullah despite his theoretical clout in the Panjshir Valley and other northern districts.

The number of complaints registered has risen from the 650 I talked of last week to more than 2,650, and in place of the 50 that were considered serious enough to affect the election outcome, there are now 650 that are seen in this light. The election commission has now said that it will entertain no more such complaints.

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The declaration of results from partial vote counts has also been delayed. The last result, with 60 percent of the vote counted on Tuesday evening put Karzai comfortably ahead with 47.3% to 32.6% for his opponent. It seems however that the election commission will not be in a position to announce the final results by September 17 as originally envisaged because this would require the investigation at the very least of the 650 serious complaints. Even the completion of the vote count by September 7 appears to be in doubt.

Most importantly, Abdullah Abdullah and other contenders have emphatically rejected suggestions that they join a Karzai-led government; something I felt the Americans would work towards. At the same time, while Abdullah Abdullah has said that he will pursue all legal means to contest the alleged fraud; his supporters in Mazar-e-Sharif - hitherto regarded as a Dostum stronghold - have threatened mass demonstrations. This, as also Gen Dostum‘s departure from Afghanistan immediately after the conclusion of the elections rather than waiting for the results, showed perhaps that Dostum‘s hold on the Uzbek vote has weakened and that Mazar-e-Sharif and Shibergan were no longer areas where he could dictate election outcomes.

The reports of Richard Holbrooke having had a stormy meeting with Karzai have been denied but one thing is clear. Holbrooke did suggest that a runoff between the two principal contenders - required under Afghan law if no candidate emerged with a clear majority - would possibly help quell the concerns about vote rigging etc.

Talking to the press before the meeting of the Afghan envoys in Paris, Holbrooke again said that the United States would have no problem with a runoff election. Is this what is likely to happen? The Afghan Independent Election Commission‘s map shows that while the vote count in the North and the West has been between 60% to 90% the vote count from much of the Pashtun dominated South and East of the country is less than 46%. One can assume that unless the Commission starts a massive rejection of votes from this area, Karzai will easily get the 50% + 1 that he needs for a first round victory.

The question then will become whether the examination of the complaints becomes the basis for calling for a runoff, and if so, what will be the consequences.

The difficulty of holding another election will be formidable. The very fact that a runoff is taking place would boost the standing of the Taliban. In a largely oral society, anecdotes of the horrific punishments meted out by those who had dared to vote will ensure that voter turnout is much lower than the 30% reported this time. Most of these votes would be cast in areas that are non-Pashtun and the election would then become unrepresentative. Can this problem be overcome, and if it is, what will happen?

In the August 20 election, Abdullah‘s seeking of votes may have been helped by the disillusionment of the people with the corruption and ineptitude of the Karzai administration and hatred for the occupying forces, but the Pashtun had the choice of rejecting Karzai by voting for a host of other Pashtun contenders - most prominently Ashraf Ghani, whose performance has been surprisingly abysmal. The fact that Abdullah Abdullah had a Pashtun father could not detract from the perception that he was the nominee of the Tajiks and an Iran- financed remnant of the Northern Alliance.

The fact that Abdullah Abdullah got an endorsement from an important tribe of a Kandahar district was a singular exception to the rule that votes are cast in Afghanistan on tribal and

230 ethnic lines. It would not be surprising if reports now emerged of large sums of money having been expended by Abdullah Abdullah or his patrons to secure this endorsement

On the other side, Karzai was not totally rejected in the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara areas, only because of his allies - Fahim, Dostum and Khalil - and because of the fairly substantial Pashtun pockets in the North. These allies may still stand with him in a runoff and in that case he is likely to get the majority of votes. As regards the Pashtun vote, to paraphrase an old American foreign policy dictum, the Pashtuns are likely to take the view that ―he is a corrupt and inept SOB but at least he is our SOB‖.

The elephant in the room however is going to be the problem of ensuring turnout in the Taliban areas, which have grown substantially and where the recent operations such as Operation Panther Claw have not been able to reduce the ability of the Taliban to intimidate and coerce the population.

For the Americans and their NATO allies, the election fiasco has come at a particularly difficult time; more on this in my next column. Despite the developments of the last week, strong misgivings about Karzai, about his reduced legitimacy, about the international ridicule this would invite, and most importantly the prospect of instability, the Americans will opt for using their influence to persuade Abdullah and others to accept the result of what was clearly a very flawed election. This would an imperative to maintain even the dwindling support that President Obama has for what he calls a ―war of necessity‖.

The writer is a former foreign secretary

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FAKE AFGHAN POLL SITES FAVORED KARZAI, OFFICIALS ASSERT (SEPTEMBER 6, 2009)

Written by admin on Sunday, September 6th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Fake Afghan Poll Sites Favored Karzai, Officials Assert SOURCE: The New York Times Sunday, September 6, 2009 By CARLOTTA GALL and DEXTER FILKINS

KABUL, Afghanistan - Afghans loyal to President Hamid Karzai set up hundreds of fictitious polling sites where no one voted but where hundreds of thousands of ballots were still recorded toward the president‘s re-election, according to senior Western and Afghan officials here.

The fake sites, as many as 800, existed only on paper, said a senior Western diplomat in Afghanistan, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the political delicacy of the vote. Local workers reported that hundreds, and in some cases thousands, of votes for Mr. Karzai in the election last month came from each of those places. That pattern was confirmed by another Western official based in Afghanistan.

―We think that about 15 percent of the polling sites never opened on Election Day,‖ the senior Western diplomat said. ―But they still managed to report thousands of ballots for Karzai.‖

Besides creating the fake sites, Mr. Karzai‘s supporters also took over approximately 800 legitimate polling centers and used them to fraudulently report tens of thousands of additional ballots for Mr. Karzai, the officials said.

The result, the officials said, is that in some provinces, the pro-Karzai ballots may exceed the people who actually voted by a factor of 10. ―We are talking about orders of magnitude,‖ the senior Western diplomat said.

The widening accounts of fraud pose a stark problem for the Obama administration, which has 68,000 American troops deployed here to help reverse gains by Taliban insurgents. American officials hoped that the election would help turn Afghans away from the Taliban by giving them a greater voice in government. Instead, the Obama administration now faces the prospect of having to defend an Afghan administration for the next five years that is widely seen as illegitimate.

―This was fraud en masse,‖ the Western diplomat said.

Most of the fraud perpetrated on behalf of Mr. Karzai, officials said, took place in the Pashtun-dominated areas of the east and south where officials said that turnout on Aug. 20

232 was exceptionally low. That included Mr. Karzai‘s home province, Kandahar, where preliminary results indicate that more than 350,000 ballots have been turned in to be counted. But Western officials estimated that only about 25,000 people actually voted there.

Waheed Omar, the main spokesman for Mr. Karzai‘s campaign, acknowledged Sunday that there had been cases of fraud committed by different candidates. But he accused the president‘s opponents of trying to score political points by making splashy accusations in the news media. ―There have been cases - we have reported numerous cases - and our view is the only place where discussion can be held is in the Election Complaints Commission,‖ he said.

American officials have mostly kept a public silence about the fraud allegations. A senior American official said Sunday that they were looking into the allegations behind the scenes. ―An absence of public statements does not mean an absence of concern and engagement on these issues,‖ the official said.

But a different Western official in Kabul said that there were divisions among the international community and Afghan political circles over how to proceed. This official said he believed the next four or five days would decide whether the entire electoral process would stand or fall. ―This is crunch time,‖ he said.

Adding to the drumbeat, on Sunday the deputy director of the Afghan Independent Election Commission said that the group was disqualifying all the ballots cast in 447 polling sites because of fraud. The deputy director, Daoud Ali Najafi, said it was not clear how many votes had been affected, or what percentage they represented of the total. He gave no details of what fraud had been discovered.

With about three-quarters of the ballots counted in the Aug. 20 election, Mr. Karzai leads with nearly 49 percent of the vote, compared with 32 percent for his main challenger, Abdullah Abdullah. If no candidate receives more than 50 percent, the election goes to a runoff.

Officials in Kabul say it will probably take months before the Election Complaints Commission, which is dominated by Westerners appointed by the United Nations, will be able to declare a winner. Such an interregnum with no clear leader in office could prove destabilizing for a country that is already beset by ethnic division and an increasingly violent insurgency.

One opposition candidate for president, Ashraf Ghani, the former finance minister, said that the scale of the fraud on Election Day had deeply damaged the political process that was being slowly built in Afghanistan.

―For five years Mr. Karzai was my president,‖ he said in an interview at his home in Kabul. ―Now how many Afghans will consider him their president?‖

Since ballots were cast last month, anecdotal evidence has emerged of widespread fraud across the Pashtun-dominated areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan, where Mr. Karzai has many allies. Many of the allegations come from Kandahar Province, where Mr. Karzai‘s younger brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, is the chairman of the provincial council and widely regarded as the most powerful man in the region. Last week, the governor of Shorabak District, which lies in Kandahar Province, claimed that Hamid Karzai‘s allies shut down all the polling centers in the area and falsified 23,900 ballots for Mr. Karzai.

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Two provincial council candidates in Kandahar, both close to the government, confirmed that widespread pro-Karzai fraud had occurred, in particular in places where poor security prevented observers and candidates‘ representatives from watching.

―Now people will not trust the provincial council and the government system,‖ said Muhammad Ehsan, the deputy head of the provincial council, who was running for re- election. ―Now people understand who has come to power and how.‖

Hajji Abdul Majid, 75, the chief of the tribal elders council in Argestan District, in Kandahar Province, said that despite the fact that security forces opened the town‘s polling place, no one voted, so any result from his district would be false.

―The people know that the government just took control of the district center for that day of the elections,‖ he said. ―People are very frustrated. They don‘t believe in the government.‖

He added: ―If Karzai is re-elected, people will leave the country or join the Taliban.‖

More evidence of fraud has emerged in the past few days. In Zangabad, about 20 miles west of Kandahar, local residents say no voting took place on Aug. 20. The village‘s single polling site, the Sulaiman Mako School, is used by Taliban guerrillas as their headquarters, the residents said. The area around Zangabad is one of the most contested in Afghanistan. Despite the nonexistent turnout, Afghan election records show that nearly 2,000 ballots were collected from the Sulaiman Mako School and sent to Kabul to be counted by election officials.

The allegations in Zangabad are being echoed throughout the Panjwai District. Official Afghan election records show that 16 polling centers were supposed to be open on Election Day. But according to at least one local leader, only a fraction of that number actually existed.

Haji Agha Lalai is a senior member of the provincial council in Kandahar, where Panjwai is located. As a candidate for re-election, he sent election observers across the area, including to Panjwai. In an interview, Mr. Lalai said that only ―five or six‖ polling centers were open in Panjwai District that day - far fewer than the 16 claimed by the Afghan government.

So far, the Independent Election Commission has released results from seven of Panjwai District‘s polling centers. The tally so far: 5,213 votes for Mr. Karzai, 328 for Mr. Abdullah.

Dexter Filkins reported from Kabul and Istanbul, and Carlotta Gall from Kandahar and Kabul.

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AFGHAN TALIBAN DECLINE SWAT MILITANTS‟ REQUEST FOR HELP (SEPTEMBER 7, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, September 7th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Afghan Taliban decline Swat militants’ request for help SOURCE: The News International Monday, September 7, 2009 By RAHIMULLAH YUSUFZAI

PESHAWAR: Afghan Taliban declined a request for help from the militants in Swat by reminding them of their policy of non-interference in Pakistan‘s affairs.

Sources among the Afghan Taliban told The News that the Swat Taliban had approached them recently and sought help in their battle against Pakistan‘s security forces. The sources didn‘t provide details as to how and where the Afghan Taliban were approached. It wasn‘t possible to seek comment from the Swat Taliban about the issue as all their commanders and spokesman Muslim Khan have gone into hiding to avoid capture.

A senior Afghan Taliban official, requesting anonymity, contacted The News from an undisclosed location to confirm that they were approached by the Swati militants for help in their fight against Pakistan‘s armed forces. ―We told them that the Afghan Taliban have a standard policy not to interfere in Pakistan‘s affairs. We reiterated our policy and requested the Swat Taliban not to involve us in Pakistan‘s internal matters,‖ he explained.

It may be added that the Afghan Taliban have often been linked to the Pakistani Taliban. There have been credible reports that Taliban leader Mulla Muhammad Omar has been sending emissaries to mediate between warring Pakistani Taliban leaders and request them not to fight with each other. Every Pakistani Taliban commander ranging from the late Nek Muhammad to Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed in a US drone attack in South Waziristan on August 5, and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Maulvi Nazeer, Maulana Faqir Muhammad to Hakimullah Mehsud has pledged allegiance to Mulla Omar and often referred to him as their Amirul Momineen, or Commander of the Faithful.

Sirajuddin Haqqani, an important Afghan Taliban commander operating in Khost, Paktia, Paktika and Kabul provinces, has often mediated between the rival Pakistani Taliban factions on behalf of Mulla Omar. He and other Afghan Taliban officials have also played a role in arranging truce and peace talks between the Pakistani Taliban and the Pakistan government in some of the tribal areas.

However, there have been only a few instances of Afghan Taliban commanders becoming involved in the fighting between the Pakistani militants and security forces. One such commander was Saeedur Rahman in Charmang area in Bajaur Agency who fought the

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Pakistani security forces along side the local militants. The other Afghan Taliban commander, who became part of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), was Yahya Hijrat, who operated out of Jamrud in Khyber Agency and was blamed for most of the attacks on the Afghanistan- bound trucks carrying supplies for Nato forces. Hijrat was captured some months ago and was later found dead along with a few other militants near Peshawar in an incident that was described by government officials as an encounter with the police.

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POST-BAITULLAH TTP (SEPTEMBER 9, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, September 9th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Post-Baitullah TTP SOURCE: The News International Wednesday, September 9, 2009 By SALEEM SAFI

It would be too optimistic to believe that the killing of Baitullah Mehsud has smashed the TTP network. It is a fact that the TTP has been weakened in the past few weeks and months, however, there are some factors which need to be considered.

The major blow to the TTP was caused by the frequent drone attacks which have left many important officials of Al-Qaeda and TTP dead have restricted the mobility of the surviving Al-Qaeda and TTP officials. The drone attacks have also badly affected the communication network of the TTP.

Another major blow to the TTP is that the US and Afghan intelligence agencies have gained major successes in penetrating the TTP among the local tribes. The Swat and Bajaur operations conducted by the Army also proved fatal to the TTP. Meanwhile, the US and Afghan forces are gearing up to wage a final battle to eliminate Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This makes the Pakistani tribal areas as the most significant refuge for the Taliban.

Sensing this possibility, the US has put pressure on Pakistan to flush out militants from its tribal belt. The US is monitoring all the offensives launched by the Pakistani forces against the Taliban. The frequent visits of US special envoy Richard Holbrook to Pakistan and his reduced focus on Afghanistan are also reflective of this strategy.

Even if we repudiate the notion of the presence of US Marines on Pakistani soil, we could easily assess the increasing direct contacts of US officials with Pakistani media persons, civil society organisations, politicians, which are mainly meant to collect information and assess the situation on the ground in Pakistan.

The death of Baitullah, the top strategist of the TTP, has also hit the TTP from so many aspects. It was a reality that he had become a focal point between Al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the TTP and all banned militant and jihadi organisations exploiting his qualities.

Since taking over the TTP, Baitullah had established himself as a serious and farsighted leader due to which he was feared as a dangerous person locally and internationally. This was a distinction, and any other TTP leader will take years to gain such influence among TTP followers.

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The death of Baitullah is a huge loss to the TTP keeping in view these factors. However, it would be imprudent to think that his death will abolish thye TTP completely as despite all his capabilities, he was neither a founder nor an architect of the TTP or Talibanisation.

History reveals that there are either founders of some movement or there are some circumstantial leaders. Prior to Baitullah, the militants were led by Naik Mohammed and later Abdullah Mehsud succeeded him after his demise. Whether it was Naik Mohammed, Abdullah or Baitullah - all were shaped up by the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda. So even if Baitullah is no more, whoever is nominated by the Afghan Taliban will gradually get the stature of Baitullah sooner or later.

The militancy in the Pakistani tribal belt is produced by bickering between international forces operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially the Pakhtoon belt on both sides of the border. Talibanisation cannot be abolished from the region until these international powers stop their dirty game in the region.

Regardless of who is dead or alive, if these powers seriously agrees on elimination of insurgents, the militants would be no more visible in the entire area. However, if these states kept playing for implementing their respective agendas, no matter who is alive or dead, the insurgents will rule the region and the Death Game.

The writer works at Geo TV.

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US IN DELICATE SPOT OVER AFGHAN VOTE FRAUD CLAIMS: NYT (SEPTEMBER 9, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, September 9th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

US in delicate spot over Afghan vote fraud claims SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Wednesday, September 9, 2009 (ANI)

Washington, Sep.9 : Though Obama administration officials are reluctant to confirm that there has been wholesale fraud in the presidential elections in Afghanistan, they have recognised that with President Hamid Karzai getting a slim majority, that they will have to keep dealing with him for another five years.

While there are clearly numerous egregious instances of fraud or vote-rigging, these officials said, it would take further investigation to judge whether, as one put it, ―this whole thing is rotten, top to bottom.‖

According to the New York Times, their caution reflects the fact that while the initial vote- counting has reached its conclusion, the Electoral Complaints Commission, an Afghan and international panel that will certify the final count, is still in the early stages of an investigation that could take several weeks.

They know that raising too many doubts about Karzai‘s legitimacy could make it impossible to work with him later.

―Even if we get a second round of voting, the odds are still high that Karzai will win. We have a fundamental interest in building up the legitimacy of the Karzai government,‖ said Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who advised the administration on its Afghan policy.

European diplomats have also expressed a similar frustration that they were powerless to do much now except wait.

―There‘s a great perception out there that Karzai has stolen this,‖ one diplomat said.

―I‘m realistic enough to know that there‘s not much we can do about that right now,‖ he adds.

The American ambassador in Kabul, Karl W. Eikenberry, has briefed US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and has also delivered a blunt message to Karzai: ―Don‘t declare victory.‖

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The slim majority tentatively awarded to Karzai, has put the Obama administration in an awkward spot: trying to balance its professed determination to investigate mounting allegations of corruption and vote-rigging while not utterly alienating the man who seems likely to remain the country‘s leader for another five years.

―We realize that the allegations have reached such a level that we need to be very careful to allow the process to breathe,‖ said an administration official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

―The message was, Let‘s make sure that the electoral bodies do their work, and do it rigorously,‖ he added.

On Tuesday, the United Nations-backed commission that is the ultimate arbiter of the vote said it found ―clear and convincing evidence of fraud‖ at several polling stations and ordered a partial recount.

Election officials said Karzai won 54.1 percent of the vote, a percentage that, if certified, would spare him a runoff against his main challenger, Abdullah Abdullah, who received 28.3 percent. PAKISTAN ARRESTS TALIBAN SPOKESMAN IN SWAT (SEPTEMBER 11, 2009)

Written by admin on Friday, September 11th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Pakistan arrests Taliban spokesman in Swat SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Friday, September 11, 2009 (IANS)

A Taliban spokesman was arrested in the Swat Valley, where troops have spent five months fighting Islamist insurgents, Pakistan‘s military said Friday.

Army spokesman Major General Athar Abbas said Muslim Khan was captured with four colleagues, including key militant commander Mehmood Khan, during a security operation in the suburb of Mingora, the main town in Swat district.

Muslim Khan had a bounty of 10 million rupees ($122,000) on his head for involvement in terrorist activities. The same reward was offered by the government for information about Mehmood Khan.

‗The arrested terrorist leaders are under the interrogation of law enforcement agencies,‘ Abbas said in a press statement.

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‗The security forces are conducting operations on the information obtained from the arrested terrorist leaders,‘ he added. ‗Any further details to the media on the arrested leaders at this stage may jeopardize the operations of security forces, which are meeting remarkable success.‘

The Taliban claimed that all five militants, who were members of the Taliban shura, or advisory council, were lured to peace talks in Islamabad and were then arrested by security officials.

The News newspaper cited a Taliban deputy spokesman, identified only as Salman, as saying the peace talks were mediated through a person named Kamal Khan, who is a resident of Swat but settled in the US, as well as a major in Military Intelligence identified only as Abdullah.

The newspaper reported that after guarantees from the military authorities, the five-member Taliban delegation went to Islamabad to hold talks with the Pakistan Army a week ago.

According to Salman, the Taliban were in regular contact with the five militant leaders for the first five days but started to suspect three days ago that the negotiators had been arrested.

Abbas denied the Taliban claim that Muslim Khan and other rebel leaders were arrested during peace talks.

‗We have already declared that no talks will be held with any terrorist,‘ Abbas said. ‗If they want to surrender, they should lay down their arms and hand themselves to civil administration or law enforcement agencies.‘

The capture of Muslim Khan, who is a close aide of the Taliban chief in Swat, Maulana Fazlullah, is considered a major success in the government‘s offensive against militants in Swat. However, Fazlullah remains at large.

The government said its troops have killed nearly 2,000 rebels and regained control over much of the Swat Valley, which is about 140 km northwest of Islamabad.

The army said Friday in a statement that the security forces killed two more militants in ongoing operations in the region. They also arrested at least 34 militants from Swat and neighbouring Dir district.

‗Security forces carried out a search operation at Kad near Sardari and killed two terrorists,‘ an army statement said.

Meanwhile, Interior Minister Rehman Malik warned militants to lay down their arms or face the consequences. In comments carried on the Geo television, Malik said Pakistan‘s army had broken the back of the militant movement in just three months in an unprecedented operation.

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US COULD SHIFT WAR ON TERROR FOCUS TO PAK-AFHANISTAN BORDER (SEPTEMBER 14, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, September 14th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

US could shift war on terror focus to Pak-Afghanistan border SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Monday, September 14, 2009 (ANI)

London, Sep.14 : The primary focus of America‘s war strategy in Afghanistan could shift towards the eastern provinces bordering Pakistan and away from the south of the country, senior military officials have said.

They believe the Afghan Taliban‘s ability to find sanctuary and support across the porous border with Pakistan plus the suspected presence in the lawless tribal Waziristan area of al- Qaida leaders including Osama bin Laden, requires a bigger effort in the east if insurgency is to be defeated, The Guardian reports.

However, they also accept that it is possible that British commanders may resist any move by General Stanley McChrystal, the US and NATO commander in Afghanistan, to concentrate firepower and resources away from Helmand, in the south.

Asked whether Pakistan was being urged by Washington to launch more Swat-style offensives on its side of the border, a senior Pakistani official insisted Islamabad, not the Americans, would decide.

―Waziristan is sovereign Pakistani territory. We will decide what happens there, and when it happens,‖ he said.

The latest development on NATO strategy comes even as fighting along the Pakistani side of the border appears to be spreading.

Reports today said Pakistani helicopter gunships had killed 22 militants and destroyed three hideouts in attacks in the Khyber region, which abuts Peshawar. Around 150 insurgents are thought to have died in the area over recent weeks.

US officials, speaking during a recent visit by Barack Obama‘s special representative in the region, Richard Holbrooke, said particular attention should be paid to Jalaluddin Haqqani and other insurgent leaders in eastern Afghanistan‘s mountains.

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According to an account in the Washington Post, Major General Curtis Scaparrotti, US commander of forces in the east, said Haqqani ―is the central threat‖ in the area and ―he‘s expanded that reach‖.

This month, McChrystal presented the broad outline of his Afghanistan strategic review to Obama, placing greater importance on the need to protect Afghan civilians and increase security as a means of encouraging political and economic development.

But the specifics of the new strategy, including the location and number of expected additional troops deployments, are still being debated.

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RECOUNT ORDERED AT 10 PCT OF AFGHAN VOTE SITES (SEPTEMBER 15, 2009) Written by admin on Tuesday, September 15th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Recount ordered at 10 pct of Afghan vote sites SOURCE: The Washington Post Tuesday, September 15, 2009 By JASON STRAZIUSO, The Associated Press

KABUL — A U.N.-backed monitoring body ordered Afghanistan‘s election commission to recount ballots from about 10 percent of the country‘s polling stations because of suspicious totals in last month‘s presidential vote, an official said Tuesday.

The recount order raises the possibility that President Hamid Karzai‘s lead could drop below the 50 percent threshold, forcing the country to hold a second-round runoff between Karzai and top challenger Abdullah Abdullah.

More than 2,500 polling sites from the Aug. 20 presidential election will need to be recounted, said Grant Kippen, the head of the Electoral Complaints Commission, a U.N.- backed body headed by three international and two Afghan commissioners.

Massive allegations of fraud have tainted the country‘s second-ever direct presidential vote. Last week the ECC ordered Afghanistan‘s Independent Election Commission, the body in charge of the election, to recount and audit ballot boxes from stations that had 100 percent turnout or where a candidate received more than 95 percent of the valid votes.

The number of stations affected by the order turned out to be more than 2,500, Kippen said. There were about 26,300 polling stations across Afghanistan on election day.

The most serious allegations of fraud have been lodged in southern Afghanistan, where Karzai would expect strong support from his fellow ethnic Pashtuns, though Kippen said that all provinces were affected by the order to recount the 2,500 sites.

The ECC has already thrown out ballots from 83 polling stations because of fraud allegations, all in areas of support for Karzai.

The country‘s election commission originally hoped to declare a certified winner this week, but claims of ballot-stuffing and phantom voters have pushed that timeline back weeks, leaving the country in political limbo at a time the Taliban is unleashing a record number of attacks.

Thousands of fake ballots were submitted across the country, and returns showed Karzai winning 100 percent of the vote in some districts.

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The most recent partial count of the preliminary results has Karzai leading with 54 percent to former foreign minister Abdullah‘s 28 percent. If enough votes are eliminated for fraud complaints, Karzai‘s tally could fall below the 50-percent threshold, forcing a two-man runoff. The current results reflect 93 percent of polling stations, with 5 percent of the votes still to be counted and the remaining 2 percent quarantined for suspected fraud.

Grant said it was not clear how much longer the ECC and IEC would need to complete the fraud investigations and recounts, though he has hinted that weeks of work remain.

―We need to be thorough about the job that we need to do,‖ he said.

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TIME TO DEAL IN AFGHANISTAN (SEPTEMBER 15, 2009) Written by admin on Tuesday, September 15th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Time to deal in Afghanistan SOURCE: The Frontier Post Tuesday September 15, 2009 By FAREED ZAKARIA

It is time to get real about Afghanistan. Withdrawal is not a serious option. The United States, NATO, the European Union and others have invested massively in stabilizing that country over the past eight years, and they should not abandon it because the Taliban is proving a tougher foe than anticipated. But there is still a large gap between the goals the Obama administration is outlining and the means available to achieve them. This gap is best closed not by sending in tens of thousands of more troops but, rather, by understanding the limits of what we can reasonably achieve in Afghanistan.

The most important reality of the post-Sept. 11 world has been the lack of any major follow- up attack. That‘s largely because al-Qaeda has been on the run in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The campaign against terrorist groups in both countries rests on ground forces and intelligence. A senior U.S. military official involved in planning these campaigns told me that America‘s presence in Afghanistan has been the critical element in the successful strikes against al-Qaeda leaders and camps. Were America to leave the scene, all the region‘s players would start jockeying for influence over Afghanistan. That would almost certainly mean the revival of the poisonous alliance between the Pakistani military and the hardest-line elements of the Taliban.

It is worth reminding ourselves that Afghanistan is not in free fall. The number of civilian deaths, while grim, is less than a tenth the number in Iraq in 2006. In the recent Afghan election, all four presidential candidates publicly endorsed the U.S. presence there. Compare this with Iraq, where politicians engaged in ritual denunciations of the United States constantly to satisfy the public‘s anti-Americanism. The Obama administration‘s answer to the worsening situation in Afghanistan appears to be: more. More troops, civilians, tasks and missions. There is nothing wrong with helping Afghans develop their country. But if the goal is to give Afghanistan a strong, functioning central government and a viable economy, the task will require decades, not years. Afghanistan is one of the 10 poorest countries in the world. It has had a weak central government for centuries. Illiteracy rates are somewhere around 70 percent. Building a 400,000-strong security force, as some in Congress have proposed, will be arduous in this context, not to mention that its annual cost would be equivalent to 300 percent of Afghanistan‘s gross domestic product.

The focus must shift from nation building to dealmaking. The central problem in Afghanistan is that the Pashtuns, who make up 45 percent of the population and almost 100 percent of the Taliban, do not feel empowered. We need to start talking to them, whether they are nominally Taliban or not. Buying, renting or bribing Pashtun tribes should become the centerpiece of

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America‘s stabilization strategy, as it was Britain‘s when it ruled Afghanistan. Efforts to reach out to the Taliban so far have been limited and halfhearted. Some blame President Hamid Karzai, who, bizarrely, wants to start this process himself by negotiating with Taliban leader Mohammad Omar, who has shown no sign of wanting to deal. But the U.S. government remains deeply reluctant as well, or at least wants to wait until Taliban forces are on the defensive. But, as one American official said to me, ―Waiting to negotiate till you are in a position of strength is a bit like waiting to sell your stocks till the market peaks. It sounds good, but you will never know when the time is right.‖

The dealmaking should extend to the top. U.S. officials should stop trashing Karzai. We have no alternative. Afghanistan needs a Pashtun leader; Karzai is a reasonably supportive one. Let‘s assume the charges of corruption and vote rigging against him are true. Does anyone really think his successor would be any more honest and efficient? The best strategy would be to see if we can get Karzai to work with his leading opponent, Abdullah Abdullah, in some kind of coalition. The muddied elections actually create an opportunity to build a national unity government.

There are three ways to change security conditions in Afghanistan. First, increase American troops. Second, increase Afghan troops. Third, shrink the number of enemy forces by making them switch sides or lay down their arms. That third strategy is what worked so well in Iraq and what urgently needs to be adopted in Afghanistan. In a few years, Afghanistan will still be poor, corrupt and dysfunctional. But if we make the right deals, it will be ruled by leaders who keep the country inhospitable to al-Qaeda and similar terrorist groups. That‘s my definition of success. Washington Post

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KARZAI DEFENDS AFGHAN POLL (SEPTEMBER 17, 2009) Written by admin on Thursday, September 17th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Karzai defends Afghan poll SOURCE: Thursday September 17, 2009 Al Jazeera and agencies

Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan‘s incumbent president, has dismissed claims that massive fraud took place during last month‘s presidential election.

Karzai, who leads a preliminary vote count, said on Thursday that he believed in the integrity of the election, despite European Union observers reporting that up to 1.5 million ballots could be fraudulent.

―I believe firmly, firmly in the integrity of the election and the integrity of the Afghan people, and the integrity of the government in that process,‖ he told a news conference.

―Media has reported major fraud. It wasn‘t that big. If there was fraud, it was small. It happens all over the world.‖

Dimitra Ioannou, the deputy head of the EU Election Observation Mission to Afghanistan, said on Wednesday that there were questions over the authenticity of 1.5 million votes, about 1.1 million of them cast for Karzai.

She said there had also been 300,000 questionable votes for Abdullah Abdullah, Karzai‘s main rival and a former foreign minister, with the rest of the suspicious votes cast for other candidates.

Investigation supported

Despite his vehement defence of the conduct of the election, Karzai said he would support a fair and unbiased investigation into any cases of suspected fraud.

Fraud, if it were conducted, it has to be investigated, and investigated fairly, and without prejudice,‖ he said.

Al Jazeera‘s Zeina Khodr, reporting from the Afghan capital, Kabul, said that Karzai also stressed the need for national unity during the uncertainty over the election outcome.

―The president [told] the Afghan people that there will be no violence, there will be no security incidents,‖ she said.

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―People here have been worried that as a result of the political impasse that civil unrest may erupt.

―He is doing his best to convince them that this election was, in his words, a success. But people are frustrated … saying the credibility of the whole process is now in question.‖

Preliminary results

The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) announced final preliminary results for the election on Wednesday giving Karzai 54.6 per cent and Abdullah 27.8 per cent of the vote.

The results will not be confirmed until all cases of fraud are investigated.

Abdullah said that the announcement of the preliminary results was premature.

―First of all this is not final. Second of all this is not right that they are making this announcement, according to the electoral law, because the issues of complaints have not been dealt with,‖ he told Al Jazeera.

―Also it includes hundreds and thousands fraudulent votes … those are included in these results so it doesn‘t mean a lot.‖

Electoral officials have warned that hundreds of thousands of votes could be held back for two to three weeks for investigations, delaying the final announcement of the victor.

Karzai must win 50 per cent of the vote to avoid a second round run-off with his rival.

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ISAF COMMANDER‟S COUNTERINSURGENCY GUIDANCE Written by admin on Friday, September 18th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance SOURCE: http://www.scribd.com/doc/19075680/COMISAF-COIN-GUIDANCE Wednesday August 26, 2009 By General McChrystal

ISAF Commander‘s Counterinsurgency Guidance‘

Protecting the people is the mission. The conflict will be won by persuading the population, not by destroying the enemy. ISAF will succeed when GIRoA earns the support of the people.

ISAF‘s mission is to help the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) defeat the insurgency threatening their country. Protecting the Afghan people is the mission. The Afghan people will decide who wins this fight, and we (GIRoA and ISAF) are in a struggle for their support. The effort to gain and maintain that support must inform every action we take. Essentially, we and the insurgents are presenting an argument for the future to the people of Afghanistan: they will decide which argument is the most attractive, most convincing, and has the greatest chance of success.

The Afghan people are a diverse mix of ethnicities and tribes with strong traditions and a fierce sense of independence. Their country has been scarred by 30 years of war, and the fabric of Afghan society has been badly damaged. Traditional tribal structures have been undermined deliberately by the insurgents; many communities have fractured. State weakness and corruption erode confidence in government. Nearly eight years of international presence has not brought the anticipated benefits. The Afghan people are skeptical and unwilling to commit active support to either side until convinced of a winning proposition.

We need to understand the people and see things through their eyes. It is their fears, frustrations, and expectations that we must address, We will not win simply by killing insurgents. We will help the Afghan people win by securing them, by protecting them from intimidation, violence, and abuse, and by operating in a way that respects their culture and religion. This means that we must change the way that we think, act, and operate. We must get the people involved as active participants in the success of their communities.

Every action we take must reflect this change: how we interact with people, how we drive or fly, how we patrol, how we use force, how we fund work programs and projects. This is their country, and we are their guests. We must think carefully about everything we do and understand the impact of our actions on the people we are here to partner with and protect. Security may not come from overwhelming firepower, and force protection may mean more personal interaction with the Afghan people, not less.

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‗This guidance applies to both counterinsurgency and stability operations in Afghanistan

An ISAF patrol was traveling through a city at a high rate of speed, driving down the center to force traffic off the road. Several pedestrians and other vehicles were pushed out of the way. A vehicle approached from the side into the traffic circle. The gunner fired a pen flare at it, which entered the vehicle and caught the interior on fire. As the ISAF patrol sped away, Afghans crowded around the car. How many insurgents did the patrol make that day?

1 =====

How insurgents operate. Our task is complicated arid threatened by a resilient, highly adaptive, and multifaceted insurgency. An insurgency is unlike a conventional military threat. The insurgent‘s attack is a secondary effort to discredit the government and provoke a counterinsurgent response that alienates the people. Corruption and abuse of power by government officials feeds into the insurgent narrative. Behind the smoke of battle, the insurgents are principally focused on political and social activities, to include information operations, designed to gain control over the population. In so doing, they displace the government‘s legitimacy.

We must understand how the insurgents compete in order to combat their strategy. They adapt to local conditions. They influence the population through both intimidation and attraction. In their propaganda they claim to protect Afghan culture and religion They incite social strife and undermine traditional structures. In places, they control the roads, collect revenues, and mete out swift justice. They co-opt disenfranchised groups and pay young men to fight. They exploit ISAF mistakes and inappropriate actions to reinforce their argument.

Playing into their hands. A military force, culturally programmed to respond conventionally (and predictably) to insurgent attacks, is akin to the bull that repeatedly charges a matador‘s cape - only to tire and eventually be defeated by a much weaker opponent. This is predictable - the bull does what comes naturally, While a conventional approach is instinctive, that behavior is self-defeating.

First, an insurgency cannot be defeated by attrition; its supply of fighters, and even leadership, is effectively endless, Roughly seventy percent of the Afghan population is under age 25. Vast unemployment, illiteracy, and widespread political and social disaffection create fertile ground for insurgent influence and recruiting.

The intricate familial, clan, and tribal connections of Afghan society turns ―attrition math‖ on its head.

From a conventional standpoint, the killing of two insurgents in a group often leaves eight remaining: 10-2=8. Prom the insurgent standpoint, those two killed were likely related to many others who will want vengeance. If civilian casualties occurred, that number will be much higher. Therefore, the death of two creates more willing recruits: 10 minus 2 equals 20 (or more) rather than 8. This is part of the reason why eight years of individually successful kinetic actions have resulted in more violence. The

251 math works against an attrition mind-set. This is not to say that we should avoid a fight, but to win we need to do much more than simply kill or capture militants.

Second, conventional military action against insurgents consumes considerable resources with little real return and is likely to alienate the people we are trying to secure. Large scale operations to kill or capture militants carry a significant risk of causing civilian casualties and collateral damage. If civilians

An ISAF unit in a relatively permissive area had a difficult time maneuvering large vehicles along a road because it was lined with fruit trees. To improve mobility, the unit had the trees cut down. Many people in the village had their livelihoods destroyed. JEDs began appearing along the road shortly thereafter.

2 ===== die in a firefight, it does not matter who shot them -we still failed to protect them from harm,

Destroying a home or property jeopardizes the livelihood of an entire family- and creates more insurgents. We sow the seeds of our own demise.

Although disruption operations may be necessary at times, we must recognize their effects are temporary at best when the population is under insurgent influence or control. Sporadically moving into an area for a few hours or even a few days solely to search for the enemy and then leave does little good, and may do much harm. The local insurgents hide in plain sight and the people remain ambivalent. Once we depart, the militants re-emerge and life under insurgent control resumes. These operations are not only ineffectual, they can be counter productive. In conducting them, we are not building relationships with people, and we are not helping Afghans solve Afghan problems.

In short, we don‘t have to be stupid or ineffective to fail -just misguided in our approach.

Changing our mindset, We need to think and act very differently to be successful. The will of the people is the Objective. An effective ―offensive‖ operation in counterinsurgency, therefore, is one that takes from the insurgent what he cannot afford to lose - control of the population. We must think of offensive operations not simply as those that target militants, but ones that earn the trust and support of the people while denying influence and access to the insurgent. Holding routine jirgas with community leaders that build trust and solve problems is an offensive operation So is using projects and work programs to bring communities together and meet their needs. Missions primarily designed to ―disrupt‖ militants are not.

Think of counterinsurgency as an argument to earn the support of the people. It is a contest to influence the real and very practical calculations on the part of the people about which side to support.

Every action, reaction, failure to act, and all that is said and done become part of the debate. The people in the audience watch, listen, and make rational choices based on who can better protect them, provide for their needs, respect their dignity and their corn muni.ty, and offer

252 opportunities for the future. Ideology can influence the outcome, but is usually subordinate to the more practical considerations of survival and everyday life.

An ISAF unit was often taking rocket fire from nearby a certain village. Rather than raiding the village, the commander decided instead to find out more about them and the reasons for hostility. The ANA commander suggested an ANA patrol to learn more about the village. The patrol discovered the village was upset about a night raid that occurred over two years ago. He also learned education was important to the village but they had no school or supplies. The commanders sent another patrol to the village a few days with a truckload of school supplies. The next day, the village elders came to the base to meet with the ANA and ISAF commanders. They delivered over 100 thank-you notes from the children. Soon, several local projects were coordinated with the elders for the village -projects they owned. The rocket attacks stopped.

3 ======

Earn the support of the people and the war is won, regardle5s of how many militants are killed or captured.

We must undermine the insurgent argument while offering a more compelling alternative, Our argument must communicate - through word and deed - that we and GIRoA have the capability and commitment to protect and support the people. Together, we need to provide a convincing and sustainable sense of justice and well-being to a weary and skeptical populace. We must turn perceptions from fear and uncertainty to trust and confidence.

To be effective, therefore, we have to help change the local context so people are more attracted to building and protecting their communities than destroying them. Leverage economic initiatives and routine jirgas with community leaders to employ young mer and develop peaceful means to resolve outstanding issues; create viable local alternatives to insurgency.

At the same time, it would be naïve to ignore the fact that the enemy often gets a vote on how we focus our time and energy. This is certainly the case in times of high kinetic activity as well as in the areas where the ―shadow government‖ influences the population. There is clearly a role for precise operations that keep the insurgents off balance, take the fight to their sanctuaries, and prevent them from affecting the population. These operations are important, but, in and of themselves, are not necessarily decisive.

They can be effective when the insurgents have become so isolated from the population that they are no longer welcome, have been kicked out of their communities, and are reduced to hiding in remote areas and raiding from there. Setting these conditions throughout the year will enable kinetic operations to have an enduring rather than fleeting impact.

Keeping the right balance over time is critical and there is no mathematical formula for it. Mobilizing the communityto participate actively fortheir own safety, stability, and success is the crux of counterinsurgency at local levels - and creates circumstances to end insurgent influence permanently.

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We rnust know the people, their environment and aspirations, and work together with them to meet their needs. Strive to focus 95% of our energy on the 95% of the population that deserves and needs our support. Doing so will isolate the insurgents. Take action against the 5% - the insurgents - as

One ISAF unit and their partnered Afghan company were participating in a large shura in a previously hostile village. Over 500 people, to include former fighters, were in attendance. Nearly the entire village turned out. The unit had been working for months to build relationships with the elders and people. As the relationships strengthened and local projects began improving quality of life and employment opportunities, the village elders requested the meeting. During the meeting, two insurgents began firing shots at one of the unit’s observation posts. Knowing the stalces of the meeting, the young sergeant in charge of the OP told his men to hold their fire. He knew this was a provocative act designed to get him to over-react and ruin the meeting. He reported the incident. The shura continued.Later, the village elders found the two militants and punished them accordingly.

4 ===== necessary or when the right opportunities present themselves. Do not let them distract you from your primary tasks:

Embrace the People. Build connections and be conscious of the need to pass them off to your successor. Afghan culture is founded on personal relationships. Earning the trust of the people is a large part of our mission. Build relationships with tribal, community, and religious leaders. Success requires communication, collaboration, and cooperation. Seek out the underprivileged, the disenfranchised, and the disaffected and bring them on the team. Understand the local grievances and problems that drive instability, and take action to redress them. Work with the children and students. Insist the ANSF and GIRoA officials support these efforts, and teach them to lead these efforts,

Use your relationships with the people, the ANSE, and the GIRoA officials to become an expert on the local situation. Get to know the neighborhood. Learn who is the most successful farmer and why, who feels excluded and why, and which families are the most powerful and who they are united to by marriage. Be a positive force in the community, shield the people from harm, and foster safety and security so people can work and raise their families in peace.

Carefully assess risk arid project confidence - excessive force protection is distancing, not inspiring. Think of how you would expect a foreign army to operate in your neighborhood, among your families and your children, and act accordingly. The way you drive, your dress and gestures, with whom you eat lunch, the courage with which you fight, the way you respond to an Afghan‘s grief or joy-this is all part of the argument.

Win the argument. Use iocalized development and economic support to bring community leaders and people together for their own success. Listen, share, and get buy-in. Build local ownership and capacity. Together with legitimate GIRoA leaders, work all local issues with the local shura and community. Foster ownership. As the Afghans say, ‗lf you sweat for it, you will protect it.‖

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Partner with ANSF at all echelons. Our job is to hold them accountable for performance in serving the Afghan people and protecting them from harm. Build their capacity to secure their own country. Foster ownership -their success is our success. Live and train together, plan and operate together. Share the same battle-rhythm and information. Integrate your command and control structures. Put them in the lead and support them, even before they think they are ready. Coach them to excellence, and they will amaze you with how quickly they take charge.

Build Governance Capacity and Accountability. Developing good governance is everyone‘s responsibility. Build capacity and accountability at all levels, down to local communities. Promote

A Police Mentor Team believed the District ANP Chief to be corrupt. After multiple attempts to facilitate a change in behavior, the PMT built a case to take to the Provincial leadership. The Provincial leadership conducted an operation that confirmed the evidence. They replaced the corrupt Police Chief with an honest, harcl-wotking leader, and referred the removed Chief to the Afghan justice system. Although the process required many weeks, the PMT helped to empower Afghan leaders to take appropriate action to protect the population from this malign actor.

5 =====

Afghan leadership that serves the people. Ernpowerthose who display competence, care, and commitment for their people. But be discerning and make distinctions, Confront self-serving officials who monopolize wealth and power and abuse the peopl&s trust. Working alongside our Afghan counterparts, we must find incentives and mechanisms to change behavior, and demand Afghan leaders take appropriate action to hold corrupt officials accountable. Looking the other way or enabling government officials who fail to meet their obligations makes you part of the problem. Protecting the people not only requires protecting them from physical harm, but also from corruption and abuse of power.

Get better every day. Take action to improve stability in your area. learn how to adapt, how to shape the environment, and how to be more effective with the community leaders and the people. Listen to our Afghan colleagues; talk with the Afghans you meet; ask questions about how we can improve and help them achieve their goals. Listen to their stories and what they want to tell you. You are authorized - indeed, it is your responsibility - to adjust your actions within the intent of this guidance to adapt to local conditions.

Over-communicate. Quickly share critical information and ideas. Challenge the conventional wisdom if it no longer fits the environment. This is a battle of wits — be vigilant as the environment shifts and the enemy adapts. If you are comfortable, the enemy is probably ahead of you. To win, we must understand their strategy and learn from their successes and their failures - and from our own as well. Adapt faster than they are able to adjust.

We (GIRoA and ISAF) will succeed by transforming the environment through local security, connecting responsive and credible governance to the community leaders and the people, and facilitating compelling alternatives to the insurgency. The people will decide the contest in GIRoA‘s favor.

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6 =====

ISAF Counterinsurgency Guidance: Key Points

The Afghan people are the Objective. Protecting them is the mission. Focus 95% of your time building relationships with them and, together with the Afghan government, meeting their needs.

Get rid of the conventional mindset. Focus on the people, not the militants, By earning their trust and helping an accountable GIRoA gain the support of the people, you take from the enemy what he cannot afford to lose -the control of the population.

Embrace the people Think before you act. Understand the consequences of your actions - how you drive, how you patrol, how you relate to people, how you help the community. View your actions through the eyes of the Afghans. If we harm Afghan civilians, we sow the seeds of our own defeat.

Be an expert on the local situation. Build connections and hold routine jirgas. Afghan culture is founded on personal relationships. Listen to the population and adjust accordingly. Earn their trust. Develop their ownership in the solution. If they sweat for it, they will protect it.

Be a positive force in the community; shield the people from harm; foster stability. Use local economic initiatives to increase employment and give young men alternatives to insurgency. Demand that CERP, CIMIC and other capabilities support these efforts. Help Afghans solve Afghan problems.

Partner with ANSF

Live, eat, and train together, plan and operate together, depend on one another, and hold each other accountable - at all echelons down to soldier level. Treat them as equal partners in success.

Their success is our goal. Respect them; put them in the lead and coach them to excellence.

Build Governance Capacity and Accountability

Facilitate and enable transparent and accountable governance from national to community level. Insist government officials serve the peopie; support those who do.

Confront corrupt officials. Protecting the people requires protection from physical harm, corruption and abuse of power. With your Afghan counterparts work to change corrupt behavior that adversely affects the people and the mission. If the behavior does not change, demand the Afghan higher leadership take appropriate action.

Get Better Everyday

Learn and adapt to the environment. Keep your skills sharp. Improve daily.

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Learn how to shape the environment, and how to achieve greater effects with the people more quickly. Listen to and learn from our Afghan colleagues.

Communicate and share ideas. Challenge the conventional wisdom if it no longer fits the environment. This is a battle of wits - learn and adapt more quickly than the insurgent.

7

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DOCUMENT: MCCRYSTAL‟S AFGHANISTAN ASSESSMENT REDACTED (SEPTEMBER 21, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, September 21st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Commander’s Initial Assessment, 30 Augustus 2009 SOURCE: Confidential Rel NATO/ISAF (Unclassified with removal of enclosure), Headquarters International Security Assistance Force, Kabul, Afghanistan Monday September 21, 2009 By STANLEY A. MCCRYSTAL

Click here for PDF-file (66 pages)

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MCCRYSTAL - MORE FORCES OR „MISSION FAILURE‟ (SEPTEMBER 21, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, September 21st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

McChrystal: More Forces or ‘Mission Failure’ Top U.S. Commander For Afghan War Calls Next 12 Months Decisive SOURCE: The Washington Post Monday, September 21, 2009 By BOB WOODWARD, Washington Post Staff Writer

The top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan warns in an urgent, confidential assessment of the war that he needs more forces within the next year and bluntly states that without them, the eight-year conflict ―will likely result in failure,‖ according to a copy of the 66-page document obtained by The Washington Post.

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal says emphatically: ―Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) — while Afghan security capacity matures — risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.‖

His assessment was sent to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates on Aug. 30 and is now being reviewed by President Obama and his national security team.

McChrystal concludes the document‘s five-page Commander‘s Summary on a note of muted optimism: ―While the situation is serious, success is still achievable.‖

But he repeatedly warns that without more forces and the rapid implementation of a genuine counterinsurgency strategy, defeat is likely. McChrystal describes an Afghan government riddled with corruption and an international force undermined by tactics that alienate civilians.

He provides extensive new details about the Taliban insurgency, which he calls a muscular and sophisticated enemy that uses modern propaganda and systematically reaches into Afghanistan‘s prisons to recruit members and even plan operations.

McChrystal‘s assessment is one of several options the White House is considering. His plan could intensify a national debate in which leading Democratic lawmakers have expressed reluctance about committing more troops to an increasingly unpopular war. Obama said last week that he will not decide whether to send more troops until he has ―absolute clarity about what the strategy is going to be.‖

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The commander has prepared a separate detailed request for additional troops and other resources, but defense officials have said he is awaiting instructions before sending it to the Pentagon.

Senior administration officials asked The Post over the weekend to withhold brief portions of the assessment that they said could compromise future operations. A declassified version of the document, with some deletions made at the government‘s request, appears at washingtonpost.com.

McChrystal makes clear that his call for more forces is predicated on the adoption of a strategy in which troops emphasize protecting Afghans rather than killing insurgents or controlling territory. Most starkly, he says: ―[I]nadequate resources will likely result in failure. However, without a new strategy, the mission should not be resourced.‖

‗Widespread Corruption‘

The assessment offers an unsparing critique of the failings of the Afghan government, contending that official corruption is as much of a threat as the insurgency to the mission of the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, as the U.S.-led NATO coalition is widely known.

―The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF‘s own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government,‖ McChrystal says.

The result has been a ―crisis of confidence among Afghans,‖ he writes. ―Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents.‖

McChrystal is equally critical of the command he has led since June 15. The key weakness of ISAF, he says, is that it is not aggressively defending the Afghan population. ―Pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us — physically and psychologically — from the people we seek to protect. . . . The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves.‖

McChrystal continues: ―Afghan social, political, economic, and cultural affairs are complex and poorly understood. ISAF does not sufficiently appreciate the dynamics in local communities, nor how the insurgency, corruption, incompetent officials, power-brokers, and criminality all combine to affect the Afghan population.‖

Coalition intelligence-gathering has focused on how to attack insurgents, hindering ―ISAF‘s comprehension of the critical aspects of Afghan society.‖

In a four-page annex on detainee operations, McChrystal warns that the Afghan prison system has become ―a sanctuary and base to conduct lethal operations‖ against the government and coalition forces. He cites as examples an apparent prison connection to the 2008 bombing of the Serena Hotel in Kabul and other attacks. ―Unchecked, Taliban/Al Qaeda leaders patiently coordinate and plan, unconcerned with interference from prison personnel or the military.‖

The assessment says that Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents ―represent more than 2,500 of the 14,500 inmates in the increasingly overcrowded Afghan Corrections System,‖ in which 260

―[h]ardened, committed Islamists are indiscriminately mixed with petty criminals and sex offenders, and they are using the opportunity to radicalize and indoctrinate them.‖

Noting that the United States ―came to Afghanistan vowing to deny these same enemies safe haven in 2001,‖ he says they now operate with relative impunity in the prisons. ―There are more insurgents per square foot in corrections facilities than anywhere else in Afghanistan,‖ his assessment says.

McChrystal outlines a plan to build up the Afghan government‘s ability to manage its detention facilities and eventually put all such operations under Afghan control, including the Bagram Theater Internment Facility, which the United States runs.

For now, because of a lack of capacity, ―productive interrogations and detainee intelligence collection have been reduced‖ at Bagram. ―As a result, hundreds are held without charge or without a defined way-ahead. This allows the enemy to radicalize them far beyond their pre- capture orientation. The problem can no longer be ignored.‖

McChrystal‘s Plan

The general says his command is ―not adequately executing the basics‖ of counterinsurgency by putting the Afghan people first. ―ISAF personnel must be seen as guests of the Afghan people and their government, not an occupying army,‖ he writes. ―Key personnel in ISAF must receive training in local languages.‖

He also says that coalition forces will change their operational culture, in part by spending ―as little time as possible in armored vehicles or behind the walls of forward operating bases.‖ Strengthening Afghans‘ sense of security will require troops to take greater risks, but the coalition ―cannot succeed if it is unwilling to share risk, at least equally, with the people.‖

McChrystal warns that in the short run, it ―is realistic to expect that Afghan and coalition casualties will increase.‖

He proposes speeding the growth of Afghan security forces. The existing goal is to expand the army from 92,000 to 134,000 by December 2011. McChrystal seeks to move that deadline to October 2010.

Overall, McChrystal wants the Afghan army to grow to 240,000 and the police to 160,000 for a total security force of 400,000, but he does not specify when those numbers could be reached.

He also calls for ―radically more integrated and partnered‖ work with Afghan units.

McChrystal says the military must play an active role in reconciliation, winning over less committed insurgent fighters. The coalition ―requires a credible program to offer eligible insurgents reasonable incentives to stop fighting and return to normalcy, possibly including the provision of employment and protection,‖ he writes.

Coalition forces will have to learn that ―there are now three outcomes instead of two‖ for enemy fighters: not only capture or death, but also ―reintegration.‖

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Again and again, McChrystal makes the case that his command must be bolstered if failure is to be averted. ―ISAF requires more forces,‖ he states, citing ―previously validated, yet un- sourced, requirements‖ — an apparent reference to a request for 10,000 more troops originally made by McChrystal‘s predecessor, Gen. David D. McKiernan.

A Three-Headed Insurgency

McChrystal identifies three main insurgent groups ―in order of their threat to the mission‖ and provides significant details about their command structures and objectives.

The first is the Taliban (QST) headed by Mullah Omar, who fled Afghanistan after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and operates from the Pakistani city of Quetta.

―At the operational level, the Quetta Shura conducts a formal campaign review each winter, after which Mullah Omar announces his guidance and intent for the coming year,‖ according to the assessment.

Mullah Omar‘s insurgency has established an elaborate alternative government known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, McChrystal writes, which is capitalizing on the Afghan government‘s weaknesses. ―They appoint shadow governors for most provinces, review their performance, and replace them periodically. They established a body to receive complaints against their own ‗officials‘ and to act on them. They install ‘shari‘a‘ [Islamic law] courts to deliver swift and enforced justice in contested and controlled areas. They levy taxes and conscript fighters and laborers. They claim to provide security against a corrupt government, ISAF forces, criminality, and local power brokers. They also claim to protect Afghan and Muslim identity against foreign encroachment.‖

―The QST has been working to control Kandahar and its approaches for several years and there are indications that their influence over the city and neighboring districts is significant and growing,‖ McChrystal writes.

The second main insurgency group is the Haqqani network (HQN), which is active in southeastern Afghanistan and draws money and manpower ―principally from Pakistan, Gulf Arab networks, and from its close association with al Qaeda and other Pakistan-based insurgent groups.‖ At another point in the assessment, McChrystal says, ―Al Qaeda‘s links with HQN have grown, suggesting that expanded HQN control could create a favorable environment‖ for associated extremist movements ―to re-establish safe-havens in Afghanistan.‖

The third is the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin insurgency, which maintains bases in three Afghan provinces ―as well as Pakistan,‖ the assessment says. This network, led by the former mujaheddin commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, ―aims to negotiate a major role in a future Taliban government. He does not currently have geographical objectives as is the case with the other groups,‖ though he ―seeks control of mineral wealth and smuggling routes in the east.‖

Overall, McChrystal provides this conclusion about the enemy: ―The insurgents control or contest a significant portion of the country, although it is difficult to assess precisely how much due to a lack of ISAF presence. . . . ‖

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The insurgents make money from the production and sale of opium and other narcotics, but the assessment says that ―eliminating insurgent access to narco-profits — even if possible, and while disruptive — would not destroy their ability to operate so long as other funding sources remained intact.‖

While the insurgency is predominantly Afghan, McChrystal writes that it ―is clearly supported from Pakistan. Senior leaders of the major Afghan insurgent groups are based in Pakistan, are linked with al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups, and are reportedly aided by some elements of Pakistan‘s ISI,‖ which is its intelligence service. Al-Qaeda and other extremist movements ―based in Pakistan channel foreign fighters, suicide bombers, and technical assistance into Afghanistan, and offer ideological motivation, training, and financial support.‖

Toward the end of his report, McChrystal revisits his central theme: ―Failure to provide adequate resources also risks a longer conflict, greater casualties, higher overall costs, and ultimately, a critical loss of political support. Any of these risks, in turn, are likely to result in mission failure.‖

Josh Boak and Evelyn Duffy contributed to this report.

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AFGHANISTAN ASSESSMENT, A CATALYST FOR OBAMA (SEPTEMBER 22, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, September 22nd, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Afghanistan assessment, a catalyst for Obama SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Tuesday September 22, 2009 (ANI)

Washington, Sep.22 : The 66-page assessment report provided to U.S. President Barack Obama by his top military commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley A. McChrystal could be read in two possible ways.

Firstly, he could read it as a blunt and impassioned last-chance plea for a revamped counterinsurgency strategy bolstered by thousands more combat troops to rescue the beleaguered, eight-year mission, or secondly, he could read it as a searing indictment of American-led NATO military operations and a corrupt Afghan civilian government, pitted against a surprisingly adaptive and increasingly dangerous insurgency.

Either way, the report is serving to catalyze the thinking of a president - who is keenly aware of the historical perils of a protracted, faraway war - about what he can realistically accomplish in this conflict.

Obama faces a deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, growing opposition to the war at home from Democrats and a desire to put off any major troop decision while he still needs much political capital to pass major health care legislation in Congress.

He is also grappling with a stark reality: it will be very hard to say no to General McChrystal.

Mr. Obama has called Afghanistan a ―war of necessity,‖ and in the most basic terms he has the same goal as President George W. Bush did after the Sept. 11 attacks, to prevent another major terrorist assault.

―Whatever decisions I make are going to be based first on a strategy to keep us safe, then we‘ll figure out how to resource it,‖ Obama said Sunday on CBS‘s ―Face the Nation.‖

The White House expects General McChrystal‘s request to be not just for American troops but for NATO forces as well. This week, the White House is sending questions about his review back to the general in Kabul, Afghanistan, and expects to get responses by the end of next week.

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PLAN TO BOOST AFGHAN FORCES SPLITS OBAMA ADVISERS (SEPTEMBER 26, 2009)

Written by admin on Saturday, September 26th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Plan to Boost Afghan Forces Splits Obama Advisers SOURCE: The New York Times Saturday September 26, 2009 By PETER BAKER and ELISABETH BUMILLER

WASHINGTON - As President Obama weighs sending more troops to Afghanistan, one of the most consequential decisions of his presidency, he has discovered that the military is not monolithic in support of the plan and that some of the civilian advisers he respects most have deep reservations.

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal‘s troop request, which was submitted to the Pentagon on Friday, has reignited a longstanding debate within the military about the virtues of the counterinsurgency strategy popularized by Gen. David H. Petraeus in Iraq and now embraced by General McChrystal, the top American and NATO commander in Afghanistan.

General McChrystal is expected to ask for as many as 40,000 additional troops for the eight- year-old war, a number that has generated concern among top officers like Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the Army chief of staff, who worry about the capacity to provide more soldiers at a time of stress on the force, officials said.

The competing advice and concerns fuel a pivotal struggle to shape the president‘s thinking about a war that he inherited but may come to define his tenure. Among the most important outside voices has been that of former Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, a retired four-star Army general, who visited Mr. Obama in the Oval Office this month and expressed skepticism that more troops would guarantee success. According to people briefed on the discussion, Mr. Powell reminded the president of his longstanding view that military missions should be clearly defined.

Mr. Powell is one of the three people outside the administration, along with Senator John F. Kerry and Senator Jack Reed, considered by White House aides to be most influential in this current debate. All have expressed varying degrees of doubt about the wisdom of sending more forces to Afghanistan.

Mr. Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has warned of repeating the mistakes of Vietnam, where he served, and has floated the idea of a more limited counterterrorist mission. Mr. Reed, Democrat of Rhode Island and an Army veteran, has not ruled out supporting more troops but said ―the burden of proof‖ was on commanders to justify it.

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In the West Wing, beyond Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr., who has advocated an alternative strategy to the troop buildup, other presidential advisers sound dubious about more troops, including Rahm Emanuel, the chief of staff, and Gen. James L. Jones, the national security adviser, according to people who have spoken with them. At the same time, Mr. Obama is also hearing from more hawkish figures, including Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Richard Holbrooke, the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

General McChrystal‘s troop request, which has not been made public, was given to Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the general in a meeting in Germany on Friday. Admiral Mullen arrived back in Washington on Friday night with one paper copy for himself and one for Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates.

Mr. Gates has not endorsed General McChrystal‘s request yet, viewing the situation as ―complicated,‖ said one person who has spoken with him. But Mr. Gates, who will be an influential voice in Mr. Obama‘s decision, has also left open the door for more troops and warned of the consequences of failure in Afghanistan.

Although Mr. Obama has called Afghanistan a war of necessity, he has left members of both parties uncertain about the degree of his commitment to a large and sustained military presence. Even some advisers said they thought Mr. Obama‘s support for the war as a senator and presidential candidate was at least partly a way of contrasting it with what he saw as a reckless war in Iraq.

His decision to send 21,000 more troops to Afghanistan early this year, which will bring the number of American troops there to 68,000 this fall, was made hurriedly within weeks of coming into office to stanch the tactical erosion on the ground and provide security during Afghan elections.

But with those elections now marred by fraud allegations, the latest troop request is forcing Mr. Obama to decide whether he wants to fully engage in Afghanistan for the rest of his term or make a drastic change of course. Some advisers said the varying views reflected the complicated nature of a debate. The troop request follows the strategy unveiled by Mr. Obama in March to focus more on protecting the Afghan population, building infrastructure and improving governance, rather than just hunting the Taliban. On Friday, a United Nations report said that from January to August, 1,500 civilians were killed, about two-thirds of them by militants.

Admiral Mullen has endorsed the idea of more troops and will be at the table representing the military. General McChrystal and ambassadors from the region will get a chance to participate in meetings with the president through a secure video hookup.

Other officers, who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan and say they admire General McChrystal nonetheless, have privately expressed doubt that additional troops will make a difference. Others question the broader impact of such a buildup on the overall armed forces.

―If a request for more forces comes to the Army, we‘ll have to assess what that will do in terms of stress on the force,‖ said an Army official, who asked not to be identified because General McChrystal‘s troop request had not been made public.

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General Casey, whose institutional role as Army chief is to protect his force, has a goal to increase by 2012 a soldier‘s time at home, to two years at home for every year served, from the current one year for every year of duty in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Advisers who have Mr. Obama‘s ear have raised other questions. Mr. Powell spoke with Mr. Obama about a variety of topics, but his remarks on Afghanistan resonated in the White House. ―The question the president has to answer is, ‗What will more troops do?‘ ‖ Mr. Powell told reporters before a speech in California last week. ―You have to not just add troops. You need a clear definition of your mission and then you can determine whether you need more troops or other resources.‖

In an interview, Senator Kerry, who met with Admiral Mullen last week, said that he had not made up his mind about the troop buildup, but that in Vietnam, ―the underlying assumptions were flawed, and the number of troops weren‘t going to make a difference.‖

Senator Reed, who met with Mr. Biden, was more measured, but said the president needed to look at the capacity of Afghan forces and the prospects of reconciliation with moderate Taliban members. ―You want to make sure you have the best operational plan to carry out the strategy,‖ he said.

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US THREATENS AIR STRIKES ON QUETTA (SEPTEMBER 28, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, September 28th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

US threatens air strikes on Quetta: UK paper SOURCE: The News International Monday, September 28, 2009 News Desk

RAWAPINDI: The United States is threatening to launch air strikes on Mullah Omar and the Taliban leadership in Quetta as frustration mounts about the ease with which they (allegedly) find sanctuary across the border from Afghanistan, reports The Sunday Times.

The Biden camp argues that attacks by unmanned drones on Pakistan‘s tribal areas, where al- Qaeda‘s leaders are (believed to be) hiding, have been successful. Sending more troops to Afghanistan has only inflamed tensions.

The Afghan election has strengthened the position of those in Washington who advocate eliminating Taliban leaders in Pakistan. Senior Pakistani officials in New York revealed that the US had asked to extend the drone attacks into Quetta and other parts of Balochistan. ―It wasn‘t so much a threat as an understanding that if you don‘t do anything, we‘ll take matters into our own hands,‖ said one.

The problem is that while the government of President Asif Zardari is committed to wiping out terrorism, Pakistan‘s powerful military does not entirely share this view, the paper claimed. Earlier this year, there was optimism that Pakistan had turned a corner after it confronted a Taliban group that had taken over the Swat Valley.

There has been tacit cooperation over the use of drones. Some are even stationed inside Pakistan, although publicly the government denounces their use, the paper said. Suspicions remain among US officials that parts of Pakistan‘s military intelligence agency, the ISI, are supporting the Taliban and protecting Mullah Omar and other leaders in Quetta.

It was to shore up Zardari‘s domestic standing that Obama attended a Friends of Pakistan summit in New York on Thursday. On the same day, the US Senate tripled non-military aid to Pakistan to $1.5 billion a year.

The Obama administration hopes such moves will reduce anti-American feelings in Pakistan. A survey last month by the Pew Research Centre found that almost two-thirds regarded the US as an enemy.

Drone attacks on Quetta would intensify this sentiment, causing some British officials to argue that such missions would be ―unthinkable‖. However, the paper added, the Pakistani government is reluctant to take its own action.

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―We need real-time intelligence,‖ said Interior Minister Rehman Malik.‖The Americans have never told us any location.‖ Western intelligence officers say Pakistan has been moving Taliban leaders to Karachi, where it would be impossible to strike. US officials have even discussed sending commandos to Quetta to capture or kill the Taliban chiefs before they are moved, The Sunday Times said.

The threat of air strikes on Quetta comes amid growing divisions in Washington about whether to deal with the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan by sending more troops or by reducing them and targeting the terrorists.

This weekend the US military was expected to send a request to Robert Gates, the defence secretary, for more troops, as urged by General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander there. In a leaked strategic assessment of the war, McChrystal warned that he needed extra reinforcements within a year to avert the risk of failure. Although no figure was given, he is believed to be seeking up to 40,000 troops to add to the 68,000 who will be in Afghanistan by the end of this year.

However, with President Barack Obama under pressure from fellow Democrats not to intensify the war, the administration has let it be known that it is rethinking strategy. Vice- President Joe Biden has suggested reducing the number of troops in Afghanistan and focusing on the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Pakistan.

Last week McChrystal denied any rift with the administration, saying ―a policy debate is warranted‖. According to The New York Times, he flew from Kabul to Ramstein airbase in Germany on Friday for a secret meeting with Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to discuss the request for more troops.

So sensitive is the subject that when Obama addressed the United Nations summit in New York, he barely mentioned Afghanistan. The unspoken problem is that if the priority is to destroy al-Qaeda and reduce the global terrorist threat, Western troops might be fighting on the wrong side of the border.

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WHITE HOUSE STARTS REVIEW OF AFGHAN STRATEGY

Written by admin on Wednesday, September 30th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

White House Starts Review of Afghan Strategy SOURCE: The Wall Street Journal Wednesday, September 30, 2009 By PETER SPIEGEL and JONATHAN WEISMAN

WASHINGTON — The White House began its review of the Afghan war strategy in earnest Tuesday, with senior administration officials meeting via videoconference with the top commander in Kabul, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, at the start of what could be weeks of debate over whether to send thousands of reinforcements.

White House officials said President Barack Obama will join in the discussions Wednesday, when he is expected to meet with Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, among other top officials.

The White House unexpectedly decided to review its strategy in Afghanistan after a series of recent setbacks in the war, including allegations of fraud following last month‘s presidential elections and surging violence throughout the country. It begins just days after Gen. McChrystal submitted his request for as many as 40,000 additional troops to the Pentagon. Some in the administration, notably Mr. Biden, have argued for a smaller military footprint and a tighter focus on counterterrorism as the best way forward.

Advocates of such a shift point to the effective use of Predator drone strikes to kill Taliban leaders in Pakistan. Two additional Predators are expected to be shifted soon to the region to patrol the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, according to people familiar with the decision, a move that would bring the total drones in the theater to a number the military has wanted for years.

Mr. Obama gave voice to a possible shift in emphasis on Tuesday when he spoke of ―dismantling, disrupting, destroying the al Qaeda network‖ as the mission, without mentioning the Taliban. He also said the U.S. is working with the Afghans to bring security to the country.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry (D., Mass.), who is emerging as an influential voice in the debate, was at the White House on Thursday to meet with the vice president. He too has said he is leaning toward a smaller counterterrorism strategy to supplant a larger military counterinsurgency effort.

After an Oval Office meeting Tuesday with the new secretary general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Mr. Obama said the review will also include regular consultations with the U.S.‘s NATO allies.

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―This is not an American battle; this is a NATO mission, as well,‖ Mr. Obama said following his meeting with Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the former Danish prime minister, who assumed the helm of NATO last month.

Robert Gibbs, the White House spokesman, said the early meetings are unlikely to include specific options for Mr. Obama to consider. Instead, he said, they will likely start with a discussion of Gen. McChrystal‘s dire assessment of the current war effort, compiled last month separately from his troop request.

―This will take place over the course of several meetings and a number of weeks as we look at where we are, what‘s happened in the intervening months since the president made a decision in March,‖ Mr. Gibbs said.

Tuesday‘s White House meeting included Gen. David Petraeus, commander of all U.S. forces in the Middle East and central Asia; Mr. Gates; Gen. McChrystal; and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

After years of pressing European allies for additional forces in Afghanistan, Mr. Obama made no mention of having discussed NATO contributions to the war effort after his meeting with Mr. Rasmussen.

But in an address Monday night to the Atlantic Council in Washington, the NATO secretary general said he believed the alliance must send more trainers to Afghanistan quickly or it will be impossible to draw down foreign troops in the future.

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ENVOY SAYS HIS REMOVAL SENDS OUT BAD SIGNAL (OCTOBER 1, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, October 1st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Envoy says his removal from Afghanistan sends out a bad signal about the UN SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Thursday October 1, 2009 (ANI)

London, Oct.1 : The senior UN envoy, who was removed from his post in Afghanistan, has told the BBC that his dismissal has sent out ―a terrible signal‖ to the world about the organisation.

Peter Galbraith said he believed he had been removed because of a dispute with his superior over how to handle fraud allegations in the country‘s recently held presidential elections.

He said that in not addressing the ―extensive‖ evidence of fraud, the UN had failed to uphold its Afghan mandate.

The UN said Galbraith‘s dismissal was ―in the best interest of the mission‖.

Galbraith told BBC‘s World Tonight that he had great respect for UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, but that he disagreed with his decision to remove him from his post.

―Not just on personal grounds, but because I think it sends a terrible signal when the UN removes an official because he was concerned about fraud in a UN-sponsored and funded election,‖ he said.

Galbraith said he had seen ―very extensive evidence of fraud‖ in August‘s president elections and had had ―a sharp disagreement‖ with his superior, Kai Eide, about how to address it.

He wanted to present the evidence to the Afghan Election Complaints Commission for further investigation, he said, but Eide ―did not want this information disseminated‖.

Galbraith said that when he intervened, President Hamid Karzai complained and Eide ―decided he would support Karzai, who would be the beneficiary of the fraudulent ballots‖.

He said Eide had initially ―tended to dismiss the fraud‖.

―Later, when the evidence of the fraud was inescapable he did talk about it but he‘s consistently minimised it,‖ he added.

EU election observers have said that about 1.5m votes - about a quarter of all ballots - cast in August‘s presidential vote could be fraudulent.

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Galbraith‘s questioning of the election commission had angered Karzai and several cabinet members, some of whom had said they no longer wanted to work with him.

But Galbraith said the UN had ―the mandate to support free, fair and transparent elections‖.

―That unfortunately imposed on us an obligation to raise the question of fraud in elections which were funded by the international community and supported by the United Nations,‖ he said.

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HOW CAN 40.000 TROOPS FIX CHRONIC CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN? (OCTOBER 1, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, October 1st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

How can 40,000 troops fix chronic corruption in Afghanistan? SOURCE: The Frontier Post Thursday, October 1, 2009

WASHINGTON/KABUL (NNI): Gen. Stanley McChrystal reportedly wants 40,000 troops for Afghanistan. But Obama is worried that the government of President Hamid Karzai is too corrupt. Comments by President Obama and his advisers this week suggest that the administration is slowly coming to the conclusion that the Afghan government - and not the Taliban - is perhaps the most serious impediment to progress in Afghanistan.

The US commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has essentially told Mr. Obama that the US must repeat an Iraq-style surge in Afghanistan - adding 40,000 troops to the 21,000 Obama has already sent - to succeed, The Christian Science Monitor reported.

Yet the administration isn‘t even debating this request yet. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said that he will leave McChrystal‘s troop request behind when he attends a series of White House meetings beginning this week about the way forward in Afghanistan. The reason is that the main concern now is not military. It is political. Is the Afghan government reliable?

After the surge in Iraq, McChrystal, Obama, and the administration can be reasonably confident that the US military has the intelligence and adaptability to fight a successful counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. The concern is that the Afghan government has become so rotted with corruption that it cannot consolidate the gains the US military makes. In other words, the US will never be able to leave Afghanistan unless there‘s at least a minimally effective government to help in the near term and then take over in the future. Former President Clinton put it this way on NBC‘s ―Meet the Press‖: ―To succeed, there needs to be a partner.‖

Doubt over that point, more than anything else, appears to be driving Obama‘s review. On ABC‘s ―This Week,‖ Secretary Gates said Obama always intended to ―reassess where were are‖ after the Afghan presidential election. But allegations of widespread fraud have turned that reassessment into a full-blown crossroads moment.

ELECTION WAS THE LAST STRAW: The doubts are well-founded, though they are not new. Analysts have struggled to invent terms to describe the depth of corruption in Afghanistan. One has called it a ―narco-kleptocracy,‖ with government posts on offer to the highest bidder and opium money fueling corruption on a massive scale. The US Drug Enforcement Administration has accused Afghan President Hamid Karzai‘s brother, Ahmed

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Wali, of running the opium trade in Kandahar Province. Law and order in the country has collapsed as many police use their posts primarily as a platform for bribe-taking.

Even before the election, President Karzai had lost broad public support in Afghanistan because of his government‘s inability - or unwillingness - to stifle corruption. Indeed, it is corruption, not insecurity, that most angers Afghans. Yet the reports of fraud from the Aug. 20 election were apparently too much for the Obama administration to ignore.

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US PULLOUT FROM AFGHANISTAN WOULD BE „DISASTROUS‟: MUSHARRAF (OCTOBER 5, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, October 5th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

US pullout from Afghanistan would be ‘disastrous’: Musharraf SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Monday, October 5, 2009 (IANS)

Former Pakistan president Pervez Musharraf says it would be ‗disastrous‘ for the United States to pull out of Afghanistan now, according to a media report.

The Americans need to prepare for the likelihood that more US troops will be needed in Afghanistan and that they will be there many years, he told Des Moines Register in Iowa.

If the Taliban are allowed to return to power, he said, they surely would allow Al Qaida terrorists to rebuild strength in Afghanistan, destabilising the region and posing a major threat to the US.

The only solution, Musharraf was quoted as saying, is for international troops, led by the US, to establish military dominance in Afghanistan and gain the trust of people there, so a long- term political solution can be formed.

Musharraf, the Des Moines Register said. waved off questions about how long it would take to stabilise Afghanistan.

‗May I suggest we forget about talking about timing,‘ he said. ‗We need to obtain objectives…When we lay down timing, it becomes very counterproductive.‘

Musharraf said Americans should not equate the situation in Afghanistan with the beginnings of the Vietnam War. The Vietnam conflict was a local problem, which posed no direct threat to the US, he said. ‗This is different,‘ he said.

‗This will engulf the whole region and have effects on the world. So I think defeat or a negative outcome in Afghanistan will have far more far-reaching consequences than you could have in Vietnam. Therefore, I think quitting is not an option.‘

When asked whether he believes Osama bin Laden is alive and hiding in Pakistan‘s mountains, Musharraf replied: ‗Your guess is as good or as bad as mine.‘

However, he said, bin Laden is no longer running a highly organised international terrorism operation. ‗Al Qaida is more a symbol now.

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NATO BATTLES FOR TALIBAN „JEWEL‟ KANDAHAR (OCTOBER 7, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, October 7th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

NATO battles for Taliban ‘jewel’ Kandahar SOURCE: The News International Wednesday, October 7, 2009

KANDAHAR MILITARY BASE, Afghanistan: The US Army faces a major challenge to win back the Taliban‘s historic stronghold of Kandahar - a key battleground in the increasingly bloody fight to control Afghanistan.

―Kandahar city is nationally critical,‖ said Steve Biddle, from the Centre of Foreign Relations think tank in Washington. ―It‘s one of the small number of places where a true setback could be a war loser.‖

A combat brigade of about 4,000 US soldiers has been sent to the volatile 54,000-square- kilometre southern province. Until their arrival, just 2,800 Canadian troops had spent the last three years trying to ensure security for the province‘s 900,000 people.

―Taliban have always viewed Kandahar city as the jewel of the south and as their ultimate goal,‖ said US intelligence officer Captain Mark Richardson. ―They believe that what Kandahar does, all the Afghans will do.‖

As the Afghan conflict enters its ninth year, the Taliban in Afghanistan now control most of the 17 districts in the province and have spread into Kandahar, Afghanistan‘s second city and the movement‘s spiritual home.

In a sign of its importance to the Nato coalition, the heavily-guarded military base to the south of the city has grown into the second-biggest behind Bagram, near the capital Kabul.

Originally constructed for 12,000 people, the base now has between 30,000 and 40,000 occupants from all countries participating in Nato‘s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations - and is getting bigger.

Armoured vehicles stretch as far as the eye can see, as Black Hawk helicopters, F-16 fighter jets and cargo planes take off and land in conveyor-belt succession. The US has deployed the majority of the 21,000 extra soldiers sent by President Barack Obama to Kandahar and the neighbouring province of Helmand, which produces most of the world‘s opium.

―Taliban have been very active in the south and I think we ignored them for the most part and concentrated our effort in the east, where al-Qaeda was more active,‖ a Pentagon military official told AFP on condition of anonymity. 278

―We really lost control of areas in the south.‖ Officials and experts criticise the decision to send most of the reinforcements to Helmand, which is less populous than Kandahar and seen as less influential to the war-torn country‘s future.

―If we retake Kandahar, if the people are satisfied and development works, that will spread everywhere in Afghanistan. Afghans say that change comes from Kandahar,‖ said a Western official familiar with the situation.

Three months after their arrival, US troops tasked with securing the main supply routes leading to Kabul, maintain they have had some successes.

―We have made incredible progress,‖ said Richardson, pointing to the Taliban withdrawal from its stronghold in Arghandab district, north of Kandahar.

―Kandahar is a microcosm of the strategic problems of the country,‖ said Biddle. ―There has to be a serious security force presence in the city. And the perception that it‘s better if it‘d be Afghan is exactly right. However the Afghan government in Kabul has not been particularly supportive.‖ The Western official added: ―The Taliban and others are taking advantage of the debate about troops and saying, ‗the foreigners won‘t stay beyond two years‘. That has had a negative impact on the population.‖

In addition, people here are victims of intimidation and racketeering by the Taliban, who often act with impunity. Several local leaders, fearing for their lives, do not even live in their own districts. International forces accept that they have come up against the problem of corruption of local authorities, which is hampering efforts to win the support of the population.

The underpaid Afghan police are widely seen as corrupt. Many Afghans also accuse the head of the provincial council, Ahmed Wali Karzai whose brother is the Afghan president, of involvement in criminal activities including drug trafficking.

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U.N. DATA SHOW DISCREPANCIES IN AFGHAN VOTE (OCTOBER 7, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, October 7th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

U.N. Data Show Discrepancies in Afghan Vote SOURCE: The Washington Post Wednesday, October 7, 2009 By COLUM LYNCH and JOSHUA PARTLOW Washington Post Staff Writers

UNITED NATIONS, Oct. 6 — Voter turnout data kept confidential by the United Nations‘ chief envoy in Kabul after Afghanistan‘s disputed August presidential election show that in some provinces the official vote count exceeded the estimated number of voters by 100,000 or more, providing further indication that the contest was marred by fraud.

In southern Helmand province — where 134,804 votes were recorded, 112,873 of them for President Hamid Karzai — the United Nations estimated that just 38,000 people voted, and possibly as few as 5,000, according to a U.N. spreadsheet obtained by The Washington Post.

The disclosure of the data seems likely to worsen a credibility crisis for the U.N. special envoy, Kai Eide, who is already facing allegations that he sided with Karzai. In the past week, two U.N. political officers in Kabul have resigned because of a lack of confidence in Eide‘s leadership, according to U.N. officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss personnel issues.

The departures were triggered by U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon‘s decision last week to fire Eide‘s American deputy, Peter W. Galbraith, after he accused his boss of failing to provide Afghan and international officials with evidence of fraud, primarily by Karzai‘s supporters.

Galbraith pressed Eide to turn over to international monitors the United Nations‘ estimated turnout data, which indicated that many fewer voters cast ballots in certain provinces than the number of votes recorded by election officials. Galbraith said Eide refused to share this data with the internationally led Electoral Complaints Commission once it became clear that the information reflected poorly on Karzai.

In an interview last week, Eide acknowledged withholding the data, saying that the information could not be verified and that he required a formal request in order to share it. He said he was confronted by a ―confusing situation‖ in which ―a lot of information was coming from sources that had their own agenda. We can‘t just hand over a bunch of information if we haven‘t made a solid assessment of it.‖

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Eide added that he ―really feels offended‖ by allegations that he favored Karzai, saying he had taken a balanced approach that enjoyed the ―unanimous‖ support of the international community.

The U.N. spreadsheet shows widespread discrepancies between turnout and results, particularly in the volatile southern and eastern provinces where Karzai won with large margins. There are also allegations of fraud by followers of Abdullah Abdullah, Karzai‘s main competitor, but on a lesser scale.

Diplomats in Kabul have previously referred to such discrepancies, but the U.N. data have not been publicly disclosed until now.

In Paktika province, for example, where Afghanistan‘s Independent Election Commission has reported that 212,405 valid votes were cast, including 193,541 for Karzai, the United Nations estimated that 35,000 voters turned out. In Kandahar province, which recorded 252,866 votes, including 221,436 for Karzai, the United Nations estimated that 100,000 people voted.

In several provinces won by Abdullah, the United Nations estimated a larger turnout than election officials recorded. In Balkh province, for example, the organization estimated that 450,000 people voted, while the results showed 297,557 votes, 46 percent of them for Abdullah.

Although the estimates in some cases include a broad range of possible turnout, Galbraith said it was important information to share with Afghan officials and international monitors. ―I favored turning it over to the Electoral Complaints Commission,‖ he said. ―I think we did an excellent job at collecting data. . . . We collected it with the idea of assisting the Afghan legal party that was investigating fraud, but Kai opposed turning it over.‖

Dan McNorton, the U.N. spokesman in Kabul, did not challenge the authenticity of the spreadsheet, but he said it should be read with caution. ―The information that you have is unsubstantiated raw data and should be treated as such,‖ he said.

McNorton said the Afghan and U.N.-backed electoral institutions are carrying out a ―robust and methodologically sound‖ audit of the suspect ballot boxes that will be completed by the end of the week. ―To suggest that UNAMA has supported one particular candidate over another is ludicrous,‖ he said, using the acronym for the U.N. mission in Afghanistan.

U.N. officials have accused Galbraith of seeking to overturn the Afghan constitution in his zeal to thwart Karzai‘s election victory, saying he sought to ―disenfranchise‖ large numbers of potential Karzai voters by closing 1,500 of 6,900 polling stations in volatile regions in southern and southeastern Afghanistan that are populated by members of the president‘s Pashtun ethnic group.

Senior U.N. officials also asserted that Galbraith urged Eide in a meeting in early September to consider annulling the elections because of fraud, to convince Karzai and Abdullah to step aside, and to set up a transitional government headed by Ashraf Ghani, a former World Bank economist who finished in fourth place with 2.7 percent of the vote. Galbraith, according to these officials, offered to seek support for the plan from Vice President Biden.

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―Here‘s a man, a U.N. representative, advocating an unconstitutional change of government,‖ Vijay Nambiar, Ban‘s chief of staff, said of Galbraith. ―Of course he was recalled. What would you have expected us to do?‖

Galbraith declined to discuss the details of the meeting but said there had been no formal proposal for a new government or a mission to Washington. ―It‘s a smoke screen to obscure the real issue, which was whether the U.N. should handle electoral fraud,‖ Galbraith said. ―There was no mission to Biden or anybody else because there was no plan to do this.‖

The disputed election results have complicated the Obama administration‘s efforts to persuade a skeptical American public of the need to prosecute a war on behalf of Karzai‘s government.

―There is nothing more important this year than the legitimacy and credibility of our Afghan partners,‖ said J. Alexander Thier, director for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace. ―The deepening skepticism in the United States about the entire engagement rests upon the idea that we don‘t have a credible partner in Afghanistan.‖

U.N. officials on both sides of the debate say Karzai — who secured 54.6 percent of the first- round vote — is ultimately expected to win the election, even without the help of fraudulent votes. But the reports of massive fraud have cast a cloud over Karzai‘s candidacy in Afghanistan, and Abdullah has stoked those suspicions by accusing Eide of bias toward the president.

On Saturday, Karl W. Eikenberry, the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, sought to bolster international support for the U.N.-backed election, telling a gathering of two dozen diplomats that the United States has full trust in Eide. ―The U.S. Embassy has full confidence in UNAMA and its leadership,‖ said Caitlin Hayden, a U.S. Embassy spokeswoman.

Edmond Mulet, the U.N. assistant secretary general for peacekeeping, also defended the envoy. ―Kai has the full support of the secretary general and of the most important stakeholders, the member states, including the United States, and all the ambassadors and special envoys sitting in Kabul,‖ he said.

But Galbraith has received backing from some rank-and-file staffers, including one former subordinate who said Galbraith ―was highly popular among the staff.‖

―The environment had become very toxic,‖ said Tracey Brinson, Galbraith‘s assistant in Kabul, who also plans to leave her job this month. ―There is a lot of anger, a lot of resentment, sort of hurt feelings, and people are a little disillusioned about what they are doing.‖

Partlow reported from Kabul.

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EMERGING GOAL FOR AFGHANISTAN - WEAKEN, NOT VANQUISH, TALIBAN (OCTOBER 9, 2009)

Written by admin on Friday, October 9th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Emerging Goal for Afghanistan: Weaken, Not Vanquish, Taliban SOURCE: The Washington Post Friday, October 9, 2009 By SCOTT WILSON

As it reviews its Afghanistan policy for the second time this year, the Obama administration has concluded that the Taliban cannot be eliminated as a political or military movement, regardless of how many combat forces are sent into battle.

The Taliban and the question of how the administration should regard the Islamist movement have assumed a central place in the policy deliberations underway at the White House, according to administration officials participating in the meetings.

Based on a stark assessment by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, and six hours of debate among the senior national security staff members so far, the administration has established guidelines on its strategy to confront the group.

The goal, senior administration officials said Thursday, is to weaken the Taliban to the degree that it cannot challenge the Afghan government or reestablish the haven it provided for al- Qaeda before the 2001 U.S. invasion. Those objectives appear largely consistent with McChrystal‘s strategy, which he says ―cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces‖ but should center on persuading the population to support the government.

―The Taliban is a deeply rooted political movement in Afghanistan, so that requires a different approach than al-Qaeda,‖ said a senior administration official who has participated in the meetings but has not advocated a particular strategy.

Some inside the White House have cited Hezbollah, the armed Lebanese political movement, as an example of what the Taliban could become. Hezbollah is considered a terrorist organization by the U.S. government, but the group has political support within Lebanon and participates, sometimes through intimidation, in the political process.

Some White House advisers have noted that although Hezbollah is a source of regional instability, it is not a threat to the United States. The senior administration official said the Hezbollah example has not been cited specifically to President Obama and has been raised only informally outside the Situation Room meetings.

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―People who study Islamist movements have made the connection,‖ said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.

Obama identified al-Qaeda as the chief target of his Afghanistan policy in March, when he announced that he would dispatch an additional 21,000 U.S. troops to the region, and his advisers have emphasized during the policy review that the administration views al-Qaeda and the Taliban as philosophically distinct organizations. White House press secretary Robert Gibbs said Thursday that ―there is clearly a difference between‖ the Taliban and ―an entity that, through a global, transnational jihadist network, would seek to strike the U.S. homeland.‖

―I think the Taliban are, obviously, exceedingly bad people that have done awful things,‖ Gibbs said. ―Their capability is somewhat different, though, on that continuum of transnational threats.‖

While some White House officials are advocating a narrower approach in Afghanistan focused first on al-Qaeda, some senior military leaders have endorsed McChrystal‘s call to vastly expand the war effort against insurgents, including those from the Taliban. The general is seeking tens of thousands of additional troops to carry out his strategy, and Obama will take up the specifics of that request for the first time Friday during a meeting at the White House with his national security team.

In his 66-page assessment of the war, McChrystal warns that the next 12 months will probably determine whether U.S. and international forces can regain the initiative from the Taliban.

McChrystal, whom Obama named in May as commander of the 100,000 U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan, writes that ―most insurgents are Afghans‖ and ―are directed by a small number of Afghan senior leaders based in Pakistan.‖ He says in the report that the Taliban operates a ―shadow government‖ that ―actively seeks to control the population and displace the national government and traditional power structures.‖

But weakening the Taliban politically, as McChrystal and the emerging White House strategy calls for, has been complicated by recent events on the ground.

For example, McChrystal‘s strategy relies on building an effective Afghan government as an alternative to the Taliban. But that goal has been undermined by widespread allegations of electoral fraud appearing to benefit President Hamid Karzai. Such allegations have raised questions about the legitimacy of his government.

At the same time, McChrystal is redeploying troops to towns and cities to better protect the Afghan population. The decision effectively leaves large stretches of territory to the Taliban, made up of a variety of groups united by an opposition to the international military presence. McChrystal argues in his assessment that securing the population and building a viable political alternative to the Taliban are at times more important than holding territory in such a counterinsurgency campaign.

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Asked how many troops would be needed to weaken the Taliban to an acceptable degree, the senior administration official said, ―That‘s the question. That‘s the sweet spot we‘re looking for.‖ About 68,000 U.S. troops are already scheduled to be on the ground in Afghanistan by the end of the year.

Obama has informed staff members and congressional leaders that he does not contemplate reducing the U.S. military presence there in the near term, and even those within the administration who argue against additional combat forces support maintaining the number of troops already there.

Saying that additional troops would provide the Taliban with fodder for further propaganda, Vice President Biden and some other senior White House officials have pushed an alternative. They have outlined a plan that would maintain current combat troop levels, speed up training of Afghan forces, intensify drone strikes against al-Qaeda operatives and help the nuclear- armed government of Pakistan counter the Taliban within its borders.

―If you accept as a premise that you will not eradicate every last element of the Taliban, preventing it from providing sanctuary to al-Qaeda or threatening the government will still require resources,‖ the official said. ―That‘s why we‘re not talking about only a counterterrorism campaign.‖

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PAKISTANIS VOW REVENGE FOR ASSAULT BY TALIBAN (OCTOBER 12, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, October 12th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Pakistanis Vow Revenge for Assault by Taliban SOURCE: The Wall Street Journal Monday, October 12, 2009 By MATTHEW ROSENBERG and ZAHID HUSSAIN

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — The brazen militant attack on Pakistan‘s military headquarters that left 20 people dead this weekend sets the stage for a Pakistani assault on the country‘s most entrenched Taliban stronghold.

The Pakistani army is expected to target the Mehsud faction of the Taliban, which operates in the country‘s mountainous South Waziristan tribal area.

The Mehsud faction claimed responsibility for the weekend‘s attack in Rawalpindi, outside Islamabad, in which 10 gunmen disguised as soldiers infiltrated the headquarters of the military, arguably Pakistan‘s most powerful and respected institution, in a 45-minute gun battle. A 22-hour standoff between militants and Pakistani army commandos ended Sunday morning when 39 hostages held by the militants were freed.

The attack is likely to accelerate plans for a Waziristan ground offensive the government has long warned is coming, say Pakistani civilian and military officials. ―We are going to come heavy on you,‖ Interior Minister Rehman Malik warned the Taliban in televised remarks.

But any offensive is likely to highlight the gap between Pakistan and the U.S. on how to deal with the Pakistan-based Taliban, the loose confederation of ethnic Pashtun militant groups that operates in rugged tribal areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and often serves as a de facto government.

The U.S. has long advocated a broad crackdown on all Pakistan-based Taliban. Washington argues that the most powerful Taliban factions here are providing support to those fighting in Afghanistan against U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces. The U.S. is currently considering a plan to deploy up to 60,000 additional troops to Afghanistan to counter the threat of the Taliban there.

Pakistan has taken a narrower approach. Even as an attack appears imminent against the Mehsud Taliban, Islamabad is seeking to renew peace deals with two other powerful Taliban factions in the country, say officials and tribal elders with ties to the militants.

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These factions, which have a history of on-again, off-again truces with the government, provide men and materiel to the Afghan insurgency, these people say. But the two groups haven‘t been involved in widespread violence against Pakistani citizens outside the country‘s tribal areas, officials say, adding they believe they can reach an accommodation with both groups though they have violated past truces.

That approach has drawn the ire of U.S. officials, who say Pakistan‘s unwillingness to act against Afghan Taliban leaders operating out of the tribal areas, and their Pakistani hosts, is undermining the U.S. effort in Afghanistan.

Aid to Afghan Taliban

In a September assessment delivered to the Obama administration, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, bluntly stated that the Afghan insurgency ―is clearly supported from Pakistan,‖ reportedly with aid from some elements of Pakistan‘s Inter- Services Intelligence spy agency.

―Stability in Pakistan is essential, not only in its own right, but also to enable progress in Afghanistan,‖ the assessment said, reflecting a widely held view among U.S. officials.

A Western diplomat in Islamabad called it ―worrying‖ that Pakistan was cutting new peace deals with some factions. ―Letting these guys run parts of the tribal areas is the problem. We don‘t see the distinction between ‗Good Taliban‘ and ‗Bad Taliban.‘ They‘re all Taliban,‖ the diplomat said.

Pakistan denies sheltering or aiding any Afghan Taliban. But ISI officials do acknowledge maintaining contacts with some of the major Taliban factions on both sides of the Pakistan- Afghanistan border.

Welcomed Hard Line

The U.S. has welcomed Pakistan‘s hard line against the Mehsud faction, which is allied with al Qaeda and other militant groups. In the past months, Pakistan‘s military has conducted air and artillery bombardment in the area. Pakistan also took forceful action earlier this year against another Taliban faction that had taken control of the Swat Valley northwest of Islamabad.

Officials say the South Waziristan territory of the Mehsud, a Pashtun tribe, has been the launching point for the vast majority of terror attacks inside Pakistan over the past two years. The chief spokesman for Pakistan‘s army, Gen. Athar Abbas, calls the area ―the center of gravity of all extremism in Pakistan.‖

The weekend‘s attackers in Rawalpindi were led by Mohammed Aqeel, also known as Dr. Usman, who Pakistani officials say was captured during the attack. He is also believed responsible for masterminding a March attack on the visiting Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore, in which six police officers were killed. Security officials say he is a key member of 287

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a banned Punjabi militant outfit with strong links to the Taliban‘s Mehsud faction and al Qaeda.

The militants‘ embarrassing infiltration into the core of Pakistan‘s army raised questions about the security of the important military installation.

Pakistan‘s police intelligence service warned last week that militants were planning an attack on army headquarters, a warning that appeared earlier this month in the News, an English- language newspaper in Pakistan.

The attackers had been staying for weeks in a house in a lower-middle-class neighborhood on the outskirts of Islamabad, according to the report. The police intelligence agency had intercepted the attack plan from a computer disk recovered from a militant killed by police last month, police and intelligence officials said Sunday. It is unclear why the warning wasn‘t heeded.

―The militants have humiliated the army,‖ said retired Brig. Javed Hussain.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, speaking in London on Sunday, said the attack showed extremists were ―increasingly threatening the authority of the state, but we see no evidence that they are going to take over the state.‖ She added: ―We have confidence in the Pakistani government and military‘s control over nuclear weapons.‖

In its fight against the Mehsud Taliban, peace deals with other Taliban factions will help improve the army‘s chances by sidelining what Pakistani officials consider less dangerous elements of the Taliban, these officials say.

One faction negotiating with the military is based in the North Waziristan tribal area, adjacent to the area where the Mehsud Taliban operates. It is run by Hafiz Gul Bahadur, who has struck at least two previous peace deals with the government, say officials and tribal elders with ties to the Taliban.

Mr. Bahadur most recently abandoned a truce in June over Pakistani cooperation with a U.S. campaign of missile strikes via pilotless drones in the tribal areas. Those attacks are credited with decimating al Qaeda‘s second- and third-tier leadership.

The other faction that is negotiating is based in South Waziristan and run by Maulvi Nazir.

A senior Pakistani government official overseeing the tribal areas, Habibullah Khan, said both men had ―maintained calm and peace in their areas,‖ and that officials were content to let them run their own affairs.

Friendly Factions

The factions run by Messrs. Nazir and Bahadur are considered among the Pakistan Taliban‘s strongest. Earlier this year, under orders from Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, they formed an alliance with Baitullah Mehsud, the late leader of the Mehsud faction

288 and the overall chief of the Pakistan Taliban, Mr. Khan said. Mr. Mehsud was slain in an August missile strike by a U.S. drone aircraft.

But neither Taliban leader was particularly fond of Mr. Mehsud or his replacement, Hakimullah Mehsud, said a tribal elder from North Waziristan, Gul Khan, in a recent interview. Both preferred to focus on aiding the Afghan Taliban, not fighting Pakistan, said Mr. Khan, who is close with Mr. Bahadur.

That allowed tribal elders ―to persuade both men that this is not a time to join with other forces and bring war to your territories,‖ said Habibullah Khan, the government official. He insisted the government has made no formal deals with the groups, just ―understandings.‖

However, Gul Khan, among other tribal elders, said in recent interviews that proper deals were being struck by both Messrs. Bahadur and Nazir. Among the terms: not to allow other Taliban groups to use their territory to launch attacks against Pakistan. Their activities in Afghanistan didn‘t figure into the deals, he said.

Asked about the latest peace deals, State Department spokesman Philip J. Crowley said Sunday: ―Whatever reconciliation activity Pakistan engages in needs to be effective. I‘ll leave it to Pakistan to decide what steps it needs to take.‖

Rehmat Mehsud in Rawalpindi and Neil King Jr. in Washington contributed to this article.

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GUNMEN, BOMBS HIT 5 SITES IN PAKISTAN, 39 DIE (OCTOBER 15, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, October 15th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Gunmen, bombs hit 5 sites in Pakistan, 39 die SOURCE: Associated Press Thursday October 15, 2009 By BABAR DOGAR and MUNIR AHMAD

LAHORE, Pakistan - Teams of gunmen launched coordinated attacks on three law enforcement facilities in Pakistan‘s eastern city of Lahore and car bombs hit two other cities Thursday, killing a total of 39 people in an escalating wave of anti-government violence.

The bloodshed, aimed at scuttling a planned offensive into the Taliban heartland near the Afghan border, highlights the Islamist militants‘ ability to carry out sophisticated strikes on heavily fortified facilities and exposes the failure of the intelligence agencies to adequately infiltrate the extremist cells.

No group immediately claimed responsibility, though suspicion fell on the Pakistani Taliban who have claimed other recent strikes. The attacks Thursday also were the latest to underscore the growing threat to Punjab, the province next to India where the Taliban are believed to have made inroads and linked up with local insurgent outfits.

President Asif Ali Zardari said the bloodshed that has engulfed the nation over the past 11 days would not deter the government from its mission to eliminate the violent extremists.

―The enemy has started a guerrilla war,‖ Interior Minister Rehman Malik said. ―The whole nation should be united against these handful of terrorists, and God willing we will defeat them.‖

The wave of violence practically shut down daily life in Lahore. All government offices were ordered shut, the roads were nearly empty and major markets were closed.

The assaults began about 9 a.m. when a group of gunmen attacked the Federal Investigation Agency, the national law enforcement body.

The attack lasted about 1 1/2 hours and ended with the death of two assailants, four government employees and a bystander, senior official Sajjad Bhutta said. Police official Chaudhry Shafiq said one of the dead wore a suicide vest.

A second band of gunman then raided a police training school on the outskirts of the city, killing nine police officers, officials said. Police killed one gunmen and the other three blew themselves up.

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A third team then scaled the back wall of a police commando training center near the airport, Lahore police chief Pervez Rathore said. The attackers stood on the roof of a house, shooting at security forces and throwing grenades, said Lt. Gen. Shafqat Ahmad, the top military officer in Lahore.

Two attackers were slain in the gunbattle and three blew themselves up, he said. A police nursing assistant and a civilian also died, he said.

TV footage showed helicopters in the air over one of the police facilities and paramilitary forces with rifles and bulletproof vests taking cover behind trees outside the compound‘s wall.

Officials have warned that Taliban fighters close to the border, Punjabi militants spread out across the country and foreign al-Qaida operatives were increasingly joining forces, dramatically increasing the dangers to Pakistan. Punjab is Pakistan‘s most populous and powerful province, and the Taliban claimed recently that they were activating cells there and elsewhere in the country for assaults.

An official at the provincial Punjab government‘s main intelligence agency said they had precise information about expected attacks on security targets and alerted police this week, but the assailants still managed to strike. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to comment on the situation.

Despite their reach and influence, the nation‘s feared spy agencies have failed to stop the bloody attacks plaguing the country.

Kamran Bokhari, an analyst with Stratfor, a U.S.-based global intelligence firm, said Pakistan needed to penetrate more militant groups and intercept conversations to prevent attacks, but the task was complicated in a country so big and populous.

―The militants are able to exploit certain things on the ground, like the anti-American sentiment, which is not just in society - it‘s also in the military,‖ he added.

In the Taliban-riddled northwest, meanwhile, a suicide car bomb exploded next to a police station in the Saddar area of Kohat, collapsing half the building and killing 11 people - three police officers and eight civilians - Kohat police chief Abdullah Khan said.

Early Thursday evening, a bomb exploded in a car outside a housing complex for government employees in the northwestern city of Peshawar, killing a 6-year-old boy and wounding nine others, most of them women and children, said Liaqat Ali Khan, the top police official in the region. He said an assailant parked the car outside the house and walked away before remotely detonating the bomb.

The U.S. has encouraged Pakistan to take strong action against insurgents who are using its soil as a base for attacks in Afghanistan, where U.S. troops are bogged down in an increasingly difficult war. It has carried out a slew of its own missile strikes in Pakistan‘s lawless tribal belt over the past year, killing several top militants.

One suspected U.S. missile strike killed four people overnight Thursday when it hit a compound in an area in North Waziristan tribal region where members of the militant network

291 led by Jalaluddin Haqqani are believed to operate, two intelligence officials said. They spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to the media.

Pakistan formally protests the missile strikes as violations of its sovereignty, but many analysts believe it has a secret deal with the U.S. allowing them.

The Taliban have claimed credit for a wave of attacks that began with an Oct. 5 strike on the U.N. food agency in Islamabad and included a siege of the army‘s headquarters in the garrison city of Rawalpindi that left 23 people dead.

The Taliban have warned Pakistan to stop pursuing them in military operations.

The Pakistani army has given no time frame for its expected offensive in South Waziristan tribal region, but has reportedly already sent two divisions totaling 28,000 men and blockaded the area.

Fearing the looming offensive, about 200,000 people have fled South Waziristan since August, moving in with relatives or renting homes in the Tank and Dera Ismail Khan areas, a local government official said, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to the media.

___

Ahmad reported from Islamabad. Associated Press Writers Rasool Dawar in Mir Ali, Riaz Khan in Peshawar and Zarar Khan and Nahal Toosi in Islamabad contributed to this report.

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PAKISTAN IN FREE FALL (OCTOBER 15, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, October 15th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Pakistan in free fall SOURCE: The Pioneer Thursday, October 15, 2009 By G PARTHASARATHY

The tranquillity around Pakistan‘s Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi,where the Army‘s X Corps, whose main claim to fame is its propensity to stage coups against civilian Governments, is also located, was rudely disturbed on October 11. A small group of militants clad in military uniforms from the Amjad Farooqi group of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan struck at the hallowed precincts of the Army Headquarters, killed Army personnel, including a Brigadier and Lieutenant Colonel and held the entire Headquarters of the Pakistani Army hostage for around 18 hours. A few days earlier, a militant dressed in the uniform of the predominantly Pashtun Frontier Constabulary carried out a suicide bomb attack on the UN offices at the very heart of the capital, Islamabad. The attacks had evidently been planned by people with inside knowledge of security arrangements in the most sensitive areas of the national capital.

These attacks came at a time when Pakistan was witnessing an unseemly tussle between the elected Government headed by President Asif Ali Zardari and Army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, over the provisions of the Kerry-Lugar Act passed by the US Congress, authorising $ 7.5 billion of economic assistance to Pakistan. A statement issued last week after a meeting of Corps Commanders presided over by Gen Kayani, alleged the provisions of the US legislation violated Pakistani sovereignty and called on the country‘s Parliament to decide whether the provisions of the Act should be accepted. Interestingly, this Army intervention, quite obviously intended to create a rift between President Zardari, who is a supporter of the US legislation and the Parliament, came after an unprecedented meeting in Rawalpindi between Mr Shahbaz Sharif, the Chief Minister of Punjab and brother of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, accompanied by the leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly, Mr Chaudhury Nisar Ali Khan, on the one hand and Gen Ashfaq Kayani, on the other. Mr Chaudhury Nisar is spearheading the opposition to the Kerry-Lugar Bill in Parliament.

Responding to the Army‘s insubordination, Zardari‘s spokesman noted that it was inappropriate for the Army to comment publicly on a sensitive issue and that its concerns should have, more appropriately, been placed before the Defence Committee of the Cabinet.

The furore in Pakistan on the Kerry-Lugar Act, which has been fomented by Gen Kayani, is largely contrived. No one denies that the cash strapped country desperately needs foreign economic assistance. Reflecting American and international concerns, the Kerry-Lugar Act requires the Secretary of State to certify the Pakistani Government has acted to prevent Al

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Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and the Jaish-e- Mohammed from operating in the territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks, into neighbouring countries.

There are also provisions seeking certification that entities in Pakistan are not involved in nuclear proliferation, that the Pakistani Army is under effective civilian and Parliamentary scrutiny and control and that all support for terrorist groups from elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence services,has ceased. These provisions for monitoring the role of Pakistan‘s military and its intelligence services have obviously rattled Gen Kayani and his cohorts. American displeasure at the ISI‘s support for Mullah Omar and Taliban military commanders like Sirajuddin Haqqani, who are spearheading attacks against American forces in Afghanistan, has been frequently voiced.

The actions of the Pakistani Army suggest that while it may reluctantly take on Taliban groups which question the writ of the Pakistan State,like Maulana Fazlullah‘s supporters in Swat and the TTP led now by Hakeemullah Mehsud, in South Waziristan, it will continue to support Afghan and Pakistani Taliban groups waging jihad against the Americans in Afghanistan. For over three months, the Army has been preparing to attack the strongholds in South Waziristan of Hakeemullah Mehsud and his Uzbek allies from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which was led by Tahir Yuldeshev. Yuldeshev had close links with the ISI since the 1990s, when the ISI facilitated his links with the Taliban and Al Qaeda and used his Uzbek forces to target the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, led by Ahmed

Shah Masood. Yuldeshev was reportedly killed in a US Drone attack on September 26. The Pakistani Army has now amassed around 28,000 soldiers for an assault, backed by air power and American drones, in South Waziristan. The assault by the TTP on the Army headquarters in Rawalpindi is a clear warning to the Pakistani military establishment that the TTP will hit at targets across Pakistan, if the Army targets it.

Past operations of the Pakistani Army in South Waziristan, bordering

Afghanistan, have failed miserably. It remains to be seen whether the Army has the ability and courage to take on the TTP and its Uzbek and other allies in South Waziristan, successfully. Moreover, there had to be support from elements within the security forces, in recent terrorist attacks in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, as the militants evidently had inside information on the vulnerabilities in the security structure. Can the Army and Frontier Constabulary now be sure that Pashtun soldiers, who hail from the tribal areas and constitute a substantial portion of the security forces, will remain steadfast in their resolve in operations that target the homes of their kith and kin? Moreover, while there was widespread political consensus within Pakistan, in Army operations in Swat, which is very close to the capital Islamabad, will there be a sustained political consensus if operations in South Waziristan are prolonged? Finally, the impending operations in South Waziristan are based on the assumption that Taliban groups elsewhere in the tribal areas will not come to aid of their erstwhile allies in South Waziristan. Is this a realistic assumption? As more and more groups once supported by the ISI turn against the Pakistani army, the US Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson recently remarked: You cannot tolerate a viper in your bosom without getting bitten!!

Pakistan is moving into even more turbulent and troubled waters as its Army, given to dictating the national agenda, confronts new challenges. But, perhaps the most shocking

294 aspect of these developments is that Mr Nawaz Sharif, who was ousted in a military coup a decade ago, now finds it expedient to make common cause with Gen Kayani. Even the political establishment seems divided on the utility of terrorist groups in Pakistan‘s relations with its neighbours.

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AFGHANISTAN - OBAMA‟S NIGHTMARE (OCTOBER 16, 2009)

Written by admin on Friday, October 16th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Afghanistan: Obama’s nightmare SOURCE: The Frontier Post Friday October 16, 2009 By: IHSANULLAH TIPU

The deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan due to Taliban-led insurgency has become a dreaded nightmare for International Coalition (IC) to deal with. A serious split seems to have occurred among the coalition war partners on the issue of setting troops exit deadline. Canada, the third largest troop shareholder after US and UK and Netherlands, a key member of NATO alliance, is planning to pull back its troops from this ―Graveyard of Empires‖ where war has become increasingly unwinnable. ―Enough is enough; time for the troops to come home‖, Canadian conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper declared on Friday. Dutch government comprising coalition partners Labour and the orthodox Christian ChristenUnie decided on Sep 30th in an intense debate in parliament regarding Dutch participation in Afghan war to stop any move in the parliament asking for extension of its mission in Afghanistan beyond 2010. This could be the beginning of the end for the NATO mission in Afghanistan. On the other hand, Japan, a key US East Asian ally is also going to end its refueling mission in Afghanistan after expiry of its legal mandate in January 2010. ―The law will expire in January. We will solemnly withdraw based on the law,‖ Defence Minister Toshimi Kitazawa said on Tuesday.

US President Barack Obama is also skeptical of troops increase in Afghanistan despite persistent requests from Gen. McChrystal, Coalition commander in Afghanistan. Serious division has occurred among the members of Obama‘s Afghan war council on the issue of troops surge in Afghanistan. The Associated Press (AP) in its recent report quoting an unnamed top ranking White House official revealed that during recently summoned Obama war council meeting on Afghanistan, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Richard Holbrooke, Adm. Mike Mullen and Gen. David Petraeus, appeared to be leaning toward supporting a troop increase in Afghanistan. While President Obama, Vice President Joe Biden, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel and Gen., national security adviser James Jones were reluctant and stressed for specific target oriented operations across Pak-Afghan borders. In this scenario the deployment of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) - the secret assassination and sabotage US armed Unit working directly under US President in Helmand, close to Pak-Afghan border might be the part of this strategy.

Economic meltdown, growing diplomatic isolation, emergence of multi-polarity and involvement in protracted and meaningless wars are factors seriously undermining American global supremacy. The unilateral decision of Obama‘s administration of adjourning deployment of missile shield programme in Czech Republic and Poland to defend her East European allies against possible Russian aggression in future has been widely perceived in

296 diplomatic circles as a humiliating blow to US international standing. Last year Moscow invasion of Georgia has rekindled the expansionist designs of former Soviet Union. Once non-compromising America is now bending down on every single stance.

Obama administration is also considering a policy shift to isolate Taliban from al-Qaeda. Taliban with limited objectives confined to Afghanistan have been considered in the West as less-dangerous in contrast to al-Qaeda which has transnational reach and working on the agenda to overthrow Western sponsored Muslim governments and drive out Western bases from Arabian Peninsula in order to establish a Caliphate across the Muslim world. ―They‘re (Taliban) not the same type of group (al-Qaeda),‖ White House press secretary Robert Gibbs recently described. But the question arises whether this policy will be feasible?

So far Taliban fighters have never disassociated themselves from al-Qaeda, both ideologically and operationally. They have been supportive of each other. Al-Qaeda is seen as a major financial aide to Taliban in their fight against International Coalition in Afghanistan. Al- Qaeda is equally being involved in strategic and operational planning in Afghanistan. Improvised Explosive Device (IED), the most lethal weapon so far proved against the western forces in Afghanistan, was basically introduced by al-Qaeda in its different and very simplistic forms to Taliban. Al-Qaeda generally known as a bunch of Arab fighters is now recruiting members from Central Asian Republics (CARs), North Africa, South Asia, Europe etc. This global posture has made it a potent threat to the West.

But if the above approach does not work, the second strategy US might probably be opted for is the phased withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan after enabling Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) to tackle the threat. This will be an attempt to ―Afghanise‖ the war as historically foreign forces have never been welcomed in Afghanistan. Paul Pillar, a former CIA veteran for almost 30 years and national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia during the invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) recently commented on the policy of phased withdrawal of Western forces from Afghanistan: ―If general McChrystal gets his way - I understand he wants 45,000 extra troops - then the US will reach the level of the Russians at the peak of their deployment in the eighties: more than 100,000. You don‘t want to go there. I‘m not in favour of a precipitate withdrawal. I would envision something parallel to what is going on in Iraq, where we‘re pulling out all the troops by the end of 2011. A timetable for withdrawal.‖

Ironically so far all these policy shifts adopted in Afghanistan to dismantle the rapidly mounting threat of Iinsurgency have appallingly failed. US is now between a hard place and a rock and seems confused how to get rid of this menace. Growing US public resentments over Afghan war also undermines Obama‘s war efforts. Mr. Obama unlike his predecessor G.W Bush seems a reasonable person and will certainly take steps to end nearly a decade long illegal occupation of Afghanistan.

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PAKISTAN ATTACKS SHOW TIGHTENING OF MILITANT LINKS (OCTOBER 16, 2009)

Written by admin on Friday, October 16th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Pakistan Attacks Show Tightening of Militant Links SOURCE: The New York Times Friday, October 16, 2009 By JANE PERLEZ

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan - A wave of attacks against top security installations over the last several days demonstrated that the Taliban, Al Qaeda and militant groups once nurtured by the government are tightening an alliance aimed at bringing down the Pakistani state, government officials and analysts said.

More than 30 people were killed Thursday in Lahore, the second largest city in Pakistan, as three teams of militants assaulted two police training centers and a federal investigations building. The dead included 19 police officers and at least 11 militants, police officials said.

Nine others were killed in two attacks at a police station in Kohat, in the northwest, and a residential complex in Peshawar, capital of North-West Frontier Province.

The assaults in Lahore, coming after a 20-hour siege at the army headquarters in Rawalpindi last weekend, showed the deepening reach of the militant network, as well as its rising sophistication and inside knowledge of the security forces, officials and analysts said.

The umbrella group for the Pakistani Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban, claimed responsibility for the attacks in Lahore, the independent television news channel Geo reported on its Web site.

But the style of the attacks also revealed the closer ties between the Taliban and Al Qaeda and what are known as jihadi groups, which operate out of southern Punjab, the country‘s largest province, analysts said. The cooperation has made the militant threat to Pakistan more potent and insidious than ever, they said.

The government has tolerated the Punjabi groups, including Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar- e-Jhangvi, for years, and many Pakistanis consider them allies in just causes, including fighting India, the United States and Shiite Muslims. But they have become entwined with the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and have increasingly turned on the state.

The alliance has now stepped up attacks as the military prepares an assault on the Taliban stronghold of South Waziristan, where senior members of the Punjabi groups also find sanctuary and support.

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―These are all Punjabi groups with a link to South Waziristan,‖ Aftab Ahmed Sherpao, a former interior minister, said, explaining the recent attacks.

In a rare acknowledgment of the lethal combination of forces, Interior Minister Rehman Malik said that a ―syndicate‖ of militant groups wanted to see ―Pakistan as a failed state.‖

―The banned Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e- Jhangvi are operating jointly in Pakistan,‖ Mr. Malik told journalists, pledging a more effective counterstrategy.

In Washington, senior intelligence officials said the multiple coordinated attacks were a characteristic of operations influenced by Al Qaeda. But the officials said they were still sifting through intelligence reports to determine whether the attacks indeed marked an attempt by Al Qaeda to assert more influence over the Pakistani Taliban‘s operations.

They said the assaults also might have been orchestrated by the Taliban to avenge the death of Baitullah Mehsud, the Pakistani Taliban leader, and send a stark message that the insurgents could still carry out daring attacks without him.

The fresh violence highlights the expanding challenges as the Obama administration tries to bolster Pakistan‘s civilian government and encourage the military to press its campaign against the Taliban.

On Thursday, President Obama signed a civilian aid package for Pakistan of $7.5 billion over five years. The package has prompted friction over conditions for the aid - like greater civilian oversight of the military and demands that Pakistan drop support for militant groups - which army officers and politicians considered infringements on Pakistan‘s sovereignty.

The White House issued a statement on Thursday noting the shared interests of the countries. However, in a sign of scant sympathy for the unappreciative reaction to the money, there was no signing ceremony.

The rise in more penetrating terrorist attacks may now add its own pressure on the Pakistani government to crack down on the Punjabi militants. It is time for the government to come out in public and explain the nature of the enemy, said Khalid Aziz, a former chief secretary of North-West Frontier Province.

―The national narrative in support of jihad has confused the Pakistani mind,‖ Mr. Aziz said. ―All along we‘ve been saying these people are trying to fight a war of Islam, but there is a need for transforming the national narrative.‖

The jihadi groups were formally banned by the former president, Pervez Musharraf, after the Sept. 11 attacks, when Pakistan joined the United States in the campaign against terrorism.

But the groups have entrenched domestic and political constituencies, as well as shadowy ties to former military officials and their families, analysts said. Even since the ban, they have been allowed to operate in Punjab, often in the open.

Punjab is the major recruiting center for the Pakistani Army and it hosts more army divisions than any other province. Yet ―these groups proliferate and operate with impunity, literally 299 under the nose of Pakistan‘s army,‖ said Christine Fair, assistant professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

A large congregation of jihadi groups, including Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, met six months ago in Rawalpindi, the city where the army headquarters was attacked last Saturday, said Mr. Sherpao, the former interior minister.

The nature of the Lahore attacks drove home the point that the ―war has come to Punjab,‖ and that the government can no longer hide the alliance between the Taliban in South Waziristan and the forces in Southern Punjab, said Zaffar Abbas, a prominent journalist at the English- language newspaper Dawn.

Until the people are told the real situation, the government will never win the support of the people ―to fight this bloody war,‖ Mr. Abbas said.

In fact, many Pakistanis do not see the jihadi groups as the enemy, said Farrukh Saleem, the executive director for the Center for Research and Security Studies in Islamabad. ―They feel America is in the region and the Pakistani Army is fighting for an American army and the jihadis have a right to retaliate,‖ he said.

The senior personnel in the security forces seem to understand the gravity of the militants‘ strength and the durability of their network, Mr. Saleem said. But they cannot bring themselves to say publicly that those whom they created are coming back to bite them, he said.

The ringleader of the assault on the army headquarters on Saturday, identified as Muhammad Aqeel, was a member of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, according to the military spokesman, Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas. Mr. Aqeel, who was captured alive, is also a former soldier in the Army Medical Corps, a background that appeared to have helped in planning the attack.

Two of the facilities attacked in and near Lahore on Thursday - the six-story building of the federal investigations agency, and a police training unit in the suburb of Manawan - were hit by militants in deadly assaults in 2008 and earlier this year.

The coordination of the attacks by three teams between 9 and 10 a.m. startled police officials as they scrambled to send commandos to each of the sites.

The raid on the headquarters of the Punjab elite police training school was seen as particularly insulting because its graduates, trained in counterterrorism techniques, are considered the pride of the province.

Five militants scaled a wall of the elite training school, where more than 800 recruits had just started classes, said Maj. Gen. Shafqat Ahmed, the officer commanding security forces in Lahore.

Six police officers were killed and seven were wounded in a gun battle that lasted more than two hours, police officials said. All five of the attackers were killed, they said.

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Reporting was contributed by Salman Masood from Islamabad, Waqar Gilani from Lahore, Pakistan, Pir Zubair Shah from Peshawar, Pakistan, and Eric Schmitt from Washington.

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PAK ARMY KICK STARTS OFFENSIVE AGAINST TALIBAN IN SOUTH WAZIRISTAN (OCTOBER 17, 2009)

Written by admin on Saturday, October 17th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Pak Army kick starts offensive against Taliban in South Waziristan SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Saturday, October 17, 2009 (ANI)

Islamabad, Oct.17 : Following the go-ahead received from the government, the Pakistani security forces have started their offensive in South Waziristan, which is considered a stronghold of the Taliban.

Pakistani Air Force pounded militant hideouts in Ladha and Sarokai tehsil as ground troops started advancing in different parts of the region.

Large numbers of people have left the region fearing an intense battle between the military and the extremists. Hordes of people have started arriving in Peshawar, Bannu and North Waziristan.

Meanwhile, extremists attacked a military convoy in Kalkola area near Jandola in which a security personnel was killed and three others were wounded.

Earlier, Pakistan Army Chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, briefed members of the PPP- led ruling coalition about the Waziristan military offensive. he briefing took place at Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani‘s house.

According to the report, members of the Pakistan People‘s Party (PPP), the Awami National Party (ANP), the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and the Jamiatulema-i-Islam - Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F) were present in the meeting.

Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Interior Minister Rehman Malik, Information Minister Qamruzzaman Kaira, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief Ahmad Shuja Pasha and all the Chief Ministers were also reportedly present at the briefing.

General Kayani is also expected to update the ruling coalition members about the overall security situation in the country.

A statement issued after the meeting said the political leadership pointed out that there was already a consensus across the country that extremism and militancy must be rooted out and the writ of the state be restored.

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―The recent upsurge of terror incidents in the country was condemned and it was agreed that these elements pose a serious threat to the sovereignty and integrity of the state,‖ the statement said.

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NOVEMBER 7 RUNOFF ORDERED IN AFGHAN ELECTION (OCTOBER 20, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, October 20th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Runoff ordered in Afghan election marred by fraud SOURCE: Associated Press Tuesday, October 20, 2009 By RAHIM FAIEZ and HEIDI VOGT

KABUL - Afghanistan‘s election commission Tuesday ordered a Nov. 7 runoff in the disputed presidential poll after a fraud investigation dropped incumbent Hamid Karzai‘s votes below 50 percent of the total. Karzai accepted the finding and agreed to a second round vote.

The announcement came two months to the day after the first round vote and follows weeks of political uncertainty at a time when Taliban strength is growing.

The chairman of the Independent Election Commission, Azizullah Lodin, said the commission, which organized the Aug. 20 vote, did not want to ―leave the people of Afghanistan in uncertainty‖ any longer.

Karzai announced his acceptance of the findings at a press conference alongside U.S. Sen. John Kerry and Kai Eide, the head of the U.N. mission in Afghanistan. Kerry said the agreement on a second round had transformed the crisis into a ―moment of great opportunity.‖

Kerry said Karzai ―has shown genuine leadership in the decision he has made today.‖ It showed that Afghanistan ―recommits to the democratic process,‖ Kerry said, further complimenting Karzai for his ―openness to finding ways of resolving differences.‖ ―The international community is 100 percent committed to helping to carry out this election,‖ Kerry said.

The possibility of a runoff emerged Monday after a U.N.-backed panel threw out a third of Karzai‘s votes from the Aug. 20 ballot, pushing his totals below the 50 percent threshold needed for a first round victory and setting the stage for a run-off against former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah.

―The commission is agreed to go to a second round and say that nobody got more than 50 percent,‖ Lodin said. Lodin said all the materials are ready for the Nov. 7 runoff.

Another election risks the same fraud that derailed the August vote, along with inciting violence and increasing ethnic divisions. A November runoff also could be hampered by winter snows that block off much of the country starting mid-month.

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The primary alternative that has been floated is a power-sharing deal, though the form that could take is unclear. And it could take weeks or months to hammer out an agreement between the two rivals.

So, the United States is still far from finding a government it can point to as a legitimate partner in the increasingly violent battle against the Taliban.

In the latest fighting, Afghan and international forces killed about half a dozen militants during a raid on compounds used by a Taliban commander in eastern Wardak province on Tuesday, the U.S. military said in a statement.

A spokesman for the Abdullah campaign said earlier they do not consider a coalition or power-sharing government an acceptable alternative.

―A coalition is against the law and does not benefit the political process of the country,‖ Fazel Sancharaki said, noting that Afghan electoral law has no provisions for such a process. ―If anyone proposes that, they should have very strong reasons for it.‖ He did not elaborate on what reasons might persuade Abdullah to consider such an option.

Abdullah still sees a second-round vote as the best path, he said. If there are security or weather concerns that mean a runoff can‘t be held before spring, some sort of interim administration should need to be worked out between the two candidates and with the help of the international community, Sancharaki said. ―Karzai‘s term is over, we cannot accept him for several more months,‖ he said.

The agreement that a runoff is required is likely just the first step in negotiations to iron out these differences between the Karzai and Abdullah camps.

The U.S. appears to be backing a power-sharing deal, but there are a number of possible scenarios. In Afghanistan, many have also suggested holding a loya jirga - a traditional Afghan meeting where decisions are made through a combination of negotiation and consensus.

American officials have repeatedly said they‘re pushing for a ―legitimate government‖ in Afghanistan, which does not necessarily need to be elected. People familiar with the talks have said both Karzai and Abdullah have said privately that they‘re open to the idea of a coalition, though with very different interpretations of what that would mean and when it could happen.

The Aug. 20 poll was characterized by Taliban attacks on polling stations and government buildings that killed dozens of people. In some areas, militants cut off the ink-marked fingers of people who had voted.

Turnout was dampened during that vote because of threats of violence from the Taliban and many say even fewer people would come out in a runoff.

Despite the danger, some Afghans in the southern city of Kandahar - a Karzai stronghold where many votes ended up thrown out for fraud - said they would prefer a runoff to a coalition government. Karzai is widely expected to prevail in a runoff vote.

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Abdur Rahman, who runs a foreign exchange bureau in Kandahar, said a runoff would be difficult, but if there is no other option, the government should organize one.

―We support a runoff, but a new coalition government would not be good for Afghanistan,‖ said 46-year-old Rahman, who voted for Karzai. ―Karzai already has a coalition. Why would he make any deal with Abdullah or give him power?‖

___

Associated Press Writer Noor Khan contributed to this report from Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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U.S. SIGNALS AFGHAN COALITION GOVERNMENT IS POSSIBLE (OCTOBER 22, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, October 22nd, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

US signals Afghan coalition government is possible SOURCE: Associated Press Thursday October 22, 2009 By ANNE GEARAN and MATTHEW LEE

WASHINGTON - The United States built pressure on Afghan President Hamid Karzai on Wednesday, signaling that a troop increase could hinge on a successful runoff election and that the Obama administration would be receptive to a power-sharing deal between Karzai and his chief rival.

A coalition government or other political arrangement that included Karzai‘s rival, former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, could provide a critical internal check on Karzai, who is widely favored to win the presidential runoff set for Nov. 7.

President Barack Obama and Sen. John Kerry, who pressed the administration‘s interests in weekend talks with Karzai in Kabul, both hinted Wednesday that pending deliberations on possible U.S. troop increases in Afghanistan could be affected by the Afghan leader‘s behavior.

Karzai‘s weak and corruption-riddled government has been blamed in part for the resurgence of the Taliban and for widespread Afghan civilian disillusionment. The Afghan national election in August was marred by massive fraud that led to the discarding of a third of the results, providing a wedge for the U.S. to press Karzai to agree to the runoff with Abdullah.

Kerry, whose meetings with Karzai helped lead to the runoff agreement over the weekend, said Wednesday after a White House session with Obama that the president should wait until after new election to make his decision on troop strength.

Obama himself said Wednesday in a television interview he might not announce his decision on sending more troops until after the runoff.

Both statements had the subtle force of increasing pressure on Karzai by implying that the administration‘s decision on U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan might depend on how the runoff turns out.

The Massachusetts Democrat said Wednesday that it wasn‘t ―common sense‖ for Obama to determine whether more U.S. troops should go to Afghanistan without knowing the election

307 results. ―You really want to know that this has worked, and you want to know what‘s coming out of it,‖ Kerry said.

Officials said Obama‘s pending decision had prominently figured in the U.S. discussions with Karzai about how to resolve the political impasse.

Several officials stressed that the looming troop plan decision was not used overtly to force Karzai to concede on the election‘s contested first round, but one highly placed U.S. official in Afghanistan said the United States used Obama‘s deliberation over troop numbers as leverage.

That official spoke on condition of anonymity because Obama has not announced whether he will agree to a U.S. military request for thousands of additional forces.

Karzai and Abdullah settled on the runoff following weeks of acrimony over Afghanistan‘s fraud-pocked national election. But both sides also are considering a coalition government that could either replace the runoff or follow it.

State Department spokesman Ian Kelly told reporters Wednesday that the U.S. would not be opposed to a power-sharing deal, depending on its legitimacy and how it was implemented. Obama appeared to allude to the still-fluid discussions Wednesday.

―I think we‘re still in - finding out how this whole process in Afghanistan is going to unfold,‖ Obama said in an interview on MSNBC.

While careful to say that any power-sharing deal would have to come from the Afghans and not the U.S., American officials were clear that Karzai‘s reluctant acceptance of a runoff vote may not be enough by itself.

Karzai and Abdullah have publicly dismissed the idea of sharing power, but there have been reports of private horse-trading discussions before and since Tuesday‘s announcement of the runoff.

Kerry told reporters after meeting with Obama on Wednesday that in Afghanistan he ―did not discuss nor did I even attempt to put on the table the concept of a coalition.‖

It would be inappropriate to raise that possibility and would make it seem to Afghans that the United States was calling the shots, Kerry said. However, he acknowledged the issue was being discussed in Kabul, and said there may have been talks between the Karzai and Abdullah camps on it ―even today.‖

In an interview Wednesday with The Associated Press, Kerry said the discussions with Karzai grew intense at times.

―I turned up the dial a few times, believe me,‖ Kerry said.

He added: ―They were very emotional. And they were very passionate and very heated at times but nicely heated. You know there was never anger, there was always the intensity of the argument.‖

308

Another State Department official said Abdullah‘s camp had expressed interest in a coalition or power-sharing deal, and that some Karzai aides, concerned about the results of a runoff, are willing to consider the idea despite the president‘s public repudiation of the idea.

That official said the U.S. would support any course that leads to the formation of a credible government in the eyes of the Afghan people. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because the negotiations don‘t involve the U.S.

That could include a coalition or other power-sharing arrangement that is either formed to eliminate the need for a second round or one that is created using the results of the runoff.

But there are no provisions for a coalition in the Afghan Constitution, and it is not clear how such a deal would work or remain enforceable.

The most important near-term goal for the U.S. was Karzai‘s acceptance of election commission results and his recognition that the impasse must be resolved.

___

Associated Press writers Jennifer Loven, Laurie Kellman, Ron Fournier and Julie Pace in Washington and Robert H. Reid in Kabul contributed to this report.

309

U.S. OFFERING MASSIVE ASSISTANCE TO PAK IN SOUTH WAZIRISTAN OFFENSIVE (OCTOBER 23, 2009)

Written by admin on Friday, October 23rd, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

US offering massive assistance to Pak in South Waziristan offensive: Report SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Friday October 23, 2009 (ANI)

Washington, Oct.23 : The United States is offering Pakistan unprecedented assistance in the military offensive against the Taliban in South Waziristan, the den of the outlawed terror outfit.

According to American officials, the US military is providing intelligence and surveillance video from unmanned aircrafts to the Pakistani forces to assist them in the operation ‗Rah-e- Nijat‘, which was kicked-off earlier this week.

Officials said information provided to Pakistan is being used exclusively for intelligence gathering in the on-going war, which is seen as the ‗mother of all battles‘.

―We are coordinating with the Pakistanis. And we do provide Predator support when requested,‖ The Los Angeles Times quoted a senior US Defence official, as saying on conditions of anonymity.

The cooperation marks a significant change in Islamabad‘s attitude, which has vehemently rejected any outside support in its struggle against militancy.

The Taliban has targeted, at will, strategic installations across Pakistan in the recent past, which is what has made Pakistan possibly accept the US assistance against the militants.

Despite the massive cooperation in place, US officials see no change in Islamabad‘s intentions of targeting the top leadership of the Taliban, the newspaper said.

They said they have seen no indication that the latest campaign has targeted, or will target, militant leaders such as Mullah Omar and Jalaluddin Haqqani.

Defense analysts also believe that Pakistan should consolidate its gains in South Waziristan before moving on to other territory, it added.

―We would like them to extend the offensive. But we would also like them to hold what they clear. It might or might not be a good call for them to add territorial goals, when it is most

310 important for them to hold what they take,‖ said Stephen Biddle, a military historian and defense analyst.

Another expert, Frederick Kagan, a defense analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, said that the South Waziristan offensive was important for both the US and Pakistan

Kagan said the operation could prove a turning point in America‘s war against terrorism and particularly against the Al-Qaeda.

―It is conceivable that we could look back at this South Waziristan operation as a turning point in the war against Al Qaeda. This has been the safe haven for these guys,‖ the newspaper quoted him, as saying.

311

WAZIRISTAN OR BUST (OCTOBER 26, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, October 26th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Waziristan Or Bust SOURCE: The Times of India Monday, October 26, 2009 By AHMED RASHID

Madrid: After nine suicide attacks in just 11 days that killed 160 people, the Pakistan army has finally started its long awaited offensive in South

Waziristan where the Pakistani Taliban are based. The success of the offensive could be critical for the fate of Pakistan which is financially broke and politically paralysed.

The spate of attacks could have been designed to prevent or delay the army offensive, but they also aimed to topple the government, impose an Islamic state and, if possible, get hold of Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons. The recent attacks have proved more deadly than those in the past because they took place in three of the country‘s four provinces, involving not just Taliban tribesmen from the Pashtun ethnic group, but extremist Punjabi and Kashmiri factions. Moreover, several within the militant leadership had direct connections to the army or the ISI. Police officials say that the Rawalpindi and Lahore attacks had help from inside because the terrorists were able to bypass the stringent security measures in place.

While the armed forces are unwilling to admit what many Pakistanis now believe that there is some degree of penetration by extremist sympathisers within its ranks the civilian government refuses to admit that the largest province of Punjab and especially its poverty-hit southern part has become the major new recruiting ground for militants.

The Punjab provincial government is run by Shabaz Sharif, the brother of Nawaz Sharif and leader of the opposition in the country. The Sharif brothers who ruled the country twice in the 1990s are known to have close ties with the leaders of several militant groups, including Hafiz Saeed, the leader of the Lashkar-e-Taiba whose militants carried out the massacre in Mumbai last year. The Sharifs have refused repeated requests by the Americans, British, Indians and the federal government to crack down on militancy in south Punjab where it is strong and providing recruits for the Taliban.

Meanwhile, the federal government has suffered increasingly fraught relations with the army. At the height of the suicide attacks, army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani chose that moment to blast the civilian government for agreeing to a $7.5 billion five-year aid package from the US for civilian and developmental purposes. The army was furious that the government had agreed to US-imposed conditions, which only insisted that there be civilian control of the army, democracy be maintained and the fight against extremism continued. The army with its deep tentacles in the Pakistani media and among opposition politicians, whipped

312 up a storm of public opinion against the deal. Neither the army nor the politicians seemed to notice that the country is nearly bankrupt, barely subsisting on life support loans from the International Monetary Fund.

The civilian government has also tried repeatedly to end the long running separatist insurgency in Balochistan province by declaring ceasefires and the promise to hold talks with insurgent leaders. However, Baloch leaders accuse the army of sabotaging any such political reconciliation by continuing to assassinate or carry out forced disappearances of Baloch activists.

Meanwhile, as the policy review over Afghanistan and Pakistan continues in the White House, both the army and government are being directly accused by US officials of continuing to harbour the Afghan Taliban leadership. As long as only British and Canadian troops in Helmand and Kandahar faced the effects of the Taliban‘s safe sanctuaries in Pakistan‘s Balochistan province, the former Bush administration was quiet. But now that there are over 10,000 US marines in Helmand and Kandahar who are taking casualties, the Obama administration has made the sanctuary issue a major plank in its future relations with Pakistan.

But the dithering in Washington over the future of US policy towards Afghanistan is leading to greater justification by Pakistan and other neighbours of Afghanistan to hedge their bets for the future in case the Americans withdraw or reduce their commitment, by backing once again their favourite Afghan proxies just as they did during the 1990s civil war.

Pakistan has been saving the Afghan Taliban leadership for just such an eventuality. But now Iran, Russia, India and the Central Asian states are all looking at their future in the country in the light of a US lack of resolve to stay the course in Afghanistan. US relations with Pakistan‘s military remain troubled everyone knows that it is still the army and not the civilian government that calls the shots when it comes to policy towards India and Afghanistan.

President Asif Zardari is known to want peace and trade with India, an end to interference in Afghanistan, improved ties with Iran and better relations and more aid from the West to strengthen the economy and democracy. However, Zardari‘s attempts to build up public support for these logical civil demands have been stymied because of public disillusionment with the civilian government.

The key to future stability is to bring the army, civilian government and the opposition onto one page with a common agenda to fight extremism, while amicably resolving other internal disputes, but so far that looks extremely unlikely.

The writer is a Pakistani journalist and author. Copyright: Yale Centre for the Study of Globalisation.

313

U.S. TESTED 2 AFGHAN SCENARIOS IN WAR GAME (OCTOBER 26, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, October 26th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

U.S. tested 2 Afghan scenarios in war game Obama and advisers evaluating exercise that used different troop levels SOURCE: The Washington Post Monday, October 26, 2009 By GREG JAFFE and KAREN DEYOUNG

The Pentagon‘s top military officer oversaw a secret war game this month to evaluate the two primary military options that have been put forward by the Pentagon and are being weighed by the Obama administration as part of a broad-based review of the faltering Afghanistan war, senior military officials said.

The exercise, led by Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, examined the likely outcome of inserting 44,000 more troops into the country to conduct a full-scale counterinsurgency effort aimed at building a stable Afghan government that can control most of the country. It also examined adding 10,000 to 15,000 more soldiers and Marines as part of an approach that the military has dubbed ―counterterrorism plus.‖

Both options were drawn from a detailed analysis prepared by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the senior commander in Afghanistan, and were forwarded to President Obama in recent weeks by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates.

The Pentagon war game did not formally endorse either course; rather, it tried to gauge how Taliban fighters, the Afghan and Pakistani governments and NATO allies might react to either of the scenarios. Mullen, a key player in the game, has discussed its conclusions with senior White House officials involved in the discussions over the new strategy.

One of the exercise‘s key assumptions is that an increase of 10,000 to 15,000 troops would not in the near future give U.S. commanders the forces they need to take back havens from the Taliban commanders in southern and western Afghanistan, where shadow insurgent governors collect taxes and run court systems based on Islamic sharia law.

―We were running out the options and trying to understand the implications from many different perspectives, including the enemy and the Afghan people,‖ said a senior military official, who was granted anonymity to discuss the classified game.

The Obama administration initiated a major review of its war strategy in late September after questions emerged about the legitimacy of the Aug. 20 Afghan elections, which were marred by allegations of widespread fraud, and a troubling update on the progress of the war by McChrystal. He warned that unless the United States moved quickly to wrest momentum from the Taliban, defeating the insurgency in Afghanistan might no longer be possible.

314

What was intended to be two or three weeks of intensive White House meetings has stretched on for almost a month. Obama and his national security advisers have sorted through the military and civilian aspects of the war, building toward a decision that many on the outside have urged be made sooner rather than later.

Last week, the president concluded the five planned review sessions, roughly 15 hours in all, with top advisers in the Situation Room.

McChrystal‘s analysis suggests that 44,000 troops would be needed to drive Taliban forces from populated areas and to hold them until Afghan troops and government officials can take the place of U.S. and NATO forces. The extra troops would allow U.S. commanders to essentially triple the size of the American forces in the southern part of the country, where the Taliban movement originated and where the insurgents have their strongest base of support.

McChrystal would also use the additional troops to bolster the effort in eastern Afghanistan, which has long been a focus of the U.S. military, and push additional troops into western Afghanistan, where the military has maintained a tiny presence and where the Taliban has made inroads, U.S. officials said. A surge of 44,000 soldiers and Marines would also allow McChrystal to designate a brigade of about 5,000 soldiers to train and advise the Afghan army and police forces, accelerating their growth.

The increase of 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers would give McChrystal one U.S. advisory brigade of about 5,000 troops to speed the development of Afghan forces and a large number of support forces to include engineers, route-clearance teams and helicopters. McChrystal‘s analysis also suggested the option of increasing the number of troops by 80,000, but that isn‘t drawing serious consideration.

In television interviews Sunday, lawmakers outlined broad partisan differences over how many troops are needed in Afghanistan. Republicans have voiced strong support for granting McChrystal‘s request for more troops, and urged that it be done quickly.

―I‘m afraid that with every passing day, we risk the future success of the mission,‖ Sen. Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) said on ―Fox News Sunday.‖

Sen. James Webb (D-Va.) disagreed, calling the decision-making process ―very proper and smart.‖ The administration‘s lengthy deliberations are ―what we need, because we‘re going to end up living with the results for a good period of time,‖ Webb said on CNN‘s ―State of the Union.‖

The administration‘s internal deliberations have emphasized that unless the Afghan government dramatically improves its performance, the Taliban will continue to find support. Administration officials said Obama‘s decision will consider a much broader range of options than the number of troops. At nearly every meeting in the White House Situation Room, McChrystal has been joined on the video screens at the end of the table by Karl W. Eikenberry, the U.S. ambassador to Kabul, and Anne W. Patterson, his counterpart in Pakistan.

One question being debated is whether more U.S. troops would improve the performance of the Afghan government by providing an important check on corruption and the drug trade, or would they stunt the growth of the Afghan government as U.S. troops and civilians take on

315 more tasks that Afghans might better perform themselves. Another factor is cost. The Pentagon has budgeted about $65 billion to maintain a force of about 68,000 troops, meaning that each additional 1,000 U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan would cost about $1 billion a year.

Administration officials say Obama might settle on a plan but delay announcing it until after a runoff in the Afghan national elections, scheduled for Nov. 7. The president is to begin a 10- day trip to Asia on Nov. 11.

Early this month, McChrystal was told to delay a planned Washington trip until Obama had finished gathering facts on the way ahead. ―When you see McChrystal in town,‖ along with Eikenberry and Patterson, a senior administration official said, ―you‘ll know that [Obama] is close to a decision.‖

Staff writer Scott Wilson contributed to this report.

316

U.S. PLANS TO WOO TALIBAN FIGHTERS (OCTOBER 28, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, October 28th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

US plans to woo Taliban fighters SOURCE: Al Jazeera English Wednesday, 28 October, 2009

The US military commanders in Afghanistan are to be allowed to pay Taliban fighters who switch sides and renounce violence against the government in Kabul.

The new provision is included in a defence bill Barack Obama, the US president, will sign into law on Wednesday.

The move establishes a programme in Afghanistan similar to one used in Iraq where former fighters were re-integrated into Iraqi society, Carl Levin, the senate armed services committee chairman, told the Reuters news agency.

Obama plans to sign the bill authorising Pentagon operations for fiscal 2010 on Wednesday, the White House said.

Reaching out Reaching out to moderate Taliban members is part of the Obama administration‘s plan to turn around the eight-year-long war in Afghanistan.

Under the legislation, Afghan fighters who renounce the violence would be paid for ―mainly protection of their towns and villages,‖ Levin said.

It would be ―just like the sons of Iraq,‖ he said, referring to the programme used in Iraq which military commanders say helped turn around a failing war.

―You got 90,000 Iraqis who switched sides, and are involved in protecting their hometowns against attack and violence.‖

The bill authorises using money from an existing Commanders Emergency Response Programme, which US commanders can use for a variety of purposes.

It does not set a specific dollar amount for the fighters‘ re-integration programme.

Troop levels There is $1.3 billion authorised for the fund in fiscal 2010, which began on October 1.

The money must still be allocated by defense appropriators, who are working to finish the legislation. 317

As part of his overall strategy review on Afghanistan, Obama is debating whether to send more US troops to the region and is set to meet on Friday with Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and the heads of the military services, the White House said.

The Joint Chiefs office recently completed an internal assessment of the two leading proposals for troop levels in Afghanistan.

These were sending roughly 40,000 additional troops, as his commander for Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, has recommended, or a far smaller number, an option McChrystal and other defense officials see as having a higher risk of failure.

318

U.S. PLANS TO WOO TALIBAN FIGHTERS (OCTOBER 28, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, October 28th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

US plans to woo Taliban fighters SOURCE: Al Jazeera English Wednesday, 28 October, 2009

The US military commanders in Afghanistan are to be allowed to pay Taliban fighters who switch sides and renounce violence against the government in Kabul.

The new provision is included in a defence bill Barack Obama, the US president, will sign into law on Wednesday.

The move establishes a programme in Afghanistan similar to one used in Iraq where former fighters were re-integrated into Iraqi society, Carl Levin, the senate armed services committee chairman, told the Reuters news agency.

Obama plans to sign the bill authorising Pentagon operations for fiscal 2010 on Wednesday, the White House said.

Reaching out Reaching out to moderate Taliban members is part of the Obama administration‘s plan to turn around the eight-year-long war in Afghanistan.

Under the legislation, Afghan fighters who renounce the violence would be paid for ―mainly protection of their towns and villages,‖ Levin said.

It would be ―just like the sons of Iraq,‖ he said, referring to the programme used in Iraq which military commanders say helped turn around a failing war.

―You got 90,000 Iraqis who switched sides, and are involved in protecting their hometowns against attack and violence.‖

The bill authorises using money from an existing Commanders Emergency Response Programme, which US commanders can use for a variety of purposes.

It does not set a specific dollar amount for the fighters‘ re-integration programme.

Troop levels There is $1.3 billion authorised for the fund in fiscal 2010, which began on October 1.

319

The money must still be allocated by defense appropriators, who are working to finish the legislation.

As part of his overall strategy review on Afghanistan, Obama is debating whether to send more US troops to the region and is set to meet on Friday with Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and the heads of the military services, the White House said.

The Joint Chiefs office recently completed an internal assessment of the two leading proposals for troop levels in Afghanistan.

These were sending roughly 40,000 additional troops, as his commander for Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, has recommended, or a far smaller number, an option McChrystal and other defense officials see as having a higher risk of failure.

320

KARZAI OPPONENT SET TO BOYCOTT RE-RUN (OCTOBER 31, 2009)

Written by admin on Saturday, October 31st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Karzai opponent set to boycott presidential election re-run SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Saturday, October 31, 2009 (ANI)

Kabul, Oct.31 : Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai‘s political opponent and former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah is expected to decide whether to withdraw from, or boycott, a presidential election run-off next Saturday.

According to The Times, Abdullah is meeting his main allies in Kabul today and tomorrow to discuss his options after failing to strike a power-sharing deal with Karzai in talks this week.

Sources were quoted as saying that it seemed increasingly unlikely that Dr Abdullah would stand in the run-off, because his staff were not even campaigning, and that without a power- sharing deal he was more likely to boycott in anger than withdraw gracefully.He wants to make a deal as he doesn‘t think the second round will be any cleaner than the first,‖ one source close to Dr Abdullah told The Times.

Dr Abdullah‘s decision will govern whether Afghanistan‘s presidential election can finally produce some sort of legitimate result after the debacle of the first round, in which a quarter of all votes were found to be fraudulent.

It will also dictate to a large extent whether President Obama decides in the next few days that he has a credible enough partner to send more troops to Afghanistan as part of a new counter- insurgency strategy.

321

ABDULLAH ABDULLAH PULLS OUT OF POLLS (NOVEMBER 1, 2009)

Written by admin on Sunday, November 1st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Abdullah Abdullah pulls out of polls SOURCE: Dawn.com Sunday, November 1, 2009 AFP

KABUL: Opposition candidate Abdullah Abdullah announced on Sunday that he was pulling out of this week‘s run-off presidential election in Afghanistan.

‗The decision which I am going to announce was not an easy one. It was a decision that I have taken after wide-ranging consultations, with the people of Afghanistan, my supporters and influential leaders,‘ Abdullah told supporters.

‗In protest against the misconduct of the government and the Independent Election Commission (IEC), I will not participate in the election,‘ he added.

Abdullah‘s decision is set to plunge Afghanistan into further uncertainty with the country in political limbo since the first round of voting on August 20, which was tainted by widespread vote-rigging.

Following the widespread fraud in the first round, Abdullah had demanded President Hamid Karzai sack the head of the IEC Azizullah Ludin and suspend four ministers who campaigned for the incumbent.

Abdullah‘s camp had set a deadline of Saturday for Karzai to bow to his demands, saying that he would not take part in a contest that would not be free and fair. His demands have so far received short shrift, with the IEC saying Ludin can only be dismissed by the supreme court while Karzai said Abdullah had no right to interfere in ministerial positions.

Karzai‘s share of the vote in the first round fell to 49.67 per cent after a UN-backed watchdog deemed around a quarter of all votes cast to be fraudulent.

Insistent that the fraud had been overstated, Karzai only agreed to a run-off under extensive diplomatic pressure from Washington, highlighted when he made the run-off announcement standing alongside US Senator John Kerry.

Asked whether the outcome of a run-off with only one candidate would result in a legitimate government, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Saturday that such situations were ‗not unprecedented.‘ We see that happen in our own country where, for whatever combination

322 of reasons, one of the candidates decides not to go forward. I don‘t think it has anything to do with the legitimacy of the election,‘ she said.

‗I‘m not going to comment on what any of the candidates might decide to do,‘ Clinton said, adding: ‗It‘s a personal choice which may or may not be made.‘Abdullah won just over 30 per cent in the first round and would have had a mountain to climb if he was to overhaul Karzai in the run-off.

323

KARZAI DECLARED AFGHAN PRESIDENT, RUN-OFF SCRAPPED (NOVEMBER 2, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, November 2nd, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Karzai declared Afghan president, run-off scrapped SOURCE: Reuters Monday, November 2, 2009 By GOLNAR MOTEVALLI

KABUL (Reuters) - Afghanistan‘s election commission declared Hamid Karzai elected as president on Monday after it called off a runoff following the withdrawal of his only rival.

The run-off, called after the first round in August was marred by widespread fraud, was to have been held on November 7.

―The Independent Election Commission declares the esteemed Hamid Karzai as the president … because he was the winner of the first round and the only candidate in the second round,‖ the commission‘s chief Azizullah Ludin told a news conference.

Ludin told a packed media conference the decision was made to spare the Afghan people the expense and risk of another election and because a one-candidate race would raise questions about the legitimacy of the presidency.

Former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah withdrew from the race over the weekend, citing doubts about the credibility of the election process.

―Karzai has lost his legitimacy, he is a very weak president and he cannot govern without reaching out to Dr Abdullah,‖ said Kabul-based political analyst Haroun Mir. ―So the ball is in Dr Abdullah‘s court right now.‖

Karzai‘s camp on Sunday had ruled out a coalition with Abdullah, but he has been under intense pressure from various quarters to bring Abdullah into the government.

Earlier U.N chief Ban Ki-moon made a visit to Kabul that had not been announced in advance, as diplomatic efforts gathered pace to resolve the prolonged political crisis.

―We continue to stand by the people of Afghanistan in their quest for prosperity and peace,‖ Ban said.

The withdrawal of Abdullah from the run-off had cast doubts over the legitimacy of the next government, already under a cloud following the August 20 election marred by allegations of fraud in favor of Karzai.

324

A weakened Afghan government under Karzai would be a blow for U.S. President Barack Obama as he considers whether to send up to 40,000 more troops to fight a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan.

A spokesman for Karzai‘s campaign said the president will issue a statement about the election commission announcement later in the day.

Abdullah had left the door open for future discussions but said no deals had been struck in return for his withdrawal, seen by diplomats as one way to spare the country more uncertainty that discredits the government and can only aid the insurgency.

Ban ki-Moon met both Karzai and Abdullah, officials said.

A U.N. statement said the meetings were ―to assure them and the Afghan people of the continuing support of the United Nations doubts over the credibility of his government.

Ban made the visit after five foreign U.N. staff were killed in a suicide attack last week on a Kabul guest-house used by the United Nations.

The attack was claimed by the Taliban, who have vowed to disrupt the run-off and said the guest-house was targeted because of the United Nations‘ role in helping organize the Afghan election.

The run-off was ordered after a UN-led investigation panel found widespread fraud in favor of Karzai in the August 20 election.

(Writing by Paul Tait and Sanjeev Miglani; Editing by Jerry Norton)

325

KARZAI VOWS TO FIGHT CORRUPTION AFTER RE-ELECTION AS AFGHAN LEADER (NOVEMBER 3, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, November 3rd, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Karzai vows to fight corruption after re-election as Afghan leader SOURCE: The Guardian Tuesday, November 3, 2009 By JON BOONE

Hamid Karzai vowed to tackle corruption in his government and reach out to his political opponents today, but gave no commitments to specific action in his first speech since being re-appointed as president of Afghanistan.

Speaking at the presidential palace in Kabul, Karzai echoed the commitments that his western backers had pushed him to accept, including appointing a clean government and making progress in peace negotiations with the Taliban.

He said his government would be one of national unity and hoped that ―no one feels themselves isolated from this future government‖. But he did not offer a place in the government to his main opponent in the elections, Abdullah Abdullah, and he pointedly avoided commenting on any role for his rival.

Karzai said high-level graft had ―tainted‖ the image of his government. ―We will strive, by any means possible, to eradicate this stain,‖ he said.

Western diplomats hope that his dubious political mandate will oblige Karzai to ―earn legitimacy‖ by delivering services to his people and cracking down on high-level corruption, thought to be fuelling support for the Taliban.

But questions remain whether he will be capable of delivering what the foreign powers demand, particularly as he struck deals during the election campaign with a number of unsavoury powerbrokers, who will expect to be rewarded by the new government.

Highlighting the potential problems, he made his commitment to reform whilst flanked by his two vice-presidents, including Mohammad Qasim Fahim, a notorious former warlord who Karzai selected as a running mate, despite strong opposition from the international community.

326

Barack Obama yesterday moved to bolster Karzai‘s position, saying that although the process had been ―messy‖, the ―results were in accordance with and followed the rules late down by the Afghan constitution‖.

But many Afghan leaders say that is a questionable assertion as Karzai did not receive more than 50% of votes, which the Afghan constitution says the president must have.

Observers believe the disastrous election is likely to do lasting damage to western efforts to stabilise the country.

Interventions by western powers - first to force Karzai to accept the need for a second round, and then for it to be abandoned - have bred popular cynicism about a democratic process many Afghans now believe is controlled by foreigners.

The Taliban have been exploiting the debacle, by mocking the process and sowing fear that they would disrupt the second round through violence.

In a statement today, the movement claimed it had succeeded in its bid to block the run-off.

―The cancellation of the second round of the election showed that decisions on Afghanistan are made in Washington and London, while the announcements are made in Kabul,‖ the statement said.

―What is astonishing is two weeks ago they were arguing that the puppet president Hamid Karzai was involved in electoral fraud … but now he is elected as president based on those same fraudulent votes, Washington and London immediately send their congratulations.‖

327

KARZAI IS WILD CARD FOR U.S. STRATEGY (NOVEMBER 3, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, November 3rd, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Karzai is wild card for U.S. strategy SOURCE: The Washington Post Tuesday, November 3, 2009 By SCOTT WILSON and RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN

As the dust settles from Afghanistan‘s election, President Hamid Karzai‘s emergence as the victor by default cements the central dilemma facing President Obama as he decides whether to escalate the U.S. involvement in the war there.

The top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan has proposed a strategy that would require an effective Afghan government to deliver services, support military operations and represent a viable political alternative to the Taliban insurgency. But Karzai‘s victory leaves in place a mercurial leader who has crossed administration officials in the past and whose record raises doubts about his willingness to take the steps necessary to reform his government.

During weeks of internal deliberations about how to proceed with an increasingly unpopular war, Obama and his senior advisers have waited for the Afghan electorate to determine who will be their next partner in Kabul, even deciding to delay any strategy announcement until after the Nov. 7 runoff vote. Karzai won reelection Monday without a second round after the withdrawal of his chief rival, Abdullah Abdullah, who left the race citing the risk of fraud.

But the decision by Afghanistan‘s Independent Election Commission to declare Karzai president deprives him of a genuine win at the polls and potentially undermines the Obama administration‘s goal of building a legitimate government in Kabul, the key to any strategy that emerges from the White House review.

On Monday, Obama called Karzai to congratulate him. ―Although the process was messy, I‘m pleased to say that the final outcome was determined in accordance with Afghan law,‖ he told reporters at the White House. ―But,‖ Obama added, ―I emphasized that this has to be a point in time in which we begin to write a new chapter based on improved governance, a much more serious effort to eradicate corruption, joint efforts to accelerate the training of Afghan security forces so that the Afghan people can provide for their own security.‖

The proposal of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, includes a request for about 44,000 additional U.S. troops to better protect Afghan population centers from the Taliban.

In his stark 66-page assessment of the war, he wrote that the ―center of gravity‖ of the 100,000 international troops under his command ―is the will and ability to provide for the needs of the population ‗by, with, and through‘ the Afghan government.‖ 328

―A foreign army alone cannot beat an insurgency; the insurgency in Afghanistan requires an Afghan solution,‖ McChrystal wrote. ―This is their war and, in the end, ISAF‘s competency will prove less decisive than GIRoA‘s.‖ The acronyms stand for the International Security Assistance Force he commands and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

The White House is evaluating whether to adopt McChrystal‘s broad counterinsurgency strategy or a more narrow counterterrorism campaign focused on defeating al-Qaeda, whose leaders and foot soldiers operate in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

A different U.S. president

Since the flawed Aug. 20 vote, the legitimacy of the Afghan government and Karzai‘s erratic role leading it has played a central part in the discussions, which are expected to continue in coming days when Obama meets for a second time with his Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Obama‘s senior civilian advisers, including Vice President Biden, are skeptical that Karzai is serious about fighting corruption in his administration or improving the central government‘s performance sufficiently to win broad support from the Afghan public.

Biden and other administration officials backing the narrower counterterrorism effort have used Karzai‘s weakness to argue that Obama should not send additional combat forces to Afghanistan. Their plan would maintain the current troop level in the near term, step up the training of Afghan troops, support Pakistan‘s government in its fight against the Taliban, and attack al-Qaeda operatives in both countries.

Karzai, an elegant and engaging politician who once charmed Washington with his furry hat and cape, grew accustomed to the chummy interactions he had with President George W. Bush during frequent videoconferences and personal visits.

But 10 days before Obama‘s inauguration, Biden made it clear to Karzai that his interactions with the new president would be very different, telling him he would probably talk to him only ―a couple of times a year.‖

Biden and other Obama advisers believe the relationship that Bush developed with Karzai masked the Afghan leader‘s flaws and made it difficult to demand accountability. They viewed Karzai as a vacillating leader, and planned to keep him at arm‘s length until he demonstrated better leadership and addressed the high-level corruption within his government.

Obama‘s special envoy for Afghanistan, Richard C. Holbrooke, also made little secret in diplomatic circles of his desire to see other candidates emerge to challenge Karzai, which stoked anger in Kabul‘s presidential palace.

At dinner the day after the Aug. 20 vote, Karzai was exulting in the victory he claimed from early poll results. But Holbrooke refused to endorse Karzai‘s claim and, presidential aides said, spoke harshly to Karzai and said he believed a runoff would be necessary.

The evening started their relationship on a downward path from which it has not recovered. Holbrooke has not been back since, although he said he expects to visit Kabul within the next few weeks. 329

Ensuring legitimacy

Senior administration officials were encouraged last month when Karzai agreed to a second round of voting, which he was widely expected to win, letting him continue as the only president Afghanistan has had since the 2001 U.S. invasion toppled the Taliban government. Administration officials said his agreement was important to ensuring the legitimacy of the election process.

But whether Karzai‘s victory without a final vote undermines his legitimacy will be decided ultimately by the Afghans themselves. The Karzai administration is already seen in Afghanistan as corrupt, and Obama administration officials have sought to identify local leaders who might serve as more effective partners than the central government.

A senior U.S. official involved in Afghanistan policy, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations, said the administration will pursue a ―two- pronged‖ approach to improving the quality of government.

Karzai, the official said, will be urged to embrace a ―compact with the Afghan people‖ that would make explicit commitments about local governance, corruption and other important issues. The official said senior members of Obama‘s national security team are weighing whether to tie the deployment of some additional troops and development resources to Karzai‘s progress on the compact.

At the same time, the official said, the U.S. government would seek to bypass Karzai by working more closely with members of his cabinet and by funneling more money to local governors. Karzai has the power to appoint and fire provincial governors, and administration officials worry that he will use the authority to remove local officials deemed effective by the United States to reward campaign supporters.

―Will he, for instance, fire the governor of Helmand and replace him with one of his cronies?‖ the official said. ―How can we urge him from doing that? Those are the questions that will be getting more attention now.‖

Staff writer Karen DeYoung in Marrakesh, Morocco, contributed to this report.

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UN PULLS OUT HALF ITS AFGHANISTAN STAFF AND THREATENS TOTAL WITHDRAWAL (NOVEMBER 5, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, November 5th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

UN pulls out half its Afghanistan staff and threatens total withdrawal SOURCE: The Times Thursday, November 5, 2009 By TOM COGHLAN in Kabul

The United Nations today temporarily pulled half its international staff out of Afghanistan and threatened that a complete and permanent withdrawal could follow.

Amid an atmosphere of increasing gloom in Afghanistan, the UN Special Representative in Kabul, Kai Eide delivered a pointed warning to the government of Hamid Karzai.

―There is a belief among some, that the international community (presence) will continue whatever happens because of the strategic importance of Afghanistan,‖ he told a press conference this morning. ―I would like to emphasise that that‘s not true.‖

He added that the Afghan government must demonstrate a willingness to reform and address corruption and the power of warlords.

Of the 1,100 foreign UN workers, 600 will now leave until the situation improves. The remaining UN workers are to be relocated inside Kabul from the current network of 93 different UN guesthouses, many of them privately run civilian houses, to a one large compound which is currently used for the European Union police training mission. The new arrangement will echo the ‗Green Zone‘ found in Baghdad.

The move follows last week‘s attack on a UN guesthouse in the heart of the Afghan capital, Kabul, in which five UN international staff were killed by gunmen and suicide bombers who were disguised in police uniform.

Other aid agencies in Afghanistan have monitored the UN response to the latest attack but most appear to be maintaining their staffing levels in the country for now.

―It will not have major impact on the operations of international NGOs. Those with staff out of country will keep them there but most staff are still on the ground,‖ said Lex Kassenberg, the head of CARE International in Afghanistan.

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Aid agencies said that tighter security restrictions imposed during the election period would remain in place but several said they would resist moves to put armed guards outside their offices, instead strengthening external defences and fitting cameras.

Aid workers told The Times that the UN move was not widely supported within the wider aid community. ―We are really concerned about how the UN will provide services while their staff are outside the country and who will pick up the slack,‖ said one aid worker, who asked not to be named. ―There is a perception that this seems like an overreaction which sends a bad message.‖

The head of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon Moon, was critical of the response of both Afghan and Nato security forces following the Kabul attack last week.

Two UN security guards armed with pistols held off the Taleban attack for over an hour before being killed. Another armed UN worker continued resistance from the guesthouse laundry room. Some 20 UN workers were able to escape as a result.

However, Afghan security forces took more than an hour to arrive on the scene.

―For at least an hour, and perhaps more, those two security officers held off the attackers. They fought through the corridors of the building and from the rooftop,‖ Ban told the UN General Assembly. ―They held off the attackers long enough for their colleagues to escape, armed only with pistols against assailants carrying automatic weapons and grenades and wearing suicide vests.‖

Mr Ban said that ―the UN security team repeatedly called for help from both Afghanistan government forces and other international partners‖. He added: ―Initial reports suggest that it was approximately an hour, if not longer, before Afghan police or others arrived on the scene.‖

Both the Afghan government and Nato denied that they had failed to respond effectively to the attack on UN staff.

The UN has 6,700 staff working in Afghanistan, of whom 5,600 are Afghan nationals.

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REVIEWS RAISE DOUBT ON TRAINING OF AFGHAN FORCES (NOVEMBER 5, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, November 5th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Reviews Raise Doubt on Training of Afghan Forces SOURCE: New York Times Thursday, November 5, 2009 By THOM SHANKER and JOHN H. CUSHMAN Jr.

WASHINGTON - A series of internal government reviews have presented the Obama administration with a dire portrait of Afghanistan‘s military and police force, bringing into serious question an ambitious goal at the heart of the evolving American war strategy - to speed up their training and send many more Afghans to the fight.

As President Obama considers his top commander‘s call to rapidly double Afghanistan‘s security forces, the internal reviews, written by officials directly involved in the training program or charged with keeping it on track, describe an overstretched enterprise struggling to nurse along the poorly led, largely illiterate and often corrupt Afghan forces.

In September, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top American and allied commander in Afghanistan, recommended increasing the Afghan Army as quickly as possible - to 134,000 in a year from the current force of more than 90,000, instead of taking two years, and perhaps eventually to 240,000. He would also expand the police force to 160,000. The acceleration is vital to General McChrystal‘s overall counterinsurgency plan, which also calls for more American troops but seeks more protection against the Taliban for the Afghan population than the Pentagon could ever supply.

While General McChrystal knew of the latest assessments when he wrote his plan, their completion just as President Obama considers the general‘s proposal has given fresh ammunition to doubters.

―Nothing in our experience over the last seven to eight years suggests that progress at such a rapid pace is realistic,‖ said Representative John F. Tierney, the Massachusetts Democrat who is the chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform subcommittee on national security.

The latest reports offer new details that show just how tough it will be to meet General McChrystal‘s training goal. Among the previously undisclosed conclusions: one out of every four or five men in the security forces quit each year, meaning that tens of thousands must be recruited just to maintain the status quo. The number of Afghan battalions able to fight independently actually declined in the past six months.

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―The most significant challenge to rapidly expanding the Afghan National Security Forces is a lack of competent and professional leadership at all levels, and the inability to generate it rapidly,‖ concluded one of the reviews, a grim assessment forwarded to Washington in September from the American-led training headquarters.

Another September report, the Pentagon inspector general‘s annual review of the training program, warned that any acceleration ―will face major challenges. ‖

A third assessment, a quarterly report sent to Congress last week, revealed that despite the formation of new army battalions, fewer of them were capable of operating independently. One reason may be that the Afghan Army‘s jerry-built logistics system, a relic of the Soviet era and one of the training program‘s orphans, has become a drag on the combat forces.

The problems have been a recurring topic during Mr. Obama‘s policy review, broken out for separate discussion among the president and his top advisers. Accelerated training has been one of the constants among the various options before them. ―We‘re aware that it‘s an enormous challenge,‖ one senior administration official said. ―We feel, though, this is essential for any strategy going forward.‖

Among other problems, one of the reports found, the United States military‘s training headquarters simply does not have enough people to do all it is already being asked to do, a flaw that ―has delayed and will continue to delay‖ building the Afghan forces and that unless corrected would only prolong the American presence in Afghanistan.

Construction is also falling behind, leaving recruits living in tents and making a boom in barracks-building problematic, since there are not yet enough qualified engineers. And attempts to draw Afghan businesses into the war effort have backfired. One local start-up company assigned to do basic weapons maintenance for the Afghan Army tried to use hammers and nails to hold grenade launchers together and ultimately had to be trained by an American contractor.

The Americans are sometimes stymied by delays in training that sprout unexpectedly from profound cultural differences. Costly delays in the building of barracks for new recruits, for example, are a result not just of scarce labor and materials, but also of time-consuming repairs of damage that occurs as soon as the troops move into their new quarters. Afghan soldiers reportedly ripped sinks from barrack walls and used them to wash their feet before praying, an important custom. They also built fires on barrack floors for heating and cooking, even in buildings with furnaces and kitchens, according to the reports.

Despite the obstacles, few disagree that Afghanistan‘s forces must eventually become bigger and better. And senior Pentagon and military officials insist that it can happen faster, too. But it may take 10,000 to 15,000 more trainers from the United States and NATO, which have just agreed to overhaul the training program.

Even that decision required a concession to European sensitivities: the creation of a wholly new NATO training effort to operate alongside the American forces who currently dominate the training program and who typically accompany the Afghans they train into combat. Some European governments balk at that practice.

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A three-star Army general, Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, will soon take command of the new NATO training mission - and overhaul the American-led program. General Caldwell, a West Point classmate of General McChrystal, was previously in charge of the influential Army schools and training programs at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., and he will command both the American and allied training headquarters.

―Our NATO allies have been an active participant in Afghanistan from the very beginning, but with this new NATO structure, we perhaps will see even more involvement by partner countries,‖ General Caldwell said in an interview.

At a meeting of defense ministers in Slovakia on Oct. 24, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates won from the alliance an agreement that the NATO training mission ―will need to be fully resourced in order to build the capacity necessary.‖

Pentagon planners consider NATO‘s contribution essential - if overdue - given the strains on the American force as it builds up.

Because of those strains, the Pentagon has failed to provide fully qualified trainers even when they have managed to hit their own numerical goals, officials said. The Pentagon‘s top generals have resisted bleeding the combat ranks to field permanent, full-time training units. But using combat forces as ad hoc trainers has proved less effective, according to Pentagon analysts.

Maj. Gen. Mike Ward, the Canadian two-star officer who will serve as General Caldwell‘s deputy for the allied training mission, said in an e-mail message that NATO‘s bigger role ―will invite a much broader community of expertise and practice.‖

One example is the brigadier general who will join them from Italy‘s Carabinieri - the national police force that is a part of the military - as the American military has nothing comparable.

Today, only about one in 10 Afghan police units is capable of operating wholly independently, according to the latest report to Congress. Despite that, the police force is constantly attacked and is taking casualties at an even greater rate than the Afghan or American military, it said.

The Afghan National Police currently fields 92,000 people, but only 24,000 have actually completed formal training, according to Pentagon records. The attrition rate is 25 percent, the training command in Afghanistan reported. The situation is not much better in the army, with 19 percent attrition.

―Clearly we will have to continue generating new forces at the small-unit level,‖ General Caldwell said. ―But leader development also has to be a priority. For us to have enduring and sustainable Afghan security forces, we have to put commensurate time and effort into the leader portion of the training effort.‖

Peter Baker contributed reporting.

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PAKISTANI SECURITY FORCES STORM TALIBAN‟S CHIEF‟S STRONGHOLD (NOVEMBER 6, 2009)

Written by admin on Friday, November 6th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Pakistani security forces storm Taliban chief’s stronghold SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Friday, November 6, 2009 (IANS)

Pakistani security forces have fought their way into Makeen, which is the stronghold of the country‘s Taliban chief Hakimullah Mehsud, during the ongoing operations against terrorists in South Waziristan.

The security forces have successfully entered Makeen area, Geo News reported Friday.

Five hideouts were destroyed and two militants were killed in a fierce battle.

Fighter jets, gunship helicopters and heavy artillery pounded the positions of the militants.

The Taliban guerrillas were fleeing to neighbouring North Waziristan, Kurram Agency and Orakzai Agency, the report said.

The Pakistani Army has stepped up its assault in mountainous South Waziristan against the heavily-armed Taliban fighters who are putting up a stiff resistance.

The country has been witnessing a spate of terror strikes, including powerful bombings. Over 200 people have been killed in the terror attacks.

The Taliban have vowed to retaliate over the US drone strikes, one of which had killed the previous Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud in early August.

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HAKIMULLAH WARNS TALIBAN FLEEING FROM BATTLEFIELD (NOVEMBER 6, 2009)

Written by admin on Friday, November 6th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Hakimullah warns Taliban fleeing from battlefield they will go to hell SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Friday, November 6, 2009 (ANI)

Islamabad, Nov.6 : The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief Hakimullah Mehsud has warned his fighters from running away from the war against the security forces, saying those who turn their back from the duty would go to ‗hell.‘

―Remember this is the commandment of God that once fighting starts with the enemy, you cannot leave the battlefield without permission from your commander, and don‘t look for excuses to run away from the fighting. Those, who do run away, will go to hell,‖ Mehsud told his followers in a radio message, which was intercepted by the security officials.

―We are in Jihad and we should not pay heed to the whispers of Satan. We should sacrifice our lives for Islam so that we can feel pride on the day of judgment,‖ Mehsud added.

Informing media persons about the radio intercepts, intelligence officials said Mehsud‘s message signifies that hordes of insurgents are running away from the massive offensive launched by the Pakistan Army in South Waziristan, the Taliban‘s den.

Meanwhile, 28 more militants were reportedly killed in Taliban strongholds of Ladha and Makeen in South Waziristan.

Five officials were also killed during an intense gun battle with the insurgents in the region, The News reports.

Military sources said security forces nabbed five more extremists from the region, where the operation Rah-e-Nijat entered its 21st day.

While the troops have claimed huge success in the operation, saying they have consolidated their position in the region, the Taliban, however, claimed that their withdrawal from their former strongholds was a tactical move, as they were planning to launch scattered attacks on security forces.

A self-proclaimed spokesperson of the TTP, Azam Tariq had earlier told a foreign news agency that the banned outfit was fully prepared to take on the challenge and that it was drawing the troops into a trap.

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―We are prepared for a long war. The areas we are withdrawing from, and the ones the army is claiming to have won, are being vacated by us as part of a strategy. The strategy is to lure the army into a trap, and then fight a long war,‖ Tariq said.

He also rejected the military‘s claims of killing hundreds of insurgents saying only 11 of his associates have been killed so far in the war.

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BACKGROUNDER: AFGHANISTAN‟S UNCERTAIN FUTURE (NOVEMBER 10, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, November 10th, 2009

Click here for PDF-file

Afghanistan’s uncertain future Written by OLIVIER IMMIG

Afghanistan‟s uncertain future

On August 30 General McChrystal handed over his eagerly awaited ‗Commander‘s Initial Assessment‘ on Afghanistan to his superiors.(1) It had been finished earlier, but the general was advised by Secretary of Defence Gates to hand it over only after the Afghan presidential election had taken place (August 20). The assessment seeks to answer three questions: can ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) achieve the mission, how should ISAF go about achieving the mission, what is required to achieve the mission? Which resources will be needed to achieve the military campaign would be declared at a later date by McChrystal. He did state, however, that not sending extra troops to Afghanistan would likely lose the war within a year.

Immediately after the leaking of McChrystal‘s strategy review and recommendations a huge debate for and against broke out. Star reporter Bob Woodward discussed the assessment in some detail, if only because it was in his newspaper that McChrystal‘s ‗Initial Assessment‘ was made public.(2) McChrystal did not regret the subsequent outburst of publicity. On the contrary; he added some fuel to the fire by stating, for instance, that there still exist connections between Pakistan‘s secret service and the Taliban.(3) Since nobody has the right answers concerning future American policy in and towards Afghanistan, by allowing the whole Afghan strategy debate to become a public affair some pressure ‗to deliver‘ has been taken off the military - only to shift to US politicians and the international coalition.

As the Obama-administration started to revise its Afghanistan-strategy, a political crisis rapidly developed in Afghanistan after increasing and undeniable evidence showed that there

339 had been large-scale fraud in the first round of the presidential election on August 20, necessitating a second round. The planned runoff on 7 November provided the Obama administration with some extra weeks to determine what the new US strategy toward Afghanistan should be and, in its wake, decide on sending more troops, and how many. Thus, both processes in Washington and Kabul got narrowly intertwined. At least two critical conditions must be fulfilled to enable a continued US and international effort in Afghanistan; good governance and the rapid development of an effective Afghan security force. In this respect, there exist no differences of opinion between the US military leadership, broadly supporting the McChrystal assessment and his troop request, and the political leadership.

But they do fundamentally differ on the desired order of implementation. The military immediately want to send extra troops to ‗regain the initiative‘, the politicians first want to develop a new viable strategy to determine the future course of events. To that end, the Obama-administration urgently needed a credible electoral process and a reliable Afghan president in Kabul.

The McChrystal assessment

In his assessment, General McChrystal nominates a number of ‗imperative‘ themes:

- protect the Afghan population from a resilient insurgency, or: ‗focus on the population‘;

- alter the current crisis in confidence among Afghans in both their government and the international coalition;

- the fact that the short-term fight will be decisive (developments in the next twelve months), or: focus resources to most threatened critical areas; improve the unity of effort and command of ISAF;

- increase the size and growth of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF, consisting of the Afghan Police Force or APF and the Afghan National Army or ANA).

To achieve these goals, a number of far-reaching changes have to be made, especially concerning the International Security Assistance Force or ISAF, numbering over 100.000 in November 2009.

ISAF must restore confidence in the near-term through renewed commitment, intellectual energy and visible progress. How? Well, ISAF must improve execution and the understanding of the basics of the present Counter Insurgency (COIN).(4) In particular, ISAF must change its operational culture in order to better protect the Afghan people, understand their environment and build relationships with them. Also, a more coherent unity of command within ISAF must be established. ISAF‘s new approach will be nested within an integrated and properly-resourced civilian-military counterinsurgency strategy. Therefore, ISAF must use existing assets in innovative and unconventional ways. McChrystal warns that this will be enormously difficult.

Poor unity of effort among ISAF, UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan), and the rest of the international community undermines their collective effectiveness. Problematic contracting processes and insufficient oversight also reinforce the perception of corruption within ISAF and the international community. The establishment of 340 an intermediate operational headquarters will synchronize operational activities and local civil-military coordination, and ensure a shared understanding of the mission throughout the force.

ISAF troops are ‗inexperienced‘ in local languages and culture. Why communities choose to resist, support or allow insurgent (Taliban) influence has not been properly understood by ISAF (nor by the Karzai-government, it is stated). ISAF has not sufficiently studied Afghanistan‘s peoples, whose needs, identities and grievances vary from valley to valley. Afghan social, political, economic and cultural affairs are complex. This country‘s environment is challenging to understand, particularly for foreigners. ISAF military and civilian personnel alike must acquire a far better understanding of Afghanistan and its people.

Over-reliance on firepower and pre-occupation with protection of its own force has severely damaged ISAF‘s legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people. ISAF cannot expect unarmed Afghans to feel secure before heavily armed ISAF forces do. As a consequence, it distanced itself physically and psychologically from the Afghan people. To alter this a new operational culture must be adopted, enabling ISAF to relate intimately to the Afghan people. McChrystal wants ISAF forces to spent as little time as possible in armoured vehicles or behind the walls of forward operating bases. ISAF must show respect for local cultures and customs and demonstrate intellectual curiosity about the people of Afghanistan, and build personal relationships with its Afghan partners.

ISAF: failure and future

This may all sound alluringly optimistic and determined - and naïve. Unfortunately, ‗getting personal‘ will certainly result in more deadly victims among foreign troops, especially in the south and east of the country where the Pashtuns live, and the Taliban among them. A case in point are developments in the southern province of Helmand, where this new approach is tested since July. As recent as on Tuesday October 27, eight US soldiers were killed there in bomb attacks.(5) Afghans and Westerners fraternizing while drinking lots of tea and eating piles of goat together requires voluntary invitation, not an occupation.

ISAF will become radically more integrated and partnered with the ANSF (Afghan national Security Forces). Neither the ANA (Afghan national Army) nor the APF (Afghan Police Force) is sufficiently effective. This is another point of great concern, as the ANSF is supposed to take over the main tasks from ISAF within 12 to 24 months from September 2009. To this end, the ANA must accelerate growth, from its present target strength of 134.000 at the end of 2010 to a new target ceiling of 240.000. Thus far, both ANA and APF have been under-sourced, short of trainers, equipment and mentoring, and poorly paid.(6)

Several key aspects are not mentioned in the assessment on this subject. One: regrettably, the new Afghan National Army will be primarily built to fight against a considerable part of its own people, in spite of the fact that al Qaeda supposedly is the main adversary. This does hardly help to lure young Afghans into the army, no matter how poverty-stricken they may be. Two: how to balance the ethnic diversity of the country within the armed forces without jeopardizing ANA‘s operational capabilities? Today, of all its officers, 70 percent are ethnic Tajiks; Pashtun recruits, the majority, do not respect their Tajik commanders.(7) Three: who will command the ANA? After all, considering the outcome of the election, no meaningful civilian superstructure of national government will be in place in the foreseeable future.

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Lastly, ISAF must work with UNAMA and the international community to build public finance mechanisms. It must pay particular attention to how development projects are contracted, and to whom.(8) This should primarily be a civilian task, not a security force one.

More US troops?

Throughout his assessment, McChrystal severely criticises the ISAF effort. Since an international military force supposedly still will be the major instrument in achieving ‘success‘ in Afghanistan, it is well worth carefully considering its shortcomings. They are certainly numerous, and serious. Surprisingly, this important aspect of the assessment has hardly been noticed in the ensuing storm of publicity and commentaries, which mainly focused on the sending of tens of thousands of additional troops.

If McChrystal sought to disqualify the ISAF efforts, he certainly succeeded. He uttered equally devastating criticisms about the performance of the Afghan government composed and led by president Karzai. However, if the General sought to plead in favour of sending more troops, he failed. Unless a veritable army of civilian experts (anthropologists, development specialists, political scientists, economists etc.) will be send to Afghanistan, all admittedly august goals McChrystal wishes to achieve are illusive. (It is equally unlikely that a ‗civilian army‘ will succeed where the military fail.) At the same time, his assessment does provide numerous valid and valuable elements which all have to be carefully attended to; but primarily by civilian specialists, not by military personnel. As McChrystal thoroughly disqualifies the present ISAF forces, more of the same will not do the trick. In this respect, this assessment is self-defeating.

Ever since this assessment was made public on 20 September the public debate about sending extra US troops to Afghanistan, and how many, has caught most attention. The advisers to president Obama turned out to be deeply divided among themselves. Obviously, whatever will be the outcome of the current strategy debate, there will always be a considerable group of disgruntled advisers around. The president himself announced that ‗There are no perfect answers‘. Consequently, every decision taken will thus be a choice between ‗least evils‘ - the main question being ‗To who?‘

Repeatedly, the president has been issuing statements that his administration would not be rushed into a decision. It was not; after a number of prolonged meetings at the White House in October, over two months after its delivery still no decision has been taken on the assessment.

Washington: Dumping the ‗AfPak‘ approach

On March 27, 2009, President Obama initiated a new policy approach of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Ever since, this ‗new‘ strategy has stirred numerous debates in all quarters and countries involved. The very name of that new strategy, ‗AfPak‘, implies a crucial acknowledgement; the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan virtually does not exist.(9) Another inescapable consequence was, that the ongoing struggle in Afghanistan readily was termed ‗Obama‘s War‘, in spite of the fact that it started back in October 2001. Surely, it never became ‗Bush‘s War‘.

Other popular qualifications of the struggle in and on Afghanistan are a ‗war of necessity‘ and, history revisited, a ‗graveyard of empires‘. No wonder. Despite eight years of protracted

342 warfare, the presence of a civil government in Kabul led by Hamid Karzai, the spending of 250 billion dollar on military and civil assistance by successive American administrations alone, the development of a huge armed international contingent of troops (40 nations have by now sent a total of over 100.000 troops to Afghanistan) and the steady growth of a national Afghan army (ANA, numbering 90.000 in September 2009), the Taliban nowadays are stronger then they have been since they were ousted from power in the fall of 2001. Another familiar Afghan development is taking place, equally unwelcome but seemingly irrepressible; ‗warlordism‘.(10)

Deciding anew on what has already been qualified as the ‗least bad‘ strategy to implement in Afghanistan proves to be rather complicated. The whole process certainly has the appearance of desperately trying to avoid ending up in a lose-lose situation. At the same time, president Obama‘s so-called ‗AfPak‘ strategy, as announced by him only on March 27 this year, seems to have been abandoned. Although the US still seeks to ‗disrupt, dismantle and defeat‘ al Qaeda, all questions and problems raised in the ongoing debate thus far exclusively focus on Afghanistan. Nevertheless, back in March, Obama proclaimed Afghanistan to be of central strategic importance, if only because that country harbours numerous Muslim extremists that are seeking to take over Pakistan, as well.(11) Since Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, that prospect terrifies governmens and public opinions alike in many countries.(12)

Kabul: Political knock-out

In the meantime, the Electoral Compliant Commission (ECC) of Afghanistan had decided to declare invalid close to a million of all 5.6 million votes cast on August 20. This diminished Karzai‘s initial share of the vote from 54.8 percent to approximately 48. His main opponent, Abdullah Abdullah, gained some percentages, to end on 31.5.(13) However, Karzai felt that he was being denied victory and defended the outcome of the election as valid. One of his aides stated that the runoff was a political decision, caused by heavy international meddling.(14)

Suspiciously little attention was paid to the preferred approach of the electoral outcome by UN-official Mr. Kai Eide, who apparently wanted to limit the Afghan election to one round, Mr. Karzai initially being declared the winner. The number two official of the UN in Afghanistan, Mr. Galbraith, was fired, since he refused to downplay the scale of electoral fraud.(15) In the process, the reputation of the UN mission was considerably damaged. It took a few days of tough negotiating and intense pressure by US senator John Kerry in Kabul to make Karzai change his mind and to accept a runoff with Mr. Abdullah.(16)

Abdullah steps out

The runoff which was to be held on November 7 was described by a number of politicians and analysts alike as an opportunity for the Afghan political system to recover from the severe damage done by the massive fraud that had tainted the first election on 20 August, and as a second chance to provide much needed legitimacy to the candidate that would have been chosen.

Mr. Abdullah Abdullah decided otherwise. After incumbent President Hamid Karzai had repeatedly rejected demands made by Mr. Abdullah, the latter announced on November 1 that he would not participate in the runoff. Abdullah cited his serious doubts about the fairness and

343 credibility of the upcoming runoff, arguing that there was no reason to assume that this time there would be no fraud.

Abdullah had asked for the immediate sacking of four minsters, plus the head of the Independent Election Committee Mr. Azizullah Ludin, who according to him had lost all credibility. These measures would help to heighten transparency of the upcoming election. Of course, Abdullah‘s attempt to wrest political concessions even before the election was held was received with suspicion. After all, Karzai was expected to win. By stepping out of the contest, Mr. Abdullah granted a second presidential term to Hamid Karzai. At the same time, the much sought-after broadening of political legitimacy of the next Afghan president and government evaporated as well.

Many Afghans, especially those few million people (2,283,907) who voted for Mr. Karzai in the first round, considered the runoff as the result of international pressure anyway, seeking to defame their preferred candidate. It remained to be seen if they had been willing to once more defy Taliban threats and cast their vote.(17) Since most of Mr. Abdullah‘s largely Tajik following originates from less Taliban-infested regions, they might well have come out in his support, once more. Ultimately, the outcome of the runoff would have been heavily influenced by the preferences of those 450.000 Afghans (10,46%)(18) who in the first round had voted for Mr. Ramazan Bashardost, an ethnic Hazara.

Although Secretary of State Mrs. Clinton had publicly but prematurely declared, before the decision to hold a runoff was even arrived at, that she expected Karzai to be the Afghan president for another five years (19), this did not unduly impress most Afghans. In 2004, close to 80 percent of all enfranchised Afghans voted. On August 20, 2009, their number was halved (38,7 percent), the total number of votes being 4.823.000. This huge loss of popular interest in choosing a president cannot be solely ascribed to increased Taliban threats; it also serves to illustrate the disappointing performance of both the Karzai-government and the international community.

It is only too well-known in Afghanistan how Karzai was able to ‗win‘ on August 20; by forging alliances with a number of notorious warlords, mostly non-Pashtun, and by massive electoral fraud. Almost a third of all votes cast for Karzai was nullified. There are no reasons to believe that president Karzai in his second term may abandon his political allies. Unfortunately, from this perspective as well, there is little reason to assume that a next Afghan government led by Mr. Karzai will do a better job. It is likely that the crisis of political legitimacy, severely restricting the authority of the national Afghan government, will continue, and deepen.

Ban Ki-Moon steps in

Secretary-general of the United Nations Ban Ki-Moon unexpectedly flew into Afghanistan to come to the rescue. After talks with both Mr. Abdullah and Mr. Karzai, on 2 November the Independent Election Commission led by Mr. Azizullah Ludin declared Mr. Karzai to be the winner of the election, and consequently the next president of Afghanistan, after all. Mr. Ludin mentioned ‘security reasons‘ and ‗financial costs‘ for the decision; subsequently, the Taliban claimed ‘success‘. At the same time the Taliban statement held that ―the cancellation of the second round of elections has shown that the decisions about Afghanistan are made in Washington and London‖.(20) This does not bode well for the renewed attempt made by Mr. Karzai to ‗bring home‘ his Taliban brothers.

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Mr. Abdullah‘s decision to step out may well have prevented the fiasco of a low turn-out, or the murdering of many voters by the Taliban movement. As before, stern ‗warnings‘ - death threats, rather - were issued by Taliban spokesmen and commanders to all those taking part in the upcoming election. The movement underlined the seriousness of its threats with a number of recent bomb attacks, targeting UN personnel in Kabul, among others.

Sufficiently safeguarding and controlling the whole electoral process would have been impossible, as before. At the same time, political and ethnic contradictions between Mr. Abdullah‘s followers and those of Mr. Karzai are likely to escalate. To this end, Mr. Abdullah urged his followers, many of whom were angered and disappointed, ‗not to go to the streets, not to demonstrate‘.(21)

The re-instalment of Karzai may not raise hopes of most Afghans for a better future, but it will be highly rewarding to his political allies, many of whom may now look forward to keep on receiving a considerable part of all international aid and holding on to lucrative positions, or even get better ones. Karzai will need them more then ever. At the same time, the broadly expected arrival of extra contingents of foreign troops will not lead to enhanced national security. (Which will only start to arrive in April or May 2010 anyway, even if the Obama- administration would decide in November to send them.) The apparently well-organized Taliban have proven that they are here to stay. The movement has succeeded in regaining and considerably enhancing its strength despite the increased presence of foreign troops, by now numbering over a 100.000.

Washington: Contours of a new strategy emerge

In the course of November president Obama is expected to announce both a new strategy and his decision about the McChrystal troop request. After many weeks of fierce debates and numerous meetings, a number of characteristics of that new strategy can be distinguished.

In accordance with McChrystal‘s recommendations, the ISAF and American troops will primarily seek to protect the Afghan population. To this end, a number of urban centers and agricultural key areas have been designated. Development funding and the number of civilian experts, especially those who support agricultural and infrastructural developments, will be raised. Instead of hiring foreign and central government contractors to carry out developmental projects local contractors will be sought for. The extra troops that will be sent will mainly be used for accelerating the growth and training of the ANA.

At the end of October president Obama requested senior US officials to investigate the possibility of cooperating with local leaders and militias province-by-province. Since the authority of the Karzai-government is limited, and is increasingly losing its legitimacy as well, this may be a rewarding approach. Conversely, empowering local leaders requires tight control; also, it should not do further damage to a weakening central authority.(22) Lest we forget, it must be noted that central authority in Afghanistan has traditionally been weak - and so was its national army. Ethnic and tribal loyalties historically did and in general still do today, override loyalty towards the central government.

At the same time, president Obama wanted his national security aides and the State Department to come up with a number of clear targets to be presented to president Karzai. He should reach out to his political opponents; remove the most notoriously corrupt governors and ministers from their posts; try to lure the least committed of the Taliban away.(23)

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Although Karzai will continue in office, presumably for another five year term (nothing is guaranteed in this respect), president Obama seems determined to make him change his ways. Congratulating Karzai during a phone call, he at the same time emphasized the need to start writing ―a new chapter based on improved governance, a much more serious effort to eradicate corruption, joint efforts to accelerate the training of Afghan security forces so that the Afghan people can provide for their own security‖.(24) To combat corruption, an anticorruption commission should be installed by Karzai and his government, in order to establish strict accountability for government officials at the national and provincial levels.(25)

After the election fiasco, president Karzai finds himself in a precarious position. Every move he decides to make will stir up determined opposition. Even if Karzai, prodded by Washington, is willing to seek reconciliation with his most powerful but unyielding foe, the Taliban movement, a number of his closest political allies like Fahim and Khalili, his vice- presidents, will oppose him. Throughout the ages, the ‗graveyard of empires‘ has always been equally mortal for its own leaders as well; Hamid Karzai seems poised to become the next Afghan leader to be savagely devoured.

Amsterdam, November 10, 2009

1 ‗Commander‘s Initial Assessment‘, 30 August 2009, Headquarters International Security Assistance Force, Kabul, Afghanistan

2 Bob Woodward, ‗McChrystal: More Forces or ‗Mission Failure‘, in: The Washington Post, Monday, September 21, 2009

3 ‗Pakistan, Iran aiding Afghan Taliban: US‘, in: Dawn, Tuesday, 22 September, 2009. Richard Holbrooke, Special US Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, is of the same opinion.

4 Counter-insurgency or COIN: generally, the term covers the armed conflict between military forces of a recognised government and an opposing armed force that seeks to remove and replace it. The latter group or organization is labelled ‗insurgents‘. Counter-insurgency primarily aims at armed suppression of a rebellion, but also implies divide and rule tactics. Among others, it serves to weaken or fraction links between the insurgents and the population. One of the main difficulties in suppressing an insurgency; it is difficult or even impossible to distinguish between insurgents and the population they mingle with. This certainly applies to Afghan conditions

5 ‗Eight more US troops killed in Afghan attacks‘, in: The News International, Wednesday, October 28, 2009

6 After eight years of building and training an Afghan army, at the beginning of November 2009 it has a force of over 90.000. But the number of forces that can sustain themselves in combat is just over 50.000. See: David E. Sanger, ‗With Karzai, U.S. Faces Weak Partner in Time of War, in: The New York Times, November 2, 2009

7 Arnaud de Borchgrave, ‗Obama Muddling Through‘, in: Atlantic Council (www.acus.org), September 29, 2009

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8 A staggering percentage of US and international assistance is pocketed by private contractors and corrupt officials. 75% of over 38 billion US dollars given since 2002 has thus disappeared; of all international assistance, 60% never reached Afghan projects and people. Karin von Hippel, ‗Combatting corruption in Afghanistan‘, in: The Afpak Channel (www.foreignpolicy.com/afpak), Wednesday September 30, 2009

9 The agreement on the Durand line, concluded in 1893 and signed by the Emir of Afghanistan as well, was concluded for a period of hundred years. Consequently, in 1993 it expired. Thus far, it has not been formally renegotiated

10 It is estimated that a total of some 120.000 Afghans belong to about 5.000 private militias. Many of them receive massive payments by US and NATO commanders, in exchange for securing international troops, roads and convoys. General McChrystal is well aware of this. Gareth Porter, ‗NATO forces turn to warlords‘, in: Asia Times Online, October 30, 2009

11 ‗White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group‘s Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan‘, Washington, March 27, 2009. Obama: ―The core goal of the U.S. must be to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan‖.

12 Perhaps it is for that reason that hardly a week has gone by since March, 2009, that US officials and politicians solemnly stated that ‗Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons are safe‘. But are they? On October 11, on the eve of a huge offensive by the Pakistani Armed forces against the bulwark of militancy in South Waziristan, a mere handful of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) members succeeded in occupying the heavily guarded military headquarters in Rawalpindi. The attackers demanded the release of over 100 fellow militants. After some 22 hours commandos stormed the building and succeeded in retaking it. Taliban spokesman Azam Tariq claimed responsibility for the attack by phoning a reporter as usual, and ominously added that ‗We have the capability to strike at any place in Pakistan‘. Unfortunately, in this respect it is easier to believe Azam Tariq then president Obama and his team - although it must be readily admitted (and hoped for) that safeguarding nukes is quite another matter then protecting military headquarters

13 ‗Karzai not clear winner in Afghan elections: ECC‘, in: Dawn, Tuesday, 20 October, 2009

14 One of two Afghans on the five-member UN-backed Electoral Complaints Commission, Maulavi Mustafa Barakzai, resigned. He did so because ‗the three foreigners on the panel were making all decisions on their own‘. ‗Afghan rivals spar over poll probe‘, in: Al Jazeera (Aljazeera.net), Tuesday, October 13, 2009. It should be noted that Mr. Barakzai was widely considered to favour Mr. Karzai

15 James Joyner, ‗Galbraith Fired, Refused to Hide Afghanistan Election Fraud‘, in: Atlantic Council, (www.acus.org), October 1, 2009

16 Kerry: ―What began as a fact-finding trip did end with several days of talks with president Karzai to resolve a dispute over the Afghan elections. You may have read that it takes three cups of tea to make a deal in Afghanistan. Well, let me tell you, it took a lot more then that for us, but we got there.‖ Transcript of ‗Afghanistan: Defining the Possibilities‘, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, October 26, 2009. Meeting with John Kerry and David Sanger

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17 Tribal leaders in Southern Afghanistan, Karzai‘s main vote bank, announced that they would boycott a runoff. ‗Next Afghan government faces daunting ‗to do‘ list‘, in: Dawn, Thursday, 15 October, 2009

18 Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan (www.iec.org.af), Final Certified Presidential Results, 21 October, 2009

19 Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, ‗White House Believes Karzai Will Be Re-elected‘, in: The New York Times, September 27, 2009

20 ‗Karzai vows ‗inclusive‘ government‘, in: Al Jazeera, November 3, 2009

21 Heidi Vogt and Rahim Faiez, ‗Afghan challenger drops out of runoff election‘, in: The Washington Post, November 1, 2009

22 On October 28, president Obama signed into law permission for US commanders in Afghanistan to pay Taliban that are willing to change sides. ‗US plans to woo Taliban fighters‘, in: Al Jazeera, October 28, 2009

23 David E. Sanger, ‗With Karzai, U.S. Faces Weak Partner in Time of War, in: The New York Times, November 2, 2009

24 Scott Wilson and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, ‗Karzai is wild card for U.S. strategy‘, in: The Washington Post, November 3, 2009

25 Alissa J. Rubin and Helene Cooper, ‗Karzai Is Vague on Confronting Corruption in Afghanistan‘, in: The New York Times, November 3, 2009

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3 TOP OBAMA ADVISERS FAVOR ADDING TROOPS (NOVEMBER 10, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, November 10th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

3 Top Obama Advisers Favor Adding Troops in Afghanistan SOURCE: The New York Times Tuesday, November 10, 2009 By ELISABETH BUMILLER and DAVID E. SANGER

WASHINGTON - Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton are coalescing around a proposal to send 30,000 or more additional American troops to Afghanistan, but President Obama remains unsatisfied with answers he has gotten about how vigorously the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan would help execute a new strategy, administration officials said Tuesday.

Mr. Obama is to consider four final options in a meeting with his national security team on Wednesday, his press secretary, Robert Gibbs, told reporters. The options outline different troop levels, other officials said, but they also assume different goals - including how much of Afghanistan the troops would seek to control - and different time frames and expectations for the training of Afghan security forces.

Three of the options call for specific levels of additional troops. The low-end option would add 20,000 to 25,000 troops, a middle option calls for about 30,000, and another embraces Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal‘s request for roughly 40,000 more troops. Administration officials said that a fourth option was added only in the past few days. They declined to identify any troop level attached to it.

Mr. Gates, a Republican who served as President George W. Bush‘s last defense secretary, and who commands considerable respect from the president, is expected to be pivotal in Mr. Obama‘s decision. But administration officials cautioned that Mr. Obama had not yet made up his mind, and that other top advisers, among them Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. and the White House chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel, remained skeptical of the value of a buildup.

In the Situation Room meetings and other sessions, some officials have expressed deep reservations about President Hamid Karzai, who emerged the victor of a disputed Afghan election. They said there was no evidence that Mr. Karzai would carry through on promises to crack down on corruption or the drug trade or that his government was capable of training enough reliable Afghan troops and police officers for Mr. Obama to describe a credible exit strategy.

Officials said that although the president had no doubt about what large numbers of United 349

States troops could achieve on their own in Afghanistan, he repeatedly asked questions during recent meetings on Afghanistan about whether a sizable American force might undercut the urgency of the preparations of the Afghan forces who are learning to stand up on their own.

―He‘s simply not convinced yet that you can do a lasting counterinsurgency strategy if there is no one to hand it off to,‖ one participant said.

Mr. Obama, officials said, has expressed similar concerns about Pakistan‘s willingness to attack Taliban leaders who are operating out of the Pakistani city of Quetta and commanding forces that are mounting attacks across the border in Afghanistan. While Pakistan has mounted military operations against some Taliban groups in recent weeks, one official noted, ―it‘s been focused on the Taliban who are targeting the Pakistani government, but not those who are running operations in Afghanistan.‖

Mr. Obama himself seems to be hedging his bets, particularly on the performance of Mr. Karzai, who is considered by American officials to be an unreliable partner and is now widely derided in the White House. Mr. Obama told ABC News during an interview on Monday that given the weakness of the Karzai government in Kabul, his administration was seeking ―provincial government actors that have legitimacy in the right now.‖

Officials said that while Admiral Mullen and Mrs. Clinton were generally in sync with Mr. Gates in supporting an option of about 30,000 troops, there were variations in their positions and they were not working in lock step. Admiral Mullen‘s spokesman, Capt. John Kirby, said that the admiral was providing his advice to the president in private and would not comment. Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary, would not comment on Mr. Gates‘s position.

A focus of Mr. Obama‘s meeting on Wednesday with his national security advisers, officials said, will be to discuss some of their differences as well as those of the president‘s other advisers. Officials also said there was a possibility that Mr. Obama might choose to phase in additional troops over time, with a schedule that depended on the timing of the arrival of any additional NATO troops and on how soon Afghan security forces would be able to do more on their own.

Officials said that no decision was expected from Mr. Obama on Wednesday, but that he would mull over the discussions at the meeting during a trip to Asia that begins Thursday. Mr. Obama is not due back in Washington until next Thursday. Officials said that it was possible that he could announce his decision in the three days before Thanksgiving, which is on Nov. 26, but that an announcement in the first week of December seemed more likely.

Should Mr. Obama choose to send about 30,000 troops, a military official said, brigades would most likely be sent from the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Ky., and the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, N.Y. In addition, 4,000 troops would be sent as trainers for the Afghan security forces, the military official said. A brigade is about 3,500 to 5,000 soldiers.

Senator Jack Reed, the Rhode Island Democrat who has been an influential adviser in the Afghanistan debate, said that one of the most difficult issues was determining the effects of a large American troop presence on the country.

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―It‘s more about, hey, are we creating such a large footprint that it‘s easier for the Afghans to walk way from their responsibility?‖ Mr. Reed said. ―I don‘t think that‘s one that can be resolved. You‘re making a judgment about that one, and not one you can solve with arithmetic.‖

Peter Baker, Eric Schmitt and Mark Landler contributed reporting.

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KARZAI AFTER RE-ELECTION (NOVEMBER 10, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, November 10th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Karzai after re-election SOURCE: The News International Tuesday, November 10, 2009 By RAHIMULLAH YUSUFZAI

President Hamid Karzai‘s recent re-election should have been a reaffirmation of Afghanistan‘s journey on the path of democracy. Instead it raised questions on the credibility of the electoral process. It also intensified the blame game due to the failure of President Karzai and the western powers that brought him to power in December 2001 to deliver on their promises to the Afghan people.

There were hardly any celebrations, and the manner of his win caused embarrassment to him and his supporters. The 54.6 percent votes (3.1 million out of the 5.7 million valid votes) that President Karzai had won according to an announcement by the Afghan Independent Election Commission, were cut down to 49.6 percent following a recount of the disputed votes by the UN-backed Election Complaints Commission. Another 0.5 percent votes would have raised Mr Karzai‘s percentage to more than 50 percent and given him a first-round win. But this didn‘t happen and thus a run-off election was necessitated between Mr Karzai and the runner- up, Dr Abdullah, who received 27 percent of the vote.

But the latter (whose real name is only Abdullah, not Abdullah Abdullah that the Western media uses owing to its reluctance to accept that a person couldn‘t have a single name) boycotted the second round. However, the fact that the run-off election didn‘t take place triggered a debate and prompted Dr Abdullah to describe Mr Karzai‘s election as illegal and unconstitutional.

The head of the Independent Election Commission Azizullah Lodin, an appointee of president Karzai, justified the decision to declare Mr Karzai re-elected under Article 61 of Afghanistan‘s constitution following Dr Abdullah‘s boycott. Mr Lodin‘s plea was that the run-off election could only take place if there were two candidates in the field. Besides, he cited the heavy expenditure required for a second round of polling and the expected security risks as reasons for calling off the run-off election.

It wasn‘t without reason that Dr Abdullah had demanded Mr Lodin‘s removal and revamping of the US-funded election commission, which couldn‘t really be ―independent‖ in a country occupied by foreign forces and run by a government made up of warlords. He had also made his participation in the run-off conditional on the sacking of at least three government ministers and certain electoral reforms.

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The president rejected his demands on the ground that these would be a violation of Afghanistan‘s laws and constitution. This was a weak argument considering the fact that ensuring democratic and credible elections was vital to raise the trust of the Afghan people in the electoral process and Afghanistan‘s nascent democracy. The fact that the turnout in the 2009 presidential poll dropped to 38.7 percent-that too despite the fraudulent figures and multiple voting, from the high of 70 percent in the 2004 election-should have been a cause for alarm as it showed the disenchantment of the Afghan people with the system of governance and justice. It also highlighted their alienation with the country‘s ruling elite, almost all dependent on the US and NATO power for their survival and on international assistance for their riches.

It won‘t be fair to blame only President Karzai for the fraudulent election. He obviously had more power and resources as Afghanistan‘s president for the last eight years to rig the poll. His men holding the reins of power in Pakhtun-populated southern and eastern Afghanistan, and in the northern and central provinces dominated by warlords Abdur Rasheed Dostum and Karim Khalili, left no stone unturned to arm-twist, buy-off and charm voters in favour of candidate Karzai.

But powerful supporters of Dr Abdullah, the man who had been President Karzai‘s foreign minister for sometime and benefited from western largesse, were not to be left behind as they hunted for votes for the half-Tajik, half-Pakhtun candidate from Panjshir Valley. One such supporter was Ata Mohammad Noor, governor of the northern Balkh province, who vigorously campaigned for Dr Abdullah and even threatened not to accept Mr Karzai as a legitimate president owing to the fraud in the election.

That anyone with the gun and the resources played a role in rigging Afghanistan‘s presidential election is evident from the European Union‘s report that a third of the disputed 1.5 million votes were fraudulent, and that this included one million polled for Mr Karzai and 300,000 for Dr Abdullah. Despite his victory, the electoral fraud will haunt President Karzai during his next five-year term in office. In fact, he has emerged bruised and weaker from the election. His Western backers, who not long ago were charmed by his English-speaking ability, his traditional Afghan robes and his relatively clean past compared to the other Afghans in power, are now determined to make him accountable for his actions. From President Barack Obama to Prime Minister Gordon Brown and from UN special representative in Afghanistan Kai Eide to the leaders of all Western nations with troops in the country, the message to President Karzai is loud and clear: rid your government of warlords and drug-runners and clean up corruption if you want out continued support.

It seems the criterion for backing the beleaguered Afghan president has become tougher and now he must meet certain stringent conditions to qualify for Western support in the form of troops and resources to battle the resurgent Taliban, sustain him in power, pay for the expenses of his cash-strapped government and its feeble institutions and also rebuild the war- wracked country.

It is strange that an Afghan president dependent on NATO forces and western money for survival is being tasked to do things beyond his power. It is the western powers which brought back to power the Afghan warlords who had been defeated by the Taliban and discredited due to their corrupt practices and their excesses against the Afghan people. But now they want the weak Afghan president to ditch these powerful men holding positions as governors, corps commanders, ministers and advisers.

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The US and its allies with 103,000 troosps in Afghanistan are also primarily responsible for the record rise in opium-poppy production and drug-trafficking and for their failure to take action against drug barons mostly part of the Afghan government out of fear of making more enemies. But their wrath is directed against Mr Karzai, who on his own cannot do much to curtail the power of the drug-runners and warlords.

Like all rulers in countries with weak desmocracies, he had to make alliances with powerful warlords and moneyed people to win election and survive in power. It isn‘t something proper and much-needed reforms, mostly written into Afghan law but not implemented, must take place in Afghanistan to give its people hope and a better life. However, expecting President Karzai to accomplish on his own the wish-list drawn for him by his western sponsors amounts to wishful thinking.

At a time when President Karzai‘s government and its impatient western supporters bicker among themselves as to what needs to be done to right the wrongs in an increasingly unstable Afghanistan, the Taliban appear to be enjoying the spectacle. They were able to partially disrupt the presidential election and ensure a low turnout. The electoral fraud and the crucial western role in resolving the issue of the disputed vote validated the Taliban‘s argument that the poll was a tool of foreigners aimed at installing a subservient government in Kabul. The misgivings about each other‘s intentions between the Afghan government and the NATO member-states taking part in the fighting in Afghanistan will further help the Taliban cause.

Making President Karzai a scapegoat for the collective western failure in Afghanistan may help influence public opinion in western countries, but it cannot win them a decisive military victory against the Taliban. That will require acceptance of the ground realities in Afghanistan as deployment of extra western forces in the country will provoke resentment among most Afghans and give a fillip to the Taliban resistance.

The 103,000 foreign soldiers in Afghanistan and the over 150,000 Afghan National Army soldiers and the Afghan National Police should be more than enough to tackle the less than 20,000 Taliban if the Afghan people were convinced that the west and its partner in Kabul, President Karzai, could be trusted to put their homeland on the path of progress and prosperity. Until that happens, neither any increase in resources and troops nor the holding of elections will be able defeat the Taliban and stabilise Afghanistan.

The writer is resident editor of The News in Peshawar. Email: rahimyusufzai @yahoo.com

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U.S. ENVOY RESISTS INCREASE IN TROOPS (NOVEMBER 12, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, November 12th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

U.S. envoy resists increase in troops SOURCE: The Washington Post Thursday, November 12, 2009 By GREG JAFFE, SCOTT WILSON and KAREN DEYOUNG

The U.S. ambassador in Kabul sent two classified cables to Washington in the past week expressing deep concerns about sending more U.S. troops to Afghanistan until President Hamid Karzai‘s government demonstrates that it is willing to tackle the corruption and mismanagement that has fueled the Taliban‘s rise, senior U.S. officials said.

Karl W. Eikenberry‘s memos, sent as President Obama enters the final stages of his deliberations over a new Afghanistan strategy, illustrated both the difficulty of the decision and the deepening divisions within the administration‘s national security team. After a top- level meeting on the issue Wednesday afternoon — Obama‘s eighth since early last month — the White House issued a statement that appeared to reflect Eikenberry‘s concerns.

―The President believes that we need to make clear to the Afghan government that our commitment is not open-ended,‖ the statement said. ―After years of substantial investments by the American people, governance in Afghanistan must improve in a reasonable period of time.‖

On the eve of his nine-day trip to Asia, Obama was given a series of options laid out by military planners with differing numbers of new U.S. deployments, ranging from 10,000 to 40,000 troops. None of the scenarios calls for scaling back the U.S. presence in Afghanistan or delaying the dispatch of additional troops.

But Eikenberry‘s last-minute interventions have highlighted the nagging undercurrent of the policy discussion: the U.S. dependence on a partnership with a Karzai government whose incompetence and corruption is a universal concern within the administration. After months of political upheaval, in the wake of widespread fraud during the August presidential election, Karzai was installed last week for a second five-year term.

In addition to placing the Karzai problem prominently on the table, the cables from Eikenberry, a retired three-star general who in 2006-2007 commanded U.S. troops in Afghanistan, have rankled his former colleagues in the Pentagon — as well as Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, defense officials said. McChrystal, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, has stated that without the deployment of an additional tens of thousands of troops within the next year, the mission there ―will likely result in failure.‖

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Eikenberry retired from the military in April as a senior general in NATO and was sworn in as ambassador the next day. His position as a former commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan is likely to give added weight to his concerns about sending more troops and fan growing doubts about U.S. prospects in Afghanistan among an increasingly pessimistic public and polarized Congress.

Although Eikenberry‘s extensive military experience and previous command in Afghanistan were the key reasons Obama chose him for the top diplomatic job there, the former general had been reluctant as ambassador to weigh in on military issues. Some officials who favor an increase in troops said they were surprised by the last-minute nature of his strongly worded cables.

In these and other communications with Washington, Eikenberry has expressed deep reservations about Karzai‘s erratic behavior and corruption within his government, said U.S. officials familiar with the cables. Since Karzai was officially declared reelected last week, U.S. diplomats have seen little sign that the Afghan president plans to address the problems they have raised repeatedly with him.

U.S. officials were particularly irritated by a interview this week in which a defiant Karzai said that the West has little interest in Afghanistan and that its troops are there only for self- serving reasons.

―The West is not here primarily for the sake of Afghanistan,‖ Karzai told PBS‘s ―The NewsHour With Jim Lehrer‖ program. ―It is here to fight terrorism. The United States and its allies came to Afghanistan after September 11. Afghanistan was troubled like hell before that, too. Nobody bothered about us.‖

Karzai expressed indifference when asked about the withdrawal of most of the hundreds of U.N. employees from Afghanistan after a bombing late last month in Kabul. The blast killed five foreign U.N. officials.

―They may or may not return,‖ he said. ―I don‘t think Afghanistan will notice it.‖

Eikenberry also has expressed frustration with the relative paucity of funds set aside for spending on development and reconstruction this year in Afghanistan, a country wrecked by three decades of war. Earlier this summer, he asked for $2.5 billion in nonmilitary spending for 2010, a 60 percent increase over what Obama had requested from Congress, but the request has languished even as the administration has debated spending billions of dollars on new troops.

The ambassador also has worried that sending tens of thousands of additional American troops would increase the Afghan government‘s dependence on U.S. support at a time when its own security forces should be taking on more responsibility for fighting. Before serving as the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Eikenberry was in charge of the Afghan army training program.

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Each of the four options that were presented to Obama on Wednesday were accompanied by troop figures and the estimated annual costs of the additional deployments, roughly calculated as $1 billion per thousand troops. All would draw the United States deeper into the war at a time of economic hardship and rising fiscal concerns at home.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates have backed a major increase in U.S. forces to drive the Taliban from populated areas and provide Afghan security forces and the government the space to snuff out corruption and undertake development projects. They have argued that only a large-scale counterinsurgency effort can produce a strong Afghan government capable of preventing the country from once again become an al-Qaeda haven.

Those views have been balanced in internal deliberations by the hard skepticism of other Obama advisers, led by Vice President Biden. They have argued for a more narrow counterterrorism strategy that would not significantly expand the U.S. combat presence.

The most ambitious option Obama received Wednesday calls for 40,000 additional U.S. troops, as outlined by McChrystal in his stark assessment of the war filed in late August.

Military planners put the additional annual cost of McChrystal‘s recommendation at $33 billion, although White House officials say the number is probably closer to $50 billion. The extra troops would allow U.S. forces to attempt to take back and hold several Taliban havens in the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan.

One compromise option put forward by the Pentagon, with the backing of Gates, would deploy an additional 30,000 to 35,000 U.S. troops — fewer than McChrystal‘s optimal number to carry out his strategy — and rely on NATO allies to make up the 5,000- to 10,000- troop difference. The third option, known by military planners as ―the hybrid,‖ would send 20,000 additional U.S. troops to shore up security in 10 to 12 major population areas. In the rest of the country, the military would adopt a counterterrorism strategy targeting forces allied with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, primarily in the north and east, with fighter jets, Predator drones and Special Operations troops that leave a light U.S. footprint on the ground. The military puts the annual cost of that option at $22 billion.

The most modest option calls for deploying an additional 10,000 to 15,000 troops. While under consideration at the White House, the proposal holds little merit for military planners because, after building bases to accommodate 10,000 or so additional soldiers and Marines, the marginal cost of adding troops beyond that figure would rise only slightly.

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AMONG OBAMA AIDES, DEBATE INTENSIFIES ON TROOP LEVELS (NOVEMBER 12, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, November 12th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Among Obama Aides, Debate Intensifies on Troop Levels SOURCE: The New York Times Thursday, November 12, 2009 By MARK LANDLER and JEFF ZELENY

WASHINGTON - The disclosure that the United States ambassador in Kabul has expressed written opposition to deploying more American troops to Afghanistan lays bare the fierce debate within the Obama administration over the direction of the war, even after weeks of deliberations and with the president on the verge of a decision.

The public airing of Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry‘s reservations bolsters the case of those in the president‘s circle, notably his vice president and some of his top political advisers, who remain skeptical of a request for 40,000 troops by the top American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, several officials said Thursday.

In meetings in the White House Situation Room, and in confidential cables, the ambassador, a retired Army lieutenant general who once was the top American commander in Afghanistan, has argued that the administration needs to move away from a debate over numbers and confront a more basic issue: the risk that sending more soldiers will deepen the dependence of the Afghan government on the United States.

Public disclosure of his views has heightened existing tensions between senior military officers and General Eikenberry, who left the military in April to become Mr. Obama‘s emissary. Several military officials complained bitterly that his latest cables were part of a skein of pessimistic and defeatist memos he has sent since taking over in Kabul.

At a National Security Council meeting on Wednesday, however, Mr. Obama picked up on General Eikenberry‘s arguments about growing Afghan dependence, according to a senior official. The president, he said, was far more assertive than in previous sessions, pressing his advisers about the wisdom of four proposals for adding troops. The change in his tone, from listening to challenging, was palpable, officials said.

The officials requested anonymity to speak more freely about internal administration deliberations.

On Thursday, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said the president had not rejected any of the four options, but was weighing how to mix and match elements from each of them.

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―I would say it was more, how can we combine some of the best features of several of the options to maximum good effect?‖ Mr. Gates told reporters. A central focus in Mr. Obama‘s deliberations, he said, was, ―How do we signal resolve and at the same time signal to the Afghans as well as the American people that this is not an open-ended commitment?‖

General Eikenberry, a soldier-diplomat with a foot in each camp, is now at the center of that debate. As a commander with two tours in Afghanistan, he helped train Afghan troops, becoming known as an advocate for the Afghan national army. He also developed strong opinions on strategic issues including the role of Pakistan, where leaders of Al Qaeda have found sanctuary.

As the top American diplomat in Kabul, General Eikenberry has had nearly daily exposure to President Hamid Karzai, most recently during 20 hours of negotiations, along with Senator John Kerry, to persuade him to accept the results of an election investigation that required a second round of voting. These encounters, officials said, have left him pessimistic that Mr. Karzai will seize the challenge of creating a viable, stand-alone Afghan army.

―No one would dispute that putting in troops will improve security,‖ an official familiar with General Eikenberry‘s views said. ―The question is, what will Afghans do? Will the Afghan government embrace the mission of training and leading combat operations? The answer is, we don‘t know.‖

It was not clear if the White House asked General Eikenberry to submit his comments, or if he did so on his own. But some senior officials who remain skeptical of the buildup seemed pleased that his perspective had entered the public debate, which has been dominated for two months by the leaked assessment of General McChrystal.

The behind-the-scenes tug-of-war over policy has become increasingly bitter. Last Sunday, a few days after General Eikenberry sent his cable to the State Department, top military and civilian officials gathered for a regularly scheduled meeting at the embassy, where General McChrystal pointedly addressed many of the issues in the Eikenberry memo.

General McChrystal did not refer to the cable directly, but specifically challenged General Eikenberry‘s conclusions, according to one official familiar with the meeting. General McChrystal, he said, said that no alternatives had been offered besides ―the helicopter on the roof of the embassy,‖ a reference to the hasty American withdrawal from Saigon in 1975.

After the meeting, General McChrystal and General Eikenberry had a private conference. It is unclear what was said at the meeting, but American officials said that the next day General Eikenberry sent another cable softening his stance about the impact of a troop increase in Afghanistan. A spokesman for General Eikenberry declined to comment.

As Mr. Obama left Thursday for a weeklong trip to Asia, he took his Afghanistan review with him. The president asked his military and civilian advisers not to present entirely new options, administration officials said, but rather to help choose from what he believes are the most promising elements. The discussions are not fixed on troop numbers alone, the officials said, but on underlying strategy and performance measures.

Even before the president announces a decision on his Afghan strategy, the White House is trying to build support among allies, in Congress and the public. The central message of the

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White House on Thursday was to stress that the president would not agree to an open-ended commitment of troops.

―It‘s important to fully examine not just how we‘re going to get folks in but how we‘re going to get folks out,‖ said Robert Gibbs, the White House press secretary.

General Eikenberry‘s reluctance on additional troops would seem to put him at odds not only with General McChrystal but also with Mr. Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, who have been coalescing around a plan to send roughly 30,000 troops, according to officials. The State Department has declined to comment on General Eikenberry‘s cables, saying that his advice and that of Mrs. Clinton were confidential.

General Eikenberry, who holds degrees from Harvard and Stanford, has long been a controversial figure in the military, with some faulting his management style as high-handed.

The State Department‘s inspector general is doing an investigation of the embassy in Kabul that has involved asking employees about General Eikenberry‘s management style. But officials said the audit was routine, and focused on issues like the heavy workload of employees.

Reporting was contributed by Mark Mazzetti, Elisabeth Bumiller, David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt from Washington; Dexter Filkins and Alissa J. Rubin from Kabul, Afghanistan; and Carlotta Gall from Kunduz, Afghanistan.

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U.S. ASKS MORE FROM PAKISTAN IN TERROR WAR (NOVEMBER 15, 2006)

Written by admin on Sunday, November 15th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

U.S. Asks More From Pakistan in Terror War SOURCE: The New York Times Sunday, November 15, 2009 By ERIC SCHMITT and DAVID E. SANGER

WASHINGTON - The Obama administration is stepping up pressure on Pakistan to expand and reorient its fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, warning that failing to do so would undercut the new strategy and troop increase for Afghanistan that President Obama is preparing to approve, American officials say.

While Afghanistan has dominated the public discussion of Mr. Obama‘s strategy, which officials say could be announced as early as this week, Pakistan is returning to center stage in administration planning. As the president traveled to Asia, his national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, was quietly sent to Islamabad, its capital.

His message, officials said, was that the new American strategy would work only if Pakistan broadened its fight beyond the militants attacking its cities and security forces and went after the groups that use havens in Pakistan for plotting and carrying out attacks against American troops in Afghanistan, as well as support networks for Al Qaeda.

General Jones praised the Pakistani operation in South Waziristan but urged Pakistani officials to combat extremists who fled to North Waziristan.

General Jones also delivered a letter from Mr. Obama to Pakistan‘s president, Asif Ali Zardari, in which Mr. Obama said he expected Mr. Zardari to rally the nation‘s political and national security institutions in a united campaign against extremists threatening Pakistan and Afghanistan, said an official briefed on the conversations, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the talks were confidential.

For their part, Pakistani officials have told the Americans that they harbor two deep fears about Mr. Obama‘s new strategy: that the United States will add too many troops on the Afghan side of the border, and that the American effort will end too soon.

Their first concern, described by officials on both sides of the recent discussions, is that if Mr. Obama commits an additional 30,000 or more troops, it will inevitably push more Taliban fighters across the border into Pakistani territory and complicate the South Waziristan offensive.

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Every time Mr. Obama declares that the United States will not have an ―open-ended‖ military commitment in Afghanistan, he fuels a second concern of the powerful Pakistani military and intelligence establishment, which believes the United States commitment is fleeting.

It is a concern that some of them say justifies Pakistan‘s continuing ties to the militants who fight American troops in Afghanistan.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton appeared to fuel this concern on Sunday in her comments on the ABC program ―This Week,‖ saying: ―We‘re not interested in staying in Afghanistan. We have no long-term stake there. We want that to be made very clear.‖

White House officials have said comparatively little about the Pakistan side of the administration‘s evolving war strategy, in part because they have so few options. They cannot place forces inside Pakistan, and they cannot talk publicly about the Central Intelligence Agency‘s Predator drone strikes in the country, though they are so much of an open secret that Mrs. Clinton was asked about them repeatedly in meetings she held late last month with Pakistani students and citizens. (She refused to acknowledge the program‘s existence.)

In his letter to Mr. Zardari, Mr. Obama offered a range of new incentives to the Pakistanis for their cooperation, including enhanced intelligence sharing and military cooperation, according to the official who had been briefed on the letter‘s contents.

During Mr. Obama‘s Situation Room briefings on his alternatives, those advocating a minimal commitment of new troops in Afghanistan have argued that the United States needs only enough forces to keep Al Qaeda ―bottled up‖ in the mountainous tribal areas of Pakistan.

―You could argue that even under the status quo, we don‘t see Al Qaeda coming into Afghanistan,‖ said one official sympathetic to this view. ―And so an additional commitment of forces isn‘t going to apply more pressure on our main target.‖

Those arguing for a more forceful presence - including Mrs. Clinton, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen - have contended that while Afghanistan is not now a haven for Al Qaeda, it could easily become one if the Taliban make further inroads.

American officials have praised Pakistan‘s leaders for finally launching comprehensive military attacks against Taliban forces that have conducted suicide bombings in the capital, on the military headquarters and last week against a key office of the main Pakistani intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate.

But the Americans are now trying, as the Bush administration did with little success, to persuade Pakistan to do more, not just against the Qaeda leadership holed up in the country‘s unruly tribal areas, but also against the Afghan Taliban leadership in the southern Pakistani city of Quetta and the Haqqani militant network in the tribal areas.

Representative Jane Harman, a California Democrat who heads the House Homeland Security subcommittee on intelligence and who visited Pakistan last week, summed up the administration‘s frustrations and her own after meetings with senior Pakistani officials: ―They are focused on who they think are threats to them. Period.‖

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A recurring theme in Mrs. Clinton‘s visit to Pakistan was the perception that the United States and NATO forces are drawing down troops along the Afghan border with Pakistan. This, Pakistani officials said, allows Afghan militants to pour across the border into South Waziristan, where they become Pakistan‘s problem.

Mrs. Clinton argued that NATO had actually increased troop levels along that border but had decided to consolidate about a half-dozen remote outposts into fewer, larger installations, because they were easier to defend. According to American military officials, the Pakistani military got no warning of the change.

So great was the Pakistani concern over the outpost closures that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top NATO commander in Afghanistan, made a special point during an unannounced trip to Islamabad after Mrs. Clinton‘s visit to reassure Pakistani officials of American resolve.

―We‘re stuck between not wanting to suggest we‘re going to be there forever, but on the other hand, if we don‘t show some kind of commitment, everyone continues to play the same game,‖ a senior administration official said Sunday. ―That‘s the challenge.‖

If Pakistanis voice concerns about a lack of American commitment, they express equal concern that sending tens of thousands more American troops to Afghanistan could force Taliban militants into Pakistan.

―Whatever we do - put in more troops or put in fewer troops - they‘ll freak out,‖ said an American intelligence officer who spoke on condition of anonymity to avoid jeopardizing his relations with Pakistani officials. But the intelligence officer acknowledged that the long-term security picture and the American commitment in Afghanistan were still unclear. ―Look, if I were in Pakistan, I‘d be hedging my bets, too,‖ the officer said. ―We need to be much more convincing that we have a better game plan.‖

Mark Landler contributed reporting.

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AFGHANISTAN LEADER TOLD TO STEP UP ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES (NOVEMBER 16, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, November 16th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Afghanistan leader told to step up anti-corruption measures SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Monday, November 16, 2009

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has told ABC News that Afghanistan‘s President Hamid Karzai must do more to fight corruption from within.

Ms Clinton said the Afghan government will need to establish a major crimes tribunal and an anti-corruption commission if it wants continued civilian aid from Washington.

Considering last month‘s fraud-tainted elections, she said any anti-corruption declaration from Mr Karzai would need to include a no impunity clause for corrupt Afghan officials.

Any US civilian aid sent to Afghanistan would need to be handled by government ministries that can be held accountable, she said.

Ms Clinton told the ABC that Washington was only in Afghanistan to defeat al-Qaeda and had no long term plans to build a modern Afghan democracy.

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WHAT IF WE FAIL IN AFGHANISTAN? (NOVEMBER 16, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, November 16th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

What If We Fail in Afghanistan? SOURCE: The New Yorker Monday, November 16, 2009 By STEVE COLL

Last week, I found myself at yet another think tank-type meeting about Afghan policy choices. Toward the end, one of the participants, who had long experience in government, asked a deceptively simple question: What would happen if we failed?

First, the question requires a definition of failure. As I‘ve argued, in my view, a purpose of American policy in Afghanistan ought to be to prevent a second coercive Taliban revolution in that country, not only because it would bring misery to Afghans (and, not incidentally, Afghan women) but because it would jeopardize American interests, such as our security against Al Qaeda‘s ambitions and our (understandable) desire to see nuclear-armed Pakistan free itself from the threat of revolutionary Islamist insurgents. So, then, a definition of failure would be a redux of Taliban revolution in Afghanistan-a revolution that took control of traditional Taliban strongholds such as Kandahar and Khost, and that perhaps succeeded in Kabul as well. Such an outcome is conceivable if the Obama Administration does not discover the will and intelligence to craft a successful political-military strategy to prevent the Afghan Taliban from achieving its announced goals, which essentially involve the restoration of the Afghan state they presided over during the nineteen-nineties, which was formally known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

What would be the consequences of a second Islamic Emirate? My scenarios here are intended analytically, as a first-draft straw-man forecast:

The Nineties Afghan Civil War on Steroids: Even if the international community gave up on Afghanistan and withdrew, as it did from Somalia during the early nineties, it is inconceivable that the Taliban could triumph in the country completely and provide a regime (however perverse) of stability. About half of Afghanistan‘s population is Pashtun, from which the Taliban draw their strength. Much of the country‘s non-Pashtun population ardently opposes the Taliban. In the humiliating circumstances that would attend American failure, those in the West who now promote ―counterterrorism,‖ ―realist,‖ and ―cost-effective‖ strategies in the region would probably endorse, in effect, a nineties redux-which would amount to a prescription for more Afghan civil war. A rump ―legitimate‖ Afghan government dominated by ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks would find arms and money from India, Iran, and perhaps Russia, Europe and the United States. This would likely produce a long-running civil war between northern, Tajik-dominated ethnic militias and the Pashtun-dominated Taliban. Tens of thousands of Afghans would likely perish in this conflict and from the pervasive poverty it

365 would produce; many more Afghans would return as refugees to Pakistan, contributing to that country‘s instability.

Momentum for a Taliban Revolution in Pakistan: If the Quetta Shura (Mullah Omar‘s outfit, the former Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, now in exile in Pakistan) regained power in Kandahar or Kabul, it would undoubtedly interpret its triumph as a ticket to further ambition in Pakistan. Al Qaeda‘s leaders, if they survived American drone attacks, would encourage this narrative and support it as best they could. The Pakistani Taliban would likely be energized, armed and financed by the Afghan Taliban as they pursued their own revolutionary ambitions in Islamabad. In response, the international community would undoubtedly fall back in defense of the Pakistani constitutional state, such as it is. However, the West would find the Pakistan Army and its allies in Riyadh and perhaps even Beijing even more skeptical than they are now about the American-led agenda. In this scenario, as in the past, Pakistan‘s generals would be tempted to negotiate an accommodation with the Taliban, Afghan and Pakistani alike, to the greatest possible extent, in defiance of Washington‘s preferences. The net result might well be an increase in Islamist influence over the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, if not an outright loss of control.

Increased Islamist Violence Against India, Increasing the Likelihood of Indo-Pakistani War: The Taliban and Al Qaeda are anti-American, yes. But they are equally determined to wage war against India‘s secular, Hindu-dominated democracy. The Pakistani Taliban, whose momentum would be increased by Taliban success in Afghanistan, consist in part of Punjab- based, ardently anti-Indian Islamist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, which carried out the spectacular raid on Mumbai a year ago. The probable knock-on effect of a second Taliban revolution Afghanistan would be to increase the likelihood of irregular Islamist attacks from Pakistan against Indian targets-not only the traditional target set in Indian-held Kashmir, but in New Delhi, Mumbai, and other cities, as has occurred periodically during the last decade. In time, democratic Indian governments would be pressed by their electorates to respond with military force. This in turn would present, repetitively, the problem of managing the role of nuclear weapons in a prospective fourth Indo-Pakistani war.

Increased Al Qaeda Ambitions Against Britain and the United States: Deliberately, I would list this problem as fourth in severity in my initial straw-man forecast. Al Qaeda‘s current capability to carry out disruptive attacks on American soil is very low. Still, it is absurd to think, as some in the Obama Adminsitration apparently have argued, that Al Qaeda would not be strengthened by a Taliban revolution in Afghanistan. Of course it would. Whether this strengthening would directly or quickly threaten the security of American civilians is another question. London might well be more vulnerable than New York during the ensuing five or ten years after an Afghan Taliban revolution. The Afghan Taliban are essentially inseparable from the Pakistani Taliban. Because of the size and character of the Pakistani diaspora in Britain, currently, there are about six hundred thousand annual visits by civilians between the two countries, a flow of individuals that is almost impossible to police effectively. Therefore, as recent terrorist-criminal cases in Britain document, bad guys periodically get through the border. By comparison, the post-9/11 American border is much harder for Pakistani- or Afghanistan-originated terrorists to penetrate. Still, in a civil war-ridden, Taliban-influenced Afghan state Al Qaeda‘s playbook against the United States would expand. As 9/11 and the current creativity of the regionally focussed Taliban amply demonstrate, their potential should not be complacently underestimated. If they did get through and score another lucky goal, it is easy to imagine the prospective consequences for American politics and for the constitution.

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IS KARZAI LOSING U.S. SUPPORT? (NOVEMBER 17, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, November 17th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Is Karzai losing U.S. support? SOURCE: The Frontier Post Tuesday, November 17, 2009

BAGRAM (NNI): Journalists have been allowed to inspect refurbished facilities at Bagram airbase in Afghanistan, the largest US military hub in the region and home to a controversial prison. Al Jazeera‘s correspondent James Bays, who was among those who inspected the facilities, said Bagram, unlike its Guantanamo counterpart, was clearly not going to be shut down soon. ―The new prison wing cost some $60 million to build … and is meant to be part of a new era of openness and transparency,‖ Bays said. ―But we were not shown the detainees. Human-rights lawyers say that, while the environment for the prisoners may be changing, their legal situation is not … not having been charged. Nor has any civilian lawyer ever been allowed inside.‖ Bays said the extended prison could hold up to 1,000 detainees, but was at present holding around 700 inmates, including 30 foreign prisoners. General Mark Martins, who runs detention operations at the airbase, said the US military was improving its treatment of detainees and had learnt many lessons since occupying the country in 2001. ―Detention, if not done properly, can actually harm the effort. We are a learning organisation … we believe transparency is certainly going to help the effort, and increase the credibility of the whole process,‖ Martins said. However, Clara Gutteridge, an investigator of secret prisons and renditions from the human rights organisation, Reprieve, said Bagram is seen as ―Guantanamo‘s lesser-known evil twin‖. ―All this talk about transparency, and the US government still won‘t release a simple list of names of prisoners who are in Bagram,‖ she told Al Jazeera. ―None of them have had access to a lawyer … and that just seems very unfair. ―We at Reprieve see this as the next big fight after Guantanamo Bay. ―But one thing that the US government is saying is that Afghan prisoners in Afghanistan have less rights than any other prisoner which just seems absurd.‖ Bagram Air Field is the largest US military hub in Afghanistan and is home to about 24,000 military personnel and civilian contractors. BASE EXPANSION: Tens of millions of dollars continue to be spent on expanding and upgrading facilities - turning Bagram into a town spread over about 5,000 acres. The air field part of the complex is already handling 400 tonnes of cargo and 1,000 passengers daily, according to Air Force spokesman Captain David Faggard. It is continuing to grow to keep up with the requirements of an escalating war and troop increases. Among new options being considered in Washington is regional commander General Stanley McChrystal‘s request to bring an additional 40,000 troops to Afghanistan. But even with current troop levels - 65,000 US troops and about 40,000 from allied countries - Bagram already is bursting at the seams, our correspondent reported. Plans are under way to build a new, $22m passenger terminal and a cargo yard costing $9m. To increase cargo capacity, a parking ramp supporting the world‘s largest aircraft is to be completed in early 2010.

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Bagram was previously a major Soviet base during Moscow‘s 1979-89 occupation of Afghanistan, providing air support to Soviet and Afghan forces fighting the mujahidin. Bagram lies in Parwan, a relatively quiet province. The Taliban is not believed to have a significant presence in the province. But the base is susceptible to rocket and mortar attacks. In 2009, the Taliban launched more than a dozen attacks on the base, killing four and wounding at least 12, according to Colonel Mike Brady, a military spokesman.

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„SUCCESS OF NEW AFGHAN STRATEGY DEPENDS ON PAKISTAN‟

(NOVEMBER 17, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, November 17th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

‘Success of new Afghan strategy depends on Pakistan’: US urges SOURCE: Daily Times Tuesday, November 17, 2009 REUTERS

WASHINGTON: The US has stepped up pressure on Pakistan to expand its fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, warning that the success of the new Afghanistan strategy depends on it, The New York Times reported on Monday.

Obama sent a letter to President Asif Ali Zardari saying he expects the Pakistani leader to rally political and national security institutions in a united campaign against extremists - reported the Times, citing a US official who was briefed on the letter‘s contents.

In his letter to Zardari, Obama offered a range of new incentives to the Pakistanis for their cooperation, including enhanced intelligence sharing and military cooperation, said the Times. The report said the letter was delivered by US National Security Adviser James Jones, who held meetings with Pakistani leaders in Islamabad on Friday.

Jones also warned Pakistani officials that Washington‘s new Afghanistan strategy would work only if Pakistan broadens its fight beyond the Taliban attacking cities to ―groups using havens in Pakistan for plotting attacks against US troops in Afghanistan‖, said the Times, citing American officials briefed on the confidential talks. Jones also praised the current operation in South Waziristan, but urged Pakistan to combat extremists who had fled into North Waziristan, reported the Times.

Jones‘ press secretary, Mike Hammer, would not discuss what was said in the meetings or whether a letter was delivered.

In Islamabad, Foreign Office spokesman Abdul Basit confirmed Jones had delivered a letter, but declined to give details. ―It was a diplomatic communication,‖ said Basit, who also declined to comment on the reported US call for Pakistan to do more.

For their part, Pakistani officials have told the Americans they harbour two deep fears about Obama‘s new strategy: the US would add too many troops on the Afghan side of the border and the American effort will end too soon, said the Times.

Their first concern, described by officials on both sides of the recent discussions, is that if Obama commits an additional 30,000 or more troops, it would inevitably push more Taliban 369 fighters across the border into Pakistani territory and complicate the South Waziristan offensive.

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KARZAI SWORN IN FOR SECOND TERM (NOVEMBER 19, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, November 19th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Karzai Sworn In for Second Term as Afghan President SOURCE: The New York Times Thursday, November 19, 2009 By ALISSA J. RUBIN and ALAN COWELL

KABUL, Afghanistan - Tainted by a flawed election and allegations of high-level corruption in his regime, President Hamid Karzai was inaugurated Thursday for a second term, saying the Afghan Army should assume full control of the country‘s security within five years.

―We will decrease the role of international forces,‖ Mr. Karzai said at a midday ceremony held at the presidential palace in Kabul. ―We want our security within five years to be entirely within the hands of the Afghan government and led by Afghans.‖

The ceremony was the culmination of a fraught and chaotic electoral process that began on Aug. 20 when Afghans went to the polls. Mr. Karzai was proclaimed the winner earlier this month when his main challenger, Abdullah Abdullah, a former foreign minister, withdrew from a run-off after a United Nations-sponsored inquiry found evidence of widespread electoral fraud.

His inauguration at this pivotal moment - eight years into the Afghan war as the United States is weighing a new battle strategy - raises the question of what Afghans and American officials can expect of him over the next five years amid doubts about whether he can complete his term.

Mr. Karzai faces calls from ordinary Afghans, Western donors, and the United States to root out corruption by overhauling his government. In his inaugural address Thursday, Mr. Karzai said corruption was ―very dangerous issue,‖ news reports said, and he promised that a broad national conference, known as a loya jirga, would be held soon in Kabul to address the issue.

He also promised to prosecute people involved in the country‘s huge, illicit narcotics industry which helps fuel both corruption and the Taliban insurgency claiming an increasingly high death toll among foreign troops. .

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton attended the ceremony with around 800 Afghan and foreign dignitaries including President Asif Ali Zardari of neighboring Pakistan and the British foreign secretary, , whose country has 9,000 soldiers deployed in the 43-nation NATO coalition here. Mr. Karzai said his administration would ―negotiate with our friends like the United States who doubt us, security-wise.‖

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The Obama administration is weighing a decision on the deployment of further American troops in Afghanistan in addition to the 68,000 already there as doubts spread in many parts of the NATO alliance about the value and risks of supporting a regime seen as lacking political credibility.

Mr. Karzai hailed the presence of the Pakistani leader as a sign of ―good relationship, good brotherhood,‖ despite a history of tensions between the two countries across a porous and mountainous border stretching over 1,500 miles.

The Pakistan Army is currently conducting a drive against militants in its lawless border region of South Waziristan. Kabul has accused its neighbor of giving sanctuary to the leadership of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. At the same time, Pakistan and its long- time rival India are jockeying for influence in Afghanistan.

Mr. Karzai stressed the desire to eliminate civilian casualties and vowed to end the use of civilian security contractors - two particularly sensitive topics among many Afghan civilians.

Mr. Karzai thanked the international election commission that oversaw the vote, which he called ―a historic moment, and great steps toward democracy and people‘s power,‖ pledging that future elections would be ―entirely Afghanized.‖

―We fight over our problems and we argue with each other,‖ he said, ―but when it comes to our Afghan pride, we all pull together.‖

―Eight years ago Afghanistan did not have any laws or regulations,‖ he said. ―We had no government, no state.

―Putting an end to the fighting is the main need of our people now.‖

But some Afghans question his ability to deliver on such promises.

Basher Dost, a candidate who came in third in the first round of the presidential election, has said Mr. Karzai‘s lifelong orientation is toward his tribe and family, and those loyalties render him unable to make the deep changes needed in his government.

―He believes his power is his warlords, it‘s the chiefs of tribes,‖ he said recently. ―It‘s not important what is true; what is important is the interest of your family. It‘s why he cannot fight the warlords and cannot fight the corruption,‖ Mr. Dost said.

Immediately after the inauguration, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the secretary-general of NATO, sent a message of congratulation coupled with a demand for accountable government and measures to halt corruption.

―President Hamid Karzai has our best wishes for his second five-year term,‖ the message said, according to the NATO Web site. ―We strongly support his intention to form a capable and inclusive administration, and to make it accountable, one in which corruption has no place.

‖ It is critically important that the Afghan people, and the citizens of the countries sending troops to the international mission, see concrete progress in this regard,‖ the message said.

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Alissa J. Rubin reported from Kabul, Afghanistan, and Alan Cowell from London. Mark McDonald contributed reporting from Hong Kong.

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HAMID KARZAI - FOREIGN TROOPS OUT OF AFGHANISTAN IN FIVE YEARS (NOVEMBER 19, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, November 19th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Hamid Karzai: foreign troops out of Afghanistan in five years SOURCE: Times Online Thursday, November 19, 2009 By RICHARD BEESTON in Kabul

President Hamid Karzai today signalled the beginning of the end of foreign military intervention in his country, when he pledged that Afghan security forces would take the lead in combating the Taleban over the next three to five years.

In a much-anticipated inauguration speech, the Afghan leader told dozens of visiting foreign dignitaries what they wanted to hear. In particular he pledged to crack down on rampant corruption in his Government, to press for a reconciliation with the Taleban by holding a loya jirga (grand assembly) and for the Afghan army and police to take responsibility for the country‘s security.

His remarks received a warm applause from Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, David Miliband, the Foreign Secretary, and other representatives of Western governments whose troops are serving in Afghanistan and whose aid budgets keep the Government afloat.

―He addressed all the issues we wanted, particularly on security and corruption‖ one foreign envoy attending the event told The Times. ―The test will now be his ability to follow up his promises. But he has made a public commitment to his people that he will be held to.‖

Wearing his trademark green chapan (coat) and grey astrakhan hat, Mr Karzai said: ―Within the next three years, Afghanistan, with continued international support and in line with the growth of its defence capacity, wants to lead and conduct military operations in the many insecure areas of the country.

―We are determined that by the next five years, the Afghan forces are capable of taking the lead in ensuring security and stability across the country,‖ he said.

His comments are likely to influence President Obama‘s decision on whether or not to send thousands more troops to the country, as his commander, General Stanley McChrystal, has requested. A surge of troops to speed up the training of Afghan forces with the aim of handing over responsibility for security now seems more likely.

374

In conjunction with his aim to build up the Afghan security forces, Mr Karzai also pledged to try and make peace with the Taleban, whose insurgency has spread steadily across the country over the past three years.

―We invite dissatisfied compatriots who are not directly linked to international terrorism to return to the their homeland,‖ he said with clear reference to Taleban figures mainly residing in neighbouring Pakistan. ―We will call Afghanistan‘s traditional loya jirga [grand assembly] and make every possible effort to ensure peace in our country.‖

Mr Karzai also tackled the hugely sensitive question of corruption in Afghanistan, which many suspect stretches to within his own family. He blamed the ―foreign media‖ for reporting on corruption, which he said had given Afghanistan ―a very bad reputation‖.

He vowed to stamp out ―the culture of impunity‖ by making officials at all levels accountable. He pledged that in future ministers, governors and other senior officials would have to declare their ―moveable and unmovable assets‖.

Mr Karzai looked and sounded convincing. But the fact that his security forces had to close down Kabul in order to let him hold the ceremony in safety said a lot about the current state of affairs in his country. The peaceful, stable, well-run Afghanistan he described is still a long way off.

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PAKISTAN WORRIES OVER NEW U.S. AFGHAN STRATEGY (NOVEMBER 20, 2009)

Written by admin on Friday, November 20th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Pakistan worries over new US Afghan strategy SOURCE: Dawn Friday, November 20, 2009

ISLAMABAD: As the United States ponders its Afghan strategy, Pakistan is waiting nervously, worried that a US troops surge would widen the war but also keen to see a robust US commitment that would convince the Taliban to talk.

US President Barack Obama pledged on Wednesday to end the Afghan war before he leaves office.

He said he would announce the results of his long-awaited review soon and it would include an exit strategy to avoid ‗a multi-year occupation that won‘t serve the interests of the United States‘.

There are nearly 110,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan, including 68,000 Americans, more than half of whom have arrived since Obama took office. He is now deciding whether to fulfil his commander‘s request for tens of thousands more.

That has raised worry in Pakistan of a spike of Afghan violence spilling over the ill-defined border into Pakistan where its army is battling its own version of the Taliban.

Those fears were raised recently in talks in Islamabad with visiting US national security adviser General James Jones, a senior Pakistani government official said.

‗We have concerns that Taliban may try to cross into Pakistan if violence increased after the new deployment,‘ said the official who is involved in Afghan policy.

‗Such a situation will definitely complicate issues for us particularly at a time when we‘re involved in the offensive in Waziristan,‘ he said, referring to a month-long offensive in South Waziristan on the Afghan border.

The army has seized most main Pakistani Taliban bases in the region of barren mountains and patchy scrub. The militants have retaliated with a barrage of bombs in towns and cities.

Responding to Pakistani concerns of a spill-over, US officials said reinforcements would not open new fronts but

376 would focus on securing populated areas, the official said.

While worried about the arrival of more US soldiers, Pakistan is probably more vexed about the possibility of their hasty departure.

Memories of the United States walking away from Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and leaving the country in chaos are still raw in Pakistan.

‗They have always felt that the United States would run away and they would be left with the mess - just like they were in the 1990s,‘ said former CIA analyst Bruce Riedel.

‗It is very hard to dispel that image,‘ said Riedel, who was in charge of Obama‘s review of policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan last March. He is now with the Brookings Institution.

Obama‘s talk of an exit before he leaves office is likely to compound fears of a US rush to the door. The US president comes to the end of his first term in just over three years. A second and final term would end in seven years.

‗An exit strategy should be staggered over six to seven years .. They shouldn‘t repeat the mistake made after the Soviet withdrawal,‘ said the Pakistani official, who declined to be identified.

Pakistan wants to see an orderly US withdrawal after a negotiated settlement including elements of the Taliban.

The Taliban will seize on any sign of US vacillating as weakness and will only be dragged into talks if they are convinced of US commitment backed by troops, an analyst said.

‗It‘s very important that they should increase their numerical strength and give an impression to the Taliban that they aren‘t going away. Tilt the balance in their favour to a point at least that some decent negotiations can go on,‘ said retired Pakistani general and analyst Talat Masood.

But any show of force to convince the Taliban of US commitment must be accompanied by political reform to win over ethnic Pashtuns, another Pakistani official said.

The Taliban draw most of their support and recruits from Afghanistan‘s biggest ethnic group, many of whom feel alienated by a Kabul government seen as dominated by ethnic Tajiks even though President Hamid Karzai is Pashtun.

‗Military strategy alone can‘t correct policy-level errors,‘ said a senior Pakistani security official. ‗They have to help create a system of governance that has broader acceptability and legitimacy by getting the larger Pashtun population on board.‘

The United States also wanted Pakistan to be a conduit for talks with the Taliban, the official said. Pakistan officially cut contacts with their former allies after the Sept. 11 attacks.

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‗There are always contacts that can be revived, so to speak, to facilitate the two sides sitting together,‘ said the security official, who also declined to be identified. - Reuters

378

A SOFTER APPROACH TO KARZAI (NOVEMBER 20, 2009)

Written by admin on Friday, November 20th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

A softer approach to Karzai New warmth from U.S. is acknowledgment that Afghan leader is needed as partner SOURCE: The Washington Post Friday, November 20, 2009 By RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN

When a team of senior U.S. officials led by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton entered the presidential palace in Kabul on Wednesday for a dinner meeting, they had little indication of what Afghan President Hamid Karzai planned to discuss, or whether questions about corruption and governance would pitch their host into a foul mood.

But instead of revisiting old disputes, Karzai brought in several cabinet ministers to talk about development and security. He explained details of a new effort to address graft. And halfway through a meal of lamb stew, chicken and rice, he looked across the table and said he had decided that the United States would be a ―critical partner‖ in his second term, according to a senior U.S. official familiar with the meeting.

The Americans also turned on the charm. Clinton, wearing an embroidered floral coat she had purchased on an earlier trip to Afghanistan, told stories of her time in Arkansas and in the Senate, and listened with interest as the Afghans detailed how they recently exported 12 tons of apples to India by air.

As President Obama nears a decision on how many more troops he will dispatch to Afghanistan, his top diplomats and generals are abandoning for now their get-tough tactics with Karzai and attempting to forge a far warmer relationship. They recognize that their initial strategy may have done more harm than good, fueling stress and anger in a beleaguered, conspiracy-minded leader whom the U.S. government needs as a partner.

―It‘s not sustainable to have a ‗War of the Roses‘ relationship here, where . . . we basically throw things at each other,‖ said another senior administration official, one of more than a dozen U.S. and Afghan government officials interviewed for this article. They spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss internal policy deliberations.

The new approach, which one official described as a ―reset‖ of the relationship, will entail more engagement with members of Karzai‘s cabinet and provincial governors, officials said, because they have concluded that the Afghan president lacks the political clout in his highly decentralized nation to purge corrupt local warlords and power brokers. The CIA has sent a longtime field officer close to Karzai to be the new station chief in Kabul. And State Department envoy Richard C. Holbrooke, whose aggressive style has infuriated the Afghan 379 leader at times, is devoting more attention to shaping policy in Washington and marshaling international support for reconstruction and development programs.

The tension in the relationship stems from the cumulative impact of several White House decisions that were intended to improve the quality of the Afghan government. When Obama became president, he discontinued his predecessor‘s practice of holding bimonthly videoconferences with Karzai. Obama granted wide latitude to the hard-charging Holbrooke to pressure Karzai to tackle the corruption and mismanagement that have fueled the Taliban‘s rise. The administration also indicated that it wanted many candidates to challenge Karzai in the August presidential election.

Although there is broad agreement among Obama‘s national security team that Karzai has been an ineffective leader, a growing number of top officials have begun to question in recent months whether those actions wound up goading him into doing exactly what the White House did not want: forging alliances with former warlords, letting drug traffickers out of prison and threatening to sack competent ministers. Those U.S. officials now think that Karzai, a tactically shrewd tribal chieftain who is under enormous stress as he seeks to placate and balance rival factions in his government, may operate best when he does not feel besieged.

Criticism of the Obama administration‘s manner of dealing with Karzai has been most pronounced among senior military officials, who question why the State Department has not dispatched more civilians to help the Afghan leader fix the government or worked more intensively with him to achieve U.S. goals.

―We‘ve been treating Karzai like [Slobodan] Milosevic,‖ a senior Pentagon official said, referring to the former Bosnian Serb leader whom Holbrooke pressured into accepting a peace treaty in the 1990s. ―That‘s not a model that will work in Afghanistan.‖

Fueling tensions

Karzai‘s first indication that his relationship with the United States would undergo a profound shift occurred 10 days before Obama‘s inauguration. Vice President-elect Joseph R. Biden Jr. had come to the palace for dinner, and halfway through the meal, he began taking his host to task for how he was responding to civilian casualties caused by U.S. and NATO military operations.

Biden told Karzai that he was politicizing the issue and leveling ―ill-founded‖ allegations in public, according to a previously undisclosed account of the dinner from a person who attended. Karzai argued back, and the discussion turned tense. ―Biden got a little bit passionate about it,‖ the participant said. ―Karzai was taken aback, and he got a little bit passionate, too.‖

Clinton further stoked tensions during her confirmation hearing three days later by calling Afghanistan a ―narco-state‖ with a government ―plagued by limited capacity and widespread corruption.‖ When Holbrooke was appointed Obama‘s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan the following week, the diplomat made little secret of his desire to see others challenge Karzai in the election. In State Department meetings and Washington cocktail parties, he talked up Ashraf Ghani, a former World Bank official who speaks eloquently about the need to address corruption but has only a small political base in Afghanistan.

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At the time, others in the administration were equally harsh in their assessment of Karzai. One senior official remarked that he had ―plateaued as a leader,‖ and the classified version of a White House review of Afghanistan strategy implied, according to two officials who read it, a lack of support for Karzai‘s reelection. Holbrooke and others openly discussed plans to send U.S. development assistance directly to provincial governors and cabinet ministers.

Back then, top administration officials thought that increasing pressure on Karzai would lead him to take meaningful steps to reduce corruption and improve governance. The officials also hoped to encourage potential rivals to run against Karzai by sending a clear signal that he was no longer Washington‘s man.

Neither assumption played out as planned. Karzai recoiled at the demands, his advisers said, in part because he resented being told what to do but also because he thought that Obama administration officials overestimated his control of the country. There also have been conflicting U.S. messages: While Biden and others pressed Karzai to remove his brother as the chairman of the provincial council in Kandahar because of allegations that he is connected to drug trafficking, the CIA continued to pay him for sharing intelligence and assisting with counterterrorism operations, according to a U.S. official with knowledge of intelligence operations in Afghanistan.

The U.S. approach to the election had the unintended consequence of strengthening Karzai‘s hand. ―Nobody wanted to coalesce around a single candidate because they each thought they were America‘s favorite,‖ said Ali Jalali, a former interior minister who briefly considered running.

Karzai was able to pull key opposition figures to his side by promising them positions in the new government. Fear that he no longer had U.S. support also prompted him to name Mohammed Fahim, a prominent former warlord alleged to have been involved in drug smuggling and corruption, as one of his vice presidential candidates.

―We created a political-diplomatic isometric exercise,‖ said Ronald Neumann, a former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan. ―The more we pressed him to remove people, the more he thought we were trying to undercut him, and we drove him back to the worst actors for support.‖

By the May 8 filing deadline, it was clear to many in Washington that Karzai would almost certainly win a second term. But there was no substantive effort to recalibrate the relationship. Although the administration maintained a neutral stance with regard to the election, Karzai saw it differently, according to his advisers.

―He was sure,‖ one said, ―that Washington wanted him to lose.‖

Disputed election

On Aug. 21, the day after Afghanistan‘s election, Holbrooke and U.S. Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry visited Karzai in a wood-paneled room in his Kabul palace to discuss the election and how Karzai would govern if he won.

Although only a small fraction of the ballots had been counted, and widespread reports of fraud were reaching the capital, Karzai told the Americans he believed he had prevailed. 381

―The votes haven‘t been counted yet,‖ Holbrooke told Karzai, according to a U.S. official familiar with the exchange.

Karzai brushed him off. ―I‘ve won,‖ he said.

Holbrooke moved on to other subjects, but he soon returned to the election. He asked Karzai how he would react if he did not receive a majority of votes. But one Afghan official asserted to journalists that Holbrooke pushed Karzai to agree to a second round before all of the ballots were counted. Although Holbrooke and Eikenberry stayed until dinner was finished, the meeting ended in acrimony.

Karzai later sought to call Obama to complain. But White House aides, who deemed the Afghan leader‘s ploy inappropriate, said he was unavailable. Karzai then tried to reach Clinton. He received the same response.

Karzai was left seething, one of his advisers said.

―Looking back on it now, I believe it was a genuine misunderstanding,‖ Holbrooke said.

By mid-October, when it became clear that the number of votes disqualified because of suspected fraud would push him below 50 percent, the administration scrambled for a way to get Karzai to agree to a second round. Holbrooke could not go because the relationship was still too raw, and Clinton said she wanted him in Washington to participate in Afghanistan strategy meetings. The administration pressed into service Senate Foreign Relations Chairman John F. Kerry (D-Mass.), who was traveling in the region.

It took more than 20 hours of talks over four days, but Kerry persuaded Karzai to accede to the runoff. To critics of the forceful approach, the senator showed that patient diplomacy — drinking copious cups of tea, flattering his ego and going for long walks in the palace garden — could still get Karzai to bend.

―You have to show him respect and consideration,‖ said Zalmay Khalilzad, a Bush administration envoy to Afghanistan who remains close to Karzai. ―You cannot lecture him. You have to listen to his explanations, why he thinks something cannot be done, and then respond to that in a constructive way.‖

New expectations

Administration officials involved in shaping the strategy insist that it was not possible to recalibrate their approach to Karzai until the election and the ensuing disputes over ballot-box stuffing had concluded. This period ―was a tremendous drain on the relationship,‖ said the senior official familiar with Wednesday‘s meeting.

In the meantime, U.S. officials also have adjusted their expectations of what Karzai can accomplish.

―This top-down thing where you go to the palace and say, ‗You‘ve got to fix this, got to fix that. Please, Mr. President.‘ He agrees to do things almost every time and they don‘t get done. Then we think it‘s because he‘s being obstructionist,‖ the senior official said. But we cannot ―expect him to solve things which he can‘t solve.‖ 382

Administration officials are also hopeful that the CIA‘s new station chief in Kabul will be an influential voice in encouraging Karzai to address U.S. concerns. The chief, who was most recently based in a Middle Eastern nation, led a team that supported Karzai‘s effort to work with tribal elders to reclaim control of his native Uruzgan province from the Taliban in November 2001, according to two people with knowledge of intelligence operations in the country. The sources said that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, was in favor of sending the officer to Kabul. The CIA declined to comment.

Despite the changes, administration officials maintain that they are not going soft on Karzai. Clinton, they said, told the Afghan leader in a 90-minute private meeting after the dinner that future levels of development aid will be linked to improvements in governance, and she urged him to use merit, not cronyism, as a criteria for filling cabinet posts. She also indicated that the White House would seek to have the Afghan government meet as-yet-defined benchmarks of progress as a condition of U.S. security and development assistance.

―There‘s no diminution of concern,‖ the senior official said. ―But she did it within the context of a different tone.‖

In public comments after Karzai‘s inaugural speech, in which he pledged to address corruption by ordering government officials to disclose their assets and establishing a major- crimes tribunal, Clinton praised his specificity but noted that she wanted to see results. She said: ―We‘re going to — along with the people of Afghanistan — watch very carefully as to how that‘s implemented.‖

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A PLAN C FOR AFGHANISTAN (NOVEMBER 23, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, November 23rd, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

A Plan C for Afghanistan SOURCE: The Washington Post Monday, November 23, 2009 By E.J. DIONNE JR.

When there is no good solution to a problem, a president has three options: to avoid the problem, to pick the least bad of the available options, or to mix and match among the proposed solutions and minimize the long-term damage any decision will cause.

President Obama is soon likely to settle on something closest to the third approach regarding Afghanistan. This will make no one very happy. Yet it might be the least dangerous choice.

No one would choose to start from where we are now in Afghanistan. We shouldn‘t have put this war on the back burner for so long, and we should have dealt much earlier with the debilitating deficiencies of President Hamid Karzai‘s government. But Obama can change none of this. And unlike enthusiasts for an all-out counterinsurgency strategy, Obama knows he has to make a decision that‘s sustainable over the long run, which means taking into account domestic economic and political realities.

One of these is the weariness over a truth that foreign policy analyst Andrew Bacevich put more plainly than most: ―that permanent war has become the de facto policy of the United States.‖ Americans have always been willing to battle terrorists. What they did not count on — and were not led to expect when the Bush administration committed troops to Afghanistan and then to Iraq — were two long, violent, indefinite occupations costing thousands of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars.

Advocates of a big counterinsurgency strategy are offended by anyone who raises the financial costs of our commitments. Typically, those most angered by talk of the immense expense of these wars are the very conservatives who bemoan America‘s fiscal condition and the dangers of long-term deficits — yet had no qualms over starting two wars and cutting taxes at the same time.

The costs are worrying Obama and getting under the skin of congressional Democrats tired of attacks on their fiscal credentials. In anticipation of the president‘s decision, a group of House Democrats led by Rep. David Obey (D-Wis.) introduced a bill last week requiring the president to set a surtax to pay for war costs in Afghanistan.

―As we‘ve struggled to pass health care reform, we‘ve been told that we have to pay for the bill,‖ the Democrats said in a statement. ―Regardless of whether one favors the war or not, if it is to be fought, it ought to be paid for.‖ The proposal may never become law, but it sends a 384 clear message: Any troop increase Obama proposes will be wildly unpopular with a large share of those who have been his strongest backers — and most popular with those whom he cannot count on for support in any other area.

Obama knows that patience with permanent war is wearing out. This is why he will insist that he is not committing new troops indefinitely.

A senior administration official, emphasizing that final choices have not been made, described the policy Obama is likely to announce in early December this way: ―It will not be open- ended, it will be limited in time, and the focus will be on strategy, not the number of troops.‖ It‘s likely that the number of troops he‘ll send will be below the 40,000 proposed by Gen. Stanley McChrystal.

Obama has decided that Afghanistan is neither Iraq nor Vietnam. This is a view that puts him at odds with both the hawks, who constantly use the 2007 Iraq surge metaphor, and the doves, who constantly look to Vietnam as a cautionary tale.

Obama insists that a surge cannot work the same way it did in Iraq because conditions in Afghanistan are so different. Yet in the wake of Sept. 11, he sees the United States as having vital interests in Afghanistan that it did not have in Vietnam: the need to defeat terrorists in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to be mindful of the impact of our choices on the future of Pakistan.

No issue has presented a tougher test for Obama‘s nonideological pragmatism than Afghanistan. Those with the greatest political stake in the debate reject the middle ground and doubt the president can think his way around the all-in-or-all-out dilemma. Yet this is exactly the kind of thinking Obama promised last year, and he‘s right to try to make it work. [email protected]

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A DRIVE TO LURE TALIBAN WITH JOBS, SECURITY (NOVEMBER 23, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, November 23rd, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

In Afghanistan, a drive to lure Taliban with jobs, security SOURCE: Los Angeles Times* Monday, November 23, 2009 By LAURA KING

In Afghanistan, a drive to lure Taliban with jobs, security The aim is to persuade Taliban foot soldiers to put down arms in exchange for jobs and protection from militants. The drive will be modeled on the ‗Sons of Iraq‘ initiative that helped calm Iraq.

Reporting from Kabul, Afghanistan - The Afghan government and the U.S. military have begun a fledgling drive to lure Taliban foot soldiers away from the battlefield by offering them job opportunities and protection, diplomats and military personnel familiar with the initiative say.

Officials hope the plan, which is loosely modeled on the ―Sons of Iraq‖ program that lured Sunni Muslims away from the Iraqi insurgency, could help pave the way for an eventual Western exit from Afghanistan.

Envisioned as a potential centerpiece of the new Karzai administration, the re-integration initiative is conceived as a bottom-up, grass-roots effort, similar to the Iraqi program, which was widely credited with reducing the level of violence there.

At a time when relations between the West and President Hamid Karzai have been soured by public wrangling over corruption, the new program marks a rare instance of high-level cooperation between the Afghan leader and his foreign patrons. The program is to be Afghan- led, with the broad support of the United States, Britain and NATO‘s military force, which had been cool to such efforts.

In Iraq, the U.S.-funded Sons of Iraq program got as many as 100,000 Sunni insurgents to stop fighting the U.S., or even take up arms against the group Al Qaeda in Iraq, by forming paramilitary groups. Efforts are underway to move them into state security forces or provide other jobs. U.S. military officers deployed in Afghanistan‘s south, the Taliban heartland, say they are being encouraged to test similar ideas in the field.

Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, head of U.S. and Western forces in Afghanistan, personally wooed a key architect of the Iraq program out of planned retirement to help craft the drive, which is to be aimed initially at low-level Taliban fighters.

British Lt. Gen. Graeme Lamb, who arrived in Afghanistan at the end of August to help

386 develop the plan, said a crucial element would be acknowledging that many insurgents believe that the West plans an open-ended occupation of Afghanistan.

Other fighters, he said, are acting on personal grievances related to powerful clan and tribal loyalties, such as a home destroyed or a relative killed, rather than subscribing to the overarching ideological agenda of Taliban leaders.

―We have an opportunity to reset the conditions,‖ Lamb, former deputy commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq, said in an interview at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization force headquarters. The vast majority of Taliban foot soldiers, he said, are ―misguided — they have fought well for a bad cause.‖

Karzai referred to the effort in last week‘s inaugural address as he was sworn in for a second five-year term, attaching the specific condition that fighters renounce any link to groups such as Al Qaeda.

―We invite all disenchanted brothers who are not directly linked to international terrorism to again embrace their homeland,‖ he said. ―We welcome those . . . who are willing to return to their homes, live peacefully and accept the constitution.‖

The Obama administration has made it clear that it intends to hold Karzai to such pledges, in order to establish conditions in which American troops can eventually draw down. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, who attended Karzai‘s swearing-in, said Washington would closely monitor the Afghan government and made pointed public references to the fact that the United States and its allies have no ambitions to remain in Afghanistan indefinitely as a military force.

British Foreign Secretary David Miliband showed strong support for a pacification effort in a speech in Edinburgh, Scotland, before attending the inauguration.

―Some Afghan Taliban may be committed to global jihad. But the vast majority are not. Their primary commitment is to tribe and to locality,‖ he said. ―Our goal is not a fight to the death. It is to demonstrate clearly that they cannot win, and to provide a way back into their communities for those who are prepared to live peacefully.‖

Afghanistan has long had a program in place to accept Taliban fighters who lay down their arms, but it is widely regarded as ineffective to the point of being something of a sham.

―Lots of Taliban surrender,‖ a Western diplomat said wryly, when asked about the work of an Afghan reconciliation commission that claims to have ―turned‖ more than 8,000 fighters. ―And lots of them then un-surrender.‖

Last week, officials of the commission summoned TV cameras to their Kabul headquarters for the purported defection of 30 Taliban fighters from Ghazni province, south of the capital. Well-worn Kalashnikov assault rifles were piled theatrically on a colorful carpet at the commission‘s headquarters, and then everyone tucked into a large, companionable lunch.

One of the commanders, who identified himself as Noor Mohammed, gave contradictory and rambling replies when asked about his reasons for turning himself in. He lightly dismissed other queries, such as whether his defection had placed his family in danger. 387

―It‘s not a problem at all; no one will hurt them,‖ he said.

Afghan and Western officials suggested that the reconciliation commission might continue, but only with a drastic revamping. Mohammed Masoom Stanikzai, Karzai‘s advisor on re- integration, said he hoped to develop a wide-ranging plan in the next month.

The new initiative will not include an immediate effort to forge some kind of accord with the senior leadership, although that could be an eventual element.

Over the last 18 months, efforts to draw Taliban leaders into indirect talks have largely foundered, in part because the insurgents believe their military prospects have been looking up.

Although they have been unable to capture any major towns, militants have rendered much of the country unsafe and have inflicted greater losses on Western forces this year than at any time since the start of the conflict.

In addition, the Taliban leadership generally dismisses Karzai as a corrupt and unpopular figure, seizing on the summer‘s election debacle as proof. The Karzai camp was accused of massive vote-rigging in the Aug. 20 balloting, and the Afghan president won reelection by default after his main opponent dropped out of a scheduled runoff contest.

―There can be no trust in this government; it is weak and lacks authority,‖ said Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, who served as the Taliban foreign minister before the movement was toppled in the 2001 U.S.-led invasion.

Karzai has expressed willingness to negotiate even with the Taliban‘s supreme commander, Mullah Mohammed Omar, but the Americans have said that blacklisted leaders such as Omar would not be allowed to be part of any talks.

Now, however, there are signs of greater Western flexibility in dealing with lower-ranking figures, even those who are known to have taken part in attacks against coalition troops.

The day after Karzai‘s inauguration, a State Department representative traveled to the Nawa district in Helmand province for talks with local officials about using jobs and development as a means of luring Taliban soldiers away from the fight.

Nawa‘s district chief, Haji Abdul Manaf, said he was in favor of it, as long as fighters were willing to lay down their arms for good. ―We can re-integrate them, but only if they accept the rule of law,‖ he said.

Areas such as Nawa, which had been under Taliban control for years until a U.S.-led offensive in midsummer, could be a proving ground for the new efforts.

Lt. Col. William McCollough, commander of a Marine battalion in Nawa, said some captured foot soldiers were being released into the custody of tribal elders if they promised not to rejoin the Taliban, with the elders providing a guarantee of their good behavior.

―I do re-integration every day,‖ McCollough said.

388

Lamb, like others involved in the initiative, believe it is not so much a question of splitting the Taliban movement as a matter of exploiting fissures that already exist in a far-from- monolithic insurgency: ―They‘ll split themselves.‖

[email protected]

Times staff writer Tony Perry in Helmand province contributed to this report.

Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times

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U.S. IN BACK-CHANNEL TALKS WITH AFGHAN TALIBAN (NOVEMBER 24, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, November 24th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

US in back-channel talks with Afghan Taliban SOURCE: Dawn Tuesday, November 24, 2009 By AZAZ SYED

ISLAMABAD: After fighting a bloody war in Afghanistan for more than eight years, the United States appears to have undertaken a re-think of its policy and has started engaging the Taliban in negotiations through Saudi and Pakistani intelligence agencies, highly-placed sources told Dawn here on Monday.

‗We have started ‗engagement‘ with the Afghan Taliban and are hopeful that our efforts will bear fruit,‘ a source involved in secret negotiations told this correspondent.

He said that four ‗major neutral players‘ were engaged with the Afghan Taliban on behalf of the Saudi leadership and the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) of Saudi Arabia and the Pakistani leadership and Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).

The GID and ISI have been doing the job on behalf of the US government and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The source said that one of the main objectives of the recent visit to Pakistan by CIA chief Leon Panetta was to assess progress in the back-channel negotiations.

The source said that four leaders were playing the role of mediators on behalf of the Saudis and the Afghan Taliban.

Among them is Abdullah Anas, a son-in-law of Osama bin Laden‘s mentor Abdullah Azzam who was killed in Peshawar in 1989 along with his two sons. Anas lives in the UK, but maintains close links with the Afghan Taliban and even Al Qaida.

Saudi national Abul Hassan Madni, once a prominent leader of Rabta-i-Alam-i-Islami, has also been in the picture. He lives in Madina.

Abu Jud Mehmood Samrai, an Iraqi who is married to a Pakistani woman, has also been contacted. He was given Pakistani nationality by former president Ziaul Haq for his role in the Afghan war.

Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, a Pakistani militant leader, is also in the loop. Khalil, who co-founded the Harkatul Ansar, currently heads Hizbul Mujahideen. 390

He had signed the famous decree issued by Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri in 1998 calling for killing the Americans. Khalil commands respect among both Pakistani and Afghani Taliban and is said to have played a secret mediatory role with Pakistani authorities for peace in the country.

Reliable sources also told Dawn that Mullah Umar, the chief of Afghan Taliban, has nominated his shadow foreign minister, Agha Motasam, to negotiate with the Americans. They said that talks held so far were of a preliminary nature, but may resume on a serious note after Eid.

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PAKISTAN IS CLOSELY CONSULTED ON AFGHANISTAN (NOVEMBER 24, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, November 24th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Pakistan is closely consulted on Afghanistan: Holbrooke SOURCE: Dawn Tuesday, 24 November, 2009 By ANWAR IQBAL

WASHINGTON: US official envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke rejected on Monday Islamabad‘s complaint that the US had not consulted Pakistan as closely as it should have on the ongoing policy-making process on Afghanistan.

The US, he said, had consulted ‗no other country more closely than Pakistan‘ on this issue because no other country was more directly linked to it.

Answering a question about DawnNews report that the Obama administration might be close to reversing its current strategy in Afghanistan as it was involved in talks with the Taliban, he said the US had not had any direct contact with the Taliban.

Holbrooke said the two sides had an ‗inadvertent‘ contact a year ago but that was not really a meeting.

He recalled that in July US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton laid out the conditions for talks with the people fighting the Afghan government. Such elements, he said, needed to renounce their links to Al Qaeda, renounce violence and lay down arms before they could be engaged.

‗Remember, we are in Afghanistan because of 9/11,‘ he added. The US envoy refused to comment on a question based on the assumption that the current political situation in Pakistan had weakened the Zardari government.

‗I am not going to comment on the internal affairs of Pakistan,‘ he said. ‗We are well aware of the development and we are watching very closely but that‘s all I will say.‘

Responding to a question about how the US could balance its ties with India and Pakistan when both were suspicious of each other, Holbrooke noted that ‗all Americans were delighted‘ with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh‘s current visit to Washington.

‗But no one in Pakistan should see this as a diminution of the importance we attach to them,‘ he said.

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The US, he said, was seeking to improve relations with all three countries in the South Asian region, India, Pakistan and China. ‗Every country will benefit from improvement in the area.‘

Holbrooke pointed out that fanning differences between India and Pakistan was not justified because the two countries ‗live side by side and have to live together‘ and the US wanted to help them both.

Asked if the US would urge India and Pakistan to resume their dialogue, he said it would support them if they decided to resume the talks but Washington was not willing to play the role of a midwife.

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WAR SPEECH TO OUTLINE ESCALATION AND EXIT (NOVEMBER 25, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, November 25th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

War speech to outline escalation and exit Obama set to address nation next week on his Afghanistan plan SOURCE: The Washington Post Wednesday, November 25, 2009 By SCOTT WILSON

When he talks to the nation next week about his Afghanistan strategy, President Obama will face the central challenge of explaining why he is escalating an eight-year-old war that is increasingly unpopular with the American public, while he also outlines plans for ending it.

Obama‘s prime-time address, tentatively scheduled for Tuesday, will begin the White House effort to sell his revised war plan — one leading scenario calls for sending 30,000 additional U.S. troops — to powerful skeptics within his party, reluctant allies abroad and an Afghan public uncertain whether international forces or the Taliban will win the war.

Administration officials say the speech will outline a modest endgame for Afghanistan that would allow U.S. forces to leave and set a general time frame for achieving that result. The remarks will last about 40 minutes, officials said, roughly twice as long as then-President George W. Bush took to outline his Iraq ―surge‖ strategy nearly three years ago.

Obama‘s speech is expected to include an appeal to NATO allies, which the president alluded to Tuesday, saying that ―one of the things I‘m going to be discussing is the obligations of our international partners in this process.‖

―I‘ve also indicated that after eight years — some of those years in which we did not have, I think, either the resources or the strategy to get the job done — it is my intention to finish the job,‖ Obama said during a news conference with visiting Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. ―And I feel very confident that when the American people hear a clear rationale for what we‘re doing there and how we intend to achieve our goals, that they will be supportive.‖

What is emerging from White House discussions is a plan favored by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates that would deploy between 30,000 and 35,000 additional U.S. troops and call on NATO allies to contribute another 10,000 soldiers. That would bring the total number of new allied troops to about 40,000, the number sought by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. There are currently 68,000 U.S. troops there.

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Gates is asking for help at a time when the European public, even more than Americans, opposes any military escalation in Afghanistan, and Obama has in the past told Gates that he doubts that NATO leaders will agree to send additional forces, according to White House officials.

But Gates‘s proposal has won powerful advocates within the military and the administration, including Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. It appears to be the most widely supported option, although Obama‘s advisers say he has yet to make known his final choice.

Long deliberation

Obama‘s decision to outline an escalation and an exit simultaneously is a result of months of deliberation over a military proposal to expand the war, with no assurance that doing so would result in a more stable Afghanistan. The debate exposed divisions within the administration over the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan and, for the second time this year, forced Obama to reconsider his goals for what he once called a ―necessary war.‖

Much of Obama‘s deliberation, according to White House advisers involved in the process, has been focused not only on ensuring that enough forces reach the battlefield but also on discouraging future troop requests if the security situation deteriorates. Obama has demanded that all troop options be explained in terms of realistic goals and timelines, an acknowledgment that the American public has limited patience for an expensive new military commitment at a time of economic hardship at home.

Some of Obama‘s most influential civilian advisers, led by Vice President Biden, favor a more narrow counterterrorism strategy that would accelerate the training of Afghan forces and intensify aerial strikes against al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Many Congressional Democrats prefer Biden‘s approach, and Obama has been considering a proposal that would send 10,000 additional U.S. troops.

In his address, White House advisers say, Obama intends to explain why his option is the right one to fight the Taliban, destroy al-Qaeda and train Afghan troops to take over the fight. President Hamid Karzai said at his inauguration this month that he hopes the transition from U.S. to Afghan forces is complete within five years, giving the Obama administration a de facto timeline.

Obama‘s advisers say he is likely to specify what the Karzai government must accomplish in the months ahead to justify the additional troops, who would be dispatched in stages over the next year.

The phased deployment would allow Obama to evaluate military gains and Karzai‘s progress in strengthening the Afghan government. White House advisers say Obama is looking for ―off ramps‖ that would allow him to adopt a strategy more narrowly focused on al-Qaeda if the one he chooses is not showing results.

―If you don‘t define your goals in a way that‘s achievable in the short term, you‘ll have another huge challenge explaining why you‘re leaving without having achieved them,‖ said a senior administration official, who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss 395 internal deliberations about the policy and its presentation. ―The goal, I don‘t believe, will be an Afghanistan free of the Taliban; it will not be an Afghanistan where the government is in control of the entire geography of the country. It has to be a goal we can reach, and that‘s what you‘re going to hear.‖

Headed to the Hill

Obama‘s speech will be followed quickly by congressional testimony from several military and civilian officials whose support for the plan is central. McChrystal and the U.S. ambassador in Kabul, Karl W. Eikenberry, have been told to prepare to testify as early as next week before key committees that would consider any additional war funding.

McChrystal and Eikenberry, a retired general who served in Afghanistan, are at odds over the war strategy, with the ambassador opposing new troops until Karzai moves against corruption in his government and takes steps to strengthen the state.

Congressional Republicans are the chief advocates for sending additional troops to Afghanistan and have been pushing Obama to quickly accept McChrystal‘s full 40,000-troop request.

But cost is becoming a primary concern on Capitol Hill. Congressional Democrats, in particular, have warned in recent days that the projected price tag of a new troop deployment could threaten Obama‘s domestic agenda amid growing public unease over the widening federal budget deficit.

Some Democrats who oppose sending additional troops to Afghanistan have raised the possibility of new taxes to pay for the war. In a conference call Tuesday with economists, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) said House Democrats would have trouble approving a proposal for additional troops because of the costs and the concerns over its long-term national security implications.

―Let me say that there is serious unrest in our caucus,‖ said Pelosi, who visited Obama at the White House later in the day.

White House Budget Director Peter Orszag attended the final war strategy meeting Monday night at the White House, and Obama is expected to address the costs in his speech next week.

―No one has any illusion that this is the campaign, that you can just turn this thing around with a speech,‖ a senior administration official said. ―A lot of this strategy depends on things we can‘t control — the Afghan government, the Taliban, the role of Pakistan. This is one of those issues that defines the extent and the limits of the president‘s power.‖

Staff writer Paul Kane contributed to this report.

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TALIBAN OPEN NORTHERN FRONT IN AFGHANISTAN (NOVEMBER 26, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, November 26th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Taliban Open Northern Front in Afghanistan SOURCE: The New York Times Thursday, November 26, 2009 By CARLOTTA GALL

KUNDUZ, Afghanistan - Far from the heartland of the Taliban insurgency in the south, this once peaceful northern province was one place American and Afghan officials thought they did not have to worry about.

Afghan officials cut the police force here by a third two years ago and again earlier this year. Security was left to a few thousand German peacekeepers. Only one Afghan logistics battalion was stationed here.

But over the last two years the Taliban have steadily staged a resurgence in Kunduz, where they now threaten a vital NATO supply line and employ more sophisticated tactics. In November, residents listened to air raids by NATO forces for five consecutive nights, the first heavy fighting since the Taliban were overthrown eight years ago.

The turnabout vividly demonstrates how security has broken down even in unexpected parts of Afghanistan. It also points to the hard choices facing American, NATO and Afghan officials even if President Obama decides to send more soldiers to Afghanistan, as he is expected to announce next week.

Even under the most generous deployments now under consideration, relatively few additional troops are expected in the north; most will be directed to the heartland of the Taliban resistance in the south and east.

Afghan and international officials say security never had to deteriorate so badly here. The Taliban were a scattered and defeated force in northern Afghanistan, long home to the strongest anti-Taliban resistance, the Northern Alliance.

But the government, and American military trainers, failed to remain vigilant to signs of Taliban encroachment, and reduced deployments in the northern provinces in order to bolster other, more volatile regions.

The decisions created vulnerabilities as Kunduz became a target with the opening of a new logistics route here for NATO supplies from Russia and Central Asia, over an American- financed bridge that opened in 2007. The route is supposed to serve as a strategic alternative to the treacherous passage through Pakistan, which is regularly attacked by Taliban militants.

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Now, the Taliban have re-emerged with such force that during the presidential election in August, police officers were fending off attacks on the outskirts of the city of Kunduz, and militants were poised to overrun the center, officials said.

―The Taliban were at the door of the city; the people thought the government was at an end,‖ said a senior security official, who asked not to be named because of the nature of his work.

Since then, the threat has been somewhat contained after an operation by NATO and Afghan forces, but the province remains at risk.

Residents of Kunduz said they noticed that the Taliban reappeared in numbers in the region in the spring of last year.

At just that time, under pressure from the American military in charge of training the Afghan security forces, the government of President Hamid Karzai reduced the number of police officers in Kunduz to just 1,000 from 1,500, officials said. Then, earlier this year, the Interior Ministry ordered 200 police officers from every northern province to help secure the capital, Kabul, which was suffering increasingly serious attacks from insurgents.

A district like Khanabad, with a population of 350,000, has just 80 police officers now, the governor of Kunduz, Muhammad Omar, said in an interview. In the district of Chahardara, where hundreds of insurgents are at large, there are only 56 police officers, enough only to guard the district center and the main road.

―It deteriorated suddenly,‖ the governor said. ―The first reason is that we have very few police in Kunduz considering the strategic position of our region, and our police are not able to cover the whole region.‖

In fact, after their defeat in 2001, the Taliban never left the region. The insurgents lay low but remained a menace to be constantly watched, according to the former governor of Kunduz, Gen. Muhammad Daoud, now a deputy interior minister.

The Taliban, who are mostly Pashtun, draw natural support through tribal ties with Pashtuns, who make up nearly half of Kunduz‘s population. Many of the fighters are local men who fled to Pakistan after 2001 and have returned in the last two years.

Central Asian fighters from a group linked to Al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, who also took refuge in Pakistan have reappeared, Afghan security officials said. Local journalists have seen some of them. The officials, who have captured some of the insurgents, accuse Pakistan‘s intelligence agency, Al Qaeda and even Iran of supporting the resurgence. Pakistan and Iran routinely deny supporting the insurgency.

Whether it is the influence of foreign fighters, or the growing capability of the Taliban and another regional militant group, Hezb-e-Islami, Western officials say the insurgency in Kunduz has grown more sophisticated, mounting coordinated suicide car bombings and ambushes.

―Clearly this year we have seen much better fighters, capable of complex attacks,‖ said one Western official.

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Kunduz, a fertile farming region interspersed with desert, has had a trajectory similar to that of many other provinces, as the insurgents extended their hold through calculated intimidation and exploitation of tribal ties.

By the spring of 2008, militants started appearing in groups of as many as 100, with some foreign fighters among them, local residents and officials said.

They assassinated local leaders, including a Pashtun Koran reader who was beheaded, and quickly took control of several Pashtun areas, forcing ethnic Uzbeks from their homes in some districts, said Wakil Qara Qushlik, a local leader who had to flee his village last year.

The Taliban were at first more subtle with their fellow Pashtuns. A group of them came last spring without guns to introduce themselves to one prominent Pashtun family in Chahardara, and asked for support. They were worried about their own safety then, one family member said, asking not to be named. ―They were behaving very well with the people,‖ he said. ―They stopped thieves, and brought law and order to the area.‖

But as elsewhere, that changed as the Taliban gained power and confidence, he said. This year the Taliban arrived with ―lots of cash, new dollars and guns,‖ and began collecting ushr, an Islamic tax, from farmers.

Now, he said, they come to his home and demand to be fed, and have begun an intimidation campaign against his family for not supporting them at the beginning.

―It is dangerous for us if a guerrilla force has an income,‖ said General Daoud, who as deputy interior minister has responsibility for counternarcotics efforts.

Drug smugglers with an eye to Kunduz‘s border with Tajikistan have jumped into an alliance with the Taliban to create instability that allows their illegal business to thrive, he said.

The former Taliban government was so harsh that many Afghans offered little resistance. ―What surprises is how easily people capitulate when they come because the memories are so fresh,‖ the Western official said.

Shoaib, 25, a villager from the Archi District who moved to the city of Kunduz to find work, said: ―We are forced to be happy with the Taliban. They force the people in each street to prepare 10 guns and men. They say come and do jihad.‖

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REPORT CLAIMS BIN LADEN SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN 2001 (NOVEMBER 29, 2009)

Written by admin on Sunday, November 29th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Report claims Bin Laden should have been taken in 2001 SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Sunday, November 29, 2009

A US Senate report has revealed that US forces could have captured Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan in late 2001.

The report, prepared by the Foreign Relations Committee Democratic staff, said calls for US reinforcements to surround Bin Laden were rejected by officials in former President George W. Bush‘s administration and military commanders at the time.

The failure to kill or capture the al-Qaeda allowed him to simply walk into Pakistan‘s unregulated tribal areas, leading to far-reaching consequences, including the protracted Afghan insurgency.

The report said that while the vast array of American military power was kept on the sidelines, US commanders chose to rely on air strikes and untrained Afghan militias to pursue Bin Laden in the mountainous area known as Tora Bora.

―On or around 16 December, two days after writing his will,‖ it said, ―Bin Laden and an entourage of bodyguards walked unmolested out of Tora Bora and disappeared into Pakistan‘s unregulated tribal area.‖

Bin Laden is still thought to be hiding in the area.

The report added that the decisions that opened the door for his escape to Pakistan allowed Bin Laden to emerge as a potent symbolic figure who still attracts a steady flow of money and inspires fanatics worldwide.

The report also rebuffed claims by former Bush administration officials that intelligence about Bin Laden‘s location was inconclusive.

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OBAMA‟S SPEECH ON AFGHANISTAN TO ENVISION EXIT (NOVEMBER 29, 2009)

Written by admin on Sunday, November 29th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Obama’s Speech on Afghanistan to Envision Exit SOURCE: The New York Times Sunday, November 29, 2009 By PETER BAKER, ERIC SCHMITT and DAVID E. SANGER

WASHINGTON - President Obama plans to lay out a time frame for winding down the American involvement in the war in Afghanistan when he announces his decision this week to send more forces, senior administration officials said Sunday.

Although the speech was still in draft form, the officials said the president wanted to use the address at the United States Military Academy at West Point on Tuesday night not only to announce the immediate order to deploy roughly 30,000 more troops, but also to convey how he intends to turn the fight over to the Kabul government.

―It‘s accurate to say that he will be more explicit about both goals and time frame than has been the case before and than has been part of the public discussion,‖ said a senior official, who requested anonymity to discuss the speech before it is delivered. ―He wants to give a clear sense of both the time frame for action and how the war will eventually wind down.‖

The officials would not disclose the time frame. But they said it would not be tied to particular conditions on the ground nor would it be as firm as the current schedule for withdrawing troops in Iraq, where Mr. Obama has committed to withdrawing most combat units by August and all forces by the end of 2011.

Officials of one allied nation who have been extensively briefed on the president‘s plan said, however, that Mr. Obama would describe how the American presence would be ratcheted back after the buildup, while making clear that a significant American presence in Afghanistan would remain for a long while. That is designed in part to signal to Pakistan that the United States will not abandon the region and to allay Pakistani fears that India will fill the vacuum created as America pulls back.

Some leading members of Congress talked publicly Sunday about their hope that the president would explain an endgame for American involvement in the eight-year war that includes how Afghans will assume more of their security needs.

But more hawkish Republicans cautioned that setting a deadline for withdrawal could signal a lack of resolve to allies, including Afghanistan and Pakistan.

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―Talk of an exit strategy is exactly the wrong way to go,‖ said Senator Jon Kyl, an Arizona Republican. ―I certainly hope the president doesn‘t do that, because all that does is signal to the enemies and also to our allies, to the folks in Pakistan as well as the Afghanis, that we‘re not there to stay until the mission is accomplished.‖ He spoke on ―Fox News Sunday.‖

Senior lawmakers also warned the White House on Sunday that its expected troop buildup in Afghanistan would fail unless the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan did more to combat militants attacking American forces, a concern that administration officials concede is a major vulnerability in President Obama‘s new war strategy.

―The key here is an Afghan surge, not an American surge,‖ Senator Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat who heads the Armed Services Committee, said on CBS‘s ―Face the Nation.‖ ―And if the president lays out the case for why our combat forces that are going particularly to the south will increase the speed-up of the Afghan Army, it seems to me that that would be very, very important.‖

With the cost of the war rising, some Democrats have even talked of a surtax. And a Republican senator, Richard G. Lugar of Indiana, asked: ―If we were talking about several years of time, how many more years beyond that? What is the capacity of our country to finance this particular type of situation as opposed to other ways of fighting Al Qaeda and the war against terror?‖

At West Point, Mr. Obama was expected to describe commitments from Afghanistan‘s president, Hamid Karzai, and specific benchmarks his government must meet: to crack down on corruption, deploy well-trained Afghan troops and police officers, and focus on development in one of the world‘s poorest nations. Mr. Obama was expected to be far less specific about Pakistan, where Taliban leaders are commanding operations across the border against American forces, and where Al Qaeda‘s central leadership still lives.

―We agree that no matter how many troops you send, if the safe haven in Pakistan isn‘t cracked, the whole mission is compromised,‖ said one official who has participated in the debate over the strategy. ―But if you make too many demands on the Pakistanis in public, it can backfire.‖

The problems in Afghanistan have only been compounded by the fragility of Mr. Obama‘s partner in Pakistan, President Asif Ali Zardari, who is so weak that his government seems near collapse. On Friday, Mr. Zardari relinquished his position in Pakistan‘s nuclear command structure, turning it over to the prime minister, in what appeared to be an effort to avoid impeachment or prosecution, and retain at least a figurehead post.

On Sunday, one of the Obama administration‘s staunchest allies, Prime Minister Gordon Brown of Britain, joined in the campaign to press Pakistan to step up attacks on Al Qaeda‘s leadership in Pakistan‘s unruly tribal areas and other militant groups there. ―People are going to ask why, eight years after 2001, Osama bin Laden has never been near to being caught,‖ Mr. Brown told Sky News, ―and what can the Pakistan authorities do that is far more effective.‖

White House officials have said relatively little about the Pakistan side of the administration‘s evolving war strategy, in part because they have so few options and so little leverage. They

402 cannot send troops into Pakistan, and they cannot talk publicly about one of their most effective measures, the Central Intelligence Agency‘s Predator drone strikes in the country.

―Everyone understands this is a complex, nuanced, critical relationship,‖ said a senior American official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because Mr. Obama‘s review had not been announced. ―Everyone has their eyes open, and there are genuine concerns. But one focus now is on trying to expand cooperation. The Pakistanis are doing some positive things in the tribal areas. That presents opportunities on which to build.‖

Mr. Obama‘s advisers previously signaled that the president wanted to outline, as he had before, expectations for the Afghan government. This time, they said, the goals would be more explicit and demanding, aimed at improving governance and curbing corruption.

But the advisers have been debating whether to put deadlines on those benchmarks, like the pace of training Afghan security forces to defend their country.

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top NATO and American commander in Afghanistan, is expected to testify about Mr. Obama‘s new strategy on Dec. 8 to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees in Washington, the official said. His appearance is expected to follow Congressional testimony later this week by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The administration has sought to build consensus among crucial allies to reach this point. In the last two weeks, Mr. Obama dispatched two top aides to Pakistan to deliver the same message: Keep the pressure on.

In separate visits to Islamabad, the capital, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Leon E. Panetta, and the president‘s national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, told Pakistani officials that no matter how many more troops the president sent to Afghanistan, the effort would fail unless Pakistan increased strikes against Al Qaeda‘s leadership and Mullah Muhammad Omar and the leadership of the Afghan Taliban in the southern Pakistani city of Quetta, and the Haqqani network, militants operating out of North Waziristan who have attacked Afghan and NATO targets in eastern Afghanistan and Kabul, the Afghan capital.

Elisabeth Bumiller contributed reporting from Washington, and Sabrina Tavernise from Islamabad, Pakistan.

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OBAMA OFFERS NEW ROLE FOR PAKISTAN (NOVEMBER 30, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, November 30th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Obama offers new role for Pakistan SOURCE: The Washington Post Monday, November 30, 2009 By KAREN DEYOUNG

President Obama has offered Pakistan an expanded strategic partnership, including additional military and economic cooperation, while warning with unusual bluntness that its use of insurgent groups to pursue policy goals ―cannot continue.‖

The offer, including an effort to help reduce tensions between Pakistan and India, was contained in a two-page letter delivered to President Asif Ali Zardari this month by Obama national security adviser James L. Jones. It was accompanied by assurances from Jones that the United States will increase its military and civilian efforts in Afghanistan and that it plans no early withdrawal.

Obama‘s speech Tuesday night at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., will address primarily the Afghanistan aspects of the strategy. But despite the public and political attention focused on the number of new troops, Pakistan has been the hot core of the months- long strategy review. The long-term consequences of failure there, the review concluded, far outweigh those in Afghanistan.

―We can‘t succeed without Pakistan,‖ a senior administration official involved in the White House review said. ―You have to differentiate between public statements and reality. There is nobody who is under any illusions about this.‖

This official and others, all of whom spoke about the closely held details of the new strategy on the condition of anonymity, emphasized that without ―changing the nature of U.S.- Pakistan relations in a new direction, you‘re not going to win in Afghanistan,‖ as one put it. ―And if you don‘t win in Afghanistan, then Pakistan will automatically be imperiled, and that will make Afghanistan look like child‘s play.‖

Proffered U.S. carrots, outlined during Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton‘s October visit to Islamabad, center on a far more comprehensive and long-term bilateral relationship. It would feature enhanced development and trade assistance; improved intelligence collaboration and a more secure and upgraded military equipment pipeline; more public praise and less public criticism of Pakistan; and an initiative to build greater regional cooperation among Pakistan, India and Afghanistan.

Obama called for closer collaboration against all extremist groups, and his letter named five: al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Pakistani

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Taliban organization known as Tehrik-e-Taliban. Using vague diplomatic language, he said that ambiguity in Pakistan‘s relationship with any of them could no longer be ignored.

Jones, a retired Marine Corps general, was more precise in conversations with top Pakistani government and military leaders, U.S. and foreign officials said, stating that certain things have to happen in Pakistan to ensure Afghanistan‘s security. If Pakistan cannot deliver, he warned, the United States may be impelled to use any means at its disposal to rout insurgents based along Pakistan‘s western and southern borders with Afghanistan.

Current U.S. policy includes the use of missiles fired from unmanned drones on insurgent locations limited to roughly 50 miles inside the western border; training in two military camps for the Pakistani Frontier Corps; and intelligence exchanges. It prohibits kinetic, or active, operations by U.S. ground forces inside Pakistan.

While praising Pakistani military offensives against groups that pose a domestic threat — primarily the alliance of groups known as Tehrik-e-Taliban, in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan — Jones made it clear that the administration expects more.

The rollout of the new strategy is being coordinated with principal U.S. allies, including Britain, whose prime minister, Gordon Brown, said Sunday, ―People are going to ask why, eight years after 2001, Osama bin Laden has never been near to being caught.‖

―Al-Qaeda has a base in Pakistan,‖ Brown said in an interview with Sky News. ―That base is still there — they are able to recruit from abroad. The Pakistan authorities must convince us that they are taking all the action that is necessary to deal with that threat.‖

Expansion of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship will require overcoming significant public and political mistrust in both countries. Officials said that they recognize the difficulty in delivering on either U.S. promises or threats, and that ―our leverage over Pakistan is very limited,‖ the senior administration official said.

At the same time, although the administration‘s goal is to demonstrate a new level and steadfastness of support, short-term U.S. demands may threaten Pakistan‘s already fragile political stability.

―It‘s going to be a game of cat-and-mouse with them for a while,‖ another official said, adding that ―what we‘re trying to do is to force them to recalculate‖ where their advantage lies.

The Pakistan strategy is complicated by a number of factors, including the fact that any indication of increased U.S. involvement there generates broad mistrust. Zardari‘s political weakness is an additional hazard for a new bilateral relationship. He is disliked by the military and is challenged by the political opposition and his own prime minister; he also remains under a cloud of long-standing corruption charges. Less than a third of Pakistan‘s population voices approval for him in polls. Obama is even less popular there, with approval ratings in the low double digits.

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Many of the broad powers that Zardari assumed from his predecessor, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who seized power in a 1999 military coup and was forced to resign last year, are being whittled away. On Friday, Zardari turned over control of Pakistan‘s nuclear arsenal to Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, who is held in much higher favor by the military.

Zardari‘s Musharraf-era powers to fire the elected government and appoint top military officials are also under challenge, and a law protecting government officials from corruption prosecution expired Saturday. On Sunday, the leading political opposition group called for him to give up the additional powers, and Zardari, who had pledged to do so, said he will act ―soon.‖ The administration expects Zardari‘s position to continue to weaken, leaving him as a largely ceremonial president even if he manages to survive in office.

Senior U.S. officers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, Adm. Mike Mullen, have made repeated relationship-building trips to Pakistan, and training programs in this country for Pakistani officers are expanding after being moribund for years.

U.S. officials have long referred to Pakistani military and intelligence officers who are sympathetic to or actively support insurgent groups fighting in Afghanistan as ―rogue elements.‖ More recently, they have described those relationships as more direct and institutional within a divided military. ―For the things that we care about,‖ a U.S. official said, ―the real decision-maker is the military.‖ It has long been hedging its bets in Afghanistan; the military has positioned itself to prevent inroads by India in the event of a U.S. withdrawal, and against a 30-year history of being used and then rejected by shifting U.S. policy aims.

―Our game is to convince them that our commitment to Afghanistan and the region is long- term,‖ the official said of the military. ―We‘re not going to pack up our bags and leave them as soon as we‘re done. We have to create a situation in which they see a much more positive interest in closer relations with us than they do in trying to play us. But it requires time.‖

India is skeptical of any U.S. involvement in its relationship with Pakistan. Bilateral attempts to resolve the long-standing border dispute in Kashmir were put on hold after last year‘s terrorist attacks in Mumbai, which were blamed on Lashkar-e-Taiba.

The group has long been active in the Kashmir conflict and is said to have close ties to Pakistan‘s Inter-Services Intelligence agency.

Obama and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh treaded carefully on the issue in public during Singh‘s state visit to Washington last week. ―It is not the place of the United States to try to, from the outside, resolve all those conflicts,‖ Obama said during their news conference here. ―On the other hand, we want to be encouraging of ways in which both India and Pakistan can feel secure.‖

Correspondent Pamela Constable in Islamabad contributed to this report.

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OBAMA‟S AFGHAN POLICY SPEECH AT WEST POINT (DECEMBER 1, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, December 1st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Obama’s Afghan policy speech at West Point SOURCE: The Washington Post Tuesday, December 1, 2009

Following is the transcript of President Obama‘s speech Tuesday at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y.

Thank you. Please be seated. Good evening. To the United States Corps of Cadets, to the men and women of our armed services, and to my fellow Americans, I want to speak to you tonight about our effort in Afghanistan, the nature of our commitment there, the scope of our interests, and the strategy that my administration will pursue to bring this war to a successful conclusion.

It‘s an extraordinary honor for me to do so here at West Point, where so many men and women have prepared to stand up for our security and to represent what is finest about our country.

To address these important issues, it‘s important to recall why America and our allies were compelled to fight a war in Afghanistan in the first place.

We did not ask for this fight. On September 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four airplanes and used them to murder nearly 3,000 people. They struck at our military and economic nerve centers. They took the lives of innocent men, women, and children without regard to their faith or race or station.

Were it not for the heroic actions of passengers on board one of those flights, they could have also struck at one of the great symbols of our democracy in Washington and killed many more.

As we know, these men belonged to al-Qaeda, a group of extremists who have distorted and defiled Islam, one of the world‘s great religions, to justify the slaughter of innocents. al- Qaeda‘s base of operations was in Afghanistan, where they were harbored by the Taliban, a ruthless, repressive and radical movement that seized control of that country after it was ravaged by years of Soviet occupation and civil war and after the attention of America and our friends had turned elsewhere.

Just days after 9/11, Congress authorized the use of force against al-Qaeda and those who harbored them, an authorization that continues to this day. The vote in the Senate was 98-0; the vote in the House was 420-1.

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For the first time in its history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization invoked Article 5, the commitment that says an attack on one member nation is an attack on all. And the United Nations Security Council endorsed the use of all necessary steps to respond to the 9/11 attacks. America, our allies, and the world were acting as one to destroy al-Qaeda‘s terrorist network and to protect our common security.

Under the banner of this domestic unity and international legitimacy — and only after the Taliban refused to turn over Osama bin Laden — we sent our troops into Afghanistan.

Within a matter of months, al-Qaeda was scattered and many of its operatives were killed. The Taliban was driven from power and pushed back on its heels. A place that had known decades of fear now had reason to hope.

At a conference convened by the U.N., a provisional government was established under President Hamid Karzai. And an International Security Assistance Force was established to help bring a lasting peace to a war-torn country.

Then, in early 2003, the decision was made to wage a second war in Iraq. The wrenching debate over the Iraq war is well-known and need not be repeated here. It‘s enough to say that, for the next six years, the Iraq war drew the dominant share of our troops, our resources, our diplomacy, and our national attention, and that the decision to go into Iraq caused substantial rifts between America and much of the world.

Today, after extraordinary costs, we are bringing the Iraq war to a responsible end. We will remove our combat brigades from Iraq by the end of next summer and all of our troops by the end of 2011. That we are doing so is a testament to the character of the men and women in uniform.

Thanks to their courage, grit and perseverance, we have given Iraqis a chance to shape their future, and we are successfully leaving Iraq to its people.

But while we have achieved hard-earned milestones in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. After escaping across the border into Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, al-Qaeda‘s leadership established a safe haven there. Although a legitimate government was elected by the Afghan people, it‘s been hampered by corruption, the drug trade, an under-developed economy, and insufficient security forces.

Over the last several years, the Taliban has maintained common cause with al-Qaeda, as they both seek an overthrow of the Afghan government. Gradually, the Taliban has begun to control additional swaths of territory in Afghanistan, while engaging in increasingly brazen and devastating acts of terrorism against the Pakistani people.

Now, throughout this period, our troop levels in Afghanistan remained a fraction of what they were in Iraq. When I took office, we had just over 32,000 Americans serving in Afghanistan compared to 160,000 in Iraq at the peak of the war.

Commanders in Afghanistan repeatedly asked for support to deal with the reemergence of the Taliban, but these reinforcements did not arrive. And that‘s why, shortly after taking office, I approved a long-standing request for more troops.

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After consultations with our allies, I then announced a strategy recognizing the fundamental connection between our war effort in Afghanistan and the extremist safe havens in Pakistan. I set a goal that was narrowly defined as disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda and its extremist allies, and pledged to better coordinate our military and civilian efforts.

Since then, we‘ve made progress on some important objectives. High-ranking al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders have been killed, and we‘ve stepped up the pressure on al-Qaeda worldwide.

In Pakistan, that nation‘s army has gone on its largest offensive in years. In Afghanistan, we and our allies prevented the Taliban from stopping a presidential election, and although it was marred by fraud, that election produced a government that is consistent with Afghanistan‘s laws and constitution.

Yet huge challenges remain: Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years, it has moved backwards. There‘s no imminent threat of the government being overthrown, but the Taliban has gained momentum. Al-Qaeda has not reemerged in Afghanistan in the same numbers as before 9/11, but they retain their safe havens along the border. And our forces lack the full support they need to effectively train and partner with Afghan security forces and better secure the population.

Our new commander in Afghanistan, General McChrystal, has reported that the security situation is more serious than he anticipated. In short, the status quo is not sustainable.

As cadets, you volunteered for service during this time of danger. Some of you have fought in Afghanistan. Some of you will deploy there. As your commander-in-chief, I owe you a mission that is clearly defined and worthy of your service.

And that‘s why, after the Afghan voting was completed, I insisted on a thorough review of our strategy.

Now, let me be clear: There has never been an option before me that called for troop deployments before 2010, so there has been no delay or denial of resources necessary for the conduct of the war during this review period. Instead, the review has allowed me to ask the hard questions and to explore all the different options, along with my national security team, our military, and civilian leadership in Afghanistan, and our key partners.

And given the stakes involved, I owed the American people and our troops no less.

This review is now complete. And as commander-in-chief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan.

After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home. These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan.

I do not make this decision lightly. I opposed the war in Iraq precisely because I believe that we must exercise restraint in the use of military force and always consider the long-term consequences of our actions.

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We have been at war now for eight years, at enormous cost in lives and resources. Years of debate over Iraq and terrorism have left our unity on national security issues in tatters and created a highly polarized and partisan backdrop for this effort. And having just experienced the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, the American people are understandably focused on rebuilding our economy and putting people to work here at home.

Most of all, I know that this decision asks even more of you, a military that, along with your families, has already borne the heaviest of all burdens.

As president, I have signed a letter of condolence to the family of each American who gives their life in these wars. I have read the letters from the parents and spouses of those who deployed. I‘ve visited our courageous wounded warriors at Walter Reed. I‘ve traveled to Dover to meet the flag-draped caskets of 18 Americans returning home to their final resting place.

I see firsthand the terrible wages of war. If I did not think that the security of the United States and the safety of the American people were at stake in Afghanistan, I would gladly order every single one of our troops home tomorrow.

So, no, I do not make this decision lightly. I make this decision because I am convinced that our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the epicenter of violent extremism practiced by al-Qaeda. It is from here that we were attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that new attacks are being plotted as I speak.

This is no idle danger, no hypothetical threat. In the last few months alone, we have apprehended extremists within our borders who were sent here from the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit new acts of terror. And this danger will only grow if the region slides backwards and al-Qaeda can operate with impunity.

We must keep the pressure on al-Qaeda. And to do that, we must increase the stability and capacity of our partners in the region.

Of course, this burden is not ours alone to bear. This is not just America‘s war. Since 9/11, al- Qaeda‘s safe havens have been the source of attacks against London and Amman and Bali. The people and governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan are endangered. And the stakes are even higher within a nuclear-armed Pakistan, because we know that al-Qaeda and other extremists seek nuclear weapons, and we have every reason to believe that they would use them.

These facts compel us to act along with our friends and allies. Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.

To meet that goal, we will pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan. We must deny al-Qaeda a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban‘s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan‘s security forces and government, so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan‘s future.

We will meet these objectives in three ways. First, we will pursue a military strategy that will break the Taliban‘s momentum and increase Afghanistan‘s capacity over the next 18 months. 410

The 30,000 additional troops that I‘m announcing tonight will deploy in the first part of 2010, the fastest possible pace, so that they can target the insurgency and secure key population centers. They‘ll increase our ability to train competent Afghan security forces and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight. And they will help create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans.

Because this is an international effort, I‘ve asked that our commitment be joined by contributions from our allies. Some have already provided additional troops, and we‘re confident that there will be further contributions in the days and weeks ahead.

Our friends have fought and bled and died alongside us in Afghanistan. And now we must come together to end this war successfully. For what‘s at stake is not simply a test of NATO‘s credibility; what‘s at stake is the security of our allies and the common security of the world.

Now, taken together, these additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011. Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground.

We‘ll continue to advise and assist Afghanistan‘s security forces to ensure that they can succeed over the long haul. But it will be clear to the Afghan government — and, more importantly, to the Afghan people — that they will ultimately be responsible for their own country.

Second, we will work with our partners, the United Nations, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy so that the government can take advantage of improved security. This effort must be based on performance. The days of providing a blank check are over.

President Karzai‘s inauguration speech sent the right message about moving in a new direction. And going forward, we will be clear about what we expect from those who receive our assistance.

We‘ll support Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the people. We expect those who are ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable. And we will also focus our assistance in areas such as agriculture that can make an immediate impact in the lives of the Afghan people.

Now, the people of Afghanistan have endured violence for decades. They‘ve been confronted with occupation by the Soviet Union, and then by foreign al-Qaeda fighters who used Afghan land for their own purposes.

So tonight, I want the Afghan people to understand: America seeks an end to this era of war and suffering. We have no interest in occupying your country. We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens. And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect, to isolate those who destroy, to strengthen those who build, to hasten the day when our troops will leave, and to forge a lasting friendship in which America is your partner and never your patron.

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Third, we will act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan. We‘re in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that country. But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan. And that‘s why we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border.

In the past, there have been those in Pakistan who‘ve argued that the struggle against extremism is not their fight and that Pakistan is better off doing little or seeking accommodation with those who use violence.

But in recent years, as innocents have been killed from Karachi to Islamabad, it has become clear that it is the Pakistani people who are the most endangered by extremism. Public opinion has turned. The Pakistani army has waged an offensive in Swat and South Waziristan, and there is no doubt that the United States and Pakistan share a common enemy.

In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly. And those days are over.

Moving forward, we are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust. We will strengthen Pakistan‘s capacity to target those groups that threaten our countries and have made it clear that we cannot tolerate a safe haven for terrorists whose location is known and whose intentions are clear.

America is also providing substantial resources to support Pakistan‘s democracy and development. We are the largest international supporter for those Pakistanis displaced by the fighting. And going forward, the Pakistan people must know: America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan‘s security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed.

These are the three core elements of our strategy: a military effort to create the conditions for a transition; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective partnership with Pakistan.

And I recognize there are a range of concerns about our approach. So let me briefly address a few of the more prominent arguments that I‘ve heard and which I take very seriously.

First, there are those who suggest that Afghanistan is another Vietnam. They argue that it cannot be stabilized and we‘re better off cutting our losses and rapidly withdrawing. I believe this argument depends on a false reading of history.

Unlike Vietnam, we are joined by a broad coalition of 43 nations that recognizes the legitimacy of our action. Unlike Vietnam, we are not facing a broad-based popular insurgency. And most importantly, unlike Vietnam, the American people were viciously attacked from Afghanistan and remain a target for those same extremists who are plotting along its border.

To abandon this area now and to rely only on efforts against al-Qaeda from a distance would significantly hamper our ability to keep the pressure on al-Qaeda and create an unacceptable risk of additional attacks on our homeland and our allies.

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Second, there are those who acknowledge that we can‘t leave Afghanistan in its current state, but suggest that we go forward with the troops that we already have, but this would simply maintain a status quo in which we muddle through and permit a slow deterioration of conditions there. It would ultimately prove more costly and prolong our stay in Afghanistan, because we would never be able to generate the conditions needed to train Afghan security forces and give them the space to take over.

Finally, there are those who oppose identifying a timeframe for our transition to Afghan responsibility. Indeed, some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort, one that would commit us to a nation-building project of up to a decade. I reject this course because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost and what we need to achieve to secure our interests.

Furthermore, the absence of a timeframe for transition would deny us any sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government. It must be clear that Afghans will have to take responsibility for their security and that America has no interest in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan.

As president, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests. And I must weigh all of the challenges that our nation faces. I don‘t have the luxury of committing to just one.

Indeed, I‘m mindful of the words of President Eisenhower, who, in discussing our national security, said, ―Each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs.‖

Over the past several years, we have lost that balance. We failed to appreciate the connection between our national security and our economy. In the wake of an economic crisis, too many of our neighbors and friends are out of work and struggle to pay the bills. Too many Americans are worried about the future facing our children.

Meanwhile, competition within the global economy has grown more fierce, so we can‘t simply afford to ignore the price of these wars.

All told, by the time I took office, the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan approached a trillion dollars. And going forward, I am committed to addressing these costs openly and honestly. Our new approach in Afghanistan is likely to cost us roughly $30 billion for the military this year, and I‘ll work closely with Congress to address these costs as we work to bring down our deficit.

But as we end the war in Iraq and transition to Afghan responsibility, we must rebuild our strength here at home. Our prosperity provides a foundation for our power. It pays for our military; it underwrites our diplomacy; it taps the potential of our people and allows investment in new industry; and it will allow us to compete in this century as successfully as we did in the last.

That‘s why our troop commitment in Afghanistan cannot be open- ended: because the nation that I‘m most interested in building is our own.

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Now, let me be clear. None of this will be easy. The struggle against violent extremism will not be finished quickly, and it extends well beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan. It will be an enduring test of our free society and our leadership in the world. And unlike the great power conflicts and clear lines of division that defined the 20th century, our effort will involve disorderly regions, failed states, diffuse enemies.

So as a result, America will have to show our strength in the way that we end wars and prevent conflict, not just how we wage wars. We‘ll have to be nimble and precise in our use of military power. Where Al Qaida and its allies attempt to establish a foothold — whether in Somalia or Yemen or elsewhere — they must be confronted by growing pressure and strong partnerships.

And we can‘t count on military might alone. We have to invest in our homeland security, because we can‘t capture or kill every violent extremist abroad. We have to improve and better coordinate our intelligence so that we stay one step ahead of shadowy networks.

We will have to take away the tools of mass destruction. And that‘s why I‘ve made it a central pillar of my foreign policy to secure loose nuclear materials from terrorists, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and to pursue the goal of a world without them, because every nation must understand that true security will never come from an endless race for ever more destructive weapons. True security will come for those who reject them.

We‘ll have to use diplomacy, because no one nation can meet the challenges of an interconnected world acting alone. I‘ve spent this year renewing our alliances and forging new partnerships. And we have forged a new beginning between America and the Muslim world, one that recognizes our mutual interest in breaking a cycle of conflict and that promises a future in which those who kill innocents are isolated by those who stand up for peace and prosperity and human dignity.

And, finally, we must draw on the strength of our values, for the challenges that we face may have changed, but the things that we believe in must not. That‘s why we must promote our values by living them at home, which is why I‘ve prohibited and will close the prison at Guantanamo Bay.

And we must make it clear to every man, woman and child around the world who lives under the dark cloud of tyranny that America will speak out on behalf of their human rights and tend for the light of freedom and justice and opportunity and respect for the dignity of all peoples. That is who we are; that is the source, the moral source of America‘s authority.

Since the days of Franklin Roosevelt and the service and sacrifice of our grandparents and great-grandparents, our country has borne a special burden in global affairs. We have spilled American blood in many countries on multiple continents. We have spent our revenue to help others rebuild from rubble and develop their own economies. We have joined with others to develop an architecture of institutions — from the United Nations to NATO to the World Bank — that provide for the common security and prosperity of human beings.

We have not always been thanked for these efforts, and we have at times made mistakes. But more than any other nation, the United States of America has underwritten global security for over six decades, a time that, for all its problems, has seen walls come down, and markets

414 open, and billions lifted from poverty, unparalleled scientific progress, and advancing frontiers of human liberty.

For unlike the great powers of old, we have not sought world domination. Our union was founded in resistance to oppression. We do not seek to occupy other nations. We will not claim another nation‘s resources or target other peoples because their faith or ethnicity is different from ours.

What we have fought for, what we continue to fight for is a better future for our children and grandchildren. And we believe that their lives will be better if other peoples‘ children and grandchildren can live in freedom and access opportunity.

As a country, we‘re not as young — and perhaps not as innocent — as we were when Roosevelt was president. Yet we are still heirs to a noble struggle for freedom. And now we must summon all of our might and moral suasion to meet the challenges of a new age.

In the end, our security and leadership does not come solely from the strength of our arms. It derives from our people, from the workers and businesses who will rebuild our economy; from the entrepreneurs and researchers who will pioneer new industries; from the teachers that will educate our children and the service of those who work in our communities at home; from the diplomats and Peace Corps volunteers who spread hope abroad; and from the men and women in uniform who are part of an unbroken line of sacrifice that has made government of the people, by the people, and for the people a reality on this Earth.

This vast and diverse citizenry will not always agree on every issue, nor should we. But I also know that we as a country cannot sustain our leadership nor navigate the momentous challenges of our time if we allow ourselves to be split asunder by the same rancor and cynicism and partisanship that has in recent times poisoned our national discourse.

It‘s easy to forget that, when this war began, we were united, bound together by the fresh memory of a horrific attack and by the determination to defend our homeland and the values we hold dear. I refuse to accept the notion that we cannot summon that unity again. I believe…

I believe with every fiber of my being that we, as Americans, can still come together behind a common purpose, for our values are not simply words written into parchment. They are a creed that calls us together and that has carried us through the darkest of storms as one nation, as one people.

America, we are passing through a time of great trial. And the message that we send in the midst of these storms must be clear: that our cause is just, our resolve unwavering. We will go forward with the confidence that right makes might and with the commitment to forge an America that is safer, a world that is more secure, and a future that represents not the deepest of fears but the highest of hopes.

Thank you, God bless you, and God bless the United States of America.

Thank you very much.

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Copyright 2009 FDCH e-Media, Inc.

By Post Editor | December 1, 2009; 8:00

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OBAMA ANNOUNCES AFGHAN SURGE AND EXIT STRATEGY (DECEMBER 2, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, December 2nd, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Obama Announces Afghan Surge and Exit Strategy SOURCE: Atlantic Council Wednesday, December 2, 2009 By JAMES JOYNER

After months of careful consideration, President Obama announced his newest Afghanistan policy last night. He will send an additional 30,000 troops in rapid fashion - giving General McChrystal most of what he asked for - but also announced an exit timetable that makes a successful counterinsurgency impossible.

Previewing the speech, Atlantic Council vice president and international security program director Damon Wilson said, ―The president needs to disarm his critics, who have questioned his clarity, decisiveness, and resolve.‖ The test of that, he explained, is ―How does the president articulate his exit strategy? Does he set a hard timeline for withdrawal or does he take a developments-based approach, focusing on progress in meeting benchmarks?‖

Looking at the text of the speech, we can see Obama tried to split the difference.

[A]s commander-in-chief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan.

After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home. These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan.

His rationale for this timetable?

We have been at war now for eight years, at enormous cost in lives and resources. Years of debate over Iraq and terrorism have left our unity on national security issues in tatters and created a highly polarized and partisan backdrop for this effort. And having just experienced the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, the American people are understandably focused on rebuilding our economy and putting people to work here at home.

This is almost purely a domestic calculus. He‘s right, of course, that the strain of the deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan have constrained our ability to deploy forces elsewhere and threatens to undermine the readiness of our military. Still, the exit strategy is decidedly not based on ―success‖ - however it might be defined - in Afghanistan.

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The president has, after a few months of seeming to back a counterinsurgency approach to AfPak, narrowed his focus back to the counterterrorism policy he announced toward the beginning of his term.

Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.

To meet that goal, we will pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan. We must deny al-Qaeda a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban‘s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan‘s security forces and government, so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan‘s future.

[...]

The 30,000 additional troops that I‘m announcing tonight will deploy in the first part of 2010, the fastest possible pace, so that they can target the insurgency and secure key population centers. They‘ll increase our ability to train competent Afghan security forces and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight. And they will help create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans.

[...]

We‘ll continue to advise and assist Afghanistan‘s security forces to ensure that they can succeed over the long haul. But it will be clear to the Afghan government — and, more importantly, to the Afghan people — that they will ultimately be responsible for their own country.

This strategy is quite similar, of course, to the successful Surge in Iraq of 2007. The differences on the ground are enormous. More importantly, while the Surge always came with the understanding that it was temporary, there was never a stark calendar-based timetable attached to it.

The president addressed this criticism head-on:

[T]here are those who oppose identifying a timeframe for our transition to Afghan responsibility. Indeed, some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort, one that would commit us to a nation-building project of up to a decade. I reject this course because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost and what we need to achieve to secure our interests.

Furthermore, the absence of a timeframe for transition would deny us any sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government. It must be clear that Afghans will have to take responsibility for their security and that America has no interest in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan.

The first of these points is unassailable. Indeed, pointed this out in his January lecture to the Atlantic Council, saying that our goals in Afghanistan exceeded our political willingness to sustain and that we therefore needed to align our strategy with what is actually possible. 418

But having a firm calendar-based timetable - especially a public one - signals that the president does not believe achieving the mission at hand is really as urgent as he claims. What if, come the middle of 2011, we have not defeated the Taliban? What if a sober assessment of the Afghan government and security forces reveals that they are not yet ready to carry out the struggle as the lead actors? Will we simply ―advise and assist‖ and hope for the best?

The president doesn‘t say.

Instead, the next twenty-five paragraphs of the speech are essentially a domestic policy address, the theme of which was ―That‘s why our troop commitment in Afghanistan cannot be open- ended: because the nation that I‘m most interested in building is our own.‖ That‘s a welcome message to a domestic audience grown weary of war. But it‘s not one likely to inspire much confidence in Afghans being asked to bet their lives on our strategy.

James Joyner is managing editor of the Atlantic Council.

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AFGHANS REACT TO OBAMA TROOP PLAN (DECEMBER 2, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, December 2nd, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Afghans react to Obama troop plan SOURCE: Al Jazeera and Agencies Wednesday, December 2, 2009 By MARK HOSENBALL

Afghan officials, the Taliban and Pakistani analysts have voiced a mixed reaction to the US president‘s plan to order 30,000 more troops into Afghanistan.

The goal, Obama said in a televised address on Tuesday, is to esculate the battle against Taliban fighters, secure key population centres and train Afghan security forces and so clear the way for a US exit in 18 months time.

But Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai, a former prime minister of Afghanistan, expressed disappointment with Obama‘s speech and his strategy.

―Sending more troops is not the solution to the Afghan crisis,‖ he said.

―I was expecting Obama to announce the withdrawal of 30,000 troops within two months but unfortunately, he did the opposite which will increase killings of both Americans and Afghans.‖

And reacting to Obama‘s announcement by email, a Taliban spokesman told Al Jazeera that they were pleased with the decision to send more US soldiers.

―More troops just means a larger target for us to hit … by increasing its forces in Afghanistan, Obama is just giving more power to the Mujahideen to recruit and receive the support of the civilian population.‖

Change of mission?

The new US deployment also fell short of a recommendation made by General Stanley McChrystal, the commander of US and Nato forces in Afghanistan, who had asked for 40,000 troops.

Al Jazeera‘s James Bays, reporting from the Afghan capital, Kabul, said: ―This wasn‘t a counter-insurgency speech; it was a counter-terrorism speech, a very different mission from the one General Stanley McCrystal has been preparing himself for.

―He only mentions the Taliban twice in the whole speech. He started talking about 9/11, he ended with talking about 9/11 and all the references in between were to al-Qaeda.‖

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Bays added: ‖I think there will be some in the military here in the command centre of Kabul who will be having to rethink things rather urgently.‖

However, after Tuesday‘s speech, McChrystal said that Obama‘s decision ―has provided me with a clear military mission and the resources to accomplish our task‖.

Strategic implications

The speech, which carries far-reaching strategic implications for the global effort to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda, also highlighted a stronger partnership with Pakistan to help to put down the insurgency in Afghanistan.

But Obama‘s orders received a cautious welcome from Pakistan.

―As far as Pakistan is concerned, Obama is offering the partnership, aid and lots of support and help,‖ Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani journalist and author, told Al Jazeera.

―But then again, it‘s the Pakistani military who will have to make very critical decisions as to whether it‘s going to help the Americans withdrawal and help bring the Taliban to the peace table.‖

Pakistan fears a US troop surge in Afghanistan would force fighters to flee to its border areas, particularly in the southwestern Baluchistan province where the government is already struggling to end a low-level insurgency by tribal fighters.

Rashid said: ―But when Obama sent 20,000 marines into Afghanistan last March … the opposite happened. What we‘ve seen this summer is a massive escalation of attacks inside Afghanistan, the spread of the Taliban to the north and the west of the country for the first time.‖

Exit strategy concern

Pakistani officials are also nervously looking at Obama‘s exit strategy.

At a time when the Afghan government is struggling to take over security responsibilities, officials fear a hasty US pullout could trigger factional fighting in Afghanistan and lead to problems at home.

―The issue which is going to effect the region, and of course the Taliban and al-Qaeda very much is the president giving a date certain for the withdrawal of US troops,‖ Rashid said.

―There‘s going to be a tendency among some of the Taliban leaders and al-Qaeda to sift out the Americans and think that the Americans are going to leave in 18 months, and then the country is ours. So how do you counter this idea amongst some of these extremists groups?‖

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‗Obama‘s war‘

Some Afghan officials expressed concern on Wednesday over Obama‘s aim to begin removing troops by 2011, saying that such a fixed timetable was not realistic.

Segbatullah Sanjar, the chief policy advisor for Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, said: ―We couldn‘t solve the Afghanistan problem in eight years, but now the US wants to solve it in eighteen months? I don‘t see how it could be done.‖

Officials also said that the talk of withdrawal of troops is premature and it could embolden the insurgency.

Bruce Riedel, a former CIA analyst, also added a note of caution, calling Obama‘s approach ―shock therapy for Afghanistan.‖

―It is a bold approach and there‘s no guarantee of success,‖ he said. ―Wars tend to consume presidencies and this is now Obama‘s war.‖

Al Jazeera and Agencies

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MCCHRYSTAL - STRENGHTENING AFGHAN FORCES MOST IMPORTANT THING WE DO (DECEMBER 2, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, December 2nd, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

McChrystal: Strengthening Afghan forces ‘most important thing we do’ SOURCE: The Washington Post Wednesday, December 2, 2009 By JOSHUA PARTLOW

KABUL — The top American general in Afghanistan told his subordinates Wednesday that strengthening the Afghan security forces would be ―the most important thing we do in the future‖ while urging the soldiers under his command to redouble their efforts in the difficult months ahead.

In a speech via video conference to regional commanders across Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal said that the Afghan people would ultimately deliver the verdict about the success of the American troop buildup but that after President Obama‘s call Tuesday for 30,000 additional troops, ―we have a level of commitment that we‘ve not had before and that will change everything.‖

―At the end of the day, the success of this operation will be determined in the minds of the Afghan people. Counterinsurgency is always about what people think,‖ McChrystal said. ―It‘s not the number of people you kill. It‘s the number of people you convince. It‘s the number of people that don‘t get killed. It‘s the number of houses that aren‘t destroyed.‖

But after eight years of fighting, many Afghans are skeptical that the U.S. military, even with an additional 30,000 soldiers, can make them safer, defeat the Taliban or help reform the Afghan government enough to attract the widespread support of the people. In fabric stalls and leather shops, among florists and restaurateurs, many in Kabul welcomed any new measure to reverse the growing violence in the country but worried that additional American soldiers might not be enough.

―It‘s not possible to beat them because there are a lot of Taliban,‖ said Tur Yalai, owner of the Usmania Restaurant in Kabul.

Some Afghans said the additional troops could deepen the perception that Americans are occupiers propping up a corrupt and ineffectual Afghan government. Several cited the porous border with Pakistan and the ability of the Taliban to seek safe haven on the other side.

―Afghan people have never allowed their country to be occupied. This new policy is not for their benefit. The U.S. has so far not satisfied the people,‖ said Ghulam Destigee, who owns a

423 fabric shop in downtown Kabul. He said Americans should focus on pressing President Hamid Karzai to fight corruption and appoint a competent cabinet for his second term.

―If the number of troops increases, insecurity and fighting will increase, more people will be backing the insurgents, more people will die,‖ said Gul Mohammad, an elderly retiree who sat on a stool on the sidewalk nearby. ―If they leave, it would be better. Our Islamic territory will be calm and the fighting will be over.‖

Several Afghan officials supported the American priority to train the Afghan army and police force, and they called for better coordination with coalition forces. NATO and Afghan commanders have set a goal of more than doubling the size of the Afghan army and police to 400,000 members over the next four years. McChrystal said he also wants more on-the- ground partnering between U.S. and Afghan military units.

―If they don‘t do that, then there will be more civilian casualties, and there will be a larger gap between the people and the government,‖ said Mohammad Anwar Isaqzai, a parliament member from Helmand province, the volatile southern Afghanistan district where some of the first U.S. Marine reinforcements are expected to deploy. ―If they coordinate operations and train Afghan forces, they will be able to defeat the Taliban, because Afghans are familiar with the terrain and the situation here.‖

McChrystal, who met with Karzai and U.S. Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry after Obama‘s speech, described the troop decision as an ―inflection point‖ in the long-running conflict.

―To paraphrase Winston Churchill, I don‘t think this is the end. I don‘t even think it‘s the beginning of the end. But I do believe it‘s the end of the beginning,‖ McChrystal said.

With the conclusion of the three-month review and Obama‘s West Point speech, McChrystal said there is a new clarity of purpose in the military mission. The coalition countries are fighting to provide the Afghan government ―time, space and capability‖ to defend their sovereignty, he said.

But the general warned of the dangers ahead.

―There are going to be more long nights. More cold days. More memorial services. More frustrations. More questions. More answers to questions. But there‘s also going to be more Afghans with a chance,‖ McChrystal said.

―This is not a war for profit, it‘s not a war for conquest, and it‘s not a war for glory. It‘s a war to give people a chance,‖ he said.

Special correspondent Javed Hamdard contributed to this report.

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MISSING TOOLS FOR THE AFGHAN JOB (DECEMBER 2, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, December 2nd, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Missing Tools for the Afghan Job SOURCE: Atlantic Council Tuesday, December 2, 2009 By HARLAN ULLMAN

U.S. President Barack Obama‘s Afghanistan speech Tuesday, well advertised in advance and delivered at West Point for added effect, provoked predictable criticism from both the left and right. Faced with a set of abysmally bad choices and conditions in Afghanistan that grow worse not better, finding fault with the administration‘s policy decision was as easy as changing television channels. Unfortunately, the real flaws and limitations in the plan were largely ignored or missed.

No strategist or politician, however brilliant or clever, could have created an approach that was capable of guaranteeing a quick reversal of the ―dire‖ conditions posed by the conflict and upheaval in Afghanistan and the region. But the problem lies not with the craftsman or the policy architect. The problem is the tool kit. That tool kit does not contain the right or effective instruments to achieve the aims and objectives set by the president and his able national security team.

Consider what should be the three most critical tools in the box. First is the means to bring governance to Afghans. In this regard, the government in Kabul is incapable certainly over the next year or two and almost certainly for the longer term. Appointing an overseer or foreign viceroy to put some steel into President Hamid Karzai‘s backbone is entirely infeasible and will no doubt force the resignation of the three or four capable ministers in the government who do not wish their authority bypassed. Hence, the job of bringing governance will fall on the shoulders of an already overstretched U.S. and NATO military and a so-called surge in civilian capacity that is a fiction. Unfortunately, even if the president had agreed with commanding Gen. Stanley McChrystal‘s upper-limit request of 80,000 additional troops, this nation building is not a job any military can do with confidence.

Second, the Afghan government has been roundly and correctly challenged on the grounds of corruption and waste. But even if those excesses could be magically corrected — which they cannot — this criticism misses the point. It is not Afghan waste and incompetence in managing its resources that is the issue. It is the incompetence and waste with which the tool of Western aid has been so grossly mismanaged that needs immediate redress.

The investigations of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan who reports to Congress - not the White House - suggest the scope of mismanagement. These could have been harsher. Specifically, for every dollar spent on Afghanistan reconstruction and aid, about a dime goes

425 to the Afghan people. If this tool cannot be made to work, then all the king‘s horses and men will not turn Afghanistan into a functioning state.

Third and most important is the tool on which NATO and the Obama administration have bet the war — fielding capable Afghan security forces. As pro-Obama supporters assert, it is the Afghan surge that is critical and not the influx of 30,000 or 40,000 more U.S. and NATO troops that will take months to carry out. The notion is to build an Afghan force of some 400,000 army and police quickly and turn security over to them much as the United States tried to do in Vietnam with the Vietnamization program.

In theory, such logic is clear. However, McChrystal himself concludes it will take three to five years to stand up such a force. And some of his advisers believe this is optimistic. To others, the ethnic and illiteracy realities are more constraining. Enlisting sufficient Pashtun recruits to serve under an officer corps long headed by Tajiks is a non-starter even if literacy were not an issue - which it is. The police are even more problematic.

And if this tool were not sufficiently dull and in need of purchase or replacement, who will pay for it? Surely not the Afghans, who are broke. And is the West prepared to underwrite these costs for long?

The speech was delivered with the verve and rhetoric people now expect of this president. It bought some breathing room for the administration with an increasingly dubious public, although Republican critics in Congress and among the chattering classes will continue to fire away with some justifiable effect. During this grace period, the administration must look hard on fixing these three tools of governance; development and reconstruction; and recruiting and training a functioning Afghan security force with far greater intensity than ever before.

The administration has purposely sent its best and brightest senior civilian and military leaders to Afghanistan to strengthen its hand. But even the best of us need the right tools to get the job done. This is precisely where Obama must focus his administration if there is to be any kind of happy or at least not disastrous landing when we and NATO finally move to our exit strategy.

Harlan Ullman is a member of the Atlantic Council‘s Strategic Advisors Group and a Distinguished Senior Fellow at the National Defense University. This essay was previously published as in UPI.

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OBAMA‟S AF-PAK POLICY - SEEDS OF FAILURE (DECEMBER 2, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, December 2nd, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Obama’s Af-Pak Policy –Seeds of Failure SOURCE: South Asia Analysis Group, Paper no. 3528 Wednesday, December 2 2009 By B. RAMAN

President Barack Obama‘s Af-Pak policy —-Mark 2 as unveiled by him in his address to US military officer cadets at West Point on December 2, 2009, has been marked by critical words for the Afghan Government and soft words for the rulers of Pakistan—– as if evils such as corruption, poor governance, narcotics production and lack of accountability are confined only to Afghanistan and one does not find these evils in Pakistan.

2. It is these evils long tolerated by successive US administrations that have landed Pakistan in the situation in which it finds itself today—– a breeding ground of extremism and sectarianism of every hue. The cancer of extremism and jihadi terrorism did not spread to Pakistan from Afghanistan. It spread from the madrasas of Pakistan to Afghanistan with the encouragement and often at the instance of Pakistan‘s military and intelligence establishments. The root of this cancer is in Pakistan and not in Afghanistan. The surgery has to start in Pakistan. This harsh reality has been played down in his address.

3. The Taliban, which nourished Al Qaeda and gave it shelter in Afghan territory, was born in Pakistani territory in 1994. Al Qaeda and the leadership of the Afgan Taliban escaped defeat by the US forces post-9/11 by taking shelter in Pakistani territory—– Al Qaeda in the North Waziristan area of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Neo Taliban headed by Mulla Mohammad Omar in the Quetta area of Balochistan.

4. From there, the surviving senior cadres of the two organisations moved to sanctuaries in the non-tribal areas. A recent report of the ―Washington Times‖ has quoted retired US intelligence sources as saying that Mulla Omar and other leaders of the Neo Taliban have shifted to the Karachi area from the Quetta area to escape attacks by US drone (pilotless) planes in the tribal areas.

5. Many senior Al Qaeda leaders operated from the non-tribal areas of Pakistan—-some even before 9/11. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM) was reported to have orchestrated the 9/11 strikes in the US from Karachi from where he shifted to Quetta and then to Rawalpindi, where he was ultimately arrested. Abu Zubaidah was caught in Faislabad in Punjab and Ramzi Binalshib in Karachi. One should not be surprised if it ultimately turns out that Osama bin Laden and his No.2 Ayman al-Zawahiri have also been sheltered in the non-tribal areas and that is why the US has not been able to get at them so far despite offers of huge rewards and the Drone strikes.

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6. The command and control of both the Neo Taliban and Al Qaeda are now located in Pakistani territory. Obama said in his address at West Point: ―Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future. …… We will strengthen Pakistan‘s capacity to target those groups that threaten our countries, and have made it clear that we cannot tolerate a safe-haven for terrorists whose location is known, and whose intentions are clear.‖

7. Strong words regarding the safehavens for terrorists in Pakistan. As in the past, strong words do not presage strong action to force Pakistan to destroy those safehavens. The Pakistani military operations in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan are meant to counter a threat to Pakistan‘s internal security from indigenous elements. They are not directed against the external activities of Al Qaeda. Nor are they directed towards facilitating the military operations of the NATO forces and the Afghan National Army in Afghan territory. The safehavens of organisations, which are seen as an asset and not as a threat to Pakistan, are being shifted from place to place to escape detection and action by the US.

8. If Obama is serious about wanting to start withdrawing from Afghanistan in dignity and honour by the middle of 2011, he has only two options. Either force the Pakistani rulers to act against the safehavens whether they are located in tribal or non-tribal areas or act against them with available US capabilities. The Obama Administration like its predecessor lacks the political will to do so.

9. Seeking partnership with a state perpetrator of terrorism is not the way of ending it. That is what Obama has done in his address. That is why his revised Af-Pak policy is unlikely to meet the objectives which he has set for the US and other NATO countries. Obama‘s West Point address contains the seeds of its pre-destined failure.

The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.

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PAKISTAN TOLD TO RATCHET UP TALIBAN FIGHT (DECEMBER 7, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, December 7th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Pakistan Told to Ratchet Up Taliban Fight SOURCE: The New York Times Monday, December 7, 2009 By DAVID E. SANGER and ERIC SCHMITT

WASHINGTON - The Obama administration is turning up the pressure on Pakistan to fight the Taliban inside its borders, warning that if it does not act more aggressively the United States will use considerably more force on the Pakistani side of the border to shut down Taliban attacks on American forces in Afghanistan, American and Pakistani officials said.

The blunt message was delivered in a tense encounter in Pakistan last month, before President Obama announced his new war strategy, when Gen. James L. Jones, Mr. Obama‘s national security adviser, and John O. Brennan, the White House counterterrorism chief, met with the heads of Pakistan‘s military and its intelligence service.

United States officials said the message did not amount to an ultimatum, but rather it was intended to prod a reluctant Pakistani military to go after Taliban insurgents in Pakistan who are directing attacks in Afghanistan.

For their part the Pakistanis interpreted the message as a fairly bald warning that unless Pakistan moved quickly to act against two Taliban groups they have so far refused to attack, the United States was prepared to take unilateral action to expand Predator drone attacks beyond the tribal areas and, if needed, to resume raids by Special Operations forces into the country against Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders.

A senior administration official, asked about the encounter, declined to go into details but added quickly, ―I think they read our intentions accurately.‖

A Pakistani official who has been briefed on the meetings said, ―Jones‘s message was if that Pakistani help wasn‘t forthcoming, the United States would have to do it themselves.‖

American commanders said earlier this year that they were considering expanding drone strikes in Pakistan‘s lawless tribal areas, but General Jones‘s comments marked the first time that the United States bluntly told Pakistan it would have to choose between leading attacks against the insurgents inside the country‘s borders or stepping aside to let the Americans do it.

The recent security demands followed an offer of a broader strategic relationship and expanded intelligence sharing and nonmilitary economic aid from the United States. Pakistan‘s politically weakened president, Asif Ali Zardari, replied in writing to a two-page letter that General Jones delivered from Mr. Obama. But Mr. Zardari gave no indication of

429 how Pakistan would respond to the incentives, which were linked to the demands for greatly stepped-up counterterrorism actions.

―We‘ve offered them a strategic choice,‖ one administration official said, describing the private communications. ―And we‘ve heard back almost nothing.‖ Another administration official said, ―Our patience is wearing thin.‖

Asked Monday about the exchange, Tommy Vietor, a White House spokesman, said, ―We have no comment on private diplomatic correspondence. As the president has said repeatedly, we will continue to partner with Pakistan and the international community to enhance the military, governance and economic capacity of Afghanistan and Pakistan.‖

The implicit threat of not only ratcheting up the drone strikes but also launching more covert American ground raids would mark a substantial escalation of the administration‘s counterterrorism campaign.

American Special Operations forces attacked Qaeda militants in a Pakistani village near the border with Afghanistan in early September 2008, in the first publicly acknowledged case of United States forces conducting a ground raid on Pakistani soil.

But the raid caused a political furor in Pakistan, with the country‘s top generals condemning the attack, and the United States backed off what had been a planned series of such strikes.

During his intensive review of Pakistan and Afghanistan strategy, officials say, Mr. Obama concluded that no amount of additional troops in Afghanistan would succeed in their new mission if the Taliban could retreat over the Pakistani border to regroup and resupply. But the administration has said little about the Pakistani part of the strategy.

―We concluded early on that whatever you do with Pakistan, you don‘t want to talk about it much,‖ a senior presidential aide said last week. ―All it does is get backs up in Islamabad.‖

During his speech at West Point last week, Mr. Obama said that ―our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan.‖ But for the rest of the speech he referred to the country in the past tense, talking about how ―there have been those in Pakistan who‘ve argued that the struggle against extremism is not their fight, and that Pakistan is better off doing little or seeking accommodation with those who use violence.‖

He never quite said how his administration views the Pakistanis today, and two officials said that Mr. Obama used that construction in an effort not to alienate the current government or the army, led by Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.

Even before Mr. Obama announced his decision last week, the White House had approved an expansion of the C.I.A.‘s drone program in Pakistan‘s lawless tribal areas. A missile strike from what was said to be a United States drone in the tribal areas killed at least three people early Tuesday, according to Pakistani intelligence officials, The Associated Press reported.

Pakistani officials, wary of civilian casualties and the appearance of further infringement of national sovereignty, are still in discussions with American officials over whether to allow the C.I.A. to expand its missile strikes into Baluchistan for the first time - a politically delicate move because it is outside the tribal areas. American commanders say this is necessary 430 because Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader who ran Afghanistan before the 2001 invasion, and other Taliban leaders are hiding in Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan Province.

Pakistani officials also voice concern that if the Pakistani Army were to aggressively attack the two groups that most concern the United States - the Afghan Taliban leaders and the Haqqani network based in North Waziristan - the militants would respond with waves of retaliatory bombings, further undermining the weak civilian government.

Publicly, senior American officials and commanders take note of that concern. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton arrived in Pakistan in late October with offers of a strategic partnership. But General Jones followed Mrs. Clinton two weeks later carrying more sticks than carrots,American officials said.

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FROM CLINTON, PLAIN TALK ON AFGHANISTAN (DECEMBER 8, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, December 8th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

From Clinton, plain talk on Afghanistan SOURCE: The Washington Post Tuesday, December 8, 2009 By WALTER PINCUS

Candor is, sadly, in short supply in Washington, particularly when government officials discuss shortcomings related to Afghanistan before congressional committees.

But Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, during last week‘s marathon set of hearings on President Obama‘s new strategy in that war, gave two examples of forthrightness that are worth further examination: a discussion of trouble with expanding the workforce of the U.S. Agency for International Development in Afghanistan, and a tough look at how U.S. aid money is being slipped into the hands of the Taliban.

In hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Clinton said that there has been a 10-month investigation of what USAID was doing on the ground in Afghanistan, and that ―we didn‘t particularly come away impressed.‖ Many of the 300 civilians there were on six-month rotations and did not have well-defined missions, and many spent time out of the country, she said. More important, Clinton added, ―most of our civilian aid going into Afghanistan had been contracted out without adequate oversight or accountability.‖

Plans call for tripling the USAID workforce and changing its mission. ―But,‖ she added, ―the numbers are going to have to grow if we expect to deliver on what is required.‖

Clinton‘s dilemma is spelled out vividly in an October USAID contractor solicitation for a second phase of what is called a ―support‖ project. ―Significant increases in USAID/Afghanistan‘s budget and program portfolio since 2002 had outstripped workforce resources,‖ said the solicitation to continue what amounts to a shadow, contractor-run USAID office in Kabul, with its own building and personnel. The project calls for supplying contractors to take over just about every personnel need required of the main USAID/Afghanistan office.

Among the services this project provides are ―activity/project designs, assessments, evaluations, management information and reporting, mapping, translation and interpreting services.‖ In addition, contracted technical specialists ―collect and disseminate public information, enhance the quality of data, and develop web content.‖

The reason for these contractors is explained in the background section of the solicitation. It says direct hire of American, third-country and local employees is constrained by ―limited

432 office space, housing, high costs for administrative support, operating expense limitations and security restrictions.‖

USAID needs the contracted experts ―to temporarily fill the staff slots until such time as the [Kabul] Mission has been able to fill the staff slots through its own internal recruitment process,‖ the solicitation says. Although the contractors will be asked to do such jobs as assist with field-based monitoring of USAID projects and the evaluation of these projects, and even propose the makeup of evaluation teams, the proposal said that since they are not ―U.S. Direct Hire employees, they will not perform inherently government functions.‖

Appearing later before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Clinton gave a blunt summary of how U.S. funds get into the hands of the Taliban — a problem that the news media have referred to in the past only through anonymous government officials.

―Much of the corruption [in Afghanistan] is fueled by the money that has poured into that country over the last eight years. And it is corruption at every step along the way, not just in the palace in Kabul,‖ she told the legislators.

Referring to the daily stream of truck convoys that bring supplies into the landlocked nation, Clinton said, ―You know, when we are so dependent upon long supply lines — as we are in Afghanistan, where everything has to be imported — it‘s much more difficult than it was in Iraq, where we had Kuwait as a staging ground.

―You offload a ship in Karachi. And by the time whatever it is — you know, muffins for our soldiers‘ breakfast or anti-IED equipment — gets to where we‘re headed, it goes through a lot of hands. And one of the major sources of funding for the Taliban is the protection money. That has nothing to do with President Karzai.‖

She concluded: ―We have to do a better job, on the international side, to coordinate our aid, to get more accountability for what we spend in Afghanistan.‖

Clinton also picked up on a theme that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, emphasized in his report this summer: He sought support for efforts to keep the door open to Taliban members who might be willing to renounce terrorism if there were a financial alternative.

Echoing the general‘s report, Clinton said: ―We understand that some of those who fight with the insurgency do not do so out of ideology, theology or conviction, but frankly due to coercion and money. The average Taliban fighter, it is our information, receives two to three times the monthly salary than the average Afghan soldier or police officer.‖

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THE DRONE DILEMMA (DECEMBER 12, 2009)

Written by admin on Saturday, December 12th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

The Drone Dilemma SOURCE: Newsweek Saturday, December 12, 2009 By MARK HOSENBALL

A clandestine CIA search-and-destroy program, which launches missile strikes from remotely piloted drone aircraft, has killed more than a dozen senior leaders of Al Qaeda during the last two years. Among the dead: Abu Khabab al-Masri, reputed to be Al Qaeda‘s top expert on weapons of mass destruction, and Baitullah Mehsud, leader of the Pakistani Taliban and reputed mastermind of the murder of Benazir Bhutto. U.S. government spokesmen won‘t even confirm the program‘s existence, but a U.S. national-security official-who, like others cited in this article, declined to be named talking about sensitive information-says the program has been so successful that some counterterrorism officials want to expand it. They say the drones have been effective not just in killing terrorists but also in keeping them on the run and disrupting their ability to plan new attacks. They have asked for authority to target terrorists in more densely populated areas of Pakistan.

One person standing in the way of expanded missile strikes: President Obama. Five administration officials tell NEWSWEEK that the president has sided with political and diplomatic advisers who argue that widening the scope of the drone attacks would be risky and unwise. Obama is concerned that firing missiles into urban areas like Quetta, where intelligence reports suggest that Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar and other high-level militants have sometimes taken shelter, would greatly increase the risk of civilian casualties. It would also draw protests from Pakistani politicians and military leaders, who have been largely quiet about the drone attacks as long as they‘ve been confined to the country‘s out-of- sight border region. The White House has been encouraged by Pakistan‘s own recent military efforts to root out militants along the Afghan border, and it does not want to jeopardize that cooperation.

The internal debate about the drone program has been going on for nearly a year. A former senior intelligence official says that, within days of his inauguration, Obama and his top aides began discussing expanding the operation from a relatively limited area along the AfPak border to a broader range of targets like the Pakistani regions of Baluchistan and South Waziristan. Obama has not closed the door on wider drone attacks. One of the officials notes that the administration is likely to continue to debate, and even plan for the possibility of expanding, drone operations in the future-if only to keep the pressure on Pakistan to maintain its current efforts to capture and kill terrorists. A White House spokesperson had no comment.

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NEW U.S. STRATEGY AND PAKISTAN‟S RESPONSE (DECEMBER 14, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, December 14th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

New US strategy and Pakistan’s response SOURCE: The News International Monday, December 14, 2009 By MUNIR AKRAM

There are good reasons to conclude that the ―new‖ US strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan announced by President Obama on 1 December will fail. But it could have serous consequences for Pakistan and the region. First, the objectives of the strategy are too broad and opaque. Last March, President Obama‘s emphasis was on defeating and eliminating Al Qaeda. Now, the aim is also to ―roll back‖ the Taliban insurgency. To eliminate Al Qaeda in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, it must be separated and isolated from the Taliban ―sea‖ in which it is currently hiding. But, the US troop surge will be mainly directed against the Taliban insurgency. It will push Al Qaeda and the insurgents closer together, making it more difficult to isolate and target Al Qaeda. Second, the strategy is mostly a military plan. It fails to address the motivation and causes of the Taliban insurgency, which derives mainly from Pashtun alienation and disempowerment and is now emerging as a Pashtun liberation movement. The Taliban and other Pashtun insurgent groups cannot be ―peeled off‖ to side with a government in Kabul that is dominated by the Tajik and other warlords the Taliban were fighting prior to the 2001 US intervention or with a foreign army supporting this regime. The Taliban may not enjoy significant popular support. But, they are mostly Pashtun and better placed to secure local support and cooperation from common people in the Pashtun regions.

Third, the additional 30-40,000 US-NATO troops may be able to clear and ven temporarily hold some of the areas in the South and East of Afghanistan. But, the troop numbers will still be entirely insufficient for sustained control over Afghanistan‘s vast deserts, valleys and mountains. (The Soviets could not do this with 140,000 troops plus an effective Afghan Army of 80,000.). In fact, the McChrystal plan envisages defending civilian population centres and withdrawing from ―indefensible‖ outposts including those along the border. As a result, the areas under Taliban and insurgent control are likely to enlarge not contract after this surge. Fourth, the aim of ―transitioning‖ security responsibility to the Afghan Army in three years is an impossible benchmark. President Karzai has said so. Apart from the admitted difficulties and costs of training, the question is whether a sufficient number of Pashtuns can be found to join a 240,000 strong Army. If not, it will continue to be largely composed of recruits from the non-Pashtun regions. Unless it is ethnically balanced, the ANA will be rejected and fought as an alien force by Pashtun insurgents. Fifth, the parallels drawn between the Iraq ―surge‖ and the current escalation are inappropriate. Whether the surge in Iraq was successful remains to be finally determined. The Sunni tribes in Iraq turned on foreign Al Qaeda elements in order to gain the political and military influence to counter the growing power of the Shias and Kurds. Afghanistan‘s tribal

435 and ideological conditions are very different. And, the Taliban are not being offered any credible inducement to discard their links with Al Qaeda. On the contrary, they are the main targets of this surge. Winning their cooperation through force is unlikely. Sixth, the expansion of aerial attacks against Al Qaeda and Taliban ―leaders‖ and training camps may achieve some tactical success. But, slain leaders and rudimentary training camps can be quickly replaced. With the Taliban also being targeted, reliable intelligence on the location of Al Qaeda leaders is likely to dry up. Without such intelligence, aerial strikes are likely to result in incorrect targeting and high civilian casualties, losing rather than ―winning hearts and minds‖. Seventh, as is already evident, the US and NATO presence in Afghanistan will be difficult to sustain over time. In the short-term, the support of the US Congress, and a slim majority of Americans, has been secured partly by indicating a short timeline for withdrawal. Other NATO governments are being cajoled to commit additional troops (7,000) in the face of opposition from the majority of their peoples. This tenuous support is likely to erode over the coming months as casualties mount, costs increase and the military, political and economic benchmarks set out in the strategy are unmet. Faced with an expensive, open-ended war, domestic pressure will intensify in Europe and the US to bring the troops home. Although President Obama‘s speech did not dwell on this, it is evident from the leaks to the US media, that the onus is to be placed on Pakistan for the success of the new US strategy. The US ―surge‖ will obviously push more of the Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents into Pakistan, who it would then be asked to deal with. Pakistan will also have to assume responsibility for securing the border and protecting the larger US-NATO supply lines. Reportedly, Pakistan has been asked to undertake military action against the Taliban groups led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, Gulbedeen Hikmatyam and Mullah Omar (and the so-called ―Quetta Shurra‖) although these groups are currently not fighting Pakistan. Pakistan‘s acquiescence is sought for more intense US air strikes against a larger number of Al Qaeda and Taliban targets in the FATA as well as NWFP and Baluchistan. For good measure, Pakistan is also asked to advance India‘s agenda by taking action against pro-Kashmiri militant groups. The consequences of this for Pakistan are not difficult to project. One, wider military operations will severely stretch the capacity of the Pakistan Army, which has already deployed 150,000 troops on the western frontier. It would jeopardize the success of the ongoing operations in South Waziristan and adjacent areas against the TTP and other insurgents who are attacking Pakistan with help from Indian and Afghan intelligence; Two, it will escalate retaliatory strikes against Pakistani civilian and military targets from a wider range of militant groups; Three, it will revive the general perception that Pakistan is fighting America‘s war and thus erode the existing national consensus to confront and defeat the TTP and other groups targeting Pakistan; Four, it will, inevitably, require the movement of more troops from the Eastern border, further diminishing Pakistan‘s ability to deter and repel possible Indian military action which has been repeatedly threatened in the event of another Mumbai-like incident. If Pakistan does not take the demanded actions, the US has threatened it will do so unilaterally. A ―strategic partnership‖ of ―limitless potential‖, promised by Secretary Clinton, cannot be forged in a crucible of coercion. In fact, the limitations of such a ―partnership‖on offer are evident from the ―incentives‖ offered to Pakistan i.e. US support for a ―dialogue‖ with India, (not a fair solution for Kashmir; nor even an end of India‘s repression of the Kashmiris, or stopping Indian interference in Baluchistan and FATA). Also, undefined ―defense cooperation‖, (whose limitations Pakistan should be well aware of, not least in the wake of the conditionalities

436 incorporated in the Kerry-Lugar Bill). Finally, additional economic assistance (whose cumbersome delivery and limited impact is evident from Pakistan‘s past history.).Pakistan‘s response to the US strategy should reflect its own national interests and the sentiments of its people. It should be formulated in consultations between the Government, Parliament and the armed forces. From Pakistan‘s perspective, it would be unwise to agree to a blanket escalation of military and police action simultaneously against all Taliban and militant groups. Pakistan‘s priority must be to finish the job of putting down the anti-Pakistan TTP militants. Pakistan must also display determined opposition to wider, unilateral US air strikes on its territory and insist on joint control of all strikes against jointly determined Al Qaeda targets. Even within these parameters, Pakistan‘s cooperation should be offered only in exchange for tangible and immediate US support for Pakistan‘s national objectives: an end to Indian- Afghan interference in Baluchistan and FATA; a Kashmir solution; a military balance between Pakistan and India; parity with India on nuclear issues; transfer of equipment and technology for counter-terrorism; unconditional defense and economic assistance; free trade access. At the same time, Pakistan, in its own interest, should take the lead to promote a political solution to the Afghan and Pashtun insurgency. This could be in the form of reconciliation initiative with all Pashtun and Taliban groups. Such an initiative would need to be undertaken though credible intermediaries, e.g. a commission consisting of respected Pashtun and tribal leaders and some other eminent Islamic personalities. Through such mediation, agreements could be evolved with the Taliban and other insurgent groups for a cessation of hostilities, support for economic development, creation of a genuine Afghan national Army, a decentralized political governance structure - in exchange for the progressive and complete withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan and continued economic support for Afghanistan and Pakistan. A political plan for Afghanistan, based on such a reconciliation effort, should be discussed and agreed, specially with Saudi Arabia., Iran and other Islamic countries as well as Pakistan‘s consistent geo-political partner - China. The outcome of this approach may be messy. It may not respond to Western ―values‖. But it stands a better chance of restoring peace in the region, dismantling Al Qaeda and securing the graceful exit of foreign forces from Afghanistan - which are now part of the problem, not the solution -than the new US strategy.

The writer is a former ambassador of Pakistan to the UN.

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U.N. OFFICIALS SAY AMERICAN OFFERED PLAN TO REPLACE KARZAI (DECEMBER 16, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, December 16th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

U.N. Officials Say American Offered Plan to Replace Karzai SOURCE: The New York Times Wednesday, December 16, 2009 By JAMES GLANZ and RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr.

As widespread fraud in the Afghanistan presidential election was becoming clear three months ago, the No. 2 United Nations official in the country, the American Peter W. Galbraith, proposed enlisting the White House in a plan to replace the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, according to two senior United Nations officials.

Mr. Karzai, the officials said, became incensed when he learned of the plan and was told it had been put forth by Mr. Galbraith, who had been installed in his position with the strong backing of Richard C. Holbrooke, the top American envoy to Afghanistan. Mr. Holbrooke had himself clashed with the Afghan president over the election.

Mr. Galbraith abruptly left the country in early September and was fired weeks later. Mr. Galbraith has said that he believes that he was forced out because he was feuding with his boss, the Norwegian Kai Eide, the top United Nations official in Kabul, over how to respond to what he termed wholesale fraud in the Afghan presidential election. He accused Mr. Eide of concealing the degree of fraud benefiting Mr. Karzai.

Mr. Galbraith said in an interview that he discussed but never actively promoted the idea of persuading Mr. Karzai to leave office.

Mr. Galbraith‘s warnings about fraud were largely confirmed in October, when a United Nations-backed audit stripped Mr. Karzai of almost one-third of his votes, preventing a first- round victory and forcing him into a runoff. He was proclaimed the winner last month after his challenger withdrew, saying the runoff would not be fair.

But the disclosure of Mr. Galbraith‘s proposal to replace Mr. Karzai, contained in a letter written by Mr. Eide and reported in interviews with United Nations and American officials, provides new perspective on the crisis in Kabul that enveloped the United Nations and the bitter feud between Mr. Galbraith and Mr. Eide.

The degree to which the United States should stand behind Mr. Karzai was vigorously debated in Washington in the fall, as the Obama administration pondered how to handle the disputed election in Afghanistan. Mr. Karzai is often criticized as being an ineffective leader

438 in the battle against the Taliban who tolerates widespread corruption in his ranks. He has an acrimonious relationship with many American leaders.

Mr. Holbrooke said he was unaware of the idea. ―And it does not reflect in any way any idea that Secretary Clinton or anyone else in the State Department would have considered,‖ he said.

Mr. Galbraith, a former American ambassador and an influential voice on Iraq, also came under scrutiny recently for his stake in an oil field in the Kurdish region of Iraq.

Mr. Eide, who is set to leave his job as head of the United Nations mission in Afghanistan by early next year, said Mr. Galbraith‘s departure from Afghanistan in early September came immediately after he rejected what he described as Mr. Galbraith‘s proposal to replace Mr. Karzai and install a more Western-friendly figure.

He said he told his deputy the plan was ―unconstitutional, it represented interference of the worst sort, and if pursued it would provoke not only a strong international reaction‖ but also civil insurrection. It was during this conversation, Mr. Eide said, that Mr. Galbraith proposed taking a leave to the United States, and Mr. Eide accepted.

Mr. Galbraith‘s proposal would begin with ―a secret mission to Washington,‖ Mr. Eide wrote last week in a letter responding to a critical public report of his work by the International Crisis Group, a research organization.

―He told me he would first meet with Vice President Biden,‖ Mr. Eide wrote. ―If the vice president agreed with Galbraith‘s proposal they would approach President Obama with the following plan: President Karzai should be forced to resign as president.‖ Then a new government would be installed led by a former finance minister, Ashraf Ghani, or a former interior minister, Ali A. Jalali, both favorites of American officials.

In response to questions from The New York Times, Mr. Galbraith said that he never put forth any fully fledged proposal and said that he only considered an effort to persuade Mr. Karzai to leave so that an interim government, allowed under the Constitution, could be installed in case a runoff election did not occur until May 2010.

Mr. Galbraith said the United Nations never informed him that these discussions played a role in his firing.

―There were internal discussions,‖ Mr. Galbraith said. ―I‘m sure I discussed the crisis and I‘m sure I discussed a way out. But that is an entirely different matter from acting on it.‖

He said he never promoted the idea with officials outside the United Nations.

But according to a Western diplomat, Mr. Galbraith discussed his plan with Frank Ricciardone, the deputy American ambassador in Kabul. Mr. Ricciardone was subsequently alerted to Mr. Galbraith‘s plan as well by Mr. Eide, the diplomat said.

A spokeswoman for the American Embassy in Kabul, Caitlin Hayden, confirmed that Mr. Galbraith had brought the plan to the embassy. She said that it was summarily rejected.

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―Mr. Galbraith was outspoken within the diplomatic community about his concerns regarding fraud and its consequences, and raised questions about various alternatives to the elections,‖ Ms. Hayden said. ―The U.S. Embassy discouraged consideration of theoretical alternatives to the constitutional elections process whenever they were raised by any party, even while acknowledging flaws in the process.‖

Mr. Galbraith and a senior United Nations official said that a staff member from Mr. Holbrooke‘s office was at some of the meetings where the idea was discussed. But Mr. Galbraith says that he does not recall any communication with Mr. Holbrooke on the subject.

Vijay Nambiar, chief of staff to the United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, said that he was aware of Mr. Galbraith‘s proposal to go to Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. and develop support for the plan, and later learned of Mr. Karzai‘s anger over the episode. Mr. Nambiar said it played a role in Mr. Galbraith‘s firing.

―It was one of several factors,‖ he said.

Mr. Galbraith also says he never actually contacted Mr. Biden or his staff on this matter. James F. Carney, a spokesman for Mr. Biden, said in an e-mail message that one of the vice president‘s staff members, Tony Blinken, did receive a call from Mr. Galbraith while he was still working for the United Nations in Afghanistan, but he did not say exactly when the call was made.

―Galbraith told Blinken that he had thoughts about Afghanistan and wanted to talk about them at some point. Blinken said he‘d be glad to discuss them. However, the discussion never took place. Blinken has not heard from Galbraith since or received any information from Galbraith about his thoughts or ideas on Afghanistan,‖ Mr. Carney said.

Mr. Eide said the Galbraith plan caused strong reactions in Kabul. Mr. Karzai was ―deeply upset,‖ he said. ―I spent quite some time trying to calm down the accusations of international interference by talking to the president,‖ he said.

A spokesman for Mr. Karzai said he was not available for comment on the matter.

James Glanz reported from New York, and Richard A. Oppel Jr. from Kabul. Mark Landler contributed reporting from Washington, and Walter Gibbs from Oslo.

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INSURGENTS HACK U.S. DRONES (DECEMBER 17, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, December 17th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Insurgents Hack U.S. Drones SOURCE: The Wall Street Journal Thursday, December 17, 2009 By SIOBHAN GORMAN, YOCHI J. DREAZEN and AUGUST COLE

$26 Software Is Used to Breach Key Weapons in Iraq; Iranian Backing Suspected

WASHINGTON — Militants in Iraq have used $26 off-the-shelf software to intercept live video feeds from U.S. Predator drones, potentially providing them with information they need to evade or monitor U.S. military operations.

Senior defense and intelligence officials said Iranian-backed insurgents intercepted the video feeds by taking advantage of an unprotected communications link in some of the remotely flown planes‘ systems. Shiite fighters in Iraq used software programs such as SkyGrabber — available for as little as $25.95 on the Internet — to regularly capture drone video feeds, according to a person familiar with reports on the matter.

U.S. officials say there is no evidence that militants were able to take control of the drones or otherwise interfere with their flights. Still, the intercepts could give America‘s enemies battlefield advantages by removing the element of surprise from certain missions and making it easier for insurgents to determine which roads and buildings are under U.S. surveillance.

The drone intercepts mark the emergence of a shadow cyber war within the U.S.-led conflicts overseas. They also point to a potentially serious vulnerability in Washington‘s growing network of unmanned drones, which have become the American weapon of choice in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Obama administration has come to rely heavily on the unmanned drones because they allow the U.S. to safely monitor and stalk insurgent targets in areas where sending American troops would be either politically untenable or too risky.

The stolen video feeds also indicate that U.S. adversaries continue to find simple ways of counteracting sophisticated American military technologies.

U.S. military personnel in Iraq discovered the problem late last year when they apprehended a Shiite militant whose laptop contained files of intercepted drone video feeds. In July, the U.S. military found pirated drone video feeds on other militant laptops, leading some officials to conclude that militant groups trained and funded by Iran were regularly intercepting feeds.

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In the summer 2009 incident, the military found ―days and days and hours and hours of proof‖ that the feeds were being intercepted and shared with multiple extremist groups, the person said. ―It is part of their kit now.‖

A senior defense official said that James Clapper, the Pentagon‘s intelligence chief, assessed the Iraq intercepts at the direction of Defense Secretary Robert Gates and concluded they represented a shortcoming to the security of the drone network.

―There did appear to be a vulnerability,‖ the defense official said. ―There‘s been no harm done to troops or missions compromised as a result of it, but there‘s an issue that we can take care of and we‘re doing so.‖

Senior military and intelligence officials said the U.S. was working to encrypt all of its drone video feeds from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, but said it wasn‘t yet clear if the problem had been completely resolved.

Some of the most detailed evidence of intercepted feeds has been discovered in Iraq, but adversaries have also intercepted drone video feeds in Afghanistan, according to people briefed on the matter. These intercept techniques could be employed in other locations where the U.S. is using pilotless planes, such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, they said.

The Pentagon is deploying record numbers of drones to Afghanistan as part of the Obama administration‘s troop surge there. Lt. Gen. David Deptula, who oversees the Air Force‘s unmanned aviation program, said some of the drones would employ a sophisticated new camera system called ―Gorgon Stare,‖ which allows a single aerial vehicle to transmit back at least 10 separate video feeds simultaneously.

Gen. Deptula, speaking to reporters Wednesday, said there were inherent risks to using drones since they are remotely controlled and need to send and receive video and other data over great distances. ―Those kinds of things are subject to listening and exploitation,‖ he said, adding the military was trying to solve the problems by better encrypting the drones‘ feeds.

The potential drone vulnerability lies in an unencrypted downlink between the unmanned craft and ground control. The U.S. government has known about the flaw since the U.S. campaign in Bosnia in the 1990s, current and former officials said. But the Pentagon assumed local adversaries wouldn‘t know how to exploit it, the officials said.

Last December, U.S. military personnel in Iraq discovered copies of Predator drone feeds on a laptop belonging to a Shiite militant, according to a person familiar with reports on the matter. ―There was evidence this was not a one-time deal,‖ this person said. The U.S. accuses Iran of providing weapons, money and training to Shiite fighters in Iraq, a charge that Tehran has long denied.

The militants use programs such as SkyGrabber, from Russian company SkySoftware. Andrew Solonikov, one of the software‘s developers, said he was unaware that his software could be used to intercept drone feeds. ―It was developed to intercept music, photos, video, programs and other content that other users download from the Internet — no military data or other commercial data, only free legal content,‖ he said by email from Russia.

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Officials stepped up efforts to prevent insurgents from intercepting video feeds after the July incident. The difficulty, officials said, is that adding encryption to a network that is more than a decade old involves more than placing a new piece of equipment on individual drones. Instead, many components of the network linking the drones to their operators in the U.S., Afghanistan or Pakistan have to be upgraded to handle the changes. Additional concerns remain about the vulnerability of the communications signals to electronic jamming, though there‘s no evidence that has occurred, said people familiar with reports on the matter.

Predator drones are built by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc. of San Diego. Some of its communications technology is proprietary, so widely used encryption systems aren‘t readily compatible, said people familiar with the matter.

In an email, a spokeswoman said that for security reasons, the company couldn‘t comment on ―specific data link capabilities and limitations.‖

Fixing the security gap would have caused delays, according to current and former military officials. It would have added to the Predator‘s price. Some officials worried that adding encryption would make it harder to quickly share time-sensitive data within the U.S. military, and with allies.

―There‘s a balance between pragmatics and sophistication,‖ said Mike Wynne, Air Force Secretary from 2005 to 2008.

The Air Force has staked its future on unmanned aerial vehicles. Drones account for 36% of the planes in the service‘s proposed 2010 budget.

Today, the Air Force is buying hundreds of Reaper drones, a newer model, whose video feeds could be intercepted in much the same way as with the Predators, according to people familiar with the matter. A Reaper costs between $10 million and $12 million each and is faster and better armed than the Predator. General Atomics expects the Air Force to buy as many as 375 Reapers.

Write to Siobhan Gorman at [email protected], Yochi J. Dreazen at [email protected] and August Cole at [email protected]

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PRESIDENT ZARDARI UNDER PRESSURE AFTER NRO RULING (DECEMBER 17, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, December 17th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

President Zardari under pressure after NRO ruling SOURCE: Dawn Thursday, December 17, 2009

ISLAMABAD: President Asif Ali Zardari faced fresh calls to step down Thursday after the Supreme Court struck down an amnesty that had protected the increasingly unpopular leader and several of his political allies from corruption charges.

The decision late Wednesday sharpened political tensions in Pakistan just as the United States and its other Western allies want it to unite and fight against al-Qaeda and Taliban militants based along the Afghan border.

While it is generally agreed that President Zardari has immunity from prosecution as president, his opponents now plan to challenge his eligibility to hold the post. Zardari and his aides say any corruption charges against him are politically motivated and that he will not step down.

Critics said he was morally obligated to resign, at least while the court heard any challenges to his rule.

‗It will be in his own interest, it will be in the interest of his party and it will be good for the system,‘ said Khawaja Asif, a senior leader from the opposition Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz party.

The amnesty was part of a US-brokered deal with former military ruler Pervez Musharraf that allowed former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to return home from self-exile and participate in politics without facing charges her party says were politically motivated. Zardari, Bhutto‘s husband, took control of the party after Bhutto was assassinated in 2007.

The amnesty, known as the National Reconciliation Ordinance, either stopped corruption investigations or probes into other alleged misdeeds or wiped away convictions in cases involving up to 8,000 ministers, bureaucrats or politicians from across the spectrum.

Civil rights activists have long argued that the amnesty unfairly protected the wealthy elite.

Zardari has long been haunted by corruption allegations dating back to governments led in the 1990s by his late wife. He spent several years in prison under previous administrations. The Supreme Court this week heard allegations he misappropriated as much as $1.5 billion.

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The court on Wednesday singled out an alleged multimillion dollar money laundering case involving Zardari and his late wife that had been heard in a Swiss court until the attorney general under Musharraf withdrew proceedings against them last year as a result of the amnesty.

The court said this was illegal and ordered the government to ask Swiss authorities to reopen the case.

Pakistani newspapers welcomed the decision as a victory for justice. Many editorialists said it boded ill for Zardari.

‗Zardari: an accused president,‘ read the headline over a front-page story by a well-known critic in The News.

Pakistani political analyst Rasul Bakhsh Rais doubted that Cabinet ministers and other politicians affected by the ruling would simply step down. He noted that investigative and prosecuting entities in Pakistan are not really independent of the government.

‗They will play all these tricks and they will stay in power,‘ Rais said, predicting many messy court battles ahead.

Some analysts said Zardari may be able to take some of the sting out of his opponents‘ attacks - and ultimately survive in office - if he gives up many of the powers he inherited from Musharraf.

A few weeks ago, amid mounting pressure, Zardari relinquished command of the country‘s nuclear arsenal and said he would give up more powers soon. But that‘s a promise he‘s made before, including in a major speech to lawmakers just days after being sworn in.

445

AFGHAN PRESIDENT SAYS NEW CABINET TO BE ACCOUNTABLE (DECEMBER 21, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, December 21st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Afghan president says new cabinet to be accountable SOURCE: The News International Monday, December 21, 2009

KABUL: Afghan President Hamid Karzai promised on Sunday his new cabinet would be held to account following mounting criticism over graft in his government.

Karzai‘s nominations for 23 ministerial positions were presented to parliament for approval on Saturday, a month after his re-election was confirmed following an August 20 poll, which was marred by rampant fraud.

The cabinet nominations are seen as the president‘s first test since his re-election to show he is serious about clamping down on corruption after coming under intense pressure from Western countries whose funds and troops support his government.

Washington is sending 30,000 extra troops to Afghanistan to try to quell a strengthening Taliban insurgency but U.S. officials acknowledge more troops can only be effective if the Afghan government has the trust of its own people.

Some Western leaders hailed the new line-up that has kept most of the technocrats favoured by the West in top positions. But some Afghan lawmakers hoping to see more new faces said the nominations amounted to a list of recycled figures.

Speaking at a news conference alongside Belgian Prime Minister Yves Leterme in Kabul on Sunday, Karzai defended his choice, saying nearly half of the nominees were new and that all ministers would be held to account for any corruption.

―I can assure that all the newly introduced ministers, and those who have been with me in the past, will be held accountable on any issue related to corruption,‖ Karzai told reporters. ―And I will be accountable before the nation of Afghanistan for preventing it (corruption) and for solving this problem.‖

446

HOW OSAMA BIN LADEN SLIPPED FROM OUR GRASP (DECEMBER 22, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, December 22nd, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

The Battle for Tora Bora How Osama bin Laden slipped from our grasp: the definitive account. SOURCE: The New Republic Tuesday, December 22, 2009 By PETER BERGEN

Four days before the in November 2001, Osama bin Laden was still in town. The Al Qaeda leader‘s movements before and after September 11 are difficult to trace precisely, but, just prior to the attacks, we know that he appeared in Kandahar and urged his followers to evacuate to safer locations in anticipation of U.S. retaliation. Then, on November 8, he was in Kabul, despite the fact that U.S. forces and their Afghan allies were closing in on the city. That morning, while eating a meal of meat and olives, he gave an interview to Hamid Mir, a Pakistani journalist who was writing his biography. He defended the attacks on New York and Washington, saying, ―America and its allies are massacring us in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, and Iraq. The Muslims have the right to attack America in reprisal.‖ Six months later, when I met Mir in Pakistan, he told me that the Al Qaeda leader had, on that day, appeared to be in remarkably good spirits.

Kabul fell on November 12, and bin Laden, along with other Al Qaeda leaders, fled to Jalalabad, a compact city in eastern Afghanistan surrounded by lush fruit groves. (He was quite familiar with the area, having maintained a compound in a Jalalabad suburb in the 1990s.) Tracking bin Laden closely was Gary Berntsen, a bear-sized CIA officer with a pronounced Long Island accent, who arrived in Kabul on the day it fell. Berntsen had been serving in Latin America on September 11 when he was yanked to run the CIA‘s fast-moving ground operations in Afghanistan. It was a perfect job for an operative with a distinctly independent and aggressive style.

By November 14, Berntsen was receiving a stream of intelligence reports from the Northern Alliance that the Al Qaeda leader was in Jalalabad, giving pep talks to an ever-growing caravan of fighters. Berntsen dispatched an eight-man CIA team to the city. To provide them with local guides, he made contact with Hazarat Ali–an Afghan commander, longtime opponent of the Taliban, and nose-picking semi-illiterate. Ali sent three teenaged fighters to escort the U.S. team into Jalalabad, which was now crawling with fleeing Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters.

But bin Laden wasn‘t in Jalalabad for long. Following the fall of Kabul, Jalalabad descended into chaos; no one was in charge for at least a week. Abdullah Tabarak, a Moroccan who is alleged to be one of bin Laden‘s bodyguards, reportedly told interrogators that, during the 447 month of Ramadan, which began on November 17, bin Laden and his top deputy, Egyptian surgeon Ayman Al Zawahiri, left Jalalabad and headed about 30 miles south. Their destination was Tora Bora, a series of mountain caves near the Pakistani border. Berntsen‘s team remained one step behind them, for now.

Tora Bora was not yet a familiar name to many Americans. But what would unfold there over the subsequent days remains, eight years later, the single most consequential battle of the war on terrorism. Presented with an opportunity to kill or capture Al Qaeda‘s top leadership just three months after September 11, the United States was instead outmaneuvered by bin Laden, who slipped into Pakistan, largely disappeared from U.S. radar, and slowly began rebuilding his organization.

What really happened at Tora Bora? Not long after the battle ended, the answer to that question would become extremely clouded. Americans perceived the Afghan war as a stunning victory, and the failure at Tora Bora seemed like an unfortunate footnote to an otherwise upbeat story. By 2004, with George W. Bush locked in a tough reelection battle, some U.S. officials were even asserting, inaccurately, that bin Laden himself may not have been present at the battle.

The real history of Tora Bora is far more disturbing. Having reconstructed the battle–based on interviews with the top American ground commander, three Afghan commanders, and three CIA officials; accounts by Al Qaeda eyewitnesses that were subsequently published on jihadist websites; recollections of captured survivors who were later questioned by interrogators or reporters; an official history of the Afghan war by the U.S. Special Operations Command; an investigation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and visits to the battle sites themselves–I am convinced that Tora Bora constitutes one of the greatest military blunders in recent U.S. history. It is worth revisiting now not just in the interest of historical accuracy, but also because the story contains valuable lessons as we renew our push against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

It was no accident that bin Laden had chosen to retreat to Tora Bora. He knew the place well. Huthaifa Azzam, a Jordanian who was close to bin Laden during the anti-Soviet jihad, when both were crossing back and forth between Pakistan and Afghanistan, recalls that, in 1987, the Al Qaeda leader used bulldozers from his family‘s construction company to build a road through the mountains. The aim was to allow for the movement of his Arab fighters from his base at Jaji, near the Pakistani border, to Jalalabad, then occupied by the Soviets. Bin Laden spent more than six months building the road.

That year, bin Laden engaged Soviet forces in a battle at Jaji. He joined about 50 other Arab fighters in managing to hold off a much larger group of Soviet soldiers. Jaji received considerable attention in the Arab world, and, for the first time, bin Laden was widely seen not as a mere financier of jihad but also as a successful military commander. After a week, bin Laden was forced to retreat from Jaji. But the battle was arguably a resounding victory for the future Al Qaeda leader, as he burnished his image–and lived to fight another day.

During the years leading up to September 11, bin Laden maintained a mountain retreat in a settlement near Tora Bora called Milawa–a three-hour drive up a narrow mud-and-stone road from Jalalabad. The buildings that made up the settlement were strung across ridges that, in winter, lay far above the snow line, commanding striking views of the expanses below. They

448 included a series of scattered lookout posts, a bakery, and bin Laden‘s two-bedroom house, all built of the baked mud and stone that typifies Afghan villages. Next to the house was a rudimentary swimming pool. Spread in front of it was a broad field–today scarred by massive bomb craters–where Al Qaeda members cultivated crops. From bin Laden‘s home, all he could see was his own fiefdom; the nearest village was thousands of feet below and out of sight.

In the winter of 1996, the Al Qaeda leader took Abdel Bari Atwan, a Palestinian journalist based in London, on a walking tour of a frigid Tora Bora. ―I really feel secure in the mountains,‖ he told Atwan. ―I really enjoy my life when I‘m here.‖ Bin Laden sat for photos with Atwan in the Tora Bora caves. He surely understood that the setting would have a certain resonance in the Muslim world, since it was in a mountain cave that the Prophet Muhammad first received the revelations of the Koran.

According to his son, Omar, bin Laden would routinely hike from Tora Bora into neighboring Pakistan on walks that could take anywhere between seven and 14 hours. ―My brothers and I all loathed these grueling treks that seemed the most pleasant of outings to our father,‖ Omar bin Laden later recalled. Bin Laden told his sons they had to memorize every rock on the routes to Pakistan. ―We never know when war will strike,‖ he instructed them. ―We must know our way out of the mountains.‖

Now bin Laden had chosen Tora Bora as the place for his climactic confrontation with the United States. Fouad Al Rabia–a Kuwait Airways engineer, then in his mid-forties, who was in Afghanistan on something of a religious vacation–was with Al Qaeda when the group retreated from Jalalabad to Tora Bora. ―Simply being out on the street was an invitation to be killed,‖ he later told officials at Guantánamo. ―We walked from there to the baseline edge of the mountains. … This was an escape route to get out of the country, because it is the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. That was the only way to get out.‖

At least five Guantánamo detainees have given eyewitness accounts of bin Laden‘s presence at Tora Bora. Typical of this group is Sulaiman Al Nahdi, a 27-year-old Yemeni who explained that he saw bin Laden ―in a valley that was downward of the mountains,‖ where he ―talked about the jihad for approximately one hour,‖ after which Ayman Al Zawahiri ―made a few comments.‖ Similarly, Khaled Qasim, a 24-year-old Yemeni, was in the mountains in November 2001 when he saw bin Laden. The Al Qaeda leader, Qasim recalled, ―was passing by and just said ‗hi‘ and went on his way.‖

Khalid Al Hubayshi, a Saudi explosives expert, was in the Tora Bora trenches as the Al Qaeda leader prepared for his showdown with the United States. Bin Laden, Hubayshi told The Washington Post, ―was convinced‖ that American soldiers would land in the mountains. ―We spent five weeks like that, manning our positions in case the Americans landed,‖ he recalled.

As bin Laden set about preparing for a U.S. maneuver that never came, Gary Berntsen‘s team remained on his trail. Several days after arriving in Jalalabad, the group moved into a schoolhouse in the foothills near Tora Bora, which they used as a base. Berntsen‘s sources on the ground continued to tell him that bin Laden was in the area.

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At the end of November, the team of eight decided to split into two groups of four, one of which would head farther into the mountains with ten Afghan fighters as guides. The team‘s members included an Air Force combat controller who specialized in calling in airstrikes, and they took with them a laser capable of ―painting‖ targets with a signal that U.S. bombers could then lock onto. The expedition was delayed when a poorly packed RPG carried on a mule blew up, killing two of the Afghan guides. Finally, the group reached a mountaintop from which it could see several hundred of bin Laden‘s men arrayed below. For the following 56 hours straight, the team called in airstrikes from all of the bombers available in theater.

Berntsen had not asked anyone for permission to begin the . About 24 hours after the airstrikes had begun, Berntsen‘s supervisor, Hank Crumpton, head of counterterrorism special operations at the CIA, called him and asked, ―Are you conducting a battle in Tora Bora?‖ Not quite knowing what his boss‘s reaction might be, Berntsen simply said, ―Yes.‖ Crumpton replied, ―Congratulations! Good job!‖

As the fighting got underway, bin Laden initially sought to project an easy confidence to his men. Abu Bakr, a Kuwaiti who was at Tora Bora, said that, early in the battle, he saw bin Laden at the checkpoint he was manning. The Al Qaeda leader sat with some of his foot soldiers for half an hour, drinking a cup of tea and telling them, ―Don‘t worry. Don‘t lose your morale, and fight strong. I‘m here. I‘m always asking about you guys.‖

But, despite Al Qaeda‘s arsenal of rockets, tanks, machine guns, and artillery, its position was becoming perilous. At altitudes of up to 14,000 feet above sea level, Tora Bora‘s thin air provides a tough environment at any time of year–and, in December, temperatures drop to well below zero at night. As the battle raged in the mountains, snow was falling steadily. What‘s more, it was Ramadan, and the ultra-religious members of Al Qaeda were likely observing the fast from dawn to dusk. Meanwhile, U.S. bombs rained down on the snow- covered peaks unceasingly, preventing sleep. Between December 4 and 7 alone, U.S. bombers dropped 700,000 pounds of ordnance on the mountains.

Ayman Saeed Abdullah Batarfi, a Yemeni doctor who was treating the Al Qaeda wounded, believed that the situation was growing untenable. ―I was out of medicine and I had a lot of casualties,‖ Batarfi later told the Associated Press. ―I did a hand amputation by a knife, and I did a finger amputation with scissors.‖ Batarfi said he personally told bin Laden that, if they did not leave Tora Bora soon, ―no one would stay alive‖ under the U.S. bombardment. But the Al Qaeda leader seemed mainly preoccupied with his own escape. ―He did not prepare himself for Tora Bora,‖ Batarfi said, ―and, to be frank, he didn‘t care about anyone but himself.‖

Bin Laden recounted his experiences at Tora Bora on an audiotape that aired on Al Jazeera in 2003. He recalled that, on the morning of December 3, heavy U.S. bombing began around the clock, with B-52s dropping some 20 to 30 bombs each. ―American forces were bombing us by smart bombs that weigh thousands of pounds and bombs that penetrate caves,‖ bin Laden said.

On December 9, a U.S. plane dropped an immense BLU-82 bomb on Al Qaeda‘s positions. Known as a Daisy Cutter, the 15,000-pound bomb was used in the Gulf war to clear minefields. Berntsen remembers that the Daisy Cutter was followed by a wave of additional U.S. airstrikes. ―We came right in behind it with B-52s,‖ he says. ―Like three or four of them. … Each of them has twenty-five five-hundred-pounders, so everything goes in there. Killed a

450 lot of people. A lot of bad guys.‖ That night, Al Qaeda member Abu Jaafar Al Kuwaiti and others ―were awakened to the sound of massive and terrorizing explosions very near to us.‖ The following day, he later recounted on an Al Qaeda website, he ―received the horrifying news‖ that the ―trench of Sheik Osama had been destroyed.‖

But bin Laden was not dead. A subsequent account on an Al Qaeda website offered an explanation of how he saved himself: Bin Laden had dreamed about a scorpion descending into one of the trenches that his men had dug, so he evacuated his trench. A day or so later, it was destroyed by a bomb.

The United States appeared to have Al Qaeda on the ropes. But, on the U.S. side, all was not well. A dispute was raging among officials about how to conduct the battle. By late November, Crumpton–a soft-spoken Georgian widely regarded as one of the most effective CIA officers of his generation–feared that bin Laden might try to escape Tora Bora. He explained this to Bush and Cheney personally at the White House and presented satellite imagery showing that the Pakistani military did not have its side of the border covered. CIA Director George Tenet remembers Bush asking Crumpton if the Pakistanis had enough troops to seal the border. ―No, sir,‖ the CIA veteran replied. ―No one has enough troops to prevent any possibility of escape in a region like that.‖ Still, Crumpton thought the United States should try–and that meant more troops would be required.

Back in Kabul, Berntsen was thinking along the same lines. On the evening of December 3, one member of his team, a former Delta Force operator who had gone deep into Tora Bora, came to the Afghan capital to brief Berntsen about the lay of the land. He told Berntsen that taking out Al Qaeda‘s hard core would require 800 Rangers, elite soldiers who had gone through the Army‘s most rigorous physical training. That night, Berntsen sent a lengthy message to CIA headquarters asking for 800 Rangers to assault the complex of caves where bin Laden and his lieutenants were believed to be hiding, and to block their escape routes. Crumpton says, ―I remember the message. I remember talking not only to Gary every day, but to some of his men who were at Tora Bora. Directly. And their request could not have been more direct, more clear, more certain: that we needed U.S. troops there. More men on the ground.‖

That bin Laden was at Tora Bora was not, by this point, a secret. The New York Times had reported it on November 25. Four days later, when asked by ABC News whether the Al Qaeda leader was at Tora Bora, Dick Cheney said, ―I think he‘s probably in that general area.‖

Meanwhile, the additional forces that Crumpton and Berntsen were requesting were certainly available. There were around 2,000 U.S. troops in or near the Afghan theater at the time. At the U.S. airbase known as K2 in Uzbekistan were stationed some 1,000 soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division, whose specialty is fighting in harsh terrain. Hundreds of those soldiers had already deployed to Bagram Air Force Base, 40 miles north of Kabul. In addition, 1,200 Marines were stationed at Forward Operating Base Rhino, near Kandahar, from the last week of November onward. Brigadier General James Mattis, the commander of the Marines in the Afghan theater, reportedly asked to send his men into Tora Bora, but his request was turned down. In the end, there were more journalists–about 100, according to Nic Robertson of CNN and Susan Glasser of The Washington Post, who both covered the battle–in and around Tora Bora than there were Western soldiers.

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Yet, when Crumpton called General Tommy Franks to ask for more troops, Franks pushed back. The general, who had overall control of the Tora Bora operation, pointed out that the light-footprint approach–U.S. reliance on local proxies–had already succeeded in overthrowing the Taliban, and he argued that it would take time to get more U.S. troops to Tora Bora.

The U.S. force was to remain tiny throughout the battle. On December 7, on-the-ground responsibility for Tora Bora passed from Berntsen to a 37-year-old major in the elite and secretive Delta Force, who would later write a memoir using the pen name Dalton Fury. Under Fury‘s command during the battle were 40 Delta operators from the ―black‖ Special Forces, 14 Green Berets from the less secretive ―white‖ Special Forces, six CIA operatives, a few Air Force specialists, including signals operators, and a dozen British commandos from the elite Special Boat Service. They were joined by three main Afghan commanders: Hajji Zaman Gamsharik, who had been living in exile in the comfortable environs of Dijon, France, before he returned to Afghanistan as the Taliban fell; Hajji Zahir, the 27-year-old son of a Jalalabad warlord; and Ali, the commander who had been helping Berntsen. The Afghan commanders disliked each other more than they did Al Qaeda. ―For the most important mission to date in the global war on terror,‖ Fury later wrote, ―our nation was relying on a fractious bunch of AK-47-toting lawless bandits and tribal thugs who were not bound by any recognized rules of warfare.‖

Why was the Pentagon so unwilling to send more troops? Recently, I asked Franks to comment on his decision. He reiterated his preference for a light footprint and his concern about the time it would take to put additional troops on the ground. He also said that he could not be sure that bin Laden was at Tora Bora because of ―conflicting intelligence‖ that alternately placed him in Kashmir, around Kandahar, and near the Afghan-Iranian border.

Lt. General Michael DeLong, Franks‘s top deputy, recalled in his 2004 memoir that the Pentagon did not want to put many American soldiers on the ground because of a concern that they would be treated like antibodies by the locals. ―The mountains of Tora Bora are situated deep in territory controlled by tribes hostile to the United States and any outsiders,‖ he wrote. ―The reality is if we put our troops in there we would inevitably end up fighting Afghan villagers–creating bad will at a sensitive time–which was the last thing we wanted to do.‖

There may also have been a reluctance to send soldiers into harm‘s way. The Pentagon‘s risk aversion is now hard to recall following the years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq and the thousands of American soldiers who have died–but it was quite real. In the most recent U.S. war–the 1999 conflict in Kosovo–not a single American had been killed in combat. And, at that point in the Afghan war, more journalists had died than American soldiers. Fury says that the 14 Green Berets who were on the ground at Tora Bora from the ―white‖ Special Forces were told to ―stay well short of even the foothills,‖ some four kilometers from any action– ‖pretty much out of harm‘s way.‖ The Green Berets did call in airstrikes but were not allowed to engage in firefights with Al Qaeda because of concerns that the battle would turn into a ―meat grinder.‖

Then there was Iraq. In late November, Donald Rumsfeld told Franks that Bush ―wants us to look for options in Iraq.‖ Rumsfeld instructed the general to ―dust off‖ the Pentagon‘s blueprint for an Iraq invasion and brief him in a week‘s time. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Richard Myers would later write, ―I realized that one week was not giving Tom and his staff much time to sharpen‖ the plan. Franks points out in his autobiography that his staff was

452 already working seven days a week, 16-plus hours a day, as the Tora Bora battle was reaching its climax. Although Franks doesn‘t say so, it is impossible not to wonder if the labor- intensive planning ordered by his boss for another major war was a distraction from the one he was already fighting.

Franks briefed Rumsfeld and other top Pentagon officials about the war plan for Iraq on December 4. But both men agreed that the plan needed work. Rumsfeld gave Franks and his staff eight days to revise it. ―Well, General,‖ he told Franks, ―you have a lot of work ahead of you. Today is Tuesday. Let‘s get together again next Wednesday.‖

On December 10, American signals-intelligence operators picked up an important intercept from Tora Bora: ―Father [bin Laden] is trying to break through the siege line.‖ This was then communicated to the Delta operators on the ground. Around 4 p.m. that same day, Afghan soldiers said they had bin Laden in their sights, according to the official U.S. military history of the battle. Later that evening, Fury received a new piece of signals intelligence on bin Laden‘s whereabouts. The information was so precise that it appeared to pinpoint the Al Qaeda leader‘s location to within ten meters. At the time, Fury was in the schoolhouse that he had been using as a base. About 15 minutes later, he received another bit of intelligence– somewhat less precise–placing bin Laden two kilometers from the first location. To this day, Fury doesn‘t know which information was more recent and therefore more accurate, but he drove into the foothills and got to within about 1,900 meters of the first location.

Fury now found himself in a quandary. This was almost certainly the closest to bin Laden‘s position U.S. forces had ever been, but, at the same time, three of his men were pinned down in a ferocious firefight with some Al Qaeda foot soldiers. And, as dusk fell, Fury‘s key Afghan ally, Hazarat Ali, had retreated from the battlefield back home to break his Ramadan fast. Fury was under explicit orders not to take the lead in the battle and only to act in a supporting role for the hundreds of Afghans in Hazarat Ali‘s ragtag army. Now, he had no Afghan allies to guide him at night into the craggy moonscape of upper Tora Bora. Fury reluctantly made the decision to bail on that night‘s mission.

Muhammad Musa, who commanded 600 Afghan soldiers at Tora Bora, later said that he was not impressed by the U.S. forces on the ground. ―[They] were not involved in the fighting,‖ he said. ―There were six American soldiers with us, U.S. Special Forces. They coordinated the air strikes. … My personal view is, if they had blocked the way out to Pakistan, Al Qaeda would not have had a way to escape. The Americans were my guests here, but they didn‘t know about fighting.‖

In fact, the five dozen or so Americans on the ground at Tora Bora fought well. There were just far too few of them to cordon off a huge, mountainous area and prevent Al Qaeda from escaping into Pakistan.

December 12 and 13 were eventful days. December 12 was when Franks briefed Rumsfeld on the revised war plans for Iraq. December 13 was the day that Pakistani militants attacked the Indian parliament, raising the possibility of war between two nuclear-armed states. India moved hundreds of thousands of soldiers to its border with Pakistan. ―We had to respond,‖ Pakistani Minister of the Interior Moinuddin Haider told me. ―All our armed forces went to combat that situation, and we also moved to the borders.‖ Suddenly, Pakistan‘s attention was diverted away from sealing its northwestern border against an Al Qaeda escape.

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As it turned out, December 12 and 13 also marked the defining moment in the battle of Tora Bora. Hajji Zaman, one of the Afghan warlords allied with the United States, had opened negotiations with members of Al Qaeda for a surrender agreement. ―They talked on the radio with Hajji Zaman,‖ an Afghan frontline commander told me, ―saying they were ready to surrender at four p.m. Commander Zaman told the other commanders and the Americans about this. Then Al Qaeda said, ‗We need to have a meeting with our guys. Will you wait until eight a.m. tomorrow?‘ So we agreed to this.‖

News of the cease-fire did not sit well with the group of 20 Delta operators who, by December 12, had made their way deeper into Tora Bora, to an area near bin Laden‘s now- destroyed two-room house. In Kabul, Berntsen went ballistic when he heard about the proposed surrender. ―Essentially I used the f-word. … I was screaming at them on the phone. And telling them, ‗No cease-fire. No negotiation. We continue airstrikes.‘‖

As Fury remembers it, U.S. forces only observed the cease-fire for about two hours on December 12–resuming bombing around 5 p.m. that day. At some point during the episode, an American pilot protested the proposed surrender by drawing a giant ―8″ in the sky, followed by the word ―ON.‖ Zaman‘s deadline of 8 a.m. came and went on December 13 without any of the militants inside Tora Bora surrendering.

That afternoon, American signals operators picked up bin Laden speaking to his followers. Fury kept a careful log of these communications in his notebook, which he would type up at the end of every day and pass up his chain of command. ―The time is now,‖ bin Laden said. ―Arm your women and children against the infidel!‖ Following several hours of high-intensity bombing, the Al Qaeda leader spoke again. Fury paraphrases: ―Our prayers have not been answered. Times are dire. We didn‘t receive support from the apostate nations who call themselves our Muslim brothers.‖ Bin Laden apologized to his men for having involved them in the fight and gave them permission to surrender.

Khalid Al Hubayshi, one of the Saudis holed up in Tora Bora, says that bin Laden‘s aides instructed the hundreds of mostly Arab fighters who remained alive in the mountainous complex to head to Pakistan and turn themselves in to their embassies. Al Hubayshi is still angry about the behavior of the Al Qaeda leader: ―We had been ready to lay down our lives for him, and he couldn‘t make the effort to speak to us personally,‖ he told journalist Robert Lacey.

The following day, on December 14, bin Laden‘s voice was again picked up by American signals operators, but, according to the interpreter who was translating for the Delta team, it sounded more like a pre-recorded sermon than a live transmission. It appeared that bin Laden had already left the battlefield area. He had likely used the cover of Al Qaeda‘s ―surrender‖ to begin his retreat.

Abdullah Tabarak, the Moroccan who was allegedly one of bin Laden‘s bodyguards, says that the top leaders of Al Qaeda separated as they made their escape to Pakistan. Ayman Al Zawahiri left the mountainous redoubt with Uthman, one of bin Laden‘s eleven sons. Osama fled with another of his sons, 18-year-old Muhammad, accompanied by his guards. Tabarak continued to use bin Laden‘s satellite phone as the Al Qaeda leader escaped, on the reasonable assumption that it was being monitored by U.S. intelligence.

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By December 17, the battle of Tora Bora was over. Fury estimated that there were some 220 dead militants and 52 captured fighters–mostly Arabs, as well as a dozen Afghans, and a sprinkling of Chechens and Pakistanis. Around 20 of the captured prisoners were paraded for the cameras of the international press. They were a bedraggled, scrawny lot who did not look much like the fearsome warriors everyone assumed them to be.

Ten days later, a videotape surfaced of bin Laden. He appeared to be visibly aged and contemplating his own death. ―I am just a poor slave of God,‖ he said. ―If I live or die, the war will continue.‖ During the 34-minute video, he did not move his entire left side.

Tora Bora would return, briefly, to the forefront of American politics in 2004. With just over a month to go before election day, John Kerry attacked President Bush for failing to capture bin Laden at Tora Bora. Franks, who had by this point retired from the military (and who would go on to join the boards of Bank of America and Chuck E. Cheese‘s), retorted several weeks later with a New York Times op-ed, writing, ―We don‘t know to this day whether Mr. bin Laden was at Tora Bora.‖ Cheney weighed in the same day, calling Kerry‘s criticisms ―absolute garbage.‖ On October 27, Bush said Kerry‘s remarks about the battle were part of a ―pattern of saying anything it takes to get elected.‖

Kerry remains furious about Tora Bora today. ―They declared Osama bin Laden the world‘s number-one criminal, and went out boldly proclaiming, ‗Wanted: Dead or Alive‘ and talking about the dangers of Al Qaeda,‖ he told me recently. ―And when they had an opportunity to completely, not only decapitate it, but probably to leave it with the minuscule, last portion of its tail, they never showed up.‖ His anger is justified. Bin Laden was clearly at Tora Bora, and sending so few troops was indeed a major failure. It‘s a lesson that bears remembering today as the United States continues to pursue Islamist militants in both Afghanistan and Pakistan: In the hunt for members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, there is simply no substitute for boots on the ground. Afghan proxies, Pakistani soldiers, drones–these are not unimportant tools in the war on terrorism. But they are not effective substitutes for U.S. troops. If we want to kill bin Laden and Zawahiri–and other top Al Qaeda leaders–we are probably going to have to do it ourselves.

The major participants in the battle of Tora Bora have long since moved on with their lives– Fury and Berntsen both retired and wrote books; Crumpton left the CIA and became the Bush State Department‘s coordinator for counterterrorism–yet the sense that something went very wrong in late 2001 has not left them. Fury is haunted by the moment on December 10 when bin Laden may have been less than 2,000 meters away. In his memoir, he wrote that the incident ―still bothers me. In some ways, I can‘t suppress the feeling of somehow letting down our nation at a critical time.‖ Earlier this month, he elaborated: ―It‘s a tough stigma to live with and one I wouldn‘t wish on anyone.‖

As for bin Laden: If his 1987 escape at Jaji created his mythic persona, then his 2001 escape from Tora Bora helped to cement it. While he no longer presides over Al Qaeda as directly as he once did, there can be little doubt that he remains its general guide–and that he played a key role in rejuvenating the organization after 2001. Still, in 2005, the CIA shuttered Alec Station, the unit that had been tasked with hunting bin Laden and Al Qaeda‘s other top leaders for the previous decade. The analysts and officers were reassigned to other missions. Today, most informed observers believe bin Laden is in or near Pakistan‘s North West Frontier Province on the Afghan border, perhaps in Bajaur or Chitral. But the fact is, as a longtime

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American intelligence analyst puts it, ―there is very limited collection on him personally.‖ That‘s spook-speak for a blunt truth: We haven‘t a clue where he is.

The Al Qaeda leader, who is now nearing his fifty-third birthday, has released several audio recordings in recent years, but the last time he was seen on video was in September 2007. In the course of a long statement that touched on everything from the Kennedy assassination to taxes, he taunted the United States for ―being the greatest economic power and possessing the most powerful and up-to-date military arsenal,‖ yet failing to stop the September 11 attacks. His once-graying beard had been dyed jet black. He looked healthy and rested and confident, like a man who had been granted a new lease on life and was planning to make the most of it.

Peter Bergen is a senior fellow at the New America Foundation and the author of The Osama bin Laden I Know.

MORE FROM THIS AUTHOR:

How the Taliban and Al Qaeda Are Merging–And Why We Should Be Very Worried

The Drone War: Are Predators our best weapon or worst enemy?

A Man, A Plan, Afghanistan: If Obama really wants to smite Al Qaeda, this is what he should do.

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A SHORT-TERM APPROACH TO AFGHANISTAN (DECEMBER 22, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, December 22nd, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

A short-term approach to Afghanistan SOURCE: The Washington Post Tuesday, December 22, 2009 By WALTER PINCUS

To supply troops in landlocked Afghanistan, the United States is relying on short-term relationships with dictatorial nations in Central Asia without factoring any long-term strategy for the region, according to testimony delivered last week to senators.

―The Department of Defense‘s primary goal in Central Asia is to support the war in Afghanistan,‖ David S. Sedney, a deputy assistant secretary of defense, told the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian affairs. ―Secondly, we continue to, as we have for years, assist the sovereign countries of Central Asia in maintaining their own security in ways they find acceptable.‖

Containers bearing supplies for troops in Afghanistan get there via what is called the Northern Distribution Network — through countries such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and, at times, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. They travel over Chinese-built roads, on Russian-built rails, through an Iranian-built tunnel and over U.S.-built bridges along the way, according to Sedney.

Stephen J. Blank of the Army War College‘s Strategic Studies Institute told the subcommittee that the nations along the route ―are authoritarian states in which we see manifestations of despotism, clan/familial rule, nepotism, [and] suffocation of autonomous space for political action.‖ The countries‘ leaders also think their political opposition is ―inherently extremist, terrorist and fundamentalist, which leads to the self-fulfilling prophecy‖ that their opponents tend ―to crystallize around an Islamic radical vocabulary,‖ Blank said.

―There is a [U.S.] strategy for the Northern Distribution Network,‖ Blank said, ―but there is no strategy [for Central Asia] that ties together . . . Afghanistan [and] domestic issues, and no commensurate investment of U.S. resources, either private or public, in these states to the degree that it is growing.‖

Begun a year ago, the military supply effort is amazing. In June, 108 of those 20-foot cargo containers traveled on ships, railroad cars and trucks through the Northern Network. By July that number reached 134; in August and September it was up to 200 and in November it was 350 a week, according to Sedney.

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Unlike the truck routes into Afghanistan through Pakistan, there have been no security incidents on the northern route. ―The danger begins once you get into Afghanistan,‖ Sedney said.

Agreements with other countries are key to the network. Russia‘s standing transit arrangement with NATO for carrying nonlethal equipment added new language this summer when President Obama was in Moscow. He and President Dmitry Medvedev agreed on the unrestricted transit of lethal and nonlethal cargo, including through the air. So far two, flights have been conducted and ―we continue to work with Russia and Kazakhstan to try and make that a route that we‘re able to use on a regular basis,‖ Sedney said.

The United States has a broad range of military programs that include Kazakhstan. There are military sales involving helicopters, and training programs, including one involving a battalion of peacekeeping forces. With Uzbekistan, military ties have been limited after U.S. criticism of a 2005 massacre of Uzbek political protesters. New military training missions are being discussed.

Kyrgyzstan, with additional funds from Washington, has renewed U.S. use of a key airbase. In addition, the United States has increased cooperation in training border and internal troops ―in terms of assisting in the struggle against terrorism,‖ Sedney said. With Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, Washington has offered military education and border assistance.

―The governments of all these countries are concerned with radical extremism, both in terms of their own countries‘ internal situation and also they‘re concerned about Afghanistan,‖ Sedney testified. The Fergana Valley, which is shared by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, is the center of extremist Islamic activity, he added.

Religion is a sensitive issue for all these countries, George A. Krol, deputy assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs, told the panel.

―They were basically forced under the Soviet system to be communistic and atheist, too,‖ Krol said. Islamic religious beliefs were suppressed, ―and since they‘ve become independent and the Soviet Union has disappeared, there is somewhat of a resurgence‖ of the Muslim faith. The governments‘ leaders are concerned ―that there may be certain groups that may try to use this for extremist purposes in their own countries.‖ It is ―an element of our bilateral discussions with them, and it is a very important one,‖ Krol said.

Beyond Afghanistan, how deeply the United States gets involved in these countries remains to be seen.

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JIHADI CULTURE ON THE RISE IN PAKISTAN (DECEMBER 24, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, December 24th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Jihadi culture on the rise in Pakistan SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Thursday, December 24, 2009 (ANI)

London: Despite ‗war on terrorism‘ and Pakistan‘s war against Taliban and massive propaganda against Muslim militants ‗Jihadi culture‘ is on rise not only in FATA but in various parts of Pakistan, including Punjab.

Renowned Pakistani writer and defence analyst, Dr Ayesha Siddiqa writes: ―Madrassas nurturing armies of young Islamic militants ready to embrace martyrdom have been on the rise for years in the Punjab. In fact, South Punjab has become the hub of jihadism. Yet, somehow, there are still many people in Pakistan who refuse to acknowledge this threat.‖

Religious groups promoting jihad have very organised system of recruiting and training young people to advance the cause of Islam. Poverty stricken areas with economic deprivation are fertile ground to spread extremist views. Young children are recruited from madrassas and are looked after so well that their own living style looks much inferior.

They undergo ideological indoctrination where they are told that jihad is must in life of a true Muslim. And, this jihad must continue till the end of their lives or until all infidels have become Muslims. They are told that a martyred person (Shaheed) will be blessed with a place in heaven where they will get 70 hoors (extremely beautiful virgin girls); and one shaheed will be allowed to get forgiveness for 70 additional people.

This temptation is too much for poor and impoverished young boys to reject.

They not only want to enjoy better status in this life - power of gun, prestige and economic stability; but also dream of heaven, hoors and bounties of heaven look so real that they abandon their existing life for a better future.

The poor and the underprivileged generally become an easy target of militant outfits, which offer money, power and better future; and country‘s deteriorating economic situation would surely attract more people to militant fold. It is also possible that they will help to recruit their friends and relatives as they also want them to embrace martyrdom that they can live in heaven together.

The jihadi culture nourished during General Zia-ul-Haq‘s rule. It had three clear objectives: A proxy war of America against Soviet Russia in name of Jihad, a proxy war of Saudi Arabia against Shia Community and Iran and to extend his military rule. Talented secret agency of

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Pakistan, ISI under watchful eyes of CIA created many jihadi outfits. Later on this jihad was also ‗exported‘ to Kashmir and other countries as well. These Jihadi outfits get official patronage as long as they work within the parameters set up by the establishment.

The Jihadi outfits which are still actively recruiting and training people are: Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT).

According to Dr Ayesha Siddiqa between 5000 and 9000 from South Punjab are actively engaged in fighting in Aghanistan and Waziristan. However, according to a renowned Pakistani researcher, Hassan Abbas, around 2,000 militants are fighting in Waziristan.

The recent attacks in various parts of Pakistan could not have been carried out without careful planning and logistical support of Punjabi Talibans. The government and policy makers deny this fact because they don‘t want to draw attention of the US and other Western powers to gravity of situation in South Punjab. Apart from that they don‘t want to eliminate them altogether, as this home grown crop could be used against India at an appropriate time.

Another difficulty in crushing them is that these militants and outfits are closely associated with Pirs, religious institutions, landlords and drug mafia and the authorities do not find it easy to eradicate them. Also using army or rangers in East Pakistan, FATA, Balochistan even in Sind is one thing but it is totally different cattle of fish to use it in any part of Punjab.

Madrassas and seminaries flourished in all parts of Pakistan in 1980s and 1990s. They have also shown impressive growth in South Punjab as well.

According to one report prepared in 1996 there were 883 madrassas in Bahawalpur, 361 in Dera Ghazi Khan, 325 in Multan and 149 in Sargodha district. The madrassas in Bahawalpur outnumbered all other cities, including Lahore. These madrassas belong to Deobandi sect of Islam and do not include the Ahl-e-Hadith, Barelvi and other branches of Islam.

According to estimate of Intelligence Bureau of Pakistan, there were approximately 1,383 madrassas in the Bahawalpur Division which had 84,000 students in 2008. Bahawalpur alone has more than 36,000 students. It is estimated that there are more than one million students in various madrassas in Pakistan. It is difficult to tell how many of them will pick up gun to advance cause of these militant groups, and how many of them will become suicide bombers in search of heaven and hoors.

Question is if these students who graduate from Madrassas don‘t resort to violence then what future do they have? At best they will become imams of some mosques or open more madrassas in some remote areas of the country. The existence of madrassas is very important for the teaching of Islam but these madrassa should also teach other subjects that people graduating from there could find alternative jobs in the society and play their due role in the progress of society.

Historian Tahir Kamran conducted a survey in which he says there were 1320 madrassas in Punjab in 1988 and this rose to 3153 by 2000. This dramatic increase is about 140%; and worries all those who are concerned about the rise of religious extremism in Pakistan. These madrassas were expected to train and supply militants for the war theatre in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

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Before 9/11 there were more than 15000 militants from the Bahawalpur division alone.

The government instead of facing the challenge find it more convenient to deny the existence of these extremist groups or rise of these madrassas; and just call it propaganda of anti Pakistan forces. This is more so when matter is related to Punjb; and especially Maulana Masood Azhar who is perceived to be so influential that authorities feel unable to arrest him or detain him in real sense.

One such claim made by the authorities was that Maulana Masood Azhar was on the run and he never visited his home town in the last three years. Truth was that on 29 April 2008, Maulana Masood Azhar had a massive book launch of his new book - Fatah-ul-Jawad- Quranic Verses on Jihad, in Bahawalpur. What is more intriguing is that, JeM‘s armed volunteers were in full control of the relevant parts of the city, even they controlled all entrance and exit routes of the city that day. The police or any other personnel related to the government were not visible that day.

Dr Ayesha Siddiqa further writes: ‗The LeT‘s presence in South Punjab is far more obvious than others courtesy of the wall chalkings and social work by its sister outfit, the Jamaat-ud- Dawa. Despite the rumours of friction between the LeT and the JuD leadership, the two segments operate in unison in South Punjab. Three of the favourite areas of recruitment in South Punjab for all outfits are Cholistan in Bahawalpur, the Rekh in Dera Ghazi Khan, and the Kacha area in Rajanpur‘.

This militancy, one way or the other, is supported by middle class Pakistanis and some government departments. Rich Pakistanis pay Zakat - Alms to help poor and needy. They also support religious institutions, as they provide religious teaching, shelter and food to poor. Also huge amount of funds are diverted from the Middle East and Gulf States in support of these institutions.

Furthermore the government collects huge amount of money by directly deducting Zakat from accounts of people and help these institutions by providing Zakat money to them. Apart from that, government apparatus, especially secret agencies share certain information with them; and at times provide training and weapons to them.

It is religious duty of all Muslims to give Zakat and Sadqa; and help the poor and needy. It is also our duty to help and support religious institutions and help them to spread message of Islam. My request to all donors is that they should urge the management committees of madrassas that they should teach students other subjects apart from the religious teaching.

By Dr Shabir Choudhry

(The writer is a spokesman of the Kashmir National Party, political analyst and author of many books and booklets. Also he is Director Institute of Kashmir Affairs. Email:[email protected]. To view other articles see my blog: www.drshabirchoudhry. blogspot.com )

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MILITANTS IN PAKISTAN STRIKE SHIITES AGAIN, PROMPTING FEARS OF SECTARIAN VIOLENCE (DECEMBER 28, 2009)

Written by admin on Monday, December 28th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Militants in Pakistan Strike Shiites Again, Prompting Fears of Sectarian Violence SOURCE: The New York Times Monday, December 28, 2009 By RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr. and SALMAN MASOOD

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan - A suicide bomber killed more than 30 people at a Shiite religious procession in Karachi on Monday, setting off rioting in parts of the city and prompting fears that extremist groups already waging a multifront war against the government were now trying to foment sectarian violence against the country‘s minority Shiite Muslims.

The attack, the third against Shiites in three days, appeared to deeply unsettle the Pakistani government, which ordered the director general of the Rangers, a paramilitary force under the control of the Interior Ministry, to take control of Karachi.

The interior minister, Rehman Malik, also asked Shiite clerics to postpone religious processions scheduled for the next two days, especially in Karachi, Pakistan‘s largest city, to avoid ―providing soft targets to militants,‖ according to the state-run news agency. Government leaders urged people not to take the law into their own hands.

Pakistan‘s president, Asif Ali Zardari, warned that ―a deliberate attempt seems to be afoot by the extremists to turn the fight against militants into a sectarian clash and make the people fight against one another.‖

Police officials said that Sunni extremists, possibly with links to the Taliban, had been behind the attack. Sunni extremists believe Shiites are apostates and have in the past attacked the group, which makes up 20 percent of Pakistan‘s population.

Two people were arrested in connection with the bombings, though no group claimed responsibility.

The bombing defied Pakistani security, which had deployed more forces in anticipation of an attack against Shiites during their annual observance of Ashura, which commemorates the death of the revered Shiite martyr Imam Hussein.

Karachi, Pakistan‘s commercial hub and main port of entry for goods shipped through the country to the United States military in Afghanistan, had largely been spared the violence that

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In retaliation for that offensive, Taliban commanders have overseen a wave of attacks against large and interior cities, including the northwestern frontier hub of Peshawar, the military garrison city of Rawalpindi, and the Punjabi heartland.

Monday‘s blast, which occurred just after 4 p.m., sent a huge plume of smoke over the Shiite procession as it wound down one of the main thoroughfares of the city. A security camera caught the explosion, which left people shrieking and running for cover.

Dr. Sagheer Ahmed, the health minister of Sindh Province, where Karachi is located, said 63 people had been wounded, some critically.

The crowd quickly turned its anger on nearby police officers, apparently blaming them for not doing enough to protect them. Dozens of shops and cars were set ablaze as evening descended. Riots also broke out in Hyderabad, the second-largest city in Sindh.

On Monday evening, the police released a picture of what they said they believed was the severed head of the bomber, who appeared to be in his late teens. But later on the authorities asked that the picture not be publicized, suggesting that they had doubts that the remains belonged to the bomber. But they did not retract their belief that the culprit was a suicide attacker, noting that a hidden bomb would have left a large crater.

Security analysts said the attack would appeal to a wide range of militants by further destabilizing Pakistan‘s weak government. ―The Taliban and the jihadi elements are very much opposed to Shiites, and this suits their double purpose of destabilizing the state while creating despondency amongst the people, and especially the Shiite,‖ said Talat Masood, a retired Pakistani general and military analyst.

He said it was likely that a militant Sunni group with a history of sectarian attacks was behind the blast. Mr. Masood pointed to Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a militant group with links to Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban.

Monday‘s blast came after two other attacks on Shiites over the weekend. On Saturday, a small hidden bomb wounded more than a dozen people in Karachi. On Sunday, a suicide bomber in Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistani-controlled Kashmir in the north, killed at least 10 people and wounded more than 80 during a Shiite procession. The bomber had tried to enter a prayer hall, but blew himself up when guards blocked him.

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AFGHAN DELEGATION INVESTIGATING CIVILIAN DEATHS (DECEMBER 29, 2009)

Written by admin on Tuesday, December 29th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Afghan delegation investigating civilian deaths SOURCE: The China Post Tuesday, December 29, 2009 By AMIR SHAH, AP

KABUL - Afghan President Hamid Karzai sent a government delegation Tuesday to investigate reports that 10 civilians, including eight students, were killed in fighting involving international troops in a tense area of eastern Afghanistan.

Karzai condemned the deaths that reportedly occurred Sunday in a village in the Narang district of Kunar province. If true, the incident would represent the most serious accidental killings of Afghan civilians by Western forces in six months.

Civilian deaths are one of the most sensitive issues for foreign troops in Afghanistan. Although far more civilians are killed by the Taliban, those triggered by foreign troops spark wide resentment and undermine international forces‘ attempts to weaken the Taliban.

NATO said Tuesday it was working with its Afghan partners ―and looking into the allegations of civilian casualties.‖ However, it said it had no operations in the Narang district of Kunar province ―at the time of the alleged incident.‖

Gen. Zaman Mamozai, local border police commander, insisted Tuesday that those killed Sunday were insurgents.

He told The Associated Press by telephone that he received photos from the forces involved in the fighting that show the young victims were armed insurgents planning attacks against international troops. Mamozai said coalition forces found homemade explosives in the house where the incident happened.

―I don‘t see civilians in the photos,‖ he said. ―The coalition said our target was insurgents who were planning to sabotage the security of the area. This operation looks like a successful operation. It seems like the men, ages between 25 and 30, were meeting in a room when they were struck.‖

The general, however, conceded that Afghan civilians often get killed unintentionally in such operations.

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―Sometimes those kind of incidents happen as civilians jump on the roofs and watch the attacks,‖ he said. ―But, it is very difficult for foreign soldiers to know who they are. The same story had happened in the past.‖

However, Mohammed Hussain, head of administration of the Chawkay district in the Kunar province, said he was in the village when the fighting took place, and all the victims were civilians. He said seven of the killed were relatives.

Hussain said coalition forces first surrounded the village in the early morning hours on Sunday before they attacked the house in which ―only innocent civilians lived.‖

―It is clear there was no insurgency and that they were students who were not carrying weapons,‖ he told the AP. ―They were in three rooms. One of the victims was a 17-year-old who was killed together with his three brothers in one of the rooms.‖

In other violence in eastern Afghanistan, the spokesman for the police chief in Khost province said Tuesday that five people died in an explosion inside a house where militants were making homemade explosives. Amir Hussain said the blast occurred Monday night near Khost city.

Also, six militants were killed and eight wounded in a clash Monday night with Afghan forces in Old Baghlan town in northern Afghanistan, the local commander, Gen. Murad Ali Khan, said. Two Afghan National Army soldiers and a member of the Afghan National Police also were killed in the fighting.

―After a two-hour battle, the Afghan forces inflicted heavy casualties to the enemy who escaped from the area, leaving behind their dead and weapons,‖ he said.

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TALIBAN COURTS MORE POPULAR (DECEMBER 30, 2009)

Written by admin on Wednesday, December 30th, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Taliban courts more popular than ‘corrupt’ Karzai government in Afghanistan SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Wednesday, December 30, 2009 (ANI)

Kabul, Dec. 30 : More and more Afghans are turning to Taliban courts to get speedy justice, as the corrupt and incompetent government of President Hamid Karzai has proved to be futile to resolve disputes - particularly at local level.

When Habiba‘s elderly husband was badly beaten in a village brawl there was only one place that she could turn to for help and justice.

Barefoot and weeping, the farmer‘s wife, 50, trekked for four hours through Afghanistan‘s Hindu Kush mountains to meet the local Taleban commander.

―We are poor people. We know the Government doesn‘t help people like us. My husband had a broken leg so he sent me to find Mullah Zafar. We don‘t know anyone in the Government and we know they won‘t solve our problems,‖ The Times quoted Habiba, as saying.

Mullah Zafar Akhund is the Taleban‘s shadow governor in Jaghatu district, Wardak province.

The insurgents have exploited local disputes that the Government cannot solve to gain footholds in new areas, irrespective of the ethnic divides.

―Ten years ago we had a problem with our land. One of our neighbours was powerful because he had connections [to a warlord] and he took some of our land. When Government came I complained many, many times but they didn‘t hear me,‖ said Reza Yousef, one of Habiba‘s neighbours.

―If you complain to the Government it takes years; they ask you for bribes and you have to go to their offices every day. That‘s why people choose the Taleban,‖ he added.

A senior NATO intelligence official admitted that the Taleban ―has a government-in-waiting, with ministers chosen,‖ ready to take over the moment the current administration failed.

―Time is running out. Taleban influence is expanding,‖ he said, adding that the Taleban run shadow governments in 33 of Afghanistan‘s 34 provinces.

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SUICIDE ATTACK ON U.S. BASE AN INSIDER‟S JOB (DECEMBER 31, 2009)

Written by admin on Thursday, December 31st, 2009

Selected by Olivier Immig & Jan van Heugten

Suicide attack on US base in Afghanistan an insider’s job SOURCE: Afghanistan Sun Thursday, December 31, 2009 (ANI)

Washington, Dec 31 : Fears are being raised that someone working with US Forces in Afghanistan was on the side of the Taliban after a suicide bomber was able to bring his explosives on the base, walk up to a group of American civilians and blow himself up.

A bomber wearing an explosive vest entered Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khost Province, near Pakistan.

The suicide bomber, who is said to be a high-ranking officer in Afghanistan Army, killed eight US CIA employees.

The outpost is located in the middle of a notorious stronghold for Afghan insurgents near the border with Pakistan, CBS News reports.

A Taliban spokesman said one of its members who was working for the Afghan army carried out the attack.

Afghan soldiers and civilians are present at almost every American outpost since one of the chief principals of the US strategy is to partner with the Afghans.

According to Christine Fair of Georgetown University, some of them may actually be working for the Taliban.

―They have really become a vehicle of infiltration for the Taliban. This is most certainly a vulnerability in our strategy going forward in trying to hand over security to the Afghans if we don‘t really have a way of figuring out who we can trust,‖ Fair said.

The Washington Post reported on Wednesday that the military post was used by the CIA as an operations and surveillance centre.

Last October, eight US soldiers were killed when insurgents very nearly overran an outpost.

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