Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014

Social Affairs: A Journal for the Social Sciences ISSN 2362-0889 (online) www.socialaffairsjournal.com

The Migration-Interstate Conflict Nexus

Sabastiano Rwengabo* Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore, Singapore

ABSTRACT When and how does forced migration strain security relations between neighbouring States? Drawing from secondary research on two interstate conflicts in Africa’s Great Lakes Region during the 1970s and 1990s, I examine the socio-political conditions in both the migrants’ home and recipient States that interweave migrants into both States’ security calculations. I argue that refugees strain neighbouring States’ security relations under conditions of domestic socio-political violence, geographical proximity, and opportunities for refugees’ forced-return mobilisation. Evidence from the 1978-79 Uganda-Tanzania war, and the post-1994 DRC-Rwanda conflict, indicates that given these conditions forced migration strains interstate security relations by arousing suspicion and fear of migrants living in neighbouring States among leaders of refugees’ home country; and provoking migrants’ desire to forcefully return home expressed through politico-military mobilisation and declaration of war. Sending States pressure host States to ‘contain’ refugees’ mobilisation for forceful return. When recipient States are unable or unwilling to satisfy sending States’ demands, refugees become infused in both countries’ security calculations. These convergent processes generate interstate conflicts and may result in armed confrontation. The findings are useful for grasping the transformation of civil wars into transnational and regional conflicts, such as prevailed in the Region since the 1990s.

Key Words: Forced Migration, Inter-State Conflict, Great Lakes Region, Uganda-Tanzania War, Rwanda-DRC Wars

Introduction conflicts originating in domestic causes. Africa’s Great Lakes Region (GLR) has Since the 1990s, these conflicts quickly experienced various transnational armed transform from civil wars to complex regional security concerns involving * Author e-mail strained interstate security relations [email protected] (Khadiagala 2006). One major causal ©2014 Social Affairs Journal. This work is force behind this evolving insecurity and licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- the metamorphosis from civil to interstate NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

52 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014 conflicts has been the phenomenon of security relations. The two processes forced migration and conflict refugees, infuse refugees in neighbouring states’ which, though appreciated in the security calculations, transforming a literature on refugees-related conflicts hitherto refugee-generating civil conflict (Mushemeza 2007; Salehyan and into a transnational and interstate one. Gleditsch 2006), remains less well This argument supplements studies analysed through comparative lenses on that examine the securitisation of interstate conflicts in the Region. In this migration in the age of globalisation. paper, I show that forced migration strains Shain and Barth examine the foreign security relations between the sending policy implications of migration, focusing and recipient States when it generates on the role of Jewish and Armenian suspicions and fears of migrants among Diasporas through a theoretical nexus leaders in refugees’ home country; and between constructivism and liberalism. when migrants mobilise and seek to They argue that a combination of return forcefully. When sending States migrants’ identities and domestic political pressure host States to contain migrants’ interactions affect States’ foreign policies activities, refugees become infused in (Shain & Barth 2003). While Shain and both countries’ security calculations Barth do not study security, they highlight vis-a-vis each other. This infusion of the possible influence of migrants upon refugees into neighbouring states’ the home State given the strength of the security calculations against each State at home. Similarly, Mushemeza other may reach a point of interstate studies the influence of Rwandan confrontation. To grasp the migration- refugees in the GLR. He concludes that interstate conflict nexus, tracing politico- with limited integration in host societies, security causes of interstate conflicts refugees with strong home attachment from both sending and recipient States is look for opportunities for forceful return important because not all countries feel (Mushemeza 2007). Salehyan and their refugees in neighbouring countries Gleditsch (2006) demonstrate why and threaten home security. To explain when how refugees are mechanisms through leaders in sending States are likely to which civil conflicts transnationalise. link their national security with their Boswell’s (2007) analysis of the refugees I consider socio-political, geo- “securitization of migration” in Europe political, and host-country conditions indicates that migration affects States’ that generate this fear. Socio-political security calculations, though he places violence in sending States results in emphasis on host-country security. I one group’s forced exile. Geographical supplement these analyses with a critical proximity allows extruded groups to settle examination of the nexus between in neighbouring countries. Opportunities migration and the security relations of for refugees’ mobilisation for return, in both the sending and receiving States. the host country, strengthen their desire This links migration and security in a to return forcefully. The resulting fears State-centric global landscape. While and suspicions among sending States’ scholars investigate migrants’ links with leaders; and refugees’ actual mobilisation domestic societies, they place emphasis for forceful return, strain neighbours’ 53 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014 on migrants’ socio-economic impact I review literature on studies of two (Poros 2001), identity issues (Soysal interstate conflicts from Africa’s GLR: 1994), and its link with other forms of the 1978-79 Tanzania-Uganda war; and transnationalism (Vertovec 2003). By the post-1994 security relations between interrogating the causal influence of the Democratic Republic of Congo forced migration on interstate security (DRC) and Rwanda. These cases are relations, I underscore the geopolitical useful: they reveal the transformation of imperatives of forced migration, the civil conflicts to international conflicts, intellectual link between Migration differences in states’ responses to actual Studies and International Security, as or perceived threats from their refugees well as African Studies, hence bringing based in neighbouring states, and the these related sub-disciplinary strands similarity of resulting interstate relations into conversation. regardless of when, who is in power, and where these refugees are based. This is a State-centric study in which forced migration implies traumatic The difference between these conflicts socio-political extrusion from the home is that where the Tanzania-Uganda country resulting from socio-political conflict followed the 1971 coup de’tat, the and/or economic persecution (Ho Rwanda-DRC conflict followed the 1994 2012) as distinct from natural-disaster- genocide. Where the Uganda-Tanzania induced migration. Strained interstate conflict took several years to break out, security relations include accusations the Rwanda-DRC war took only one year. and counter-accusations that may result While the Uganda-Tanzania war lasted a in armed conflict between sending and short period resulting in the overthrow of recipient neighbouring States. This Amin, the Rwanda-DRC conflicts have security concern arises from home- raged on even after Mobutu’s downfall and country leaders’ fears of, and about, Kabila Sr’s assassination. The DRC had refugees’ activities in the host country, apparently failed to contain mobilising and and refugees’ desire to return home re-arming Rwandan refugees as Mobutu forcefully expressed through mobilisation had supported the fallen government or support for armed conflict. For these in Kigal against the Rwanda Patriotic processes to strain States’ security Front/Army (RPF/A), just as Nyerere had relations, certain conditions must prevail: disapproved of Amin’s coup. However, domestic political violence, which initially both conflicts followed forced migration leads to forced migration; geographical resulting from intrastate political crises. proximity, which allows refugees to live Regardless of differences in leaderships in their home-country’s neighbourhood; of these countries and the causes of the and the host country’s inability or initial refugee-producing conflicts, forced unwillingness to repatriate or relocate migrants led to interstate conflicts, hence these migrants. These conditions making forced migration the major causal generate and exacerbate fears and factor in these conflicts. suspicions from migrants’ home country, Ironically, scholars tend to address while amplifying migrants’ desire to these conflicts as contextually unrelated, return. To illustrate these mechanisms, yet they have commonalities on the 54 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014 independent variable: forced migration. Migration and Security Because I sample on the independent Globalisation, Migration, and Security variable, I emphasize the causal process through which refugee status and Analyses of contemporary migration activities lead to the dependent variable: emphasize the influence of migrant strained interstate security relations. The communities on States’ responses two conflicts might differ in their contexts– through migration policy and domestic post-1994 genocide in the DRC-Rwanda security. In the age of globalisation relations; and the post-1971 Uganda and open borders, State policies must coup in the Tanzania-Uganda conflict. accommodate migration pressures. There were different leaderships in Contemporary states exist in a globalised Zaire and Tanzania. And they occurred landscape wherein territorial control, at different times. But both cases according to this view, is limited by constitute some unique experiences in increasing linkages and interdependence. the GLR’s security complexes that have This allows people to migrate more than refugees at their core. I bring them in a was previously possible–say during single analytical framework. Therefore, slave trade and pre-World War periods this is less an explanation of inter-state (Zeleza 2005). Thus, globalisation–ease insecurity, stressed in analyses of the of transport, communication, networking, incompatibility of states’ interests and transnational business and social actors preferences (Levi 1960; Levy 1998), linkages, connections between the local and more of a demonstration of when and the global–“undermines the salience and how forced migration strains states’ of national sovereignty and citizenship”, security relations. and creates “deterritorialised and post- national communities as an alternative The paper proceeds as follows: the to territorially-bounded national polities” first section summarises the literature (Baubock 2003, p.701). Through on migration in the age of global migration, these communities link the interconnectedness before focusing on local and the global, the rural and the securitised migration. Then follows a urban, the peripheral and the core. This theoretical outline of the conditions under calls for the redefinition of identities, which force migration may strain inter- influence, and communities whose state security relations. I also develop a global existence transcends the State- causal mechanism showing theoretically centric territorial and security space how this occurs. The empirical section (Levitt et al 2003; Vertovec 2003; demonstrates how each of the two International Newsletter on Migration, mechanisms led to conflicts in both 2004). By forcing States to open their cases. The conclusion draws implications borders, globalisation pressures create for further research and policy. “Migration State”, a state whose borders are open to migratory pressures and whose population, domestic, and border security policies must accommodate these pressures (Hollifield 2004).

55 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014

From the foregoing, migration affects the solidified, regardless of globalisation’s nation-state in three ways. First, it forces tendency to mute some. It follows from the State to adjust its migration policies to the foregoing that differences in causes the changing realities as States’ security and circumstances of migration across controls within their territorial confines time and space explain differences in are continually subjected to migrants’ how States perceive of and receive influences and pressures. Second, return migrants. Here lies the notion of States must contend with migration’s securitised migration. consequences, especially its internal and external security dimensions. As States Securitisation of Migration open their borders, they receive and Securitised migration has three send out migrants that may or may not dimensions: domestic concerns about lose their home-identity and attachment. the activities of migrant communities; Migrants, then, become national citizens the security implications of migrants’ with global presence. Third, while states existence in host and sending States; are concerned about immigrants, others and the extension of sending States’ may provide preferential treatment to security concerns to States hosting their immigrants on ethnic (Ho 2012) and refugees. Domestic security concerns political grounds, while also responding depend on the way migrants left the to international normative expectations country and these migrants’ perceptions to protect forced migrants (e.g. UNHCR about the home government. Forced 1951). This is especially so if the State is migrants are likely to politically affect the a signatory to, and respects, international home country, for they signify intergroup refugee instruments. However, when conflicts: one group displaces the other first-generation migrants identify and fears the latter’s solidification in exile; themselves with their home State one the displaced group feels the urge to can say that migration opens up the State return home especially when memories without erasing it given the salience of of extrusion are still strong. Voluntary state-centric citizenship identity. As a migrants may not raise these concerns. super-structural social arrangement to When forced migrants blame the ruling which “persons owe exclusive loyalties government for their extrusion their of citizenship and identity” (Baubock resentment may propagate international 2003, p.700), the State becomes a criticism against it. They may work beneficiary, victim, or definer of migrants’ toward its downfall through elections and identities depending on the context. The diasporic funding for the opposition or State contends with migrants’ security by mobilising and creating transnational dimension, including accommodating politics as well as funding armed conflicts the resource-based pressures these at home (International Crisis Group 2010; “returnees” create (Ho 2012). Refugees’ Brun & Nicholas Van Hear 2012; Koinova security dimension, then, combines the 2011; Lum et al 2013). politico-security and socio-economic pressures they create, their state-based The demands and pressures, which citizenship, and identities. These identities affect both sending and host States, have persisted, in some instances are important for understanding the 56 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014 securitisation of refugees. Lum et al of diasporic finances and mobilisation argue that “under certain circumstances, against their home governments: the diaspora groups pose a risk to intrastate front is both local and diasporic (Brun security by increasing the probability & Van Hear 2012). Though diasporas of civil war” (Lum et al 2008, p.201). may promote peace through mediation, Mushemeza argues that Rwandan peace building, mobilising resources, refugees integrated to their host lobbying governments and international communities to acquire the political, organisations (Baser and Ashok Swain security, economic and other skills 2008; Lum et al 2008, p.201), refugees and resources necessary for a return can also become key actors in the spread home movement (Mushemeza 2007). of civil wars. I agree with Salehyan By forming return-home movements, and Gleditsch that forced migrations they became a security threat to their are a key mechanism through which home country. Refugees may also conflicts spread across regions. While affect their host countries’ security when refugees are victims of domestic turmoil, they involve in resource and power argue Salehyan and Gleditsch, they struggles with natives of host countries. “increase the risk of subsequent conflict This creates insecurity for the migrants in host and origin countries” by creating themselves and their host society given “rebels without borders” (Salehyan & the survival struggles between both Gleditsch 2006; Salehyan 2009, p.145- groups. Mamadani’s (1998) analysis of 164). This internationalisation of civil “the Kivu Crisis” in the DRC is informative conflicts provides ample evidence of the of this complex process in Kinyarwanda- international security dimension of forced speaking communities in Eastern DRC, migration. which faced identity-based insecurity for However, these analyses require many years. Insecurity may also arise supplementary reflections on the when some migrants involve in criminal conditions under which migration is and/or terrorist acts (Boswell 2007; securitised and how it affects interstate Waldmann 2010). From this perspective, security relations. Within our “borderless securitised migrants affect host States world” (Hiebert 2003), there are political domestically by conflicting with indigenes conditions under which refugees and internationally as refugees. The create security concerns, absent which resulting international security concerns they hardly could. These conditions and human vulnerability affect the State and activities create “overlapping in important ways (Newman and van memberships between territorially Selm 2003; Ho 2012). separated and independent polities” The sending State’s security concerns (Baubok 2003, p.700). Extrusion become intertwined with the host combines with ethnic geopolitics and State’s generosity: for instance, forced existential conditions that link “the local migrants may mobilise for and take and the diasporic”, breeding interstate part in anti-home-government activities conflicts (Brun and van Hear 2012). like civil wars. Such wars become Investigating the link between forced deterritorialised due to the involvement migration and international security is a

57 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014 response to Baubock’s call for empirical living across the border as the Uganda- studies on migrant transnationalism. Tanzania war demonstrated (Mukasa Baubock avers that the political activities Mutiibwa 1992, p.125-6). Therefore, the in which migrants engage affect their migration is “transnational”, the relations self-definition, collective identities, “interstate”. This does not conceptually and conceptions of citizenship among conflate the “international”, and the sending and host societies. This in turn “transnational”. Instead, it shows them affects relations between both countries. as complementary realities in a complex By demonstrating how these activities migration-security nexus. affect these States’ security relations, Likewise, domestic conditions generate I underline refugees’ influence on cross-border and transnational migration. security relations between geopolitically However, once the migration has contiguous States. occurred it acquires causal import of its own. Herein lies the value of calling Migration and Interstate attention to the nature and causes of Security Relations migration: for instance, civil conflict’s Under what conditions do forced physical threat and social consequences migrations strain relations between affect people’s choices to flee (Adhikari the sending and the recipient State? 2012), but the way both forced migrants How do these causal relations obtain? and States perceive and respond to Answers to these questions help us to this fleeing affects States’ security appreciate differential consequences calculations in ways that transcend the of migration on interstate security original cause of migration. For example, relations and to distinguish “refugees” when a neighbouring State provides from “returnees” in terms of migrants’ sanctuary for refugees organising to relationship to sending and recipient forcefully return home the resulting trans- States’ policies (Hein 1993; Ho 2012). territorial conflict (Salehyan 2007) affects It helps us to explain why some sending both the sending and host States. No States conflict with some, and not all of longer does what caused the original their refugees’ host states. This requires migration matter; migration itself acquires a good grasp of background conditions causal influence. This demonstrates the in both sending and recipient States that importance of background conditions in give causal import to forced migration. the migration-security analysis. Since it is difficult to find a country whose emigrants live only in its neighbourhood, Background Conditions “transnational” and “international” Not all instances of forced exile strain migration are undistinguishable here interstate security relations. Some forced because of the linkages between exiles are received, settled, integrated emigrants living in neighbouring countries as “returnees”, receiving preferential and those living in distant lands. While treatment contrary to “repatriation” and those living in neighbouring countries management of “refugees” associated have geographical proximity, those with forced migration literature (Ho 2012). spread across the globe facilitate those Other exiles raise security concerns

58 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014

as soon as they emigrate (Mushemeza them to exile. Ethno-political conflicts 2007). So, when is forced migration may also result from ethno-racial or problematic for States’ security relations? religious identities, whereby one group I argue that three conditions must forces another into exile owing to ethnic prevail. First, domestic political violence persecution as has happened in the GLR that leads to forced migration indicates (Prunier 2009a and b). severe intergroup conflicts. Second, Likewise, some domestic conflicts have geographical proximity makes some of ethno-racial and religious dimensions. the migrants to raise security concerns These degenerate into insurgencies with in the home country. Third, opportunities ethno-political undertones because of for migrants’ mobilisation to return accumulated conflicts and conflict spirals home are vital. These conditions are (Fearon and Laitin 2003). States may necessary but not sufficient to influence also ethnicise their counter-insurgency interstate security relations: they are also responses, as did Sudan over the years necessary for they create fertile ground leading to refugees (Hagan and Rymond- for exiles/refugees to enter States’ Richmond 2008). When refugees cannot security calculations. Not all refugees are integrate in the host society, or when securitised: for instance, refugees born of there is limited ethnic homogeneity natural disasters have different existential within the host state, they have strong and political constraints from politically desire to return, and may mobilise to extruded migrants. Some forced exiles do so forcefully. If both countries cannot may appeal to extra territorial kinship agree on how to manage these refugees’ ties or ethnic affinity, leading to quick repatriation–for reasons ranging from integration. Others may not (Brubaker historically-divergent interests to personal 1998). conflicts between state leaders and to Political violence may take the form of geostrategic interests or interference in revolution, State repression, or ethno- neighbouring states’ domestic politics– political conflicts. A revolution disrupts leaders in the sending State become the existing socio-political order, resulting worried about their security. These fears in some groups ethnically dominating the intensify as refugees mobilise to invade political and socio-economic landscape. their home country. When the sending Revolutionary violence threatens the State seeks to counter this perceived, target group, leading to extrusion. State potential, or actual mobilisation from repression may involve a dictator purging within the host State’s territory it threatens members of the society, especially the host State’s sovereignty. This situation personnel in security services, to reduce characterised Sudan-Uganda relations domestic opposition and threats to the since 1991: Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance regime. Coups, purges, and counter- Army (LRA)’s original founders sought coups typify such repressive regimes refuge in southern Sudan in 1986. When (Mazrui 1975; Horowitz 1985; Omara- they received Sudanese support, Uganda Otunnu 1987; Prunier 2009a). This retaliated in 1993 by supporting John creates fear among the persecuted Garang’s Sudanese People’s Liberation and other opposition groups, forcing Movement/Army (SPLM/A) against

59 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014

Sudan. Both rebel groups had refuge obtaining from outside the mobilising in the sponsoring country. Forced exile groups’ current residence/location. I defined security relations between these identify three kinds of opportunities for neighbours (Prunier 1994) as it did in the mobilisation among migrants: the host GLR during the 1990s. State’s limited control over its domestic domain; conflicts in the host society and Neighbourhood implies geographical beyond; and support from the host State. proximity and always entails ethnic Weak States allow rebel groups fighting geopolitics for countries with against neighbouring countries, criminal transnational ethnicities. Refugees who networks, and terrorists, to use their live in neighbouring countries are more peripheral regions. They can become problematic for the home country’s “sanctuaries” for rebel movements security concerns than those who migrate (Salehyan 2007; Piazza 2008), allowing to distant destinations: given desire them access to uncontrolled resources and opportunities they can easily attack necessary for war. Conflict onset and the homeland from across the border. prolongation are more likely when the True: migrants who are more distant conflict is located in resource-rich areas may provide financial, mobilisational, (Lujala 2010). Similarly, limited domestic ideational and political resources for control gives refugees the opportunity to return-home movements (Baser & Swain find operational ground, hence enhancing 2008, p.7). However, distance from home their maneuverability for violent return. In forces them to rely on indirect means like addition, when there are conflicts in the international pressure on home countries. host State, refugees/exiles participate in When an armed struggle breaks out, more these conflicts as a preparatory measure distant refugees rely on their compatriots for their subsequent return home through, in neighbouring States or within the home say, integration into security services, and country’s territory for active combat. taking sides with one of the conflicting Refugees living in neighbouring countries groups to acquire training, experience, are near enough to monitor conditions at and networks necessary for their planned home, and to recruit fighters from home return. where necessary. Proximity becomes a motivator. However, this arises from Integration of refugees in the host State’s “opportunities for mobilisation” in the host security services may also complicate country. the host State’s political and security landscape. Indigenous peoples may resist Opportunities for mobilisation are migrants’ influence in security circles, as facilitating conditions, resources, and well as their socio-economic and political technologies, which enable refugees influence. Yet participation in the host who are intent on mobilising for a country’s security crises, partaking of its forceful return to do so without, or with political and socio-economic space gives limited, hindrances from the host State refugees resources, knowledge, and skills and society. Such opportunities may in the management of violence, political exist beyond the host State and society, maneuverings, diplomacy, resources, but those accruing within the host technologies, and networks, which make society are more effective than those 60 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014

them more demanding against their strain interstate security relations. I derive home government. This further renders the causal mechanism from analysing compromise between refugees and their government concerns in the home country home government difficult, as armed, and desire among refugees themselves. experienced, networked and organised This is important because not all countries refugees acquire greater bargaining with refugees in neighbouring countries leverage, when compared to refugees fear that those refugees threaten without such opportunities. This may force their home country’s national security. the host State to support refugees when This helps to delineate countries that they decide to return home to rid itself of securitise their refugees and those that non-citizens who can potentially cause do not. Second, I emphasize refugees’ domestic conflicts. If their home country desire to return. This is distinct from is unwilling, for whichever reasons, to ethnic returnees who may be positively peacefully receive its refugees, the host received by the host State and integrated country has limited choices besides (Ho 2012) and those without desire and supporting refugees’ armed struggle opportunity to return home forcefully. against their country, as happened in This implies two causal processes from Uganda-Rwanda relations (Mushemeza both sending and host States: fears and 2007). suspicions among leaders of the sending State; and refugees’ desire to return Causal Relationship: From Migration home expressed through mobilisation to Interstate Security Relations for armed engagement with the home The foregoing clarifies that refugees can government (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Domestic Suspicion, Migrants’ Desire, and Interstate Conflict

Figure 1 indicates that suspicion at factors that we may consider to affect the home and migrants’ desire to return migration-interstate security relationship home work in opposite directions but in because the processes directly combine a complementary manner. They affect the agency of main actors: the sending inter-state security relations (either State, the recipient State, and migrants conflict or cooperation in security themselves. The meeting point between affairs related to these refugees) from home-based fear and suspicion, and opposite directions because the causal migrants’ desire to return home, is a state forces come from both the sending and of either interstate conflict or peaceful recipient country. These two causal relations depending on whether States processes are more important than other agree to address, jointly, the challenge

61 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014 they both face as a result of the earlier Other factors constant, a higher forced migration. likelihood that the host country will meet the sending State’s demands reduces Suspicion, Fear at home the likelihood of suspicions from the When refugees flee to a neighbouring latter. In consequence, there will be country, the immediate concerns for less strain on security relations between leaders in the home country are the them. Contrarily, if the host State remains settlement, demobilisation, repatriation if uncooperative or fails to meet these at all, weakening their intent to forcefully demands, the sending State’s suspicions return, disarmament of armed ones, and may degenerate into fear. The issue, possibly relocation to distant places to then, becomes deeply engrained in the preclude their threat to home security. sending State’s security calculations vis- This suspicion arises from leaders’ à-vis the host State (The Independent concern that these refugees may forge 2009)1. alliances with their remaining kin The fear is that refugees are too near to and kith and other domestic opposition be ignored, for they can easily access groups to mobilise against especially the home citizens and state structures. new socio-political order. Here I consider This resonates with arguments about forced exile resulting from socio-political the relationship between proximity and displacement of one [racio-ethnic, armed conflict or cooperation (Robst et religious or ideological] group by another. al 2007; Buhaug and Scott Gates 2002). Evidence of suspicions and fears consists The geopolitical dimension, however, in home governments’ rhetoric and their works concurrently with forced migrants’ interests expressed through domestic strong desire to return home. politico-security actions. Desire to Return Home The home country may also suspect– even fear–that the host State may support Most refugees desire to return home. such groups in case of previously strained Yet, some may fear that return is relations. Here, the sending State has dangerous depending on their distinctive several choices. First, it may appeal to circumstances and the way the host State the host State to demobilise, disarm, or received them. Among those desirous relocate refugees. For various reasons, of returning, some believe in, and have say the host State’s international refugee motives for, forceful return. Motives being obligations, level of domestic control, the difficult to measure, I determine the desire transnational ethnicity of neighbouring to return home by considering mobilisation States, and degree of cooperation for armed attack, justifications for such between the new regime and the host mobilisation, and actual armed attacks country, the host State may have difficulty against their home country. The longevity meeting the sending country’s demands. of mobilisation is unimportant here: it We can measure variations in these State- depends on opportunities like personnel, related conditions, but I place emphasis and conditions in, and support from, the on whether or not the host State finally host State. Mobilisation may involve the satisfies the sending State’s demands. formation of organisations/associations 62 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014 as well as political and military wings The home groups, conversely, believe to meet refugees’ politico-military the only way to secure themselves and objectives. Therefore, refugees show protect their hard-won socio-political and their desire to return home forcefully by economic space is to keep their enemies mobilising politically and militarily, and by outside. However, because the extruded attacking the home country. groups live in a neighbouring country, the latter joins the home-country’s security Refugees’ “desire” involves dichotomous calculations. Simultaneously the host variation. Either there is strong desire country considers how its relations with among a considerable section of migrants, the sending country can be normalised who then constitute the necessary post-the violent extrusion. Diplomatic leadership and mobilise others; or settlement of this dispute, as already there is none and the migrants remain noted, is affected by the ease with without leadership and un-mobilised. which the host State can accommodate The experience of forced migration, the demands from the sending State, the pains previously inflicted upon them, and ease with which the host State can keep the victors’ fear of the return of violently these migrants under strict, tight control, extruded peoples, hampers possibilities and relations between the two States’ of negotiating peaceful return. Both governments. groups have developed moralistic and dependable affects and intra-group The above conditions may not be easy expectations within themselves and to combine on the positive in developing against the other group. They have societies. Even western societies were enhanced intra-group cohesion while unable to prevent Tamil refugees from widening inter-group biases regarding supporting the civil war in Sri Lanka for power, threat, and conflict. This hampers reasons of domestic politics, limited negotiated settlement of the dispute understanding of the complex dynamics between refugees and the ruling group, of the war, and the sheer immensity and erodes the latter’s respect for and influence of disaporic mobilisation the plight of exiles. Both groups have (Brun & Van Hear 2012). Thus, when reservations dealing with each other, the migrants’ desire exceeds the host having developed negative perceptions country’s ability or willingness to control, and feelings of injustice and betrayal. the alternative may be to support their Amity between such groups remains return as Uganda did in 1990 against elusive (Ascher 1986; Rouhana and Rwanda2. This draws the host country Fiske 1995). More so when there are into a conflict with its neighbour. When ethnic undertones, in agreement with there are no strained relations the two analyses that underscore the difficulty countries may work together to reduce of peacefully resolving ethnic conflicts the group’s mobilisation and possibly without external involvement (Walter attack against the home government, 1999; Downes 2007). Given these deep- thereby maintaining interstate amity. seated ill feelings, forced migrants believe Likewise, besides strained relations, the they can only return forcefully. country may not easily support these groups to return home forcefully unless

63 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014 they demonstrate this desire through beyond. They mobilised to return home, leadership and organisation. This relates forming various anti-Amin armed groups. to the notion that the level of organisation At home, Amin also feared political and is one of the major conditions for foreign military elites whom he suspected of support to armed conflicts (Salehyan, cooperating with these exiles. As he Gleditsch and Cunningham 2011). purged the Langi and Acholi ethnic Refugees must demonstrate the desire groups in the armed forces who had not to return home. Otherwise, they may not only dominated Uganda’s military and threaten the sending State’s security or other security services since colonialism, acquire support from the host State even but more so because the Langi were if these States’ relations are unfriendly. Obote’s co-ethnics, he forced many to This relational logic shows interstate flee the country, creating more refugees. security relations as influenced by causal With Tanzania unwilling to extrude the forces from opposite directions/sources. refugees, this strained relations between Evidence from two seemingly unrelated the two countries, leading to war in 1978. cases of inter-state conflicts in Africa’s This war is interesting in two ways. First, GLR proves this hypothesis. since Idi Amin’s ascension to power Tanzania’s president, Mwalimu Julius Evidence from Africa’s Great Kambarage Nyerere, had disapproved Lakes Region of Amin’s coup d’état. Many Ugandans In Africa’s GLR, two interstate conflicts had fled to exile in Tanzania and other are helpful for empirically demonstrating countries. However, the two countries the above-theorised migration-interstate continued cooperating especially within conflict nexus: the 1978-9 Tanzania- the ambit of the East African Community Uganda war and the post-1994 DRC- (EAC) instead of declaring open hostility Rwanda relations. Both conflicts involved right from the start. Second, a group of home-based fear of migrants; and exiles led by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, migrants’ mobilisation to return home. formed the Front for National Salvation While one conflict followed a coup d’état, (FRONASA) and attacked Uganda in another followed a genocide. Both were 1972. They were repulsed and fled rooted in domestic political crises, and back to Tanzania. However, this did not followed from forced migrants who lead to open confrontation between the exhibited readiness to mobilise and two countries though Amin knew these attack their home countries–to ensure groups’ activities in Tanzania. forceful return from host neighbouring countries. Amin’s Suspicions, Fears As Amin’s fears increased, he sought to A) The Tanzania-Uganda Conflict, eliminate domestic opposition that could 1978-79 potentially ally with the Tanzania-based In Uganda, Idi Amin overthrew President groups. He undertook ethnic balancing Milton Obote in a coup d’état in January approaches, which endangered all 1971. Obote and several other Ugandans Ugandans but especially two Luo sub- fled to neighbouring Tanzania and ethnic groups, many of whose members

64 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014 were already in exile: the Acholi who had Migrants’ Desire, Politico-Military dominated the military since colonialism; Mobilisation, Attack and the Langi, Obote’s co-ethnics (Mazrui Ugandan exiles mobilised in two ways. 1975; Rwengabo 2013).Claiming that First, they formed military groups that the Acholi and the Langi, “had plotted to would confront Amin. For instance, disarm all other soldiers, and to assert Museveni’s FRONASA, after the 1972 a complete ethnic monopoly of military repulsion, continued to secretly recruit power in Uganda”, Amin killed “thousands and train young Ugandans and Rwandan of Langi and Acholi” (Mazrui 1976, p.261; refugees living in the Region since the Rwengabo 2013) in one of Africa’s worst 1959 Rwandan social revolution. One military purges. of them was Fred Rwingyema who later Amin established two notorious security led the invasion of Rwanda in 1990. This agencies: the State Research Bureau increased their military capacity for war. (SRB) and Public Safety Unit (PSU). Apart from FRONASA, Akena p’Ojok, These agencies committed hundreds William Omaria and Ateker Ejalu, led the of thousands of extrajudicial killings Save Uganda Movement, while Andrew (Mazrui 1975, p.297-312), forcing more Lutakoome Kayiira commanded the Ugandans into exile. This reign of terror Uganda Freedom Movement. Second, had two countervailing consequences. ugandan refugees mobilised exiled First, it increased insecurity for his military officers and men. For instance, potential and actual opponents, forcing Col David Oyite-Ojok and Brig Tito Okello more of them into exile. This increased remained under Obote’s leadership. They numbers of refugees whose numerical later commanded the Kikosi Maalum and mobilisational capacity increased (Special Force) of Obote’s Uganda Amin’s security fears. Second, Amin National Liberation Movement/Army was concerned with Tanzania where (UNLM/A) when they attacked Amin in most refugees were mobilising militarily 1978. Col. Zed Maruru, Amin’s exiled to invade from. He asked Tanzania former Air force commander, was also to chase them away in vain. Forced instrumental in commanding the UNLA’s migration had created a transnational invasion of Uganda. anti-regime force that strained relations These various anti-Amin military groups between these neighbouring countries. received morale from Tanzania. Aware As Amin’s domestic policies created more of their potential for invasion, Amin pre- insecurity and exiled more Ugandans, emptively attacked Tanzania under the worldwide anti-Amin sentiment widened guise of territorial claims (the Kagera and deepened. This heightened the Salient) on 9 October 1978. Possibly his exiles’ politico-military mobilisation and real objective was to rally the people at vigilance when they realised that Amin home around the flag, neutralise domestic had lost international reputation. opposition, and/or turn Tanzania’s territory into a buffer zone/fighting-ground with these groups. Why? Because domestic support had dwindled. Factions in the military were severe. Amin’s life itself was 65 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014 endangered: there were more than seven Thereafter, Amin might have prepared coup and assassination attempts against himself for an all-out war with Tanzania. him between 1972 and 1977 (Morrison et Thus, Amin’s attack forced Tanzania to al 1984, p.673-74; Omara-Otunnu 1987). rally its military behind Ugandan fighters. Given these conditions refugees could What drove Amin to war was his fear of easily link up with domestic opponents. the many anti-Amin groups in Tanzania It was judicious for Amin to externalise who were suspected to have infiltrated the problem. Amin’s son, Jaffar Amin, his security services (Amin 2013). has hinted at the links between domestic To further illustrate the salience of and foreign opposition. He indicates that refugees’ desire to return home measured though Tanzania-Uganda relations were in terms of mobilisation, attack, and not cordial, “dad and his senior officers justification for attack, consider the were given false and misleading reports various groups formed: Kirunda Luwuliza by saboteurs and subversive elements and Edward Rugumayo, in Zambia, operating within the SRB in order to start worked with Tanzania-based fighting a war between Uganda and Tanzania groups. In addition to the aforementioned so that dad could be overthrown” (Amin military groups in Tanzania, there had 2013). been formed several political groups. From the foregoing, open armed These included Tarsis Kabwegyere and confrontation between Uganda and Martin Aliker, in Nairobi, that mobilised Tanzania followed, and was rooted in, political and military recruits from among Ugandan exiles who had organised refugees; Andrew Kayiira and Godfrey militarily and clandestinely to fight Amin. Binaisa, in the United States, offering Tanzania counter-intervened in support moral, financial, and political support of these anti-Amin groups (Umozurike and mobilisation; and Sam Sabagereka, and Umozurike 1982). Tanzania might George Kanyeihamba and Paulo only have repulsed Amin’s forces from Muwanga, in London, who mobilised its territory and defended its borders. politically and internationally. Other However, Tanzanian forces continued groups emerged toward the end of Amin’s the war fighting alongside Ugandan regime (Mutiibwa 1992, p.125-6). groups until the fall of Amin. Just War The Tanzania-based and other groups, theorists like Acheson-Brown might view which mobilised both politically and this as “Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda” militarily, threatened Amin most. and not a “counter-invasion” or counter- Tanzania’s unwillingness to relocate intervention (Acheson-Brown 2001). them strained the Uganda-Tanzania What is undisputable is that Ugandan security relations. As part of resolute exiles acquired Tanzanian support to desire, these groups later joined under overthrow Amin in what appeared as a the Uganda National Liberation Front/ war between Uganda and Tanzania. If Army (UNLF/A) under Obote’s political Tanzania had withdrawn after repelling leadership, during the Moshi Conference Amin’s troops from the Kagera Salient, (Morrison et al, p.674). Desire gives possibly the Ugandans might have been refugees the much-needed incentives defeated and forced back to Tanzania. to organise, risk war to ensure forceful 66 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014 return, and to seek support from the host refugees/exiles had shown direct interest country and beyond. Would Tanzania in forceful return. They had also acquired have supported these groups had Amin opportunities for political coalescence not invaded? Yes: it had hosted them from Tanzania, Kenya and beyond. since 1971, gave them opportunites to Relations between Uganda and Kenya mobilise and coalesce. Would these had also dwindled over time. Amin groups have attacked Uganda without accused Kenya of being used by Tanzania’s military backing? Yes: they western powers to neocolonise Africa, were mobilising, collecting intelligence, and especially disintegrate the East recruiting and training, while FRONASA African Community (EAC), while also had demonstrated this resolve by stifling anti-Israeli developments in the attacking as early as 1972. Nile Valley that were opposed to Israeli Tanzania helped anti-Amin groups to occupation of Palestine. It is suspected coalesce. It offered them avenues for that Kenya helped Israel’s Mossad to political and military mobilisation and spy on and prepare for the 4th July 1976 training before and during the war. The “Operation Entebbe”–a counterterroist key element in mobilisation was the hostage rescue mission in which Israeli bringing together of different political, commandoes raided Uganda’s Entebbe military, human rights, and activist International Airport–to rescue hostages groups in a joint anti-Amin effort (Table of the Air France flight 139 which had 1). This resulted in a “Uganda Unity been hijacked and flown to Entebbe Conference”, held in Moshi, Tanzania. by members of the Popular Front for Dr Tarsis Bazaana Kabwegyere chaired the Liberation of Palestine that were the Conference. According to Mukasa- believed to target Israelis and other Jews Mutiibwa, more than twenty-five groups on the plane (Okumu 2007, p.77-98). gathered in Moshi. From their meeting, These strained relations provided fertile they “emerged with what came to be ground for anti-Amin groups to coalesce, called the ‘Moshi Spirit’”. The Conference mobilise, and hide within the breadth “was convened … between 23 and 25 of East Africa, while building on their March 1979”. Its chair, Kabwegyere, networks to confront Amin. Thus, while “had been elected by the various exile anti-Amin groups were more coalesced groups meeting in Nairobi the previous in Tanzania, refugees within and beyond January, to be the Chairman of a Africa were all desirous of returning consultative committee set up to liaise home, exploited available opportunities with Ugandan organisations fighting Amin for mobilisation, and did mobilise for an with the view to remove Amin, establish anti-Amin armed conflict that drew both democracy in Uganda and re-establish Tanzanai and Uganda into an interstate national independence.”3 By implication, war.

67 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014

Table 1: Anti-Amin Groups of Ugandans in Exile that Attended the Uganda Unity Conference at Moshi, Tanzania, 23-25 March 1979

Organisation Leader Other Known Key Members

Uganda National Edward Rugumayo Fred Ssempebwa, Eriya Movement (UNM) Kategaya, James Mwebaze

Negotiating Comittee Dani Wadada Yashpal Tandon, Omwony for Democratic Unity - Nabudere Ojwok, Jack Maumbe Dar es Salaam (DU-D)

Save Uganda Yonasani Johnson Eteke Ejalu, Apollo Movement (SUM) Kanyomoozi Echeku, William Okwero,

Uganda Unity Group- Leander Komakech Dr Hilary Latigo Lusaka (UUG)

Moshi Discussion Osinde Wangwo Omara Aliro, Omara Atubo Group (MDG) (Moshi Conference Organiser)

Muthaiga Discussion Mathias Ngoli Grace Ibingira Group (MDG)

Uganda Freedom Andrew Lutakoome- Olara Otunnu, John Movement/Union Kayiira Odongkara, Joshua Luyimbazi (UFM), Zake

Uganda Nationalist Dr Peter Magezi- Israel Mayengo, Andrew Organisation (UNO) Sinabulya Adimola, Robert Serumaga

Organisation for Semei Nyanzi Vincent Okot Uganda Refugee Services (OURS)

Uganda Human Rights George-William Paul Otiti Omule, Sam UK (UHR) Kanyeihamba Sabagereka, Paul Wangoola

Relief Educational Bishop Festo Christipher Mubiru Musoke Training - Uganda Kivengere Refugees Now

Free Uganda (FU) Dr Martin Aliker

Freedom from Anold Bisase Paul Kibuuka Musoke Oppression (FO)

68 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014

Organisation Leader Other Known Key Members

Uganda National Unity Eric Otema-Alimadi Paul Milton Bonima Makmot, and Reconciliation, Ben Wacha, Fabian Odongo, Dar es Salaam (UNUR)

Nairobi Discussion Tarsis Bazaana Kabwegyere chaired this Group (NDG). Kabwegyere, PhD “Uganda Unity Conference”. Other members: Oparia Ekwero., James Stepahon Aggrey Kwegir, Sam Magara, Ephraim Kamuntu,

Uganda People’s George Luwuliza- David Onapa Wacha, George- Congress (UPC) Kirunda William Obua, Ken Oteng,

Democratic Party (DP). Dr Paul Kawanga- Anthony Ocaya Semwogerere

Uganda National Akena p’Ojok Movement (UNM)

Fund for Uganda Rev. Fredrick Kefa (FfU), Sempangi

Arusha Discussion Stephen Ariko Bill Nangai, Richard Ejotu, Ben Group for Diplomacy Ogwang (ADG-D)

Uganda Liberation Emmanuel Aldo Moses Apiliga, Mwa Alimadi, Group, Zambia (ULG) Oteng Dr Willy Washington Adokbongo

Council for the Bernard Buzabo John Magezi Liberation and Reconstruction of Uganda (CLRU)

Front for National Yoweri Kaguta Fred Rubereeza; Salvation (FRONASA) Museveni Jackson Senene

“Special Delegates” Yusuf Lule and Paul Muwanga

69 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014

Organisation Leader Other Known Key Members

Military Leaders Col. Tito Okello, Lt Maj. Chris Mudoola, Maj Col William Omaria, Smauel Manyumba, Oryema and Col. Zeddy Odongkara, Capt James Maruru Odongo, Sgt Tom Oyo, Samuel Okello, Col. Toko

Source(s): This Note4 From Table 1, by bringing different groups Tanzania’s counter-intervention would to a single united front and facilitating not end after repulsing Amin’s forces its logistical, intelligence and territorial from its territory. Instead, the exiles who home, Tanzania supported these groups. had merged into UNLA after the Moshi However, the groups had the desire conference, together with Tanzanian and were organised. They, however, forces fought their way to the capital and needed to coalesce politically and beyond, overthrowing Amin and pacifying militarily. After the “Unity Conference”, the country. Thus, while forced migrants there was a united front against Amin. may spread transnationally, geographical Opportunities and desire intersected in proximity is central to the mobilisation a synergistic anti-Amin effort. Thus, the and threat-generation sufficient to strain Uganda-Tanzania war was not a mere interstate security relations. One can instance of interstate conflict; it revolved conclude that political violence in Uganda around refugees’ anti-Amin struggles. It had led to forced migration; geographical involved Amin’s fear of these organising proximity had turned migrants into a refugees, and the migrants’ widespread security concern for Amin’s regime; desire and mobilisation. These factors, and forced migrants showed their open at a point of intersection, engendered intentions to return home, acquired the deteriorating security relations between Tanzania-supported opportunities for Uganda and Tanzania that burst into open mobilisation, and galvanised under the hostilities. Ugandans’ migration had been Moshi Spirit. The two causal processes transnational: refugees were scattered – suspicion and fear in Uganda; and beyond neighbouring countries and the mobilisation for returning home in exile – Region, as were their anti-Amin groups. were concurrently important in sparking However, the core fighting groups, which off the war. We find similar realities were based in Tanzania, threatened with the Rwanda-DRC strained security Amin most. Likewise, Tanzania, which relations since 1994. had not supported Amin’s coup, could neither support Amin’s demands for B) The DRC-Rwanda Conflict since relocation of exiles nor deny refuge to 1995 fleeing Ugandans. This forced Amin to After the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, invade Tanzania in a bid to flush these the genocidaires, former government groups out, mobilise domestic support, soldiers, and other Rwandese fled and prevent the groups from becoming to Zaire (now DRC). The armed men strong. 70 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014 among these refugees attacked the post- for National Union (RANU) in 1979. This genocide government forces in 1995. later became the Rwandese Patriots Zaire was unable or unwilling to contain Army/Front (RPA/F) in 1987.Rwandan their operations: Mobutu had supported refugees who had integrated in Uganda’s the fallen government in Kigali against the politico-security circles founded and led RPF. The increasing insecurity in Rwanda the RPF. Its objective was to facilitate strained Zaire-Rwanda relations, leading the return of all Rwandan refugees to the 1997-2002 Congo War and future to Rwanda–by force if necessary conflicts. (Prunier 1995, p.73). Like anti-Amin groups, Rwandan refugees exploited The 1994 genocide can be traced from opportunities for mobilisation, and the 1959 social revolution following coalesced for forceful return. Because which Rwanda’s ethnic Batutsi refugees peaceful return remained elusive owing traversed the GLR. Initially Batutsi to the aforementioned problems– colonial elites among these migrants organised legacies that entrenched ethno-political a forceful return to Rwanda, under a hatred among the Batutsi and Bahutu, rebel group called Inyenzi (translated failure of these groups’ leading elites “cockroaches”). They used Ugandan to reach compromise, and foreigners’ territory where they had settled as involvement–forceful return would strain refugees. They formed “small, armed relations between Rwanda and their host guerrilla groups which carried armed countries especially Uganda. incursions into the border areas in Rwanda, and later into the interior. The The RPF/A invaded Rwanda on 1 leaderships of Inyenzi consisted of Tutsi October 1990 after ‘deserting’ Uganda’s elites opposed to compromise with NRA (National Resistance Army) in the Hutu establishment [in Kigali], like which they had been integrated since Yeremiya Kajuga, Efraim Ruhozozo, the anti-Amin struggles dating back to and Kamari” (Mushemeza 2007, p.63). 1972 (Kabareebe 2014). Between 1990 The Inyenzi, however, lacked Ugandan and 1994, the war caused security rifts support after 1962/independence, as between Uganda and Rwanda, for the Uganda’s new post-independence invaders had been refugees in Uganda, Obote leadership disapproved of their had actively participated in Uganda’s rebel activities using Ugandan refugee security crises of 1972-1990, and had settlements and territorial spaces. The integrated in Uganda’s politico-security Inyenziwere were defeated in 1963. services. But armed hostility between They went underground. Later, they or the two countries was confined to the their remnants and descendants in exile RPF war for, undoubtedly, Uganda took part in several prevailing insecurities did support the RPF. Regionally, Zaire in especially Uganda and Zaire: for supported Rwanda against the invading instance, Fred Rwigyema and Paul RPF/A, positioning itself against Uganda. Kagame were influential in anti-Amin The war also caused rifts in Rwanda’s and post-Amin Ugandan conflicts. The political landscape (Mushemeza 2007). Inyenzi and/or their descendants later Some ruling elites opposed compromises coalesced under the Rwanda Association with the invading Inyenzi (now renamed

71 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014

Inkotanyi)’s return to Rwanda. Others Among those who fled were ex-FAR and argued for a negotiated settlement of party genocide-militias, commonly known the conflict and return of the invading as Interahamwe (named after the militia RPA. The leadership could not agree. of Rwanda’s largest political party before The conflict eluded political solutions. the genocide). Mobutu Seseseko’s Zaire Meanwhile the RPA was making military was too weak to disarm these refugees. gains against Rwanda’s Force Armises With armed elements amongst refugees, Rwandaise (FAR). When President more recruitment would go on and the Juvenal Habyarimana was assassinated new government of returned Batutsi in on 6 April 1994, as he returned from Rwanda would be destabilised (Meredith Arusha, Tanzania, for peace talks with 2006). the RPF/A, the country degenerated into Exploiting Zaire’s weakness and genocide: the ethnic divide between the unfriendly relations with the RPF, the exiled (therefore rebelling) Batutsi and the “new refugees” regrouped and rearmed. ruling Bahutu had never been reconciled They formed the Forces démocratiques since 1959. The “myths of homeland de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and and return” (Safran 1991) combined attacked Rwanda from Zaire in 1995. with home-country resistance to return Because these fighters invaded from caused by far the most horrible genocide across the border as it had done after in Africa. Refugees desired, mobilised to 1959, the war became interstate as had return. They had done so forcefully. been the RPA invasion that displaced the FAR forces/government. Moreover, the Refugee Desire, Mobilisation, and Bahutu-Batutsi conflict had extended to Attack Zaire with renewed pugnacity, creating The 1994 genocide lasted about three- ethnic geopolitical conflicts. This and-half months as the RPA made exacerbated Rwanda’s fear that the advances on the capital, Kigali. Previous FDLR would exploit conflicts in Zaire, victims of ethno-political conflicts, the which Mobutu had failed to contain, and Batutsi, displaced their earlier expellers continued threatening Rwanda’s internal of 1959, the Bahutu. Rwanda’s Bahutu- and cross border security. The FDLR dominated armed forces, the Force might also exploit limited State control in Armises Rwandaise (FAR), disintegrated Zaire to build strength and find external owing to lack of effective political leadership support. after the president’s assassination. Some officers joined the civilian genocidaires Suspicions, Fears in post-1994 who had been mobilised and encouraged Rwanda by some radical political and media elites. Rwanda invaded Zaire in 1996 in support As the RPF cornered these actors, many of an anti-Mobutu Allied Democratic fled to neighbouring Zaire, with them an Force for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire estimated 1.5 million people, probably (ADFLC). The RPF-ADFLC overthrew more. Former refugees were back in Mobutu and enthroned Laurent Dezire power; those formerly in power were now Kabila in May 1997. Kabila renamed Zaire refugees. to DRC. Rwanda, in supporting Kabila,

72 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014 hoped that Kabila’s new government p.214). Nkunda’s operations underscore would disarm the Rwandan refugees in fears prevalent among Rwandophone Zaire. Kabila failed to satisfy Rwandan Congolese along Tutsi-Hutu divides demands. Rwanda (and Uganda, which within the DRC, as well the transnational had similar security interests) sought to dimension of Rwanda’s ethno-political replace Kabila. This sparked off another tensions that evolved since the dawn of war in August 1998, which lasted until Belgian rule. Kabila’s assassination in January 2001. The DRC-Rwanda relations improved Joseph Kabange-Kabila replaced his with time. Nkunda was, according to father and sought international assistance some reports, arrested in a joint operation to end the second DRC war in 2003 between Rwandese and Congolese (Reyntjens 2009; Prunier 2010). forces on 22 January 2009. This might While Kabila II quickly ended the official have followed serious diplomatic war, in which the DRC accused Rwanda engagements, international pressure and Uganda of invading the country, on Rwanda, and the international another war broke out in North Kivu community’s involvement in the DRC. province. Laurent Nkunda who had A one John-Bosco Ntaganda assumed broken away from the Congolese forces, Nkunda’s leadership (Reyntjens 2009, apparently with Rwanda’s support, led p.6, 211-215, and 265-6). Ntaganda, also the war. Nkunda, who is an ethnic Tutsi, an ethnic Mututsi, reportedly originates claimed to be defending Batutsi minority from Rwanda. He grew up in the DRC in eastern DRC against Bahutu and following the 1959 forced migrations. indigenous Congolese groups. Together He too reportedly received Rwandan with Xavier Chiribanya, Col Jules support. Rwanda seems to use cross Mutebutsi and other politicians supported border ethnic proxies in the DRC to fight by Rwanda, Nkunda formed the Front de against anti-Rwanda groups using DRC Liberation de l’Est du Congo (FLEC). On territory. This turns eastern DRC into a 24 May 2004, his forces declared war in buffer zone for Rwanda’s ethno-political North Kivu, captured Bukavu on 30 May, armed conflicts, while also raising killing civilians in the process (Reyntjens Congolese internal security concerns and 2009, p.211-12). He renamed his group worries about its territorial sovereignty. Congres National pour la defense du When Ntaganda handed over himself to people (CNDP) on 30 December 2006 the United States Embassy in Kigali on (Prunier 2009b, p.323). He clashed with 26 March 2013 for transfer to the ICC the Pakistani-led United Nations Mission the war had not ended (Musavuli 2013; in DRC (MONUC) forces, losing about Arinaitwe 2013). Instead, another group, 300 fighters in November 2006 (Prunier the 23 March Movement (M23), also 2009b, p.323).Though the International known as the Congolese Revolutionary Criminal Court (ICC) accused Nkunda of Army, had emerged under General war crimes and crimes against humanity, Sultani Makenga and Jean-Marie Runiga he was seen as Rwanda’s proxy in Eastern Rugerero who was formerly a member of DRC if reports of Rwanda’s support Nkunda’s CNDP. are anything to go by (Reyntjens 2009,

73 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014

The M23 emerged in April 2012, but is destabilise the country by allying with in reality a continuation of the Nkunda- Bahutu and some disgruntled Batutisi Ntaganda groups. Most of its members in and outside Rwanda. Nkunda, are defecting Congolese soldiers of Tutsi Ntaganda, and M23 groups are said to origin, some of whom are post-1959 be predominantly Tutsi; and therefore Rwandan refugees or their descendants. ethnically linked to the Kigali regime. Some like Nkunda are suspected to be Since most Rwandan refugees had fled to part of Rwanda’s proxies in the DRC that the DRC, it was an immediate geopolitical help check the activities of anti-Rwanda concern. The Zairean State was unable groups that might use Congolese to disarm these refugees, allowing them territory. The group claims to pursue to organise and attack Rwanda. They military interests while also fighting ethnic have since formed different anti-Rwanda conflicts that had spiraled out of Rwanda armed groups, which continue to threaten in 1959 and 1994. The UN has accused Rwanda’s security. To weaken these Rwanda of supporting the M23, indicating groups, Rwanda sought to change the that its invasion of the DRC in support of Zairian leadership in 1996-1997 hoping Nkunda and Ntaganda continues (UNSC that Kabila Sr would disarm these groups. 2008 and 2012). There are ongoing When this failed, Rwanda got enmeshed Uganda-chaired efforts under the in Congo conflicts. It ostensibly supports International Conference on the Great Tutsi-dominated armed groups as proxies Lakes Region (ICGLR) to bring peace to against Hutu-dominated anti-Rwanda the DRC. Whatever the outcome of the groups that operate from DRC territory. ICGLR process, it remains undisputable Consequently, since 1995, Rwanda has that the forced migrations from Rwanda been accused of participating in conflicts in 1959 and 1994 are the key factors that in DRC (Kabila 2001; UNSC 1998, 2008, have caused these security crises over and 2013). Rwanda, in turn, accuses the the years. DRC of allowing anti-Rwanda forces to operate from its territory, and for failure Two lessons remain important in to exercise sovereign control over, and understanding DRC-Rwanda security monopoly of, violence within its territory tensions: suspicions and fears, in now being used by anti-RPF elements. Rwanda, of refugees in the DRC; and These groups are predominantly refugees’ mobilisation and willingness to Rwandan refugees and exiles. These attack using DRC territory. In Rwanda, accusations and counter-accusations the new post-1994 genocide government typify the DRC-Rwanda security relations. was wary that Rwandan refugees in the With these suspicious relations and DRC, among whom were armed former refugees’ mobilisation, the GLR conflicts soldiers and radicalised militia who had transformed “from genocide to continental executed the genocide, would mobilise war” (Prunier 2009a; Reyntjens 2009). and attack Rwanda. This, the refugees did. Forced migration blighted interstate Additionally, Rwanda’s Tutsi-dominated amity. government may be concerned that the Hutu-dominated refugees might use identity-based justifications to further

74 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014

Conclusion appreciating beyond-the-neighbour refugees’ mobilisation, as did the various Forced migration has great potential transnational anti-Amin groups. Likewise, to strain security relations especially emphasis on desire to return home between neighbouring States, though helps us to distinguish securitised return stakeholders in these conflicts may be desires from non-securitised return, and transnational and global. By generating from refugees who integrate. Thus, the suspicions and fears from migrants’ paper has demonstrated that suspicions home country, migration forces sending- and fears from migrants’ home country, State actors to behave in ways that create and migrants’ desire to return home, are security concerns in the host State. sufficient to alter pre-existing interstate Likewise, migrants’ struggles to forcefully relations. A state may not easily return home draw the host and sending instrumentalise refugees to pressure a State into a complex but interlinked neighbour unless these forced migrants security situation. These findings agree are well organised and prepared to with analyses which underscore the return, forcefully where necessary. The geographical dimension of armed conflicts Tanzania-Uganda war indicates that (Robst et al 2007); studies which highlight besides the non-cordial relations that the securitisation of migration (Boswell existed between Nyerere and Amin, the 2007); and International Relations two countries did not face-off until 1978. scholarship which examines the domestic Even as Ugandan exiles struggled with origins of States’ international behaviour Tanzania’s ‘hospitality’, and as Amin (Gordon 1974; Wood 1994; Gokacek, became increasingly concerned with their 2002). I have demonstrated interstate mobilisation, armed conflict took long conflicts that evolve when forceful to break out. The refugees threatened exile generates maneuvers that impact Amin’s power. And yet Tanzania could countries’ security postures. This proves not deny them refuge partly because of the view that refugees strain interstate Nyerere’s misgivings about Amin. The security relations, for their relationship Rwanda-DRC conflict is similar: Rwanda’s with the sending and host State is one refugees in the DRC had transformed of crises of belonging, accusations and into rebels. The post-genocide regime counter-accusations, and of the urge needed time to consolidate their power to return home. By analysing security and restore order in a post-holocaust concerns in migrants’ home country and landscape. But ‘refugee’ attacks from the migrants’ desire to return home, we Zaire forced Rwanda to respond. As are able to identify the two mechanisms former statespersons and patriots by which forced migration raises fears at became rebels and refugees while home while also creating return demands former rebels and refugees became in the host state, hence straining security statespersons and patriots, the Hutu- relations between neighbouring States. Tutsi ethno-political tensions that had This conception is helpful for typified Rwanda’s political landscape distinguishing countries which conflict since 1957 were to define the GLR’s with their refugees’ hosts from those politico-security future as the DRC war that do not. It stresses the value of transformed into “Africa’s World War” 75 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014

(Prunier 2009b; Reyntjens 2009). guarantee their security can the host State and the refugees themselves These findings incentivise me to make accept repatriation. As Walter (1999) and three recommendations. Conceptually Downes (2007) argue, resolving some and analytically, it is important to of the world’s complex transnational distinguish voluntary from forced ethnic and interstate conflicts requires migration, and thereby methodologically determined international involvement develop analytical frameworks for and guarantees because of commitment understanding differences in security problems they engender for both parties. behaviours of voluntary and forced This generalised fear partly explains why migrants across time and space. This is Rwandan refugees in the DRC refused to vital for addressing both conditional and return home peacefully, further allowing causal variables that work in combination war entrepreneurs among them to to produce the observed intestate conflicts. recruit, train, and attack Rwanda, and Empirically, the role of forced migrants, for Rwanda to counterattack refugee based in non-neighbouring countries, in camps in the DRC. This raised the conflict situations involving their fellow dilemma of Rwanda’s self-defence and refugees in neighbouring countries, is respect for the DRC’s territorial integrity vital for clarifying the otherwise unclear in line with UN and African Union (AU) distinction between “international” conventions (AU 2000, Art 3(b); Zacher and “transnational” migrants and their 2001). By highlighting these dilemmas influence on interstate relations. While and complexities of governing Africa’s the geopolitical dimension of migration- transnational and regional security related interstate conflict is helpful from landscape, this study should go the viewpoint of refugee mobilisation, along way in laying the foundation for contemporary refugees can easily foregrounding the evolution and connect with one another from different metamorphosis of refugee-related countries. In fact, some leaders of armed conflicts in the GLR’s changing contours conflicts frequently travel from their of ethno-regional geopolitics (Prunier operational territory for safety, resources, 2009a and 2010). It also provides and other reasons. Many have networks useful insights on how to prevent and/ of supporters beyond neighbouring or minimise interstate conflicts arising states. Therefore, understanding the from transnational armed conflicts. degree to which refugees based in Improvements in domestic governance distant countries influence the causal by encouraging political inclusion, and transformative dynamics of civil and accommodation, and consensus transnational conflicts would be useful democracy, might be the starting contribution to analyses of the migration- point. Developing regional regimes security nexus. that protect refugees in a manner that In terms of policy, the task of addressing prevents their instrumentalisation for refugee problems without raising interstate war entrepreneurship, which might security concerns is considerable. ignite interstate conflicts, or refugees’ Only when the sending State is ready being used by some states as excuses to peacefully receive its refugees and for selfish interests that may generate 76 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014 complex regional security challenges, is Kampala: The Monitor(http://allafrica.com/ equally useful. This requires interstate stories/200110300359.html, 20 May 2013) (2009, March 4). Renegade Col. Kyakabale cooperation, and in case of recalcitrance, on the way home? The Independent. punitive sanctioning. Finally, this analysis Retrieved from http://www.independent. challenges the international community co.ug/reports/special-report/666-renegade- col-kyakabale-on-the-way-home to avoid temptations of underlooking the 2. James Kabarebe, 2013, ‘Rwanda potential for civil conflicts to transform Invasion: Kagame breathes life into into complex regional and global security collapsing struggle’, in Daily Monitor, threats not envisaged at the start of Sunday, Oct. 6 2013 (accessed from http://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/ the civil conflict or of the initial forced ThoughtIdeas/Kagame-breathes-life-into- migration (Prunier 2010). It is ironical that collapsing-struggle/-/689844/2019896/-/ the international community’s experts and view/printVersion/-/gef8shz/-/index.html, 06 Oct. 2013) intelligence services were either unable to envision the potential transformation 3. Mutiibwa, Uganda Since Independence, pp. 125-7 of these refugee-related conflicts in the 4. Abbe Kibirige Semuwemba, Online, Region or that policymakers took it lightly http://semuwemba.com/category/moshi- in the face of an impending “continental conference-1979/ (accessed 20 May 2013). catastrophe” (Prunier 2009b). Lance Corporal (Rtd) Patrick Otto. Though this list is not verified from official sources, I find most of its content supported by official Acknowledgements: sources and scholarly works, such as: Yoweri Museveni, 1997, Sowing the Mustard Seed: I sincerely thank Dr. Subhasish Ray The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in (Dept. of Political Science, NUS) and Dr. Uganda, Autobiography, London: Macmillan Education; S.B.K. Kasozi, 1994, The Social Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho (Dept. of Geography, Origins of Violence in Uganda, Kampala: NUS), as well as students and colleagues Fountain Publishers; Tarsis B Kabwegyere, in NUS’s Migration Research Cluster, for 1995, The Politics of State Formation and Destruction in Uganda, Kampala: Fountain useful comments and critical observations Publishers; and Mutiibwa, Uganda Since on the original draft of this paper. Independence, pp. 126-7

Notes References

______Acheson-Brown, D. G. (2001). The 1. For example: When Rwanda and Tanzania Invasion of Uganda: A Uganda agreed to relocate their respective Just War? International Third World political asylum seekers–Samsom Mande Studies Journal and Review, 12, and Anthony Kyakabale (who had declared war against Uganda)–the two countries pp.1-11 normalised their relations which had been strained since the conflict in Kisangani during Adhikari, P. (2012), The Plight of the the DRC war. See: The Independent, 2009 Forgotten Ones: Civil War and (Wednesday, 04 March), ‘Renegade Col. Forced Migration. International Kyakabale on the way home?’, Kampala: The Independent (http://www.independent. Studies Quarterly, 56(3), pp.590- co.ug/reports/special-report/666-renegade- 606 col-kyakabale-on-the-way-home, 15 May 2013); Julius Mucunguzi and Goodluck M., African Union (AU). (2000). Constitutive 2001 (30 Oct.), ‘Rwanda: Kampala, Kigali Act of the African Union. Lome: Agree to Relocate Renegade Officers’, Togo. Retrieved from http://www1. 77 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014

uneca.org/Portals/ngm/Documents/ shifting centre of gravity in war-torn Conventions%20and%20 Sri Lanka’s transnational politics. Resolutions/constitution.pdf Contemporary South Asia, 20(1), pp.61-75 Amin, J. (2013, April 13). Idi Amin’s son relives his father’s years at the Buhaug, H. & S. Gates (2002). The helm. Daily Monitor. Retrieved Geography of Civil War. Journal of from http://www.monitor.co.ug/ Peace Research, 39(4), pp.417-433 SpecialReports/Idi-Amin-s-son- Downes, E. (2007). The Problem with relives-his-father-s-years-at-the- Negotiated Settlements to Ethnic helm/-/688342/1746682/-/item/1/-/ Civil Wars. Security Studies, 13(4), cbs4cdz/-/index.html pp.230-279 Arinaitwe, O. (2013, Friday, March 29). Fearon, J. D. & D. D. Laitin (2003). No peace after Ntaganda. The Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. Independent. Retrieved from http:// The American Political Science www.independent.co.ug/rwanda- Review, 97(1), pp.75-90 ed/rwanda/7613-no-peace-after- ntaganda Gokcek, G. G. (2002). Ethnic Conflict and Interstate War: An Analysis of the Ascher, W. (1986). The Moralism of Kurdish Problem. Prepared for the Attitudes Supporting Intergroup International Studies Association Violence. Political Psychology, 7(3), Annual Meeting, New Orleans, pp.403-425 Louisiana, March 27, 2002 Baser, B. & A. Swain (2008). Diasporas Gordon, M. R. (1974). Domestic Conflict as Peacemakers: Third Party and the Origins of the First World Mediation in Homeland Conflicts. War: The British and the German International Journal on World Cases. The Journal of Modern Peace, 25(3), pp.7-28 History, 46(2), pp.191-226 Baubock, R. (2003). Toward a Political Hagan, J. & W. Raymond-Richmond, Theory of Migrant Transnationalism. (2008). The Collective Dynamics International Migration Review, of Racial Dehumanization and 37(3), pp.700-23 Genocidal Victimization in Darfur. Boswell, C. (2007). The Securitisation American Sociological Review, of Migration: A Risky Strategy for 73(6), pp.875-902 European States. Copenhagen: Hein, J. (1993). Refugees, Immigrants, Danish Institute for International and the State. Annual Review of Studies Sociology, 19, pp.43-59 Brubaker, R. (1998). Migrations of Ethnic Hiebert, D. (2003). A Borderless World: Unmixing in the “New Europe”. Dream or Nightmare? ACME: An International Migration Review, International E-Journal for Critical 32(4), pp.1047-1065 Geographies, 2(2), pp.188-93 Brun, C. & N. Van Hear (2012). Between the local and the diasporic: The 78 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014

Ho, E. L. (2012). “Refugee” or Kabwegyere, T. B. (1995). The Politics of “Returnee”? The Ethnic Geopolitics State Formation and Destruction in of Diasporic Resettlement in China Uganda. Kampala: Fountain and Intergenerational Change. Kasozi, S.B.K. (1994). The Social Origins Transitions, 38, pp.599-611 of Violence in Uganda. Kampala: Hollifield, J. T. (2004). The Emerging Fountain Migration State. International Khadiagala, G. M. (Ed). (2006). Security Migration Review, 38(3), pp.885- Dynamics in Africa’s Great Lakes 912 Region. London: Lynne Rienner Horowitz, D. L. (1985). Ethnic Groups Koinova, M. (2011). Diasporas and in Conflict. Berkeley: University of secessionist conflicts: The California Press. mobilization of the Armenian, International Crisis Group. (2010, Albanian and Chechen Diasporas. February 23). The Sri Lankan Tamil Ethnic and Racial Studies, 34(2), Diaspora after the LTTE- Asia pp.333-356 Report N°186. Retrieved from http:// Levi, W. (1960). On the Causes of War www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/ and the Conditions of Peace. The asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/186-the- Journal of Conflict Resolution, 4(4), sri-lankan-tamil-diaspora-after-the- pp.411-420 ltte.aspx Levitt, P, J. DeWind and S. Vertovec. International Newsletter on Migration. (2003). International Perspectives (2004). Conceptual and on Transnational Migration: An Methodological Developments in Introduction. International Migration the study of International Migration. Review, 37(3), pp.565-75 International Migration Review, 38(3), pp.1283-91 Levy, J. (1998). The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace. Annual Kabarebe, J. (2013, October 6). Review of Political Science, 1(1), Rwanda Invasion: Kagame pp.139-165 breathes life into collapsing struggle. Daily Monitor. Retrieved Lujala, P. (2010). The Spoils of Nature: from http://www.monitor.co.ug/ Armed Civil Conflict and Rebel Magazines/ThoughtIdeas/Kagame- Access to Natural Resources. breathes-life-into-collapsing- Journal of Peace Research, 47(1), struggle/-/689844/2019896/-/view/ pp.15-28 printVersion/-/gef8shz/-/index.html Lum, B, M. Nikolko, Y. Samy, and D. Carmet. Kabila, J. K. (2001). DRC: President (2013). Diasporas, Remittances Joseph Kabila’s Speech on Day of and State Fragility: Assessing the Inauguration. Retrieved from http:// Linkages. Ethnopolitics: Formerly www.irinnews.org/Report/72397/ Global Review of Ethnopolitics, DRC-President-Joseph-Kabila-s- 12(2), pp.201-219 Speech-on-Day-of-Inauguration, 15 May 2013 79 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014

Mamdani, M. (1998). Understanding Mutiibwa, P. K. (1992). Uganda Since the Crisis in Kivu: Report of Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled the CODESRIA Mission to the Hopes. Trenton NJ: Africa World Democratic Republic of Congo. Press Dakar: CODESRIA Newman, E. and J. Van Selm. (Eds.) Mazrui, A. A. (1975). Soldiers and (2003). Refugees and Forced Kinsmen in Uganda: The Making a Displacement: International Military Ethnocracy. London: Sage Security, Human Vulnerability, Publications and the State. Tokyo & elsewhere: United Nations University Press Mazrui, A. A. (1976). Soldiers as Traditionalizers: Military Rule and Okumu, W. (2007). Counterterrorism the Re-Africanization of Africa. Measures in the East African World Politics, 28(2), pp.246-272 Community. In Andre Le Sage, (Ed.), African Counterterrorism Meredith, M. (2006). The State of Africa: A Cooperation: Assessing Regional History of 50 Years of Independence. and Subregional Initiatives (pp.77- New York: Free Press 98). National Defence University Morrison, D. G., R. C. Mitchell, and J. Press and Potomac Books N. Paden. (1984). Black Africa: A Omara-Otunnu, A. (1987). Politics and Comparative Handbook, New York: the Military in Uganda, 1890-1985. Irving Publishers London: Macmillan Mucunguzi, J. and M. Goodluck. Piazza, J. (2008). Incubators of Terror: (2001). Kigali Agree to Relocate Do Failed and Failing States Renegade Officers. The Monitor. Promote Transnational Terrorism? Retrieved from http://allafrica.com/ International Studies Quarterly, stories/200110300359.html 52(3), pp.469-488 Musavuli, K. (2013). Ntaganda’s Poros, M. V. (2001). The Role of Migrant surrender in Rwanda: What must be Networks in Linking Local Labour different this time in the DR Congo? markets: The Case of Asian Indian The Independent. Retrieved from migration to New York and London. http://www.independent.co.ug/ Global Networks, 1(3), pp.243-260 column/comment/7634-ntagandas- surrender-in-rwanda Prunier, G. (1995). The Rwanda Crisis, 1959–1994: History of A Genocide. Museveni, Y. K. (1997). Sowing the London: Hurst & Co Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda. Prunier, G. (2004). Rebel Movements London: Macmillan Education and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo (1986-99). African Mushemeza, E. D. (2007). The Politics Affairs. 103(412), pp.359-383. of Empowerment and Integration of Rwandan Refugees in Uganda, Prunier, G. (2009a). From Genocide to 1959-1990. Kampala: Fountain Continental War: The Congolese

80 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014

Conflict and the Crisis of Transnational Studies, 1(1), pp.83- Contemporary Africa, London: Hurst 99 Prunier, G. (2009b). Africa’s World War: Salehyan, I. and K. S. Gleditsch. (2006). Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, Refugees and the Spread of Civil and the Making of a Continental War. International Organization, Catastrophe. Oxford & New York: 60(2), pp.335-366 Oxford University Press Salehyan, I. (2007). Transnational Reyntjens, P. (2010). The Great Rebels: Neighboring States as African War: Congo and Regional Sanctuary for Rebel Groups, World Geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge Politics, 59(2), pp.217-242 Massachusetts: Cambridge Salehyan, I. (2009). Rebels without University Press Borders: Transnational Insurgencies Robst, J., S. Polachek, and Y. C. Chang. in World Politics. Ithaca and London: (2007). Geographic Proximity, Cornell University Press Trade, and International Conflict/ Salehyan, I., K. S. Gleditsch, and D. E. Cooperation. Conflict Management Cunningham. (2011). Explaining and Peace Science, 24(1), pp.1-24 External Support for Insurgent Rodney, W. (1972/2012). How Europe Groups. International Organization, Underdeveloped Africa. Cape Town 65(4), pp.709-744 and elsewhere: Pambazuka Press Semuwemba, A. K. (2010, August 02). Rouhana, N. N. and S. T. Fiske. (1995). According to the Moshi Conference Perception of Power, Threat, and Delegates List, Comrade Olara Conflict Intensity in Asymmetric Otunu was actually in UFM just Intergroup Conflict: Arab and Jewish as recently as March 1979 [Blog Citizens of Israel. The Journal of post]. Retrieved from http:// Conflict Resolution, 39(1), pp.49-81 semuwemba.com/category/moshi- conference-1979/ Rwengabo, S. (2013). Regime Stability in Post-1986 Uganda: Counting the Shain, Y. and A. Barth. (2003). Diasporas Benefits of Coup-Proofing. Armed and International Relations Theory. Forces and Society, 39(3), pp.531- International Organization, 57(3), 559 pp.449-479 Rwengabo, S. (2014). The Dark Side Soysal, Y. N. (1994). Limits of regional of Diasporas in Africa’s Great belonging and identity: Migrants Lakes Region. In Sahoo, S. & B. K. and postnational membership in Patternaik, (Eds.), Global Diasporas Europe. Chicago: University of and Development: Socioeconomic, Chicago Press Cultural, and Policy Perspectives The Independent Team. (2013, March (pp.283-304). New Delhi: Springer. 22). DR Congo warlord Ntaganda Safran, W. (1991). Diaspora in Modern now in custody of the ICC. The Societies: Myths of Homeland and Independent. Retrieved from http:// Return. Diaspora: A Journal of www.independent.co.ug/news/ 81 Social Affairs. Vol.1 No.1, 52-82, Fall 2014

news/7598-dr-congo-warlord- 6D27-4E9C-8CD3- ntaganda-now-in-custody-of-the-icc CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2012_979. pdf Umozurike, U. D. and U. O. Umozurike. (1982). Tanzanias Intervention in UNSC. (2014). Final report of the Group of Uganda. Archiv des Völkerrechts, Experts on the Democratic Republic 20(3), pp.301-313 of the Congo. Retrieved from http://www.securitycouncilreport. United Nations High Commission for org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B- Refugees (UNHCR). (1951 and 6D27-4E9C-8CD3- 1967). Convention and Protocol CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_42. relating to the Status of Refugees. pdf Retrieved from http://www.unhcr. org/3b66c2aa10.html Vertovec, S. (2003). Migration and Other Forms of Transnationalism: Toward United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Conceptual Cross-Fertilization. (2010). Final Report the Group International Migration Review, of Experts on the Democratic 37(3), pp.641-665 Republic of the Congo submittee in accordance with Para. 6 of Security Waldmann, P. K. (2010). Radicalisation Council Resolution 1896 (2009). in the Diaspora: Why Muslims in the Retrieved from http://www.un.org/ West Attack Their Host Countries. sc/committees/1533/egroups.html International Terrorism/Working Paper 9/2010. Madrid: Elcano Royal UNSC. (2008). Final report of the Group of Institute Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2008/773. Retrieved Walter, B. F. (1999). Designing Transitions from http://www.un.org/ga/search/ from Civil War: Demobilization, view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/773, Democratization, and Commitments 20 May 2013 to peace. International Security, 24(1), pp.127-155 UNSC. (2012a). Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic Wood, W. B. (1994). Forced Migration: of the Congo. Retrieved from Local Conflicts and International http://www.securitycouncilreport. Dilemmas. Annals of the Association org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B- of American Geographers, 84(4), 6D27-4E9C-8CD3- pp.607-634 CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2012_843. Zacher, M. (2001). The Territorial Integrity pdf Norm. International Boundaries UNSC. (2012b). Report of the Security and the Use of Force. International Council Committee established Organization, 55(2), pp.215-250 pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) Zeleza, P. T. (2005). African Diaspora. In concerning the Democratic Republic Encyclopedia.com. Retrieved from of the Congo. Retrieved from http://www.encyclopedia.com http://www.securitycouncilreport. org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-

82