OLIVIER RENAUT | 71 Thumos and doxa as intermediates in the Republic Olivier Renaut Université Paris Nanterre
[email protected] ABSTRACT Broadly speaking, something can be called intermediate for Plato insofar as it occupies a place between two objects, poles, places, time, or principles. But this broad meaning of the intermediate has been eclipsed by the Aristo- telian critique of the intermediate objects of the dianoia, so that it has become more difficult to think of the intermediates as functions of the soul. The aim of this paper is to show how, in the Republic, thumos is analogously treated as an intermediate with other kinds of intermediate ob- jects, and tentatively to relate this psychological intermediate in a broader theory with doxa, as its epistemological ground in the course of action. Keywords: intermediate, thumos, doxa, opinion, spirit, metaxu https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_18_6 72 | Thumos and doxa as intermediates in the Republic INTRODUCTION soul (with reason and desire) to a tripartition, thumos introduces a new way of thinking of When it comes to “intermediates” in Plato, the relation between reason and desire: thumos one is tempted to think solely of mathematical is immediately thought to be a metaxu. As for intermediates, the objects of dianoia in book 6 doxa, which we take to mean opinion, but also of the Republic. Whether or not it comes from belief, this is certainly an ubiquitous concept Aristotle’s critique on such intermediates, one in Plato’s dialogues which is not tied with any must admit that he himself forgets to describe systematic presentation; nevertheless, as it will as intermediates some of the most important be shown, doxa is presented in the Republic as a aspects of Plato’s psychology and ethical the metaxu too, between knowledge and ignorance, ory1.