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Talos Regional Report – 28 May, 2021 TALOS REGIONAL REPORT – 28 MAY, 2021 Weekly highlights Iran agreed to extend February’s agreement with the IAEA, thus continuing to allow the partial monitoring of Iranian nuclear activities. The extension is a positive indicator, facilitating negotiations to restore the JCPOA by temporarily easing tensions that would likely arise should the inspections under the Additional Protocol be terminated in full. The Iranian Interior Ministry announced a final list of seven approved candidates, from an original pool of 592, to participate in the upcoming Presidential Elections on 18 June. The list notably includes one reformist in a field dominated by principlist candidates, corroborating preliminary expectations of a conservative victory. In the coming weeks the Talos Regional Report will continue to provide analysis of the elections with a series of features, including profiles of the primary candidates. Talos Focus Piece: Iran-linked factions demonstrate intent to escalate UAV activity. A recent increase in UAV attacks in Iraq highlights intent by Iran-linked factions to employ drones to target US-linked locations. Combined with the observed escalation in Yemen, this highlights concerns about intent to replicate tactics employed by the Houthi Movement in Yemen. The Talos Regional Report offers a weekly summary and analysis of the main strategic security developments in the region, with a focus on Turkey, Iran, Syria and the Gulf region from a regional perspective. The report is complementary to Talos’ Iraq coverage which offers unrivalled insight into Iraq’s security, political, economic and social developments. Reports are accessible through a secure online portal with interactive mapping and client-driven analysis. To subscribe to Talos products, or for a free trial access to the Talos reporting please contact Talos Director Ellen Pope at [email protected]. For more insight into Talos please visit www.talos-iraq.com/welcome-to-talos Every effort is made to provide accurate and complete information, however TALOS LLC does not warrant that the information in this document is complete, true, accurate or correct. TALOS LLC accepts no liability arising out of or in connection with the comments made or information provided in this report and is not responsible for any decision made in reliance on this report. TALOS LLC does not accept any liability if this report is used for an alternative purpose from which it is intended, nor to any third party in respect of this report. This information product is graded as Commercial in Confidence and should be transmitted, communicated, stored and secured accordingly. Weekly regional snapshot To access detailed interactive map, click here Iran In a phone call with the Chinese President Xi Jinping, Iranian counterpart Hassan Rouhani reaffirmed intent to implement the Strategic Partnership document signed on March 7. According to a government readout, Rouhani described relations with China as “strategic and durable”, and emphasised intent to expand economic cooperation and facilitate Chinese investments. For his part, Jinping expressed support for Iran’s re-entry into the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and described the termination of US sanctions as a prerequisite for Iran’s return. A related assessment of the Iran-China partnership is available in the Talos Regional Report 09 April 2021. In a vote on 26 May, Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf was re-elected Speaker of Parliament for another year. Qalibaf, a prominent principlist MP who ran unsuccessfully against President Rouhani in the 2017 elections, was elected by a vote of 230 to 18 against rival Fereydoon Abbasi. In a statement addressing the Israel-Palestinian ceasefire, Ayatollah Khamenei said Israel was “forced to accept defeat” while praising the resistance of the Palestinian people. Meanwhile, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyef thanked Iran for continuing to “provide funds and weapons” to the organisation and for its support during the latest round of hostilities. CONFIDENTIAL – FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY Page 2 of 12 Syria The Syrian Presidential elections proceeded as planned on 26 May, amidst international protestations and widespread rejection of polling legitimacy by opposition groups. Casting his vote on the day, President Assad, who is overwhelmingly expected to secure a fourth term, dismissed criticism and opinions in the west as irrelevant. While the widely predictable election results are expected to be presented in the coming days, regional diplomatic reactions to the polls will serve as key indicators amidst ongoing normalisation efforts, notably between Syria and the Gulf states. Turkey Turkish authorities announced the closure of the Diyarbakir Airport in eastern Turkey for more than a month following a UAV strike against the location on 19 May. Turkey blamed the incident on the PKK but paradoxically denied any damage was inflicted. Reports citing local witnesses indicated at least one impact resulted in a fire, but no casualties were discussed. The airport is located in the Kurdish-dominated Diyarbakir province and is utilized for civilian and military purposes. Iraq At least one round of indirect fire impacted the al-Assad Airbase in Anbar province on 23 May. According to the Spokesperson for Operation Inherent Resolve, the attack comprised a single rocket impact with no casualties, however, local reports and circumstantial evidence indicate a possible UAV strike (see more p. 7). Large-scale demonstrations were held nationwide on 25 May, as protesters affiliated with the October Movement organised mass gatherings to denounce violence against civil activists. In Baghdad, clashes with security forces resulted in the death of at least one protester, and 28 others were reportedly injured. Coordinated demonstrations were held in several provincial capitals across the country. Saudi Arabia & Yemen On 20 May, US Special Envoy to Yemen Tim Lenderking announced a US decision to impose sanctions on two senior Houthi military officials involved in coordinating the continued operation in Marib. Meanwhile, Lenderking expressed support for the reopening of all ports and airports in Yemen to ease humanitarian conditions in the country. Lenderking described the lifting of the blockade as a required step towards finding a lasting political solution to the conflict. UAE & Gulf Region Qatar and Egypt assisted in brokering a ceasefire between Israel and Palestine, ending weeks of hostilities. Cautious optimism remains that the ceasefire will hold, while successful Qatari-Egyptian cooperation constitutes a sign of improved relations between the two countries following the al- Ula Agreement in early January. To recall, Egypt participated in the diplomatic and economic blockade of Qatar, and has yet to restore ambassadorial relations with Doha despite the end of the blockade. CONFIDENTIAL – FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY Page 3 of 12 Iran agrees to extend technical agreement with IAEA Iran agreed to extend February’s agreement with the IAEA that allows the continuation of partial monitoring of Iranian nuclear activities. The extension is a positive indicator, facilitating negotiations to restore the JCPOA by temporarily easing tensions that would likely arise should the inspections under the Additional Protocol be terminated in full. On 24 May, the National Security Council of Iran announced a decision to extend the agreement reached with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in February, thus continuing partial inspections of Iranian nuclear activities. The statement added the decision ensures “negotiations have the necessary chance to progress and bear results.” IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi confirmed the extension, stating partial monitoring will continue until 24 June. IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi To recall (see Talos Regional Report 26 February), in February 2021 the Iranian Government implemented the Strategic Action Plan, a piece of legislation ratified in the aftermath of the assassination of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakrizadeh, that accelerated nuclear activities and nominally suspended more intrusive inspections under the Additional Protocol of the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA). Under the stipulations of the Additional Protocol, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) is required to provide data and surveillance footage to the IAEA on a monthly basis in order to facilitate monitoring. Shortly before the implementation of the Strategic Action Plan, the AEOI and the IAEA reached a technical understanding whereby Iran would continue to collect but withhold for up to three months, the release of the data pending the lifting of sanctions. Grossi said at the time that the technical understanding - which has now been extended for another month with sanctions still in place - allows necessary verification and monitoring activities to continue. CONFIDENTIAL – FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY Page 4 of 12 Extension likely to facilitate negotiations The extension of the technical understanding is a positive indicator, facilitating negotiations for the restoration of the JCPOA by temporarily easing tensions that would likely arise should the Additional Protocol be terminated in full. The extension is however politically sensitive given accusations from conservative factions in Tehran that the technical understanding violates the Strategic Action Plan and undermines Iranian leverage in current negotiations. Earlier this week, Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi, who leads the Iranian negotiation team, held a meeting
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