TALOS REGIONAL REPORT – 28 MAY, 2021

Weekly highlights agreed to extend February’s agreement with the IAEA, thus continuing to allow the partial monitoring of Iranian nuclear activities. The extension is a positive indicator, facilitating negotiations to restore the JCPOA by temporarily easing tensions that would likely arise should the inspections under the Additional Protocol be terminated in full.

The Iranian Interior Ministry announced a final list of seven approved candidates, from an original pool of 592, to participate in the upcoming Presidential Elections on 18 June. The list notably includes one reformist in a field dominated by principlist candidates, corroborating preliminary expectations of a conservative victory. In the coming weeks the Talos Regional Report will continue to provide analysis of the elections with a series of features, including profiles of the primary candidates.

Talos Focus Piece: Iran-linked factions demonstrate intent to escalate UAV activity. A recent increase in UAV attacks in Iraq highlights intent by Iran-linked factions to employ drones to target US-linked locations. Combined with the observed escalation in Yemen, this highlights concerns about intent to replicate tactics employed by the Houthi Movement in Yemen.

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Weekly regional snapshot

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Iran

In a phone call with the Chinese President Xi Jinping, Iranian counterpart reaffirmed intent to implement the Strategic Partnership document signed on March 7. According to a government readout, Rouhani described relations with China as “strategic and durable”, and emphasised intent to expand economic cooperation and facilitate Chinese investments. For his part, Jinping expressed support for Iran’s re-entry into the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and described the termination of US sanctions as a prerequisite for Iran’s return. A related assessment of the Iran-China partnership is available in the Talos Regional Report 09 April 2021.

In a vote on 26 May, Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf was re-elected Speaker of Parliament for another year. Qalibaf, a prominent principlist MP who ran unsuccessfully against President Rouhani in the 2017 elections, was elected by a vote of 230 to 18 against rival Fereydoon Abbasi.

In a statement addressing the Israel-Palestinian ceasefire, Ayatollah Khamenei said Israel was “forced to accept defeat” while praising the resistance of the Palestinian people. Meanwhile, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyef thanked Iran for continuing to “provide funds and weapons” to the organisation and for its support during the latest round of hostilities. CONFIDENTIAL – FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY Page 2 of 12

Syria

The Syrian Presidential elections proceeded as planned on 26 May, amidst international protestations and widespread rejection of polling legitimacy by opposition groups. Casting his vote on the day, President Assad, who is overwhelmingly expected to secure a fourth term, dismissed criticism and opinions in the west as irrelevant. While the widely predictable election results are expected to be presented in the coming days, regional diplomatic reactions to the polls will serve as key indicators amidst ongoing normalisation efforts, notably between Syria and the Gulf states.

Turkey

Turkish authorities announced the closure of the Diyarbakir Airport in eastern Turkey for more than a month following a UAV strike against the location on 19 May. Turkey blamed the incident on the PKK but paradoxically denied any damage was inflicted. Reports citing local witnesses indicated at least one impact resulted in a fire, but no casualties were discussed. The airport is located in the Kurdish-dominated Diyarbakir province and is utilized for civilian and military purposes.

Iraq

At least one round of indirect fire impacted the al-Assad Airbase in Anbar province on 23 May. According to the Spokesperson for Operation Inherent Resolve, the attack comprised a single rocket impact with no casualties, however, local reports and circumstantial evidence indicate a possible UAV strike (see more p. 7).

Large-scale demonstrations were held nationwide on 25 May, as protesters affiliated with the October Movement organised mass gatherings to denounce violence against civil activists. In Baghdad, clashes with security forces resulted in the death of at least one protester, and 28 others were reportedly injured. Coordinated demonstrations were held in several provincial capitals across the country.

Saudi Arabia & Yemen

On 20 May, US Special Envoy to Yemen Tim Lenderking announced a US decision to impose sanctions on two senior Houthi military officials involved in coordinating the continued operation in Marib. Meanwhile, Lenderking expressed support for the reopening of all ports and airports in Yemen to ease humanitarian conditions in the country. Lenderking described the lifting of the blockade as a required step towards finding a lasting political solution to the conflict.

UAE & Gulf Region

Qatar and Egypt assisted in brokering a ceasefire between Israel and Palestine, ending weeks of hostilities. Cautious optimism remains that the ceasefire will hold, while successful Qatari-Egyptian cooperation constitutes a sign of improved relations between the two countries following the al- Ula Agreement in early January. To recall, Egypt participated in the diplomatic and economic blockade of Qatar, and has yet to restore ambassadorial relations with Doha despite the end of the blockade.

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Iran agrees to extend technical agreement with IAEA Iran agreed to extend February’s agreement with the IAEA that allows the continuation of partial monitoring of Iranian nuclear activities. The extension is a positive indicator, facilitating negotiations to restore the JCPOA by temporarily easing tensions that would likely arise should the inspections under the Additional Protocol be terminated in full.

On 24 May, the National Security Council of Iran announced a decision to extend the agreement reached with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in February, thus continuing partial inspections of Iranian nuclear activities. The statement added the decision ensures “negotiations have the necessary chance to progress and bear results.” IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi confirmed the extension, stating partial monitoring will continue until 24 June.

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi To recall (see Talos Regional Report 26 February), in February 2021 the Iranian Government implemented the Strategic Action Plan, a piece of legislation ratified in the aftermath of the assassination of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakrizadeh, that accelerated nuclear activities and nominally suspended more intrusive inspections under the Additional Protocol of the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA). Under the stipulations of the Additional Protocol, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) is required to provide data and surveillance footage to the IAEA on a monthly basis in order to facilitate monitoring. Shortly before the implementation of the Strategic Action Plan, the AEOI and the IAEA reached a technical understanding whereby Iran would continue to collect but withhold for up to three months, the release of the data pending the lifting of sanctions. Grossi said at the time that the technical understanding - which has now been extended for another month with sanctions still in place - allows necessary verification and monitoring activities to continue. CONFIDENTIAL – FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY Page 4 of 12

Extension likely to facilitate negotiations The extension of the technical understanding is a positive indicator, facilitating negotiations for the restoration of the JCPOA by temporarily easing tensions that would likely arise should the Additional Protocol be terminated in full. The extension is however politically sensitive given accusations from conservative factions in Tehran that the technical understanding violates the Strategic Action Plan and undermines Iranian leverage in current negotiations.

Earlier this week, Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi, who leads the Iranian negotiation team, held a meeting with members of the Iranian Parliament’s Security and Defence Committee to discuss the current state of negotiations ahead of the next round of dialogue this week in Vienna. According to Committee Spokesperson and conservative MP Abolfazl Amouei, members of the committee reiterated demands that “all US sanctions must be lifted and verified” before Iran returns to its previous commitments. In a statement on Twitter following the meeting, Araghchi described the talks as “very tough” but “useful”, indicating continued disagreements between the government and conservative dominated parliament. However, Araghchi reiterated in the same statement the Iranian position that the US “must first provide verifiable sanctions lifting” and that “Iran will then resume full implementation.”

With Iranian Presidential elections approaching, conservative pressure for a more hard-line approach will likely complicate further concessions from the government, potentially resulting in a continued stalemate. On 23 May, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken indicated doubts over the current progress of the negotiations, saying “we don’t yet have an answer to” whether “Iran is ready and willing to make a decision to do what it has to do.” Blinken acknowledged however, that previous rounds have been helpful in clarifying the positions and objectives of both sides.

It should be noted that the current extension is set to expire shortly after the Presidential elections held on 18 June. In the likely event of a conservative victory, the elections are expected to produce an overhaul of the Iranian negotiation team currently led by Araghchi. The next round of negotiations commenced on 26 May and are ongoing as of writing, with no significant progress reported thus far.

Iranian presidential candidates approved The Iranian Interior Ministry announced a final list of seven approved candidates, from an original pool of 592, to participate in the upcoming Presidential Elections on 18 June. The list notably includes one reformist in a field dominated by principlist candidates, corroborating preliminary expectations of a conservative victory. The Talos Regional Report will continue to provide analysis of the elections in the coming weeks, with a series of features including profiles of the primary candidates.

The candidates announced by the Interior Ministry on 25 May include Mohsen Mehralizadeh, Seyed Ebrahim Raisi, Saeed Jalili , Alireza Zakani, Seyed Amir Hossein Qazizadeh Hashemi, Mohsen Rezaei and Abdolnaser Hemmati. Mohsen Mehralizadeh – the former Vice President under President Khatami and former Governor of the Isfahan Province – stands out as the only reformist candidate, representing the Party of the Nation’s Path. Remaining candidates fall on the principlist (or conservative) spectrum, corroborating expectations of a conservative victory.

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The most prominent principlist candidate, and the preliminary favourite following the disqualification of former parliament speaker Ali Larijani, is Ebrahim Raisi who is the current Head of the Judiciary appointed by Ayatollah Khamenei in 2019 and who ran unsuccessfully in the 2017 Presidential Elections. Raisi finished second behind President Rouhani as a candidate for the Popular Group of Islamic Revolution Forces, the main conservative faction, with 38.3% of the votes. Another prominent candidate is Saeed Jaili - a former nuclear negotiator, diplomat and member of the principlist Front of Islamic Revolutionary Stability, a far-right wing party. Jaili unsuccessfully ran in the 2013 elections, ending third behind Rouhani and Parliament Speaker Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf.

Ebrahim Raisi, current head of the Iranian Judiciary, slated as preliminary favorite Remaining candidates have less prominent profiles. These included Alireza Zakani, an experienced and former MP who served four separate parliamentary terms representing various principlist factions. Zakani registered but was disqualified from running in the 2013 and 2017 elections. Seyed Hashemi - the current spokesperson for the Front of Islamic Revolution Stability - is another experienced principlist MP. Mohsen Rezai is a senior officer in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the only IRGC-linked candidate following the disqualification of several senior members during the registration phase. Abdolnaser Hemmati, a prominent banker and the current Governor of the Central Bank, is officially running as an independent. Hemmati also served in the Economy Committee of the National Security Council and as the Ambassador to China.

585 candidates screened out by the There were 592 prospective candidates originally registered to participate during the five-day registration period earlier in May, with all but 45 immediately disqualified by the Guardian Council for failing to meet minimum requirements. Prominent candidates disqualified by the Guardian CONFIDENTIAL – FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY Page 6 of 12

Council notably included Ali Larijani – the former parliament speaker who, despite being nominally identified as a conservative, has occasionally allied with President Rouhani and played a significant role in shielding the government over the JCPOA. The disqualification of Larijani was unexpected, with preliminary reports suggesting a likely race between the centrist Larijani and Ebraim Raisi. Other prominent but disqualified candidates included former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and , a former Vice President and ally of President Rouhani.

Foreign Minister Zarif and Speaker of Parliament Ghalibaf did not register as prospective candidates despite widespread speculation of their participation in the lead up to the registration period. While Zarif never publicly expressed intent to participate, the release of a leaked recording containing critical remarks of Qasem Soleimani and the influence of the IRGC on Iranian diplomacy, is widely believed to have realistically ended his candidacy.

Talos Focus Piece: Iran-linked factions demonstrate intent to escalate UAV activity A recent increase in UAV attacks in Iraq highlights intent by Iran-linked factions to employ drones in targeting US-linked locations. Combined with the observed escalation in Yemen, this highlights concerns regarding intent to replicate tactics employed by the Houthi Movement in Yemen.

Three UAV strikes in Iraq highlight standing intent: Thus far in 2021, at least three separate attacks involving weaponized Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have targeted US-linked locations in Iraq, underscoring a tactical change in the modus operandi employed by Iran-linked factions. On 14 April, Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) Spokesperson Col. Wayne Marotto confirmed a UAV strike involving one explosion targeted a storage hangar at Erbil Airbase, adjacent to Erbil International Airport, causing a fire but no casualties. The KRG Interior Ministry subsequently confirmed the involvement of a so-called “suicide drone”, a UAV outfitted as loitering munition. Early on 8 May, another UAV, likewise involving a loitering munition, targeted al-Assad Airbase in Anbar province. One aircraft hangar was damaged, but no casualties were reported. A third UAV strike on 14 May was not widely discussed but was confirmed by Talos through reliable closed sources. This attack targeted Harir Airbase, located north of Erbil City, with no casualties discussed.

A fourth possible attack took place on 24 May when at least one round of indirect fire reportedly impacted the al-Assad Airbase amidst scant reporting. The Iraqi Security Media Cell and the OIR Spokesperson both confirmed the involvement of a rocket attack, however, separate unverified reports from local reliable sources indicated the potential involvement of an explosive-laden UAV, with the absence of a confirmed point of origin and reports of a single impact with high accuracy providing circumstantial evidence of a UAV-strike. As of writing, the nature of the attack on 24 May remains unconfirmed.

Regardless of the veracity of the reports surrounding the 24 May incident, the repeated attacks this year corroborate increased militia intent to expand the utilization of UAVs in indirect fire attacks against US-linked locations beyond standard tactics, typically involving the employment of CONFIDENTIAL – FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY Page 7 of 12

107 and 122mm rockets. Prior incidents recorded in Iraq include an isolated incident in September 2020 when a crude UAV delivering an improvised aerial munition reportedly impacted facilities of an international private security company entity in central Baghdad. While Iranian conventional drones have been consistently employed for reconnaissance purposes during the IS-campaign, the attack on Erbil Airbase on 14 April comprised the first incident involving a weaponized UAV targeting a US-linked location.

Other incidents during 2021 corroborating militia employment of drones to demonstrate regional projection capabilities includes the interception of a UAV in the vicinity of Riyadh on 23 January, claimed by the Iraqi Alwiyat al-Waad al-Haq militia. The recent interception of an unspecified UAV in the vicinity of Beith Shean in Israel was likewise claimed by an Iraq-based militia faction, with Iran-linked militia involvement corroborated by Israeli officials.

The circumstances differ and the evidence remains difficult to confirm, but the frequency of attacks, combined with the demonstrated capability to successfully exploit vulnerabilities in existing air defense systems at US-linked linked locations, have predictably raised concerns about expanding intent and capability to utilize such tactics in future attacks. In a press conference coinciding with his most recent visit to Iraq and Syria, CENTCOM Commander Frank McKenzie reiterated concerns about the increasing UAV threat while acknowledging that measures are being undertaken to mitigate existing vulnerabilities.

Iraq-based capabilities subject to confirmation The UAV variants involved in the recent attacks remain unconfirmed, as US officials have refrained from providing details amidst reports generally referring to the involvement of single so-called “suicide drones” – a generic term denoting little more than a loitering munition without repeated strike capabilities. Details of explosive charges and the point of origin of the attacks – which would provide insight into the variants involved – have likewise not been confirmed amidst deliberately scant reporting, reflecting assessed sensitivities on both sides. In his press conference, McKenzie notably emphasized concerns about the “small-drone threat” involving “quadcopters”, likely referring to the use of commercially available UAVs equipped with explosives.

While certainly a source of concern given the relative accessibility of such devices, the assessed range and damage involved in the attacks in Erbil and Anbar required a significant explosive carriage. This suggests the more likely involvement of a sophisticated capability resembling those employed by Iran-linked factions elsewhere, notably by the Houthi Movement in Yemen. Erbil, Harir, and al-Assad Airbases are all located well outside the range of most commercially available drones from current militia support zones, and the damage inflicted is likewise assessed to require the delivery of explosive charges far exceeding those of improvised devices utilizing regular quadcopters. These considerations are corroborated by imagery circulating in the aftermath of the 14 May attack allegedly showing debris of the variant involved, with initial but unconfirmed

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Alleged footage of debris of UAV employed in attack on Erbil Airbase assessments pointing to a fixed-wing UAV with a wingspan resembling the Samad-1 variant widely employed by the Houthi Movement in Yemen, and an approximate range of 500km.

Details of the UAV variants involved in the Riyadh attack on 23 January are likewise unclear amidst initial efforts by the Saudi coalition to downplay the significance of the incident. To recall, initial claims by Alwiyat al-Waad al-Haq – a previously unknown faction with suspected ties to Katai’b Hezbollah – were preliminarily considered propaganda, however subsequent reports citing US and Saudi intelligence officials have added credibility to the reports. While the point of origin has not been confirmed, any UAV strike targeting Riyadh from Iraqi territory would, at a minimum, require range capabilities in excess of 485km, which is consistent with the assessed involvement of a Samad-type drone.

As previously discussed in Talos Regional Reporting, there is precedence of suspected long-range drone capabilities being utilized by Iraq-linked factions, including most notably, attacks in May of 2019 when two pumping stations were targeted in Dawadimi and Afif in Saudi Arabia. The attacks reportedly involved a "delta-wing" design, variably referred to as the Samad-2 or UAV-X, with reported similarities to the Samad 1 and Samad 3. The point of origin was reportedly identified in Iraq’s Jurf al-Sakhar, a Katai’b Hezbollah stronghold, superficially corroborating reports of this organization’s involvement in the attack earlier this year.

Houthi capabilities expanding with Iranian assistance: The reported involvement of Alwiyat al-Waad al-Haq in the January 23 attack, combined with the possible proliferation of Houthi-style capabilities in Iraq, highlights the possibility of increased Iranian coordination. This is predictably raising concerns about intent to mirror tactics employed by militias in Yemen, where Houthi capabilities and intent to employ UAVs, with Iranian assistance, have evolved significantly since 2017. While officials in Tehran continued to deny the provision of

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material support beyond the imposition of an arms embargo, Iranian officials have admitted assisting in the transition from initially crude and domestically built devices to advanced long-range capabilities from 2017 and onwards. This predominantly includes the deployments of the Samad series (including Samad 1, 2 and 3) and the Qasef series (including Qasef 1 and 2) in a combat capacity while other designs, including the Hudhud-1 and the Rased, are predominantly employed for reconnaissance purposes.

FSamad-3 series, widely implicated in long-range attacks in Saudi Arabia The long-range Samad-series, with estimated ranges between 500km and 1500km and a reported delivery capacity of 18kg of explosives, is implied in several long-distance attacks against high- profile targets within Saudi Arabia and (allegedly) the UAE including operations targeting oil facilities in Ras Tanura in 2018, Shabayh oilfield, Dawadimi-Afif and Abqaiq-Kurais in 2019, and in Ras Tanura in March 2021. The Sammad-3 is also implied in alleged attacks targeting Abu Dhabi and Dubai International Airports in July and August 2018 respectively, with the latter not verified.

By comparison, the Qased-1 and 2, with assessed ranges of approximately 150km and a delivery capacity of approximately 30kg, is predominantly implied in attacks within Yemen and in southern Saudi Arabia where, statistically, the majority of attacks are conducted. The frequency of attacks has undeniably increased, with near-weekly attacks recorded in southern Saudi Arabia so far during 2021, including attacks in Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jizan, and Najran. While the Saudi-led coalition typically refrains from specifying capabilities involved, statements by Houthi officials indicate attacks most commonly involving the Qasef-2 and Sammad-3, with the target locations falling well within the range limitations of the Qasef-type drones.

In a further significant development this year, the Houthi Movement announced the development of a Sammad-4 version, with secondary strike capabilities that may be used for repeated attacks, allowing explosives to be discharged and the aircraft then returned to the point of origin. There is as yet no evidence of the aircraft being deployed in combat, however, the design was reportedly showcased in March, with associated Houthi rhetoric claiming a range superseding 2000 km and a capability to deliver two explosive charges of approximately 20kg each. As of writing, these claims remain unconfirmed pending demonstration and verification. CONFIDENTIAL – FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY Page 10 of 12

Strategic considerations and outlook: While these developments in Yemen serve as a potentially ominous precedent and justify concerns about the increasing capabilities of Iran-linked factions, it is important to consider differences in the strategic context in which these capabilities are employed, and the associated limitations imposed as a result. For the Houthi movement, the operations against strategic Saudi interests can be conducted with relative impunity and are consistent with assessed intent to escalate operations to accelerate Saudi withdrawal from Yemen. Iranian support in developing Houthi capabilities can likewise be expected to continue, with comparatively limited pushback against wider Iranian interests. Another significant difference involves the targeting of predominantly Saudi, not US, strategic interests, which continue to provoke little more than rhetorical responses from the US.

In Iraq by contrast, Iran-linked factions remain mindful of wider escalation, with attacks more carefully calibrated to reduce the potential for significant retaliation or associated political fallout that may negatively affect Iranian strategic interests. This includes efforts to reduce or fully expel US troop presence, and restoring mutual compliance with the JCPOA, with Iranian strategy assessed to involve a combination of diplomatic and proxy-linked pressure tactics working in tandem. Thus far, the attacks in Erbil and Anbar are assessed to comprise a demonstration of capability for strategic threat messaging purposes rather than to inflict casualties and provoke wider escalation, as evidenced by the utilization of high-precision, long-range drones inflicting material damage without casualties.

An escalation in UAV attacks is certainly plausible, especially in the event that international media attention for such attacks begins to wane. Retaliatory responses from the US comprise another key indicator, with the Biden administration so far continuing to pursue a relatively cautious approach, reflecting intent to avoid regional entanglements despite recent developments. So far, airstrikes in eastern Syria in January, calibrated to target IRGC-linked facilities outside Iraq, constitutes the only retaliatory event to Iran-linked operations and was assessed to be conducted in response to the death of a US contractor, which remains a ‘red line’ and likely to provoke a more concerted response from the US in the event of further casualties.

In the current context, wider employment of UAVs replicating the scale witnessed in Saudi Arabia is highly unlikely, but the trajectory of the UAV threat and the employment of additional capabilities showcased in Yemen should be considered in the context of wider strategic developments. As such, the impact of key developments, including the US-Iraq Strategic Dialogue, JCPOA negotiations, the Iran-Saudi rapprochement efforts, and possible changes to Iranian strategic objectives associated with the Iranian Presidential elections, should be monitored closely.

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Weekly incidents

Please see full interactive map Here Country On 23 May, nine individuals were reportedly injured in an unspecified explosion inside an industrial facility in the Ishafan province. The cause of the explosion was not specified, but the facility is reportedly utilized for the manufacturing of explosive materials and materials used Iran for the manufacturing of UAVs. On 23 May, a suspected drone attack reportedly targeted a PMF-linked vehicle in the vicinity of the Iraq/Syrian border. The attack was not confirmed by official sources, however Shia militia Iraq linked sources claimed an Israeli airstrike targeted a vehicle inside Iraqi territory. On 25 May, at least one protester was killed and 28 others injured during clashes with security forces in central Baghdad. This followed nation-wide gatherings organised by October Iraq movement protesters demanding accountability for violence against civil activists. On 25 May, ten civilians were wounded when a VBIED detonated in Hadithah district, Anbar Iraq province. IS claimed responsibility for the attack in a statement. On 24 May, according to OIR Spokesman Col. Wayne Marotto and other sources, one rocket impacted at Al Asad Air Base, western Anbar province. The spokesman added no injuries were reported, and the damage was “being assessed.” According to unverified reports provided by reliable local sources, two or three injuries resulted from the impact, with the nationalities of Iraq the victims not publicized. Saudi On 24 May, the Saudi-led coalition announced the interception of an explosive laden boat in an Arabia unspecified area of the southern Red Sea. Saudi On 26 May, the Saudi-led coalition announced the interception of unspecified "projectiles" in Arabia the vicinity of Jizan, southern Saudi Arabia. No casualties were reported. On 21 May, five members of the Syrian government forces were reportedly killed in an IS Syria ambush east of Palmyra, eastern Homs. On 19 May, a UAV strike targeted the Diyarbakir airport in southeastern Turkey. The Turkish government blamed the incident on the PKK, with official reporting indicating no damage Turkey inflicted. Reports citing local witnesses indicated at least one impact causing a fire. On 24 May, an explosive-laden UAV detonated inside a market in Marib. Three civilians were Yemen killed. On 20 May, the Saudi-led coalition announced the interception of an explosive-laden UAV in Yemen the vicinity of Jizan. On 24 May, the Saudi-led coalition announced the assassination of a senior Hezbollah leader in Yemen the vicinity of Marib. The operative was killed in an airstrike.

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