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Program Occasional Paper Series MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SUMMER 2005 Iran After the June 2005 Presidential Election The Iranian Presidential Elections: Who Voted, Why, Introduction didate was not a serious contender). The con- How & Does it Matter? 5 Haleh Esfandiari, Director, Middle East Program servatives, unable to achieve consensus on a As part of its series on Iran, the Middle East single candidate, fielded two men: Mohammad What Does the Ninth Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Baqer Qalibaf, a former member of the Center for Scholars, in collaboration with the Revolutionary Guards, and, until he resigned Presidential Election Say Institute for National Strategic Studies at the the post on the eve of the campaign, the chief about Iranian Politics? 8 National Defense University, hosted two meet- of the Tehran police; and Mahmoud ings on the ninth Iranian presidential election. Ahmadinejad, the mayor of Tehran and a civil Ahmadinejad and the The first meeting, on May 23, 2005, focused engineer by training. The reformist camp also Parliament 10 on the politics of the election campaign; the ended up with two candidates: Mostafa Moin, second, on July 7, 2005, analyzed the outcome a former Minister of Science, Research and of the election and its implications for the Technology (formerly known as the Ministry Regime Change in Tehran: future. The proceedings of the first meeting of Culture and Higher Education), and Mehdi The Direction of Foreign can be accessed on the Middle East Program’s Karrubi, a cleric and a former Speaker of Policy in a Post-Khatami website, www.wilsoncenter.org/middleeast. Parliament. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Presidency 13 This publication brings together the papers chairman of the Expediency Council, ran as presented at the second, post-election meeting. the pragmatic centrist. Rafsanjani, also a for- The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to mer Speaker of Parliament, had already served Iran’s New President and the presidency in June 2005 caught observers two previous terms as president (1989-1997). Relations with the U.S. 16 both in Iran and abroad by surprise. The elec- Analysts almost universally expected a close tion was basically a five-man race (a sixth can- contest between Rafsanjani and Moin, and The Iranian Street in the Post-Khatami Era 17 This publication was made possible through the support of the Open Society Institute. MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SUMMER 2005 hardly focused on the other candidates. Iranian ed he would be the man to repair relations with law requires a second round of balloting if no the United States, bring negotiations with the candidate wins over 50% of the vote in the first Europeans on Iran’s nuclear program to a suc- round. Each of the eight previous presidential cessful conclusion, and spur economic growth. elections was decided in the first round. On this Ahmadinejad ran on a populist platform, criti- occasion, most analysts expected Rafsanjani to cizing the elites he claimed had monopolized win in the second round, if not in the first. wealth and power, and promised expanded During the campaign, Moin promised to con- opportunities for the little man. Karrubi’s cam- tinue the reformist policies of outgoing presi- paign also had populist overtones; he promised dent Mohammad Khatami. Rafsanjani suggest- a handout of around $65 per month to every About the Middle East Program Director The Middle East Program was launched in February 1998 in light of increased Dr. Haleh Esfandiari U.S. engagement and the profound changes sweeping across many Middle Eastern states. In addition to spotlighting day-to-day issues, the Program continues Associate to concentrate on long-term developments and their impact on political and social Jillian Frumkin structure, economic development, and relations with the United States. The Middle East Program draws on domestic and foreign regional experts for its Assistant meetings, conferences, and occasional papers. Conferences and meetings assess the Julia Bennett policy implications of long-term political, social, and economic developments in the region and individual states; the Middle East's role in the international arena; Special thanks American interests in the region; the threat of terrorism; and strategic threats to and Special thanks to Professor from the regional states. Judith Yaphe of the Institute for The Program pays special attention to the role of women, National Strategic Studies at youth, civil society institutions, Islam, and democratic and auto- the National Defense University cratic tendencies. In addition, the Middle East Program hosts for her collaboration and initial programs on cultural issues, including contemporary art and vision of this two-part series. literature in the region. She and her staff, Dahlia Reed and Mallika Good, provided • Current Affairs: The Middle East Program emphasizes analysis of current excellent and much needed issues and their implications for long-term developments in the region, including support to make these meetings Arab-Israeli diplomacy, Iraq and its neighbors, political participation, globaliza- successful. Thank you also to tion, technology transfer, U.S. foreign policy, economic and political partner- Jillian Frumkin, the Middle ships, and the impact of developments in Central Asia and the Caucasus. East Program’s Associate, for • Gender Issues: The Middle East Program examines employment patterns, coordinating the meetings and education, legal rights, and political participation of women in the region. The this publication; Julia Bennett, role of women in advancing civil society, the problem of trafficking in women, the Middle East Program’s and the attitudes of governments and the clerical community toward women's Assistant, for ensuring the rights are areas to which the Program devotes considerable attention. The speakers’ arrival and overall Program also has a keen interest in exploring women's increasing roles in conflict smooth logistics; Interns Evan prevention and post-conflict reconstruction activities. Hensleigh, Nathan Raab, and • Islam, Democracy and Civil Society: The Middle East Program monitors Fariba Yassaee for their consis- the growing demand of people in the region for democratization, accountable tent help through all phases; government, the rule of law, and adherence to international conventions on top- and Lianne Hepler for design- ics such as human rights and women's rights. It continues to examine the role of ing the Occasional Islamic movements in shaping political and social developments and the variety Paper Series. of factors that favor or obstruct the expansion of civil society. adult Iranian. Qalibaf, in an expensive cam- Ahmadinejad’s populist platform and his paign, tried to appeal to Iran’s youth and mid- attention to the concerns of ordinary voters dle class as the strong man who would get paid off. Voters gave the unknown mayor of things done. Tehran seven million votes more than The reformists came to the elections in a Rafsanjani. Rafsanjani’s implied promise to weakened state. They had suffered a severe set- reach out to America or to conclude a deal with back in the 2002 local council elections, when the EU did not resonate with voters. Neither conservatives won in all major cities, allowing his warning against “extremism,” nor Karrubi’s Ahmadinejad to become mayor of Tehran. dire prediction that Rafsanjani’s defeat would They also lost their majority in Parliament to bring a Taliban-like government to office, the conservatives in the 2004 general elec- greatly impacted voters. It turned out that for tion—thanks to the Council of Guardians, the majority of voters, bread and butter issues which disqualified hundreds of prominent (the high price of everyday goods, affordable reformist candidates. Yet, they believed that housing, inflation, jobs and opportunity) mat- Iranian voters would still rally around the ter far more than foreign policy issues. reformist candidate and against Rafsanjani. Ahmadinejad’s talk about de-westernizing cul- The first round took place on June 17 and ture and returning to the social values of the the second a week later on June 24. On both early days of the revolution didn’t frighten occasions, as has happened frequently in the away voters: it won him votes. past, voting hours were extended to accommo- The speakers at the July 7th meeting exam- date all who wished to vote. Turnout in the first ined the short-term and long-term implica- round stood at 63% of eligible voters, consider- tions of Ahmadinejad’s election on domestic ably lower than the more than 80% who came and foreign policy. to the polls to vote for Khatami in 1997. In the Siamak Namazi, currently a visiting public first round, as expected, Rafsanjani came in first policy scholar at the Wilson Center, analyzed with 21% of the votes, but it was Ahmadinejad the election in terms of voters, voting pat- who came in second, with 19.5%, followed terns, and campaign promises. He noted that closely by Karrubi and then, at some distance, Iranian presidential elections have frequently Qalibaf closely trailed by Moin. Karrubi alleged proved unpredictable. In this election, even irregularities in the voting, as did Moin, sug- Ahmadinejad’s people never expected him to gesting that the security forces influenced voters win. Ahmadinejad and Karrubi had both and improperly intervened in the election. The stressed economic justice—an issue closer to Council of Guardians ordered a token recount the concerns of Iranian voters, Namazi said. of one hundred ballot boxes and announced He described Ahmadinejad as a member of that no irregularities had taken place. the “second generation” of the revolution and Between the first and the second rounds, predicted that he and his team will run the Ahmadinejad’s campaign gained momentum. government on the basis of a populist pro- His posters appeared everywhere; he came on gram. He also discussed the expectations of national television and gave interviews and the voters from the new president, analyzed press conferences.
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