MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES

SUMMER 2005 Iran After the June 2005 Presidential Election The Iranian Presidential Elections: Who Voted, Why, Introduction didate was not a serious contender). The con- How & Does it Matter? 5 Haleh Esfandiari, Director, Middle East Program servatives, unable to achieve consensus on a As part of its series on Iran, the Middle East single candidate, fielded two men: Mohammad What Does the Ninth Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Baqer Qalibaf, a former member of the Center for Scholars, in collaboration with the Revolutionary Guards, and, until he resigned Presidential Election Say Institute for National Strategic Studies at the the post on the eve of the campaign, the chief about Iranian Politics? 8 National Defense University, hosted two meet- of the Tehran police; and Mahmoud ings on the ninth Iranian presidential election. Ahmadinejad, the mayor of Tehran and a civil Ahmadinejad and the The first meeting, on May 23, 2005, focused engineer by training. The reformist camp also Parliament 10 on the politics of the election campaign; the ended up with two candidates: Mostafa Moin, second, on July 7, 2005, analyzed the outcome a former Minister of Science, Research and of the election and its implications for the Technology (formerly known as the Ministry Regime Change in Tehran: future. The proceedings of the first meeting of Culture and Higher Education), and Mehdi The Direction of Foreign can be accessed on the Middle East Program’s Karrubi, a cleric and a former Speaker of Policy in a Post-Khatami website, www.wilsoncenter.org/middleeast. Parliament. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Presidency 13 This publication brings together the papers chairman of the Expediency Council, ran as presented at the second, post-election meeting. the pragmatic centrist. Rafsanjani, also a for- The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to mer Speaker of Parliament, had already served Iran’s New President and the presidency in June 2005 caught observers two previous terms as president (1989-1997). Relations with the U.S. 16 both in Iran and abroad by surprise. The elec- Analysts almost universally expected a close tion was basically a five-man race (a sixth can- contest between Rafsanjani and Moin, and The Iranian Street in the Post-Khatami Era 17 This publication was made possible through the support of the Open Society Institute. MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SUMMER 2005

hardly focused on the other candidates. Iranian ed he would be the man to repair relations with law requires a second round of balloting if no the United States, bring negotiations with the candidate wins over 50% of the vote in the first Europeans on Iran’s nuclear program to a suc- round. Each of the eight previous presidential cessful conclusion, and spur economic growth. elections was decided in the first round. On this Ahmadinejad ran on a populist platform, criti- occasion, most analysts expected Rafsanjani to cizing the elites he claimed had monopolized win in the second round, if not in the first. wealth and power, and promised expanded During the campaign, Moin promised to con- opportunities for the little man. Karrubi’s cam- tinue the reformist policies of outgoing presi- paign also had populist overtones; he promised dent Mohammad Khatami. Rafsanjani suggest- a handout of around $65 per month to every

About the Middle East Program

Director The Middle East Program was launched in February 1998 in light of increased Dr. Haleh Esfandiari U.S. engagement and the profound changes sweeping across many Middle Eastern states. In addition to spotlighting day-to-day issues, the Program continues Associate to concentrate on long-term developments and their impact on political and social Jillian Frumkin structure, economic development, and relations with the United States. The Middle East Program draws on domestic and foreign regional experts for its Assistant meetings, conferences, and occasional papers. Conferences and meetings assess the Julia Bennett policy implications of long-term political, social, and economic developments in the region and individual states; the Middle East's role in the international arena; Special thanks American interests in the region; the threat of terrorism; and strategic threats to and Special thanks to Professor from the regional states. Judith Yaphe of the Institute for The Program pays special attention to the role of women, National Strategic Studies at youth, civil society institutions, Islam, and democratic and auto- the National Defense University cratic tendencies. In addition, the Middle East Program hosts for her collaboration and initial programs on cultural issues, including contemporary art and vision of this two-part series. literature in the region. She and her staff, Dahlia Reed and Mallika Good, provided • Current Affairs: The Middle East Program emphasizes analysis of current excellent and much needed issues and their implications for long-term developments in the region, including support to make these meetings Arab-Israeli diplomacy, Iraq and its neighbors, political participation, globaliza- successful. Thank you also to tion, technology transfer, U.S. foreign policy, economic and political partner- Jillian Frumkin, the Middle ships, and the impact of developments in Central Asia and the Caucasus. East Program’s Associate, for • Gender Issues: The Middle East Program examines employment patterns, coordinating the meetings and education, legal rights, and political participation of women in the region. The this publication; Julia Bennett, role of women in advancing civil society, the problem of trafficking in women, the Middle East Program’s and the attitudes of governments and the clerical community toward women's Assistant, for ensuring the rights are areas to which the Program devotes considerable attention. The speakers’ arrival and overall Program also has a keen interest in exploring women's increasing roles in conflict smooth logistics; Interns Evan prevention and post-conflict reconstruction activities. Hensleigh, Nathan Raab, and • Islam, Democracy and Civil Society: The Middle East Program monitors Fariba Yassaee for their consis- the growing demand of people in the region for democratization, accountable tent help through all phases; government, the rule of law, and adherence to international conventions on top- and Lianne Hepler for design- ics such as human rights and women's rights. It continues to examine the role of ing the Occasional Islamic movements in shaping political and social developments and the variety Paper Series. of factors that favor or obstruct the expansion of civil society. adult Iranian. Qalibaf, in an expensive cam- Ahmadinejad’s populist platform and his paign, tried to appeal to Iran’s youth and mid- attention to the concerns of ordinary voters dle class as the strong man who would get paid off. Voters gave the unknown mayor of things done. Tehran seven million votes more than The reformists came to the elections in a Rafsanjani. Rafsanjani’s implied promise to weakened state. They had suffered a severe set- reach out to America or to conclude a deal with back in the 2002 local council elections, when the EU did not resonate with voters. Neither conservatives won in all major cities, allowing his warning against “extremism,” nor Karrubi’s Ahmadinejad to become mayor of Tehran. dire prediction that Rafsanjani’s defeat would They also lost their majority in Parliament to bring a Taliban-like government to office, the conservatives in the 2004 general elec- greatly impacted voters. It turned out that for tion—thanks to the Council of Guardians, the majority of voters, bread and butter issues which disqualified hundreds of prominent (the high price of everyday goods, affordable reformist candidates. Yet, they believed that housing, inflation, jobs and opportunity) mat- Iranian voters would still rally around the ter far more than foreign policy issues. reformist candidate and against Rafsanjani. Ahmadinejad’s talk about de-westernizing cul- The first round took place on June 17 and ture and returning to the social values of the the second a week later on June 24. On both early days of the revolution didn’t frighten occasions, as has happened frequently in the away voters: it won him votes. past, voting hours were extended to accommo- The speakers at the July 7th meeting exam- date all who wished to vote. Turnout in the first ined the short-term and long-term implica- round stood at 63% of eligible voters, consider- tions of Ahmadinejad’s election on domestic ably lower than the more than 80% who came and foreign policy. to the polls to vote for Khatami in 1997. In the Siamak Namazi, currently a visiting public first round, as expected, Rafsanjani came in first policy scholar at the Wilson Center, analyzed with 21% of the votes, but it was Ahmadinejad the election in terms of voters, voting pat- who came in second, with 19.5%, followed terns, and campaign promises. He noted that closely by Karrubi and then, at some distance, Iranian presidential elections have frequently Qalibaf closely trailed by Moin. Karrubi alleged proved unpredictable. In this election, even irregularities in the voting, as did Moin, sug- Ahmadinejad’s people never expected him to gesting that the security forces influenced voters win. Ahmadinejad and Karrubi had both and improperly intervened in the election. The stressed economic justice—an issue closer to Council of Guardians ordered a token recount the concerns of Iranian voters, Namazi said. of one hundred ballot boxes and announced He described Ahmadinejad as a member of that no irregularities had taken place. the “second generation” of the revolution and Between the first and the second rounds, predicted that he and his team will run the Ahmadinejad’s campaign gained momentum. government on the basis of a populist pro- His posters appeared everywhere; he came on gram. He also discussed the expectations of national television and gave interviews and the voters from the new president, analyzed press conferences. The pundits still assumed the strengths and the shortcomings of Rafsanjani would win. Iranian voters, they Ahmadinejad, and noted that he will face lim- believed, would choose a seasoned politician, itations, as did his predecessor. The new pres- no matter what baggage he was carrying, not a ident, Namazi explained, will have little say in novice. Rafsanjani continued to employ the foreign policy or power over the judiciary and language of reform and moderation while the military—areas which are the prerogative Ahmadinejad emphasized his poor and humble of the Supreme Leader. background and focused on alleviating poverty, According to Farideh Farhi from the creating jobs, and fighting the corruption of University of Hawaii at Manoa, the election what he called the “oil mafia.” “clarified the political map of Iran.” The 3 MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SUMMER 2005

Iranian electorate is divided, she said, and vot- that there would be no sharp break with exist- ers do not necessarily follow their leaders. They ing foreign policy. Ahmadinejad will continue decide for themselves and are not averse to negotiations with the EU, improve relations change. They elected a reformist for two con- with Iran’s Persian Gulf neighbors, support the secutive terms and now decided to elect a con- Jaafari government in Iraq, and pursue expand- servative as their president. She predicted ed relations India and China. However, changes in government personnel in both in Ahmadinejad’s presidency could usher in a the capital and provinces. The biggest chal- change in “style and vision,” and this could lenge facing the centrist technocracy and the impact foreign policy, Semati said. middle class professionals lies in their ability to Shaul Bakhash, Clarence Robinson of moderate Ahmadinejad and his team, and to History at George Mason University, noted that prevent statist policies—a return to the 1980’s Ahmadinejad did not campaign on foreign pol- when the state played an expanding role in the icy issues and that little is known about his for- economy and everyday life. eign policy views. During the campaign, he Mohammad Takhshid from Tehran emphasized that relations with the U.S. are not University examined the likely relations “high among his priorities.” He thought Iran’s between the Parliament, which is dominated team was not tough enough in its negotiations by the conservatives, and the new president with the EU. He thought Iranian resources who belongs to the same camp. He emphasized should be exploited by Iranians, not foreign the role that the Leader and the Expediency firms. Although these attitudes suggest a more Council play in shaping the relationship isolationist policy, Bakhash expected continuity between the legislative and executive branches. in Iran’s foreign policy. Major foreign policy The Expediency Council serves as the arbi- issues, he noted, are the prerogative of the trator between the two branches, while the Leader. He noted that the character of relations Leader has the ultimate say on all major deci- with the U.S. would be determined not only by sions taken by either branch. The current Tehran but also by Washington, and Bush Parliament did not cooperate with outgoing Administration policy towards Iran has been President Khatami and his government. For characterized by a mixture of hostility and example, the Parliament attempted to use no- fuzziness. The danger is that a more uncompro- confidence vote to oust a number of Khatami’s mising stand on Iran will encourage a hardline ministers from office—although it was pre- stand on America’s part, dimming prospects for vented from doing so by the Leader. Takhshid a rapprochement between the two countries. predicted that Parliament and the new govern- Karim Sadjadpour, an analyst with the ment will see eye-to-eye on economic issues, International Crisis Group, also analyzed the matters relating to foreign investment, and on election results. They indicate, he concluded, a stricter line on social freedoms won by that young populations will not necessarily Iranians in the last several years. vote for reform or for the candidate who Hadi Semati, a professor of political science promises to initiate talks with the U.S. He at Tehran University and currently a public noted that Ahmadinejad did not talk about policy fellow at the Wilson Center, described establishing relations with the U.S., democra- Iran’s foreign policy as sophisticated and com- cy, or liberalization; yet, his populist campaign plex, and one directed by a number of knowl- resonated with the voters. Young Iranians seek edgeable diplomats. He thought it unlikely reform, Sadjadpour said, but they wish to that the foreign policy system in place could be avoid “unrest, insecurity, and uncertainty.” easily dismantled. He predicted that Iranians no longer consider Iraq as a “para- Ahmadinejad may adopt a tougher line, but digm for change.”

4 The Iranian Presidential Elections: Who Voted, Why, How & Does it Matter? By Siamak Namazi, Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Iranian elections since 1997 have had one con- candidate, to run. This move put a candidate sistent theme: they have defied the wildest pre- in the race who could draw many domestic dictions, shaming analysts who dared venture a opposition votes (i.e., people who would have guess regarding the results. On June 17, 2005, otherwise just boycotted the elections); some 63% of Iran’s 47 million eligible voters showed up to vote. The only prediction that 3. Rafsanjani’s risky decision to stand in these proved true was that this would be the Islamic elections, a decision which injected a lot of Republic’s first two-round presidential elec- excitement and brought in not only his sup- tion, and that former President Akbar Hashemi porters, but also his staunch opponents; Rafsanjani would come in first in the initial round. But no one predicted the second round 4. The Moin camp’s decision to team up with would be between Rafsanjani and Tehran’s the Freedom Movement of Iran to form a hardline Mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, nor national coalition for freedom and democra- that Ahmadinejad would win in a landslide. cy, which again broadened the appeal for A series of questions come to mind when we voters to come to the polls; look at these results: Why do we see such a dis- crepancy between the final results and the polls 5. Former Majlis Speaker Mehdi Karrubi’s taken just hours before the elections? Why did campaign promise to give all Iranians over so many Iranians come out to vote this June, 18 years of age nearly $60 per month if he while there was a clear trend toward apathy evi- were to become president also played a role dent in the last two national elections (the in attracting voters to the polls. Surely many Local Councils and Majlis in 2003 and 2004, voters thought this promise was a lie, when respectively)? Could there have been foul play? in desperate economic conditions, they did What was Ahmadinejad’s secret to success in not lose anything by voting for him; these elections? 6. Demographic factors. Young voters tend to be Why Such High Turnout? more eager about voting. Iran’s large youth Regardless of whether or not some foul play population and the low voting age in Iran took place in favor of a particular candidate, (15) meant that there were close to seven mil- which will be addressed below, it is obvious lion eligible first-time voters (15-19 years); that the real turnout was considerably higher than analysts expected. The main factors driv- 7. Poor performance of outside opposition, ing the more than 60% of eligible voters who particularly through broadcasts from the Los participated include the following, though in Angeles-based television stations. Their out- the absence of proper exit polling it is impossi- rageous and ridiculous broadcasts reminded ble to weigh each factor: many voters that there is no viable “Choice B” and that they have to make do with the 1. The Iranian society’s continued desire to hand that they are dealt; bring about change through gradual evolu- tion rather than radical upheaval; 8. Statements coming from the White House also helped draw Iranians to the voting 2. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s decision to booth. U.S. President George W. Bush’s reverse the Guardian Council’s ruling, thereby comments were aired repeatedly, and allowing Mostafa Moin, the main reformist although he did not specifically say so, view- 5 MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SUMMER 2005

Final Results (Round I) • The main accusation is that the paramilitary (20 June update by the Ministry of Interior) basij (volunteer militia) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) were Percent of used to mobilize votes in the last minutes in Candidate Votes total favor of Ahmadinejad;

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani 6,179,653 21.01% • There are also complaints by both Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad that there was defamation Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 5,710,354 19.48% through the use of illicit newsletters distrib- Mehdi Karrubi 5,056,686 17.28% uted at night, and SMSes sent to cell phones. Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf 4,075,189 13.90% Mostafa Moein 4,069,699 13.83% All sorts of other allegations and rumors Ali Larijani 1,716,081 5.94% exist, including a number of cases of voters casting a ballot more than once. Nevertheless, Mohsen Mehralizadeh 1,289,323 4.40% it is nearly impossible to imagine that cheating Blank/void ballots 1,287,440 4.17% could have taken place at a level that could bridge the big gap between the votes cast for Total votes 29,318,895 100.00% Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad in the second Eligible voters 46,786,418 round. Keep in mind the multiplicity of com- Voter turnout 62.66% peting power centers watching over each other and the fact that besides the Interior Ministry and the Guardian Council, each candidate is From a PowerPoint presentation by Siamak Namazi. allowed to have his own representative at the voting centers and during the ballot counting. ers were told that the American President Moreover, even institutions like the IRGC and was calling for a boycott. For a few, the “for- the basij are not entirely controlled by one per- eign interference” factor was enough impe- son, and could not have possibly been at the tus to go to the polls. More importantly, a sole disposal of a single candidate. number of intellectuals also felt that if the Ultimately, like it or not, we must accept participation level dropped, the neoconserv- that Mr. Ahmadinejad was truly able to send a atives could mistake that for a cry from the message that appealed to the majority of Iranian people that they want to be “freed” à Iranian voters and brought him to office. la Iraq. So, showing up and voting was also important in protecting Iran from potential What Was Ahmadinejad’s Secret to U.S. belligerency; Success? The shock of the first round results polarized 9. There is traditionally a group of “scared” society in advance of the second round. The voters. It is no secret that some Iranians reformists, who up until this point opposed worry that they might be turned down from Rafsanjani, switched positions and rallied behind a governmental job or a loan, for example, if him out of fear of an ultra-conservative govern- their identity papers do not display a stamp ment. Many intellectuals and secular Iranians showing that they participated in national that had previously stayed out of the elections votes. This group is more likely to cast a were now determined to vote, albeit not for blank ballot than other voting blocks are. Rafsanjani as much as against Ahmadinejad. Despite the rallying call and the new voters Was There Foul Play? who stepped into the elections game to block There are two chief complaints being lodged an Ahmadinejad victory, voter turnout in the by various persons and organizations: second round actually dropped from 63% of 6 eligible voters to just below 60%. It appears that a lot of the voters who had voted for a Final Results (Round II) reformist candidate in the first round did not vote in the second round. Many could not sup- port Rafsanjani, no matter what. Others were Candidate Votes Percent of total simply too upset at the hypocrisy of the reformist parties who U-turned overnight Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 17,248,782 61.70% regarding the former president. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani 10,046,701 35.93% Ahmadinejad’s supporters, on the other hand, were energized by the initial results and Blank/void ballots 663,770 2.37% redoubled their efforts to mobilize votes, using Total votes 27,959,253 100.00% mainly the basij and parts of the IRGC, as well as the many local councils controlled by the Abadgaran faction, with which Ahmadinejad is affiliated. While Rafsanjani also commands a Eligible voters 46,786,418* respectable network throughout the country, he Voter turnout 59.76%* was unable to compete with the effectiveness of the basij, at least at the speed required between * based on 17 June statistics the two rounds of elections, held one week From a PowerPoint presentation by Siamak Namazi. apart. It’s important to note that while the basij was accused of being the source of many irregu- larities during the polling, its impact was chiefly pool of economically disillusioned voters, as well concentrated on mobilizing voters rather than as anti-Rafsanjani votes. Many voters expressed carrying out any direct fraud. the desire to see “new faces” in a regime where a During the second round, it became even handful of people have been recycled in cabinet clearer that the key issue for a significant sec- posts for over two decades. tion of society was the economy and the per- ceived injustice and mismanagement of it. It What Does It All Mean? appears that for many it was a choice between The main lesson of the overall results of the Rafsanjani, who symbolized a pattern of eco- presidential election is that Iran is undergoing a nomic injustices—both personally and sociological shift. The voting pattern shows the through structural adjustment policies during population moving away from reformist themes his two term presidency (1989-1997)—and such as the growth of civil society and democra- Ahmadinejad, who symbolized a simple, com- tization, and towards a focus on economic sta- mon citizen, who could understand the diffi- bility. This phenomenon also explains why both culties faced by the masses. Ahmadinejad and Karrubi did so much better As mayor, Ahmadinejad had gained a Robin in the first round than anyone expected. Hood-like reputation. A good example is his The Ahmadinejad victory represents the creation of low-interest marriage loans to the start of top-level involvement of the second needy. He created this fund by eliminating post-revolutionary generation in Iran’s execu- “frivolous” budgets for top managers, such as tive politics. This is a generation whose experi- those for redecorating offices. ence was shaped by the Iran-Iraq War, an event Ahmadinejad’s election on a platform of that gives them self-confidence, a sense of defi- social justice, anti-corruption, and government ance, and a profound distrust of the West. efficiency suggests he was successful in present- Given Ahmadinejad’s recent entry into ing himself as the anti-establishment candidate high-level politics in the Islamic Republic, little to many voters who are fed up with the per- is known about his policies. But in general ceived mismanagement and corruption in gov- terms, for Ahmadinejad and his close associ- ernment. Thus, in addition to his ultra-conser- ates, social justice trumps values such as per- vative supporters, he was able to tap into a large sonal liberties and democracy. Emphasis is put 7 MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SUMMER 2005

on the need for decentralization of the state We must understand that Ahmadinejad will bureaucracy and empowerment of the provin- face a variety of restrictions as president, restric- cial governors. They believe that the govern- tions which will limit his ability to execute this ment should put national wealth at the service vision. These include being bound by the of the masses and not the economic elite, while guidelines of the Supreme Leader and the they also cry out against the existing rampant Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) in corruption. In foreign policy, they insist that foreign policy and the 4th Five-Year Plan and Iran must deal with the outside world from a the 20-Year Perspectives in economic policy. position of strength and not weakness. They Furthermore, other issues, such the realities want to empower national industries and to see posed by the country’s demography, power foreign investment curtailed at a minority structure, etc., that will no doubt play a big role stake. For them, it is time to give the younger in any future administration’s policymaking. forces of the country—albeit, not all of them, In the end, we need to wait and see what this but rather the “trusted” few—a chance to new president does before judging him. The implement the needed change. first big clue will come in his cabinet selection.

What Does the Ninth Presidential Election Say about Iranian Politics? By Farideh Farhi, University of Hawaii at Manoa

If the 7th and 8th presidential elections Ahmadinejad, who claimed the simple life of revealed the depth of popular support for the the assassinated President Mohammad Ali reform of the political system, the two rounds Rajai as his inspiration despite protests by the of the 9th presidential election clarified the latter’s widow. political map of Iran. More importantly, all candidates ran on a A comprehensive interpretation of election platform of change. Conservatives (or results is perhaps premature. Nevertheless, the Osulgarayan—which literally means fundamen- way the campaign was conducted as well as the talists—as they preferred to call themselves dur- immediate results allow for some preliminary ing the campaign) relentlessly critiqued the past generalizations about Iranian politics. 16 years of the Islamic Republic. The reformists First and foremost is the evolving relation- continued their talk of reform, and even Ali ship of the Islamic state with the Iranian popu- Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the one candidate lace. Both the campaign and results suggest whose name is literally synonymous with the that the Iranian state and contending political Islamic Republic, talked about being a different players take the electoral and everyday behavior president than he had been in the past. of the Iranian populace seriously, and at least Ultimately, Ahmadinejad, and his anti-cor- partially adjust in order to placate, appease, or ruption, pro-Islamic, simple way of life mes- address their aspirations and demands. sage, garnered a landslide in the second round, A good example of this adjustment was but with less than 37% of eligible voters. In manifested in the campaign slogans for the conjunction with the way the votes were split presidential election. Only two candidates were in the first round of election, this number willing to identify with the past revolutionary reveals a second often neglected point about legacy. One was Mostafa Moin, whose cam- Iranian politics: the divided nature of the paign poster identified Mohammad Mossadeq, Iranian electorate. Ayatollah Mohammad Taleqani, Mehdi The Iranian electorate does not operate in Bazargan, and Ali Shariati, not Khomeini, as an almost herd-like fashion, moving from one 8 his companions. The other was Mahmoud direction to another in consort. They are incor- rectly stereotyped as homogenous: first revolu- the promises and alliances of this election are to tionaries, then martyrs of war, then reformists, be taken seriously, Iran may witness significant then disaffected reformists, then anti- efforts to bring about change in distributive reformists, then people with democratic aspira- policies as well as economic priorities along sim- tions, and now seekers of economic justice. ilar lines to those already partially witnessed The reality is that the Iranian citizenry, like with the conservative victory in the 7th elsewhere, is a rather differentiated lot with Parliamentary elections. The extent to which important crisscrossing splits in terms of socioe- powerful economic forces, including the ones conomic background, cultural practices, provin- lodged within the state itself, will resist these cial and ethnic ties, and political aspirations. changes is of course yet to be seen. The decision on the part of major political There will also be significant changes in players inside Iran, including some of the terms of personnel manning the leadership of opposition, to participate and not boycott the important government ministries. Again, these election should be seen more as a choice neces- dynamics make Iran very similar to other coun- sitated by this majority desire rather than an tries with competitive elites in which elections attempt to shape it. Moreover, the decision on rarely signify change in the power structure of the part of all candidates, to accept the results the country but often herald shifts in policy as the “will of the people” and see their defeat direction and personnel. mostly in terms of their own organizational Given this competitive environment, a fifth weakness must also be seen as part and parcel point this election confirms yet again is the fal- of a “reality check” that this election has ham- lacy of treating the Iranian political landscape mered home. as completely dominated by single individuals The third revelation of this election is the or unified groups. This fallacy is something possibility that competitive politics in Iran may that should be particularly avoided now. No not be as different as people have claimed from doubt, conservatives have now managed to competitive politics elsewhere. Candidates take over all key institutions of the Islamic with local ties did well in their own provinces, Republic, elected or unelected. But their politi- and candidates with better grassroots organiza- cal cadres were unable to reach an agreement tion were skillful in both moving people to over a single candidate during the election, and vote, bullying opponents, instigating violence, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the using media resources, and in all likelihood, most organized of the cadres shifted allegiances some election-day vote fraud. from one conservative candidate to another Ahmadinejad was bumped into the second just a few days before the first round of elec- round on the basis of the very organized and tions. As such, the expectation that forces that coordinated support of about 10% of the elec- could not agree on a candidate will now begin torate. In this sense, what makes Iran’s election to act in a cohesive and unified manner in the politics different from competitive politics else- policy realm seems unwarranted. To be sure, where is not necessarily the behavior of those the question of lack of agreement about a can- who have managed to be organized and devel- didate and lack of coordination between the op resources, but the failure of other political unelected and elected government institutions forces to cultivate matching skills and capital. was solved by the Iranian voters. But the basic Still, despite this patent unfairness of the conflicts and dilemmas that exist within the process, the fourth revelation of this election is a Iranian polity remain. confirmation of the fact that elections actually At this point, Ahmadinejad’s supporters do matter in Iran, but not necessarily in terms of may not have thought through the domestic reshaping the nature or structure of the political and international implications of his win. We system. They matter in terms of the possibility will have to wait to see how the state bureau- of unexpected results, important changes in pol- cracy, run mostly by career technocrats and icy direction, and changes of political cadres. If contending political players, will respond. 9 MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SUMMER 2005

Ahmadinejad ran on an anti-corruption, policies will not solve the unemployment prob- pro-justice, anti-establishment/elites platform lem and will certainly be inflationary. It will while remaining totally committed to individ- scare off foreign investment and antagonize uals who personify the establishment and in domestic investors and the bazaar. many ways, along with others, have been A new game has begun in Iran. In the last 8 responsible for the policies pursued and cor- years, we watched how the political forces of ruptions ensued. At this point, it is by no reform were continuously thwarted by unelect- means clear how he and his euphoric support- ed institutions. Now we have to watch to see ers can overcome this basic contradiction whether the Iranian middle and upper classes, beyond expanding government’s social welfare the technocratic forces that inhabit state policies made possible by high oil prices. Such bureaucracies, and opposing political forces policies, pursued in the 1980s (facetiously have the capacity to moderate Ahmadinejad called “couponism” for the coupon-based sub- and his cohorts’ self-proclaimed fundamental- sidies they provided to the population), and ism, populism, and state welfarism. My bet is their remnants continue to be extremely diffi- that they are not as helpless or hapless as they cult to bring under control. Expansion of these are being portrayed these days.

Ahmadinejad and the Parliament By Mohammad Takhshid, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Tehran Univeristy, Iran

Iran’s factional politics have seen many surpris- The Parliament in the Islamic Republic of es during the 26 years since the founding of the Iran, in contrast to many Parliamentary sys- Islamic Republic. In May 1996, many Iranians, tems, is not dominated by blind ideological among them scholars and politicians, believed allegiance to the president; nor does Parliament that the then conservative Speaker of dissolve itself when the majority party loses Parliament Ali Akbar Nategh Nuri would be that majority in Parliamentary elections. The the clear winner of the 7th presidential elec- Parliament acts independently of the president, tion. Mohammad Khatami, by contrast, was a serving as a dynamic and vibrant institution relatively unknown candidate who headed that challenges the executive branch on many Iran’s National Library and ran on an agenda of important issues. reform, beating Nuri with 69% of the votes. Contrary to other Parliamentary systems, The elections in June 2005 saw a similar there are two external actors who influence upset. Here, the largely unknown, hard-line relations between the executive and legislative conservative candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad branches in Iran: Supreme Leader Ayatollah surprised even his own supporters by beating the Khamenei and the Expediency Council, head- well-known Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in ed by Hashemi Rafsanjani. The majority in the the runoff election, winning on a conservative 7th Parliament is receptive to the views and agenda quite different from that of his reformist orders of the Spiritual Leader. predecessor Khatami. In May 2004, a conservative Parliament Before examining the relations between replaced a reformist one. The new members of President-Elect Ahmadinejad and the 7th Parliament openly questioned cabinet mem- Parliament, let us discuss the role of Parliament bers, requesting a wide range of changes in the in the Iranian political system and existing fac- composition of ministries and the replacement tions in Parliament, as well as the issues most of reformist deputy ministers with conservative likely to cause friction between the president ones. The ministers who resisted were ousted 10 and Parliamentarians. from office through a vote of no confidence by conservative members of Parliament. The first Parliament. In protest, the two major reformist such case was Ahmad Khoram, minister of parties, the Islamic Participation Party of Iran Roads and Transportation. When the members and the Islamic Revolution’s Mujahideen of Parliament began the same process with the Organization (IRMO), did not participate in education minister, Ayatollah Khamenei sent a the election. The conservatives, who had lost letter to the speaker of Parliament and called for three of four national elections, were better a halt to the Parliamentary proceedings. organized with new faces, new ideas, and new Members of Parliament brought no further slogans; they took advantage of the situation motions against the cabinet members. and soundly defeated the reformists. Potential disputes between the president- Since May 2004, the majority in the 7th elect and Parliament are likely to center on Parliament has adopted a conservative approach. foreign policy, the economy, culture, social They confronted reformist agenda of the gov- issues, political reforms, and the approval of ernment in several areas including economics, cabinet ministers. foreign policy, and socio-cultural issues. Until the 6th Parliament, much of Iran’s Regarding the economy, influential members of factional politics had been dominated by two the conservatives—including Mohammed powerful political unions of ulama (commu- Khoshchehreh, Hussein Sobhaninia and Ahmad nities of religious scholars): the Jame- Tavakkoli—have advocated populist economic Ruhaniyate-e mobarez (Militant Clergy policies and passed legislation to prevent any Association) and the Majma-e ruhaniyun-e increase in the price of gasoline, electricity, mobarez (Society of Combatant Clerics). The water, or other government services. This has Jame-Ruhaniyate-e mobarez, considered the caused budgeting problems and also made it dif- “Islamic Right.” Its platform includes less ficult for the government to pursue its privatiza- government involvement in economic affairs, tion and investment policies. In the area of for- privatization of the economy, and adherence eign policy, even though the head of the Majlis to a stricter interpretation of Islamic law, National Security and Foreign Policy especially in social and cultural issues. The Commission is the more moderate Aladdin Majma-e ruhaniyun-e mobarez were consid- Boroujerdi, the Abadgaran faction has pursued a ered the “Islamic Left.” Its views include more hard-line policy on issues such as Iran- more government involvement in the econo- U.S. relations, negotiations with Europe, and my and the passage of laws—such as a land nuclear policy. On socio-cultural issues, the con- reform bill—to guarantee a more equitable servative majority has sought to oppose the lib- income distribution. It also favored a looser eral policies of President Khatami in areas such interpretation of Islamic law. Members’ views as publications, art, and cultural events. Some of on domestic and foreign policies were more the most vocal critiques of Khatami’s socio-cul- radical and revolutionary than those of the tural policies are Mohammad Reza Faker, Emad Islamic Right. Afroogh, and Mehdi Kouchakzadeh. In Parliament, therefore, there existed two The 7th Parliament, dominated by conser- main political factions, the Right and the Left, vatives consists of three loose factions. First: the as well as a small number of independents. majority “Osulgara” faction, which is conserva- After Khatami came to power in 1996, differ- tive and numbers about 190-200; second, a 40 ent political parties and associations with vary- member reformist minority faction; and lastly, ing views were born, and a younger generation the independent faction, which includes 70 or among both factions sought more political 80 members. The views of the latter group are power and influence. closer to those of the majority faction. The 7th Parliamentary election was very It should be mentioned that the majority controversial. The Guardian Council rejected faction consists of two separate political the credentials of many candidates including alliances: the older generation of the Right more than 80 reformist members of the 6th (more traditional, moderate conservatives) and 11 MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SUMMER 2005

the new generation of the Right (the With regard to social and cultural issues, “Abadgaran,” more radical conservatives). Each there are many similarities between Parliament’s of these two conservative factions has 90-100 position and that of Ahmadinejad. The majori- members in Parliament. ty of parliamentarians opposed the social and cultural policies of the Khatami government. Predicting President-Parliament Relations They wanted more control over the newspa- Since the views of the newly elected president pers, publications, and the film industry. are not well known, it is extremely difficult to Recently, it voted for an investigation of the make a viable prediction of his interactions Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance on with Parliament on important issues. However, the grounds that the ministry was not in tune the first and most important issue that is like- with conservative principles and that its polices ly to dominate the interaction of the presi- were not in accordance with those of the Islamic dent and the Parliament is the economy. Republic. The conservatives also discussed a Ahmadinejad’s proposed economic policy national dress code and criticized the universi- (more equitable income distribution and the ties for being too liberal. They demanded fur- closing of the gap between rich and poor) ther Islamization of universities. won him most of his votes. Most of the mem- Looking at Ahmadinejad’s views and his bers of Parliament share his economic views. work during the past two years as mayor of Most of the high ranking and influential Tehran, there are no major differences between deputies (such as Ahmad Tavakkoli, Elias his social and cultural views and the policies Naderan, and Mahmood Khoshchereh) were pushed by Parliament. among the more vocal critics of the economic With regard to foreign policy, major issues policies of Rafsanjani and Khatami and at the center of discussion and of controversy attacked the privatization and investment focus on relations with the United States and polices of the past 16 years. They argued that the European Union, nuclear policy, and those policies had helped the upper class human rights. Again, with regard to these more than the poor and working classes. issues, there are many similarities between Since Khoshchehreh, the chair of the views of the Parliamentary majority and those Parliament’s Economic Affairs Committee, is of the elected president. the top economic advisor to Ahmadinejad, On foreign policy issues, the Parliament is there is not likely to be much friction between not eager to pursue a policy of closer ties with Parliament and the new President. It is, howev- the U.S. or in many areas with the EU Many er, possible that reformists, independents, and hard-liners like Rafat Bayat were frequently some moderate members of the majority fac- critical of the government and the negotiators tion will form a strong and vocal minority in during the three-power talks with Europe opposing populist economic policies and call- (France, England, and Germany), accusing ing for the continuation of privatization. them of acting from a weak position. Bayat With regard to increased foreign investment introduced a bill requiring a harder line vis-à- in Iran, neither Parliament nor Ahmadinejad vis the EU Parliament also passed a bill requir- are vocal advocates of such a policy. The 7th ing the government to support efforts to obtain Parliament passed laws in the past year making peaceful nuclear technology. foreign investment more difficult. These laws In contrast to presidential candidates who had a notable effect on the government con- talked about closer Iran-U.S. relations, tract with the Turkish company Turkcell and Ahmadinejad largely ignored the issue. With the proposed expanded Iranian cell phone net- regard to nuclear policy, he made a controversial work (Turkcell’s share fell to less than 50%). statement that the Iranian delegation in these Management at Turkcell is considering aban- negotiations with the EU is in a weak position doning the project. Ahmadinejad’s views in this and is intimidated by the other side (the EU 12 regard appear similar to those of Parliament. and the U.S.). With regard to human rights, he agrees with Parliament as seeing the debate as ly that a strong minority of reformists and one meant to put pressure on Iran, believing some conservatives might oppose the extreme there are no human rights violations in Iran. policies of the new government. With this in mind, we can expect little con- It is too early to make a sound prediction flict between Parliament and the elected presi- about the nature of the Parliament and dent on major policy issues such as economic, Ahmadinejad’s relations with it. However, social, culture, and foreign policy. examining Parliamentary trends over the past One final note is that since about 120-140 year and comparing these with Ahmadinejad’s members of Parliament supported Rafsanjani’s views from the election campaign, there will candidacy before the election, and more than not likely be major disputes between 100 of them went to his office after his defeat Parliament and the new government, which to convey their support for him. It is very like- will be sworn into office on August 3.

Regime Change in Tehran: The Direction of Foreign Policy in a Post-Khatami Presidency By Hadi Semati, Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Tehran University, Iran

The victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in policy team that Ahmadinejad will assemble is Iran’s June 25, 2005 runoff election caught currently unknown, and his lack of experience almost everybody by surprise. Despite irregular- in foreign and security policies make it all the ities preceding the election and the unfairness more difficult to predict at this early stage his of the electoral process because of the Guardian approach to foreign relations. Having these Council’s interference in vetting candidates, the uncertainties in mind, however, there are sever- massive turnout surpassed everybody’s expecta- al issues worth examining regarding the possi- tions. Usual irregularities of such a large scale ble foreign policy direction of Mr. election would not in any way change the result Ahmadinejad’s presidency. of the runoff election. However, one can credi- bly argue the possibility of Mr. Mehdi The Maze of Iran’s Foreign Policy-Making Karroubi’s having replaced the president-elect Structure in the final competition of the second round Patterns of Iranian foreign policy-making over had the conservative establishment not mobi- the last decade are indicative of a consensus- lized all its instruments of persuasion and based process that is built into a multi-centered manipulation to support Ahmadinejad’s candi- power structure. The political process underly- dacy. Ultimately, one thing is clear; no degree of ing the decision-making apparatus in foreign ballot-rigging could alter the landslide victory policy necessitates that jockeying factions of Ahmadinejad in the final battle for the votes. negotiate their positions within accepted The consequences of this election on Iran’s frameworks. The consensus-driven process has foreign policy are not yet apparent and may not changed, though the framework within prove to be as astonishing as the election itself. which the policy is grounded has shifted in a It is not clear how the president-elect of the few distinct phases. It is safe to assume that the Islamic Republic will position himself within master frame of critical co-existence with the the minefield of the Iranian factional politics. international community has not changed; as it It is equally unclear how the shock of this par- is the context for foreign policy deliberations ticular election, which led to a distinct polar- within the Islamic Republic of Iran. ization of the public as well as the elite, might This political context underlies a very com- reshape the conservative faction. The foreign plex foreign policy machinery that observers of 13 MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SUMMER 2005

Iran tend to underestimate. Iran, like every means one can not be sure. But indications other state in the world, suffers extensively from his remarks and his associates’ occasional from the phenomenon of bureaucratic politics. comments suggest that he intends to focus Over a dozen formal bureaucracies and a more on the relations with great powers such as plethora of informal institutions are involved India, China, and Russia that to some extent in a competitive process to influence the direc- started during President Khatami’s tenure and tion of foreign and security policy. Therefore, it has already borne some fruits. This may not is highly inaccurate to think that this largely exactly be a reorientation of Iranian foreign sophisticated apparatus could be changed or policy direction. Ahmadinejad will likely con- completely subdued by a shift at the apex of the tinue the engagement with Europe but will be executive branch. Many of these bureaucracies more demanding and drive a tougher bargain have internalized threat perceptions of their with Europeans. His seemingly more autarkic own, perceptions that are hard to change, and economic policy could have some spill-over all of them fight ferociously to get maximum effects on political relations with Europe; but access to the most critical player, the Supreme that may prove to be more transitory and Leader to voice specific interests. But it is also a superficial than substantive. misrepresentation to assume that the consen- The fate of the nuclear negotiations with sus-driven and very vast decision-making struc- the European Union troika (France, Germany ture is monolithic and run by a single individ- and the United Kingdom) will be the first test ual. Furthermore, the fractured nature of the of the new president’s handling of critical for- political system has survived, and there is no eign policy issues. Ahmadinejad’s initial mes- reason why this trademark of the Islamic sages have reaffirmed his intentions to contin- Republic of Iran would cease to function dur- ue the negotiating process. Although the nego- ing Ahmadinejad’s presidency. tiations with Europe over the Iranian nuclear program have been set in the wider consensual Is Dramatic Change in Foreign Policy process of Iran’s power structure, the reserva- Possible? tions that the new president has regarding the Because of the features of the process explained viability of any European offer could change above, it would be very difficult to change the the dynamics of bargaining in favor of a harder master frame within which the policy is line. But it is also plausible to argue that formed. Even the most dynamic and aggressive because no Iranian politician (including president would find it hard to revert Iran back Ahmadinejad) can give up Iranian fuel-cycle to an age of ideology and away from some capability, that process is doomed to failure. It degree of pragmatism. The foreign policy nar- seems that Iran under the new president will rative of Iran seems to indicate that it has genuinely try to make this process work and passed the anti-status quo days and is in search will do everything possible not to be the party of accommodation and cohabitation. It would responsible for the failure of negotiations with take more than a presidential change to put the the EU. Given the pressure coming from his evolving process in reverse gear. This of course constituency, Ahmadinejad would have to pur- does not mean that we will not see an intensi- sue a much tougher line. This will make suc- fied turf battle over the direction of foreign cess more difficult to accomplish unless the policy. The usual pulling and pushing of all Europeans offer a concession to accommodate complex and faction-ridden foreign policy Iranian demands for keeping some form of fuel apparatuses may become more acute, but the cycle capability. institutionalized process and the actors will The ongoing rapprochement with Persian bear more marks of continuity than change. Gulf states will in all likelihood proceed unaf- President-elect Ahmadinejad has empha- fected. This policy is so firmly established in the sized the importance of Asian and Muslim Iranian foreign policy agenda that no adminis- 14 states in his foreign policy. What that exactly trative changes would undermine it in the absence of unforeseen events. This includes the fy the complex relations with the outside world overall policy vis-à-vis Iraq, which is based on and deepen the existing misconceptions and three pillars of the transition to a functioning miscommunications. democracy: Iraq’s territorial integrity; cohesion; Possible extensive staff change and realign- and stability along the western borders of Iran. ment of the foreign policy-making apparatus This will undoubtedly maximize Iranian influ- is worthy of attention. If Mr. Ahmadinejad ence inside post-Saddam Iraq. Ahmadinejad fulfills his promises of bringing in new blood seems to be less disposed to a radical change of to the foreign policy community, the existing course in Iraq. arrangements could change in favor of hard- Last but not least is the effect of an liner institutions. These institutions, the Ahmadinejad presidency on U.S.-Iran relations. Revolutionary Guard for instance, have the Ahmadinejad has said on several occasions that potential of moving beyond their convention- he sees no need for the improvement of rela- al purview in national security to the more tions between the two adversaries. Even if he routine areas of foreign policy. Although the wanted to take a softer tone and entertain the traditional balance of bureaucratic structures possibility of dialogue with the United States, in could upset the process, it is conceivable that the face of an elevated rhetorical attack on Iran these outfits may be forced to operate in a and White House statements that aimed to de- more pragmatic fashion. Moreover, the insti- legitimize the electoral process, he would find it tutionalized structures are much more almost impossible to undertake any initiatives. resilient and would in all likelihood put up The net result is that Ahmadinejad will de-pri- some fight in response to extreme departures oritize U.S.-Iran rapprochement and focus on from established policies. The friction with other issues. During the presidential campaign, the technocratic base of foreign policy unlike other candidates who made clear their machinery could in all likelihood create more interests, he often mentioned the issue in a cur- inefficiency. sory fashion and indicated that Iran can solve its Mr. Ahmadinejad’s worldview seems to own problems and does not need the United reflect an egalitarian approach to the interna- States. He seems to genuinely believe this prin- tional system. He does not have a foreign poli- ciple, which appears to be a reflection of his cy but a vision or attitude that heavily depends overall worldview. on national power and self-reliance. As a tech- nocratic member of the second generation of Potential Changes in Iranian Foreign Policy conservatives, Ahmadinejad personifies the Management link between the revolutionary days of the If the changes in substantive policies will be 1980s and the development imperatives of the marginal, what will change during 1990s and early twenty first century. His over- Ahmadinejad’s presidency? There are some all postures suggest a more inward-looking issues of style and vision that need to be scruti- approach to both domestic and foreign policy. nized. First is the risk-taking propensity that Will the triple effects of these changes lead to the new president brings to the job. This trait the re-socialization of the Islamic Republic of largely derives from his strong self-confidence. Iran’s foreign policy machinery? It would His pious and religious upbringing could be a arguably be extremely difficult for Iran to source of this self-confidence. Second is the revert back to the age of ideology; but a limited perceived mandate of the conservatives as a paradigmatic change, especially at the top ech- result of the landslide victory in the election elons of the bureaucracy, is probable. has reinforced the sense of re-legitimization of the Islamic Republic of Iran, hence injecting Conclusion fresh energy that will embolden the new for- The presidency of Ahmadinejad may produce eign and security policy elite. Lastly, the lack of more change in form and style than substance experience in foreign policy areas could simpli- in Iran’s foreign policy direction. But as stu- 15 MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SUMMER 2005

dents of international relations are increasingly dent of the Islamic Republic with a populist arguing, the form and style, particularly in a agenda and less-than-friendly image will cer- region where language and symbols often tainly be a challenge. However, it is unlikely trump other considerations, could have signifi- that he would or could stop the transitional cant material and policy consequences. At a process that Iran is going through. His major time when Iran is transforming from an anti- initial challenge is incidentally how to handle status quo power to a regional superpower in the digitalized communications networks of search of accommodation and recognition, the image-making and symbolic representation, rise of a fairly unknown politician as the presi- which have so far given him a very rough start.

Iran’s New President and Relations with the U.S. By Shaul Bakhash, Clarence Robinson Professor of History, George Mason University

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s new president, term economic objectives are shaped by the said little on foreign policy issues—including five-year development plan. Insofar as these relations with the U.S.—during the election development programs relate to foreign rela- campaign. He did say that negotiations with tions—construction of major infrastructure Washington do not rank high on his priorities. and industrial projects, foreign trade and invest- He charged Iranian diplomats with being ment, oil—Ahmadinejad’s freedom to radically ‘weak’ in negotiations with the EU over Iran’s change direction is limited. nuclear program. He asserted Iran’s resources On the other hand, in foreign policy, style should be exploited by Iranians rather than for- and tone do matter. A foreign policy approach eign firms. But these comments suggest an atti- characterized by suspicion of the outside world tude, a posture, rather than well-thought out and indifference to what others think of Iran policy positions. can undo the patient fence-building with the The factors contributing to continuity in international community of recent years. Had Iran’s foreign policy are numerous and substan- Rafsanjani been elected president, he would tial. But the election of Ahmadinejad injects almost certainly have put out feelers to the new and possibly unsettling ingredients into U.S.; Ahmadinejad will not do so. Although the equation. Khamenei certainly endorsed the willingness On the one hand, Iran’s foreign policy on high-ranking Iranian officials expressed in the major issues—Iran’s nuclear program, its sup- last two years to talk to Washington, Khamenei port for Hizballah in Lebanon and Islamic has always been skeptical about the possibility Jihad on the West Bank, its opposition to Israel, and even the usefulness to Iran of a rapproche- the nurturing of relations with major powers ment with America. Ahmadinejad’s negative other than America like China, Russia, Japan, attitude to the U.S. could therefore resonate India and the EU—is ultimately the prerogative with the Leader. of the Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. The gov- Voices in the foreign policy establishment ernment, for example, could not enter into arguing for moderation and flexibility in for- negotiations with the U.S. without the Leader’s eign relations would be weakened and hardline agreement. On these major issues, including voices strengthened if the new president is those of interest to the U.S., there is a large allowed by the Leader to replace key foreign degree of consensus among the foreign policy policy officials with men and women who elite and consistency and continuity in the last share his views. Khamenei may choose to several years. Iran’s negotiating position on its accommodate Ahmadinejad on both foreign nuclear program is not likely to change because and domestic issues because the new president 16 a new president has come to office. Iran’s long- has support among the same constituency on which the Leader relies—the Revolutionary Iranian natural gas to India via a pipeline Guards, the basij para-military forces, the con- crossing Pakistan would greatly cement rela- servative elements among the clergy and the tions and ease tensions between India and urban poor. Pakistan. Yet the Bush Administration has The first few months of the Ahmadinejad pressured both India and Pakistan to aban- presidency will indicate whether the forces of don the deal. Washington’s refusal to continuity or of change in foreign policy will acknowledge that Iran has legitimate interests prevail. in Iraq and its repeated allegations of Iranian But Iran-U.S. relations under an ‘meddling’ in that country are but further Ahmadinejad presidency will not depend on examples of a Bush Administration policy Iran alone. They will also be shaped by that can hardly be regarded as friendly in Washington. At the moment, the Bush Tehran. Vice-President Cheney’s remark that Administration shows no inclination to Israel may attack Iran’s nuclear facilities was engage Iran; its policy towards the Islamic presumably the Administration’s way of pres- Republic has been characterized by hostility suring Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions. and fuzziness. The Administration for a long But such veiled threats, much like the ambi- time took a dismissive attitude towards the guity the Administration favors in its attitude EU’s negotiations with Tehran over Iran’s towards the EU-Iran negotiations, only rein- nuclear program before it finally endorsed force doubt in Tehran about the Bush these negotiations last year. But even now, Administration’s ultimate intentions and American insistence that Iran entirely give up encourage Iran to adopt a posture of ambigu- its fuel enrichment program remains unreal- ity, say on its nuclear policy, as well. istic; and with the U.S. still chary of appear- The danger is that a harder line under a new ing to make ‘concessions’ to Iran, any pack- president in Tehran will reinforce hardline atti- age the EU offers to Iran is bound to fail tudes in Washington. Prospects for an without full American participation. improvement in relations between Iran and the A proposed agreement for the supply of U.S. do not look promising.

The Iranian Street in the Post-Khatami Era By Karim Sadjadpour, Analyst, International Crisis Group, Tehran, Iran

The surprising victory of conservative Tehran open—given the fact that only candidates Mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran’s who are screened by the unelected Islamic recent presidential elections forces analysts Guardian Council are permitted to run— and observers of Iran to go beyond the con- there is no denying that Ahmadinejad’s mes- ventional wisdom that Iran’s youthful popula- sage resonated among a not insignificant por- tion is composed largely of freedom fighters tion of Iranian society whose economic lot has in search of democracy, social freedoms, and ceased to improve, despite the country’s soar- relations with the United States. After all, Mr. ing oil wealth. Ahmadinejad was the only one of Iran’s seven Nonetheless, having received less than 20% presidential candidates who spoke little (if at of votes cast in the first round, Ahmadinejad’s all) about democracy, social liberalization, and mandate should at the same time not be exag- relations with the United States, focusing gerated; he is still by and large an unknown instead on populist themes such as economic quantity in Iran, showing up on the national justice and deliverance. And though no political radar only in the last two years. Iranian election can be categorized as free and What’s more, among those familiar with 17 MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SUMMER 2005

Ahmadinejad’s background and politics, he is surprising that the candidate who projected a a polarizing figure, generally invoking admira- humble, incorruptible image, who talked tion among the lower income classes for his about subsidies and helping the poor, prevailed empathy and simple lifestyle and concern over the candidates who were talking about among the middle and upper classes for his social liberalization, democracy, and human right-wing political and social leanings. As rights. As Tehran University Political Science such, the new president will inherit a divided Professor Nasser Hadian aptly put it, “You can’t society when he takes office on August 3. Mr. eat democracy and human rights.” Ahmadinejad’s challenge will be to live up the lofty expectations of those who helped get him Tehran Is Not A Microcosm elected, while at the same time attempting to Another reason the election results took ana- pacify the millions who believed he was not lysts and observers by surprise is that Tehran is the right man for the job. not a microcosm of Iran. Similar to urbanites around the world, Tehran’s population is gener- In Search of Economic Dignity ally more progressive, more informed, and For any visitor to Iran, it is quickly apparent more politicized than the rest of the country. that the primary concern for the vast majority Rather than rely on official state television as its of Iranians is a lack of economic dignity. sole news source, Tehran boasts much higher Despite soaring oil prices and a growing Gross rates of Internet penetration, satellite television Domestic Product (GDP), the government has viewership, and newspaper readership. had little success ameliorating its twin Achilles’ Moreover, political discontent in the capital is heels, inflation and unemployment, both of exacerbated by exhausting traffic, suffocating which hover between 15% and 20%. For older air pollution, and high inflation. Anecdotally it generation Iranians, revolutionary promises of is increasingly difficult to find Tehran resi- economic justice and wealth redistribution dents—be it from the north or south end of have gone largely unmet; per capita income in the city—who have faith left in the country’s today’s Iran is estimated to be less than half of political leadership. This sense of alienation what it was during the years prior to the 1979 was apparent in the election, as first-round Revolution. The younger generation’s econom- voter turnout in Tehran was only 33% (as ic prospects are even bleaker. The country’s opposed to 62% nationwide). demographic bulge—around half of Iranians Outside of Tehran, Iranians are similarly are under the age of 25—has led to a scenario dissatisfied with the status quo, but they are far where, according to the government’s own sta- less politicized. Political discussion is usually tistics, it can only accommodate around half of centered around the lack of viable employment the approximately one million people who or the high cost of “meat and onions” rather enter the labor market each year. than a lack of political and social freedoms. This economic alienation proved to be the This presents a growing dilemma for journal- most salient factor in Ahmadinejad’s election. ists and analysts covering Iran. On one hand, In a country where politicians are often seen as Tehran is the country’s political heart and soul self-serving, he cancelled out the millions other (where the 1979 Revolution took place) and candidates spent on flashy, Western-style ad deserves the lion’s share of the focus. On the campaigns by simply having his humble home other hand, national elections are increasingly in a working class area of Tehran broadcast on being decided outside of Tehran, given the cap- state television. As one working class Tehran ital’s low voter turnout. While the seeming gulf resident told me, “He may not be able to solve between north and south Tehran was empha- all our economic problems, but at least he sized during the elections, more difficult to rec- won’t enrich himself in the process of trying.” oncile for Iran watchers is the gulf between So, in the context of Iran’s widespread econom- Tehran and the rest of the country. 18 ic malaise, perhaps it should not have been so Rise of Ethnic Nationalism? tion of an Iranian Kurdish dissident in Vienna, In addition to Iran’s economic and political Austria will make his job doubly difficult. discontents, one of Ahmadinejad’s challenges as president will be to address the increasing An Aversion Towards Unrest signs of alienation among Iran’s ethnic and The deep-seated desire for economic, political, religious minorities. Though the words and social reform among many Iranians is tem- “Persian” and “Iranian” are often used inter- pered by a strong aversion to unrest, uncertainty, changeably, little over half of the Iranian pop- and insecurity by others. Having already experi- ulation is ethnically Persian, the rest consisting enced one tumultuous revolution (or in the case of Azeri Turks, Kurds, Baluchis, and Arabs (the of Iran’s youth, the aftermath of one tumultuous last three of which also have Sunni Muslim revolution) and a brutal eight-year war with populations, in contrast to Iran’s Shiite major- Iraq, Iranians have few concrete ideas as to how ity). In the first round of the election, the five reform should take place other than it ought to provinces with the lowest turnouts were either occur bedun-e khoonrizi—“without bloodshed.” Kurdish or Azeri regions, and in the last few The post-war turbulence and insecurity in months before the election there have been next-door neighbor Iraq has made Iranians incidents of rioting among the Arab and Sunni even wearier about the prospects for a quick-fix minority communities in the oil-rich solution. As opposed to the aftermath of the Khuzestan Province. U.S. removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Perhaps the cause for greatest concern at the when some Iranians could be heard romanti- moment is the Kurdish question. Past conven- cizing about the prospects of a U.S. interven- tional wisdom has been that Kurds, who make tion in Tehran, today Iranians are not looking up around 7% of the Iranian population, are to Iraq as a paradigm for change. In the widely far closer historically, culturally, and linguisti- echoed words of one middle class, middle-aged cally to Persian than they are to Turks or Tehran resident, “When we look at what’s Arabs. Hence Iranian Kurds are far less prone going on in Iraq, it seems that the real choice is to agitation than Turkish or Iraqi Kurds. not one between democracy or authoritarian- While this may be true, a new dynamic in Iraq ism, but between stability or unrest. People are and a newfound self-confidence among Iraqi not happy in Iran, but no one wants unrest.” Kurds have seemingly amplified the sense of The task of dealing with Iranians’ deep sense ethnic nationalism among Iranian Kurds. of alienation vis-à-vis their government will Voter turnout in Kurdistan Province was the now be entrusted in the hands of Mahmoud lowest in the country, and according to one Ahmadinejad. And despite the new president’s journalist (who recently visited the region), vague campaign promises of economic justice “They make a concerted effort to speak their and relief, ensconced political barriers to eco- own language, fly their own [Kurdistan] flag nomic reform will likely be insurmountable. inside their homes, and watch Kurdish satellite Hence, how the new president chooses to act on television at home.” issues which he has greater potential to affect— During his tenure as president, Mohammed political and social freedoms, the rights of eth- Khatami was generally well-received among the nic and religious minorities—will take on country’s ethnic and religious minorities, but added importance, yet Mr. Ahmadinejad has in the aftermath of the removal of Saddam given no indication that these issues are priori- Hussein and the rise of Sunni-Shiite difficulties ties for him. While Iranian politics are highly on the regional level, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad unpredictable (as is evidenced by the election of will surely face steeper challenges. The presi- Ahmadinejad) it can be said with certainty that dent-elect’s alleged link to the 1989 assassina- Mr. Ahmadinejad has his work cut out for him.

19 MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SUMMER 2005

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Lee H. Hamilton, President and Director

Board of Trustees Joseph B. Gildenhorn, Chair David A. Metzner, Vice Chair

Public Members: James H. Billington, Librarian of Congress; John W. Carlin, Archivist of the United States; Bruce Cole, Chair, National Endowment for the Humanities; Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Condoleezza Rice, Secretary, U.S. Department of State; Lawrence M. Small, Secretary, Smithsonian Institution; Margaret Spellings, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education.

Private Citizen Members: Carol Cartwright, Robert B. Cook, Donald E. Garcia, Bruce S. Gelb, Charles L. Glazer, Tamala L. Longaberger, Ignacio E. Sanchez.

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