Update Briefing Middle East Briefing N°18 Tehran/Brussels, 4 August 2005 Iran: What Does Ahmadi-Nejad's Victory Mean?

Update Briefing Middle East Briefing N°18 Tehran/Brussels, 4 August 2005 Iran: What Does Ahmadi-Nejad's Victory Mean? I. OVERVIEW victory is likely to aggravate tensions with Washington and perhaps with Brussels. A diplomatic newcomer, Ahmadi-Nejad brings a less sophisticated approach than The surprise election of Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, who his predecessor; alone among the candidates, he did is being sworn in as president this week, has given rise not broach improved relations with the U.S. during to dire predictions about Iran's domestic and foreign the campaign and, since his victory, has been at best policies and relations with the U.S. and the European indifferent about them. But bottom line positions -- on Union. There are reasons for concern. Based on his Iran's nuclear program, regional interests, Iraq policy -- rhetoric, past performance, and the company he keeps, almost certainly will not budge in the foreseeable future. Ahmadi-Nejad appears a throwback to the revolution's early days: more ideological, less pragmatic, and anti- The new president is dismissive of the need to improve American. But for the West, and the U.S. in particular, relations with the U.S., and his election strengthened to reach and act upon hasty conclusions would be those within the U.S. administration who have long wrong. Iran is governed by complex institutions and believed engagement would only further entrench a competing power centres that inherently favour continuity hostile, undemocratic regime and who wish to pursue over change. More importantly, none of the fundamentals a strategy of "delegitimisation". But though both sides has changed: the regime is not about to collapse; it holds might take short-term comfort from continued pivotal cards on Iraq and nuclear proliferation; and any estrangement, this posture is unsustainable. On at least chance of modifying its behaviour will come, if at all, two burning issues -- Iraq and the nuclear question -- the through serious, coordinated EU and U.S. efforts to U.S. and Iran inexorably must engage, collide or both. engage it. While Iran has turned a page on the Khatami era, President Ahmadi-Nejad faces the same situation and President Ideologically, Ahmadi-Nejad remains somewhat of a Bush the same dilemmas as before. mystery, not so much because he conceals his beliefs as because they are strikingly abstract. His campaign In short, and for all their flaws -- hundreds of candidates, utterances, much like his mayoral tenure, were dominated including all women, were disqualified by an unelected by lofty phrases about economic justice, Islam, national body, and there were serious charges of irregularities -- dignity and the need to protect the national interest the election clarified some core realities of Iranian politics, against foreigners. Arguably the best indicator of his with significant implications that the West cannot afford views are the positions of his allies -- the Islamic to ignore: Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the basij militia, and the Abadgaran movement, all of which have The current regime is not about to collapse, embraced socially conservative and internationally and any reform movement will need time to confrontational outlooks, and some of which have revive. In an election that by regional standards supported violent activity abroad. was competitive, had strong participation, and offered a broad choice, Iranians voted on the But presidential change is unlikely to signify fundamental basis of economic rather than political needs. policy change. Ironically, the same U.S. observers who There is little doubt a vast majority wants genuine before the election argued a reform victory would make reform but at this point is more interested in its little difference because unelected officials make decisions, well-being, and Ahmadi-Nejad spoke to that issue have been quick to express alarm at a threatened rightward best. In contrast, the reform movement is in turn. Given Iran's political system, earlier assessments disarray, unable to find a way to participate in the ring truer. Domestic changes may come at the margins, political system without ultimately being stymied not spectacular enough to provoke international and discredited by it. Reformers are disorganised, opprobrium, albeit serious enough for those affected. lack a strong leader, have a desultory eight-year On the foreign front, the style likely will be more record and are failing to connect with voters' confrontational and less appealing to Western audiences, everyday concerns. In other words, for all the and in the short run at least, Ahmadi-Nejad's surprise dissatisfaction, the regime is not nearing collapse. For the U.S. to assume that popular anger will Iran: What Does Ahmadi-Nejad's Victory Mean? Crisis Group Middle East Briefing N°18, 4 August 2005 Page 2 translate into an organised opposition and that the Ghalibaf), and a reformist (former Minister of Higher regime is ripe for a fall would be a risky gamble Education Mostafa Moin).2 that virtually nothing in Iran appears to validate. Extrapolating from Mohammed Khatami's landslide Serious, coordinated U.S.-EU engagement with victories in 1997 and 2001, as well as the 2000 Iran on the nuclear issue is required to avert a parliamentary elections, it was assumed only roughly 20 full-blown crisis or, at a minimum, genuinely per cent of the electorate identified with the conservatives, test Tehran's intentions. Renewed Iranian threats and most desired a significant overhaul of the Islamic to resume work at a uranium conversion facility Republic.3 For this reason every other candidate in Isfahan are only the latest indication that the emphasized the need for political and social reform while current process is not working. More creative many -- again, not Ahmadi-Nejad -- also suggested the proposals -- allowing Iran to operate a small need for improved ties with the U.S. Ahmadi-Nejad was enrichment capacity under strict international given no chance to reach the second round (a runoff surveillance or joint Iranian/international being necessary if no candidate won more than 50 per management of nuclear sites -- should be put cent of the vote), let alone prevail. on the table, along with discussion of Tehran's security concerns, before taking the uncertain Among reformers, media attention focused on Moin, step of Security Council referral. who called for democratisation and greater respect for human rights, and, to a lesser degree, Mehdi Karroubi, a On Iraq, Washington eventually must have former speaker of the parliament who pledged to give a dialogue with Iran to maximise chances of every Iranian over eighteen $55 (50,000 toman) monthly, stability. Even with enhanced regional cooperation, at an estimated annual cost of $30 billion.4 Moin started in particular from Tehran, the U.S. will continue slowly but appeared to finish strongly, igniting at to face a resilient insurgency and a tenuous Iraqi least some enthusiasm among young, more well-to-do political process; without it, the tasks will be reformers. Among conservatives, eyes were on Ghalibaf considerably more difficult. and Ali Larijani, a former head of state television and Engagement by the U.S. and the EU does broadcasting and a close adviser to Supreme Leader not mean appeasement, and certainly not Ayatollah Khamenei. Weeks prior, newspapers considered indifference to human rights abuses. A first close to Khamenei urged Ghalibaf to withdraw in favour test will be the status of Akbar Ganji, a political of Larijani; in conservative strongholds such as Qom, prisoner whose health has deteriorated dangerously Larijani's presence was the most visible.5 as a result of a hunger strike. His release would constitute an important symbolic gesture by the But much of the focus, domestic and international, was on Ahmadi-Nejad administration. Rafsanjani. He announced his candidacy three days before the deadline, explaining the decision was "one of the most difficult of all my years of political activity" but he felt the II. HOW IT HAPPENED need to run because of "the emergence of radical trends 2 A. THE INVISIBLE CANDIDATE According to a poll shown to Crisis Group by an official of the ministry of intelligence four weeks prior to the election, 36 per cent favoured Rafsanjani, 15 per cent Ghalibaf, 9 per cent Moin, Of the eight presidential candidates authorised to run by and 7 per cent Larijani. Ahmadi-Nejad had less than 5 per cent the twelve-member Guardian Council, Mahmoud Ahmadi- support. Crisis Group interview, Tehran, 27 May 2005. Nejad appeared among the least competitive until 3 In 1997, there was a roughly 80 per cent voter turnout, practically the end.1 Until a week prior to the election, he and Khatami received approximately 70 per cent. In 2001 had barely surfaced in opinion polls and was denying participation was roughly 67 per cent, of which Khatami got rumours of imminent withdrawal. In the last week, most about 80 per cent. 4 The third reform candidate was Mohsen Mehralizadeh, the surveys predicted a three-man race between a centrist little-known head of the national sports organisation and vice (former president Hashemi Rafsanjani), a conservative president for physical education/recreation. The Guardian (former national police chief Mohammed Bagher Council initially vetoed Moin and Mehralizadeh but they were reinstated after Ayatollah Khamenei's intervention. 5 As former Tehran mayor and key Rafsanjani adviser Mohammed Atrianfar told Crisis Group weeks prior to the 1 Over 1,000 people applied to

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