BORN SECRET The H-Bomb, the Progressive Case, and National Security A. DeVolpi G.E. Marsh T.A. Postol G.S. Stanford [Printed edition] originally published by Pergamon Press NEW YORK • OXFORD • TORONTO • SYDNEY • PARIS • FRANKFURT Copyright © 1981 Pergamon Press Inc. Library of Congress: Cataloging In Publication Data Main entry under title: Born Secret. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. United States, appellee. 2. The Progressive. 3. Liberty of the press-United States. 4. Atomic weapons information — Law and legislation — United States. 5. Hydrogen bomb. I. DeVolpi, Alexander, 1931- [Printed edition] ISBN 0-08-025995-2 AACR1 [Republished by authors (with corrections) as a Kindle eBook version on Amazon.Com: 2011] [Version: BS.071.wpd November 20, 2011] I know that's a secret, for it's whispered everywhere. — William Congreve (English playwright, late 18th Century) LIST OF MAJOR TOPICS AND CHAPTERS PREFACE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS CHAPTER I: THE NUCLEAR AGE — POINT OF NO RETURN CHAPTER II: THE CHANGING MEANING OF DEFENSE CHAPTER III: SOCIETY'S NEED TO KNOW CHAPTER IV: OPPOSING LEGAL ARGUMENTS IN THE Progressive CASE CHAPTER V: TECHNICAL DISCUSSION CHAPTER VI: PROLIFERATION RISK CHAPTER VII: GOVERNMENT SECRECY CHAPTER VIII: MISUSES OF SECRECY CHAPTER IX: OFFICIAL INFRACTIONS OF SECURITY GUIDELINES CHAPTER X: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS CHAPTER XII: REMEDIES EPILOGUE POSTSCRIPT (2011) COMMENTARIES APPENDICES NOTES GLOSSARY ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS PROGRESSIVE CASE LEGAL REFERENCES GENERAL REFERENCES ABOUT THE AUTHORS HYPERLINKED TABLE OF CONTENTS (OPTION: Go to Hyperlinked Table of Contents) LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES Table 1. Summary of nuclear weapons tests through 1979 Figure 1. Design configurations for four types of nuclear weapons Figure 2. Encyclopedia Americana version of H-bomb conceptual design Figure 3. Merit Students Encyclopedia version of H-bomb conceptual design Figure 4. The most significant “Greenglass Diagram” used as evidence in the Rosenberg case PREFACE It was with mixed emotions that we became involved in the Progressive case — a legal conflict between government secrecy and the First Amendment. We found ourselves caught between those who felt that to preserve national security our constitutional institutions would have to yield, and those who thought that the constitutional protections were more important than what they saw as remote risks to national security. We felt squeezed between our public duty, as we saw it, and the views of the agency that funds our employer. Caught in a controversy among scientific colleagues, we found ourselves submitting testimony to courts, giving technical advice (solicited) to defendants, offering advice (unsolicited) to legislators, communicating with reporters, and generally contributing to the cacophony raised by various people and groups in their diverse efforts to make nuclear war less likely. The opinions we express in this book are our own — not those of the U.S. Department of Energy nor those of our employer, Argonne National Laboratory, which is under contract to DOE. Nevertheless we acknowledge with admiration and gratitude the forbearance of those two organizations. In the best democratic tradition, they have let us have our say — with some indications of disappointment, perhaps, but with no hint of pressure to cease and desist. Indeed, the classification branches of Argonne (which is not a weapons laboratory) and DOE have been actively helpful in granting the security clearances needed by two of us in assisting the defendants, and in making special arrangements for the local security and storage of pertinent classified documents. In being frankly critical of some of the things DOE has done, we are doing our best to enhance national security. We are all on the same side. The book does not dwell on our personal reactions, but rather attempts to assemble in one place material that will help foster an understanding of the events surrounding the Progressive case. We hope it provides insights into the broader underlying technical, social, and legal issues for which the episode is but a paradigm. The work was not sponsored by the government, and the book contains no information from classified sources. We use four notations for references. Documents from the Progressive case are indicated by numbers in brackets (thus, [1]); they are listed at the end of the book. Names of legal cases are italicized (Progressive, or New York Times); no full reference is given because that would be outside the scope of this book. One-of-a-kind references to articles and books are expressed in full when mentioned; repeated references are cited by initials and date of publication in brackets (thus, [F&W- 74]). These references are tabulated at the back. Notes containing extended remarks or references are listed separately according to Chapter; thus [Note IV-3] is the third note for Chapter IV. Notes for all chapters follow the appendices. Throughout we have made reference to the “government.” We use this term in a generic sense to refer to the executive branch of U.S. federal government as a political entity. Its use is not necessarily confined to any particular presidential administration, nor do we mean to single out or exclude any particular department, branch, or agency. A glossary of technical terms and a list of acronyms and abbreviations are near the end of the book. Also, some documents that are frequently referred to but are not readily available, including the contested article about the H-bomb, are reproduced in appendices. [Because this book was published in 1981, some verbs that use present and future tenses have been or might need to be changed.] ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We are indebted to The Progressive Foundation for supplying us with copies of all the case documents in their possession, and to Marshall Perlin for providing an extensive file of documents regarding the Rosenberg case. The American Civil Liberties Union, particularly Bruce Ennis and Chuck Simms, helped us make our way through the legal thicket. We appreciate their legal support throughout the case and their review of drafts of the manuscript. Howard Morland has permitted us to reproduce his article. From Sam Day and Erwin Knoll we have received continued encouragement, as well as constructive remarks about our manuscript. Much- appreciated suggestions have also come from Hugh DeWitt and Ray Kidder. Material from a column by Rear Admiral H.C. Eccles is reprinted by permission of The Christian Science Monitor: 1980, The Christian Science Publishing Society, all rights reserved. Excerpts from The Myths of National Security, 1957, by Arthur Macy Cox, are quoted by permission or Beacon Press. We also appreciate permission to quote passages from Secrecy and Foreign Policy, edited by Thomas M. Franck and Edward Wiesband, 1974, by Oxford University Press. David Kellogg, our editor from Pergamon Press, reviewed the manuscript at several stages, and has been a constant source of editorial ideas and congenial guidance. OPTION: Go to Hyperlinked Table of Contents CHAPTER I: THE NUCLEAR AGE — POINT OF NO RETURN In nuclear warfare, mistakes are irretrievable. — H.C. Eccles, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy When the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, the most revolutionary weapon ever to be introduced into warfare destroyed not only a city and much of its population, but also all classical concepts of warfare. It was no longer possible to defend industrial centers, territories, or populations. The concept of defense became an anachronism, to be replaced by deterrence — the threat of retaliation. In an attempt to prevent other nations from getting the atomic bombs against which there is no defense, the government created a superstructure of secrecy around nuclear technology. Because information and programs protected by secrecy are effectively removed from public view and discussion, secrecy and the democratic process are fundamentally inconsistent. Any benefits of secrecy claimed for a given program must be carefully balanced against the costs. As secrecy becomes more pervasive, it increasingly threatens social, political, economic, and democratic institutions in fundamental, if subtle, ways. During and after World War 11 the extraordinary power of science and engineering in military affairs was manifested in the form of radar, aircraft, the proximity fuse, fire-control systems, ballistic missiles, submarines, and the most destructive weapon of all time, the nuclear warhead. The great military and economic benefits of giant, well-organized, and protected (by secrecy) government projects were recognized, and many such projects became permanent institutions. Allied war operations were revolutionized by the technology created in these massive and impressive efforts. However, the national security implications of the war-born technologies have been immeasurable, and the existence of large programs behind veils of secrecy is a matter of growing concern. One danger in large, institutionalized secret programs is that they can develop significant political undercurrents that have an important impact on our lives. As an example, consider the original decision, shortly after the atomic (fission) bomb was developed, to proceed with work on the thermonuclear H-bomb. The decision to develop a thermonuclear (fusion) weapon, the “super” as it was then known, was debated behind closed doors. Declassified only in 1974, an October 30, 1949, report of the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission contains warnings, by knowledgeable scientists,