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The Role of US Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War Era / by Richard A

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The Role of US Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War Era / by Richard A Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Paulsen, Richard A., 1956- The role of US nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era / by Richard A. Paulsen. p. 207. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. United States-Defenses. 2. Nuclear weapons-United States. 3. World poll- tics-1989- 1. Title. UA23.P373 1994 94-25605 355.02'17'0973-dc20 CIP ISBN 1-58566-055-8 First Printing September 1994 Second Printing July 1998 Third Printing September 2000 Fourth Printing September 2001 Disclaimer This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment and in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, or the United States government. This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release . Ll. Contents Page Chapter DISCLAIMER . ii FOREWORD . Vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . PREFACE . xi INTRODUCTION . xv Notes . xviii 1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY . 1 The Truman Era-Containment . 1 The Eisenhower Years-Massive Retaliation . 4 The 1960s-Flexible Response . 9 The 1970s-Sufficient Deterrence and Countervailing Strategy . 11 The 1980s-Peace through Strength . 15 Strategic Modernization . 16 Emphasis to Denuclearize . 18 Changing Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe . 21 The 1990s-Peace through Disarmament . 22 A New Defense Strategy . 22 The Impact of Desert Storm . 24 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks . 25 The Disintegration of the Warsaw Pact . 27 Unilateral Initiatives-Round One . 28 The Downfall of Communism and the Soviet Union . 32 Unilateral Initiatives-Round 2 . 33 Washington Summit and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II . 35 An Economical Approach to Arms Control . 37 Notes . 38 2 US NUCLEAR POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR . 43 National Security Strategy . 43 Strategic Nuclear Forces . 45 Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces . 46 1.1.E Chapter Page Missile Defenses . 47 Arms Control . 48 Proliferation . 49 Technology . 50 National Military Strategy . 50 The Strategic Triad . 52 Bombers . 53 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles . 55 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles . 56 The Future of the Triad . 57 Notes . 58 3 CURRENT THINKING ON THE FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS . 61 An Assessment of Current Thinking . 61 Seven Questions regarding Future US Nuclear Forces . 61 Terms . 62 Are Nuclear Weapons Still Necessary? . 63 Nuclear Weapons Should Be Eliminated . 64 Nuclear Weapons Should Not Be Eliminated . 67 Chemical/Biological Weapons and Conventional Attack . 69 Arguments against Nuclear Use in These Roles . 69 Arguments for Deterring Chemical and Biological Attack . 71 Arguments for Deterring Conventional Attack . 72 Extended Deterrence . 73 Tactical Nuclear Weapons . 74 Eliminate Tactical Nuclear Weapons . 75 Maintain Tactical Nuclear Weapons . 76 Nuclear Strategy . 79 Deterrence . 80 Countervalue . 81 Counterforce . 83 Multilateral Concerns . 85 How Many Nuclear Weapons? . 85 Multilateral Concerns . 88 iv Chapter Page Nuclear Posture . 89 Crisis Stability . 90 Notes . 92 4 THE THREAT-WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION . 97 Proliferation . 98 US Approach to Proliferation . 98 Proliferation Rationale . 101 Nuclear Threats and Considerations . 105 Current Nuclear Countries . 106 Current Nuclear-Capable and Undeclared Nuclear Countries . 111 Developing Nuclear Countries . 112 Chemical and Biological . 117 Ballistic Missiles . 121 Future Potential Scenarios . 123 Notes . 130 5 US NUCLEAR FORCES FOR THE POST-COLD WAR ERA . 135 PostCold War Environment . 135 Possible US Responses to Proliferation . 138 Carrots . 139 Sticks . 140 Acceptance . 147 The Role of US Nuclear Weapons . 149 A Declining Role? . 149 Warfighting and Deterrence . 151 US Defense Strategy . 153 Arms Control and Acquisition Policy . 155 A Hedge against Uncertainty . 156 Unilateral Capability . 157 An Analysis of Nuclear Force Capabilities . 158 Quick Response . 159 Positive Control . 161 Crisis Stability . 161 Decisive Firepower . 165 High Probability of Kill . 165 Minimizing Collateral Damage . 167 Precision Accuracy/Wide Variety of Yields . 167 u Chapter Page Flexible Employment Options . 168 Demonstration of Capability . 169 Show of Force/Visible Generation . 169 Survivability . 170 Hedge against Uncertainty . 170 Bottom Line . 172 Notes . 172 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . 175 INDEX . 181 Illustrations Table 1 Bush's and Gorbachev's Tactical Nuclear Weapon Initiatives . 29 2 Bush's and Gorbachev's Strategic Nuclear Weapon Initiatives . 30 3 Bush's and Gorbachev's Proposals . 31 4 Bush's 28 January 1992 Initiatives . 33 5 Bush's 28 January 1992 Proposals . 34 6 Yeltsin's 29 January 1992 Initiatives . 34 7 Yeltsin's 29 January 1992 Proposals . 35 8 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II . 36 9 National Objectives Involving Military Forces . 44 10 Possible Future Weapons of Mass Destruction Threatening US National Security . 124 UL Foreword The decade of the 1990s opened with a declining Soviet threat that ushered in an astonishing round of unilateral and bilateral nuclear arms reductions . While the dissolution of the Soviet Union has greatly reduced the possibility of global nuclear war, it has also increased third world instability, conflict, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction . While the threat of chemical and nuclear weapons never materialized in Desert Storm, the next regional confrontation may not afford the United States such latitude. Maj Rick Paulsen's study analyzes the role of United States nuclear weapons in this new, multipolar environment. He begins with a historical look at the role nuclear weapons have played in US defense policy since 1945. He reviews current unclassified guidance and the spectrum of public opinion on where the United States should be going with its nuclear weapons programs . He then surveys the potential threat of weapons of mass destruction. Major Paulsen concludes his study by suggesting nuclear force capabilities that would provide the United States with a viable deterrent for the post-cold war era. His recommendations address a broad range of issues that focus on developing a coherent nuclear strategy. About the Author Maj Richard A. Paulsen completed this study as the last Strategic Air Command (SAC)-sponsored research fellow and one of the first two Air Combat Command (ACC)-sponsored research fellows at the Airpower Research Institute (ARI), Air University College for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (AUCADRE) at Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama. Major Paulsen is a 1978 graduate of the United States Naval Academy, with a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering. After graduation, he served as an electronics project engineer for five months at the Naval Ordnance Station at Indian Head, Maryland, while waiting to attend nuclear power training. Major Paulsen attended the Navy Nuclear Power School at Orlando, Florida, the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Prototype Plant at Windsor Locks, Connecticut, and the Officer Basic Submarine School at Groton, Connecticut. He reported to the USS Lafayette (SSBN 616) Poseidon missile submarine blue crew in January 1980 . While on Lafayette, he completed three 70-day deterrent patrols and took the ship through a two-year refueling overhaul. During the course of his tour, Major Paulsen held the positions of electrical division officer, reactor control division officer, main propulsion assistant, communications officer, and reactor refueling officer. He received his gold dolphins on 23 March 1981 and passed the Naval Reactors Engineer's Exam prior to departing for the Air Force . Major Paulsen received an interservice transfer to the Air Force on 31 LX October 1983 and reported to the Air Force Weapons Laboratory at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, for his first Air Force assignment. He served as the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects section chief and, later, as the technology branch chief in the nuclear technology office during his tour. In 1987 he was assigned to the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, where he earned a master of science degree in operations research. After AFIT, Major Paulsen was assigned to the Force Analysis Division at SAC headquarters at Offutt AFB, Nebraska . In 1992 the commander of SAC selected him as a research fellow at ARI and as a student to concurrently attend Air Command and Staff College. He became an ACC-sponsored research fellow during the Air Force reorganization in June 1992 . Major Paulsen is currently assigned to the Joint Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) as a strategic analyst . He and his wife, Barb, were married in 1978 and have a daughter, Donna, and two sons, David and Daniel. x Preface I arrived at SAC in January 1989 and was assigned to the Force Analysis Division, commonly referred to as "the vault." One of my key responsibilities was to support commander in chief Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC) with force structure analysis and, in particular, to provide the analysis for his yearly testimony before Congress. At that time, we vigorously provided analytical support to validate strategic force modernization requirements-132 B-2s, advanced cruise missile (ACM), short-range attack missile (SRAM) II, Peace- keeper Rail Garrison, small intercontinental ballistic missile (SICBM), and Trident submarines equipped with the D-5 missile . Then, unexpectedly, the threat disappeared-the Warsaw Pact disbanded,
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