Brexit and Northern Ireland

H-Nationalism Brexit and Northern Ireland

Discussion published by Brian Girvin on Thursday, April 26, 2018 H-Nationalism is pleased to publish here the fourth post of its 'Brexit, Nationalism and the Future of Europe' monthly series, which discusses the United Kingdom's decision to leave the European Union and its impact on nationalism and the future of Europe in a multidisciplinary perspective. Please feel welcome to add to the discussion by posting a reply. Today's contribution is by Professor Jonathan Tonge of the University of Liverpool.

Brexit, the Good Friday Agreement and Polarisation in Northern Ireland Brexit has exacerbated inter-communal polarity in Northern Ireland. Unionist versus nationalist divisions over Brexit have not caused the collapse of devolved government. Rows over the RHI scandal, an Irish Language Act and legacy issues precipitated that downfall, but disagreement over Brexit has added to the crisis over the Good Friday Agreement. This post examines why.

Deepening the intercommunal divide

Northern Ireland voted to remain in the EU by 56% to 44%, with 89% of nationalists, 88% of Irish identifiers and 85% of Catholics supporting Remain.[1] Unionists were more evenly divided, but most voted in favour of withdrawal. Only 35% of unionists, 38% of British identifiers and 41% of Protestants voted to remain in the EU.[2] Within this community, the assertion of British sovereignty trumps alternative considerations. 86% of Sinn Féin voters supported remaining in the EU; 70% of DUP supporters backed leave. These views had changed little one year on, at the 2017 General Election.[3] Some features of the British referendum result also pertained in Northern Ireland. Highly qualified people were more likely to be pro-EU. Immigration was another. Protestants are significantly less pro-immigration than Catholics and among DUP identifiers there is a greater propensity towards negative attitudes than among Sinn Féin or SDLP identifiers, or those without a party identification. Working class voters were significantly more likely than middle class voters to vote Leave. However, age did not reach significance (unlike in Britain) and nor did gender. Overall, unionist or nationalist ideological identity was by far the strongest of the

Citation: Brian Girvin. Brexit and Northern Ireland. H-Nationalism. 08-16-2018. https://networks.h-net.org/node/3911/discussions/1748157/brexit-and-northern-ireland Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 1 H-Nationalism variables, followed by religion and party. Sinn Féin historically regarded EU institutions as a derogation from true Irish national sovereignty and the party remains sceptical of the concept of ever- deepening European union. Sinn Féin did not support the EU until the Good Friday Agreement, when party policy switched to ‘critical engagement’. Sinn Féin opposed the Nice and Lisbon treaties expanding EU competences. If arriving late at the EU party, Sinn Féin has been reluctant to leave, insisting that Brexit will ‘destroy the Good Friday Agreement’, is at odds with consent for change, undermines human rights, denies Irish-EU citizens in the North their nationhood and, dangerously, reinforces the border.[4] Sinn Fein’s advocates, as a minimum, special status for Northern Ireland, effectively associate membership of the EU.[5] Special status for Northern Ireland would recognise unique historical circumstances, cross-border trade and dual citizenship. The DUP’s hostility to the EU has changed from Ian Paisley’s assertions of a ‘Catholic conspiracy’ to argument grounded in sovereignty and EU inflexibility. The party’s 2017 Westminster election manifesto asserted: the decision to support leaving the European Union was based on principle and practicality … The DUP supported the idea of a renegotiation of the UK’s terms of membership following the 2015 General Election and did not commit at that stage to a Brexit referendum position, but ‘the deafness of the EU institutions to change in those negotiations meant that this process did not deliver the fundamental reform the EU required. Therefore, with no reasonable alternative available the DUP chose to maintain its stance and advocate a leave vote.[6] The DUP position is that a return of devolved government is desirable to offer input from Northern Ireland, but, regardless, the UK government will negotiate on Northern Ireland’s behalf. The party wants the ‘particular circumstances of Northern Ireland with a land border fully reflected’ a ‘frictionless border’ with the Irish Republic and a ‘comprehensive free trade and customs agreement with the European Union’.[7] Special status for Northern Ireland within the EU is rejected by the DUP on the grounds it creates a border in the Irish Sea and pushes Northern Ireland closer to the Irish Republic. A bespoke UK-Ireland deal with the EU would, however, be acceptable and deal with the border problem. The Good Friday Agreement’s Strand One (devolved power-sharing) has collapsed and Strand 2 is in trouble due to Brexit. References to the EU within the 1998 deal need deletion. The Agreement comprises two treaties: a Multi-Party Agreement

Citation: Brian Girvin. Brexit and Northern Ireland. H-Nationalism. 08-16-2018. https://networks.h-net.org/node/3911/discussions/1748157/brexit-and-northern-ireland Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 2 H-Nationalism involving most political parties in Northern Ireland and the British-Irish Agreement, the accord between the governments of the UK and Ireland. In Article 2 of the British-Irish Agreement, the two governments ‘affirm their solemn commitment to support, and where appropriate implement, the provisions of the Multi-Party Agreement’. The Article establishes a North/South Ministerial Council and the ‘implementation bodies referred to in paragraph 9 (ii) of the section entitled “Strand Two” of the Multi-Party Agreement’, the all-island dimension. The British-Irish Agreement to uphold the Multi-Party Agreement is a binding bilateral international legal treaty between the UK and Irish governments, registered at the United Nations. The Good Friday Agreement assumes continuing EU membership for both the UK and Ireland but binds neither explicitly to maintaining that membership. Court judgements in 2016 (High) and 2017 (Supreme) declared that it would be an over- statement to suggest that EU membership was a constitutional bulwark central to the Good Friday Agreement. This would be to ‘elevate this issue [of EU membership] over and beyond its true contextual position’.[8] The Courts declared that the principle of consent for constitutional change contained in the Good Friday Agreement referred to whether Northern Ireland remained in the UK or unified with the rest of Ireland, not EU membership or withdrawal. Strand Two of the Good Friday Agreement is where references to the EU are significant, forming part of the background to institutional arrangements. Strand Two pledges that the North-South Ministerial Council, designed to promote and oversee all-island cooperation, will ‘consider the European Union dimension of relevant matters, including the implementation of EU policies and programmes and proposals under consideration in the EU framework’ (para. 17). The same paragraph also requires ‘arrangements to be made to ensure that the views of the [North-South Ministerial] Council are taken into account and represented appropriately at relevant EU meetings’. The Annex to Strand Two suggests areas for North-South cooperation and implementation which ‘may include’ (item 8) ‘Relevant EU programmes … and their successors’. By far the most significant of the North- South bodies is the Special European Union Programmes Body (SEUPB), given how it has implemented the huge EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland. As one of the signatories to the Good Friday Agreement will no longer be part of the EU, it is unclear how the required ‘implementation of EU policies and programmes and proposals under consideration in the EU framework’, as outlined in para. 17 of

Strand Two, can continue. References to ‘relevant EU programmes’ in the Annex may also require deletion. How the ‘arrangements to be made to ensure that the views of the [North-South Ministerial] Council are taken into account and represented appropriately at relevant EU meetings’ in para. 17 can be deemed adequate if only one party to the Agreement, the Irish Government, can provide such representation, is unclear. The UK Government pledges ‘continued adherence to the constitutional framework, rights and institutions provided for in the Belfast Agreement’[9] (Annex B, para.5). The White Paper also states that the government ‘remain fully committed to the Belfast Agreement and its successors’. The use of the plural ‘successors’ is curious. The 2006 St Andrews Agreement modified the Belfast Agreement and might possibly be considered a ‘successor’ deal but there have been no others. Will post-Brexit revisions to the Good Friday Agreement effectively form a ‘successor’ deal?

Conclusion The unionist versus nationalist faultline was rendered even more acute by Brexit. Nationalists overwhelmingly oppose; Unionists support. Both identities are concerned with nation-state sovereignty and identity. Ideology-as-identity and definitions of the nation state – UK or Irish – outweigh all else. Unionist or Nationalist self-identification was the most important determinant of referendum choice on Brexit. Although social status had some influence, given that the Unionist working-class was the likeliest sector to vote for Brexit and attitudes to immigration mattered, it was traditional unionist priorities of UK sovereignty that held sway. The DUP has never supported the EU, a stance resonating with much of its base. Moreover, the DUP has never formally endorsed the Good Friday Agreement anyway, even if it came to accept its contents as a route to power. In being pro-EU, many nationalists also prioritised another Union, politically not yet attained – that of the island. This Irish nationalism might be viewed as ‘soft’; in opposing Brexit, not many of those nationalists are demanding – or expecting - a united Ireland soon. What they will not accept, however, is a border on their island being upgraded from a political fact to a fence, even an electronic customs type.

Acknowledgements I acknowledge with thanks funding from the ESRC for the 2017 Northern Ireland

General Election study (Principal Investigator J. Tonge)., I am grateful to Professor John Garry at Queen’s University Belfast for data from the ESRC 2016 Northern Ireland Assembly Election

References

[1] ‘Coakley, J. and Garry, J. (2016) ‘Northern Ireland: the challenge of public opinion’, http://qpol.qub.ac.uk/public-opinion-challenge-ni/, 9 December 2016.

[2] ‘Coakley, J. and Garry, J. (2016) ‘Northern Ireland: the challenge of public opinion’, http://qpol.qub.ac.uk/public-opinion-challenge-ni/, 9 December 2016. [3] https://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue/?sn=8234&type=data%20catalogue [4] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-northern-irealand-gerry-adams -sinn-Féin-good-friday-agreement-peace-eu-a7539011.html

[5] Sinn Féin (2017) ‘The Case for the North to achieve designated special status within the EU’, Dublin: Sinn Féin, http://www.sinnfein.ie/files/2016/The_Case_For_The_North_To_Achieve_Special_Desi gnated_Status_Within_The_EU.pdf

[6] Democratic Unionist Party (2017) ‘Standing Strong for Northern Ireland’. Westminster Election Manifesto, Belfast: DUP, 18, http://www.mydup.com/images/uploads/publications/DUP_Wminster_Manifesto_2017 _v5.pdf

[7] Democratic Unionist Party (2017) op cit., 19.

[8] R (Miller) and others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, 29 October 2016.

[9] HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union’ London: HMSO, CM9417, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/58919

1/The_United_Kingdoms_exit_from_and_partnership_with_the_EU_Web.pdf