Identity and Conflict in Northern Ireland 19 Cathal Mcmanus

Identity and Conflict in Northern Ireland 19 Cathal McManus Contents Introduction ...................................................................................... 332 Background to the Conflict...................................................................... 333 Northern Ireland: A Legacy of Sectarian Division ............................................. 335 Conflicting Cultures: The Politics of Identity .................................................. 336 Comfort in Sectarianism? ....................................................................... 340 Conclusion ....................................................................................... 344 Cross-References ................................................................................ 344 References ....................................................................................... 344 Abstract For almost 30 years, Northern Ireland society was torn apart by a conflict based along competing ethno-religious lines. The signing of the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement in 1998, however, promised a peace process that would bring an end to the militancy of previous decades and the establishment of new political arrangements that would see the competing groupings of Irish Nationalism and Ulster Unionism share power in a devolved Northern Ireland assembly. Despite much progress in the 20 years since the Agreement, many problems remain, and often bitter sectarian tensions continue to blight Northern Irish society and block progress toward full implementation of both the Good Friday Agreement and the subsequent St Andrews Agreement of 2007. This chapter will examine the nature of these ongoing divisions and highlight the role that competing identities have come to play in maintaining a sectarian divide since 1998. Arguing that Northern Ireland has yet to confront a legacy of “Othering” between the two conflicting communities, it will be stressed that much work remains to be done to fulfil the C. McManus (*) School of Social Sciences, Education and Social Work, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, Northern Ireland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 331 S. Ratuva (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Ethnicity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2898-5_21 332 C. McManus promise and optimism of 1998 and to create a Northern Ireland at peace with its diversity. Keywords Northern Ireland · Othering · Peace process · Reconciliation · Identity · Sectarianism Introduction In July 1997, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) declared an “unequivocal restora- tion” of the ceasefire it had previously called in August 1994, bringing about a “complete cessation of military operations.” The ceasefire was an important mile- stone in bringing to an end a conflict that had raged for almost 30 years and had claimed the lives of over 3,500 people. Central to this conflict were the competing national aspirations of Ulster Unionism/Loyalism, who seek to protect Northern Ireland’s position within the United Kingdom, and Irish Nationalism/Republicanism who strive to bring about some form of political unification with the Irish Republic. The decision by the IRA to restore its ceasefire also helped to create a political climate that made negotiations toward a new compromise settlement possible, negotiations that were to culminate 9 months later with the signing of the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement (the Agreement) in April 1998. At the heart of the Agreement was a new power-sharing/consociational assembly headed by a governing executive, positions to which were allocated via the d’Hondt system with each party being allocated ministerial posts based on the number of votes gained in elections (HMSO 1998). This helped to ensure that power would largely be shared between the two dominant political blocs with the smaller cross- community alliance party occasionally holding one or two ministerial positions. In addition to establishing the power-sharing assembly, the Agreement also provided for reform to policing, the release of paramilitary prisoners, and the decommissioning of illegally held weapons by these groups which included not only the IRA but also loyalist organizations such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). Furthermore, and in an important addition to the consociational frameworks proposed by Arend Lijphart (1977), the Agreement also established new North- South ministerial bodies to develop greater cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland on “matters of mutual interest” and new institutions designed to improve working relations between both parts of Ireland and the United Kingdom (McGarry and O’Leary 2009). For proponents of this consociational democracy, the Agreement ought to have provided a long-term settlement to the long-running constitutional question having accommodated the competing nationalist yearnings of both Irish nationalists and Ulster Unionists. In protecting the immediate future of Northern Ireland by attaching it to the principle of consent and developing stronger UK ties, the Agreement had much to reassure Unionists. With the establishment of the power-sharing assembly, 19 Identity and Conflict in Northern Ireland 333 the creation of new (and potentially further) cross-border ties, the guarantee to the right of Irish citizenship, and a promise to protect and promote Irish cultural identity, there was also much to reassure Irish Nationalists and Republicans. Yet, implementation of the Agreement has proven to be hugely problematic as Northern Ireland remains bitterly divided along its historic sectarian lines. Indeed, at the time of writing, Northern Ireland has been without a government for 19 months following the collapse of the assembly in January 2017 in part because of issues related to the introduction of an Irish Language Act (Acht na Gaeilge). This dispute is merely the latest in a long line of disagreements that have had cultural issues at their heart, leading some to argue that we are now witnessing the old military conflict being fought out over matters of identity (McManus 2017). This chapter will examine the causes of these cultural disputes and, in particular, highlight how processes of “Othering” are continuing to shape negative attitudes toward “the Other.” It will be argued that although the Agreement was designed to provide a long-term solution to what was once deemed an intractable conflict, it has also helped to feed and sustain the sectarian divisions that have characterized Northern Ireland society throughout much of its history. Background to the Conflict Although the conflict in Northern Ireland finds its immediate roots in the crisis generated by the civil rights campaigns of the 1960s, it has a much longer ideological lineage (Bew 2009). At its heart lies the question of the constitutional relationship that should exist between the island of Ireland and its nearest neighbor Great Britain – a question that has been framed by political, economic, religious, and cultural considerations. This was to become an increasingly important issue following the Act of Union of 1800/01 which brought an end to the historic Irish parliament in Dublin, with representation shifting to Westminster as part of the new United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (Bew 2009). Opposition to this Union grew throughout much of the nineteenth century, mainly within the Catholic population but initially with considerable backing from within the radical elements of Protestantism. The radical nationalist movements of the nineteenth century, which included such groups as the Young Irelanders, were greatly influenced by developments elsewhere in Europe, including the emergence of a cultural nationalism that served to define nationhood around the possession of a distinctive identity (McManus 2016; English 2006). McManus (2016) argues that because Ireland “was seen to possess its own distinctive cultural identity, including its own language,” it provided a “greater legitimacy” to nationalist claims for nationhood and, as such, the island “was deserving of political independence” (pp. 46–47). The emergence of a cultural nationalism during the 1890s, however, merely helped to reinforce wider divisions that had appeared throughout the nineteenth century and which, increasingly, became defined by religion. Many Irish Protestants had hoped that the Union with Britain would lead to a decline in the Catholicism of the majority 334 C. McManus population of the island – aided by increased support for proselytization furthered by the establishment of a new National Schools system. Leading figures within Irish Protestantism looked down upon Catholicism as little more than an “idolatrous superstition” (McManus 2015, p. 54) but also, crucially, viewed the church as a threat to their “established” status, especially as Catholicism became better organized and structured as the century progressed (Bew 2009). This fear intensified with the emergence of the various Irish nationalist movements, culminating in the Home Rule movement from the 1880s, which commanded a very public support from leading figures in the Catholic clergy (English 2006). Opposition to Home Rule – a limited form of self-governance that would also maintain the UK – came predomi- nantly from within the Irish Protestant population, particularly in North East Ulster, who rallied around the belief that Home Rule would mean Rome Rule and, as such, posed a huge threat to Protestant interests in Ireland

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