Identity and Conflict in Northern 19 Cathal McManus

Contents Introduction ...... 332 Background to the Conflict...... 333 : A Legacy of Sectarian Division ...... 335 Conflicting Cultures: The of Identity ...... 336 Comfort in ? ...... 340 Conclusion ...... 344 Cross-References ...... 344 References ...... 344

Abstract For almost 30 years, Northern Ireland society was torn apart by a conflict based along competing ethno-religious lines. The signing of the () Agreement in 1998, however, promised a peace process that would bring an end to the militancy of previous decades and the establishment of new political arrangements that would see the competing groupings of Irish and Unionism share power in a devolved Northern Ireland assembly. Despite much progress in the 20 years since the Agreement, many problems remain, and often bitter sectarian tensions continue to blight Northern Irish society and block progress toward full implementation of both the and the subsequent of 2007. This chapter will examine the nature of these ongoing divisions and highlight the role that competing identities have come to play in maintaining a sectarian divide since 1998. Arguing that Northern Ireland has yet to confront a legacy of “Othering” between the two conflicting communities, it will be stressed that much work remains to be done to fulfil the

C. McManus (*) School of Social Sciences, Education and Social Work, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, Northern Ireland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Pte Ltd. 2019 331 S. Ratuva (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Ethnicity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2898-5_21 332 C. McManus

promise and optimism of 1998 and to create a Northern Ireland at peace with its diversity.

Keywords Northern Ireland · Othering · Peace process · Reconciliation · Identity · Sectarianism

Introduction

In July 1997, the (IRA) declared an “unequivocal restora- tion” of the ceasefire it had previously called in 1994, bringing about a “complete cessation of military operations.” The ceasefire was an important mile- stone in bringing to an end a conflict that had raged for almost 30 years and had claimed the lives of over 3,500 people. Central to this conflict were the competing national aspirations of Ulster Unionism/, who seek to protect Northern Ireland’s position within the , and / who strive to bring about some form of political unification with the . The decision by the IRA to restore its ceasefire also helped to create a political climate that made negotiations toward a new compromise settlement possible, negotiations that were to culminate 9 months later with the signing of the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement (the Agreement) in April 1998. At the heart of the Agreement was a new power-sharing/consociational assembly headed by a governing executive, positions to which were allocated via the d’Hondt system with each party being allocated ministerial posts based on the number of votes gained in elections (HMSO 1998). This helped to ensure that power would largely be shared between the two dominant political blocs with the smaller cross- community alliance party occasionally holding one or two ministerial positions. In addition to establishing the power-sharing assembly, the Agreement also provided for reform to policing, the release of paramilitary prisoners, and the decommissioning of illegally held weapons by these groups which included not only the IRA but also loyalist organizations such as the (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). Furthermore, and in an important addition to the consociational frameworks proposed by Arend Lijphart (1977), the Agreement also established new North- South ministerial bodies to develop greater cooperation between Northern Ireland and the on “matters of mutual interest” and new institutions designed to improve working relations between both parts of Ireland and the United Kingdom (McGarry and O’Leary 2009). For proponents of this consociational , the Agreement ought to have provided a long-term settlement to the long-running constitutional question having accommodated the competing nationalist yearnings of both Irish nationalists and Ulster Unionists. In protecting the immediate future of Northern Ireland by attaching it to the and developing stronger UK ties, the Agreement had much to reassure Unionists. With the establishment of the power-sharing assembly, 19 Identity and Conflict in Northern Ireland 333 the creation of new (and potentially further) cross-border ties, the guarantee to the right of Irish citizenship, and a promise to protect and promote Irish cultural identity, there was also much to reassure Irish Nationalists and Republicans. Yet, implementation of the Agreement has proven to be hugely problematic as Northern Ireland remains bitterly divided along its historic sectarian lines. Indeed, at the time of writing, Northern Ireland has been without a government for 19 months following the collapse of the assembly in January 2017 in part because of issues related to the introduction of an Act (Acht na Gaeilge). This dispute is merely the latest in a long line of disagreements that have had cultural issues at their heart, leading some to argue that we are now witnessing the old military conflict being fought out over matters of identity (McManus 2017). This chapter will examine the causes of these cultural disputes and, in particular, highlight how processes of “Othering” are continuing to shape negative attitudes toward “the Other.” It will be argued that although the Agreement was designed to provide a long-term solution to what was once deemed an intractable conflict, it has also helped to feed and sustain the sectarian divisions that have characterized Northern Ireland society throughout much of its history.

Background to the Conflict

Although the conflict in Northern Ireland finds its immediate roots in the crisis generated by the civil rights campaigns of the 1960s, it has a much longer ideological lineage (Bew 2009). At its heart lies the question of the constitutional relationship that should exist between the island of Ireland and its nearest neighbor – a question that has been framed by political, economic, religious, and cultural considerations. This was to become an increasingly important issue following the Act of Union of 1800/01 which brought an end to the historic Irish parliament in , with representation shifting to as part of the new United and Ireland (Bew 2009). Opposition to this Union grew throughout much of the nineteenth century, mainly within the Catholic population but initially with considerable backing from within the radical elements of . The radical nationalist movements of the nineteenth century, which included such groups as the Young Irelanders, were greatly influenced by developments elsewhere in , including the emergence of a that served to define nationhood around the possession of a distinctive identity (McManus 2016; English 2006). McManus (2016) argues that because Ireland “was seen to possess its own distinc- tive cultural identity, including its own language,” it provided a “greater ” to nationalist claims for nationhood and, as such, the island “was deserving of political independence” (pp. 46–47). The emergence of a cultural nationalism during the 1890s, however, merely helped to reinforce wider divisions that had appeared throughout the nineteenth century and which, increasingly, became defined by religion. Many Irish Protestants had hoped that the Union with Britain would lead to a decline in the Catholicism of the majority 334 C. McManus population of the island – aided by increased support for proselytization furthered by the establishment of a new National Schools system. Leading figures within Irish Protestantism looked upon Catholicism as little more than an “idolatrous superstition” (McManus 2015, p. 54) but also, crucially, viewed the church as a threat to their “established” status, especially as Catholicism became better organized and structured as the century progressed (Bew 2009). This fear intensified with the emergence of the various Irish nationalist movements, culminating in the movement from the 1880s, which commanded a very public support from leading figures in the Catholic clergy (English 2006). Opposition to Home Rule – a limited form of self-governance that would also maintain the UK – came predomi- nantly from within the Irish Protestant population, particularly in North East Ulster, who rallied around the belief that Home Rule would mean and, as such, posed a huge threat to Protestant interests in Ireland (Walker 2004). A crucial component of the political culture in Ireland during the period of the Union (1801–1922) was the processes of Othering that helped to define attitudes toward the Other (McManus 2017). Two elements are important in this Othering process: possessing a sense of superiority over the Other but also, at the same time, fearing the Other as a threat to “our” way of . As can be seen above, for example, Irish Protestants looked down upon the Catholicism of the majority population from a theological perspective, but this was also to be reflected in their attitudes toward the Irish cultural heritage as it was defined by the various cultural nationalist movements (Loughlin 1999). This was particularly true of the Irish language which was seen as a backward language of the peasantry with little practical use in a modern society (Crowley 2008). What is more, this backwardness was seen as one element of the wider threat posed by Irish nationalism to the superior way of life in Ireland (McManus 2015). In other words, not only were the Catholic Irish a numerical threat; they also represented a cultural threat (Loughlin 1999). McManus (2017) maintains that Othering, by its nature, is a two-way process and that it is this that helps to feed conflict (see also McManus Forthcoming). As such, over the course of the nineteenth century, many Catholics/Irish nationalists also came to view their religion and cultural heritage as being superior to that of Protestantism and (Boyce 1995; Hutchinson 1987). Furthermore, for many nationalists, the nature of Protestantism and Unionism in Ireland meant that it posed an existential threat to the Irish way of life – a perception seemingly reinforced by Unionist opposition to Home Rule and their apparent willingness to the nation by 1912 (English 2006). As a , elements of radical Irish nationalism adopted something of an anti-colonial narrative that emphasized the need to protect the nation including its cultural identity (English 2006; Howe 2000). These divisions meant that the two communities came to feel permanently threatened by their Other. This reinforced a sectarianization of Irish society in which neither community could nor would seek to understand the position of their Other or reach out in an effort to incorporate them into their vision for the Irish nation (McManus 2017). Rather, both political communities focused mainly on their own priorities and continued to ignore the complex realities of diversity on the island. The 19 Identity and Conflict in Northern Ireland 335 outcome, of course, was the creation of an ever more sectarianized society and, ultimately, the (Bew 2009).

Northern Ireland: A Legacy of Sectarian Division

Northern Ireland was established in 1921 amid chaos across the island of Ireland (English 2006). The IRA, predominantly in the southern , were waging a guerrilla campaign against the British establishment, while in Northern Ireland itself, the had escalated so dramatically that effectively raged on the streets of Belfast and other major towns (Bardon 2005). These violent origins helped to shape the political culture of the new Northern state (McManus Forthcoming). Of particular significance was the impact the vio- lence had on attitudes toward the Catholic minority – representing one-third of the total population – who were immediately labeled as an internal threat being aided by external and hostile forces from the South (McGarry and O’Leary 1995). This sense of threat, McManus argues, helps in part to explain “why the Unionist government failed to use the new opportunity presented to them to build a state capable of representing all its citizens”:

The reality was that the combined sense of hostility towards and fear of their “Other” made any movement towards conciliation unlikely. Although “most Catholics did not actively work against the Northern Ireland state,” both the passive hostility of the majority and the active opposition of a minority helped to feed unionist fears and convince them that their negative perceptions of the Other was accurate. (McManus Forthcoming)

The sectarianism of the previous century, therefore, continued to frame the political culture of Northern Ireland (Brewer and Higgins 1998). A sense of anti- Catholicism, alongside a dislike for and fear of anything “Irish,” was evident in Unionist government circles from the foundations of the state (Walker 2004; Elliott 2000). This was to manifest itself in various policy approaches that led to discrim- ination against the Catholic population in terms of housing allocation, employment opportunities, and voting (Elliott 2000) – issues that would come to the fore in the campaign for civil rights during the 1960s and which would eventually push the state toward crisis (English 2006). It was also evident, however, in the negative attitudes expressed by Unionists toward aspects of Irish culture that Northern Catholics continued to define them- selves by. In particular, there was considerable opposition among Unionist politi- cians toward giving support – financial or educational – to the Irish language which they viewed as backward and useless. In a debate at Stormont over the position of an “organiser of Irish language instruction,” in May 1923, one Unionist (MP), Robert Lynn, queried:

...whether a circular has been issued...saying that in cases where Irish is taken up history may be dropped. I respectfully suggest to the Ministry of Education that history – that is, real history, not imaginative history of the Irish type – would be of more benefit to the schools 336 C. McManus

than the teaching of Irish. That is purely a sentimental thing. None of these people who take up Irish ever know anything about it. They can spell their own names badly in Irish, but that is all. I do not think it is worth spending any money on. (Lynn 1923, p. 663)

The language used here emphasizes the negative and sectarian attitude of many Unionists toward the Catholic Irish and, more specifically, the Irish language. This was again highlighted in 1933 when the MP for North Belfast, William , declared in parliament that “the only people interested in this language are the people who are the avowed enemies of Northern Ireland” (Grant 1933, p. 773). Such remarks, as shocking as they often are, need also to be contextualized. As (2006) highlights, the views and actions of Unionists in the early decades of the state were, to a large extent, “determined by Irish nationalism”:

IRA violence in the founding years of Northern Ireland heightened unionist anxiety, as did the increasing Catholicization and Gaelicization of independent Ireland once de Valera came to power in 1932, and the understandable sense among northern nationalists themselves that the new northern state was neither fair nor legitimate. (p. 342)

Although Unionists unquestionably looked down upon Gaelic Irishness, they also had very genuine fears concerning the threat posed by Irish nationalism. As such, they felt justified in taking the actions, outlined above, that would limit the political influence of Catholics (Patterson and Kaufmann 2007; Elliott 2000). McManus (Forthcoming) argues that what emerged in Northern Ireland was a political climate fed by a series of “self-fulfilling prophesies.” Unionists, for exam- ple, in preventing Catholics from fully participating in the state (for what they deemed to be defensive reasons), merely reinforced the negative views held by the Catholic population toward both, the Unionist administration and the state itself. This negativity fed a continuing sense of alienation that would manifest itself in an ongoing support for nationalist and/or republican political movements – thus, in itself, reinforcing unionist fears that Catholics remained disloyal (English 2006). It was these fears that helped, in part at least, to frame Unionist attitudes toward the civil rights movement during the 1960s – while Catholics argued that they all they wanted was “British rights,” Unionists feared that this was little more than a new nationalist/ to undermine Northern Ireland by other means (McManus Forthcoming; English 2006). It is within this context that violence was to erupt in the late 1960s. As English has succinctly summed it up, “[c]ulture, economy, symbols, religion and politics all combined to produce...the worst combination in the north: a disaffected minority and an under-confidant majority” (2006, p. 369).

Conflicting Cultures: The Politics of Identity

The crisis surrounding the civil rights movement quickly escalated, and street violence – largely organized along sectarian lines – became a regular feature of Northern Irish society (Hennessey 2005). Moreover, as English argues, an 19 Identity and Conflict in Northern Ireland 337 inadequate response from the Unionist government at Stormont only helped to further inflame tensions:

...a one-sided curfew in Catholic Belfast in 1970, the introduction of an equally one-sided and clumsy internment in 1971, and the disaster of the killings in 1972 all backfired, and helped destroy the chance of a rapprochement between the British state and the Catholic working class. (2006, p. 370)

The use of the British military and the Royal Ulster in this response further alienated many Catholics from both, and, as a result, elements within the community turned to the IRA for protection from loyalist attacks (Taylor 1998; McCleery 2015). McManus (Forthcoming) argues that this turning to the IRA had significant implications for the movement who found their ranks swelling with “significant numbers of young men and women angered by events around them” (p. 10) but who lacked a significant grounding in traditional Irish republican ideology. The outbreak of violence in 1969/1970 had, to some extent, caught the IRA by surprise, and they initially lacked the resources necessary to help defend nationalist areas in an effective manner (Taylor 1998). Although they worked to quickly correct this military weakness, less time was taken to deal with the absence of an ideological background among its members (McManus Forthcoming;Adams 1995). When such efforts did emerge, it was very much reflective of the republican movement of the early twentieth century and had, as a key component of its ideological narrative, an anti-colonial outlook (McManus 2016,pp.53–54). Cen- tral to this was, again, the Irish language which, McManus argues, gained “amore prominent status within what was seen as a wider political struggle against the effects of British colonialism on the island” (2016, p. 53). As political activity grew in importance for republicans, so too did the significance of the Irish language, with considerable efforts made to promote the language in nationalist areas. Throughout the and , Irish-medium schools were established in greater numbers, and programs of adult education courses became a common occurrence in community halls (McManus 2016). The importance of the Irish language to and Republican commu- nity(ies) can be seen in the status afforded to it within the Good Friday Agreement. Under the terms of the Agreement, the British government committed “where appropriate and where people so desire it” to:

• Take resolute action to promote the language. • Facilitate and encourage the use of the language in speech and writing in public and private life where there is appropriate demand. • Seek to remove, where possible, restrictions which would discourage or work against the maintenance or development of the language. • Place a statutory duty on the Department of Education to encourage and facilitate Irish-medium education in line with current provision for (HMSO 1998, pp. 19–20). 338 C. McManus

In addition to this, the British government, in a further Agreement reached at St Andrews between Sinn Féin and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in 2006, committed to introducing “an reflecting on the experience of and Ireland and work with the incoming Executive to enhance and protect the development of the Irish language” (NIO 2006, p. 12). The prominence of the language was part of a concerted effort by the nationalist parties, the Social Democratic and (SDLP) and Sinn Féin, to gain a greater recognition for the Irish cultural identity of Northern Catholics and to provide developmental support for a language that they believed had been suppressed by both the British and Unionist governments (Adams 2005, pp. 78–88). For both parties, but increasingly for Sinn Féin as it became the biggest nationalist party in the North, governmental support for developing the Irish language was part of a rights-based and equality agenda. As (2005), a prominent figure in the Republican movement since the , has argued:

The negotiation for the Good Friday Agreement involved rights and safeguards for cultural expression, including the promotion of the Irish language. These rights and safeguards had been absent from the Six since its foundation. (p. 84)

That Sinn Féin were arguing for the protection and development of Irish sat uncomfortably with many Unionists with three key reasons helping to explain this. In the first instance, many Unionists continue to look down upon the language with many believing that it is not worth protecting. The former aspect was demonstrated by a controversial incident in the Stormont Assembly in November 2014 when a senior DUP politician, Gregory Campbell, mocked the language as he stood to give a statement (BBC 2014). Later in the same month, as the controversy still raged, another prominent Unionist, , was quoted as having described Irish as “adead language that will never bring jobs to anyone” ( Chronicle 2014). A second, and more prominent reason, was that Unionists feared the Irish language was being used by Sinn Féin for political reasons – specifically, they believed that it was part of a wider agenda to undermine the Britishness of Northern Ireland. In support of this, they could point to various campaigns and policy statements developed by the party during the years of conflict which emphasized the role of Irish in a “reconquest” of the island (McManus 2016, pp. 53–54). As late as 2005, indeed, Gerry Adams was writing that “it is impossible to separate national liberation from cultural revival” (Adams 2005, p. 84). Such a viewpoint has been aided by the fact that although the political arrange- ments provided for in the Agreement were seen to protect the position of Northern Ireland in the UK in the short to medium terms, the Agreement also legitimized Nationalist aspirations for Irish and, under certain circumstances, catered for a border poll to be held to determine the North’s future constitutional status. McManus (2017) maintains that this has fed unionist fears regarding key elements of the peace process and particularly those aspects designed to protect what are deemed as component parts of an Irish culture: 19 Identity and Conflict in Northern Ireland 339

Working under the terms of the Agreement, northern Catholics have sought greater recog- nition and equality for their political and cultural identity...Unionists, however, interpret this as part of a new nationalist strategy designed to undermine the ‘Britishness’ of the state and advance their cause of Irish unity – an analysis seemingly reinforced by the opposition of Nationalists to Unionist/Protestant culture such as parading. (p. 422)

This leads therefore to the final consideration which centers on the above idea that while Sinn Féin were promoting Irish as part of an “equality” and “rights-based” agenda, they were also seemingly attacking Unionist culture and rights. This per- ception stemmed from various disputes that emerged during the 1980s and 1990s over the right of the , a Unionist and Protestant organization, to parade through predominantly Catholic/Nationalist neighborhoods (McManus 2017; Bryan 2000). In the mid-1990s, as the peace process was still emerging, disputes about these parades in , Belfast and, most famously, , led to significant out- breaks of sectarian violence (Bryan 2000). Unionists believed that the emergence of residents’ protest groups were part of a deliberate strategy by Republicans to undermine Unionist and Orange culture while at the same time promoting an Irish agenda (McManus 2017). Such were the fears of Unionism in this period the then leader of the (UUP), , predicted that “culture is going to be a political battleground” (quoted in McManus 2017, p. 422). In many ways, this prediction has come to pass. In the two decades since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, progress has been stalled at various intervals over disputes related to identity politics that have included not only Orange Order parading but also the flying of Union flags on civic buildings, loyalist commemora- tive bonfires and, most recently, the implementation of the Irish Language Act seemingly promised in the St Andrews Agreement (Nolan 2014; Nolan et al. 2014). Divisions over the latter, indeed, had a role to play in the collapse of the Northern Ireland Assembly in January 2017 when Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness resigned his position as deputy . In his resignation letter to the Speaker of Assembly, McGuinness accused “elements of the DUP” of having “exhibited the most crude and crass bigotry” toward those “who wish to live their lives through the medium of Irish” (McGuinness 2017). Although the primary reason for Sinn Féin’s decision to bring down the Assembly was an alleged financial scandal involving the DUP, the primary issue preventing its return has become the Irish Language Act (Dunlevy and Mainnin 2017). Sinn Féin claim that there will be no return of the Assembly until the St Andrews Agreement is implemented in its entirety which, for them, means the introduction of an Irish Language Act. The DUP, however, have claimed that they never agreed to this in the St Andrews negotiations and that its inclusion was part of a side deal agreed only between Sinn Féin and the then Labour Government in Westminster. Yet, despite this, the party did come close to signing a fresh agreement with Sinn Féin in early 2018 which would, according to a prominent Belfast journalist, have included a self- contained “Irish Language Act” only for that deal to collapse due to a huge swell of opposition within grassroots Unionists (Mallie 2018). 340 C. McManus

Comfort in Sectarianism?

Opposition toward the Irish Language Act within grassroots unionism provides a useful insight into current political thinking within that community and highlights the extent to which unionist leaders have failed in selling what they deem to be political progress to their support base (Shirlow 2012; McAuley 2010). This failure, indeed, highlights an important consequence of Othering in that it demonstrates the extent to which it is difficult to break free from the sectarian politics it creates, even if doing so has potentially positive outcomes for the in-group. To assess the nature of this in more detail, it is important to understand the nature of Unionism and, more especially, the brand of Unionism represented by the DUP. As the DUP rose in electoral strength at the turn of the century, it sought to portray itself as the party of strong and confident unionism – a unionism that would stand up to the threat of Irish nationalism and republicanism and which would, as a result, win a fairer peace than that secured by the UUP in 1998 (McAuley 2010). Although there was much initial anger and resentment at the party’s decision to share power with Sinn Féin – a party they had previously promised to “smash”–they successfully managed to contain the disquiet and held off the challenges from a rival, anti- Agreement party, the Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) led by former member Jim Allister (Tonge et al. 2014). By 2012, the then party leader and Northern Ireland’s First Minister, Peter Robinson (despite having lost his own Westminster seat in 2010), was keen to portray the success enjoyed by the DUP over the previous 5 years and how they had successfully contained the threat posed by Irish nationalism. He told his party conference in November of that year that the “siege has lifted, as we knew them are over, and the constitutional debate has been won” (Robinson 2012). Almost a year later, in October 2013, he proclaimed that the “simple and unchallengeable reality is that the Union has never been stronger...Support for the Union has never been higher” (Robinson 2013). This confidence, however, has not been reflected across Unionism and, in partic- ular, within its working-class loyalist communities. Indeed, within a couple of months of Robinson’s 2012 speech, Belfast was once again subjected to a period of violence and sectarian tension following ’s decision to limit the number of days the Union flag would fly at City Hall (Nolan et al. 2014). Although there is evidence that the DUP had sought to exploit anger at the vote to win back Robinson’s lost Westminster seat in East Belfast, there is little doubt that the party was also, to some extent, sidelined in the loyalist protests (Nolan et al. 2014). For these protestors, the decision by the Council was yet another attempt by Sinn Féin – now the largest party in Belfast – to undermine the British identity of the City and Northern Ireland more widely, and it was seen to make a mockery of Robinson’s more optimistic outlook (Tonge et al. 2014). For many Unionists, therefore, the flag dispute in Belfast again highlighted what they perceived to be an ongoing cultural war being waged against the Protestant/ Unionist identity (Tonge et al. 2014, pp. 120–122). Sinn Féin’s campaign for the Irish Language Act is very much seen within this context, and, as such, there appears to be a strong determination within grassroots unionism to frustrate it. 19 Identity and Conflict in Northern Ireland 341

This was evident during the negotiations between Sinn Féin and the DUP as they sought an agreement that could restore the Stormont Assembly. Even as talks were progressing, it was clear that opposition to an Irish Language Act was strong within grassroots Unionism with an Orange Order lodge at Queen’s University Belfast issuing a stark warning to party leaders that Unionists had “no appetite” for further compromise. According to this lodge, an Irish language act would have “far ranging ramifications across civil society” that would not have “a positive impact on the nation.” They further claimed that the “promotion of cultural supremacy, under the guise of equality, will only further entrench divisions in Northern Ireland” (Queen’s LOL 2018). Such attitudes reflect the views gathered by Tonge et al. (2014) in their study of the modern DUP. They found among grassroots members that:

The idea that the DUP are engaged in a ‘culture war’ has been given further momentum by perceptions that attacks on Orange Order halls are not just sectarian, but also politically inspired. This understanding is also applied to other issues, such as restrictions placed on Orange marches, or the limiting of the flying of the Union Flag on to designated days. Such actions are interpreted by the DUP as evidence of a broader campaign of ‘anti-British bigotry’ waged by Irish republicans. (Tonge et al. 2014, p. 121)

Such views, however, raise an important question for Unionists, particularly within the context of Peter Robinson’s 2012–2013 speeches arguing that the Union was safe: if the Union has been secured should they now take moves to better facilitate the Irishness of Northern Catholics in an effort to create greater political stability? To examine this question, a number of important issues need to be considered. Firstly, Robinson’s claim that the Union “has never been stronger” was based on a growing perception that more and more Catholics were content with the political status quo – that is to say, they were willing to support a form of Union with devolved powers to Northern Ireland. Robinson, indeed, in his 2013 speech was keen to emphasize that:

Support for the Union has never been higher. When Republicans can’t even persuade a majority of their own people of the case for a you know their game is up. For the first time in generations Northern Ireland has stable political structures. (Robinson 2013)

These claims have been backed by findings from the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (NILT), which has been conducted annually since 1998 by researchers from both Queen’s University Belfast and . These findings show a consistent support for Northern Ireland remaining within the United Kingdom (with devolved power) with a majority of Catholic respondents supporting that position between 2010 and 2016 (Fig. 1). Notably, in that period, there was a significant degree of political stability and functionality at Stormont despite ongoing tensions on the ground. This data would suggest that the political aspirations of those labeled “National- ist” are more complex than is often allowed for and hint at the idea that respect for 342 C. McManus

50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Irish unity Remain in UK with Devolved power Direct Rule Don’t know

Fig. 1 The long-term policy for Northern Ireland should be? (Catholic respondents only). (Source: NILT) the Irish identity of Catholics could facilitate a degree of contentment with the state (McManus 2016). The second consideration, therefore, centers on how Unionism has responded to such findings. While there has been lip-service paid to these changing dynam- ics – as highlighted by the speeches of Peter Robinson – Unionist leaders have failed to move beyond this rhetoric in any meaningful way. This is evident not only in their failure to engage with the idea of an Irish Language Act but, perhaps more symbolically, in the fact that they continue to refer to the Irish language in such derogatory terms. The high-profile examples of Gregory Camp- bell and Jim Allister have already been highlighted but perhaps even more crucial was the intervention of , the current DUP leader and former First Minister. Speaking at a DUP event in February 2017, Foster claimed that the party would “never agree to an Irish language act” and claimed that because there were more Polish speakers in Northern Ireland than Irish speakers, a Polish Language Act should take precedence. Regarding Sinn Féin’s demand for an Irish Language Act, she quipped that “if you feed a crocodile it will keep coming back for more” (Foster 2017). Such views do little to lessen the Catholic population’s alienation from the Northern state which has potentially been further reinforced by Britain’s2016 decision to leave the – a decision supported by the DUP but opposed by the vast majority of Nationalists ( 2018). Indeed, polls during the referendum campaign suggested that 85% of Catholics supported Remain – a stark contrast to the 41% of Protestants that did so (Murphy 2018). Moreover, in the immediate aftermath of the vote, questions started to be asked concerning the compatibility of “” with the political arrangements established by the Good Friday Agreement – an issue that had been largely neglected in the 19 Identity and Conflict in Northern Ireland 343 mainstream debates leading up the referendum (Murphy 2018). In particular, the issue of the Irish border – soon to be the only land border between the UK and the EU – became a significant stumbling block to progress in given the possible necessity of new custom checks should any divergence emerge between the UK and Ireland (Hayward 2017). Such a possibility angered Irish nationalists who firmly oppose any return of a visible and/or physical border between the North and the Republic (Murphy 2018). The issue has been further complicated by the DUP’s continued support for Brexit, despite the fact that a majority in Northern Ireland voted in support of Remaining (56% Remain – 44% Leave). What is more, the party continues to espouse an uncompromising Leave position that will tolerate no special treatment for Northern Ireland that might help to prevent the reintroduction of border check- points even in the case of a no deal scenario. All of this has seemingly had an impact on political attitudes in Northern Ireland. According to the 2017 NILT survey, for example, there has been a in support for Irish unity within the Catholic population from 35% in 2016 to 41% in 2017. This analysis suggests that Unionism can be, at times, its own worst enemy. This leads to an obvious follow on question to that posed above: why don’t unionist politicians do more to reach out to the Catholic/Nationalist population if they are willing to support the Union under certain circumstances? One answer to this is that it brings little electoral advantage to the DUP in the short term. Although many Catholics/Nationalists will express a willingness to support some form of Union, they have not yet come to see themselves as Unionist and are not, therefore, likely to vote for the DUP. Moreover, should the DUP reach out on issues such as the Irish language, it is likely they would anger their own political community who may turn against the party in elections. A second reason is that Unionism continues to fear the normalization of Irishness in Northern Ireland society. Such a normalization would serve, as stated by the Queen’s LOL 1845, to undermine what is deemed the British character of the state and to reinforce the idea that it is a place apart. Indeed, this fear of being viewed as different has been evident in relation to the Brexit question and how any customs checks on the island should be managed. While those in favor of Remaining in the EU have argued for Special Status for Northern Ireland, this idea has been rejected by Unionists who see it as a “trap” and a Sinn Féin ploy to “break up the Union” (Murphy 2018, pp. 133–134). It is important also to contextualize this situation within the framework of Othering. McManus (Forthcoming) has argued that a fear of the Other (as well as a sense of superiority) will lead to an in-group taking measures that often contradict what it claims to stand for. In this case, although Unionists will talk about representing open and tolerant British values and express a desire to see stable political structures operating in Northern Ireland, they often lack the polit- ical leadership necessary to implement those measures that might achieve such ends. 344 C. McManus

Conclusion

Identity has played an important role in helping to frame the sectarian divisions in Northern Ireland that fed conflict for almost 30 years. It has been instrumental in shaping long-term processes of Othering that generate an in-group sense of superi- ority over the Other but which also, as a consequence, feeds a sense of fear over the threat posed to “our” way of life. Although the Northern Ireland peace process has provided the basis for a political settlement, the failure to address the processes of Othering has allowed a cultural war to emerge that is perpetuating the divisions caused by the military conflict. Most recently, this has focused on the implementation of an Irish Language Act, but there is also a very real possibility that Brexit could become a further strand of this such are the levels of polarization it is creating. Indeed, with an apparent unwillingness to compromise now evident in both communities, it appears that any resolution to the political deadlock that has taken hold since January 2017 will be far from easy and will require a brave leadership to emerge – something that has been lacking in the recent times.

Cross-References

▶ Cultural Socialization and Ethnic Consciousness ▶ Ethnic Conflicts and Peace-Building ▶ Ethno-cultural Symbolism and Group Identity ▶ Historical Memory and Ethnic Myths

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