Who Speaks for Islam in Tunisia?

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ISSUE BRIEF 05.16.19 Who Speaks for Islam in Tunisia?

Sharan Grewal, Ph.D., The Brookings Institution

In 2017, Tunisian President Beji Caid ENNAHDHA Essebsi proposed to grant women equal inheritance rights, challenging the traditional Electorally, Ennahdha is one of the most interpretation of the Qur’an, which grants powerful political parties in Tunisia. It won women half the inheritance as men. Some the 2011 constituent assembly elections, religious authorities, such as the Tunisian placed second in the 2014 parliamentary Grand Mufti, supported the proposal, arguing elections, and received the most votes of it would “consolidate the place of women any party in the 2018 municipal elections. and eliminate discrimination between Although it once championed political Islam, 1 the two sexes.” However, other religious Ennahdha in 2016 declared itself a Muslim actors, including the Islamist political party Democratic party that would focus only on Ennahdha, condemned the proposed reform politics and not on religious activities. as contradicting Islamic precepts. Our survey likewise suggests that During such disagreements, whom Tunisians do not view Ennahdha as a do Tunisians trust to provide the proper religious authority today. While Ennahdha’s interpretation of religious texts? In other president, Sheikh Rached Ghannouchi, words, who wields religious authority received one of the highest approval in Tunisia? ratings among religious leaders named To help answer this question, the Baker in the survey, he received relatively low Institute conducted a poll of 800 Tunisians scores when evaluated specifically “as a as part of a larger study on religious religious authority” (1.8 points out of 5). 2 authority in the Middle East. The survey, Moreover, in our endorsement experiments, While the moderate described in detail in a previous country which indirectly measured support for Islamist party Ennahdha report3 (https://bit.ly/2HwekOX), yielded each religious figure, Ghannouchi saw a performs well in three surprising findings. First, while the statistically significant negative effect: moderate Islamist party Ennahdha performs support for a religious interpretation elections, it is well in elections, it is not widely viewed as decreased when endorsed by Ghannouchi. not widely viewed as an authority on religious matters. Second, These results suggest that Ennahdha an authority on traditional religious authorities, like the is not viewed as a religious authority. Its religious matters. Grand Mufti and Grand Imam of Zaytouna repeated compromises on issues of religion, mosque, enjoy substantial popularity such as its decision not to enshrine shari’a in despite their lack of independence from the 2014 constitution, may have weakened the state. Finally, the Islamic State (IS) its religious credentials. Indeed, survey continues to wield considerable religious data from the Arab Barometer suggest authority in Tunisia, even while domestic that Ennahdha’s loss of support has been Salafi-jihadi groups like Ansar al-Sharia sharpest among Tunisians who wish to see do not. This policy brief discusses each of shari’a as the basis of legislation.4 these findings in more detail, and reflects on their policy implications. RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.16.19

Since our December 2017 survey, would suggest that a lack of autonomy Ennahdha has taken a stronger stance from the state should undermine their on religious issues. It has repeatedly and credibility as religious authorities, but publicly opposed Essebsi’s proposal for our data suggest not. Similarly, in my equal inheritance explicitly as a violation experience, very few Tunisians actually of the Quran and Sunna.5 This renewed know Battikh and Obeidi’s names, but the deployment of religious rhetoric, and as importance of their institutions should of yet no willingness to compromise on apparently not be underestimated. this issue, may help it regain its religious The popularity of Tunisia’s state base. However, it remains to be seen authorities has important policy implications. whether such attempts are “too little too It would suggest that the Grand Mufti’s late” or can actually shore up its image as public support of equal inheritance in 2017 a religious authority. should not be simply dismissed. While At the time of our survey, Tunisians justifying equal inheritance on religious looking for religious authority no longer grounds is particularly difficult,6 the survey found it in Ennahdha. This weakening of results suggest that an endorsement by the “moderate middle” of the religious the Grand Mufti may be able to move the spectrum may help to explain our two other needle at least a few percentage points. surprising findings: support for each end of Unfortunately, the Grand Mufti’s subsequent the spectrum. flip-flop on this issue, publicly opposing equal inheritance again once the bill was finally sent to the parliament in November STATE AUTHORITIES 2018,7 may doom this proposal at least in its Among the most popular religious current form. authorities in our survey were the Tunisian Grand Mufti, Othman Battikh, and the former SALAFI-JIHADISTS Grand Imam of Zaytouna mosque, Hussein al-Obeidi. Both institutions represent An equally surprising but more troubling Tunisia’s modern, liberal, and largely state- survey finding concerns Abu Bakr imposed interpretation of Islam. While most al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State accounts would view these institutions (IS). While in direct questions, few were as coopted by the state and therefore not willing to state their support for Baghdadi, credible authorities on Islam, our data he emerges as the most popular figure in the The Grand Mufti suggest otherwise. endorsement experiments. An endorsement and Grand Imam of Among the seven Tunisian religious by Baghdadi increased support for a religious figures named in the survey, the Grand Zaytouna were the interpretation by about half a point on the Mufti and Grand Imam of Zaytouna were the 5-point scale on average, double that of the two most trusted two most trusted as religious authorities. state authorities, and close to a full point on religious authorities. Moreover, they produced some of the some questions. Baghdadi elicited a positive few positive and statistically significant and statistically significant endorsement endorsement effects: support for a religious effect on 7 of the 14 religious interpretations, interpretation increased when endorsed twice as many as any other figure. by these state authorities—on some Baghdadi’s popularity among Tunisians interpretations, by as much as a full point on may help to explain why Tunisia has sent the the 1-5 point scale. highest per capita number of foreign fighters The strong performance of the to the Islamic State. About 2,900 Tunisians state religious authorities is somewhat fought in Iraq and Syria, while an additional surprising. Grand Mufti Battikh, for 27,000 allegedly attempted the trek but instance, is visibly subservient to the state: were stopped by Tunisian authorities.8 he had opposed equal inheritance in 2016, Yet these numbers alone do not tell us only to then support it when proposed by why Tunisia has exported so many foreign Essebsi in 2017. The conventional wisdom fighters. Is it because Tunisians genuinely 2 WHO SPEAKS FOR ISLAM IN TUNISIA?

support IS more than other populations, or is the religious spectrum became delegitimized, it simply because it is easier for Tunisians to Tunisians may have found religious authority leave their country than it is elsewhere? The instead in both the liberal and conservative survey results validate the assumption that ends. This polarization of religious authority Tunisia’s high rate of fighters implies a high may also help to explain the paradox that rate of support for IS, rather than an easier is Tunisia: how a country that produced ability to travel. And yet, while support for thousands of jihadists can at the same time Baghdadi may have been expected given lead the Arab world on women’s rights. the number of foreign fighters, the extent of These survey results have several his support in Tunisia—far above any other implications for policymakers. They religious figure named in the survey—is suggest that the Grand Mufti may carry surprising and normatively troubling. the credibility to sway public opinion on This support for Baghdadi may also religious matters, at least to a certain be influencing some Tunisians’ relative degree. The mufti could therefore be an While some Tunisians openness to returning foreign fighters. important political player not only for equal appear to support jihad According to the 2018 Afrobarometer inheritance but perhaps also for other abroad, they do not survey, 30 percent of Tunisians would prefer priorities of the Tunisian state, such as returnees to be rehabilitated (27) or left countering violent extremism (CVE). Training support it in their alone (3), allowing their reintegration into state imams to advance counter narratives, own backyard. society.9 For a sizable minority of Tunisians, for instance, may therefore be an effective fighting for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria approach. It is unclear, however, whether does not warrant punishment or even a trial. playing a more overt role in CVE would make On the other hand, while some Tunisians state authorities be seen as (even) more appear to support jihad abroad, they do not political than they already are, and whether support it in their own backyard. Two Salafi- that would affect their credibility. jihadist figures operating in Tunisia—Salafi The relatively high support for the sheikh Khatib al-Idrissi and Ansar al-Sharia Islamic State, however, suggests that Tunisia leader Abu Iyadh—saw the lowest levels of still has much work to do to counter and support of any religious figure. Indeed, they prevent violent extremism. Tunisia and its saw strong negative endorsement effects, international partners should continue to decreasing support for a statement by 0.2- invest in preventing and countering violent 0.5 points (out of 5) when their names were extremism (P/CVE) programs to help stem associated with it. Whether in the direct or this ideology, and promote alternative indirect questions, these Tunisian Salafi- narratives to channel grievances into more jihadi figures performed the worst of all 13 peaceful pathways. Moreover, as foreign religious figures named in the survey. In fighters return to Tunisia, the state should short, while Tunisia may send thousands prioritize de-radicalization and rehabilitation of fighters abroad, there appears to be very programs to help prevent a potential future little support for violent or extremist figures flow of fighters. back home.

ENDNOTES IMPLICATIONS 1. See Marc Daou, “Égalité devant The answer to the question of who speaks l’héritage : le débat enfle en Tunisie, les for Islam in Tunisia is fairly surprising. While religieux s’en mêlent,” France 24, August Ennahdha may dominate the political scene, 18, 2017, https://www.france24.com/ matters of religion appear to be swayed fr/20170817-tunisie-egalite-femmes- more by state religious authorities and, more droits-heritage-debat-essebsi-mariage- troublingly, by the Islamic State. Indeed, it is ennahda. The grand mufti reversed his possible that Ennahdha’s declining religious position one year later when the bill was authority may have contributed to support sent to the parliament. for both of these extremes. As the center of 3 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.16.19

2. See https://bit.ly/2WfoqXT. 3. See https://bit.ly/2HwekOX. AUTHOR 4. See Sharan Grewal, Where are Sharan Grewal is a postdoctoral research Ennahdha’s Competitors? Issue brief no. fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy 04.26.18, Rice University’s Baker Institute for at the Brookings Institution. His research Public Policy, Houston, Texas, https://www. examines democratization, security studies, bakerinstitute.org/files/12873/. and political Islam in the Arab world, 5. See Ennahdha Movement, “Final especially Egypt and Tunisia. This report is part of statement of the 21st session of the Shura Council,” August 26, 2018, https://bit. a two-year project on ly/2MZqAKf. religious authority in 6. Sharan Grewal, “Can Tunisia find the Middle East. a compromise on equal inheritance,” The study is generously Brookings Institution (blog), September 25, supported by a grant 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ order-from-chaos/2018/09/25/can- from the Henry Luce tunisia-find-a-compromise-on-equal- Foundation. inheritance/. 7. See https://goo.gl/7dEJDC. In January 2019, however, Battikh claimed that he was continuing to study the matter. See also https://www.realites.com.tn/2019/01/ egalite-successorale-le-dialogue-doit-se- poursuivre-selon-othmane-battikh/. 8. Aaron Y. Zelin, Tunisian Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria, Policy Notes 55 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute See more issue briefs at: for Near East Policy, 2018), https:// www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/ Documents/pubs/PolicyNote55-Zelin.pdf. This publication was written by a researcher (or researchers) who 9. See Q83 in Afrobarometer, “Summary participated in a Baker Institute project. of Results for Tunisia, 2018,” http:// Wherever feasible, this research is afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/ reviewed by outside experts before it is publications/Summary%20of%20results/ released. However, the views expressed tun_r7_sor_eng.pdf. herein are those of the individual author(s), and do not necessarily represent the views of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

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Cite as: Grewal, Sharan. 2019. Who Speaks for Islam in Tunisia? Issue brief no. 05.16.19. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas.