Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the New Legislation
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University of California, Hastings College of the Law UC Hastings Scholarship Repository Faculty Scholarship 2019 The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the New Legislation Manoj Viswanathan UC Hastings College of the Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship Recommended Citation Manoj Viswanathan, The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the New Legislation, 103 Minn. L. Rev. 1439 (2019). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1742 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Article The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax Legislation David Kamin, David Gamage, Ari Glogower, Rebecca Kysar, Darien Shanske, Reuven Avi- Yonah, Lily Batchelder, J. Clifton Fleming, Daniel Hemel, Mitchell Kane, David Miller, Daniel Shaviro, & Manoj Viswanathan† Introduction ........................................................................... 1441 I. Using Corporations as Tax Shelters ............................... 1445 A. The Two-Step Game for Sheltering Income Through a Corporation .............................................. 1446 † The complete list of authors with affiliations is as follows: David Kamin, Professor of Law, NYU School of Law; David Gamage, Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; Ari Glogower, Assistant Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law; Rebecca Kysar, Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Darien Shanske, Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law; Reuven Avi-Yonah, Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, Uni- versity of Michigan Law School; Lily Batchelder, Frederick I. and Grace Stokes Professor of Law, NYU School of Law; J. Clifton Fleming, Ernest L. Wilkinson Chair and Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young Uni- versity; Daniel Hemel, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School; Mitchell Kane, Gerald L. Wallace Professor of Taxation, NYU School of Law; David Miller, Partner, Proskauer Rose, LLP; Daniel Shaviro, Wayne Perry Professor of Taxation, NYU School of Law; & Manoj Viswanathan, Associate Professor of Law, UC Hastings College of the Law. David Kamin is the primary organizer for this project and is thus listed as the first author. The other primary drafters are listed next in alphabetical or- der—David Gamage, Ari Glogower, Rebecca Kysar, and Darien Shanske—fol- lowed by the remaining authors, also listed in alphabetical order. Beyond the listed authors, this article reflects insights from many other tax scholars, practitioners, and analysts, as acknowledged in the footnotes to the text. All errors are our own. Copyright © 2019 by David Kamin, David Gamage, Ari Glogower, Rebecca Kysar, Darien Shanske, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Lily Batchelder, J. Clifton Fleming, Daniel Hemel, Mitchell Kane, David Miller, Daniel Shaviro, and Manoj Viswanathan. 1439 1440 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1439 1. Why the Two-Steps: A Game of Rates ................ 1447 2. How to Defer or Eliminate the Second Individual Layer of Tax ....................................... 1448 3. Current Anti-Abuse Rules Are Insufficient ........ 1450 B. Examples of Tax Gaming Using Corporations ......... 1450 1. Investing Through a Corporation ....................... 1451 2. Transforming Labor Income into Corporate Profits ................................................................... 1452 3. Gaming by Shareholder-Employees in a Closely Held Corporation .................................... 1454 4. Section 962 Election ............................................ 1454 C. Reform Possibilities ................................................... 1457 1. Partial Reforms ................................................... 1457 2. Fundamental Reforms ......................................... 1458 II. The Faulty Pass-Through Deduction .............................. 1459 A. Tax Games to Qualify for the Pass-Through Deduction ................................................................... 1462 1. Becoming a Non-Employee ................................. 1463 2. Becoming a Favored Business Through “Cracking” and “Packing” .................................... 1465 a. “Cracking” ...................................................... 1465 b. “Packing” ........................................................ 1468 3. Not Being in One of the Listed Categories ......... 1469 a. Gaming “Reputation or Skill” ....................... 1469 b. Gaming the Other Listed Categories ........... 1471 4. Unprofitably Stuffing Property into the Business ............................................................... 1472 B. Reform Possibilities ................................................... 1473 III. State Government Responses to the SALT Deduction Cap ................................................................................... 1474 A. Increased Use of Charitable Gifts ............................. 1477 B. Increased Use of Payroll Taxes ................................. 1481 C. Increased Taxation of Pass-Through Businesses ..... 1483 D. Reform Possibilities ................................................... 1486 IV. International Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches ............ 1488 A. Problems with the GILTI Regime ............................. 1490 1. Implications of a Global Minimum Tax .............. 1490 2. The Deemed Ten Percent Return ....................... 1493 3. Reform Possibilities ............................................. 1495 B. Problems with the FDII Regime ............................... 1498 1. WTO Violations ................................................... 1499 2. Gaming Involving Round-Tripping Transactions ........................................................ 1503 3. Other Perverse Incentives ................................... 1504 2019] THE GAMES THEY WILL PLAY 1441 4. Reform Possibilities ............................................. 1505 C. Problems with the BEAT Regime ............................. 1507 1. The Cost of Goods Sold Game ............................. 1508 2. Matters of Thresholds ......................................... 1508 3. International Law Issues .................................... 1509 4. Taxpayer Unfriendly Glitches............................. 1512 5. Reform Possibilities ............................................. 1513 D. Tax Competition ........................................................ 1514 V. Other Technical Problems ............................................... 1515 A. Other Games .............................................................. 1515 1. Circumventing the Interest Limitation .............. 1515 2. Circumventing the Limitations on Deducting Executive Compensation ..................................... 1518 B. Miscellaneous Itemized Deduction Glitches ............. 1519 Conclusion .............................................................................. 1520 INTRODUCTION In the final months of 2017, Congress enacted the most ex- pansive tax legislation in decades,1 with sweeping changes to the rules for taxing individuals and business, the deductibility of state and local taxes, and the international tax regime. The tax legislation2 was drafted and passed quickly through a rushed 1. See H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); Samuel A. Donaldson, Under- standing the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 1 (Ga. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Legal Stud- ies Research Paper No. 2018-07, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers .cfm?abstract_id=3096078 (“[This] represents the most dramatic change to the Internal Revenue Code since passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Whereas the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was the product of years of bi- partisan negotiation, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was the product of a deeply partisan and largely closed-door process.”). For further discussion of extensive negotiations and deliberations resulting in the Tax Reform of 1986, see, for example, JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UN- LIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Leg- islation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1990). 2. Throughout this Article, we refer to the new legislation as the “2017 tax legislation,” or as just the “tax legislation.” The full name of the legislation had been the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” (TCJA), and many commentators continue to refer to the legislation by this name. However, the Senate parliamentarian ruled that this name was non-germane, resulting in the name being removed from the legislation. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Budget, Parlia- mentarian Determines Three Provisions in Republican Tax Bill Are Impermis- sible (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.budget.senate.gov/ranking-member/ newsroom/press/parliamentarian-determines-three-provisions-in-republican -tax-bill-are-impermissible. For further explanation, see Daniel Shaviro, The 1442 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1439 process,3 denying legislators and the public sufficient time to an- alyze the provisions of the legislation—many of which are highly complex. This Article is an effort to supply the analysis and delibera- tion that should have