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Mohammed M. Hafez MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XXV, NO. 2, SUMMER 2018 FRATRICIDAL JIHADISTS: WHY ISLAMISTS KEEP LOSING THEIR CIVIL WARS Mohammed M. Hafez Dr. Hafez is an associate professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.* hy do Islamists kill each impiety. By doing so, they amalgamate other? In the last three their disparate enemies into a single united decades, Islamist rebels camp. enmeshed in civil wars have Second, fratricidal jihadists pursue Wdescended into internecine conflicts that transformative goals that are too ambitious divided their ranks, alienated their sup- for rebels with limited imaginations. Their porters, and cost them their bid for power. doctrinaire ideology sacrifices all political From the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, realism, making them suspicious of kin- to al-Qaeda in Iraq, to the Islamic State, dred groups that might sell them out in the each of these movements had perfect op- name of pragmatism. They prefer to wipe portunities to topple their regimes. Yet, in out their rivals than compete with them the midst of civil wars, they turned their through political strategies. guns on fellow rebels, choosing to pursue Third, fratricidal jihadists usually begin hegemonic leadership over coalition unity. as extreme factions that indiscriminately In fact, they assisted incumbent elites in target civilians in their wars against a re- crisis by handing them the perfect oppor- gime. Their ideological justifications gener- tunity to divide and conquer their move- ate a permissive moral code that allows for ments. What explains this self-defeating the killing of their own brothers in arms. behavior? Those who willfully justify the wanton kill- Fratricidal jihadists share three unique ing of innocents will not find it difficult to characteristics — or flaws — that make turn their guns on fellow rebels who violate them prone to internecine wars. First, they their notions of ideological purity. frame their civil conflicts along Manichean Underpinning these recurrent strategic lines, reducing the complexity of adver- errors is a puritanical ideology impervious sarial relations into categories of us versus to accommodation with alternative world- them, good versus evil, Islam versus views. Jihadists often operate alongside * The author wishes to thank Paul Cruickshank, Michael Gabbay, Emily Gade, Glenn Robinson, Zachary Shore, and Craig Whiteside for their constructive feedback and invaluable insights. They have informed this piece tremendously. © 2018, The Author Middle East Policy © 2018, Middle East Policy Council 86 HAFEZ: FRATRICIDAL JIHADISTS militant factions that share some of their as it rebuilt its ranks in Iraq following the objectives but do not embrace their politi- precipitous decline of its predecessor, the cal ideals. They cannot even bring them- Islamic State in Iraq. Rather than seeking selves to compromise with groups that to forge unity with Syria’s Islamist fac- share their political ideals but diverge with tions, it went its own way, by declaring a them on tactical pragmatism. Their puri- caliphate and waging war on fellow rebels. tanical ideology is also a major obstacle Today, it has lost the territory it once held to strategic learning and adaption. They in Iraq and is all but finished in Syria.1 appear to be incapable of internalizing These three movements were well lessons from past failures, as evident from positioned to make gains against their their proclivity to repeat mistakes even regimes. At a minimum, they could have after being cautioned by veterans of earlier avoided the precipitous downfall they conflicts. These inherent weaknesses of- suffered at the hands of their adversaries, fer the international community strategic had they not turned their guns on fel- lessons for fighting future iterations of the low rebels. Yet, in the midst of their civil Islamic State. wars, they prioritized fighting with rivals above winning conflicts. In the process, THE PUZZLE they alienated their supporters, fragmented In the last three decades, Islamist their movements and drove away external rebels have snatched defeat from the jaws sponsors. More puzzlingly, they did not of victory on three major fronts. Dur- heed the warnings of veteran jihadists who ing the 1990s, the Armed Islamic Group communicated their concerns directly and (Groupe Islamique Armé, GIA) saw the clearly. Algerian government mired in a legitimacy Take, for example, how al-Qaeda lead- crisis after a military coup ended a popular ers sought to warn Abu Musab al-Zarqawi electoral process. Rather than capitalize in Iraq, using the case of Algeria as a on the regime’s internal vulnerabilities and cautionary tale. Atiyah Abdul Rahman, international isolation, the GIA embarked senior Libyan operational planner within on a fratricidal war with rival Islamists al-Qaeda’s top leadership (killed in Paki- and alienated its supporters through mass stan by a U.S. drone attack in 2011), sent a atrocities. It lost the war and took down the letter to al-Zarqawi before he was killed by entire Islamist project with it. a U.S. airstrike in 2006: In the 2000s, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other Sunni insurgents had the Ameri- Ask me whatever you like about can-led coalition in a bind as the latter des- Algeria between 1994 and 1995, when perately sought a way out of a quagmire. [the Islamist movement] was at the Yet, like the GIA, AQI turned its guns on height of its power and capabilities, and was on the verge of taking over fellow rebels and sought to monopolize the government. … I lived through it power at the expense of unity. Afterward, it myself, and I saw firsthand; no one was routed by the Sunni communities that told me about it. … [GIA militants] once hosted its fighters. destroyed themselves with their own The Islamic State is the latest jihadist hands, with their lack of reason, delu- group to fall victim to its own predation. It sions, and neglect and alienation of failed to learn the lessons of earlier jihads people through oppression, deviance, 87 MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XXV, NO. 2, SUMMER 2018 and harsh conduct. … Their enemy ROLE OF IDEOLOGY did not defeat them, but rather they Extreme violence in rebel movements defeated themselves.2 can be driven by strategic considerations such as competition for territory, resources A few years later, Osama bin Laden, or leadership within the rebel hierarchy.8 concerned with growing infighting be- But not all rebel groups are equally prone tween AQI and Sunni insurgents, sent an to pursue their strategic aims by killing audiotaped “Message to Our People in their rivals. Some compete for power by Iraq,” in which he urged all the insurgents forging balancing alliances,9 outbidding and tribes to reconcile their differences others10 or spoiling the efforts of rivals to and acknowledge that “errors” had been strike a deal with the regime.11 Only the 3 made. He advised his followers to avoid most ideologically extreme factions — the “fanatical loyalty to men” and reminded ones that advance Manichean worldviews, them that what unites Muslims is their transformative goals and indiscriminate adherence to Islam, not their “belonging violence — are willing to initiate rebel to a tribe, homeland, or organization.” Yet, fratricide. the future leaders of the Islamic State, the Several cognitive and organizational successors of AQI, practiced exactly what mechanisms can help explain why ideo- 4 he cautioned against. logical extremists cannot compromise One of the most notable early critics with rival groups. Puritanical individuals of puritanical groups (i.e., jihadi Salafists) are more attuned to ideological differ- was Abu Musab al-Suri, who criticized ences than political centrists and are prone them for their lack of strategic thought or to “belief superiority,” associated with a revolutionary theory. He railed against the tendency toward “non-corruptibility.”12 “inflexible dogmatism and narrow-minded- People with extreme beliefs also exhibit 5 ness” of Salafists. One may fault his fierce a greater need for certainty than centrists, independence and lack of deep roots in and a high level of uncertainty is associ- traditional Salafism for contributing to his ated with a high sense of threat.13 Addi- failure to influence jihadists, but the same tionally, persons with conservative world- cannot be said of other radical authorities views, which would include Islamists, tend who issued clarion warnings similar to al- to be more dogmatic than those with more Suri’s. For example, Abu Muhammad al- liberal views.14 Furthermore, ideologically Maqdisi, perhaps the leading jihadi Salafist extreme groups are likely to associate with authority, also sought to warn al-Zarqawi, other extremists, leading to an ideological 6 his former disciple. Similarly, Abdelmalek encapsulation that shuts out the counter- Droukdel, the leader of al-Qaeda in the vailing voices necessary to learning and Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), articulated in adapting.15 Lastly, extremist leaders with writing the strategic errors that should be utopian projects can more easily rational- avoided by the jihadists who captured vast ize violence against those who appear to territory in northeast Mali in 2012. Based stand in the way of their revolutionary on his Algerian experience, he warned objectives.16 against the premature establishment of an The three cases of fratricidal Islamists Islamic state, extreme application of sharia in Algeria, Iraq and Syria highlight how 7 law and fighting with other factions. ideological extremism contributes to 88 HAFEZ: FRATRICIDAL JIHADISTS movement fragmentation, internecine on total war to establish an Islamic state. fighting and, ultimately, defeat. In each Confronted with the possibility of losing case, polarizing narratives, transformative leadership, the FIS put forward the AIS as goals and indiscriminate violence directly an alternative to the GIA in July 1994.17 contributed to strife with other Islamist The AIS wanted to restore the pre-war groups and, ultimately, to fratricidal equilibrium in which radicals were sub- bloodletting.
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